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ABSTRACT
One of the economic reforms started in the People’s Republic of China since 1979 is to enhance 
the productivity and profitability of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which still accounted 
for over 40% of the National Industrial Output and over 60% of the working population in 1996. 
However, over one-third of all the SOEs in China have incurred financial losses since the early 
1990s and how to revive their efficiency and profitability has become one of the most important 
work plans for the Chinese government in recent years.
In July 1992, the State Council of China implemented the “Regulations for State-Owned Industrial 
Enterprises Operation Mechanisms Transformation” whose major aim is to delegate more 
autonomy to the SOEs to ensure that they are self-financed, self-managed, self-regulated and self­
developed. In addition, the promulgation of the “Socialist Market Economy” by the 14th 
People’s Congress held in October 1992 would make the SOEs more market driven in planning, 
operation and control. Furthermore, in the same year more SOEs on a selective basis were 
allowed by the central government to be transformed into “Shareholding Enterprises” where 
boards of directors have been empowered by the authorities to manage their own businesses.
The focus of this doctoral research is to study the actual impact of the above legislation, economic 
and ownership changes on “Responsibility Accounting” which is the most widely used 
management accounting technique employed by the large- and medium-sized SOEs in China since 
1987. The non-existence of systematic empirical research on this management accounting aspect 
in China justifies the use of an “Exploratory Case Study” approach to investigate a sample of 20 
SOEs through repeated interviews over a period from 1991 to 1995. This type of longitudinal 
field study has verified that there have been significant changes in the responsibility accounting 
styles and the associated planning and control systems in these 20 SOEs before and after 1992. 
Further minor variables or factors have also been identified to explain these changes.
This research provides observations, findings and comparisons with the literature which can 
generate ideas and hypotheses on many aspects related to the responsibility (management) 
accounting development in China which can be subject to rigorous empirical testing by the 
researcher and other academics or practitioners in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Professor Clive R. Emmanuel for his excellent academic 
guidance, generous comments, and perpetual support all through the period of the research.
I am thankful to the Department Doctoral Committee and other staff members at the department 
for their continued constructive criticisms and encouragement.
The financial support provided by The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and the British Council 
is most appreciated.
Special thanks to my colleagues and friends in the People’s University in Beijing, the Shanghai 
University of Finance and Economics, the Xiamen University, and the Jinan University in 
Guangzhou, for helping me to visit over 20 enterprises in China repeatedly over a period of 4 
years.
Last but not least, I deeply indebted to my wife, Amy, for her compassion and for her patience 
to look after our two children during my absence from home when this research took precedence 
over important family duties.
DECLARATION
I declare that this thesis has been composed by me and all work reported in it is my own. The 
works of other researchers and authors are cited and referenced throughout the thesis.
Yau Shiu Wing Joseph 
Hong Kong 
April 1998
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(VOLUME 1)
Page
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................. i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................... ii
DECLARATION........................................................................................................  iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................  iv
ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS OF TERMS............................................. x
LIST OF SOES INVESTIGATED xii
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH........................................................  1
1.1.1 Economic Reform............................................................................  1
1.1.2 Accounting Reform..........................................................................  1
1.1.3 Responsibility Accounting................................................................ 3
1.1.4 Environmental Problems................................................................... 3
1.2 FACTORS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM............................................  8
1.2.1 General Factors/Variables................................................................ 8
1.2.2 Specific Factors/Variables............................................................... 16
1.2.3 Long-Term Factors/Variables.........................................................  29
1.3 DEFINITION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.......................................  38
1.4 RESEARCH MODEL.................................................................................... 38
1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES........................................................................  38
1.5.1 Primary Hypothesis.......................................................................... 39
1.5.2 Secondary Hypotheses.....................................................................  39
1.5.3 Purposes of the Hypotheses............................................................  40
1.6 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK.......................................................................  41
1.6.1 Planning System/Influence..............................................................  41
1.6.2 Control System/Influence...............................................................  45
1.6.3 Responsibility Accounting Styles....................................................  48
1.7 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE......................................................................  50
1.8 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.........................................  51
1.8.1 Tripartite Link.................................................................................  51
1.8.2 PhD Programme.............................................................................. 52
1.8.3 Research Design.............................................................................. 53
1.8.4 Research Methodology...................................................................  54
1.9 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS.......................................................................  55
1.10 RESEARCH THESIS OUTLINE.................................................................  59
1.11 CONCLUSION............................................................................................  60
iv
CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW Page
2.1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................  61
PART A : WESTERN COUNTRIES
2.2 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST .... 62
2.2.1 Definitions of Management Accounting......................................... 62
2.2.2 Historical Development of Management Accounting..................... 63
2.2.3 Contemporary Issues of Management Accounting.........................  63
2.3 RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING IN THE WEST................................  65
2.4 ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES..............................................................  67
2.4.1 Decentralization and Coordination.................................................  67
2.4.2 Participation in Management..........................................................  69
2.4.3 Participation in Budgeting..............................................................  70
2.4.4 Participation and Job Satisfaction................................................... 72
2.5 CONTROL SYSTEMS................................................................................  73
2.5.1 Control Systems in Organizations  ................................................  73
2.5.2 Controllability in Control Systems..................................................  75
2.5.3 Environment and Control Systems..................................................  78
2.5.4 Interdependence in Control Systems...............................................  80
2.6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT..........................................................  83
2.6.1 Accounting Measurement...............................................................  83
2.6.2 A Measurement Model.................................................................... 84
2.7 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL & REWARDS.........................................  85
2.7.1 Performance Appraisal....................................................................  85
2.7.2 Allocation of Rewards.....................................................................  86
2.8 CONTINGENCY THEORY........................................................................  90
2.8.1 Relevant Contingent Variables........................................................  90
2.8.2 Impacts on Accounting and Control................................................ 91
2.8.3 Contingency Theory & Management Accounting in China............. 92
2.9 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING & CULTURE........................................  95
2.9.1 Effects on Accounting.....................................................................  95
2.9.2 Cross-Country Analysis...................................................................  96
2.9.3 Management Accounting & Culture in China..................................  97
2.10 AN OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING............................ 99
2.10.1 Traditional Approaches....................................................................  99
2.10.2 New Working Environment.............................................................  100
2.10.3 Research...........................................................................................  101
PART B : PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
2.11 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & OPEN DOOR POLICY......................... 102
2.12 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY.................  103
2.13 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA  105
2.13.1 Early Development (1949-1978)..................................................... 105
2.13.2 Further Development (1979-1989).................................................. 106
2.13.3 Recent Development (1990-1996).................................................. 108
2.14 RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA  109
2.14.1 Establishing Responsibility Centres..................................................  109
2.14.2 Targets Setting.................................................................................  109
v
Page
2.14.3 Internal Transactions......................................................................... 109
2.14.4 Performance Evaluation...................................................................  110
2.14.5 Conclusion........................................................................................  110
2.15 PROBLEMS OF RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING IN CHINA  110
2.15.1 Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) System..........................  I l l
2.15.2 Shareholding System.......................................................................  114
2.15.3 Market Discipline............................................................................. 115
2.15.4 Big Rice P o t.....................................................................................  116
2.15.5 Computer Applications....................................................................  117
2.15.6 Management Knowledge.................................................................  118
2.16 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 119
CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... 120
3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGMS.......................................................................... 120
3.2.1 Social Science Research Paradigms.................................................. 120
3.2.2 Scientific & Naturalistic Research.................................................... 124
3.2.3 Case Study Approach......................................................................  126
3.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE METHODOLOGY........................................ 129
3 .4 RESEARCH PROCEDURES......................................................................  132
3.4.1 Literature Review............................................................................  132
3.4.2 Preliminary Case Study....................................................................  133
3.4.3 Pilot Test..........................................................................................  133
3.4.4 Research Design..............................................................................  133
3.4.5 Sample Selection.............................................................................  134
3.4.6 Data Collection Instrument Design.................................................  136
3.4.7 Data Collection................................................................................  137
3.4.8 Data Analyses..................................................................................  139
3.4.9 Case Analyses.......................... ........................................................ 141
3.4.10 Thesis Writing.................................................................................  142
3.5 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................  143
CHAPTER 4 : ANALYSIS OF DATA I : ENTERPRISES INFORMATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................  144
4.2 BACKGROUND OF SUBJECTS................................................................  144
4.2.1 Nature of Business........................................................................... 144
4.2.2 Ownership.......................................................................................  146
4.2.3 Total Assets......................................................................................  148
4.3 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE...................................................................  150
4.3.1 Turnover........................................................................................... 150
4.3.2 Profitability......................................................................................  151
Page
4.4 ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACT SYSTEM (ERCS)...........  152
4.4.1 ERC Periods.....................................................................................  152
4.4.2 ERC Targets.....................................................................................  153
4.4.3 ERC Replacement............................................................................ 154
4.5 SUMMARY................................................................................................... 155
CHAPTER 5 : ANALYSIS OF DATA H : PLANNING INFLUENCE
5.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................  157
5.1 ORGANISATION STRUCTURE...............................................................  164
5.1.1 Responsibility Centre......................................................................  166
5.1.2 Decentralisation..............................................................................  168
5.1.3 Appointment.................................................................................... 169
5.1.4 Interdependencies...........................................................................  171
5.2 REVIEW PROCESS.................................................................................... 172
5.2.1 Central Planning.............................................................................  174
5.2.2 Operation........................................................................................ 175
5.2.3 Participation...................................................................................  177
5.2.4 Review & Communication............................................................  178
5.3 STRATEGIC THEMES, THRUSTS & SUGGESTIONS.........................  180
5.3.1 Themes........................................................................................... 182
5.3.2 Thrusts............................................................................................ 183
5.3.3 Suggestions..................................................................................... 185
5.4 LONG-TERM PLANS................................................................................. 187
5.4.1 Central Planning.............................................................................  189
5.4.2 Operation........................................................................................ 190
5.4.3 Participation...................................................................................  192
5.4.4 Review & Communication.............................................................  193
5 .5 SHORT-TERM PLANS/BUDGETS...........................................................  194
5.5.1 Central Planning.............................................................................  196
5.5.2 Operation.........................................................................................  197
5.5.3 Participation....................................................................................  198
5.5.4 Review & Communication.............................................................  200
5.6 INTERNAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS........................................  201
5.6.1 Target Bias.....................................................................................  203
5.6.2 Participation...................................................................................  205
5.6.3 Review & Communication.............................................................  208
5.6.4 Incentive..........................................................................................  210
5.7 MANAGEMENT OF INTERDEPENDENCIES (TRANSFER PRICING) 212
5.7.1 Characteristics..................................................................................  213
5.7.2 Participation.....................................................................................  218
5.7.3 Review.............................................................................................  220
5.8 SUMMARY..................................................................................................  221
CHAPTER 6 : ANALYSIS OF DATA H I: CONTROL INFLUENCE
Page
6.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................  233
6.1 DECENTRALISATION & CONTROL.......................................................  237
6.1.1 Organisational Design....................................................................... 239
6.1.2 Personnel..........................................................................................  241
6.1.3 Control Mechanism........................................................................... 243
6.2 AGREEING OBJECTIVES.......................................................................... 245
6.3 MONITORING RESULTS........................................................................... 248
6.3.1 Reporting Requirements...................................................................  250
6.3.2 Performance Measurement...............................................................  252
6.3.3 Review & Communication...............................................................  253
6.4 REWARDS & INCENTIVES....................................................................... 255
6.4.1 Incentives.........................................................................................  257
6.4.2 Performance Orientation..................................................................  262
6.4.3 Participation.....................................................................................  263
6.4.4 Review & Communication...............................................................  263
6.5 SUMMARY...................................................................................................  264
CHAPTER 7 : FINDINGS -  CASE STUDY RESULTS
7.1 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................  272
7.2 SUMMARY OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES......................  273
7.2.1 Planning Influences........................................................................... 273
7.2.2 Control Influences............................................................................. 274
7.2.3 Planning & Control Scores Summary................................................. 275
7.3 RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING STYLES............................................. 276
7.4 HYPOTHESES TESTING............................................................................ 280
7.4.1 All 20 SOEs......................................................................................  282
7.4.2 Wholly SOEs to Wholly SOEs.......................................................... 283
7.4.3 Wholly SOEs to Shareholding SOEs..............................................  284
7.4.4 Geographical Locations...................................................................  286
7.4.5 Industrial Differences........................................................................ 290
7.5 MATRIX ANALYSIS.................................................................................. 296
7.5.1 Planning & Control Influences Analysis by Ownership & Location 297
7.5.2 Planning & Control Influences Analysis by Ownership & Industry 299
7.5.3 Planning & Control Influences Analysis by Ownership/Industry/
Location...........................................................................................  301
7.5.4 Responsibility Accounting Style Analysis by Ownership/Industry/ 
Location...........................................................................................  303
7.6 SUMMARY................................................................................................... 306
CHAPTER 8 : SUMMARY & CONCLUSION Page
8.1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................  312
8.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH....................................................... 312
8.3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS...................................  314
8.3.1 Planning System & Influence......................................................... 314
8.3.2 Control System & Influence...........................................................  315
8.3.3 Responsibility Accounting Style..................................................... 315
8.3.4 Hypotheses Testing.......................................................................  315
8.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH..................................................... 317
8.4.1 Contingency Model.......................................................................  317
8.4.2 Specific Contributions...................................................................  317
8.4.3 General Contributions...................................................................  318
8.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH....................................................  319
8.6 FUTURE RESEARCH...............................................................................  320
8.7 RECOMMENDATIONS.......................  324
8.7.1 SOE Reforms................................................................................. 324
8.7.2 Responsibility (Management) Accounting Reforms......................  326
8.8 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH........................................................... 328
8.9 CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 331
APPENDICES
(1) TABLES.....................................................................................................  332
(2) CHARTS....................................................................................................  361
(3) FIGURES...................................................................................................  388
(4) WORKINGS............................................................................................... 390
BIBLIOGRAPHY 412
(VOLUME 2)
20 Case Analyses Reports 1-502
Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Interviews 503-538
(VOLUME 3)
20 Data Analyses Reports 1-651
Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Interviews 652-687
(Chapters 1-8 of this thesis contain 99,622 words.)
ix
ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
Abbreviations Terms Definitions/Descriptions
AAA American Accounting Association See Section 2.2.1
ABC Activity-Based Costing See Section 2.2.3
AGM Annual General Meeting Held by the shareholding enterprises
AIS Accounting Information System Usually refers to responsibility 
accounting system in China
AMT Automated Manufacturing 
Technology
See Section 2.10.2
ASC Accounting Society of China The largest professional accounting 
institution in China
BOD Board Of Directors Required by Company Law (1994) 
for shareholding SOEs
CEO Chief Executive Officer General/Factory manager of a SOE
CICPA Chinese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
The only CPA body in China 
regulated by the MOF
CIMA Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants
Headquarters in London with two 
liaison offices in China
CMA Certified Management Accountant Refers to the management 
accounting professional bodies in 
Canada & US
ERC Economic Responsibility Contract See Section 2.15.1
FMS Flexible Manufacturing System See Section 2.10.2
HKPU Hong Kong Polytechnic University The researcher is an assistant 
professor of HKPU
GAAP General Acceptable Accounting 
Practice
Refers to the 30 PRC Accounting 
Standards to be used in 2000
GDP Gross Domestic Products An important economic measure in 
China especially in national planning
GM General Manager Usually the CEO in the shareholding 
SOEs
IRC Internal Responsibility Contract See Section 2.14
X
Abbreviations Terms Definitions/Descriptions
JIT Just-In-Time See Section 2.10.2
LANS Local Area Network System See Section 2.15.5
MA Management Accounting See Section 2.2.1
MAS Management Accounting System Emerging accounting control system 
in China
MOF Ministry Of Finance The ultimate governing authority of 
the accountancy profession in China
MRP Material Requirement Planning See Section 2.10.2
NIO National Industrial Output Measurement of the manufacturing 
output in China
PBT Profit Before Tax Profit after sales or value-added tax 
but before income tax
PRC People’s Republic of China Founded on 1 October 1949
RA Responsibility Accounting See Section 2.3
RMB Ren Min Bi China monetary currency unit
SOE State-Owned Enterprises Enterprise’s assets are owned by the 
central government or all the people
SSAP Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practices
Equivalent to the GAAP
SUFE Shanghai University of Finance 
and Economics
One of the top accounting and 
finance institutions in the PRC
UOG University of Glasgow The owner of this thesis
LIST OF SOES INVESTIGATED
Enterprise Numbers/Codes/Names
EN* ECU Enterprise Names Employees®,
01 SSW5 Shanghai No. 5 Iron & Steel Works 23,000
02 XFLT Xiamen Fork Lift Truck Plant 1,100
03 GFDS Guangzhou Friendship Department Store 2,300
04 GDDS Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store 950
05 BEEF Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory 600
06 SMCW Shanghai Measuring & Cutting Tool Instruments Factory 1,550
07 GNFF Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill 940
08 GNFB Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Ltd. 4,000
09 BCRF Beijing Chushu Rectifier Factory 970
10 BIMT Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works 1,250
11 SDS1 Shanghai No. 1 Department Store 4,500
12 SCCW Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works 2,470
13 SMEF Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment Factory 5,000
14 SCM2 Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill 4,860
15 SXSW Shanghai Xinhua Iron & Steel Works 5,600
16 GLIL Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. 1,450
17 XLIG Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company 540
18 BCM3 Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill 8,000
19 BFSH Beijing Friendship Hotel 3,800
20 BPMH Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. 2,800
* EN = Enterprise numbers in sequence of writing the 20 Case Analyses and 20 Data Analyses 
as shown in Volume 2 and Volume 3 respectively of the research documentation.
# EC = Enterprise Codes (i.e. enterprise names in short form).
@ Numbers of Employees at the end of 1994.
Ch. 1 : Introduction
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
1.1.1 Economic Reform
After the ten years of “Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976), the year of 1978 was a critical turning 
point in China’s history. The top leaders of China firmly decided to re-open the doors to the 
outside world and started an unprecedented and ambitious reform. In December 1978, at the 
Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a 
series of economic campaigns were announced mainly to enhance the productivity and profitability 
in the “State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)”.
Public ownership is one of the major characteristics of a socialist system. Public ownership is 
represented by SOEs whose assets are owned by the central government or all the people in China 
(Chow, Cooper & Tang 1993). SOEs consist of both commercial and industrial entities which 
produce goods or provide services in accordance with the central economic planning system 
started in the 1950s. The Industrial SOEs and Commercial SOEs accounted for 68.7% of the 
National Industrial Output and 39.4% of the Total Retail Sales Value respectively in 1986 (Cheng 
1989: 252). The national economic plan mainly focused on the productivity in the SOEs without 
due regard to market demand, product quality and diversification, labour efficiency and, most 
important of all, the profitability of the businesses. Furthermore, remuneration to both 
managements and workers were not in line with the group or individual performances, therefore, 
self-motivation and initiative did not exist at all.
1.1.2 Accounting Reform
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese accounting 
systems mainly adopted the Soviet Union’s models such as the industrial, agricultural and 
metallurgical accounting systems. The traditional accounting practices were influenced by the 
information needs of a planned economy and rest heavily on stewardship objectives. Some
1
Ch. 1 : Introduction
notable features are a standardised system with a uniform chart of accounts, a fund-oriented 
source, and application-type balance sheet, a somewhat conventional income statement and 
numerous analytical supplementary schedules (Winkle et al 1994). In parallel with the open-door 
policies, the accounting theories and practices of the western world have been gradually employed 
by the SOEs. However, the indiscriminate introduction of the western accounting practices 
caused many Chinese accountants to feel more confused than enlightened. They realised that 
blindly copying the accounting systems used in other countries could hardly solve the problems 
in China. The Chinese accounting practitioners and academics began to evaluate the situation in 
order to develop an accounting structure and methodology geared to Chinese socio-economic 
objectives (Chow, Cooper & Tang 1994).
There are a growing number of articles addressing the differences in accounting practices between 
China and other western countries and most of them forecast a narrowing of differences in coming 
years (Zhou 1988; Lefebvre & Lin 1990; Fang & Tang 1991; Lin & Deng 1992). Much of the 
literature was concentrated on financial accounting and was of limited value for the managerial 
accounting purposes. The proclamation of the open-door policy in 1978 let the Chinese 
accounting academics study, translate and publish western management accounting methods 
which were immediately implemented by the managers and accountants in the SOEs. Concepts 
like contribution margin, cost-volume-profit analysis, flexible budgets, variable costing, and cost 
allocation were applied in varying degrees depending upon the expertise of accounting personnel 
and the industry (Bromwich & Wang 1991).
Seeking to link closely accounting with enterprise management has been the major theme of this 
reconstruction and a theory of “Accounting Management’ has been evolved since the beginning 
of the 1990s. This concept states that accounting is one of the most important management 
activities rather than merely being a management tool or information system that provides users 
with a way of understanding the financial situation and assessing the performance of SOEs. 
Accounting should play an active and positive function in forecasting, budgeting, evaluating, 
analysing as well as controlling so as to strengthen management control and increase the 
contribution to socialist modernization (Zhu 1991; Yang & Xu 1995).
2
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Many authors and practitioners hold that the establishment of a new11 Responsibility Accounting” 
is the key of any desired accounting reform, because only when a new enterprise accounting 
system which directly serves management is set up can the nature and functions of accounting be 
actually achieved.
1.1.3 Responsibility Accounting
“Responsibility Accounting” is a very important and effective tool to realize the objectives of the 
“Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC)” adopted by the SOEs in China. An ERC is an 
agreement between the state or government and a certain SOE defining the responsibilities, 
authorities and benefits of both parties. The remuneration of the workers and employees are 
commensurate with their individual effort. A SOE undertakes certain economic responsibilities 
as designated by the government and in turn assigns various targets to its responsibility centres 
such as divisions, production lines, work teams, support functions and even individual employees 
according to their levels of autonomy. Based on the extent of accomplishment of the targets 
(both financial and non-fmancial) and the overall economic effectiveness in each responsibility 
centre, the monetary or other material rewards are given to the centre’s managers and employees 
in order to stimulate their motivation and also to raise the economic benefits (Maschmeyer & 
Yang 1990).
Responsibility Accounting in China is the most important and widely used managerial accounting 
system which concerns the identification of responsibility centres, the assignment of cost and 
profit targets and the subsequent measurement, analysis, evaluation and remuneration of the 
participants.
1.1.4 Environmental Problems
During the period from September 1991 to December 1992, the senior managements (mainly the 
accounting personnel) of the following 13 Chinese enterprises located in 4 different cities had 
been interviewed as pilot tests before the proposal and instrument of this research were 
determined in March 1993.
3
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Location/Enterprise Name Business Nature Size@
1 Shanghai Baoshan Iron & Steel Factory* Iron & Steel Manu. V. Large
2 Shanghai No.5 Iron & Steel Works* Iron & Steel Manu. Large
3 Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill# Textiles Manu. Large
4 Shanghai No.2 Textile Machines Factory# Machine Manu. Large
5 Shanghai & Bell Telecommunication# Equipment Manu. Large
6 Shanghai Foxborrow Electronic Instruments* Equipment Manu. Large
7 Shanghai Measurement & Cutting Tool 
Instruments Factory*
Instrument Manu. Medium
8 Shanghai Eastern Airlines# Transportation Services Large
9 Hangzhou No. 1 Department Store# Retailing Services Medium
10 Xiamen Forklift Truck Plant* Vehicle Manu. Medium
11 Xiamen Rubber Manufacturing Factory* Consumables Manu. Medium
12 Xiamen Chinese Medicine Factory* Consumables Manu. Medium
13 Shenzhen Guangming Metal Frame Factory# Metalwork Manu. Small
14 Shenzhen Blue Diamond Watch Factory# Watch Manu. Small
* Wholly SOEs before and after 1992.
# Converted into Shareholding Enterprises since 1992 or 1993.
@ Small-Sized Enterprise = 900 or less employees
Medium-Sized Enterprise = 901 - 2,500 employees 
Large-Sized Enterprise = 2,501 or over employees
During the above enterprise visits, the following problems were observed which reflected the 
responsibility accounting system employed as being important planning and control means and 
tools for the managements in the SOEs.
(1) After the wide and general implementation of the ERC system since 1987, over half of all 
the SOEs in China were still suffering losses in 1992 and 1993. The reasons were mainly 
two-fold that firstly the short-term nature of the contract did not encourage enterprises 
to take a long-term perspective; and secondly the ultimate ownership of the enterprise
4
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resided in the state and therefore the system did not necessarily ensure goal congruence 
between the state, enterprise management and employees.
(2) The “Three Iron Bowls” (i.e. iron employment, iron work position, iron wages) had not 
really been abolished because the “Big Rice P o f  concept1 was still deeply-rooted and 
exerted an adverse influence in the ERC and enterprise internal responsibility accounting 
systems.
(3) The “Enterprise Law” enacted in May 1988 had not been adequately enforced in 
separating the government’s role in SOEs from the enterprise’s own management 
autonomies and responsibilities. Many SOEs were still under strict supervision by 
government agencies. The majority of the economic resources were provided by the 
State, and production, in terms of quantity and variety, followed rigidly the plan set by the 
State. Under this economic structure, the initiative of enterprise management was 
seriously constrained (Chow, Cooper & Tang 1993). This situation had made it difficult 
to design and implement the responsibility accounting system effectively in the past.
(4) The “Communist Party Secretary” holding high position in a SOE, was the representative 
from the state to ensure that the government policies and regulations had been observed. 
The stringent administrative and management controls that were imposed on the SOE’s 
managers inhibited their dynamism and achievement (Child & Lu 1990). As a result, the 
development of the responsibility accounting system was slowed down as well.
(5) The over-production and inappropriate product mix to cater for market needs had created 
problems of over-stocking, and low stock-turnover especially since the third quarter of 
1991 and reached a level of RMB133 billion at the end of April 1992. These problems 
resulted in difficulties in implementing working capital control.
1 The “Big Rice Pot” idealism means that everybody in a SOE eats the same pot of rice 
or is remunerated equally disregarding the effort contributed by each individual.
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There were loop-holes in the “Two-Tier Pricing’ system characterized by a government 
price and a market price since the 1980s. This could be seen by the fact that by summer 
1988, only 27 raw materials, including steel, coal and grain were centrally controlled 
(Beijing Review 1989). The SOEs which produced these materials were required to sell 
the planned quantity to the state at the state-set price, but were allowed to sell the product 
beyond the quota in the market, where the price was determined by supply and demand. 
In the same way, other enterprises which used these materials could purchase the planned 
quantity at the state-set price. Any extra purchases must be made at the market price, 
which was usually substantially higher than the state price.
This “two-tier pricing” system encouraged the material-producing enterprise to expand 
production. At the same time however, it created new problems. Firstly, China had a 
commodity shortage economy and the relaxing of price controls soon pushed the price so 
high that it was far beyond many users’ means. Secondly, this system allowed those in 
control of the commodity allocation to obtain illegal profits, either by selling the product 
which was purchased at government price, at a much higher market price or by 
transferring such products to related parties in exchange for other benefits, thus creating 
a so-called “grey market' . Such anomalies had adversely affected the pricing policy of 
the SOEs (Fan & Schaffer 1991: 7-10; Chow, Cooper & Tang 1994: 10).
The inadequate capital investment, to be generated either by retained earnings or injected 
by the state to maintain or improve productivity, had significantly affected the ultimate 
profitability and return on capital employed.
The use of computers had not been widely applied in SOEs in particular the small- and 
medium-sized enterprises due to the lack of funds for this kind of investment. Therefore, 
this situation imposed a constraint on the further development of responsibility accounting 
which could be used as a good planning and control system.
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(9) The high inflation rates notably in the 5 Special Economic Zones and the 14 coastal cities 
have rendered the performance measurement of profit centres difficult. Following the 
rapid upsurge in 1984, prices in China rose at an annual rate of 7.3% from 1985 through 
1987 and jumped to 13% in 1987 (Liu 1989). Due to the fast expansion of capital 
projects and property development since 1992, the overall inflation went over 13% again 
in 19932.
(10) The absence of competitive markets and the control established by government and 
implemented by state and regional bureau, made detailed and decision-aiding management 
accounting techniques of limited use. The accounting data were rarely used for control 
purposes. This was quite clearly in the use made of standard costs; although standard cost 
systems were common they were typically not used for control and performance 
measurement purposes (Firth 1996).
(11) Due to the lack of decision-making responsibilities, much of the managerial accounting 
data produced in the SOEs were oriented toward calculating inventory costs and there 
was little emphasis on the potential use of cost data for future oriented or decision-making 
purposes (Skousen & Yang 1988; Bromwich & Wang 1991).
(12) Most important of all, the lack of the concepts of effective management, and the 
inadequate knowledge of management accounting techniques among SOE’s senior 
managers, who were usually old-aged people, had been obstacles to the development of 
management accounting theories and practices.
2 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) 1996 Annual Review p. 18 published on 3 
January 1997.
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1.2 FACTORS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Why does this research regard the responsibility accounting in China as its unique or primary 
focus? The following are the three major categories of “factors” or “variables” affecting the 
development and operation of the “responsibility accounting system” and the associated 
“planning and control aspects” adopted by many SOEs in China.
1.2.1 General F actors/V ariables
1.2.1.1 Legislation Changes
1.2.1.2 Market Economy Changes
1.2.2 Specific Factors/Variables
1.2.2.1 Ownership Changes
1.2.2.2 Local Government Policies & Regulations
1.2.2.3 Macro-Economic Control Measures
1.2.3 Long-Term Factors/Variables
1.2.3.1 Education & Training
1.2.3.2 Management Knowledge
1.2.3.3 Professionalization
1.2.1 General Factors/Variables
The “Legislation Changes” and “Market Economy Changes” are the two general factors or 
variables which allow all the 20 SOEs investigated in this research since 1992 enjoy greater 
discretion over development and operation of their responsibility accounting systems (and their 
associated planning and control systems) at the responsibility centre level. This enlarged 
autonomy applies whether the SOEs are wholly or partly owned by the government or have a 
listing on a stock exchange (represented by the Primary Hypothesis in Section 1.5.1 of this 
Chapter).
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1.2.1.1 Legislation Changes
Government’s economic and commercial legislation is one of the most direct and effective 
methods to regulate the business activities of all types of enterprises and organisations in China. 
Since the early 1990s, more and more business and commercial related laws have been enacted 
by the People’s Congress every year. The following 4 laws have significant impact on the 
planning and control influences in the SOEs since 1992.
Legislation Titles Notes
1 SOE Operation Mechanisms Transformation 
Regulations (1992)
Specify 14 major regulations to delegate 
the planning and control autonomies to 
the SOEs (see Notes 1).
2 Company Law (1993) Formulate the legal framework and 
regulate the management and operation 
of the limited liabilities and joint stock 
companies (see Notes 2).
3 Labour Law (1995) Govern the relationships between the 
employees and employers in all forms of 
enterprises (see Notes 3).
4 Bankruptcy Law (1986, 1996) Stipulate the legal requirements, rules, 
regulations, procedures and liabilities 
concerning the insolvency (see Notes 4).
Notes:
(1) It was after long and substantial consultation with the provincial authorities since 1990 
that the central government enacted the above legislation on 24 July 1992 with the major 
purpose to reform the management and operational systems and mechanisms of the SOEs. 
The major objectives of this law of transformation, which has 7 chapters and 54 articles, 
are to motivate the SOEs to be market-oriented in every aspect of operation and to raise 
the economic productivity and efficiency of the SOEs. The 14 specific regulations of 
autonomy delegation to the SOEs include:
1.1 production and operation decisions (Article 8);
1.2 products and labour pricing decisions (Article 9);
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1.3 selling of products (Article 10);
1.4 purchasing of materials and supplies (Article 11);
1.5 import and export rights (Article 12);
1.6 investment decisions (Article 13);
1.7 capital and profit retention (Article 14);
1.8 appropriation of assets (Article 15);
1.9 joint-venture and merger decisions (Article 16);
1.10 labour recruitment and assignment (Article 17);
1.11 personnel management (Article 18);
1.12 appropriation and distribution of wages and bonus (Article 19);
1.13 internal organisation structure design (Article 20); and
1.14 prevent misappropriation of human, material and financial resources by the 
government authorities (Article 21).
These delegated decision making authorities given to the SOEs are protected by law and 
no government departments, agents and individuals can interfere or interrupt their 
introduction (Article 22). According to a survey released by the State Commission for 
Economics and Trade, most of the respondents (large- and medium-sized SOEs) agreed 
that items 1.1, 1.4, 1.7, 1.12 and 1.13 of the above autonomies have been really honoured 
by the government3. Having delegated greater discretion as given by this legislation, it is 
supposed that the SOEs can adopt and operate a more western-oriented responsibility 
accounting system in terms of planning and control aspects.
(2) The following chapters/sections of the Company Law (1993) are related to the planning 
and control aspects of the limited liabilities and joint stock (or shareholding) companies 
in China:
2.1 Chapter 2: Establishment and Organisational Setup of a Limited Liability
Company 
Section 2: Organisational Setup
3 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 28 January 1996.
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Section 3: Solely State-Owned Companies (e.g. limited liability
companies established solely by State authorized 
investment institution or department)
2.2 Chapter 3: Establishment and Organisational Setup of Joint Stock Company
Limited
Section 2: Shareholders’ Meeting
Section 3: Board of Directors, Manager
Section 4: Supervisory Committee
2.3 Chapter 6: Financial Affairs & Accounting of a Company
2.4 Chapter 7: Merger and Division of a Company
2.5 Chapter 8: Bankruptcy, Dissolution & Liquidation
(3) The following chapters of the Labour Law (1995) are related to the planning and control 
aspects of all legal forms of enterprises in China:
3.1 Chapter 3: Employment Contracts and Corporate Contracts
3.2 Chapter 5: Wages
3.3 Chapter 6: Labour Safety & Working Environment
3.4 Chapter 8: Vocational Training
3.5 Chapter 9: Social Insurance & Benefits
(4) Since the Bankruptcy Law implemented in 1986, less than 1,500 ailing and loss-making 
SOEs have been bankrupted up to the end of 19964 mainly because of two reasons:
4.1 the biggest creditors (i.e. state-owned banks) will incur huge amounts of bad debts 
(Arthur Andersen 1993: 71); and
4.2 laying off millions of redundant employees would cause social instability in view
of insufficient social and employment welfare and benefits available.
In parallel with refining the Bankruptcy Law in 1996, the government has been 
implementing various social welfare policies, such as centralized pension, medical,
4 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 15 October 1996.
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unemployment, reemployment, life insurance and work compensation funds in recent years 
so that the winding up of ten thousands of bankrupt SOEs can settle the redundant 
employees properly. In fact, 518 SOEs were declared insolvent in 1996 which was the 
highest annual record since 1987s. Furthermore, 5,000 bankruptcy cases were under 
stringent considerations by the government6 but these declining enterprises are encouraged 
to be taken over by promising enterprises instead of going into bankrupt7. The 
Bankruptcy Law was revised in 1996 and settlement of creditors has been determined in 
the following order8: (1) liquidation expenses; (2) wages and salaries payable; (3) social 
security contributions; (4) taxes payable; and (5) other creditors.
1.2.1.2 Market Economy Changes
One major breakthrough in economic reform has been the recognition and practice of the 
“Planned Commodity Economy” (China’s nearest equivalent to the western term of the market 
economy), that is, the integration of the planning economy with market regulation. It is different 
from both China’s former highly centralised and rigidly controlled planned economy and the 
market economy of capitalist countries. It is argued that it is possible to combine the merits of 
the planned economy and market regulation, and establish an economic operational mode 
adaptable to China’s socialist environment.
State plans, which can help maintain a comprehensive balance in the national economy, can also 
place the economy under extremely rigid control and hamper its vitality, as has been experienced 
by China in the past. Market mechanisms can flexibly regulate the relationship between supply 
and demand and embody the law of value, but such mechanisms can also cause problems such as 
inflation as experienced by capitalist countries from time to time (Dong 1993). Both planned and
5 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 7 December 1996.
6 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 15 October 1996.
7 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 10 January 1997.
8 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 26 October 1996.
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market economies have their strengths and weaknesses. Integration of a planned economy with 
market regulation is aimed at attempting to obtain the best compromise suited to China. 
Specifically, such a planned economy consists of a mandatory plan, guidance plan, and market 
regulation.
The mandatory plan constitutes one of the important means for the integration of the planned 
economy with market regulation. In the 1990s and beyond, mandatory plans will be executed on 
a measured scale for certain economic sectors. Such plans, of course, should take into 
consideration the relationship between supply and demand and conform to the law of value. The 
guidance plan covers the enforcement of economic policies and measures, such as policies on 
interest rates and foreign exchange rates which chart the direction of economic activities. Market 
regulation is achieved through changes in the relationship between supply and demand in the 
market-place, under the guidance of the overall plans and laws of the state.
The planned commodity economy is based on public ownership and regulated economic plans 
with assistance from market forces. Various reforms were designed according to this objective, 
under which the proportion of a planned economy has been gradually reduced, and the market has 
played an increasingly important role. The Chinese economy has recently experienced a period 
of rapid development. At the same time many problems emerged for two main reasons.
Firstly, a sound theory underlying the planned commodity economy was not established. The 
arguments among researchers and government officials on the ways to combine the planned 
economy and the market economy has not yet been solved. Secondly, people who were used to 
the planned economy were not familiar with market mechanisms. Some simply interpreted the 
changes as permitting them to do whatever they wished to do. Suddenly, the old economic order 
had broken down while the new one was not yet established. Competition without any regulatory 
framework inevitably caused chaos. The government realised such a situation had to be remedied. 
Clearer objectives needed to be established on which sound theory could be formulated. This 
evolved into a “Socialist Market Economy”, a concept put forward by the Chinese government 
in 1992 and its principles are now written into the Constitution of the PRC from the Third Plenary 
Meeting of the 14th Communist Party Central Committee held in October 1994 (Chow, Cooper
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& Tang 1994: 9-11).
The major concept of “Socialist Market Economy” is to let almost all sorts of economic and 
business activities be more market driven instead of centrally directed by the government 
authorities. The following are thought to be the major implications in implementing the Socialist 
Market Economy which affect the planning and control influences in the SOEs directly and 
indirectly.
(1) Planned Production
Among the 190,000 medium- and large-sized industrial SOEs in China, the varieties and quantities 
of industrial and agricultural products as controlled by the government have been reduced from 
120 categories in 1980 to 50 categories in 19929 and then further decreased to the following 6 
major categories in 1996.
1.1 iron and steel products;
1.2 petroleum and chemical products;
1.3 coal and mine products;
1.4 textile and clothing products;
1.5 food and oil products; and
1.6 defence and related products.
The above 6 major categories of products accounted for about 10% of the “National Industrial 
Outputs (NIO) Value” at the end of 1996. Furthermore, the NIO value of the other industrial 
products monitored or guided by the government authorities accounted for about 20% of the total 
in the same year. Therefore, most of the SOEs investigated in this research have got higher 
autonomies in terms of production planning and control.
(2) Market Orientation
As a result of promoting the Socialist Market Economy coupled with the favourable terms and
9 See State Statistics Bureau. 1992. Economic reform after 14 years. China Statistics 
Press (Beijing): 32.
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conditions provided by the Government’s Legislation (as described in 1.2.1.1 above), most of the 
SOEs are able to chart their planning and control functions in accordance with the needs and 
changes in both the domestic and overseas markets. Some of these planning and control activities 
are listed as follows:
2.1 determine production quantities and varieties (or mixes) according to sales forecasts (or 
market demands);
2.2 purchase input resources (e.g. materials, labour, expenses, capital items, etc.) according 
to feasible sales/production requirements;
2.3 manage the production functions to meet the sales demands;
2.4 sell the products to the customers in need;
2.5 develop and explore the domestic and overseas markets by selling to them the right 
products, of the right quantity and at the right time; and
2.6 conduct appropriate market or marketing research for the present and future products.
(3) Input/Output Pricing
In line with the development of “Socialist Market Economy”, the pricing control of both input 
resources and output products (including services) have been released gradually since the early 
1990s. Before the economic reform started in 1978, over 95% of the product/service prices had 
been fixed by the government through the State Price Control Bureau. Turning into the 9th 
National 5-Year Planning Period (i.e. 1996-2000), except for the prices of the 6 major categories 
of industrial and agricultural products (as listed in (1) above) plus properties, transportation and 
communication services which are still closely monitored by the Bureau, all the other 
product/service prices are now determined by the market supply and demand.
The almost-free market prices affect significantly the SOEs in terms of measuring the actual profit 
performance since both input costs and output revenues have become variables that have to be 
planned and controlled in order to achieve both the Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) and 
Internal Responsibility Contract (IRC) (both described in Part B of Chapter 2) targets for the 
SOEs which have been treated as either investment or profit centres. In other words, more 
emphasis and tighter concerns should be placed on the planning and control aspects by the
15
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enterprise management to survive and compete in different rapidly changing domestic and 
overseas markets.
(4) Inflation
The most obvious adverse effect resulting from the “Socialist Market Economy” promotion is the 
high inflation experienced in the last few years. The inflation rates of commodity products 
climbed to 22.7% (yearly average) in 1993 and 21.7% (yearly average) in 1994. Then the macro- 
economic control policies (described in Section 1.2.2.3 below) adopted since July 1993 have 
taken effect to curb the inflation rate to 14.7% and 6.5% (yearly average) in 1995 and 1996 
respectively. It was expected that this figure would be maintained at below 6% (yearly average) 
in 199710. Inflation control has been put as the first agenda item of the State Economic 
Development Committee during the 9th National 5-Year Plan (i.e. 1996-2000).
Similar to “Input/Output Pricing” described in (3) above, the vagaries of inflation can affect the 
planning and control management in the SOEs such as formulating strategic plans, setting 
budgets, measuring performances and determining incentives which are the major elements of 
“Responsibility Accounting” in China.
1.2.2 Specific Factors/Variables
The “Ownership Changed, “Local Government Policies & Regulations” and “Macro-Economic 
Control Measures” are the three specific factors or variables which affect the pace of change as 
measured by the degree of discretion over planning and control in these 20 SOEs varied with form 
of ownership, geographical location and industry sector respectively (represented by the 4 
Secondary Hypotheses in Section 1.5.2 of this Chapter).
1.2.2.1 Ownership Changes
Nearly all the enterprises in China have been converted into wholly state-owned since 1953 until 
the economic reform formally started in 1979. Since then, other forms of ownership have been
10 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 31 December 1996.
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allowed for the industrial and commercial enterprises to operate their businesses in China. The 
following table summarizes the various forms of enterprise ownership existed at present.
Forms o f  Ownership Examples
1 Listed Shareholding Enterprises11 A-shares12, B-shares13, H-shares14, N-shares15
2 Private Shareholding Enterprises16 shares owned by the government, employees and 
other enterprises
3 Equity Joint-Ventures shares held by the foreign investors and the 
government and other enterprises in China
4 Cooperative Joint-Ventures similar to (3) but investments are mainly in the 
form of tangible assets such as land, building, 
materials, etc. and intangible assets like patent, 
copyright, technology, management, etc.
5 Foreign-Owned Enterprises fully-owned by the foreign investors
6 Leased/Underwritten Enterprises mainly managed and operated by foreign investors 
for a number of years but the ultimate ownership 
remains state-owned
11 Only 4 SOEs with A-shares listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (1 
SOE has H-shares listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange as well) have been investigated in this 
research.
12 A-shares can only be purchased and held by the citizens in China excluding Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macau residents (689 A-shares have been listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges at the end of January 1998).
13 B-shares can only be purchased and held by the foreign investors including Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macau residents (99 B-shares have been listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges at the end of January 1998).
14 H-shares are shares of SOEs in China listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange (39 H- 
shares have been listed in Hong Kong at the end of January 1998).
15 N-shares are shares of SOEs in China listed in New York Stock Exchange (6 N-shares 
have been listed in New York at the end of January 1998).
16 Only 4 private shareholding enterprises with shares held by the government, employees 
and other enterprises have been investigated in this research.
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Forms o f  Ownership Examples
7 Partnerships invested by the government, enterprises, 
employees, individuals, etc.
8 Private-Owned Enterprises invested by enterprise employees and other 
individuals
9 Sole Proprietors enterprises owned by entrepreneurs
China desired to establish “Westernized” stock exchanges for quite a long time, but the official 
opening of stock exchanges was delayed again and again for political reasons. Because of the 
important economic role of Shanghai and the advantageous position of Shenzhen (neighbour to 
Hong Kong) in China’s opening to the outside world, China officially opened the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange on 19 December, 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on 3 July 1991 (Chen 1996).
The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges offer two types of shares, A share and B share. 
A shares are purchased by Chinese citizens and denominated in RMB, while B shares, which 
started in 1992, are only available for purchase by foreign investors including Hong Kong and 
Taiwan residents, and other overseas Chinese. Shanghai B shares are priced and traded in US 
dollar, while Shenzhen B shares are denominated in Hong Kong dollar. It is possible for one 
enterprise to issue A shares as well as B shares, or to issue A or B shares only. There were 689 
A shares and 99 B shares17 issued in the two stock exchanges at the end of January 1998.
Furthermore, 39 SOEs with listed A shares, have listed their shares in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (H shares) at the end of January 1998. Similarly, 6 SOEs have listed their shares in the 
New York Stock Exchange (N shares) as well18. Among the 20 SOEs investigated in this
17 Over US$3.5 billion capital has been raised from issuing 99 B-shares. It has been 
planned that 33 new B-shares would be issued (mainly SOEs located in the inner provinces) in 
1997 and 1998 to attracted further foreign investment funds (see Hong Kong Wen Wei Po 
Newspaper on 8 January 1997).
18 At the end of 1996, US$4.9 billion of capital has been raised through listing SOEs’ in 
the overseas stock markets and another 50 SOEs have been approved by the State Securities 
Supervisory Commission for listing abroad in the next two or three years (see Hong Kong Wen 
Wei Po Newspaper on 30 December 1996).
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research, 4 of them (i.e. SDS1(11), SCM2(14), GLIL(16), BPMH(20)) have A shares listed in 
the two exchanges. In addition, BPMH(20) listed its H shares in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
in 1993. In fact the number of Chinese enterprises listed in China and overseas accounts for only 
a very small proportion of the total 400,000 large- and medium-sized SOEs.
Other than these 830 listed enterprises, the Beijing government has approved the transformation 
of about 9,200 large- and medium-sized SOEs into shareholding enterprises by issuing shares to 
their government authorities, employees and other enterprises without listing in the two stock 
exchanges in China. There are 4 such private shareholding enterprises (i.e. GFDS(03), 
GDDS(04), GNFF(07), GNFB(08)) investigated in this research.
As a result of such a massive scale of rapid shareholding conversion or privatization, which seems 
to be a fashionable trend to be pursued by thousands of other Wholly SOEs, the directors and 
chief executives of these shareholding enterprises are now accountable more to local and overseas 
stakeholders who demand a true and fair financial disclosure on the one hand and consistent 
improvement in profitability on the other hand to justify their investments. In the long run, the 
transformation of enterprises may influence enterprises to endeavour to improve their financial 
performance and thus, shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, an effective management accounting 
system (including responsibility accounting) may change in line with the ownership changes, in 
order to achieve such a goal.
1.2.2.2 Local Government Policies & Regulations
Government’s policies and regulations have always played a very important role in China’s 
economic environment. For the past 18 years, China’s economic policies have swung wildly (e.g. 
boom-bust cycle), with inflation rates rising and falling as the central government opened and 
closed money supply19.
19 See South China Morning Post (Hong Kong English Newspaper) on 2 December 1996.
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As mentioned in Section 1.2.1.1 above, since the early 1990s, more and more business and 
commercial related laws have been enacted in China and some of them have direct and indirect 
impacts on the planning and control systems in the SOEs. In addition to the nationwide 
legislation, the local governments in different provinces and cities may have their own policies and 
regulations which are claimed to suit the specific economic situations prevailing in their territories.
For example, as an extension to the new Tax Law implemented in January 1994, the 5 Special 
Economic Zones in southern China (i.e. Xiamen, Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Hainan) have 
enacted some compromised tax policies and regulations for the joint-venture enterprises in order 
to maintain and further attract foreign investments. Another example is the Labour Law 
implemented in January 1995. To cater for the faster economic development status in Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shenzhen etc, the local governments of these coastal cities have 
been approved by the Beijing Government to implement more favourable policies and regulations 
in relation to wages, benefits, social welfare, employment, personnel, etc. These different local 
government policies and regulations are thought to affect the management aspects of the SOEs 
including the planning, control and operation systems.
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1.2.2.3 Macro-Economic Control Measures
Transforming from the “Planned Economy to the “Socialist Market Economy” environment 
since the early 1990s, the China government has employed some “Macroeconomic ControF 
measures in order to maintain a steady and healthy economic growth and enhance the living 
standard of over 1.2 billion people in the country20.
Inflation is one of the most typical examples described in Section 1.2.1.2(4) above. The 3 major 
macroeconomic control measures installed by the State Council during 1994 to 1996 were (1) to 
control the pace and portfolio of capital asset investments; (2) to increase agricultural outputs; 
and (3) to balance the nationwide supply and demand of major products and commodities21.
Under the prevailing socialist market economy transformation, the market should play the most 
vital role in the development of the pillar industries (e.g. machinery and electronics, 
petrochemical, automobile, iron and steel, transportation, telecommunication, building industries). 
But State guidance and support (i.e. macroeconomic control) are indispensable when the market 
is immature and the industries suffer from lack of funds22.
During the many interviews with the senior managements of the 20 SOEs in this research, every 
interviewee did mention the ripple effects of macroeconomic control measures on his or her 
enterprise. A common example is the direct effect on demand for the products or services 
provided by each SOE. As a result, the planning, control, evaluation, performance measurement 
and remuneration systems of that SOE will be influenced in both directions — favourable and 
adverse.
The following five sections briefly describe some of these specific macro-economic control 
measures adopted by the central and local governments during the last few years.
20 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 16 September 1996.
21 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) 1996 Annual Review p. 18 published on 3 
January 1997.
22 See China Daily on 4 August 1994.
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(1) Public Sector Restructuring & Changing Role
During the last decade, there has been some restructuring of government departments. The last 
significant one took place in 1993 in order to streamline many ministries, departments and 
organisations under the management scope of the State Council. The number of government 
departments was reduced from 86 to 59. As a result, about 20% of the civil servants have either 
been laid off or reallocated to other SOEs out of the government authorities. Also the 
government role needs to change more quickly according to the principles of separating 
government ownership and enterprise management. The government needs to focus on macro­
control through planning, coordination, supervision, and other principles of economics and law23.
Furthermore, the roles played by these governmental departments and their local agencies in 
different provinces and cities have changed mainly by delegating the various autonomies to the 
SOEs according to the “SOE Operation Mechanisms Transformation Regulations’’ implemented 
since July 1992. The government authorities keep some macroeconomic control measures (i.e. 
capital investment, acquisition and merger, etc.) on and provide guidance and assistance (i.e. 
market information, import and export right, etc.) to the SOEs.
According to a survey performed by the State Commission for Economic System Restructuring 
in early 1996, over 71% of the respondents (large- and medium-sized SOEs) indicated that their 
supervisory (government) authorities have exerted less direct planning and control influences on 
them since 199224.
In all the nationwide economic conferences held in the last few years, further public sector 
restructuring and the changing role have been emphasized in order to motivate the managers and 
employees in the SOEs to actualize the concepts of self-financing, self-managing, self-controlling 
and self-developing25. This initiative taken by the central government is reducing the planning and
23 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 8 May 1995.
24 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 7 February 1996.
25 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 16 December 1996.
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control influences on the SOEs by their respective supervisory government authorities.
(2) Taxation. Foreign Exchange & Financial Market Changes
Taxation is one of the most common means to distribute the economic wealth among the 
government, enterprises and individuals in China. The new Tax Law adopted in January 1994 
redefined nearly all kinds of tax sources including income tax, sales tax, value-added tax, service 
tax, consumption tax, capital gained tax, etc. which affect the “profit after tax” of the SOEs. In 
turn, the Profit After Tax (PAT) has direct impact on the dividend policy (for shareholding 
enterprises), capital investment, research and development, business expansion, employees’ 
welfare and bonus, etc. of the SOEs. Some interviewees in this research have complained that 
the higher enterprise income tax of 33% (as from 1995) applied to the Wholly SOEs compared 
with the 15% applied to the Shareholding or Foreign-Invested Enterprises was unfair because 
different types (ownerships) of enterprises were not competing at the same starting point. It is 
observed that the taxation system has some planning and control influences on the SOEs in one 
way or another.
To implement the centralised control and management of foreign exchange, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange Control (SAFEC) was established and it reports directly to 
the State Council. The SAFEC, in association with the State Planning Committee (SPC), 
allocates limited foreign currency resources to the SOEs through a quota system based on a 
number of criteria, including their record of foreign exchange generation. In addition to the quota 
allocated by the SPC, the SOEs are allowed to retain a proportion of the foreign exchange they 
generate and to trade it in the foreign exchange swap centres. These centres were established 
alongside the quota system, with the aim of adjusting the demand and supply of foreign exchange 
(Chow, Cooper & Tang 1994).
For those SOEs who do not have the “import and export right’ granted by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation, they can only export their products through some 
agents or enterprises having this right and export quotas. For example, before the Beijing No.3 
Cotton Mill (BCM3) obtained the import and export right in 1994, this mill sold the yarns and 
cloths to an import and export enterprise at the SAFEC’s official rate of
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US$l=Renminbi(RBM)5.7. After exporting the products and receiving the foreign currency, the 
import and export enterprise could exchange the foreign currency in swap centre at the market 
rate which might be US$1=RMB8.7.
But on the other hand, when BCM3 needed to buy US dollar to pay for the purchases of raw 
materials (e.g. cotton), machines and equipment, they had to buy the foreign currency from the 
swap centre at the same market rate of US$1=RMB8.7. Therefore the significant exchange 
differences create heavy transaction costs as BCM3 found in this case. Furthermore, the 
fluctuation and devaluation of RMB to the US dollar in the last few years have influenced the 
planning, control and performance measures of many SOEs.
In order to balance the foreign currency receipts and payments or to meet the foreign currency 
income as agreed in the ERC, some SOEs investigated in this research have to increase the export 
of their products (e.g. SSW5(01), GLIL(16), BCM3(18)) or the domestic sales of their 
commodities and services in foreign currency (e.g. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11), 
BFSH(19)). As a result, these enterprises have to consider the foreign currency issues in their 
planning and control work.
Apart from the “shareholding transformation” (described in Section 1.2.2.1 above) as a major 
source of raising capital funds, some SOEs including banks, utility entities owned by central 
government and some local enterprises26 have been allowed to issue “bonds’’ to their employees, 
other enterprises and individuals in order to gather a certain portion of free money from the 
private sector without going through the complicated rules and regulations for public or private 
listing (Fang & Tang 1991). Both the shares and bonds issued by the SOEs can make funds 
available for them to implement their long-term plans and maintain their short-term operations. 
Therefore, both the planning and control aspects of the SOEs are indirectly affected by the 
changes of capital market in China.
26 A total of RMB30 billion of bonds have been raised by these SOEs. The Ministry of 
Finance and Bank of China have decided to approve more SOEs to issue “private bonds” to 
absorb the increased corporate and individual free capital in the market (see Hong Kong Wen Wei 
Po Newspaper on 7 January 1997).
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(3) Bad Debts & Bank Credits
In January 1995, the State Statistics Bureau reported that more than 40% of the 400,000 large- 
and medium-sized SOEs incurred losses at the end of 1994. To put them on the road of recovery 
is the first agenda item of the Chinese government work plan of 199527. The continuous 
unprofitable performance of these loss-making enterprises has created a very serious problem of 
“Chain Debts” or “Triangle Debts”. This means when one enterprise is unable to pay its 
creditors, in turn they cannot settle their own debts and so on. According to the State Statistics 
Bureau’s press release on 25 January 1995, the total outstanding accounts receivable of all SOEs 
exceeded RMB600 billion at the end of November 1994 which doubled the figure at the end of 
199328. About 60% of these accounts receivable could be considered to be doubtful debts.
A survey of 10,000 SOEs was done by the State Statistics Bureau in the same month and 55% 
of the respondents indicated that “Chain Debts” would be the most critical problem in 1995 
(Liang, Tang, Tsang & Yau 1995). The “Chain Debts” was getting worse in 1996 with an 
estimation of over RMB800 billion at the end of the year. As a result, many SOEs are running 
out of ‘‘working capitaF to finance their operational activities and even unable to pay the wages 
and bonus in some extreme cases. Under this adverse situation, both the planning and control 
activities in these SOEs are affected.
In connection with the bad debts situation in China, the banks suffer most since they are the major 
working fund providers to the SOEs. Since the early 1980s, the central and local governments 
have ceased the direct capital injection into the SOEs, instead bank loans have become the major 
source of fund other than the retained earnings created by the SOEs. Therefore, a significant 
proportion of these chain debts is financed by bank loans. If these high gearing enterprises go into 
bankruptcy, the banks will suffer most in terms of the loan repayment ability from the liquidated 
assets. Consequently, many of the Chinese banks bear with huge amounts of loans for these SOEs 
as long as they are able to pay for the interest.
27 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 23 January 1995.
28 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 26 January 1995.
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Most of the Wholly SOEs investigated in this research do not provide for bad or doubtful debts 
since this is not required by law. Some interviewees in this research have disclosed the fact that 
they really have significant amounts of bad and doubtful debts but they just left these uncollectible 
debts in the accounts receivable waiting for the government to inject funds into their enterprises 
to relieve most of their chain debts. In fact, the central government has used this option since the 
early 1990s and the People’s Bank of China (Central Bank) transferred RMB50 billion and 
RMB20 billion of funds into the other state-owned and commercial banks to write-off and settle 
part of these heavy bad and doubtful debts in 1991 and 1996 respectively29. The budget of this 
government subsidy for 1997 was RMB30 billion30.
The “Commercial Banking Law” enacted in 1996 allows some of the previous state-owned banks 
to become commercial banks which will be more market and profit oriented. This implies that 
these commercial banks will not finance and support the loss-making SOEs endlessly. The 
commercial banks will scrutinize the financial performance and liquidity of their clients, including 
the SOEs, closely before they grant credits to existing and new customers31. In view of this 
privatization of banks in China, the insolvent SOEs will be very difficult to obtain bank credits to 
finance their operations and ultimately they may go into bankruptcy or be taken over by other 
legal entities.
According to the State Statistics Bureau, in 1996 over 80% of the working capital of all the SOEs 
in China were financed by bank loans32. Although the prime rate was as high as 11% in the same 
year, the SOEs still have to rely on bank loans to maintain their operations. Therefore, the 
availability of bank credits has always been an influential factor in the planning, operation and 
control of a SOE in China. Of course, the most important solution to this problem is to enhance 
the profitability of the SOEs by selling all products or services that can be produced and collecting
29 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 20 January 1996 and Hong Kong 
Oriental Newspaper on 15 December 1996.
30 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 10 January 1997.
31 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 19 January 1996.
32 See Hong Kong Oriental Newspaper on 15 December 1996.
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all the accounts receivable within a reasonable period of time.
(4) Manpower & Wages Systems
The rate of unemployment has increased in recent years because of SOE activity relating to 
merger, acquisition, takeover, contracted-out, leased-out, management-buyout, auctioned-off, 
liquidation and bankruptcy. In addition, the promulgation of “SOE Operation Mechanisms 
Transformation” has encouraged the SOEs to restructure their organisations and lay off part of 
the redundant employees. Putting aside the unemployment effects on the social stability in China, 
the reduction of excess employees and workers could certainly enhance the productivity and 
profitability of the SOEs, and in many cases, save them from bankruptcy. Wages system reform 
was firstly started in Shenzhen (across the boarder of Hong Kong) during 1984. The traditional 
8-bracket wages scale adopted in the SOEs was abolished (see Section 6.4 of Data Analysis 5 in 
Volume 3 [pp. 128-131]). Wages were then determined according to job nature, post, time-rate 
and piece-rate. In most cases, wages and bonus were directly related to individual performance 
and ability33. This successful pilot scheme was employed by many cities in the last decade.
In the recent wages and salaries reform, the real issue is whether the SOEs should bring together 
all types of cash payments into one high monthly payment, or separate them as previously done. 
But this new method may not result in the greatest economic benefits to the SOE or the employee, 
given the current Chinese taxation, accounting and insurance systems. So it may be wiser for the 
SOEs to structure a wage package that features a base salary, and subsidies not subject to taxation 
should be accounted for separately. All others can be lumped together into a “cost of livelihood” 
subsidy to be added to the basic wage (Arthur Andersen 1993: 124).
In such a huge developing country, monetary rewards are very important to the well being of the 
0.7 billion working population in China especially more crucial to the SOE employees located in 
the inner provinces. Worst of all, there are 65 million of people in China who are struggling 
below the so called uline o f poverty” according to some worldwide standards34. In other words,
33 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 9 December 1996.
34 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 6 January 1997.
27
Ch. 1 : Introduction
many people in China can only fulfil the lower two or three levels in “Maslow ’s Hierarchy of 
Needs”. As verified in many interviews during the data collection period of this research, 
“extrinsic rewards” are the most important “motivation facto?' or “key facto?' for both managers 
and workers to actualize the economic effectiveness and efficiency of the “responsibility 
accounting system” particularly in terms of setting targets and subsequent performance 
measurement.
(5) Social Security Systems
For significant improvements to be possible, SOEs must be able to adjust the size and nature of 
their operations in response to market signals, adding or shedding workers as necessary. 
However, given the housing, pensions, and healthcare, among a myriad of social welfare services, 
which are tied to the enterprise, labour mobility is highly constrained. This makes it difficult to 
reallocate redundant labour across occupations, enterprises, and locations. Clearly, for more 
efficiently-operating labour markets to emerge, worker access to housing and other welfare 
benefits must be de-coupled from employment in the enterprise and managed by the government 
(Lee 1993).
According to a survey on 1,200 citizens in 7 big cities in 1996, ‘medical benefits’, ‘housing 
provisions’, ‘inflation rates’ and ‘retirement schemes’ were ranked the top four concerns by the 
respondents35. Although the government is taking up gradually the responsibility to coordinate 
and maintain the major social security systems relating to retirement, medical, unemployment, 
reemployment, work compensation, nevertheless, the SOEs still have to contribute about 42%- 
46% of the gross wages payment to those government-managed social security funds (Liu & 
Zhang 1996). On top of that, the SOEs still have to alleviate the housing problems (more critical 
in the big cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou) of the majority of their employees such as to build 
quarters and purchase apartments for them. These substantial capital expenditures require money 
from the “employee welfare fund ’ which is one of the reserve accounts appropriated from the 
profit after tax (Arthur Andersen 1993: 124-125).
35 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 14 October 1996.
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From the positive perspective, the financial burden of various employees’ welfare on the SOE 
compels the top management to be more aggressive in planning for the incomes and conscious 
in controlling the expenses. However, looking from the negative side, these almost unavoidable 
fixed costs demotivate the enterprise management to perform their planning and control functions 
properly.
1.2.3 Long-Term Factors/Variables
The “Education & Training’, “Management Knowledge” and “Professionalization” are the three 
long-term factors or variables which may not have immediate impacts on the responsibility 
accounting, planning and control systems operated by the SOEs at the present moment, 
nevertheless, they should be regarded as the “diffusion factors” of responsibility (management) 
accounting in the SOEs of China (Firth 1996).
1.2.3.1 Education & Training
The present management accounting development in China is similar to the Hong Kong situation 
prevailing in the 1970s. In 1974, the Department of Accountancy of the Hong Kong Polytechnic 
launched a 3-year full-time Higher Diploma in Management Accountancy course whose syllabus 
was closely geared to the examinations of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
(CIMA) in the UK. Soon, another 6-year part-time Certificate in Management Accountancy 
course was offered to the working students as well. Apart from assisting the full-time and part- 
time students to sit for the 18 papers of CIMA examinations, these courses helped to promote 
management accounting theories and practices to employers and accounting practitioners in Hong 
Kong.
As from 1977, the graduates of these CIMA courses started to apply their management 
accounting knowledge in their working environments. They also grouped together to organise, 
promote and participate in the activities of the CIMA Hong Kong Division. After 20 years of 
hard work, there were about 880 qualified CIMA members and over 1,280 students in Hong
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Kong at the end of 199636. Evidently, the management accounting theories and practices have 
been well recognised by the industrial, commercial and public sectors and have contributed to the 
Hong Kong economic prosperity in one way or another.
The root solution to facilitate and speed up the development of management accounting and the 
refinement of responsibility accounting in China lies on the efforts in education and training which 
should be initiated from the central government to the local authorities and universities. The 
following sections briefly describe the present situation and suggest strategies for the future.
(1) Accounting Education
During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1977, the accountancy degree system was ceased. 
Students received no formal accountancy education and were not awarded degrees. Since 1978, 
the extremes of the Cultural Revolution have been abandoned and accounting has become an 
important part of the management system and was being studied by both the Chinese academics 
and practitioners (Yu 1983; Ruan 1992). Effective from 1979, the degree system was formally 
re-established followed by curriculum reforms in accountancy education. Colleges and 
universities in China are offering multi-level accountancy courses leading to different kinds of 
awards from first degree to doctoral degree.
Accountancy curriculum reforms have been more extensive at the undergraduate level. For 
example, the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics has adopted the American model by 
generically categorising subject contents into accounting principles, financial accounting, cost 
accounting, management accounting, financial management, international accounting and auditing. 
To ensure a close link between theories and practices, academic staff have been encouraged to 
carry out research activities.
36 According to CIMA membership database at the end of December 1996.
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At present, almost all the accountancy undergraduate and postgraduate programmes have 
included “management accounting” as an individual subject (Feng, Leung & Yau 1992). 
Furthermore, a few universities have suggested to separate “responsibility accounting1’ out from 
management accounting as an independent subject which is the case adopted by the People’s 
University in Beijing (He & Lin 1991). Attempts are now being made to conceptualize 
management accounting in Chinese terms, and western ideas, concepts and techniques are being 
explored to identify elements which may be of use in China (Ding 1992; Li 1992). During the 
past ten years, the accounting graduates have made use of their management accounting 
knowledge and applied them in their jobs. Through training courses, seminars, articles and 
teaching programmes, they have shared their experience, whether good or bad, with other 
accounting practitioners and academics.
The accounting education has developed rapidly since 1979. At present, there are more than 
103 universities and tertiary institutions offering full-time accountancy undergraduate 
programmes37. In addition, there are hundreds of technical colleges running full-time and part- 
time accountancy sub-degree courses of which the certificate and diploma holders can upgrade 
their qualifications into higher diplomas or degrees by further study on a part-time basis for two 
to three years in some universities. Moreover, there are many open learning and distance learning 
institutions providing various accounting education programmes which lead to different levels of 
awards, ranging from bachelor degree to certificate. Management accounting is one of the core 
subjects of most of these accountancy programmes. Although the avenues to study accounting 
have increased, the demand however is much greater than the supply particularly in the inner 
provinces and smaller cities of China.
(2) Professional Examinations & Training
Since the economic reforms started in 1979, the accountancy profession has not been well 
recognised by the public and private sectors. In order to standardize the professional accounting 
qualifications and formalize the social status of the accounting practitioners, the Ministry of
37 See List of Accounting Academics in China (1996). China Accounting Professors 
Association [CAPA]. Shanghai (June).
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Finance and the Ministry of Personnel jointly published the “Accounting Professional 
Qualification Examination Regulations” and its “Implementation Procedures” on 21 March 
1992.
As from 1 August 1992, a “Three-tier Examination System” has become the only qualifying 
examinations for all the accounting practitioners who want to be qualified as professional 
“Accountants”, “Assistant Accountants” and “Accounting Technicians”. Management 
accounting is one of the papers in the “Accountants” examination, which signifies the importance 
of management accounting knowledge to the qualified professional accountants in China38.
Currently, there are over 10 million accounting practitioners working at different organisational 
levels39. Over 95% of this huge accounting workforce are working for the industrial, commercial 
and public sectors. Before the implementation of the above mentioned “Three-tier Examination 
System”, there were about 27,000 accountants, 750,000 assistant accountants and 1.1 million 
accounting technicians qualified by education levels and working experience. Judging from these 
figures, it can be seen that at least 8 million of accounting personnel are waiting for some sort of 
basic accounting education to prepare themselves to sit for the qualifying examinations.
In addition, there are over 1 million semi-qualified accounting practitioners who are looking for 
further education and training for the examinations on the one hand, and uplifting their 
professional expertise for new job requirements on the other hand. It is no doubt that accounting 
education and training in China, including management accounting, is a huge market in this part 
of the world (Yan 1991).
(3) Management Accounting Education Strategies
Concerning the promotion of management accounting theories, methods, techniques and 
practices, the following four types of educational arrangements have been envisaged.
38 See*Shanghai Accounting Journal. June 1992.
39 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 5 May 1993.
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3.1 Postgraduate Programme
On 3 November 1981, the Education Commission of China approved the first list of universities 
to confer master and doctoral degrees to their accountancy postgraduates. Since then, the 
postgraduates programmes have developed rapidly and so far about 90 accounting doctoral 
degrees have been conferred and a few hundred of postgraduates have obtained their master 
degrees in accountancy.
The following 9 universities and institutions have been allowed to confer PhD in Accounting since
198140
(a) Beijing Institute of Financial Sciences (under the Ministry of Finance);
(b) People’s University of China (Beijing);
(c) Northeast University of Finance & Economics (Dalin);
(d) Tianjin Finance & Economics Institute;
(e) Shaanxi Finance & Economics Institute (Xian);
(f) Shanghai University of Finance & Economics;
(g) Xinan University of Finance & Economics (Sichuan);
(h) Zhongnan University of Finance & Economics (Wuhan); and
0) Xiamen University.
Management accounting has become a compulsory subject in these postgraduate programmes and 
also a research area for many students to investigate and write their theses. For example, one- 
third of the accountancy postgraduate students in the Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics are researching management accounting topics in their final year projects. The 
provision of management accounting education programmes in the universities can help to 
produce trainers for the future and will definitely accelerate the building up of the strengths of 
management accounting research and application.
40 See List of Accounting Academics in China (1996). China Accounting Professors 
Association [CAPA]. Shanghai (June).
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3.2 Undergraduate Programmes
The full-time and part-time accountancy courses offered by thousands of universities, technical 
colleges, vocational schools and distance learning institutes should strengthen the contents of 
management accounting at various levels. These courses aim at equipping the accounting 
personnel with different levels of management accounting knowledge to cope with their jobs. 
Furthermore, the universities should invite more foreign management accounting experts to teach 
and give seminars. The Chinese academics can learn from their experience on how to improve 
the management accounting research and the applications in actual practice.
3.3 Technical Seminars
During the last few years, numerous Chinese accounting societies, universities, federations of 
industry and commerce, and the foreign management accounting associations (i.e. CIMA in the 
UK) have co-organised some management accounting seminars in China. Undoubtedly, these 
seminars would open up venues for the Chinese participants who are enterprise managers and 
accounting practitioners, to learn more about management accounting techniques and to 
transplant the foreign counterparts’ successful experience into their own enterprises for long-term 
economic improvement.
3.4 In-house Training
As far as the internal education and training are concerned, the major motivating force comes
from the management of state-owned enterprises. In-house training courses of different time 
spans and attendance modes have been found to be effective means to enhance the quality of the 
enterprises’ accounting staff and also the awareness of the accounting functions by the other non­
accounting staff. One example is the Shanghai No.2 Textile Machines Factory (visited in 
September 1991) which is one of the largest textile machines manufacturers in China with over 
6,000 employees. This enterprise has been conducting various accounting short courses for most 
of the employees to attend for an hour before work.
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1.2.3.2 Management Knowledge
In parallel with the economic reform and open-door policy, the management systems and 
techniques currently adopted by Chinese SOEs need to be enhanced via learning from the western 
countries41. Since the early 1990s, the promotion of the shareholding system, enterprise 
mechanisms transformation and market economy have created a favourable environment for the 
SOEs to manage their own operations, to improve the financial performance and to increase the 
benefits to the government, the enterprises and the employees.
However, it will take a long time to change the mind set and management practice of millions of 
managers in China. In Chinese enterprises management control seems to be based largely on 
loyalty, seniority and trust. Chief executives are usually very authoritarian and manage their 
enterprises through direct involvement and personal relationships, rather than through accounting 
numbers (Wang 1986; Zhang 1989). Chinese accountants frequently complain that management 
accounting is not used for management control and chief executives attach little importance to it 
(Yang 1982; Yu 1983; Wang 1986).
The general manager of China Pacific Insurance has said that over 60% of the loss-making SOEs 
in China was due to their top management malpractice and the reluctance to employ the modern 
management techniques42. For example, in a study by Meng (1991), accountants at the Beijing 
Oil Machinery Factory complained that they could not use management accounting methods 
because their senior executives know little about management accounting and they preferred to 
rely on their own business experience.
The lack of concepts of effective management and the inadequate knowledge of management 
accounting techniques among the enterprise’s senior management, who are usually old-aged 
people, have been the blocking factors against the further development of management accounting
41 This was one of the major SOE’s reform focuses promulgated in the 9th State Economic 
Plan (1996-2000). (See Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Newspaper on 24 September 1995.)
42 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 25 November 1996.
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theories and practices43. Education and training as described in Section 1.2.3.1 above should be 
one of the best ways and the long-term solution to promote this management intelligence 
transformation process.
During the National Economics and Trading Conference held from 6-8 December 1996, the China 
Vice-Premier, Mr Wu Bong Quo, pointed out that the present low economic performance in many 
SOEs was mainly due to the mis-management of the enterprise top leaders who either did not 
have the concepts to strengthen the management control or did not follow the “corporate 
compliance/governance” strictly. He suggested that a system ot “management audit’ should be 
installed in 1997 to evaluate the performance of most of the top managements in the SOEs. For 
those unqualified chief executives in the SOEs revealed after the management audit, they should 
either be replaced or subject to stringent management training. Subsequently, this management 
audit policy was being implemented in 199744.
1.2.3.3 Professionalization
The “Accounting Administration Department’ under the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is 
responsible for all the accounting affairs in China including the supervision of the accountancy 
profession via the “Chinese Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (CICPA)”. Since October 
1993, CICPA has implemented its annual “ Unified Professional Examination” (or qualifying 
examination) on the following 5 subjects:
(a) auditing;
(b) taxation;
(c) economic law;
(d) financial accounting; and
43 This weakness was pointed out in the “Report on how to reform SOEs in 1996’ 
compiled by the State Commission for Economics and Trade (see Shenzhen Economics Daily on 
9 April 1996).
44 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 10 January 1997.
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To be qualified as a CPA in China, passing the above 5 subjects is the first prerequisite. Other than 
the above-mentioned CPA examination, a “three-tier professional accounting examination” has 
been described in Section 1.2.3.1(2). This second examination has been conducted since 
November 1992 and designed for the accounting personnel to be qualified as “accountants, 
“assistant accountants” and “accounting technicians”. The “Accounting Society o f China 
(ASC)” is the largest professional accounting institution to coordinate the professional 
accountants in China. In recent years, the Accounting Administration Department of MOF has 
been very busy in drafting 30 accounting standards to be implemented before the year 2000.
Meanwhile, another team in the same department has been working hard for the auditing 
standards of which some of the planned statements and guidelines were announced and 
implemented in January 1996. Both the CICPA and ASC (and also their numerous branches in 
various cities) have been actively participating and promoting the setting of the “accounting 
standards” and “auditing standards” for the MOF.
During a China accounting and auditing seminar held in The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
in November 1996, the honourable speaker, Professor Yang Ji Wan46, was asked why the 
development of management accounting was not so significant in China. Professor Yang replied 
that the major reason was that the Accounting Administration Department of the MOF has been 
too busy in drafting the accounting and auditing standards, and therefore they had no resources 
and time to develop the management accounting practices. He also added that the education and 
training provided by the universities and colleges in China has not been enough to promote the 
theories and techniques of management accounting.
45 Management accounting is included in this subject. It has been proposed to set 
management accounting as an individual subject.
46 Prof. Yang is the (1) Ex-Secretary General of the Accounting Administration 
Department of the MOF; (2) Member, Standing Committee, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference; (3) Chairman, Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants; and
(4) Executive Vice Chairman, Accounting Society of China.
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Professor Yang said that without sound economic performance and profitability achieved by the 
SOEs, the accounting and auditing standards would not add values to the country’s wealth no 
matter how good the accounting standards, auditing standards, taxation systems and capital 
markets are. He also agreed that the MOF should take the initiative to propound the theories and 
practices of management accounting especially the responsibility accounting which has been the 
crux of management accounting in most of the SOE in China. Finally, Professor Yang remarked 
that in the long-term, a professional body such as “Institute of Management Accounting in China” 
should be established to promote the management accounting knowledge on the one hand, and 
to accredit the management accountant qualification on the other hand.
1.3 DEFINITION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The above mentioned general, specific and long-term factors/variables which have been changing 
in China since 1992 have triggered the following research problem.
“Has the Chinese Responsibility Accounting and the associated Planning and Control Systems 
in the Wholly SOEs and Shareholding SOEs been changed before and after 1992?”
This precise definition of the problem is the core of this study that the researcher will examine 
more explicitly in the hypotheses, as shown under Section 1.5, and place a boundary around the 
research, as shown under Section 1.4 (Emory & Cooper 1991).
1.4 RESEARCH MODEL
The basic concept of this research can be summarised and depicted in the model as shown in 
Figure 1 (see Appendix 3) which will be the most significant implication of this research as 
discussed in Section 8.4.1 in Chapter 8.
1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Derived from the research problem definition and domain, the following “Primary” and 
“Secondary” hypotheses are investigated.
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1.5.1 Primary Hypothesis
Mainly because of the legislation and economic changes (i.e. general factors/variables), a pre- and 
post-reform study was carried out by developing case histories of 20 SOEs over a period of time 
from 1991 to 1995 in order to identify whether any changes have been made or not in the 
“Responsibility Accounting Systems” and the associated “Planning and Control Influenced. This 
can be represented in the following null “Primary Hypothesis”.
HO ~  The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 20 SOEs investigated in this research have not changed 
before and after 1992.
1.5.2 Secondary Hypotheses
Since the 20 SOEs investigated in this research are classified into 2 types of ownership (i.e. wholly 
state-owned and shareholding enterprises), located in 4 different cities and belonging to 6 various 
industries, the following four null “Secondary Hypotheses” have been identified. They are 
believed to be affected by the three specific factors/variables, inter alia, ownership changes (for 
HI and H2), local government policies and regulations (for H3) and macro-economic control 
measures (for H4) respectively.
HI The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 12 wholly SOEs, which have remained as wholly 
SOEs after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.
H2 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 8 wholly SOEs, which have converted to 
Shareholding SOEs after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.
H3 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 20 SOEs, which are located in 4 different cities, 
have not changed before and after 1992.
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H4 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences o f the 20 SOEs, which belong to 6 different industries, 
have not changed before and after 1992.
The following table summarizes the relationships between the above identified factors/variables 
and the primary/secondary hypotheses.
Factors/Variables Hypotheses
General Legislation Changes Primary HO
Market Economy Changes Primary HO
Specific Ownership Changes Secondary H1& H2
Local Government Policies & Regulations Secondary H3
Macro-Economic Control Measures Secondary H4
Long-Term Education & Training Possibly affect all 
Primary and Secondary 
Hypotheses
Management Knowledge
Professionalization
1.5.3 Purposes of the Hypotheses
The major purposes behind testing the one primary and four secondary hypotheses are as follow:
(1) to ascertain the changes of the systems of responsibility accounting adopted by the top 
managements in the 20 SOEs investigated in this research before and after the related 
legislation, economic, ownership and government policy transformations (both general and 
specific factors/variables) started in 1992.
(2) to investigate how far the planning and control systems, which are pertinent to the styles 
of responsibility accounting, have changed under the emergence of these legislation, 
economic, ownership and government policy transformations;
(3) to identify the underlying reasons for these changes; and
(4) to understand how these changes are made and are there any external and internal 
constraints limiting the ways and extents of the changes.
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The framework used to test the above primary and secondary hypotheses is based on the 
“Management Style Grid’ propounded by Goold and Campbell (1991: 36) to identify how the 
“styles of responsibility accounting’ in the Chinese SOEs, in terms of “planning and control 
systems”, have changed under the rapid legislation, ownership and economic reforms since 1992.
The concepts and ideas of this research framework are depicted in the following matrix which is 
simpler than the Goold and Campbell’s Management Style Grid because the other four 
management styles (i.e. Holding Company, Centralized, Strategic Planning and Strategic 
Venturing) are not applicable to the SOE’s current development in China as perceived from the 
literature review and enterprise visits performed during this study (Goold & Campbell: 42-43).
STYLES OF RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING
Planning System Control System
Strategic Control Influence Financial Control Influence
High Corporate 
Influence Strategic Programming Style Financial Programming Style
Low Corporate 
influence Strategic Control Style Financial Control Style
1.6.1 Planning System/Influence
“Planning System” concerns the enterprise’s efforts to design the responsibility accounting 
system. “Planning Influence” concerns the head office’s efforts to shape strategies as they 
emerge and before decisions are taken. It is a measure of the top-down involvement of the head 
office in major decisions such as establishing responsibility centres or the setting of targets, and 
of the contribution that the head office makes to the strategy proposals developed in the business 
units. It is through planning influence that the head office seeks to improve the quality of thinking 
that surrounds major decisions.
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The head office’s influence on the proposals made by business unit managers is a function not only 
of the objectives that are set and the instructions given, but also of the atmosphere and systems 
within which the unit managers operate. The organisation structure, the review process, the type 
of guidance from the head office, the way overlaps are managed and the way scarce resources are 
allocated all have an effect on the head office planning influence.
To study and assess the “Planning Influence” on the 20 SOEs and their responsibility centres 
(both external and internal dimensions) in this research, the following 7 variables are employed:
(1) Organisation Structure*;
(2) Review Process*;
(3) Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions*;
(4) Long-Term Planning (Resource Allocation)*;
(5) Short-Term Planning/Budgeting*;
(6) Internal Responsibility Contracts#; and
(7) Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)*.
* All the 6 planning influence variables used by Goold and Campbell are employed in this study.
# This is the additional variable which is the core of the responsibility accounting system adopted 
in the SOEs in China.
The following are brief descriptions of the above 7 planning variables47 as applied in the Chinese 
context.
(1) Organisation Structure
The way the organisation is structured will affect the degree of planning influence. If a manager 
has full responsibility for a business unit or a responsibility centre, without any constraining 
overlaps or functional links with other units, he will feel less pressure to seek top-down advice 
and guidance, and he will be more prepared to fight for his bottom-up point of view. If, on the
47 Refer to Goold, M. & Campbell, A. 1991. Strategies and Styles: The Role o f the Centre 
in Managing Diversified Corporations. Blackwell Business: 36-39.
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other hand, there are extensive overlaps, coordinating committees, and dual responsibilities, the 
unit manager will feel more external influences on his planning decisions.
(2) Review Process
Most of the business units of these 20 SOEs review their plans with the head office or CEOs. In 
some enterprises this review is carried out only on the setting of targets or budgets. In others, 
the head office reviews strategic plans as well as budgets. These formal reviews provide an 
opportunity for the head office to ‘give a steer’ to the managers in the unit if they think the targets 
being proposed are weak. At the extreme, the head office can reject the proposal or issue 
instructions, but normally the head office limits its involvement to asking probing questions.
Alongside these formal reviews there is continual informal contact between the head office and 
in the business units. In these discussions the head office is trying to find out more about the 
business. And the unit manager will be testing the ground on initiatives or projects he wants to 
pursue. These informal reviews are an important part of the influence process.
(3) Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
The themes or distinctive competences, such as the “abolishment o f the three iron bowls” (iron 
employment, iron position and iron wages) in the Chinese SOEs, are often stated in the broadest 
terms. They can have important top-down impact on setting targets. But by no means the 20 
SOEs have explicit themes of this sort.
A related, but separate, type of influence stems from specification by the head office of broad 
guidelines or thrusts for particular business units. Examples are broad product range goals, 
market development objectives and competitive position. Although the business units are free to
devise plans to achieve these targets and to propose objectives consistent with them, the
guidelines provided a framework for their strategic thinking. The importance of these strategic 
thrusts varies between enterprises.
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Another way for the head office to influence plans is by making specific suggestions. The degree 
to which the head office refrained from intervening with specific suggestions reflects their 
commitment to decentralization. But even in enterprises that profess a high degree of 
decentralization, head office’s managers still from time to time make suggestions (e.g. the pricing 
of a major contract, pack size and design for a particular brand, factory layout, etc.). These may 
arise from regular budget or plan discussions, from normal reviews by head office ‘experts’, or 
from much less formal conversations. The suggestions may be based on wider central 
perspectives, external contacts, personal beliefs, detailed knowledge -- even pure prejudice. 
Whatever the basis they are unlikely to be ignored, and they form part of the top-down influence 
process.
(4) Long-Term Planning (Resource Allocation)
The ultimate and most powerful way in which the head office can influence strategy is through 
the allocation of resources. By supporting one investment project rather than another, the head 
office can affect the whole shape of the business portfolio. Some link resource allocation closely 
to long-term business plans; others adopt a more project-by-project approach. Some give 
considerable freedom to division managers; others wish to sanction even the smallest 
expenditures. Some largely react to divisional proposals; others take the lead in sponsoring 
changes in the portfolio, including acquisitions and divestments. The way the head office allocates 
resources is, therefore, a critical part of the planning influence process.
(5) Short-Term Planning/Budgeting
The head office’s attitude and practice toward letting the division or unit managers have more 
actual participation in setting plans and targets will affect the quality of the planning process and 
lead to a more meaningful performance measurement which may be linked with the remuneration 
and bonus system. There seems to be very little research in China focusing on the form and extent 
of this kind of participation which is an important component in the responsibility accounting.
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(6) Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRCs)
The IRC is the major vehicle of responsibility accounting system for many SOEs in China. An 
IRC is an agreement between the CEO and a certain responsibility centre manager stipulating the 
exact financial and non-financial targets to be achieved by the latter in a certain period of time 
which is normally of one year duration. The fulfilment of these targets will determine the levels 
of remuneration and incentive to be awarded to the responsibility centre. An IRC also defines the 
authorities and responsibilities of the both parities (i.e. contractor and contractee). Further 
details are described in Section 2.14 of Chapter 2.
(7) Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
The head office’s influence in the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions is exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between business units need to be managed. 
The coordination of functional strategies; cross-supply and transfer pricing between divisions or 
units in a vertically integrated chain; sharing or transfer of expertise; exploitation of a shared 
resource, lead to opportunities for intervention. The extent of overlaps is determined largely by 
decisions on the divisional and business structure of the enterprise. The degree of influence which 
the head office exerts, however, is a function of how active the head office wants to be in 
resolving the overlap issues.
1.6.2 Control System/Influence
Control is the final stage of the management process. It includes the steps managers take to 
ensure that organisational strategies are implemented, or, if conditions warrant, that strategies are 
modified. Management control is thus fundamentally concerned with ensuring that appropriate 
actions are taken to implement overall organisational plans, and with monitoring the effectiveness 
of such action and plans (Emmanuel, Otley & Merchant 1990: 109-110).
“Accounting Control System” mainly involves monitoring the operation, collecting of financial 
and non-financial data, reporting of performance, measuring and evaluating the performance and 
rewarding or penalizing according to results.
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“Control Influence” concerns the way in which the head office reacts to results achieved. 
Whereas planning influence is about the ‘inputs’ to decision, control influence is about the results 
of decisions ~ the ‘outputs’ such as profit or market share. Control influence arises from the 
targets that the head office agrees with its business units, the way the head office reacts to poor 
performance, and the frequency with which the head office monitors results. Control influence 
has its most immediate impact on day-to-day actions -- how strategy is implemented. But it can 
also indirectly influence thinking and choices about future strategies.
For example, a manager who follows a risky strategy that fails is likely to interpret his experience 
very differently depending on whether he receives a bonus that year or not. And his interpretation 
will affect the choices he makes about strategy in the future. The budget process, the capital 
appropriation system, and the strategic planning system provide the formal framework for control, 
which is essentially a linked process of agreeing objectives, monitoring results and applying 
pressure and incentives.
To study and assess the “Control Influence” on the 20 SOEs and their responsibility centres 
(both external and internal dimensions) in this research, the following 4 variables are employed:
(1) Decentralisation & Control#;
(2) Agreeing Objectives*;
(3) Monitoring Results*; and
(4) Rewards & Incentives*.
* All the 3 control influence variables used by Goold and Campbell are employed in this research.
# This is the additional variable which is a typical element of control in the responsibility 
accounting system adopted in the SOEs in China.
The followings are brief descriptions of the above 4 planning variables48.
48 Refer to Goold, M. & Campbell, A. 1991. Strategies and Styles: The Role o f the 
Centre in Managing Diversified Corporations. Blackwell Business: 40-41.
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(1) Decentralisation & Control
In large enterprises, centralised decision making can lead to inefficiencies in both the timeliness 
and quality of decisions and control actions. Decentralisation refers to the extent to which 
decisions are taken by unit managers rather than head office or CEOs. Any form of 
decentralisation creates considerable problems of integration and coordination. The head office’s 
prime tasks are overall planning, control and the integration of divisional activities into a coherent 
whole. Thus in a very large enterprise, decentralisation can represent an important form of 
control, requiring its own specific type of management information system such as responsibility 
accounting for its effective operation.
(2) Agreeing Objectives
The setting of objectives is the first step of the control process. Enterprises differ widely in how 
they establish objectives. Some may emphasize the product or service quality, others may rely 
on annual profit numbers when setting objectives. There are differences in the precision and detail 
of targets; the balance between objective and subjective measures; the time frame for achievement; 
the influence of the centre in proposing and agreeing objectives; the degree o f ‘stretch’ built into 
objectives; and the emphasis on financial versus non-financial targets. These differences are 
important to the type of control influence adopted by the head office.
(3) Monitoring Results
All the enterprises investigated in this research ask their business units or responsibility centres 
to report results monthly, and for some there are weekly reports (i.e. production results), ad hoc 
questions and many informal ways for the head office to check on how well the business unit or 
responsibility centre is performing. The way in which the head office seeks out performance 
information, the type of information it asks for, and the arrangements it has for discussing the 
results with managers are all part of the control process.
(4) Rewards & Incentives
The follow through on performance achieved is also important. Where bonuses are linked to 
performance targets, or where careers are at risk, the pressure of the control process is enhanced.
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The reaction of the head office to poor performers varies among enterprises and is an important 
influence both on the sorts of strategies that unit or centre managers are likely to propose and on 
the actions they take during the year.
One of the major aims of a responsibility accounting system is to induce individuals to behave in 
ways which contribute to overall enterprise performance, such as fulfilling the profit target agreed 
between an SOE and the government in China. An important element of the control process is 
therefore concerned with how and why individuals are motivated to act. Central to effective 
motivation is the link between incentives (i.e. rewards and/or penalties) and those aspects of 
behaviour (i.e. content and process motivational theories) that it is wished to encourage.
There seems to be little difficulty in providing incentives that will encourage behaviours designed 
to gain them particularly in the SOEs; the major problem lies in ensuring that achievement of the 
required measures of performance is done in the desired manner. That is, it is devising adequate 
systems of performance measurement that is crucial to linking performance with rewards.
1.6.3 Responsibility Accounting Styles
Referring to the research framework depicted at the beginning of this Section 1.6, the four 
specified “Responsibility Accounting Styles” are summarised and defined as follows49:
Planning Influence Control Influence Responsibility Accounting Style
High Corporate Tight Strategic Strategic Programming (1)
High Corporate Tight Financial Financial Programming (2)
Low Corporate Tight Strategic Strategic Control (3)
Low Corporate Tight Financial Financial Control (4)
49 Refer to Goold, M. & Campbell, A. 1991. Strategies and Styles: The Role o f the Centre 
in Managing Diversified Corporations. Blackwell Business: 42-43.
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(1) Strategic Programming
The head office or CEOs are involved in developing targets at the business unit level, but in 
addition it attempts to set clear performance targets and to insist that they are met. The style 
embraces detailed planning, central sponsorship of strategy and tight control against financial 
objectives and strategic milestones.
(2) Financial Programming
Although broad strategic directions are left to the business units, the head office will suggest, even 
dictate, which financial results and ratios can be improved. This is in addition to sanctioning 
targets and capital expenditures.
(3) Strategic Control
The head office prefers to leave the initiative in the development of plans to business unit 
managers. The head office does review and criticize the system, but they use reviews as a check 
on the quality of thinking of business unit managers, rather than as an opportunity to give 
direction. The control process is an important influence mechanism for the head office. Targets 
are set for strategic objectives (such as market share) as well as financial performance, and 
managers are expected to meet the targets. Targets can only be missed when important strategic 
objectives are at stake.
(4) Financial Control
The head office’s influence is exercised mainly through the target setting process. The head 
office’s role in developing strategies is limited, and long-term plans are not formally reviewed by 
the head office. Instead, the head office focuses on a close review of the annual target setting 
exercise. Profit targets are set when the whole system is approved, and careers are at stake if 
targets are missed.
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1.7 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE
Since the early 1980s, the “economic reform” in China has attracted substantial foreign 
investments or capital year after year50 and at the same time this “open-door policy” has 
compelled the “accounting reform ” which had to be undertaken by doing away with the Soviet 
Accounting Model and moving towards the “International Accounting Standards” and as a 
result about 30 standards will be implemented in China before the end of the year 2000 (Yang 
1994, 1996). In parallel with the formulation of financial accounting standards, many government 
officials (especially in the Ministry of Finance), accounting practitioners and academics have 
realised the importance of “management accounting’ which could be employed as a very useful 
management tool to improve the productivity and efficiency of the Chinese enterprises on the one 
hand and to revive the loss-making SOEs on the other hand.
The most widely used management accounting technique by the SOEs in China is “responsibility 
accounting” which has been refined and systemized since 1987. Besides the immense promotion 
of responsibility accounting theories by the accounting academics through the teaching 
programmes and materials, many accounting practitioners in various industries have been sharing 
their experiences in applying responsibility accounting through business meetings, training 
sessions, educational seminars and accounting journals. However, systematic, academic and 
empirical research on this specific topic can hardly be found in the accounting and management 
literature.
Through this research project and writing up the thesis, the following contributions to the 
knowledge of responsibility accounting (or management accounting) in China are identified:
(1) to ascertain the diversity of practices in the Responsibility Accounting Systems adopted 
by the Chinese SOEs due to the legislation, ownership, economic and government policy 
changes (the general and specific factors/variables as shown in the Research Domain (i.e. 
Section 1.4)) in the 1990s;
50 The State Statistics Bureau reported that the accumulated total amount of foreign- 
invested capital from 1980-1996 in China was over US$160 billion according to Wen Wei Po 
(Hong Kong Newspaper) on 12 December 1996.
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(2) to compare the pace of changes in the Responsibility Accounting Styles and the associated 
Planning and Control Systems in terms of the following “matching-pairs”:
2.1 Wholly SOEs before and after 1992;
2.2 Wholly SOEs before 1992 and Shareholding SOEs after 1992;
2.3 SOEs located in different cities before and after 1992; and
2.4 SOEs belonging to various industries before and after 1992;
(3) to identify and understand the reasons, ways, extents and limitations of the changes 
discovered in (1) and (2) above;
(4) to recommend some means to improve the effectiveness of the Responsibility Accounting 
System practised in China in terms of the Planning and Control aspects; and
(5) to recommend future potential research for future management accounting research 
especially in the Planning and Control areas.
1.8 RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY
1.8.1 Tripartite Link
Since 1989, a tripartite link was established by the Accountancy Departments of the University 
of Glasgow (UOG), Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SUFE) and The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University (HKPU) with financial sponsorship from the British Council. The major 
purpose of this tripartite link was for academic exchanges and collaborations among the three 
parties in terms of research, teaching and studying. Supported by this link, the researcher, as a 
lecturer of the HKPU, was seconded to SUFE in August/September 1991 for one month for 
learning the accounting system in China, giving lectures to SUFE’s undergraduates, exploring 
joint-research with SUFE’s academic staff and visiting some State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in 
Shanghai. Specific focus was put on the management accounting aspect in all of these activities.
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With the great assistance from SUFE’s faculty members, especially Professor Feng Zheng Quan, 
and some postgraduates, the researcher visited 8 large-sized manufacturing SOEs in Shanghai as 
listed in Section 1.1.4 above. From the interviews with the senior managements of these SOEs 
and observations in the plant tours, the researcher learnt a lot about the political, social, 
economical, organisational and behavioural factors affecting the management accounting 
development in China since the 1950s. This was an early identification of a preliminary research 
problem for the subsequent research activity and literature search, and so was an important early 
part of the PhD research project (Zuber-Skerritt & Knight 1986). Before returning to Hong Kong 
at the end of September 1991, the researcher had decided to focus his future research interest in 
“Management Accounting in China”.
1.8.2 PhD Programme
After talking to Professor John Dickinson, who was the Head of Department in Accounting and 
Finance in the University of Glasgow, during his visit to the HKPU in October 1991, the 
researcher had great interest to apply for the Part-time Overseas PhD Programme in Accounting 
and Finance of UOG. Having had only two months’ preparation for an initial research proposal 
entitled “Management Accounting in China”, the researcher presented to a departmental doctoral 
seminar in the Department of Accounting and Finance in UOG before the Christmas in 1991. 
Many constructive and thoughtful comments were given by the faculty members although the 
acceptability of this research proposal could not be determined by the Director of Postgraduate 
Studies, Professor John Holland. Fortunately, Professor Clive Emmanuel indicated his intention 
to provide the researcher further guidance to redefine the whole research proposal. Under the 
extremely helpful and insightful guidance from Professor Emmanuel in the next few days after the 
presentation, the researcher got a clearer picture in formulating a second and better research plan.
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1.8.3 Research Design
Upon returning to Hong Kong in early January 1992, the researcher immediately expanded his 
literature research concerning the management accounting practices in China. Furthermore, the 
researcher went to Shanghai in the same month to revisit some SOEs again in order to gain a 
more in-depth understanding of their “Responsibility Accounting Systems” which was the niche 
of research for the PhD programme. With the continuous academic support from Professor 
Emmanuel through correspondence between Glasgow and Hong Kong, the researcher prepared 
the second research proposal entitled “Responsibility Accounting Development in China” and 
presented it to another departmental doctoral seminar in UOG during April 1992. Again, more 
constructive suggestions were raised by the faculty members for brushing up the research 
proposal in some areas. At the end of this study trip to Glasgow, Professor Emmanuel was 
informally appointed as the Supervisor for this PhD research. After some revisions on the 
research proposal and clearing some administrative procedures in UOG and HKPU, the researcher 
was registered as a PhD student in the University of Glasgow in September 1992.
During the second half of 1992, with the assistance of some faculty members in a few Chinese 
universities, the researcher visited and revisited many SOEs (as listed in Section 1.1.4 above) in 
Shanghai, Hangzhou, Xiamen and Shenzhen in order to understand the contemporary issues 
related to the responsibility accounting systems operated in those SOEs. Meanwhile, continuous 
literature review was performed in China and Hong Kong to enrich the design of the research 
plan.
The researcher stayed in University of Glasgow for his first 3-month “residential period” from 
January to March 1993 in order to (1) undertake course work; (2) carry out literature research;
(3) meet with the Supervisor regularly; (4) determine the research plan and timetable with the 
Supervisor; and (5) set the research instrument and agree with the Supervisor. The skeleton of 
the research design was described in Sections 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 above.
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1.8.4 Research Methodology
“Case Study Approach ” as agreed with Professor Emmanuel in 1992 has been the research
methodology adopted by this study because of the following reasons.
(1) This research is classified as an “Exploratory Case Study” which is used to explore the 
practices for responsibility accounting in China. It enables the researcher to generate 
hypotheses to test the changes of these accounting practices. Further propositions and 
hypotheses can be tested subsequently in larger scale studies. As such, the case study 
represents a preliminary investigation which is intended to generate ideas and hypotheses 
for rigorous empirical testing at a later stage (Scapens 1990: 265; Ryan, Scapens & 
Theobald 1992: 115). Furthermore, management accounting research case studies (e.g. 
the present study) have an explanatory role and are central to the processes of theory 
construction and development (Scapens 1992; Otley & Berry 1994).
(2) External validity is a major concern in this study although multiple-cases (i.e. 20 cases)
have been investigated by replicating the same semi-structured questionnaire (i.e. research 
instrument). Critics typically state that single cases offer a poor basis for generalization. 
However such critics are implicitly contrasting the situation to research, where a “sample” 
(if selected correctly) readily generalizes to a large universe. This analogy to samples and 
universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies. This is because survey research 
relies on statistical generalization, whereas case studies rely on analytical generalization 
(Yin 1984: 43).
(3) Case study approach is more suitable for such a longitudinal study (i.e. from 1991 to
1995) in which the same enterprises, the same personnel (in most of the cases) and the 
same type of questions can be examined under the guidance of the same researcher.
(4) Through interviews (a combination of open-ended and focused questions, see Yin 1984:
89), more qualitative information can be acquired to explain the observed phenomenon 
and more accurate data can be obtained from multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1984: 95- 
98) which can maintain the ‘construct validity’ of the study (Yin 1984: 41).
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(5) By using questionnaire survey either through mailing or by-hand to complete such an 
extensive coverage of research is very difficult because the respondents may lose 
enthusiasm easily.
(6) The SOEs in China are very reluctant to disclose their information, in particular the 
accounting data, in black and white due to the strict confidentiality rules imposed by the 
government and the communist party. Therefore, conducting empirical research by 
circulating questionnaires in China, the response rate may be almost zero.
(7) The extremely low response rate by using questionnaire survey as experienced by many 
researchers including this researcher, makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to come up 
with some sorts of “generalization” which is not required by this research study.
(8) Performing this kind of case study research is an interactive process and requires the
development of social, as well as academic, skills. The researcher had to spend years of
time to interview repeatedly many managers in the Chinese enterprises and also work with 
many academics in some Chinese universities. It is not an ‘ivory tower’ activity which 
was far removed from reality and from social contact with others (Phillips & Pugh 1987: 
11).
1.9 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
There is no perfect research design in the world. There are always some drawbacks or loopholes 
in every empirical research and this research study is no exception. Research limitations in a few 
areas of this project are explained below.
(1) Literature Review
The purpose of literature review is to identify what has been written on the subject and to 
synthesize in a critical review which demonstrates some awareness of the current state of 
knowledge on the subject, its limitations, and how the proposed research aims to add to what is 
known (Gill & Johnson 1991: 21). In this research, the literature concerning the responsibility
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accounting was limited to publications in the Chinese accounting textbooks and journals and they 
largely referred to the basic concepts and principles of responsibility accounting without 
describing the real-life practices, problems and solutions of its operation in the Chinese 
enterprises. Furthermore, responsibility accounting articles published in the international 
accounting journals were limited as well. The lack of prior research might have confined the 
scope o f this research project and the design o f research instrument, but compelled the 
researcher to employ exploratory case study method in this research.
(2) Research Methodology
“Exploratory Case Study” approach51 has been considered to be the appropriate methodology to 
be adopted in this research, but the obvious outcome was hardly any “generalisation” could be 
made due to only 20 Chinese enterprises being visited. To interpret, consolidate and report such 
a huge volume of data and information collected through interviews was not easy although a semi­
structured questionnaire and tape recorder had been used. This experience has verified the fact 
that case study research is remarkably hard, even though case studies have traditionally been 
considered to be ‘soft’ research. Paradoxically, the ‘softer’ a research technique, the harder it is 
to do (Yin 1984: 26). Interpretation poses burden on researcher to be as unbiased as possible and 
hence using Goold and Campbell’s model as a framework.
(3) Questionnaire Design
The lack of prior research has constrained the scope of the research instrument (i.e. semi­
structured questionnaire) designed for this case study research. The many observations and 
understandings obtained in the pilot visits (over 13 SOEs) have enriched the breadth and depth 
of many areas in the semi-structured questionnaire which could only be completed after a few 
visits to each enterprise. The holistic ideal of studying all aspects of the responsibility accounting 
system in China is clearly unattainable and some limits on the subject matter should be placed 
(Scapens 1990: 276).
51 Exploratory research is qualitative and asks ‘what are the variables involved?’ (see 
Easterby-Smith et al 1991).
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(4) Sample Size
As suggested by Parkhe (1993: 255), the research method (i.e. case study) and instrument (i.e. 
extensive semi-structured questionnaire) employed in this study could not avoid the problem that 
the number of SOEs (i.e. sample size) investigated was limited to 20 within the timespan 
available.
(5) Selection of Sample
The case study approach has proved to be feasible in this research but how did the researcher 
select the targeted SOEs? The researcher had to rely on some academic staff contacts of the 
universities in China who could introduce the researcher to some enterprise managers to start off 
the research dialogue. Therefore, the freedom to choose a portfolio of enterprises to be 
investigated was somehow controlled by these academic counterparts although the researcher 
could suggest which types of enterprise to be included. But in ‘exploratory case’ research, the 
selection of the particular case for study is relatively unimportant. What is needed is a case within 
the relevant area which will enable the researcher to begin the process of theory (or hypothesis) 
development (Scapens 1990: 273).
(6) Extraneous Variables
The unanticipated or extraneous variables are possible threats to the ‘internal validity’ of 
research especially to the causal or explanatory studies. But this logic is inapplicable to 
descriptive or exploratory studies (whether the studies are case studies, surveys, or experiments), 
which are not concerned with making causal statements (Yin 1984: 43).
The possible existence and influence of extraneous variables have been assessed carefully during 
the pilot tests (visits), literature review and instrument design. However, the rapid political, social 
and economical changes in China may introduce a few unanticipated variables related to the core 
of this study. New commercial legislations, upsurge of inflation and high interest rate are typical 
examples which are proved to be influences affecting the responsibility accounting system design 
in this research.
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(7) Quantitative Analysis
Kaplan (1986c: 103-115) recognises the many roles for quantitative models and statistical analysis 
not only in testing hypotheses but rather in model building, structuring data banks and in data 
analysis. He also argues that much more concern should be given to how managements interact 
creatively with their environments. This agrees with Coates (1983) who states that researchers 
should observe organizations in order to see whether their activities can be modelled in any 
general way. However, in some PhD research, there may be a mix of qualitative research 
questions and quantitative hypotheses, and a case study methodology can combine both in either 
exploratory and explanatory research (Yin 1984). Therefore, although the original design of this 
research was qualitatively (or fieldwork) oriented without the requirement of using very 
sophisticated quantitative methods to analyse the data, yet some parametric and non-parametric 
statistical methods have been employed to test the defined hypotheses and their implications 
quantitatively as far as the data merits.
(8) Cultural Difference
The lack of working and learning experience in China of the researcher before undertaking this 
project has come up with a certain extent of cultural difference in a sense that sometimes the 
researcher might find difficulties in understanding the underlying meanings behind the information 
and data provided by the interviewees. This situation has become less significant as the learning 
and research process was accomplished.
(9) Language Barrier
Although the researcher’s proficiency in Putonghua (official language in China) has improved 
substantially during the years of working in China, it might yet have been a barrier in 
communicating with the interviewees in these 20 SOEs.
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(10) Time Constraint
As a part-time PhD student having a full-time teaching job, the researcher has found insufficient 
time travelling in China to visit the targeted 20 SOEs more frequently in order to collect more 
information and data to substantiate the findings although great assistance and patience have been 
granted by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University to the researcher. Furthermore, the time 
constraint did not allow the researcher to send the transcripts of interview to the participants (or 
interviewees) for verification, to increase the number of visits per case study and to interview 
more managers in each case study.
1.10 RESEARCH THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter 1 explains the general background and specific factors leading to the research problem 
and the design of this research including the domain, hypotheses, framework, significance, 
methodology and limitations.
Chapter 2 describes the in-depth literature search on topics relevant to the theories and practices 
of Responsibility Accounting adopted in the western countries on one hand, and the development, 
applications and problems of responsibility accounting in China on the other hand.
Chapter 3 reviews the classical research paradigms in social science and justifies the specific 
research methodology employed for this study, and then narrates the whole research procedures.
Chapter 4 is the first part of data analysis providing the key background information of the 
subjects (20 SOEs) under the research.
Chapter 5 is the second part of data analysis describing the 7 variables which determine the 
planning system or influence in these 20 SOEs.
Chapter 6 is the third part of data analysis narrating the 4 variables which ascertain the control 
system or influence in these 20 SOEs.
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Chapter 7 discloses the research findings after tentatively inspecting the hypotheses and identifies 
the reasons, ways, extents and limitations of the planning and control changes.
Chapter 8 summarizes the major findings and implications of the research, and also suggests 
some related areas for further research.
Attached to this Thesis (Volume 1), there are two separate volumes of case and data analyses. 
Volume 2 contains the 20 Case Analyses dedicated to assess the changes of planning and control 
influences, and the resultant responsibility accounting styles of the 20 SOEs investigated. Volume 
3 includes the 20 Data Analyses (or data transcriptions) providing the detail information obtained 
during the repeated interviews of these 20 SOEs over the period from September 1991 to 
February 1995. The latter two volumes of documentation are not only supporting the facts and 
findings described in the Thesis (Volume 1), but also providing rich information for further studies 
of this topic and other related ones.
1.11 CONCLUSION
The first chapter of this thesis explains the general background and specific factors leading to the 
research problem and the design of this research includes the domain, hypotheses, framework, 
significance, methodology and limitations. In fact, this chapter outlines the whole research 
process beginning from the literature review to writing the thesis. The most important purpose 
of this research is to make a contribution to the development of responsibility accounting or 
management accounting in China (i.e. current state of knowledge) and to identify factors, 
propositions and hypotheses for future research in the same chosen field or related disciplines. 
After all, the work of this PhD project is essentially a “research training process” (Phillips and 
Pugh 1987: 31). It does not mean an enormous breakthrough which has the subject rocking on 
its foundations, but instead it is a stepping-stone for the researcher to explore further academic 
and empirical research in his career.
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter of literature review is divided into two parts. Part A describes the literature search 
on topics and materials relevant to the theories and practices of Responsibility Accounting 
adopted in the western countries. Firstly, the definitions, historical development and some 
contemporary issues of management accounting are sketched out as background leading to the 
framework of responsibility accounting employed in the west (Section 2.2).
Secondly, the theoretical propositions and research findings of the major components of 
responsibility accounting are discussed (Sections 2.3-2.7) . They include organizational theories, 
control systems, performance measurement, performance appraisal and rewards which are 
identified as reference factors to investigate and evaluate the responsibility accounting system 
practised in China. Thirdly, the contingency theory in terms of some contingent variables and 
cultural aspects relevant to the management accounting system are highlighted in order to explain 
and qualify some of the findings in this research (Sections 2.8 & 2.9). Furthermore, this part of 
the literature search can foster some hints for future research related to responsibility accounting 
or management accounting in China (see Chapter 9). Finally, the challenge of how to put 
management accounting research into practice to serve the needs of new businesses and industrial 
environments is mentioned in the overview (Section 2.10).
Part B focuses on the evolution of responsibility accounting in China which is a very unique 
planning and control system in such a large developing and socialist country. First of all, the 
general impact of China’s recent economic reform on the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has 
urged the needs of setting up of a responsibility accounting system which is an important 
milestone in the management accounting development in China (Sections 2.11-2.13). Then the 
infrastructure of the responsibility accounting system practised in the SOEs is narrated (Section 
2.14). Finally, the discussions on the major problems encountered by the SOEs in implementing 
the responsibility accounting system provide some insights into the field work in this research 
(Section 2.15). Lastly, Section 2.16 is a concluding comment on the whole chapter.
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PART A : WESTERN COUNTRIES
2.2 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST
2.2.1 Definitions of Management Accounting
The American Accounting Association (AAA) views accounting as “the process o f identifying, 
measuring and communicating economic information to permit informed judgements and 
decisions by users o f the information (p.])1”.
Management accounting is concerned with the provision of information to managers who make 
decisions about the ways in which an organisation’s resources should be allocated (Arnold & 
Hope 1990: 5). In an informational context, management accounting is the process of producing 
financial and operating information for organizational employees and managers. The process 
should be driven by the informational needs of individuals internal to the organization and should 
guide their operating and investment decisions (Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan & Young 1995: 4). 
The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) expands the definition of 
management accounting in the following manner.
‘An integral part o f management concerned with identifying, presenting and interpreting 
information usedfor formulating strategy; planning and controlling activities; decision making; 
optimising the use o f resources; disclosure to shareholders and others external to the entity; 
disclosure to employees; and safeguarding assets. The above involves participation in 
management to ensure that there is effective formulation ofplans to meet objectives (strategic 
planning); formulation o f short-term operation plans (budgeting/profit planning); acquisition 
and use o f finance (financial management) and recording o f transactions (financial accounting 
and cost accounting); communication o f financial and operating information; corrective action 
to bring plans and results into line (financial control); and reviewing and reporting on systems 
and operations (internal audit, management audit).2'
1 American Accounting Association. 1966. A Statement o f Basic Accounting Theory.
2 CIMA. 1991. Management Accounting Official Terminology: 13.
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2.2.2 Historical Development of Management Accounting
A case written by Jones (1985) revealed that some basic cost and management accounting 
concepts existed even in the eighteenth century though not necessarily expressed in the language 
of modem accounting. Studies in the United Kingdom suggest that some of the ideas of early and 
mid-twentieth-century management accounting were understood and used by a number of firms 
in the nineteenth century (Wells 1977). Before the Second World War, management accounting 
was essentially concerned with such cost accounting issues as the determination of product costs. 
The production technology was relatively simple and it was fairly easy to identify labour and 
material costs. During the 1930s the focus on product costs was supplemented by work on 
budgets and responsibility accounting (see Section 2.3 below), and extended to divisional 
performance measurement and transfer pricing in the 1950 (Ashton, Hopper & Scapens 1991: 4). 
After the Second World War there was an increasing awareness of the view that cost information, 
in particular, and accounting information, in general should be appropriate to the needs of users, 
especially decision-makers (Scapens & Arnold 1986: 79).
Homgren (1995) reinforces that the management accounting system has two simultaneous 
missions: (1) transmission of information to help reach wise economic decisions; and (2) 
motivation of users toward organizational goals.
2.2.3 Contemporary Issues of Management Accounting
Bromwich (1988) points out two major problems of management accounting. One major problem 
is management accounting does not seem to have a sound theoretical basis. Management 
accounting is represented in journals and textbooks as a set of weakly-related subjects which have 
not been integrated at a theoretical level. In China, management accounting theories have recently 
been mentioned in academic textbooks (Li 1994). The recent history of finance indicates the 
revolution that could be accomplished if a mobilising theory could be provided for management 
accounting.
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A second major problem is that much of management accounting theory, although in existence 
for many years, has had little impact on, routine management accounting. For example, many 
authoritative academic criticisms of overhead allocation seem to have had little impact on practice, 
even though such criticisms figure in most education courses and professional examinations. The 
evidence is that practical management in the West is still using the management accounting of the 
early 1950s, though theory would seem to play a part in ad hoc or one-off decision making. A 
link must exist between the particular processes considered to be required for organisational 
success and the technicalities of the management accounting task (Bromwich & Bhimani 1994: 
232).
In effect, Kaplan (1983, 1984b, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1988a, 1988b) sees management accounting 
as lagging behind the times especially in view of technological developments and as presently 
facing the important challenge to devise new internal accounting systems supportive of 
companies’ changed manufacturing strategies. His view is that in many instances, by the late 
1980s, companies had recognized the limitations of traditional cost accounting systems for 
measuring, motivating, and evaluating manufacturing performance (Kaplan 1990: 10).
In the early 1990s, a major survey was carried out aimed at examining cost management 
techniques and practices in use and those being planned for introduction at UK manufacturing 
enterprises (Davies & Sweeting 1991a, 1991b). The sample comprised 677 manufacturing 
companies in a cross-section of industries. This survey reveals that cost management information 
is most widely used for control, product pricing, investment justification and management 
performance. Respondents indicated that by introducing advanced costing techniques and 
practices into their organisations, they expected to obtain significant benefits, particularly to 
improve product profitability and cost reduction and obtain more timely and relevant management 
information. In terms of specific cost management techniques being used and planned, activity 
based costing (ABC) was the most commonly cited and life cycle costing the least. The survey 
also revealed that manufacturing resources planning was the most highly used (or planned) 
manufacturing technique and flexible manufacturing systems the least cited. The emergence of 
novel management accounting practices, according to Davies & Sweeting (1991a: 44) are far
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from revolutionising practices in the manufacturing sector3.
2.3 RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING IN THE WEST
As a key integral part of management accounting, Responsibility Accounting has been developed 
in the Western countries since the 1930s. Higgins (1952) defines responsibility accounting system 
as “a  new approach to accounting and reporting which is the development o f an accounting 
system designed to control expenditures by directly relating the reporting o f expenditures to the 
individuals in the company organization who are responsible for their control. This system 
results in the preparation o f accounting statements for all levels o f management, designed 
primarily so that they can be effectively used by the operating people as a tool in controlling 
their operations and costs4”.
Decentralization becomes necessary when organizations increase in size. Top management 
typically creates areas of responsibility, which are known as responsibility centres, and assigns 
subordinate managers to those areas. Melumad, Mookheijee and Reichelstein (1992) consider 
a principal-agent model to examine the effectiveness of responsibility centres, in particular cost 
or profit centres. They show that rather than contracting with each agent directly, the principal 
can create equally powerful incentives by setting up a responsibility centre structure. The 
principal contracts with only the ‘manager’ of the centre and delegates contracting with other 
agents and coordinating their activities to the manager. The principal then must monitor some 
measures of financial performance such as the centre’s cost or profit5.
3 As observed in the 20 Chinese SOEs investigated in this research, the present 
technological and manufacturing environments are not yet justified to employ the advanced and 
contemporary management accounting techniques and practices.
4 A similar description can be found in many Chinese management accounting textbooks 
such as He and Lin (1991).
5 As evidenced in many of the 20 SOEs studied in this research, the government authority 
(principal) enters into an Economic Responsibility Contract with the general manager (agent) of 
an enterprise and delegates contracting (e.g. via Internal Responsibility Contracts) with other 
agents (e.g. production managers) and coordinating their activities to the general manager.
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Effective planning and control systems are structured around the implicit or explicit areas of 
responsibility within the organization (DeCoster, Schafer & Ziebell 1988: 549). Planning 
identifies where the whole organization or individual responsibility centres is/are going. The 
strategies developed during planning identify the steps that the organization will follow to reach 
its goals. The short-term objectives (e.g. budgeting system) identify where the organization or 
centres plan to allocate their resources in various operations. The performance measurement and 
evaluation systems are the controls that the organization uses to ensure that individual 
responsibility centres are on track toward achieving their plans and the overall goal in aggregate.
Therefore, planning and control work together. Without control, planning is meaningless because 
there is no follow up to identify whether plans are being achieved and, if not, why they are not 
being achieved. Without planning, control is meaningless because there is no target, or plan, 
against which results are compared (Atkinson et al 1995: 443)
If planning is a process of continually establishing ends and courses of action, control is the 
process of ensuring that these courses of action are maintained and that the desired ends are 
achieved. It is the process of continually ensuring conformance to expectation (Dermer 1977). 
Control is concerned with the successful implementation of a course of action as predetermined 
by a decision model and with feedback that might (a) change the future plans given the model, and 
(b) possibly change the decision model itself (Homgren 1982). Management control can be 
defined as a systematic effort by business management to compare performance to predetermined 
standards, plans, or objectives in order to determine whether performance is in line with these 
standards and presumably, in order to take any remedial action required to see that human and 
other resources are being used in the most effective and efficient way possible in achieving 
corporate objectives (Amey & Egginton 1973; Mockler 1973: 14).
The approach described above reflects that traditional responsibility accounting system includes 
five aspects. First, a responsibility centre is identified with the responsibility defined in 
accounting terms (e.g. costs or profits). Second, an accounting standard or benchmark is set, 
usually through budgeting. Third, a reward system is established to encourage managers to
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provide good performance. Fourth, a manager’s performance is measured by comparing actual 
performance with budgeted performance. Fifth, managers are rewarded or penalized according 
to the policies and discretion of higher management (Hansen & Mowen 1994: 612)6.
This literature on responsibility accounting embodies a variety of theories of behaviour and 
organization. Examples include expectancy theory (Hackman & Lawler 1971: 259-286; Lawler 
1973; Ronen & Livingstone 1975; Brownell & Mclnnes 1986), contingency theory (Bruns & 
Waterhouse 1975; Merchant 1984), neoclassical economics (Gordon 1964: 1-26), and principal- 
agent modeling (Baiman 1982). Principal-agent modeling emphasizes information asymmetries 
in understanding responsibility accounting. In particular, the link between controllability and 
informativeness (Holmstrom 1979, 1982, Baiman & Demski 1980; Antle & Demski 1988) has 
been well explicated, and the use of relative performance evaluation (Demski & Sappington 1984; 
Antle & Smith 1986; Ma, Moore & Turnbull 1988) has received significant attention.
2.4 ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES
2.4.1 Decentralization and Coordination
The participative model of management is more than human relations. The participative approach 
also incorporates an alternative to bureaucracy as a means of coordination. Developing a 
technology of ‘loose coupling’ may be one mechanism for creating order without destroying 
individual responsibility (Glassman 1973; Weick 1976; Ouchi 1979; Weick & Orton 1990). The 
creation of decentralised organizational structures is a mechanism for de-coupling large 
organization into smaller units. Sub-units may be somehow attached but each unit retains some 
separateness and the attachment may be infrequent, weak, unimportant and/or lack mutual 
response7. Likert (1967a) suggests an alternative means of coordination. He suggests the use of
6 These 5 components of responsibility accounting were observed during the pilot 
enterprise visits carried out during the period from September 1991 to December 1992 (see 
Section 1.1.4 in Chapter 1) before the proposal and instrument of this research were determined 
in March 1993.
7 Divisions or profit centres of the 4 department stores investigated in this research are 
using this loose-coupling concept since they have minimal interdependencies with each other.
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‘group structures' in organizations which would provide support to each member of the group. 
These groups would be coordinated through a series o f ‘linking pins’ or integrators.
In general, within the participative approach, there has been a tendency to suggest organizational 
structures that are intended to widen individual group autonomy and discretion. These structures 
have, on the one hand, involved apparent decentralization of decision-making (typically viewed 
as merely involving participation in discussing means to achieve given goals) and, on the other 
hand, coordination to achieve consistency through project teams, integrating units and committees 
as well as the mechanisms which are part of the repertoire of scientific management (e.g. rules, 
plans, etc.) (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967)8.
But whilst management could have a role in aiding and sustaining new forms of work 
organization, the role has not been well explicated. Informal information systems (Galbraith 
1973; Clancy & Collins 1979) would seem to play an important role in organizations emphasizing 
lateral communication. Formal management accounting systems that embrace the participative 
model of management are not well-developed. Management accounting systems such as 
responsibility accounting, standard costing and product cost accumulation systems tend to be 
hierarchical in nature. Management accounting systems that seem to be a part of decentralized 
structures appear, on close inspection, to revert to the scientific management model (Watson & 
Baumler 1975). Even decentralized accounting systems based on decomposition programming 
methods which are intended to encourage divisional autonomy and independence, ultimately 
require centralized information flows and rigid rules that enforce central authority (Baumol & 
Farbian 1964; Govindarajan & Gupta 1985)9.
8 Some SOEs studied in this research adopt this group-structures approach especially 
where the interdependencies among the responsibility centres are high (e.g. BCM3, SCM2, 
SSW5, SXSW).
9 As observed in many of these 20 SOEs, the strategic themes and thrusts, budgeting 
guidelines and performance reporting systems are the major centralized information flows and 
rigid rules that enforce government and/or headoffice authority.
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2.4.2 Participation in Management
Initially, participation was believed to generate positive attitudes toward the job and greater 
acceptance of the standards by the subordinates which may result in better performance. 
However, the empirical evidence by both accountants and non-accountants is mixed. Many 
studies do support the arguments that participation produces (1) higher job related satisfaction 
and self actualization (Swieringa & Moncur 1972; Swieringa 1975; Locke & Schweiger 1979; 
Schweiger et al 1997); (2) positive attitudes toward the job and company (Milani 1975); and (3) 
motivation to achieve the budget (Hofstede 1968; Searfoss & Monczka 1973). However, Foran 
& Decoster (1974) found no difference in attitudes toward the standards when comparing open 
and lateral and hierarchical participative models of communication.
Milani (1975) noted that participation did not relate consistently to performance, thereby 
supporting Stedry’s (1964) argument that there are weak lines (if any) between participation and 
productivity. Moreover, Schiff & Lewin (1970) documented some potentially dysfunctional 
effects, noting that participation often leads to gaming and slack. The empirical results of 
numerous other studies report similar conflicting results (Becker & Green 1962; Searfoss & 
Monczka 1973; Hopwood 1974).
Researchers also argue that participation may increase employees’ personal feelings of 
“ownership” of the goal or standard and the level of their trust in the intentions of management 
(Vroom 1964; Lowin 1968; Patchen 1970; Lawler & Hackman 1979; Raval 1982). Others have 
argued that participation is a mechanism for information exchange by which individual employees 
obtain more information about their job (Hopwood 1974).
Such additional information facilitates a clearer understanding of their job, thereby improving 
motivation and performance (Mitchell 1973; Schuler & Kim 1976; Schuler 1980). Mia (1989) 
conducted the study which found that managerial performance was high where perceived 
participation was commensurate with perceived level of job difficulty. On the other hand, 
performance was low where participation was not commensurate with the perceived level of job 
difficulty.
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Although participation has long been a popular idea and is currently finding renewed interest in 
the context of Ouchi’s Theory Z (Ouchi & Jaeger 1978; Ouchi & Price 1993), its specific effects 
on performance and productivity are not clear. Manager’s time in a position or the company and 
organizational structure (Bruns & Waterhouse 1975) can all play a role in determining the 
effectiveness of participation. Nevertheless, there is still a tendency to view the potential 
functional consequences of participation as being greater than any dysfunctional effects which 
might occur (Otley 1980)10.
2.4.3 Participation in Budgeting
The relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance has been equivocal. 
Results have ranged from participation strongly and positively influencing performance (Argyris 
1952; Becker & Green 1962; Bass & Leavitt 1963; Kenis 1979; Brownell 1982b; Brownell & 
Mclnnes 1986), to insignificantly influencing performance (French et al 1960; Fleishman 1965; 
Cherrington & Cherrington 1973; Milani 1975; Ivancevich 1976; Steers 1976; Brownell & Hirst 
1986), to negatively influencing performance (Stedry 1960; Bryan & Locke 1967). These mixed 
results have led researchers to conclude that there is no simple direct relationship between 
budgetary participation and performance and that there could be other variables (e.g. job-relevant 
information, role ambiguity, job difficulty, pressure, etc.) that could act as moderating or 
intervening factors in this relationship (Hopwood 1974; Brownell 1982c; Locke et al 1986; 
Chenhall & Brownell 1988; Lyne 1988; Murray 1990; Brownell & Dunk 1991; Kren 1992; Dunk 
1993; Shields & Young 1993; Dunk & Lysons 1997). Gul et al (1995) conducted a questionnaire 
survey in Hong Kong and their findings supported the interaction hypothesis and found that at 
high levels of decentralisation there is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and 
managerial performance but at low levels of decentralisation this relationship is negative.
10 In this research, participation in the planning review process, long-term plans, short­
term plans, internal responsibility contracts, management of interdependencies and rewards and 
incentives are measured. However, the relationships between participation and the other 
dependent/intervening variables mentioned in Section 2.4.2 are not tested in this study.
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In terms of agency theory, participation can enable budgets to be improved if superior managers 
(principals) could be made aware of local information held by subordinate managers (agents) prior 
to the setting of the budget (Magee 1980). Since subordinates are typically better informed than 
their superiors about their operating environments, the value of participative budgeting emanates 
from the transmission of information that takes place (Magee 1980; Baiman 1982; Penno 1984; 
Chow, Cooper & Waller 1988; Waller 1988). The incorporation of that private information 
(owned by the subordinate managers) into their budgets is likely to lead to more accurate budgets 
(Baiman & Evans 1983). The achievement of those budgets is likely to result in higher levels of 
performance from the corporate viewpoint (Pope 1984; Waller 1988).
But agents may not provide principals with all their locally based (or private) information, which 
could result in slack budgets (Christensen 1982; Young 1985; Waller 1988), and thus lower 
subordinates’ self-evaluation of performance. Such a possibility has been a primary concern of 
the literature on the grounds that participation raises the potential for positive slack creation 
(Schiff& Lewin 1970; Christensen 1982; Antle & Eppen 1985; Lukka 1988). Whether budgetary 
slack is a likely outcome in all participatively set budgets is a matter of conjecture.
Lukka (1988) argued that a high degree of participation gives subordinate managers the 
opportunity to contribute directly to the creation of slack, and vice versa. However, the link 
between participation and slack is equivocal, since Onsi (1973), Cammann (1976), Merchant 
(1985b), Dunk (1993), and Nouri (1994) provide evidence that participation may lead to a 
reduction in slack, which can be attributed to the positive communication between managers so 
that subordinates feel less pressure to create slack.
Becker & Green (1962) argued that participatively set budgets provide “information to associate 
reward or punishment with performance (p.401)”. Additionally, Brownell & Mclnnes (1986) 
found evidence that participation in the budget setting process strengthened the expectation of 
receiving rewards linked to budget achievement, providing subordinate managers with an 
inducement to negotiate easy budgets. Indeed, Lowe & Shaw (1968) found in their study that 
managers were prepared to bias their forecasts “to suit their own interests as rational economic 
individuals (p.314)”. As such, participative budgeting is likely to sensitize subordinates to the
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performance criteria superiors regard to be critical to their evaluation. From empirical findings, 
Dunk (1990) suggests and explains the apparent contradiction of participation leading to lower 
managerial performance through the setting of slack budgets, yet being positively related to 
performance, by illustrating that budgetary participation and agreement between superiors and 
subordinates on evaluation criteria interact to affect manager’s performance (Merchant & 
Manzoni 1989)11.
2.4.4 Participation and Job Satisfaction
In an extensive review of the literature on participative decision making, Locke & Schweiger 
(1979) found little consistent support for the perspective that participation and job satisfaction 
are significantly and positively related. Evidence revealed that the association between budgetary 
participation and job satisfaction may be dependent upon factors such as locus of control 
(Brownell 1982a), consideration and initiating structure (Brownell 1983), the configuration of 
authoritarianism between superiors and subordinates (Chenhall 1986), role ambiguity (Chenhall 
& Brownell 1988) and managerial roles (Dunk & Leung 1992).
Dunk (1992) finds that the degree of authority inherent in jobs at different managerial levels may 
influence the relationship between participation in the budget setting process and the job 
satisfaction of managers. The primary objective of his study is to evaluate the extent to which the 
relationship between participation and job satisfaction is dependent upon managerial level. The 
results of his research suggest that the association between budgetary participation and job 
satisfaction is significantly influenced by differences in managerial level in the hierarchy12.
11 The many variables and moderating or intervening factors described in Section 2.4.3 are 
potential research topics for the participation in budgeting practised in the Chinese enterprises.
12 The relationship between budget participation and job satisfaction is another potential 
research topic to be tested in the Chinese enterprises.
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2.5 CONTROL SYSTEMS
2.5.1 Control Systems in Organisations
Theoretical approaches to the design of formal control systems have developed through various 
stages. Early prescriptions were introverted (Anthony 1965); they were premised on the primacy 
of stability and efficiency in the accomplishment of given organizational tasks (Dunbar 1982)13. 
Later theorists were influenced by organization-environment dependencies (Lowe & Mclnnes 
1971; Ansari 1977, 1979). Their prescriptions sought to introduce a more extroverted 
orientation, pivoting control-systems design around the task of adapting organizational activities 
to environmental changes14. Later, contingency theories have been advanced (Waterhouse & 
Tissen 1978; Ginzberg 1980), with the implication that optimal design characteristics depend on 
an organization’s particular circumstances: for example, the degree of change in the organization’s 
environment, the organization’s size, and the complexity and interdependence of organizational 
activities15. The mainstream theory is still remarkably conventional which relies on neoclassical 
bureaucratic principles of “rational and efficient organization”. Order and coherence is seen as 
“good”, disorder and chaos as “bad” (Weber 1947; Bums & Stalker 1961; Miles & Snow 1978).
Over the last decade or so, an “alternative” theory has emerged to challenge the wisdom of this 
approach. The principles of rational bureaucratic organization insulate organizational members 
from inherent uncertainties and change in their environments and to promote inflexibility 
(Brunsson 1985). Individuals and organizations are encouraged to experiment, to be skeptical, 
to act on intuition, and to pursue incompatible goals; for through such behaviour they discover
13 As observed in these 20 SOEs, the control mechanisms built into the Economic 
Responsibility Contract (ERC) and the Internal Responsibility Contract (IRC) are premised on 
the primacy of stability and efficiency in the accomplishment of the agreed financial targets for the 
SOE as a whole.
14 The rapid economic changes in China compels many SOEs to cater for the 
environmental changes in their control systems such as the 4 department stores, which are moving 
towards the strategic control style in their responsibility accounting systems, as studied in this 
research.
15 The impact of these contingency variables on the organizational control systems are 
potential research topics in the Chinese enterprises.
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their preferences and learn about their environment (Jonsson & Lundin 1977; Starbuck 1982). 
Incoherence and insecurity are promoted to counter tendencies toward inertia and perpetuation 
of the past. Formal control system should be designed to stimulate curiosity (Hedberg & Jonsson
1978). They should promote latent tensions, so that they become explicit motivators for action 
(Hedberg, Nystrom & Starbuck 1976). Degrees of confusion, overlap, and ambiguity are 
advocated to activate dynamics and discovery in organizations16.
Thus, contemporary literature and research suggest two “generic” approaches or principles for 
the design of formal control systems. Bureaucratic principles emphasize efficiency in task 
accomplishment; the alternative principle focuses more on the activation of dynamics for change. 
To an extent, this dichotomy is perhaps false. Polarities are drawn and arguments overstated. 
Katz and Kahn (1978) note that organizations possess both maintaining systems, which insulate 
them from change and uncertainty and perpetuate the status quo, and adaptive systems, which 
stimulate innovation and experimentation. Large organizations, in particular, may need degrees 
of structure and order. Simultaneously, there may be a need to foment pressures for change. 
Arguably, design options are best seen as ranging across a continuum, affording varying emphases 
to each of the approaches. This suggests an essential tension in designing formal control systems. 
It focuses attention on the question of an appropriate balance between both principles in systems 
design (Dent 1987)17.
Theorists have argued that relatively few real organizations possess the underlying ‘rationality’ 
which is assumed in market and bureaucratic forms of control. Parson (1960), Ouchi and Maguire
(1975) and Williamson (1975) have argued that most hierarchies fail to transmit control with any 
accuracy from top to bottom. Simon (1964) has made a convincing case that most organizations 
do not have a single or an integrated set of goals or objectives and that the subunits of
16 The department stores and shareholding enterprises investigated in this research are 
more receptive and proactive to the environmental changes and opportunities (more dynamic 
control system) than the other wholly state-owned enterprises.
17 Both of the maintaining and adaptive systems exist together in the department stores and 
shareholding enterprises studied in this research in order to attain their ERC/IRC commitments 
on the one hand and to seek growth in the fast changing and competitive environment on the other 
hand. However, this observation is not tested in this research.
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organizations are, as a matter of necessity, only loosely joined to each other. Evan (1966), 
Aldrich (1972) and Pfeffer (1976) have argued that the structure of most organizations is 
determined more by their environment than by any purposive, technologically-motivated 
managerial strategy. Hannan and Freeman (1977) have argued even more strongly that 
organizational form is isomorphic with ecological conditions, thus implying that organizations can 
be designed only by nature, through a process of selection; and Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) 
have argued that organizational decision processes are far from our view of ‘rationality’ and have 
chosen instead the metaphor of the ‘garbage can’ to describe them.
2.5.2 Controllability in Control Systems
The concept of responsibility accounting is widely held to be an essential feature of any 
respectable management accounting system. The idea is a simple and an appealing one: in the 
evaluation of a manager’s performance only the factors under his control should be considered 
(Gordon 1963; Ferrara 1964). Therefore, responsibility accounting and the controllability 
principle may be viewed as being inseparable (Bierman & Drebin 1972: 9; Dopuch, Bimberg & 
Demski 1974: 26; McNally 1980). The force of the controllability principle is recognised by 
Solomons (1965): ‘It is almost a self-evident proposition that, in appraising the performance of 
divisional management, no account should be taken of matters outside the division’s control 
(p.83).’
Controllability is defined generally as the ability of the manager to anticipate behaviour-outcome- 
reward contingencies18 (Choudhury 1986). This definition encompasses:
(1) Environmental or objective uncertainty which affects outcome. This has been the subject 
of the agency theory literature, as exemplified in Demski (1976), Demski and Feltham 
(1978), Baiman and Demski (1980) and Baiman (1982).
18 Autonomy, which often tends to be confused with controllability, refers to the freedom 
of choice between alternatives. Thus the manager may feel free to choose from a range of options 
but he may still be unable to influence (control) the consequence of the chosen action.
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(2) Role conflict and task ambiguity where the manager perceives his function, span of 
responsibility or the reward scheme to be inadequately specified. These aspects are 
discussed in Kahn el al (1964), Thompson (1967), Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1968), and 
March and Olsen (1976). Included in this concept is the manager’s own perception of 
external (environmental) and internal (knowledge-based) uncertainty (Kahneman & 
Tversky 1982).
(3) The manager’s influence over the reward scheme. This constitutes an extension of the 
controllability concept which is generally understood to refer to the control of outcome. 
Such a view is based on the plausible notion that the manager does not value outcome per 
se and if he is able to influence the end product, i.e. reward, whether extrinsic or intrinsic 
(Ronen & Livingstone 1975), he will perceive the situation to be controllable (Staw
1977)19.
One of the most commonly cited principles of control is that individuals should be held 
accountable only for results they can control. The rationale for the controllability principle, which 
is discussed in many works, including Maciariello (1984: 135-136), Merchant (1985a: 21-24) and 
Magee (1986: 268-269) is: first, if performance indicators are influenced by uncontrollable events, 
the indicators become less informative about the desirability of the actions the individual has 
taken; and second, holding individuals accountable for uncontrollable events can lead to 
dysfunctional behaviour. Some research has presented plausible reasons for not implementing the 
controllability principle. It has used both deductive and inductive reasoning (Merchant 1987).
The deductive work, based on economic theory, has presented three arguments as to why 
principals should hold agents accountable for outcomes over which they do not have complete 
control. One argument shows that holding agents accountable for the effects of random and 
uncontrollable phenomena (e.g. changes in product demand) and the effects of actions of other
19 Some of the ERC/IRC adopted by the SOEs investigated in this research provide 
exceptional clauses to take into account the uncontrollable factors affecting the responsibility 
centre managers in particular the linkage between performance and rewards. Therefore, the 
ERC/IRC systems are means to minimize the unfavourable impacts from the uncontrollable 
factors and environmental uncertainties, and allow rooms for revising the ERC/IRC.
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managers (i.e. those effects caused by organizational interdependency) will cause agent’s 
decisions to reflect “a [proper] degree of risk aversion, and the combined risk-bearing abilities of 
the owner and manager will exceed that of either alone” (Demski 1976: 233). This argument 
introduces the desirability of having subordinates share risks with their superiors as a justification 
for evaluating subordinates on random outcomes.
A second reason for holding agents accountable for some categories over which they have no 
control is to tell them how their decisions affect areas outside their control. Baiman and Noel 
(1985) show that it can be useful to charge agents for the costs of capacity. Zimmerman (1979) 
makes a similar argument for assigning the costs of shared resources.
A third argument is that in situations with imperfect postdecision information, agents should be 
evaluated on their accomplishments as they compare with those of other agents who face the same 
environment -- even though those agent’s accomplishments are clearly outside the first agent’s 
control. This relative performance evaluation is desirable because the broader data provide 
information about the agent’s unobservable actions (Baiman & Demski 1980; Holmstrom 1982; 
Maber 1987). Antle and Demski (1988) offer that the information content perspective is a 
precisely defined controllability notion that accounts for other sources of information.
These deductive works are based on some simplifying assumptions. For example, in Demski’s
(1976) model, simplifications include excluding the cost of evaluation and the existence of 
alternative risk-sharing possibilities. Demski also assumed that the principal and agent were 
cooperative; that is, preference and belief information were assumed to be freely and completely 
passed among the individuals. Whether the findings are descriptive of a more realistic setting 
remains largely untested. The single empirical study available to date provided only partial 
support for the relative performance evaluation argument (Antle & Smith 1986).
Inductive researchers have not discussed the controllability principle by name, but they have 
provided some limited evidence about managers’ lack of complete implementation of the 
controllability principle and some plausible reasons for the managers’ actions. Hofstede (1968) 
observed several cases where the accounting system did not coincide with the responsibility
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structure of the organization, “mostly because the rather static reporting system had not followed 
recent changes in the responsibility organization (p.32) ”
Vancil (1979) collected data from 291 firms and found that profit-centre managers almost never 
have control over all the items for which they are held responsible. He concluded that assigning 
largely uncontrollable expenses (e.g. for administrative services) can be functional because it tells 
managers they should become involved in the benefit/cost trade-offs involved20.
2.5.3 Environment and Control Systems
The information-processing model of organizations predicts that, in an effectively functioning 
organization, the amount of information processed increases with increasing levels of uncertainty 
(Galbraith 1973; Tushman and Nadler 1978). The major source of uncertainty for an organization 
within its environment (Thompson 1967; Katz and Kahn 1978; Weick 1979), comprising five 
external components: competitors, customers, suppliers, regulatory groups, and the technological 
requirements of the industry (Bourgeois 1985). In addition, a firm’s business strategy may also 
influence its actions in positioning products in certain niches or market segments of the 
competitive environment (Porter 1980).
Environmental uncertainty is highest for firms facing heterogeneous and dynamic environments. 
Environmental heterogeneity describes complexity and diversity in an organization’s activities 
(Child 1972). Heterogeneity produces uncertainty owing to an absence of relevant information 
for decisions. This is illustrated in Galbraith’s definition of uncertainty as “the difference between 
the amount of information required to perform a task and the amount of information already 
possessed by the organization (p.36)” (Galbraith 1973). To reduce this type of uncertainty, 
additional information may be gathered and processed to allow solution of a problem or
20 The above arguments for and against the allocation of uncontrollable costs to the 
responsibility centres are potential research topics in the Chinese enterprises. Some of these 20 
SOEs (e.g. BCM3, BCRF, BPMH, SXSW) involve this issue in setting their internal transfer 
prices.
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Environmental dynamism, by contrast, is the condition of instability and turbulence; i.e. changes 
in the environment are difficult to predict (Duncan 1972; Miles, Snow & Pfeffer 1974). This is 
a different type of uncertainty and relates to the ambiguity and conflicting interpretations inherent 
in information (Weick 1979; Daft & Lengel 1986). With this type of uncertainty, the problem or 
task may be poorly understood or subject to multiple interpretations (Mintzberg, Raisinghani & 
Theoret 1976). Collecting and processing additional information may be insufficient to clarify 
opportunities, problems and solutions.
The belief that the administrative structure of an organization should be aligned with its external 
environment (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967) is one of the central paradigms of modern organization 
theory. The number of studies, however, that have explored the information-processing link 
between environmental uncertainty and formal planning and control procedures is limited. Still 
unknown are conditions under which the bureaucratic organization (Weber 1947), controlled 
through specialization of tasks, rules and policies, and a clear hierarchy of authority, is appropriate 
or inappropriate to firms operating in uncertain environments22.
Early empirical work, such as Burns and Stalker (1961), indicated that uncertain environments 
require flexible, organic forms of organization. Conversely, stable and relatively predictable 
environments require bureaucratic, mechanistic forms of structuring. Burns and Stalker argued 
that organic firms operating in uncertain environments minimize their reliance on formal controls. 
Similar findings were reported by Miles and Snow (1978). Other studies, however, have 
concluded that environmental uncertainty in the form of intense product competition (Khandwalla
21 As mentioned by a few managers interviewed in this research, the promulgation of 
“socialist market economy” in China in recent years has intensified the environmental 
uncertainties such as the 5 components suggested by Bourgeois (1985). The SOEs need more 
sophisticated management information and control systems to sustain their survival and growth.
22 The department stores and equipment manufacturing enterprises studied in this research 
reveal some planning and control differences between organic (dynamic) and mechanistic 
(bureaucratic) types of organization and control respectively, but further in-depth empirical 
research (e.g. Simons (1995, 1996))can be performed.
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1972), product innovation (Kamm 1980), and certain types of business strategy (Miller & Friesen 
1982; Simons 1987a) can be associated with the increased use and perceived “tightness” of 
control procedures.
Most of these empirical studies have focused on an array of organizational characteristics in which 
formal controls represented a single variable from a larger set. The diversity of results in these 
studies illustrates that little attention has been given to understanding either the type of controls 
used by firms or the nature of the uncertainty that they face in their environments (Simons 1987b). 
Simons (1987b, 1995, 1996) performed case study research to identify more firsthand knowledge 
of the ways in which management accounting techniques are actually used in modem business 
organizations (Kaplan 1984a). Accordingly, Simons’ studies used interviews, observation and 
the examination of relvant documentation in one well-managed company to focus on the role of 
control in certain business environments.
The traditional definition of the scope and practice of management control that was developed 
in the last few decades is now too restrictive as it is based on a context of large, hierarchically 
structured organizations that are now in relative decline. This decline has been caused by changes 
in the business and social environment that are reflected in the terminology of current management 
ideas. The traditional definition has also led to an emphasis on accounting-based controls that are 
becoming increasingly peripheral to fundamental needs of contemporary organizations. 
Organizations still need systems of management control, but it is likely that they will be very 
different to those found suitable in the past (Otley 1994, 1995).
2.5.4 Interdependence in Control Systems
Interdependence is the extent to which departments depend upon each other and exchange 
information and resources to accomplish their respective tasks (Van de Ven et al 1976; McCann 
& Ferry 1979). The concept of interdependence is proposed as an organizational variable relevant 
to control systems for two reasons.
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First, interdependence reflects workflow and hence the amount of coordination and feedback 
needed among departments. The data available for coordination and feedback may be available 
from the management systems used to manage and control those departments (Thompson 1967; 
Van de Ven el al 1976; Tushman 1977). Second, several accounting researchers have identified 
interdependence across departments as a potentially important organizational variable for future 
management accounting studies (Watson & Baulmer 1975; Hayes 1977; Ginzberg 1980; Otley 
1980; Kilmann 1983; Emmanuel & Otley 1985; Merchant 1985b; Chenhall & Morris 1986).
Machintosh and Daft (1987) conducted an interview and questionnaire survey which reported that 
the relationship between the organizational characteristic of departmental interdependence and 
the design and use of three elements in a package of management controls -- the operating budget, 
periodic statistical reports, and standard operating policies and procedures. The findings support 
the hypothesis that departmental interdependence is related to the emphasis placed on each 
management control system. Standard operating procedures were an important control device 
when interdependence was low. The budget and statistical reports were used more extensively 
when interdependence was moderate. When interdependence among departments was high, the 
role of all three control system diminished.
One interpretation of the findings is that the role of each control system reflects a fit between the 
need for information created by interdependence and the supply of information provided by the 
control system. Standard operation procedures are a standing body of knowledge that is 
appropriate for specifying standard behaviours across relatively stable and independent 
departments. Sequential interdependence creates a need for more data to schedule, plan, and 
monitor the flow of material and activities between departments. Budgeting and statistical 
reports, which can provide data on a monthly, weekly, or even a daily cycle, provide data that are 
more current and more relevant than standard operation procedures for the short time horizon 
needed for coordination. When interdependence among departments is reciprocal, the information 
requirements begin to outstrip the data supplied by formal control systems. These systems may 
be used for planning and scheduling, but special emphasis is given to face-to-face coordination 
and mutual adjustment.
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Since managers cannot predict in advance the problems that may arise and the information 
required, the data contained in formal reports will not cover all problems, and hence will receive 
less emphasis than in the case of pooled and sequential interdependence. Thus as interdependence 
increases, data are needed that are current, timely, and pertain to unpredictable events. These 
data are supplied in turn by standard operation procedures, budgets, statistical reports and by 
direct managerial involvement in face-to-face coordination23.
23 The divisional interdependence in some of the 20 SOEs investigated in this research bear 
similar control characteristics as revealed by Machintosh and Daft (1987) in the following manner: 
low interdependence: the department stores use standard daily/weekly/monthly control reports; 
moderate interdependence: the equipment manufacturing enterprises employ tight budgetary 
control measures and production (statistical) control reports; and
high interdependence: the iron & steel and textile manufacturing enterprises involve many ad hoc 
and face-to-face negotiations.
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2.6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
2.6.1 Accounting Measurement
Two distinct sets of variables require measurement. Firstly activity requires to be monitored along 
those dimensions defined as objectives. Thus, for example, if long-run survival requires the 
generation of a certain level of profitability then this requires measurement and comparison with 
the defined standard. Secondly, as the predictive models used contain an array of variables which 
are necessary to predict behaviour and performance, these predictor variables must also be 
measured (Otley & Berry 1980)24.
*
Accounting procedures have traditionally been designed in response to the need for the first kind 
of measurement. Thus they stress the components of objective-oriented measures such as 
production, cost and profit. Although influenced heavily by shareholder objectives, they are 
compatible with measuring partial objective achievement for other groups (e.g. price for 
customers; wages for employees etc). Indeed, it may be argued that certain income measures, for 
example, residual income, are surrogates for measures of overall enterprise viability, rather than 
serving the interests of any particular stakeholder group (Emmanuel & Otley 1976). But such 
measures possess little predictive power. The second purpose is partially served by systems which 
allow causes for deviations from standard to be deduced (e.g. the calculation of cost accounting 
variances), but even these systems have very limited predictive ability25.
24 The accounting measures adopted by most of the 20 SOEs investigated in this research 
focus on the activity performance as pre-determined in the ERC/IRC or other financial targets 
agreed with the government.
25 None of the 20 SOEs studied in this research is employing residual income to measure 
overall enterprise viability. Standard costing has been used by some of these SOEs (e.g. BCM3, 
BIMT, SSW5, GNFF, etc.) to measure the production performance.
83
Ch.2 : Literature Review
By using accounting numbers to evaluate management performance, there are three significant 
factors which generally create difficulties in developing performance measures for a given 
manager. First, the actions and strategies implemented by the manager are not observable 
directly, so the manager’s effort cannot be compensated directly for his input into the firm. 
Second, the full consequences of the manager’s actions are not observable, in large part because 
the impact of those actions extend beyond his subunit of the firm and beyond his time as manager 
of that subunit. Third, uncontrollable events influence the consequences that are observed 
(Feltham & Xie 1994). Management accountants need to consider how to extend their role to 
include supporting all aspects of performance management such as non-fmancial, quantitative and 
qualitative indicators (Otley 1997)26.
2.6.2 A Measurement Model
Briers & Hirst (1990) have reviewed substantial relevant literature and identified a range of 
variables implicated in the use of budgetary information in performance evaluation. They have 
chosen to classify these variables as either antecedent, independent, moderator, intervening or 
dependent variables. “Supervisory style” has been adopted to refer to the key independent 
variable of interest, the way budgetary information is used in performance evaluation. Other 
variables were classified as: “antecedent’ if they are considered to have a causal influence on the 
emergence of a supervisory style; “moderator”, if the effect of supervisory style is thought to be 
dependent on their value; and “intervening’, if they are both affected by supervisory style and 
have a causal effect on the dependent variable of interest (performance). The following figure 
shows the simple causal relations among, and examples of, these variable categories.
26 Wang (1986) and Zhang (1989) suggest similar difficulties to measure manager’s 
performance by accounting numbers because of (1) higher autonomy in deciding actions and 
strategies has been delegated to managers; (2) short-term behaviour emerges as a result of 
meeting ERCARC targets; and (3) rapid economic reforms create intensive environmental changes 
and uncertainties.
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ANTECEDENT------->INDEPENDENT----------->INTERVENING------->DEPENDENT
(Supervisory Style) ^
MODERATOR
Variables Examples
ANTECEDENT Differentiation, General leader style, Unit size, Contagion effect, 
Environmental conditions*, Realism/Accuracy of budget*, Business 
strategy*, Degree of decentralisation*
INDEPENDENT 
(Supervisory Style)
Needling, Raising standards*, Uncompromising attitude, Reward 
contingent budget emphasis*, Frequency of contracts*, Focus on 
negative results*, Evaluative/Problem solving use*, Short/Long run 
criteria*, Subjective/Formula-based criteria*, Use of flexible/static 
budgets*, General/Punitive style*
MODERATOR Budgetary participation*, Accounting information accuracy, Task 
uncertainty, Environmental uncertainty*, Job function, Business 
strategy*, Technology*
INTERVENING Tension, Resentment, Pressure, Fear of failure, Budget motivation*, 
Role conflict*, Role ambiguity, Intrinsic motivation*
DEPENDENT Dysfunctional behaviour, Job performance, Budgetary performance*, 
Unit performance*
Adapted from Briers & Hirst (1990)
* Examples of factors of those variables that have been considered in the case studies of this 
research although they are not structured according to Briers & Hirst (1990) model. However, 
this model contains many contextual variables to be tested in future empirical research related to 
this study.
2.7 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL & REWARDS
2.7.1 Performance Appraisal
The performance appraisal system contains two main elements: (1) a specification of the job that 
the subordinate has to do and the criteria that will define what constitutes good performance (e.g. 
operating budgets or specific production targets); and (2) a mechanism for gathering information 
about the adequacy of the behaviour that takes place (e.g. monthly management reports 
comparing budgeted and actual performance). Once the performance of an individual has been
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evaluated, then some form of reward (or more rarely punishment) has to be given which the 
individual can relate to the effort that he or she expended on their job. The rewards can be either 
economic (e.g. money or prizes) or psychological (e.g. praise or blame)27.
The essence of all performance appraisal and reward systems is the assumption that if good 
performance is rewarded, then an individual employee will be motivated to expend more effort 
in order to improve his or her performance so that he or she can enjoy the rewards that follow 
from the improvement in performance (Moizer 1991: 126; Banker et al 1996).
The main aim of a system of performance appraisal and rewards is the motivation of subordinates 
to perform well. The term ‘motivation’ means ‘furnishing with a motive’ or ‘causing (someone) 
to act in a particular way’. In psychological terms, motivation is that which energizes, directs and 
sustains behaviour. There are three principal theories of the internal causes of behavioural choice: 
‘expectancy theory (Vroom 1964; Hackman & Lawler 1971; Lawler 1973; Ronen & Livingstone 
1975; Brownell & Mclnnes 1986)’, ‘equity theory (Adams 1965)’ and ‘goal-setting theory (Lock
1978)’. The three theories emphasize different aspects of human nature.
2.7.2 Allocation of Rewards
Chen (1995) has performed a comparative study to explore preferences for allocating various 
organizational rewards and resources in the United States and the People’s Republic of China. 
It sought to identify possible trends in allocation preferences in the two countries and the effects 
of cultural norms, organizational goal priorities, and reward types on allocation preferences. 
Organizational reforms in the US and the PRC offer ideal opportunities for exploring these 
matters. The two nations are known to have distinct cultural traditions of individualism and 
collectivism (Earley 1989, 1993; Meindl, Hunt & Lee 1989: 59-77), which have been linked 
directly to reward or incentive norms (Bond, Leung & Wan 1982; Leung 1988; Hui, Triandis & 
Yee 1991); but reward systems are changing in both countries. Innovative US companies are 
revamping their individual-based reward systems to support team-based reorganization and foster
27 Very similar procedures are adopted by the 20 SOEs in their ERC/IRC/Budgeting 
processes.
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cooperation (Kanter 1989), and pioneering Chinese enterprises have been reforming their 
egalitarian reward systems to establish individual responsibility and encourage initiative and 
competition (Jackson 1992)28.
Chen’s (1995) study proposed an integrative model that incorporates three well researched 
determinants of allocation decisions: cultural norms, organizational goals, and resource types. 
To define the “Allocation Preferences”, three types of “Allocation Rules” have been considered 
most important (Deutsch 1973, 1985; Leventhal 1976: 211-239): (1) the equity rule, which 
mandates allocation proportional to each organization member’s contribution or performance; (2) 
the equality rule, which mandates equal allocation to all members regardless of contribution; and
(3) the need rule, which mandates allocation according to members’ needs29. From these basic 
rules, Martin and Harder (1988) derived seven organization-based allocation rules: performance, 
rank, seniority, job-related needs, group equality, personal needs, and individual equality. 
These rules are believed to vary on the dimension of equality. Rules that result in unequal 
distribution of rewards are differential rules, whereas those that result in equal or nearly equal 
distribution are equalitarian rules30.
The differential-equalitarian distinction is similar to Reis’s (1984) empirically established 
dimension of status orientation, which ranges from status assertion to status neutralization. 
Status assertion “creates, enhances, or perpetuates distances between people in terms of their 
standing on a status hierarchy”; status neutralization “minimizes existing differences by
28 As observed in these 20 SOEs, the linkage of performance and rewards stated in the 
ERC/IRC is mainly on collective or group incentive basis but within a division or department, 
individual initiative and competition are encouraged and remunerated accordingly.
29 Similar characteristics have been observed in these 20 SOEs as follow: 
equity rule: applied to more work/more pay in bonus;
equality rule: applied to standard allowances (e.g. housing, inflation, attendance, etc.); and 
need rule: applied to fringe benefits (e.g. pension, medical, unemployment, etc.).
30 The 7 organization-based allocation rules suggested by Martin and Harder (1988) are 
now being considered as a “balanced score-card” in determining the employee’s promotion and 
remuneration as evidenced in studying the 20 SOEs. Further empirical research focusing on this 
proposition can be performed in the Chinese enterprises.
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establishing caretaking bonds or stressing the basic equality of all people (p.48)”.
Cross-cultural research (cultural model) has found that members of collectivistic societies, such 
as ethnic Chinese communities, prefer equalitarian allocations, whereas individualistic nationals, 
such as US Americans, generally prefer differential allocations that match proportional 
contributions (Bond et al 1982; Leung & Bond 1984; Hui et al 1991). The key to the distinction 
between individualism and collectivism is concern for self-interest as opposed to concern for a 
group (Triandis 1989: 41-133). Collectivists prefer equalitarian allocations presumably because 
they are very concerned with creating and maintaining interpersonal harmony. Individualists 
prefer differential allocations because they are concerned with task achievement (Leung 1988; 
Triandis 1989: 41-133)31.
Allocation goals (goal model) are linked with the collective goals of a social system (Leventhal 
et al 1980; Mikula 1980: 167-217). To achieve the superordinate goal of survival, organizations 
must achieve derivative goals of productivity, social harmony, and individual development and 
welfare. However, the relative importance of various goals can vary from one organization to 
another and over time within a single organization as demands created by environments and 
members’ needs change (Leventhal et al 1980). Typically, researchers have tested goal priority 
models in within-culture contexts, where differential rules are preferred when economic 
productivity is the priority but equalitarian rules are preferred when maintaining social harmony 
is the priority (Leventhal et al 1980; Deutsch 1985). A rationale for these relations is the 
instrumental utility of allocation rules (Wiggins 1945; Yamagishi 1984). Different rules have 
different consequences, and groups and individuals learn to adopt rules that are instrumental to 
the attainment of their goals32.
31 As evidenced in this research, in general the 20 SOEs are moving towards the 
differential allocations paradigm at enterprisewise as well as on individual employee basis although 
the total wages and group bonuses are still subject to the terms and conditions stated in the 
ERC/IRC.
32 The prevailing rapid economic development and profitability emphasis in China tend to 
apply differential rules in respect of employee remuneration but to some extent the government 
has to equalize the existing large wealth disparities among different industries and geographical 
locations.
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The resource model has a theoretical basis in resource theory (Foa & Foa 1980: 99-131), 
according to which resources have distinct properties that signify and characterize types of social 
relationships, such as economic and noneconomic exchanges. Different resources satisfy different 
needs of the exchanging parties. Hence, not all resources equally fit given equity rules or 
differential rules are more appropriate for allocating material resources and equalitarian rules are 
more appropriate for socio-emotional resources.
Integrating the resource classification made by justice researchers (Tallman & Ihinger-Tallman 
1979; Foa & Foa 1980) and the rewards classification made by motivation researchers (McGregor 
1960; Herzberg 1966; Likert 1967b), Martin and Harder (1988) proposed a material- 
socioemotional distinction from grouping organizational rewards. Material rewards are typically 
involved in impersonal exchanges and socioemotional rewards are typically involved in 
interpersonal particularistic exchanges that enhance the participants’ psychological well-being.
In Chen’s (1995) comparative study, data from Chinese and US business organizations showed 
that the Chinese employees were economically oriented and preferred to invoke differential rules 
(those that result in unequal distribution of rewards) for the allocation of both material and 
socioemotional rewards whereas their US counterparts were humanistically oriented and preferred 
a performance rule for the allocation of material rewards but equality rules for socioemotional 
rewards33.
Another cross-cultural field study on the relationship between measurement, evaluation and 
reward of profit centre managers has been performed by Merchant, Chow & Wu (1995). The 
findings were generally inconsistent with the research propositions that Taiwanese firms in 
comparison with US firms have (1) smaller individual performance-dependent monetary rewards;
(2) higher performance-dependent monetary rewards based on group; (3) less use of long-term 
incentives; and (4) more subjective performance evaluation. However, the study did reveal seven 
other variables that seem to be more important than national culture in explaining differences (and
33 Similar findings were observed in some of these 20 SOEs (e.g. department stores) that 
Chinese employees prefer differential rules for allocating both material (monetary) and 
socioemotional (intrinsic) rewards in order to enhance motivation and competition.
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similarities) between the practices of the firms in the two countries. This list includes senior 
managers’ education and experience, the company’s type of business, managers’ belief about the 
workings of their nation’s stock market, the company’s type of product, the nation’s labour force 
mobility, the company’s pattern of growth, and the use of consultants34.
2.8 CONTINGENCY THEORY35
2.8.1 Relevant Contingent Variables
The contingency approach to management accounting is based on the premise that there is no 
universally appropriate accounting system which applies equally to all organizations in all 
circumstances. Rather, it is suggested that particular features of an appropriate accounting system 
will depend upon the specific circumstances in which an organization finds itself. Thus a 
contingency theory must identify specific aspects of an accounting system which are associated 
with certain defined circumstances and demonstrate an appropriate matching (Dermer 1977; 
Otley 1980; Homgren 1982).
Conflicting results which could not satisfactorily be resolved within a universal framework, have 
been one source of stimulus for the development of contingency formulations. Concepts such as 
technology (Woodward 1965; Perrow 1967; Bruns & Waterhouse 1975; Piper 1978; Daft & 
Macintosh 1978, 1981; Fry 1982), size (Williamson 1970; Child 1975; Merchant 1981, 1984; 
Jones 1985), organization structure (Baumler 1971; Child 1972; Hopwood 1972; Otley 1978; 
Merchant 1981; McCann & Selsky 1984; Jones 1985), environment (Khandwalla 1972, 1977; 
Gordon & Miller 1976; Hayes 1977; Amigoni 1978; Otley 1978; Pfeffer 1978; Waterhouse & 
Tiessen 1978; Gordon & Narayanan 1984; Govindarajan 1984), strategy (Chandler 1962; 
Fouraker & Stopford 1968; Child 1972; Rumelt 1974; Galbraith & Nathanson 1978; Miles & 
Snow 1978; Snow & Hrebiniak 1980; Hambrick 1981; Govindarajan & Gupta 1984, 1985) and 
culture (Flamholtz 1983; Markus & Pfeffer 1983; Chow et al 1995) have been invoked to explain
34 Although this research was designed before the publication of Merchant et al (1995) 
study, yet their findings are potential propositions to be tested in the Chinese enterprises to 
identify any similarities and differences with the Taiwanese firms.
35 Contingency theory and management accounting in China is described in Section 2.16.
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why accounting and control systems have been found to differ from one situation to another. 
Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant (1990: 57-66) give a detail account of some of these contingent 
variables.
Typically, many researchers have investigated the effect of various contingency variables on the 
relationship between budget emphasis and both intervening and dependent variables; Otley (1978) 
with accuracy of accounting information; Hirst (1981, 1983) and Imoisili (1985) with task 
uncertainty; Brownell (1982b), Hirst (1987), Bottger & Hirst (1988) and Magner et al (1995) 
with budgetary participation; Brownell & Hirst (1986) with budgetary participation and task 
uncertainty; Govindarajan (1984) with environmental uncertainty; Brownell (1985, 1987) with 
environmental uncertainty and budgetary participation; Govindarajan & Gupta (1985) with 
business strategy; and Brownell & Merchant (1987) with technology. Implicit in some of these 
approaches (e.g. Govindarajan 1984) is the assumption that a match between budget emphasis 
and contingency factors will have a beneficial effect.
Furthermore, many studies have focused on the relationship between aspects of contextual 
variables (e.g. environmental and task uncertainty), management accounting system, performance 
and compensation (Galbraith 1977; Gordon & Narayanan 1984; Chenhall & Morris 1986; Gul 
1991; Kren & Kerr 1993; Mia 1993; Gul & Chia 1994; Chong 1996; Fisher 1996). The design 
of information or control system should meet the requirements or demands as a result of 
uncertainty facing the organization (Tushman & Nadler 1978; Gerloff 1985). By matching the 
capacities with the requirements, the organization can improve its performance (Gerloff 1985; 
Nadler & Tushman 1988).
2.8.2 Impacts on Accounting and Control
Contingency theory has become popular because it provides order to organization theory and, by 
implication, the design of management accounting systems with organizations. Theory suggests 
that designers of accounting systems should consider the unpredictability of the organization’s 
situation, structure their organization accordingly and then modify or design their systems 
consistent with the organization, its technology and environment (Cooper 1981). The ‘order’
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typically created by the use of contingency theory will be the maintenance of the status quo (the 
existing order). Contingency theory, as it has typically been understood in management 
accounting (Watson 1975; Gordon & Miller 1976; Cooper 1977; Waterhouse & Tiessen 1978), 
has been used in an inherently conservative fashion. This conservatism has been reflected in three 
broad ways.
First, by accepting the fundamental validity of existing techniques of control, contingency theorists 
have typically failed to consider the meaning and nature of organizational control (Otley & Berry 
1980). We may question the assumption that control has to be equated with domination 
(Braverman 1974; Nichols & Benyon 1977; Chems 1978). Secondly, by focusing on choices of 
efficient organizations and information systems, contingency theory has ignored the question of 
whose interests organizations can or should serve. Questions of effectiveness are rarely 
considered (Churchman 1968) and the problematic nature of concepts such as environment, 
uncertainty and organizations have not been sufficiently recognized when the design of 
information systems is being discussed (Ashby 1956; Beer 1975; Pfeffer 1978). And thirdly, 
contingency theorists have taken an unduly restricted view of the varieties of control and their 
uses in organizations (Burchell et al 1980).
By focusing on a simple-minded notion of science and rationality, there has been little 
consideration of organizations as social entities (Burns 1966; Pondy & Mitroff 1978; Boland
1979) and thus little recognition of the more symbolic forms of organizational control such as 
culture (Pettigrew 1979), myth (Jonsson & Lundin 1977) and magic (Gambling 1979). By using 
a relatively deterministic orientation to the study of organizational activity, many contingency 
theorists have tended to ignore issues of change and the ways organizations can learn, experiment 
and legitimise their activities in dynamic situations (Hedberg et al 1976; Amey 1979; Weick
1979).
2.8.3 Contingency Theory & Management Accounting in China
The importance of contingency theory has not yet been recognised, at least in the academic 
research, by the management accounting professionals in China. The only relevant introduction
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of this theory that can be found in the literature search of this study is from Professor Li’s (1994: 
126-129) textbook (the only one in management accounting research in China) in which he briefly 
describes the meaning of contingent management and its relationships with organization 
structures, Theory X and Y, and leadership styles. Therefore, there is a big research gap and 
ample space for empirical research in studying the relationships and applications of contingency 
theory (and its contextual variables) in management accounting.
In fact some contingent variables, which have been invoked by many researchers to explain why 
accounting and control systems have been found to differ from one situation to another, have 
certain impacts on the management and responsibility accounting systems practised in China 
although very few empirical research have been done. The following briefly describe a few 
contingent variables which have direct or indirect effects on the planning and control (or 
responsibility accounting system) of the 20 SOEs investigated in this study.
(1) Technology (see various authors) — 6 (i.e. SMCW, GNFF, SCCW, SMEF, SXSW, 
BCM3) of the 15 manufacturing SOEs in this study emphasize the production technology 
innovation and improvement in their long-term plans by increasing the capital investments 
(e.g. importing foreign facilities and equipment) in order to diversify their products, 
improve production efficiency and enhance product quality and competitive edge (see 
Section 5.4.2 in Chapter 5). Most of the top managements believe that technology 
advancement would be the life-blood for survival and business growth.
(2) Size o f firm  (see various authors) -- in general the planning and control systems of the 
large-sized SOEs are more sophisticated than the medium- and small-sized SOEs mainly 
because the associated volume of business and the manpower and expertise available in 
the accounting function. For example in SSW5, a large iron and steel enterprise in 
Shanghai having 23,000 employees, their planning, control, evaluation and reward systems 
are far more complicated than BEEF, which is a small electrostatic equipment 
manufacturing factory in Beijing having 600 employees.
(3) Organization structure (see various authors) -- is a major planning variable analysed in
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this research along four dimensions: responsibility centre; decentralisation; appointment 
(personnel); and interdependencies (see Sections 5.1.1-4 in Chapter 5). The organization 
structures of most of these 20 SOEs are complicated in terms of role definitions and 
interactions mainly because of the prevailing “excess-staff’ situation. During the last few 
decades, to ensure nearly full-employment in the urban cities, SOEs were compelled by 
the government authorities to recruit or absorb surplus labour force who did not have real 
assignments. In many cases, ‘pseudo-jobs’ were created to settle these redundant 
employees. Hence, the heavy payroll increased the operating costs and reduced efficiency 
per employee as well. For example, the annual output per labour (in tons) of SXSW, 
another large iron and steel manufacturer in Shanghai, was equivalent to 25% and 33% 
of the output rates in Japan and the USA respectively in 1995. Therefore, how to 
streamline the organization structures and reduce the labour force have become critical 
personnel issues encountered by the SOEs recently.
(4) Environment (see various authors) — is the most extensive contingent variable that covers 
both external and internal environments of a SOE. In Chapter 1, some political, legal, 
social, economical, organizational and behavioural factors affecting the SOEs have been 
discussed. They are recognised as the major external and internal environmental factors 
affecting the operation and management of the SOEs with specific focuses on their 
planning and control systems. In this world’s largest populated and developing country, 
China is undergoing tremendous changes in these environmental factors at the macro­
level, and at the same time, the Chinese enterprises (in particular the SOEs) are subject 
to various kinds of reforms at the micro-level. Both scenarios justify different disciplines 
of social science research, including the management accounting research, as means to 
foster better solutions to revive or enhance the economic efficiency and performance in 
the Chinese enterprises. In the management accounting discipline, those environmental 
factors can be selected for specific empirical research in MAS as has been done in the 
western countries during the last few decades.
(5) Strategy (see various authors) -- is specifically discussed in Chapter 5 relating to strategic 
themes, thrusts and suggestions (Section 5.3) and long-term planning (Section 5.5).
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Strategic management has been delegated from the government central planning system 
to the enterprise’s long-term planning and budgeting systems after the implementation of 
the ‘Operation Mechanisms Transformation Legislation’ since 1992. The enterprise’s 
managers have been learning how to put strategic planning into actions and controls 
although their enthusiasm is still subject to many environmental influences as described 
in the last paragraph (4) in general and the macroeconomic control measures (since July 
1993) in particular. Some in-depth empirical research on the relationship between strategy 
and responsibility accounting can provide better insights on how to design the planning 
and control systems.
2.9 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING & CULTURE36
2.9.1 Effects on Accounting
Culture is a problematic topic. It is ill defined (Smircich 1983). There is debate whether it is a 
unity concept (Martin & Siehl 1983). Culture has been defined to be the broad constellation of 
interpretative structures through which actions and events are rendered meaningful within a 
community (Geertz 1973). It is a human system (values, beliefs and knowledge) through which 
individuals attribute significance to their interaction and context. Expressed in this way, culture 
may not be observable directly. However, a distinction is often drawn between culture and its 
observable artefacts and rituals (Schein 1984). In so far as artefacts and rituals are symbolic of 
underlying values and beliefs, an appreciation of the significance ascribed to artefacts within a 
community is valuable in uncovering deeper constellations of meaning.
In the field of organizational analysis all manner of artefacts and rituals are observable such as 
office layouts, ceremonies, even the way things are done. Accounting practice is one such 
artefact. This suggests that a cultural perspective on accounting requires attention to the 
meanings and significance ascribed to accounting practice in particular settings, and their 
integration into wider structures of meaning for participants (Dent & Green 1985). Such analysis
36 Management accounting and culture in China is described in Section 2.9.3.
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may be conducted at the organizational or societal level (Hofstede 1980; Horovitz 1980; Child 
1981: 303-356; Goold 1986: 188-190; Meyer 1986). The relationship between culture and 
accounting is an important and neglected area for research (Dent 1986: 169).
There appears to be a general expectation in the literature that the effects of subordinate 
participation in budgeting and decision making will be different across nations because of cultural 
differences (French et al 1960; Hofstede 1968: 280-281; Brownell 1982c: 124; Daley et al 1985: 
94). However, this expectation seems to be based on the general premise that culture is always 
potentially important, rather than on specific examination of the cultural characteristics which may 
give rise to similar or different responses to participation in different nations. In order to 
determine the cross-cultural effects of participation, it is necessary to work from a theoretical 
foundation of culture which permits culture to be broken down into its underlying characteristics 
or components. These components may then be examined for their implications for differential 
reactions to participation and for their distribution in different nations (Harrison 1992; Lau, Low 
& Eggleton 1995, 1997).
2.9.2 Cross-Country Analysis
Much evidence has been reported on how national cultures differ and how people of different 
national origins have different views of, and reactions to, management practices (Hofstede 1980; 
Child 1981; Pascale & Athos 1981; Yang 1984; Bartlett & Ghoshal 1988; Bimberg & Snodgrass 
1988; Steers 1989: 293-326; Itami 1991; Nishimura 1995; O’Connor 1995).
It has been suggested that the accounting systems used in developing countries may be irrelevant 
to their needs because they originate in western countries with different cultural values. The 
accounting literature on this point, however, is vague in its assessment of exactly what aspects 
of western accounting systems fail to meet the test of relevance. Furthermore, it is not clear 
whether the differences between the needs of users in various countries are differences in kind or 
only differences in degree (Baydoun & Willett 1995).
The increasing dominance of Asian manufacturing firms in the global economy has raised an
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important issue: whether these firms’ superior manufacturing performance is caused by their 
management control systems, the national culture of their employees, or the interaction of these 
two factors (Cole 1979; Ouchi 1981; Pascale & Athos 1981). This explanation is consistent with 
the contingency theory of organizations (Hall 1987), which proposes that organizational structure 
is dependent on organizational context, and that context and structure interactively affect 
performance. Chow, Shields & Chan (1991) have tested the effects of national culture and 
management control system on manufacturing performance. The dimension of national culture 
studied was individualism (vs collectivism) because this work-related attribute has been noted as 
a major difference between Asian and Western cultures. In turn, the focus on cultural 
individualism motivated a study of two aspects of management controls: work flow 
interdependence and pay interdependence. The results are consistent with cultural individualism 
and management controls having independent, but not interactive, effects on manufacturing 
performance.
Chow, Kato and Merchant (1996) performed a comparative study in order to provide evidence 
useful for addressing descriptive and evaluative questions about control systems at the profit 
centre organization level of one U.S. manufacturing firm and a compatible (in size and industry) 
Japanese manufacturing firm. They find that overall, Japanese managers are subject to tighter 
controls than their U.S. counterparts. But when faced with controls of equal tightness, they are 
less likely to manipulate performance measures and to discard their good investment ideas.
2.9.3 Management Accounting & Culture in China
According to the Hofstede (1980) and Gray (1988) cultural models, China’s accounting 
development and practice should be in the cluster that supports statutory control, uniform 
practices, a conservative measurement approach and secrecy in disclosure. A uniform and rigid 
system of financial reporting which is adaptable to China’s recently emerged socialist market 
economy is in the “pipeline”. The adoption of accounting standards in the later phases of the 
reforms makes a dramatic turning point in China’s accounting history towards a more 
international Anglo-Saxon orientation in financial reporting (Chow et al 1995) .
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Based on an analysis (Chow et al 1995) of the authority for accounting systems, the accounting 
profession and accounting measurement and disclosure in China, it is argued that this development 
will be constrained by the influence of China’s culture and its accounting sub-culture. While 
financial reporting will be governed by accounting standards, their development and enforcement 
will remain a governmental and legalistic function. Accountants will continue to rely heavily on 
detailed technical rules. This mixed orientation will constitute China’s unique national identity 
in terms of its accounting and financial reporting system.
In order to determine the cross-cultural effects of accounting, it is necessary to work from a 
theoretical foundation of culture which permits culture to be broken down into its underlying 
characteristics or components. These components may then be examined for their implications 
for different accounting systems in different nations (Harrison 1992; Lau, Low & Eggleton 1995). 
From the studies of Hofstede (1980) and Gray (1988), a comparison of societal values between 
China and both the US and the UK is shown below:
Hofstede's 
Societal Value
China US/UK Gray’s Accounting 
Value
China US/UK
Power distance Large Small Uniformity/
Flexibility
Uni­
formity
Flexibi­
lity
Collectivism/
Individualism
Collecti­
vism
Individual­
ism
Statutory control/ 
Professionalism
Statutory
control
Profes­
sionalism
Uncertainty
avoidance
Strong Weak Conservatism/
Optimism
Conser­
vatism
Opti­
mism
Masculinity/
Femininity
Less
Masculinity
More
Masculinity
Transparency/
Secrecy
Secrecy Trans­
parency
Adapted from Chow et al 1995.
The above cross-country cultural comparison provides an useful framework for describing, 
measuring and explaining the relationships between these cultural variables or dimensions and the 
management accounting and control systems practised in China and other countries (Chow, 
Shields & Chan 1991). Very little of this kind of cultural research related to management 
accounting has been done in China.
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2.10 AN OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
2.10.1 Traditional Approaches
Following Child (1977), Hopwood (1978) and Wood (1979), it would appear that there are major 
problems with contingency theory and its use in management accounting (Otley 1980). 
Management accounting seems to have developed, at least in part, to facilitate coordination of 
activities in diverse and dispersed organizations, to monitor performance of organizational sub­
units and to allocate funds to these sub-units (Chandler & Daems 1979). In short, management 
accounting may, in part, have been developed to aid managers in making decisions about the most 
appropriate ways of achieving their objectives.
Scientific management assumes that individual motivation and behaviour is based on economic 
rewards and penalties and that man is imaginative in maximizing his economic welfare. Control 
is achieved in scientific management through the manipulation of organizational rewards and 
sanctions and the directing of behaviour through a set of plans, rules and a hierarchy. This model 
of control is not only found in the work of Taylor (1947) and Weber (1947) but is also found in 
the theory of agency and organization (Alchian & Demsetz 1972; Demski & Feltham 1978).
Most textbook pictures of management accounting fit into this model (Horngren 1982). 
Accounting information is orientated towards score card and attention directing roles of 
information (Simon et al 1954). Responsibility Accounting systems and divisional reporting 
schemes reflect, reinforce, and thereby facilitate, the creation of the well-defined patterns of 
hierarchy, authority and responsibility that are found in bureaucracies. These accounting systems 
specify the actions to be reported, who has responsibility and authority to make decisions and on 
what criteria these decisions will be evaluated (Cooper 1981).
Most of the prescriptions offered by the applied economics branch of management accounting 
(Carsberg 1975) reinforce bureaucratic rationality and act as a means of coordinating and 
directing individual activity The development of optimal production plans, inventory policies, 
investment strategies, pricing policies and so on provide the specific rules of organizational 
activity that will facilitate the objectives of the owners of the firm. Similarly, budgets and 
standard costing are typically viewed as techniques to achieve control through order. Budgets
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are seen as ways of imposing the goals of top managers on other organizational participants and 
as means of scheduling tasks and achieving organizational coordination (Livingstone 1973). Not 
surprisingly, there has been some relatively careful work done on the optimal degree of difficulty 
o f‘imposed’ standards (Stedry 1960; Stedry & Kay 1966; Hofstede 1968) and the ‘best’ way to 
use organizational reward systems in the evaluation of individual performance (Argyris 1952; 
Cherrington & Cherrington 1973; Hopwood 1973; Otley 1978). Yet whilst the results of each 
of these studies is interesting in its own right, a major conclusion has been that the conflicting 
results about the uses of budgetary control systems may be dependent on the state of the 
organization and its environment (Baumler 1971; Otley 1978).
2.10.2 New Working Environment
Automated manufacturing technology which forms the nucleus of the 'factory o f the future ’ is 
becoming an increasingly significant factor in competitive battles across the developed world. 
This growth in advanced manufacturing technologies (e.g. MRP, JIT, FMS, AMT, etc.) is seen 
by many to be making new demands on organisational information systems in general and 
accounting and control systems in particular. It has been argued that managers faced with having 
to make decisions in complex technology driven situations are supplied with information by the 
firm’s internal management systems which is not considered to be adequate for this environment 
and, in effect, which often is misleading (Berliner & Brimson 1988). Consequently, products are 
being mispriced, overheads misallocated and organisational processes mismanaged. It is thus 
important for the management accountant to become aware of the novel demands perceived as 
being made on internal accounting systems by modem production systems and to reassess the role 
of management accounting in an altered production environment (Kaplan 1984a: 101; Neumann 
& Jaouen 1986: 132; Kaplan 1988b: 39-40; McNair et al 1988: 18; Bromwich & Bhimani 1994: 
11-13).
Many modem management accounting techniques such as cost driver analysis or activity-based 
costing (Cooper & Kaplan 1987: 169-203; Horngren 1995), backflush accounting (Foster & 
Homgren 1988), throughput accounting (Galloway & Waldron 1988), life-cycle costing (Berliner 
& Brimson 1988), materials requirements planning (Mackey 1991: 193-203), non-cumulative
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costing and total quality control techniques, are only beginning to be implemented in practice in 
a limited sense. Many of these innovations are advocated on the basis of their potential benefits 
within a theoretical framework. Empirical evidence as it emerges, will no doubt help in assessing 
the validity of some of these ideas (Bromwich & Bhimani 1994: 87).
2.10.3 Research
Much of the received knowledge of management accounting research of the last five decades has 
been regarded with scepticism by academics and has never been overwhelmingly accepted in 
practice (Bromwich 1987: 217). The body of knowledge used by practice in all but a few areas 
has remained loyal to a set of practices which had reached maturity and obtained widespread 
application by the early 1950s. These techniques had been developed mainly in practice and at 
the interface between practice and practically oriented academics (Kaplan 1984a).
During the 1980s, accounting researchers in the UK have become increasingly interested in the 
nature of management accounting practice. This interest was initially prompted by a perceived 
gap between the theory and practice of management accounting, and especially the generally held 
belief that the conventional wisdom of management accounting textbooks is not widely used in 
practice. However, this belief was based on anecdotes, occasional visits to companies and a few 
published studies of the use of particular management accounting techniques (Scapens 1991). 
There was clearly a need to establish the nature of management accounting practice through 
empirical research (Cooper et al 1983: 2) such as this study where the major objective is to 
understand the responsibility accounting systems practised in the state-owned enterprises in China 
through field work (i.e. exploratory case study).
After reviewing the above literature, some relevant theories and empirical evidence relating to (1) 
organizational theories (Section 2.4); (2) control systems (Section 2.5); (3) performance 
measurement (Section 2.6); (4) performance appraisal and rewards (Section 2.7); (5) contingency 
theory (Section 2.8); and (6) culture (Section 2.9) have been incorporated into the research 
instrument and case writing of this study. These are the elements which capture the essential 
features of this research question or problem (Section 1.3 in Chapter 1).
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PART B : PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
2.11 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & OPEN DOOR POLICY
In 1978, an important year in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), at the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a series of 
economic reforms and open-door policies were announced. These reforms and policies had 
penetrating influences into every stratum of the economy, ranging from the production 
responsibility system adopted in the rural farms, diversified manufacturing factories established 
in villages and small towns37, to operational reforms of the industrial enterprises in the big cities. 
The pace of these economic reforms has been speeded up significantly right after the South 
China’s visit by the Chinese top leader, Mr Deng Xiao Ping, during January 1992. His major 
message was to further open the economic doors in the 1990s. With regards to legislation, the 
Chinese government has enacted and promulgated many laws and policies in the last ten years to 
facilitate the economic enhancement. The following are some of them which have direct 
implications on the core of this study.
(1) Company Law (1993)
(2) Socialist Market Economy (1992)
(3) Regulations for State-Owned Industrial Enterprises Operation Mechanisms 
Transformation (1992)
(4) Shareholding Enterprise Transformation or Privatization (1990)
(5) Bankruptcy Law (1986)
One of the most important objectives of the above mentioned laws and policies is to improve the 
economic efficiency of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the motivation of their employees 
(Lin & Yau 1994).
37 According to the results of the ‘Agricultural Economic Quantitative Research’ reported 
by the Chinese Social Science Academy, there were 250 million peasants producing the 
agricultural products and 100 million people working in the township factories (enterprises) at the 
end of 1996. They accounted for 28% of the total population in China (Hong Kong Wen Wei Po 
Newspaper on 24 December 1996).
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2.12 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The major purpose of these laws and regulations is to delegate more autonomy to the SOEs to 
ensure that they are self-financed, self-managed, self-regulated and self-developed (Beijing 
Review 1984; Reynolds 1987: 10-11; Bromwich & Wang 1991). The “Regulations for State- 
Owned Industrial Enterprises Operation Mechanisms Transformation (1992)” with 7 chapters and 
54 articles was announced by the State Council on 24 July 1992. The major objectives of this law 
of transformation are to motivate the enterprises to be market-oriented and to raise the economic 
productivity and efficiency of the SOEs.
Autonomy regarding purchasing, production, selling, distribution, labour employment and 
remuneration, capital and fund raising, merger and takeover, winding-up and bankruptcy are 
delegated to the enterprise managements and accountants who can adopt and implement the 
management accounting methods (typically the responsibility accounting) more rigorously and 
effectively. Further refinement on this law of transformation was one of the five major themes 
discussed during the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party held in November 1993.
Another important ongoing reform is the Socialist Market Economy which was the major theme 
of discussion and was written into the PRC’s Constitution during the 14th People’s Congress held 
during October 1992. The implementation of this economic style will result in the future planning, 
operation and control in the SOEs to be more market driven. As a result, planning and control 
responsibilities fall squarely on the shoulders of the enterprise managements. Enterprises are 
allowed the autonomy to purchase and supply according to their own marketing and production 
plans. They are also permitted to price their products or services according to market conditions. 
In addition, their investment decisions in terms of fixed assets acquisitions, enterprise mergers and 
takeovers, and divestments will be enlarged. All these consequences are affecting the 
management accounting systems employed by the SOEs.
However, after implementing these laws and regulations, 34.3% of the large and medium SOEs 
incurred losses in the first quarter of 1995, and to put them onto the road to recovery is
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undoubtedly of paramount importance38. The proportion of large and medium-sized SOEs 
reporting losses increased to 45% and total amount of loss was Renminbi39(RMB)69 billion (an 
increase of 45.7% compared with the same period in 1995) for the year of 199640. It has been 
estimated that the income tax levied on the SOEs by the government dropped by 70% from 
RMB175 billion in 1995 to RMB54 billion in 199641. Another adverse example was that 88% of 
the 19,476 SOEs in Guangdong Province (where Hong Kong is a city in this province) incurred 
losses in 1996 and 3,260 SOEs had debit balances in their networth42.
Although the SOEs in China account for 49% and 41% of the total National Industrial Output 
Value in 1992 and 1996 respectively43, they have imposed a heavy financial burden onto central 
and regional governments. The total subsidies for these enterprises amounted to RMB70 billion 
in 1993, RMB50 billion in 1995 and RMB101 billion in 1996. Part of these ailing SOEs have 
been subject to merger, takeover, management-buyout, leased-out or contracted-out to foreign 
investors in order to improve their operations and make them more market oriented44.
Nevertheless, from a long-term perspective, the ultimate panacea to sustain and enhance the 
economic efficiency of these SOEs is to improve their management technologies especially their 
management accounting methods and techniques including the “Responsibility Accounting 
System”.
38 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 28 March 1995.
39 Renminbi (RMB) is the monetary currency used in China. The market exchange rate 
at the end of 1996 is approximately US$1=RMB8.3.
40 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 31 December 1996.
41 See Hong Kong Oriental Newspaper on 15 December 1996.
42 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 28 December 1996.
43 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) 1996 Annual Review p. 14 published on 3 
January 1997.
44 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 23 May 1994 and 6 January 1996, and 
Hong Kong Oriental Newspaper on 15 December 1996.
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2.13 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
2.13.1 Early Development (1949-1978^
Since 1949, the Chinese accounting system has been designed to elicit uniform accounting 
information which could be used for national financial budgeting and economic planning, national 
income statistics and national bank credit planning (Zhou 1988; Scapens and Meng 1993). The 
traditional macroeconomic orientation of Chinese accounting meant that accounting information 
lacked relevance for managerial planning and control at the enterprise level (Bromwich & Wang 
1991).
During the 1950s, many SOEs emphasized the “ Work Team” concept. Work-teams were cost 
centres at the lowest level. These teams or groups of workers were responsible for achieving their 
planned production, cost and also assigned profit targets (Maschmeyer & Yang 1990). 
Production tasks were assigned to work-teams rather than to individual workers. Individualism 
was suppressed and group efforts encouraged. Actual group performance was measured against 
the targets to determine the group bonuses which were divided among the members according 
to their own rules (Kwang 1966; Yang 1981). Contrary to contemporary practice, top 
management of these enterprises were responsible for meeting production quotas only, paying 
little attention to financial results (Skousen & Yang 1988). In fact the “Work-Team” concept was 
the foundation of “Responsibility Accounting System” which has been widely developed since 
1987.
During the 1960s, many SOEs focused on the “ Working Capital and Cost ControF of divisional, 
departmental and work-team levels in order to make the best use of scarce resources and improve 
profitability. Turning into the 1970s, the “Internal Profit System” was used in many enterprises 
to increase the cost and profit awareness of factory managers although the majority of commodity 
prices were still under the control of the government (Shi & Lin 1989). Both facets of 
management accounting practice have contributed trial-and-error experience to the subsequent 
development of the responsibility accounting system.
However, the above developments in management accounting have not achieved great results 
because of the low productivity created by the uBig Rice PoF system (described in Section
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1.1.4(2) in Chapter 1 and Section 2.15.4 below), the government controlled policies and the self- 
reliance national policy since 1949. During the three decades to 1979, management accounting 
as a discipline had not been well recognised in China.
2.13.2 Further Development (1979-19891
The theme of the transformation of the Chinese accoumting system has coincided with general 
economic reforms seeking to increase decision-making power concerning production, supply, 
marketing, financing, pricing, personnel, wages and b<onuses at the SOE level and to loosen 
centralized control (Zhou 1987; Bromwich & Wang 19'91).
When many SOEs were given the authority to sell at leastt a portion of their products in response 
to market demand, and to retain a portion (around 20%) of profits for the benefit of workers, 
accounting techniques to facilitate this profit-oriented aind “increased autonomy” management 
system were needed. The enterprises could not model these accounting techniques on the Soviet 
system. Profit centres were better developed by using western management accounting methods. 
The proclamation of open-door policies in 1978 encouraged the Chinese academics to study, 
translate and publish western management accounting methods, primarily from American 
accounting textbooks and journals (Yang 1987; Skousen & Yang 1988; Hau 1991). The 
following were some of these major publications:
Chen, Xiuhqui. 1980. Management Accounting. Mechanical Industry Publication (Beijing).
Yu, Xiuin. 1983. Management Accounting. China Finance & Economics Press (Beijing).
Li, Tanmin. 1984. Management Accounting. Central Broadcasting & Television University 
Publication (Beijing).
Wang, Xahyau. 1987. Management Accounting. Economic Science Publication. (Beijing).
Shi, Ranjing, and Lin, Baohuai. 1989. Management Accounting. Shanghai People’s Press.
The above textbooks have adopted the western management accounting models into some 
management accounting systems, typically the responsibility accounting, with Chinese 
characteristics. Many of these new management accounting methods were quickly endorsed by 
Chinese national accounting associations such as the Accounting Society of China and many
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other provincial accounting associations, various state ministries, bureaux, as well as 
administrative corporations. The new concepts were immediately implemented, at least by the 
enterprise managers and accountants who had limited technical training only (Meng 1987). 
Education programmes and seminars were initiated, and the curricula of management and 
accounting in the universities were modified accordingly.
A number of western concepts like variable and fixed costs, contribution margin, cost-volume- 
profit analysis, flexible budgets, variable costing and service department cost allocations started 
to be used by Chinese accountants and managers. Of these methods, the responsibility accounting 
and the cost-volume-profit analysis were the most extensively applied (Ding 1981; Yang 1982). 
However, whether wholesale moves toward the various management accounting systems 
employed in the western enterprises are appropriate is questionable (Firth 1996). Morsicato & 
Radebaugh (1979), Schweikart (1986), and Scapens & Meng (1993) caution that the adoption 
of western management accounting standards in the other countries (e.g. China) may be sub- 
optimal due to different environmental conditions and thus lead to economic inefficiency.
Fundamental to the use of the profit centre accounting method was the determination of “profit” 
in a free-market economy in which prices were subject to supply and demand. The situation in 
China was quite different in this respect during this period from 1979 to 1989. Although the 
central government had introduced many economic reforms, the market was far from being 
operated by supply and demand only. Prices for most industrial and consumable commodities 
were set by the government via the State Price Control Bureau.
The investment concept, and optimization of investment returns were still largely unexplored in 
China during the 1980s. For many years, the performance measurement of SOEs have been 
related mainly to the achievement of production quotas. Profit was largely viewed as any savings 
from the predetermined production costs. Capital investment in individual enterprises was largely 
determined and controlled by the government (Firth 1996). Increases in profit due to increased 
investment could not generally be attributed to the efforts of enterprise management. Thus, 
managers endeavoured only to meet the production quotas and “profit” goals with no heed to 
inventory and asset investments. To most Chinese managers, concepts such as return on
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investment, residual income and time value of money had little meaning (Bromwich & Wang 
1991).
2.13.3 Recent Development ( \990-1996)
Seeking to link closely accounting with enterprise management, a theory of “Accounting 
Management’ has evolved since the early 1990s in China. The concept stipulates that accounting 
is one of the most important management activities rather than being a management tool or 
information system. According to this emergent perspective, accounting should play an active 
and positive function in forecasting, planning, evaluating, analysing as well as controlling business 
operations (Ding 1992; Li 1992).
In a typical medium- or large-sized SOE, the “chief accountant’, the “chief economist’ and the 
“chief engineer” are the three deputies to the chief executive of the enterprise. In some SOEs, 
a new section dealing with routine management accounting matters is set up within the accounting 
and finance department. In others, a new office under the chief executive usually called the 
“enterprise management office” or “general manager office” is set up to apply management 
accounting knowledge to assist top management. These different arrangements also reflect the 
varied importance given to management accounting functions in different SOEs.
The crux of enterprise accounting reform has been the shifting of attention from merely 
bookkeeping to participating in managerial decision-making and control, from retrospective 
reporting to prospective forecasting and the use of feedback control, from serving the needs of 
state control to assisting and advising the enterprise’s decision-makers (Bromwich & Wang 
1991).
Many authors (Shi & Lin 1989; He & Lin 1991; Yu 1991) and practitioners hold that the 
establishment of a new responsibility accounting system is the key to enhance the economic 
efficiency of the SOEs. Only when a new enterprise accounting system which directly serves 
management is set up can the nature and functions of accounting be actually achieved. Some 
academics have proposed a new accounting subject called “Responsibility Accounting1’ separated 
from the management accounting syllabus.
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2.14 RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
During the 1980s, many SOEs instituted a kind of “Responsibility Accounting System” known 
as the “Internal Responsibility Contract (IRQ”, which is mainly a four-step mechanism (Yan 
& Long 1987; Wan & Wei 1993).
2.14.1 Establishing Responsibility Centres
The overall responsibilities for an enterprise for meeting the target level of annual turnover and 
profit are divided and assigned to various internal units and centres (e.g. production departments, 
work shifts and even individual workers) which together constitute the enterprise. Profit and cost 
centres are also identified in order to identify income generating and cost control responsibility.
2.14.2 Targets Setting
Every year, the financial targets prescribed in the uEconomic Responsibility Contract (ERC')” 
(for an example, see Section 4 of Data Analysis 1 in Volume 3 [pp.6-7]) are always established 
as the primary guidelines used by the enterprise top management for the responsibility centres’ 
managers to formulate the terms and conditions within their IRCs, and then negotiate them with 
the top management until compromises are reached and contracts signed. The IRC contains both 
financial and non-financial targets, the achievement of which will determine the group and 
individual bonuses of that responsibility centre. The financial targets stipulated in the IRC 
normally include sales, production values (or added-values), capital and working funds, costs and 
expenses. On the other hand, the non-financial targets may embrace production quantity and 
quality, product mix and variety, labour productivity and efficiency, material consumption, safety 
record, production capacity and quality, and even birth control!
2.14.3 Internal Transactions
In some large SOEs, a system of “Internal Bank” is established. The system is similar to the 
internal transfer pricing mechanism in other countries. Products and services are provided to an 
internal unit at prices set by the enterprise management, after consultations with the managers
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concerned. Transfer prices are set on the basis of market price, cost or cost plus an appropriate 
margin. Internal currency and cheques originated by internal banks under the auspices of the 
enterprise’s department of finance or accounting are commonly used for the settlement of inter­
unit transactions. Interest is paid on deposit and charged on credit extended by the bank. This 
system can also act as a means to monitor the working capital levels and flows among the 
responsibility centres or units within the enterprise (Shi & Zhang 1994; Liu & Zhang 1996).
2.14.4 Performance Evaluation
The financial and non-financial targets agreed upon for each IRC are usually evaluated on a 
periodic basis. Actual performances are measured against the pre-set targets in order to control 
the operational progress and award the group bonus. Furthermore, internal transfer prices set for 
the internal banking system facilitate an objective performance measurement and encourage 
efficiency and goal congruence within the enterprise. Performance evaluation for each unit can 
be based on the actual profit relative to the target profit levels. Usually, performance is linked 
with material, socio-emotional and moral incentives (Foa & Foa 1980; Zhao 1988; Cheng 1989).
2.14.5 Conclusion
Evidently, both ERC and IRC systems should lead to better economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of SOEs. The targets set in the ERC are segregated and passed on the organisational hierarchy 
through the IRC system which bears great similarities to the western responsibility accounting 
practice (Bromwich & Wang 1991; He & Lin 1991: 2 & 107).
2.15 PROBLEMS OF RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING IN CHINA
The applications of responsibility accounting have encountered some problems although many 
government officials, academics and practitioners have promoted and refined this management 
accounting system for almost a decade. The following six causes provide some explanations of 
the problems.
1 1 0
Ch.2 : Literature Review
2.15.1 Economic Responsibility Contract fERCl System
Under the direction of Deng Xiao Ping, who in 1981 was the PRC’s Premier, the first ERC was 
signed between the Beijing Municipal Government and the Capital Iron & Steel Corporation (the 
largest steel work in China) in 1981. The major terms and conditions were as follow45:
(1) The enterprise must hand-over to the government the predetermined annual profit 
(disregarded the actual financial performance) which was based on a compound growth 
rate of 7.2% per annum. The surplus profit over the target could be wholly retained by 
the enterprise. The government would not invest any additional capital.
(2) The retained earnings should be appropriated 60% to the production development reserve 
fund, 20% to the employee welfare fund, and 20% for the employee bonus.
(3) The annual gross wages paid should not exceed 80% of the annual profit before tax.
(4) The enterprise had the autonomy to sell 15% of the planned production to its own 
customers. Any surplus production over the plan could be sold by the enterprise in the 
free markets.
(5) The ERC period was for 15 years from 1981 to 1995 (the longest one ever in China).
(6) The authorities, responsibilities and rewards of this ERC should be underwritten by or 
delegated to individual employees of the enterprise.
(7) The enterprise had autonomy to invest by using the production development reserve fund.
(8) The enterprise had import and export rights.
The Capital Iron & Steel Corporation exceeded the financial targets in all the 15 years under this 
ERC. Having had this successful experience, the State Council of China promulgated the ERC 
system across all the SOEs in April 1987 and enacted the “State-Owned Industrial Enterprises 
Economic Responsibility Contract Temporary Regulations” in February 1988. This ERC 
system was adopted by over 90% of all the SOEs by the end of 199246. Under such a system, the 
top management or chief executive of a SOE entered into a contract with its supervisory authority
45 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 1 November 1994.
46 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 9 November 1993.
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and other government agencies (municipal or provincial government) in return for full autonomy 
to manage its business operation (Yu 1988).
The contract requires enterprise management to reach some prescribed target levels of turnover 
and profit upon which sales and income taxes are levied. The period of the contract is normally 
three to five years. The basic turnover and profit targets set for the first year are based on the 
average levels attained in the preceding three years and subject to negotiation between the two 
parties. Then, usually there will be a compounded growth percentage added to the subsequent 
years. After handing-over the pre-determined taxes and profits to the municipal or provincial 
government, the enterprise can retain the surplus for the business growth, capital investment, 
distribution of bonus and providing welfare (e.g. housing) for the employees. Such a contract is 
renewable subject to satisfactory performance of the enterprise management (Fan & Schaffer 
1991: 16-17; Arthur Andersen 1993: 70; Chow, Cooper & Tang 1993).
It is evident from the above that the ERC system is designed to (1) assure a stable growth in 
government’s income; (2) change government’s control from direct to indirect; and (3) create an 
environment for better economic management of the SOEs (Xie & Lin 1992). In order to achieve 
the prescribed levels of financial performance, the enterprise management and accounting 
personnel should participate in technology improvement, investment analysis, product and market 
development, sales and promotion strategies, cost control, and wages and bonus determination 
(Yan & Chen 1988).
Although a small portion of the SOEs (i.e. about 9,200 in total) have been converted into 
shareholding enterprises and have ceased their ERCs, over 69% of the remaining SOEs are still 
practising ERCs or equivalent agreements with the government in 199647. The government 
believes that before the widespread use of and the maturity of socialist market economy, the ERC 
system is the best means to delegate the management autonomies to the SOEs in order to make 
them be self-financed, self-managed, self-regulated and self-developed48.
47 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 7 February 1996 and 16 July 1997.
48 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 4 November 1994.
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However, over 34% and 45% of the SOEs, which are using the ERCs, have incurred financial 
losses in 1995 and 1996 respectively. The following are the four major reasons (Liu & Liu 1994).
(1) The “short-term behaviour’' of the enterprise management leads to inadequate long-term 
investments in research and development, production facility and equipment, product and 
market development, human resources, education and training (Arthur Andersen 1993: 
69; Chow, Cooper & Tang 1993; Liu & Zhang 1996:113-118).
(2) The relatively “low sales and profit targets set in the ERC do not really motivate the 
enterprise management to capitalize the business opportunities and potentials (Liu 1989).
(3) Managers of individual responsibility centres within an enterprise may overemphasize the 
interests of their own responsibility centres, and avoid modifying or improving their own 
targets even when the economic environment faced by the enterprise has been changed. 
This negative behaviour can affect the coherence of targets across the enterprise and make 
it difficult to realise the targets of the enterprises as a whole (Scapens & Meng 1993).
(4) As the sole owner, the state still exerts influences on planning, decision making, 
administration and personnel affairs in the operation of these enterprises (Lin & Yau 
1994).
Partly because of the above reasons, modem management techniques, including management 
accounting methods, have not been well implemented in these SOEs.
To replace this ERC system, many enterprises have adopted the “Income Tax System” under 
which the enterprises are required to pay sales tax, value-added tax, consumption tax and other 
miscellaneous local service taxes, which are based on the amount of turnover. In addition, income 
tax has to be paid according to taxable profit after deducting operating costs and allowable 
expenses. Therefore, the higher the profit after tax, the more will be the retained earnings without 
any pre-determined targets as set in the previous ERC.
In parallel with the income tax system, many government officials, business managers, accounting 
practitioners and academics believe that “Shareholding System” or privatization is the best means 
to solve this problem faced by the government in the 1990s (Chow, Cooper & Tang 1993;
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According to a survey on 371 shareholding or privatized enterprises by the State Council at the 
beginning of 1994, 53.7% of the respondents agreed that significant operational changes had 
occurred after the ownership transformation50. After the first year of conversion, the following 
financial indicators of this sample of shareholding enterprises (overall average) had increased by: 
Average output per employee 57.3%
Profit before tax per employee 85.2%
Sales profit margin 49.2%
Return on capital employed 39.3%
Wages per employee 44.0%
The promulgation of shareholding enterprises by the government was encouraged by these 
promising economic results.
2.15.2 Shareholding System
The transformation of wholly SOEs into shareholding enterprises is a national policy which has 
been further facilitated in the second half of the 1990s. According to the “Company Law” 
enacted in December 1993 and implemented in July 1994, “Meeting o f Shareholders (AGM)” 
should be the highest authoritative body of these companies. On the other hand, the major duties 
of the “Board o f Directors” are to execute the resolutions passed by the meetings of shareholders 
to decide on the operation and investment plans of the company. Furthermore, the “Supervisory 
Committee” is to check on the financial affairs of the company and to supervise the law and 
regulation violating acts and the directors and managers in performing their duties51.
49 The State Securities Supervisory Commission stated that shareholding transformation, 
especially listing overseas, could enhance the management and control systems in the SOEs (see 
Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Newspaper on 30 December 1996).
50 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 7 May 1994.
51 See Company Law. 1993. People's Congress o f China (December): Chapter 2. 
Sections 37, 38, 45, 46, 52, 53, 54.
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Some of the provisions in the Company Law seem to have vested the planning, control and 
management autonomy to the meeting of shareholders, board of directors and supervisory 
committee (see p.332 of Volume 3). A survey of 89 shareholding enterprises showed that 47% 
of the shares were owned by the state, 28% by other enterprises, 15% by individuals and 10% by 
foreign investors (Liu 1992). Over 50% of the shares in all the 8 shareholding enterprises 
investigated in this research were held by their supervisory state authorities.
Thus, the enterprise controlling power is still rested in the hands of the regional government who 
can impose directives and exert influence on every aspect of the enterprise. As a result, the 
enterprise management may not have the authority, autonomy and motivation to operate the 
business. To solve this problem, the state can materialise the spirit and provisions of the Company 
Law, and fully delegate the authority and responsibility to the chairman of the board. The state 
can also uplift its visible hand from the shareholding enterprises. Under these circumstances, the 
enterprise management will be able to use the management accounting techniques to enhance the 
long-term economic efficiency and profitability for the enterprise (Lin & Yau 1994).
2.15.3 Market Discipline
In western countries, it is usually assumed that if an enterprise does not compete successfully in 
the market it will fail to earn sufficient profits and, in the long run, it will become bankrupt. 
Currently such a market discipline is not common in China. Although there has been a 
Bankruptcy Law since 1986, less than 1,500 SOEs have actually been made bankrupt despite the 
fact that about 180,000 SOEs were still loss-making in 1996. A major reason is that if many SOEs 
are to be bankrupted, large numbers of workers and employees would lose their jobs, and this 
could cause political instability due to the lack of a well-structured social welfare system although 
the government has been implementing successive plans to strengthen this system52. Thus, in the 
future Chinese SOEs may be subject to the “discipline o f the markef \  but as yet they remain 
relatively protected.
52 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 20 January 1996.
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Since the managers of the SOEs in China are not subject to market disciplines to the same extent 
as western managers, it is not surprising that Chinese managers do not give as much priority to 
the economic and financial management of their enterprises as their western counterparts. Before 
the SOEs in China do really become independent economic entities, management accounting is 
unlikely to play a major role in the management of Chinese enterprises (Scapens and Meng 1993).
2.15.4 Big Rice Pot
The “Big Rice Pot' ideology or the “Three Iron Bowls “ (iron employment, iron work position, 
iron wages) concept has not really been abolished because it has still taken root and exerted an 
adverse influence on the IRC system. In may large- and medium-sized SOEs, laying off the 
redundant employees (may be as high as 20%-30% of the labour force) will create many social 
problems in the light of the current insufficient employment social welfare and benefits in China53. 
Hence, economic efficiency and productivity could not be enhanced significantly although the 
responsibility accounting has been widely implemented in the SOEs.
In addition to reform the social welfare system in China, the government should enforce, 
according to the “Operation Mechanisms Transformation Regulations” and “Labour Law” 
enacted in 1992 and 1995 respectively, to allow the enterprise management to implement the 
“Employment Contract System” to replace the long-established “Life-Long Employment’ or 
“Iron Bowls” practices. The duration of an employment contract is usually from one to five years 
subject to review and renewal. This employment contract system is to initiate the self-motivation 
(in a positive way) of or to impose threat of termination (in a negative way) on the enterprise 
managers and employees.
53 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 29 November 1997.
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2.15.5 Computer Applications
Due to the lack of funds, the use of computers has not been actively promoted in many SOEs, in 
particular, the medium- and small-sized enterprises. Only the profitable large SOEs can afford 
to install mainframes or mini-computers, and the medium enterprises employ stand-alone personal 
computers to automate the production management, inventory control, purchasing, sales and 
accounting functions. The development of “Local Area Network System (LANS)” rarely exists 
in these enterprises. Therefore, it is difficult for various levels of management to retrieve instantly 
relevant information from the computer system to enhance the management efficiency.
Four visits were made to the Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) which had 1,100 employees and 
achieved RMB180 million of turnover in 1994. As from 1986 to 1994, this enterprise has 
invested over a million dollars of RMB (Renminbi) in both hardware (e.g. a centralised mini­
computer) and software (e.g. tailor-made package). Furthermore, a postgraduate in computer 
science was recruited in 1989 from the Fudan University (Shanghai most famous university) to 
head the computer centre. It was amazing that in a few years’ time, a LANS has been built up 
to integrate the sales, purchasing, inventory, production, accounting (financial and management 
reporting), wages, fundflow (cash flow) sub-systems.
The economic efficiency of this enterprise has been greatly improved since the early 1990s and 
it is now one of the top ten SOEs in Xiamen which is one of the five coastal special economic 
zones since 1981. Since 1993, this enterprise has started a joint-venture with a well-known 
German company to establish a manufacturing plant in Xiamen which will be the largest of its kind 
in China. The researcher had a chance to talk with a top executive of this German Company in 
September 1994 and was told that the major reason to choose XFLT to be their partner was 
because of their efficient management system. It is evident from this example that the use of 
computers or automation is a crucial tool to facilitate the installation of AIS or MIS as a 
cornerstone to support the management accounting applications in China.
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2.15.6 Management Knowledge
In parallel with the economic reforms and open-door policies, the management systems and 
techniques currently adopted by Chinese SOEs need to be enhanced via learning from the western 
countries. Since the early 1990s, the promulgation of the shareholding system, operation 
mechanisms transformation and socialist market economy have created favourable environments 
for the SOEs to manage their own operations, to improve the financial performance and to 
increase the benefits to the government, the enterprises and the employees.
However, it will take a long time to change the mind set and management practice of millions of 
managers in China. In Chinese enterprises, management control is sometime based on loyalty, 
seniority and trust. Chief executives are usually very authoritarian and manage their enterprises 
through direct involvement and personal relationships, rather than through accounting numbers 
(Wang 1986; Zhang 1989). Chinese accountants frequently complain that management 
accounting is not used for management control and chief executives attach little importance to it. 
For example, in a study by Meng (1991), accountants at the Beijing Oil Machinery Factory 
complained that they could not use management accounting methods because their senior 
executives knew little about management accounting and they prefer to rely on their own business 
experience.
The lack of concepts of effective management and the inadequate knowledge of management 
accounting techniques among the enterprise’s senior management, who are usually old-aged 
people, have been the blocking factors against the further development of management accounting 
theories and practices54. Education and training as described in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.3.1) 
should be one of the best ways to promote this management intelligence transformation process 
(Bromwich & Wang 1991).
54 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 25 November 1996.
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The literature review in Part B of this chapter, in particular the descriptions on “Responsibility 
Accounting Development in China” (Section 2.14) and “Problems of Responsibility Accounting 
in China” (Section 2.15) has addressed the essential features of the changes in planning and 
control systems adopted by the SOEs in the 1990s. These recent changes justify the research 
problem or question (Section 1.3 in Chapter 1) to be investigated by conducting some field work.
2.16 CONCLUSION
The lack of clarity and confounding evidence as shown in the literature review coupled with the 
dynamic changes in China make it very difficult to have a clear overall framework for this 
research. However, Goold and Campbell’s Strategic Framework offers some means of 
classification to be applied in this study. Hence, there is a need for exploratory case study on this 
topic.
The literature reviews are by no means exhaustive but they serve the dual purposes of providing 
(1) rich theoretical propositions, research findings and practical experiences to design and conduct 
this research; and (2) suggestions to explain the phenomena revealed in this research. In such an 
‘exploratory case study’ research, it is not intended and may not be feasible to test some of these 
normative or positive hypotheses quantitatively although some simple parametric and non- 
parametric statistical analyses are performed to verify the changes of responsibility accounting 
style of 20 SOEs within a modified management framework (i.e. Goold and Campbell’s Strategic 
Management Grid). Instead, the above intensive literature search can pinpoint or highlight many 
similarities and discrepancies between theories and practices relating to the substances of 
responsibility (or management) accounting system in China which will be worthwhile potential 
research areas for this and other researchers.
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CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter firstly describes the classical social science research paradigms which have provided 
guidance for the researcher to identify the appropriate research methodology to be used in this 
study (Section 3.2). Then the justifications for employing the “Exploratory Case Study” method 
are explained (Section 3.3). Finally, the detail procedures from research conceptualization to 
thesis writing are reported (Section 3.4) before the concluding remark (Section 3.5).
3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGMS
3.2.1 Social Science Research Paradigms
Burrell and Morgan (1979) propounded a very useful framework for classifying various research 
paradigms in the social sciences. This is based on two sets of philosophical assumptions 
concerning the “nature of social science” and the “nature of society”. The social science 
assumptions are interrelated and deal with (1) epistemology; (2) ontology; (3) human nature; 
and (4) methodology. The societal assumptions make a distinction between a society which 
strives toward social order on the one hand and social change on the other hand (Burrell & 
Morgan 1979: 1-7).
(1) Epistemology refers to the assumptions about the ‘nature o f knowledge’ — about how
one might begin to understand the world and communicate this knowledge to fellow
human beings. There are two extreme views on the nature of knowledge. The first one 
is called “positivism” (or scientific knowledge) which seeks to explain and predict what 
happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships between 
its constitute elements {objective approach). The second view of knowledge is called 
“anti-positivism” which rejects the standpoint o f ‘observer’ and maintains that one can 
only ‘understand’ by occupying the frame of reference of the participant in action 
{subjective approach).
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(2) Ontology concerns the nature of reality and the very essence of the phenomena under 
investigation. This may actually be considered as a continuum where, at one extreme 
there is termed as “realism” which states that the social world is viewed as having an 
empirical concrete existence which is independent of external, or prior to human, 
cognition (objective approach). At the other extreme, it is called “nominalism'’ (or 
conventionalism) which views that the social world external to individual cognition is 
made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels used to structure reality 
(subjective approach). Morgan and Smircich (1980) developed a six-way classification 
encompassing the objective and subjective extremes of the reality continuum which will 
be considered in Section 3.2.2 below.
(3) Human nature concerns the relationship between human beings and their environment 
or society. At one extreme is “determinism'’ which regards man and his activities as 
being completely determined by the situation or ‘environment’ in which he is located 
(objective approach). At another extreme is the “voluntarism” which views human 
behaviour a completely autonomous and free-willed (subjective approach).
(4) Methodology in social science research depends on the three sets of assumptions 
concerning epistemology, ontology and human nature. The “ideographic” view 
(subjective approach) to social science is based on the view that one can only understand 
the social world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It 
thus places considerable stress upon getting close to one’s subject and exploring the 
detailed background and life history. On the other extreme is the “nomothetic” view 
(objective approach) which lays emphasis on the importance of basing research upon 
systematic protocol and technique. It is common in this latter approach and methods 
employed in the social sciences, which focus upon the process of testing hypotheses in 
accordance with the construction of scientific tests and the use of quantitative techniques 
for analysis of data. Surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and standardised research 
instruments of all kinds are prominent among the tools which compromise nomothetic 
methodology.
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The following research paradigms have been chosen for the present study after considering their 
suitability to the current environment in China.
Assumption Paradigm Approach Reason o f Choice
Epistemology Anti-Positivism Subjective To understand the ‘inside’ operation of 
the Responsibility Accounting (RA) in the 
Chinese SOEs.
Ontology Nominalism Subjective RA system is regarded as ‘artificial 
creations’ whose utility is based upon 
their convenience as tools for planning 
and control.
Human Nature Determinism Objective RA system is subject to the planning and 
control influences from the legislation, 
ownership and economic changes.
Methodology Ideographic Subjective Despite the existence o f ‘determinism’ 
paradigm, the ‘ideographic’ is thought 
more appropriate for this research.
On balance the research methodology and assumptions selected are more towards the ideographic 
than nomothetic but it should be recognised that these terms describe the polar positions. The 
definition of the research question requires a methodological stance more consistent with the 
research assumptions underlying the subjective approach.
The assumptions about society emphasize a dichotomy between a society which strives towards 
social order or regulation (i.e. cohesion and stability) and a society which questions status quo, 
division of interests and power distribution thereby providing a rationale for radical change (social 
change). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), these two dimensions of society and social 
science create four paradigms as illustrated in the following diagram.
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE
SUBJECTIVE
‘Radical Humanist’ ‘Radical Structuralist’
‘Interpretative*’ ‘Functionalist’
OBJECTIVE
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION
Subjective Approach Objective Approach
to Social Science To Social Science
EPISTEMOLOGY
ONTOLOGY-
HUMAN NATURE
METHODOLOGY
POSITIVISM
REALISM
NOMOTHETIC
NOMINALISM
IDEOGRAPHIC
VOLUNTARISM DETERMINISM
ANTI-POSITIVISM
Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979: 3 & 22)
* The present research is classified into this domain.
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However, it should be borne in mind that Burrell and Morgan framework only represents a 
convenient means of classifying and appreciating various approaches to social science research. 
The most common criticism of this model relates to the strict dichotomies between the “objective” 
and “subjective” categories. These extremes and mutually exclusive paradigms have been 
considered unrealistic from a practical point of view (Morgan & Smircich 1980; Hopper & Powell 
1985; Chua 1986). Furthermore, different paradigms cannot be rationally compared as they are 
‘incommensurable’ or they are grounded in different traditions (or cultures such as in China) 
which literally inhabit different worlds (Kuhn 1970). Again on balance the research methodology 
in this study can be classified as interpretative. There is growing appreciation of the need to 
triangulate research methods when dealing with social science research.
3.2.2 Scientific & Naturalistic Research
The distinction between scientific and naturalistic approaches to the development of accounting 
theory is well explained by Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya (1979). They point out that the naturalistic 
paradigm generates “Class A” theory which is inductive, descriptive and seeks to present reality 
as it is, derived from factual observation. In contrast, the scientific paradigm “Class B” theory 
is deductive, normative, and anticipates what the world should be like. It is logically derived from 
assumptions or elementary propositions which are external to the phenomena under investigation. 
Although there exists an element of deduction in defining the research boundaries and domain 
from the literature review (Chapter 2) and identifying the research hypotheses (Chapter 1), the 
wide scope of research and method of data collection require inductive, descriptive and 
interpretative analysis. Therefore, the present research relates more to “Class A” theory.
Morgan and Smircich (1980: 492) developed a six-way classification of ontological assumptions 
concerning the nature of the social world (see the table below). This classification was used by 
Tomkins and Groves (1983) to explain the linkage between each ontological category and its 
associated research style or methodology. They are intended to provide a rough typology for 
thinking about the various views that different social scientists hold about human beings and their 
world.
124
Ch.3 :ResearchMethodology
Six Basic Ontological Assumptions (Morgan & Smircich 1980)
Ontological
Assumptions
Human Nature 
Assumptions
Epistemological 
Stance (Basic)
Some Favoured 
Metaphors
Research
Methods
Reality as a
concrete
structure
man as a 
responder
to construct a
positivist
science
machine lab experiments 
surveys
Reality as a
concrete
process
man as an 
adaptor
to study 
systems, 
process, change
organism historical
analysis
Reality as a 
contextual field 
of information
man as an
information
processor
to map contexts cybernetic contextual
analysis
Reality as a
symbolic
discourse
man as an actor: 
the symbol user
to understand 
patterns of 
symbolic 
discourse
theatre, culture symbolic
analysis
Reality as social 
construction
man as a social 
constructor: the 
symbol creator
to understand 
how social 
reality is created
language game, 
accomplish­
ment, text
hermeneutics
Reality as 
projection of 
human 
imagination
man as pure 
spirit,
consciousness,
being
to obtain 
phenomenolo­
gical insight, 
revelation
transcendental exploration of 
pure
subjectivity
The above model could be thought of as a continuum ranging from the strict objectivist (from 
top) view of the first category to the strict subjectivist (to bottom) view of the last category. 
The first three categories represent scientific paradigms while the last three constitute naturalistic 
research paradigms. In terms of this six-way classification, the present research is closer to the 
‘reality as social construction’ ontological assumption.
The scientific approaches are the dominant modes of inquiry adopted by accounting researchers. 
Tomkins and Groves (1983: 362) explained that this usually begins with the identification of a 
research problem from a review of the existing literature. The research problem is then 
transformed into hypotheses with a specification of independent and dependent variables 
representing the treatment involved. Subsequently, a highly structured or pre-determined
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protocol for data collection and mathematical or statistical analyses follows, leading to an almost 
exclusively quantitative validation of the hypotheses under investigation. Tomkins and Groves 
(1983) argue that this hypothetico-deductive orthodoxy has constrained the range of issues 
explored by accounting researchers and that it has left academic accounting literature adrift from 
the reality of everyday practice. Hence they advocate a shift in paradigm to redress the balance.
The “interpretive paradigm” (as shown in the 4 paradigms matrix in Section 3.2.1) is informed 
by a concern to understand that world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social 
world at the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm of individual 
consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of reference of the participants as opposed to the 
observer of action (Burrell & Morgan 1979: 28).
For example, the interpretive research paradigm adopted in the present research conforms with 
the well established approach in sociology for studying organisations such as the SOEs in China 
(Silverman 1970: 159-163). This research process is not just one of establishing empirical ‘facts’, 
but also involves the ‘interpretation’ of observed social practices (Scapens 1992). Furthermore, 
the choice of an interpretive research perspective was based on a fundamental belief in the 
usefulness of the more ‘naturalistic’ research paradigm (Tomkins & Groves 1983; Chua 1988).
3.2.3 Case Study Approach
In the last decade, there have been several calls for accounting research studies based on the case 
study or clinical methods (Kaplan 1983, 1984a, 1984c; Scapens 1983, 1990; Tomkins & Groves 
1983; Chua 1986; Horngren 1986). In this regard, the Harvard Business School sponsored a 
colloquium on field research studies in management accounting in June 1986. The 13 papers 
presented at this colloquium have been published in an edited volume by Bruns and Kaplan 
(1987). Each paper represented research on a management accounting issue within an actual 
organization (or organizations) so that through this study, the researchers could learn more about 
field research methods and determine whether an organizational study could provide new insights 
for their teaching and research activities. Some of the key features of qualitative research design 
based on the methodological guidance given by Bruns and Kaplan (1987) are now considered.
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It has been observed that rigorous accounting research of the hypothetico-deductive and model 
building varieties have proved very effective in areas where the issues at stake were well 
documented and generally accepted. However, Bruns & Kaplan (1987) note that:
“In cases where the phenomena are poorly documented, or where recent changes in the 
environment make even well-documented conventional wisdom suspect, it becomes 
important to optfor research methods that fully capture the relevant phenomena..... One 
should not expect researchers to be able to use rigorous research methods when studying, 
describing, and classifying poorly understood phenomena (p. 4 )”
These recommendations are pertinent to the present study because academic literature on the 
implementation of the Responsibility Accounting System is rare, if not in existence at all. 
Furthermore, the topic is very poorly understood and documented in an empirical manner. Also 
application of western management accounting (which is not based on single or universal 
framework) adds to the complexity.
Four important criteria for evaluating good case study or clinical research which have been 
developed and agreed upon by the Harvard Business School (HBS) faculty are taken into account 
in designing the current study (Bruns & Kaplan 1987: 1-14). These relate to the choice of subject 
matter, research design, data interpretation and practical implications of results.
(1) Choice of Subj ect Matter
The HBS faculty recommend that case study researchers choose a significant topic, ask good 
questions and explore original themes. A good topic is recognised in terms of its importance to 
practitioners and/or its potential for making advances in the conceptual development of the area 
investigated. It is agreed that originality occurred when the phenomenon is previously 
undescribed or unexplained. The topic of the current study presents considerable potential in this 
respect since no prior studies have been conducted on the implementation of the Responsibility 
Accounting in China and much of its associated phenomena were previously undescribed or 
unexplained in the literature. Furthermore, this research addresses the serious lack of systematic 
field research into understanding managerial accounting practices in their political, organisational 
and wider social and societal contexts (Roberts & Scapens 1985).
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(2) Research Design
The second recommendation concerns the research design. It covers the choice of sites for the 
study and research strategies. Emphasis is laid on the need for rich and evocative data describing 
organisational phenomena and their environmental contexts via interviews, possibly using 
anecdotes (case writings) to enhance communication and understanding for the readers.
Besides semi-structured interviews, the case studies also incorporate the use of unobtrusive 
measures (both adopted in this research). Unobtrusive measures are techniques for measuring or 
observing behaviour which, at the same time, eliminate reactivity problems. Reactivity refers to 
the behaviour of an individual who is aware of being observed. Archival records are unobtrusive 
measures because they may reflect certain attitudes of the record keepers which may be of interest 
to researcher (Webb et al 1966: 13-21; Cozby 1977: 33-34; Yin 1984: 87-88).
(3) Data Organisation and Interpretation
The third issue recognised by the HBS faculty is the organisation and interpretation of case study 
data. It is recommended that if individuals at the research site are quoted, then it should be in 
their own terms rather than in edited academic jargon. The use of previously existing concepts 
and metaphors is considered essential in organising the data with a view to making them 
accessible and understandable to readers. The research findings can then be contrasted with 
existing theories and concepts. Bruns & Kaplan (1987) state that this might even disprove 
hypotheses by pointing out that:
“Clinical research is most powerful when it shows that conventional models and wisdom 
do not apply in actual situations; used in this mode, clinical evidence could disprove 
hypotheses. Greater skill is required to use clinical evidence to establish new 
propositions and theories (p. 7)”
The “Case Analyses” and “Data Analyses” contained in Volume 2 and 3 are trying to capture 
these aspects. Case writing not only sets down the circumstances of the case, but also provides 
enough evidence to convince readers that this researcher has a good understanding of the relevant 
circumstances and that the explanations given are based on sound reasoning (Scapens 1990: 276).
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(4) Implications for Practice
The final criterion for evaluating case study research concerns its implications for practice. The 
findings from the research study may be useful. The implications for practice are clear, and 
appropriate qualifications in light of the sample size and types of organizations studied, are noted. 
The findings ring true to an informed reader, though the practitioners do not have to agree with 
the analysis, interpretation, or prescription offered by the researcher. Major implications are 
highlighted in the “findings chapter” (i.e. Chapter 7).
3.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE METHODOLOGY
Every method in accounting research has its respective strengths and which method to be used 
depends on its suitability for specific problems. The spectrum of research methods ranges from 
large scale quantitative questionnaire surveys to a qualitative participant observation case study. 
Quantitative questionnaire survey methods have great deductive power in verifying normative and 
positive theories and hypotheses, but were deemed inappropriate for the research questions in the 
present study include lack of clear literature, process of adaptation of change and longitudinal 
aspect. They could have imposed false assumptions and abstracted interpretations in the research 
and questionnaire design.
The “case study ” is but one of several ways of doing social science research. In general, case 
studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real-life context. Such “explanatory” case studies also can be complemented by two 
other types — “exploratory” and “descriptive” case studies (Yin 1984: 13).
In asking questions of ‘how?’ and ‘why?’during the interviews, this researcher could avoid the 
influence of dominant principles, theories, models, preconceptions and distortions prevalent in the 
contemporary accounting literature. The purpose of the case study interviews was to find out 
information and explanation about the changes of planning and control systems of the SOEs in 
China, and the research should not be just looking for simple and precise answers. Therefore, 
qualitative open-ended interviews (supported by a semi-structured questionnaire) were chosen
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as the main research method because only the interviewees could reveal the historical and detailed 
development of their responsibility accounting systems in terms of the planning and control 
aspects. In-depth and repeated interviews across a number of years were likely to be less biased 
than deterministic questionnaire studies because respondents could explain the areas of study in 
their own words rather than fit in with predetermined answers in the questionnaire. A second 
advantage is the production of a wealth of detailed information about the various issues under 
investigation which provide better understandings to the readers and this researcher for future 
related research topics.
By using this qualitative method of personal interviews, problems of complex influences of the 
research subject and the researcher (Covaleski & Dirsmith 1990) were keenly felt, and this 
researcher has consciously maintained reflexivity in the fieldwork. Inevitably, the researcher was 
also the chief research instrument, so the quality and reliability have to be guaranteed by the 
honesty, independence and integrity of the researcher (Patton 1990) who brought the value of 
human insights, flexibility and ability to build on tacit knowledge (Guba & Lincoln 1985: 268- 
276).
To maintain the validity of this research approach, it must also incorporate methods and source 
triangulation (Patton 1990) to yield reliable insights about a complex and sensitive accounting 
issue which has been treated as confidential in most of the Chinese SOEs. This study used a 
combination of pilot case study, data-gathering methods, documentary analysis and partial 
quantitative questionnaire survey methods to build towards the qualitative interview research. 
Through empathetic neutrality, non-judgemental and holistic inquiry, this researcher could identify 
the all-round answers or suggestions to the research questions from the empirical data. In this 
way, it is hoped the real world has been captured.
The specific and practical reasons for employing “Exploratory Case Study” method in this 
research are described in Section 1.8.4 of Chapter 1 which also addresses the specific aspects of 
rigour and credibility such as external validity. Finally, Keating’s (1995) management accounting 
case study model can also be employed as a very useful framework to summarise the whole 
research logic of this empirical study.
130
Ch.3: Research Methodology
Keating (1995) classifies four distinct types of case studies spanning into three stages of research 
in management accounting as shown in the following table.
Stages o f Theory 
Development
Types o f Case Study Objectives
Theory Discovery Theory Discovery Case To map novel, dynamic, and/or 
complex phenomena ignored or 
inadequately explained by existing 
theories.
Theory Refinement 1. Theory Illustration Case To establish the plausibility of a 
specific theoretical perspective by 
demonstrating its capacity to 
illuminate some previously 
unappreciated aspect of management 
accounting practice.
2. Theory Specification Case To refine a sparse, underspecified 
theory in order to make it amenable 
to broad scale statistical test or 
critical case test.
Theory Refutation Crucial Test/Counterpoint 
Case
To falsify or otherwise refute a well- 
specified theory.
In terms of Keating’s (1995) management accounting case study model, the primary objective of 
this study falls into the “Theory Discovery Case” type aiming at exploring the reasons for 
responsibility accounting practices in 20 Chinese SOEs (as described in Chapters 4 to 6). In 
addition, the hypotheses testing of responsibility accounting style changes (and the associated 
planning and control influences) are similar to the “Theory Illustration Case” by employing a 
theoretical perspective (Goold and Campbell’s (1991) Management Style) to demonstrate the 
longitudinal development of the responsibility accounting in a sample of SOEs (as described in 
Chapter 7). Furthermore, the comparisons between literature (or theory) research and findings 
of this study (as described in the footnotes of Chapter 2) are close to the “ Theory Specification 
Case” type and suggest various propositions and hypotheses to be tested subsequently in larger 
scale studies.
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The following procedures were carried out from the research conception in October 1991 to 
writing up this thesis since February 1997.
3.4.1 Literature Review
The literature review has not just taken place early in the research sequence. In fact it has been 
an on-going process from the beginning to the end of this whole project in order to keep up to 
date with the literature related to this topic. The state of the literature search needed to be kept 
under close review, in consultation with my supervisor and colleagues, to avoid becoming over- 
concerned with other people’s work at the expense of creativity. But some literature seemed to 
be uncritical catalogues of all that has been found which vaguely related to the topic regardless 
of the merits of the work. Therefore, an insightful evaluation of the literature was required to 
clarify the gaps in the field and the way in which the proposed search is intended to fill them (Gill 
and Johnson 1991: 21).
Another issue was that the literature concerning the responsibility accounting was limited to 
publications in the Chinese accounting textbooks and journals and they largely referred to the 
basic concepts and principles of responsibility accounting without much description on the 
contemporary practices, problems and solutions of its operation in the Chinese enterprises. 
Furthermore, responsibility accounting (and also management accounting) articles published in 
the international accounting journals were limited as well. Despite this lack of prior research 
situation, extensive and intensive effort has been spent on the literature search from the following 
avenues in the UK, China and Hong Kong (including local and overseas publications):
(1) accounting and management textbooks;
(2) accounting and management journals;
(3) accounting research projects;
(4) accounting conference presentations;
(5) government publications;
(6) accounting and business magazines; and
(7) newspapers.
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3.4.2 Preliminary Case Study
As described in Section 1.8.1 in Chapter 1, during the one-month study visit to the Shanghai 
University of Finance and Economics (SUFE) in August 1991, the researcher visited 8 large-sized 
manufacturing SOEs in Shanghai to learn their accounting reform with specific focus on the 
management accounting development. From these interviews with the senior managements and 
observations in the plant tours, the researcher learnt a lot about the political, social, economical, 
organisational and behavioural factors affecting the management accounting development in China 
since the 1950s. The exposure gained from these preliminary interviews plus some literature 
review created a foundation to initiate a research proposal on this topic for the PhD programme.
3.4.3 Pilot Test
Sections 1.8.2 and 1.8.3 in Chapter 1 tell the successive stories of how the researcher prepared 
for the research proposal and presented it twice in Glasgow before he was admitted as a PhD 
student by the Department of Accounting and Finance in the University of Glasgow during the 
period from October 1991 to September 1992. As a pilot test before the final research design, 
a total of 13 SOEs (as listed in Section 1.1.4 in Chapter 1) were visited during the same period 
of time in order to have a better understanding of the contemporary issues related to the 
responsibility accounting systems operated in those SOEs.
3.4.4 Research Design
The researcher stayed in the University of Glasgow for the first 3-month “residential period” from 
January to March 1993 in order to (1) undertake course work; (2) carry out literature research;
(3) meet with the supervisor regularly; (4) determine the research plan and timetable with the 
supervisor; and (5) set the research data collection instrument and agree with the supervisor. 
Eventually, the whole research design (see Sections 1.3 - 1.6 in Chapter 1) was completed at the 
end of March 1993 and then the data collection period commenced in April 1993.
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3.4.5 Sample Selection
Since the “Case Study” approach has been adopted as the research method of this study, the 
“Sample Size” or number of enterprises to be investigated was limited. The following criteria 
have been decided for selecting some Chinese enterprises as research subjects:
(1) State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)1; either
(2) Wholly SOEs; or
(3) Shareholding SOEs (i.e. government is holding less than 100% of shares);
(4) located in Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen or Guangzhou2;
(5) included ‘manufacturing’ and ‘service’ industries; and
(6) number of employees at least 500.
During the data collection period from April 1993 to September 1995, the following 20 SOEs 
were selected as research subjects for investigation.
1 In the 1990s, SOEs still account as the majority of all the business entities in China in 
terms of national industrial output, assets investment, turnover and number of employees. Almost 
all the large and medium SOEs have been operating the responsibility accounting system in one 
way or another.
2 Many large and long-established SOEs are located in the coastal cities like these four 
whereby the economic development is rapid under the government designated policies and the 
inflow of foreign investment. Furthermore, the researcher has close connections with the top 
universities in these four cities. Through the assistance of the faculty members in these Chinese 
universities, the researcher has been introduced to the senior managements of the targeted SOEs.
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Location/Enterprise Name Business Nature Size®,
1 Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill* Textiles Manufacturing Large
2 Beijing Friendship Hotel* Hotel Services Large
3 Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd.# Machine Manufacturing Large
4 Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works* Machine Manufacturing Medium
5 Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory* Machine Manufacturing Medium
6 Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory* Machine Manufacturing Small
7 Shanghai No.5 Iron & Steel Works* Iron & Steel Manu. Large
8 Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works* Iron & Steel Manu. Large
9 Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment Factory* Machine Manufacturing Large
10 Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill# Textiles Manufacturing Large
11 Shanghai No.l Department Store# Retailing Services Large
12 Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works* Machine Manufacturing Medium
13 Shanghai Measuring & Cutting Tool 
Instruments Factory*
Instrument
Manufacturing
Medium
14 Xiamen Fork Lift Truck Plant* Vehicle Manufacturing Medium
15 Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company* Beverage Manu. Small
16 Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Ltd.# Retailing Services Large
17 Guangzhou Friendship Department Store# Retailing Services Medium
18 Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store# Retailing Services Medium
19 Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd.# Consumables Manu. Medium
20 Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill# Food Manufacturing Medium
* Wholly SOEs before and after 1992.
# Converted into Shareholding Enterprises since 1992 or 1993.
@ Small-Sized Enterprise = 501 - 900 employees
Medium-Sized Enterprise = 901 - 2,500 employees 
Large-Sized Enterprise = 2,501 or over employees
For more background information of the above 20 SOEs, refer to Tables 1A-E in Appendix 1.
135
Ch.3 .Research Methodology
3.4.6 Data Collection Instrument Design
After extensive literature review and intensive enterprise visits (pilot test), a semi-structured 
research instrument was designed for interviewing participants and agreed with the supervisor at 
the end of March 1993. The research instrument is attached in both Case Analyses (Volume 2) 
and Data Analyses (Volume 3) for easy reference. The interview covered the following issues:
Section 1 History and Background
Section 2 Legal Form and Organisation Structure
Section 3 Financial Indicators
Section 4 Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Section 5 Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
5.2 Strategic Themes
5.3 Broad Strategic Thrusts
5.4 Long-Term Plans
5.5 Short-Term Plans
5.6 Setting Targets Through Internal Responsibility Contracts
5.7 Setting Targets Through Budgets
5.8 Capital Budgeting
5.9 Transfer Pricing
Section 6 Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
6.2 Agreeing Targets
6.3 Reporting Requirements
6.4 Performance Measurement Criteria
6.5 Rewards and Incentives
There are some ‘ open-ended questions ’ under each of the above sections in order to probe into 
the details of every factor and variable defined in the research design. Based on these open-ended 
questions, data and information were collected during the repeated interviews in the 20 SOEs.
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3.4.7 Data Collection
During the data collection period from April 1993 to September 1995, the researcher travelled 
to Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen and Guangzhou frequently in order to interview the senior 
managements of the selected 20 SOEs repeatedly. It could not expect to collect all the 
information or answer all the questions required in the first interview which should be quite 
informal and sometimes ended up at a dining table. In minority cases, tape recording was not 
permitted. A few meetings afterwards, a friendship between a manager and the researcher has 
been built upon which further and more relevant data or information could be acquired. At this 
stage, hardcopy of some required documents such as organisation chart, ERC, IRC, budget, etc. 
could be obtained as well.
The reasons for visiting each SOE at least two times across the years are:
(1) to go through all the questions as far as possible in the lengthy semi-structured research 
instrument which could not be completed in one interview of about 3 to 4 hours;
(2) to identify changes in the planning and control systems, and other related issues along the 
years as the legislation, ownership and economic influences (research variables) are 
carrying on (longitudinal study);
(3) to verify the validity of information and data provided by the interviewees at different 
times (internal triangulation effect); and
(4) to obtain more in-depth information and explanation (both verbal and documentation 
evidence) from the managers at interviews.
The following table is a summarized record of the many interviews on these 20 SOEs.
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EC@ Personnel Interviewed Dates o f Interviews#
SSW5(01)* Mr Huang Han Bin (Chief Accountant) (1) 13.09.91 (2)25.01.92 
(3) 16.09.92 (4)27.09.92 
(5) 10.09.93 (6) 06.09.94 
(7) 07.02.95
XFLT(02)* Mr Wang Zhao Liang (Chief Accountant)+ 
Mr Huang Tian Qing (Assistant Chief 
Accountant)+
(1) 22.09.92 (2) 08.06.93 
(3) 15.09.93 (4) 14.09.94
GFDS(03)* Mr Zhu Zu Xuan (Deputy-General Manager) 
Mr Ho Li Qian (Assistant Chief Accountant)
(1)07.07.93 (2)29.10.93
GDDS(04)* Mr Chen Hang (Deputy-General Manager) (1) 10.07.93 (2)30.10.93
BEEF(05)* Mr Quo Zhong Mao (Chief Accountant)+ 
Miss Li Xiao Min (Cost Accountant)*
(1) 22.05.93 (2) 30.08.93 
(3)03.09.94
SMCW(06)* Mr Tao Yi Seng (Chief Accountant)* 
Mr Ju Wei Ya (Ass. Chief Accountant)*
(1) 17.09.92 (2)07.09.93 
(3) 12.09.94 (4) 10.02.95
GNFF(07)* Mr Cheng Qi Chang (Chief Accountant)* 
Mr Lai Ping (Managing Director)*
(1) 11.12.93 (2) 11.08.94
GNFB(08)* Mr Zheng Jian Zhong (Ass. General Mgr.)+ 
Mr Shaw Tim (Accounting & Fin. Mgr.)+
(1) 10.12.93 (2) 13.08.94
BCRF(09)* Mr He Gao Hua (Chief Accountant) (1)31.08.93 (2) 30.08.94 
(3) 12.09.95
BIMT(IO)* Mr Wu De Cheng (Chief Accountant) (1)01.09.93 (2)01.09.94
SD Sl(ll) Ms Lee Shu Hua (Chief Accountant) (1) 11.09.93 (2)05.09.94 
(3) 10.02.95
SCCW(12)* Ms Zhu Mei Di (Chief Accountant)*
Ms Zhu Zhi Mei (Deputy Finance Manager 
of the Holding Enterprise)*
(1)06.09.94 (2) 12.01.95
SMEF(13)* Mr Weng Wei Shan (Finance Manager)
Ms Tao Wen Quen (Ass. Finance Manager)
(1) 12.09.91 (2)28.05.93 
(3) 08.09.94 (4) 06.02.95
SCM2(14)* Ms Zhou Wei Min (Chief Accountant) (1) 15.09.91 (2) 10.09.93 
(3) 12.09.94 (4) 08.02.95
SXSW(15)* Mr Ni Zhong Fong (Ass. Chief Accountant) 
Mr Zhang Ke Qin (Financial Accountant)
(1) 11.09.93 (2)07.09.94 
(3) 12.01.95
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EC@ Personnel Interviewed Dates o f Interviews#
GLIL(16)* Ms Huang Yan Qing (Finance Manager) (1)29.10.93 (2)01.04.94 
(3) 12.08.94
XLIG(17) Ms Lin Chu Zhi (Deputy General Manager) 
Mr Ye Ren Chu (Administration Manager)
(1) 17.09.93 (2) 14.09.94
BCM3(18)* Mr Hsu Ching Soon (Chief Accountant) (1)04.09.93 (2)31.08.94 
(3) 13.09.95
BFSH(19) Ms Zhang Lin (Finance Manager)+
Mr Sun Yu Qing (Ass. Finance Manager)*
(1)04.09.93 (2)31.08.94 
(3) 11.09.95
BPMH(20) Ms Zhang Wei Fen (Finance Manager) (1) 02.09.93 (2) 30.08.94 
(3) 15.09.95
@ Enterprise Code (Number) - See Abbreviations on front page xii for the full names.
* Tape recording was allowed.
# Although most the above 20 SOEs were visited after 1992 when the legislation, ownership and 
economic changes had taken place, all the interviewees were asked to compare the differences in 
their planning and control systems, and other related issues before and after 1992.
+ Participants were interviewed separately.
Usually, each interview could only last for one morning or one afternoon (about 3-4 hours) due 
to other business occupied by the manager(s) and the feeling of fatigue of both the interviewer 
and the interviewee(s). But sometimes the travelling hours were quite long because of the poor 
traffic conditions especially in Shanghai and Guangzhou. Therefore, the researcher used to ride 
on his bicycle from the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics to the targeted enterprises 
in Shanghai. A round-trip to Shanghai No.5 Iron and Steel Works (located at the northeastern 
suburb) would take three hours if the researcher was in good physical condition!
3.4.8 Data Analyses
During the data collection period from April 1993 to September 1995, “Data Transcription ” was 
carried out in parallel. In fact, data transcription was the first step of the data analysis. Based on 
the semi-structured interviews, data and information were collected during the interviews with 
the senior managements of the 20 selected SOEs. Then these data and information recorded in
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tapes and draft papers, and documents provided by the interviewees were transcribed into a 
standard format or report called “Data Analysis” for each SOE. The 20 sets of “Data Analyses” 
are bound in Volume 3. The contents layout of each Data Analysis was in accordance with the 
sequence of the interview. Relevant descriptions, figures and examples are referring to the 
specific questions in the research instrument for data source trail.
Each Data Analysis was updated after the SOE had been visited again. The following table 
indicates the completion dates and last review dates of these 20 Data Analyses.
EC* C. Date# R. Date@ EC* C. Date# R. Date@
SSW5(01) 28.01.94+ 07.02.96 SD Sl(ll) 29.12.94 12.03.96
XFLT(02) 04.02.94 01.03.96 SCCW(12) 18.01.95 17.03.96
GFDS(03) 23.02.94 06.03.96 SMEF(13) 06.02.95 19.03.96
GDDS(04) 01.03.94 06.03.96 SCM2(14) 28.02.95 18.03.96
BEEF(05) 07.03.94 06.03.96 SXSW(15) 31.03.95 22.03.96
SMCW(06) 15.06.94 04.02.96 GLIL(16) 07.04.95 23.03.96
GNFF(07) 30.04.95 09.03.96 XLIG(17) 03.06.95 24.03.96
GNFB(08) 23.05.95 10.03.96 BCM3(18) 05.12.95 24.03.96
BCRF(09) 26.08.95 10.02.96 BFSH(19) 12.01.96 24.03.96
BIMT(IO) 31.08.95 10.03.96 BPMH(20) 30.01.96+ 24.03.96
* EC = Enterprise Code/Number
# C. Date = Completion Date (complete the first report)
@ R. Date = Last Review Date (review the accuracy and update information obtained in post­
completion date interviews)
+ First and Last Data Analysis Completion Dates
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As a result of the long data collection period (2.5 years), the 20 Data Analyses could only be fully 
completed at the end of January 1996 and then they were finally reviewed in the next two months 
as shown in the table above. The major purpose of these 20 Data Analyses is to organise and 
interpret the 20 case study data collected in order to help the readers understand the planning and 
control systems actually practised in these 20 SOEs and their changes due to the various 
legislation, ownership and economic reforms which happened in recent years (refer to Sections 
3.2.3(2) & (3)). Furthermore, the rich and evocative data describing organisational phenomena 
and their environmental contexts via interviews provide hints and insights for future empirical 
research relating to the responsibility accounting in China.
3.4.9 Case Analyses
During the third “residential period” staying in University of Glasgow for 1 month in July 1995, 
the researcher agreed with the supervisor to develop another 20 sets of “Case Analysis” which 
were based on the previous 20 sets of “Data Analysis” (data transcriptions). The major purposes 
of these 20 “Case Analyses” are:
(1) to trace each planning and control parameter to the respective questions in the semi­
structured research instrument;
(2) to identify the factors affecting each planning and control parameter;
(3) to quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or control influence on each
factor and parameter; and
(4) to summarize all the planning and control parameters and represent the final results into
the responsibility accounting style grid.
Most of the selected planning and control parameters and the essence of the responsibility 
accounting style grid come from the literature of Goold and Cambell3. The 20 sets of “Case 
Analysis” are bound in Volume 2 which is an extension or appendix to this “Thesis” (i.e. Volume 
1). As indicated in the following table, all of these 20 Case Analyses were completed after
3 Goold, M. & Campbell, A. 1991. Strategies and Styles: The Role o f the Centre in 
Managing Diversified Corporations. Blackwell Business.
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finishing of all the 20 Data Analyses as mentioned in Section 3.4.8 above.
EC* DA Date# CA Date@ EC* DA Date# CA. Date@
SSW5(01) 28.01.94 21.07.95+ SD Sl(ll) 29.12.94 17.06.96
XFLT(02) 04.02.94 07.04.96 SCCW(12) 18.01.95 20.06.96
GFDS(03) 23.02.94 14.07.95 SMEF(13) 06.02.95 26.06.96
GDDS(04) 01.03.94 05.04.96 SCM2(14) 28.02.95 03.07.96
BEEF(05) 07.03.94 30.04.96 SXSW(15) 31.03.95 09.07.96
SMCW(06) 15.06.94 12.05.96 GLIL(16) 07.04.95 29.07.96
GNFF(07) 30.04.95 24.05.96 XLIG(17) 03.06.95 07.08.96
GNFB(08) 23.05.95 31.05.96 BCM3(18) 05.12.95 11.08.96
BCRF(09) 26.08.95 15.06.96 BFSH(19) 12.01.96 01.09.96
BEMT(IO) 31.08.95 17.06.96 BPMH(20) 30.01.96 05.09.96+
* EC = Enterprise Code/Number
# DA Date = Data Analysis Completion Date 
@ CA Date = Case Analysis Completion Date
+ First and Last Case Analysis Completion Dates
Both “Data Analyses” and “Case Analyses” are important “documentation wortf' for this 
researcher and for other investigators to repeat the same or similar study in order to test its 
“reliability” (Yin 1984: 45).
3.4.10 Thesis Writing
Immediately after finishing the 20 “Case Analyses” in September 1996, the “Thesis Writing” 
commenced. With continuous hardwork, the first full draft of this thesis was completed in March 
1997 and submitted to the supervisor. Based on the supervisor’s comments, substantial 
amendments had been made before the second full draft was submitted to the supervisor at the 
end of August 1997. Then, after receiving further suggestions from the supervisor, additional 
amendments had been made before the third full draft was submitted to the external examiner via
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3.5 CONCLUSION
By using the “Social Science Research Paradigms” suggested by Burrell and Morgan (1979), it 
can be seen that the “interpretive research paradigm” is the most appropriate methodology to 
be employed for the present study. This choice of “naturalistic research paradigm ” is further 
supported by the work of Morgan and Smircich (1980) in classifying 6 types of ontological 
assumptions. As recommended by many accounting researchers during the past decade, “Case 
Study Approach” should be an appropriate method to be adopted in this management accounting 
research which is more “exploratoryP oriented (Kaplan 1986d). Given the objective of this study 
is to examine the process, obstacles and adaptation to changes of responsibility accounting in 
Chinese business enterprises, fieldwork in the form of exploratory case studies seems appropriate. 
The number of diverse and potentially influential variables effecting this would be unmanageable 
unless some link to the literature was made. The development and use of hypotheses should 
therefore be seen as providing boundaries for the investigation rather than complying with the 
strict hypothesis-deductive approach of positivism.
Although the steps proceeded during this research project were quite time-consuming and subject 
to many constraints, nevertheless, experiences and results have shown that they were correctly 
employed and put into actions in view of the unique business and social environments in China. 
Bearing in mind that management accounting development in China is just at an infant stage and 
many Chinese managers do not understand much about accounting research, this researcher has 
to obtain the first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation by putting himself within the 
frame of reference of the participants (or SOE’s managers).
This researcher believes that by using “Exploratory Case Study” in this preliminary investigation, 
it can generate ideas and hypotheses on many aspects related to the responsibility accounting in 
China which may be subject to rigorous empirical testing at a later stage (Scapens 1990; Ryan, 
Scapens & Theobald 1992).
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CHAPTER 4 : ANALYSIS OF DATA I - ENTERPRISES 
INFORMATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This is the first of the three data analysis chapters describing the general information of the 20 
SOEs (subjects) investigated in this research. Firstly, background information of the subjects 
concerning their nature of business, ownership and total assets are summarised by various tables 
with explanations (Section 4.2). Secondly, the financial performance of the subjects in terms of 
turnover and profitability are analysed and evaluated for the period from 1992 to 1995 (Section
4.3). Thirdly, the Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS) adopted by the subjects 
during the past ten years are narrated in respect of their durations, targets and changes (Section
4.4). Finally, a summary of facts highlighting the major observations in the previous sections is 
given at the end of this chapter (Section 4.5).
4.2 BACKGROUND OF SUBJECTS
Despite the constraints and difficulties in selecting the sample for this research as described in 
Section 1.9(5) of Chapter 1 (i.e. research limitations), a portfolio of 20 SOEs has been 
investigated which includes manufacturing and servicing industries, wholly state-owned and 
shareholding enterprises, different scales of operation and entities in four cities from north to 
south in China. Among the existing 190,000 large- and medium-sized SOEs in China, these 20 
SOEs represent a very insignificant percentage of the whole population. Therefore, it is not 
expected to achieve any generalisability from the findings of this study.
4.2.1 Nature of Business
The 20 SOEs in the sample can be classified according to the following three criteria (see Tables 
1 A-IE in Appendix 1) :
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Cities Manufacturing
Business
Servicing
Business
Beijing BEEF(05), BCRF(09), 
BIMT(IO), BCM3(18), 
BPMH(20)
*BFSH(19)
Shanghai SSW5(01), SMCW(06), 
SCCW(12), SMEF(13), 
SMC2(14), SXSW(15)
SD Sl(ll)
Xiamen XFLT(02), XLIG(17)
Guangzhou GNFF(07), GLIL(16) GFDS(03), GDDS(04), 
GNFB(08)
15 SOEs (75%) 5 SOEs (25%)
* Enterprise Code & Number
(B) Geographical Location & Type of Industry
Cities Beijing Shanghai Xiamen Guangzhou
Manufacturing
Iron & Steel 
Textiles
Machine & Tool 
Electronic Equip. 
Motor Vehicle 
Food & Beverage 
Consumables
18#
10,20
05,09
01,15
14
06,12,13
02
17 07
16
SOE Count (15) 5 6 2 2
Servicing : 
Department Store 
Hotel 19
11 03,04,08
SOE Count (5) 1 1 0 3
Total Count (20) 6 7 2 5
# Enterprise Number
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(C) Geographical Location & Size by No. of Employees
Cities Beijing Shanghai Xiamen Guangzhou
Small SOE 
(501-900)
05# 17
Medium SOE 
(901-2,500)
09,10 06,12 02 03,04
07,16
Large SOE 
(Over 2,500)
18,19
20
01,11,13,
14,15
08
Total Count 6 7 2 5
# Enterprise Number
The size of an enterprise is defined by its number of employees as stated in the above table.
4.2.2 Ownership
Among the 20 SOEs, there are two types of ownership, namely, “Wholly SOE” and 
“Shareholding SOE” which are presented as follow (see Tables 1A-1E in Appendix 1) :
Cities Beijing Shanghai Xiamen Guangzhou
(A)
Wholly SOE 
(before 1992)  
Wholly SOE 
(after 1992)
BEEF(05)
BCRF(09)
BLMT(IO)
BCM3(18)
BFSH(19)
SSW5(01)
SMCW(06)
SCCW(12)
SMEF(13)
SXSW(15)
XFLT(02)
XLIG(17)
SOE Count 5 5 2 0
(B)
Wholly SOE 
(before 1992)  
Shareholding 
(after 1992)
BPMH(20)* SDSl(ll)*
SCM2(14)*
GFDS(03)
GDDS(04)
GNFF(07)
GNFB(08)
GLIL(16)#
SOE Count 1 2 0 5
* Shares listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
# Shares listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
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The above 12 SOEs under category A remain “Wholly SOE” before and after 1992. Whereas, 
the 8 SOEs under category B were transformed from “Wholly SOE” into “Shareholding SOE” 
in 1992 and 1993.
For the 4 unlisted, shareholding enterprises, the shareholders and their percentages of 
shareholding are as shown below :
Enterprises Government Employees Total
GFDS(03) 85% 15% 100%
GDDS(04) 80% 20% 100%
GNFF(07) 84% 16% 100%
GNFB(08) 75% 25% 100%
For the 4 listed shareholding enterprises, the shareholdings and their percentages of shareholding 
are shown below :
Enterprises Government Other
Enterprises
Public & 
Employees
Total
BPMH(20) 62.5% 25% 12.5% 100%
SD Sl(ll) 60% 21% 19% 100%
SCM2(14) 63% 27% 10% 100%
GLIL(16) 60% — 40% 100%
The government is the majority shareholder holding over 50% of the shares in all the above 8 
shareholding enterprises. In other words, the government or its authorized agencies can still 
influence the planning and operation of these shareholding enterprises through the board meetings 
or by other means.
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Shareholding transformation or privatization of the SOEs in China is in a preliminary stage or trial 
period. Among the total 400,000 SOEs, about 9,200 (2%) have been transformed into 
shareholding enterprises at the end of 1996. There are a lot of stringent rules and regulations 
imposed by the local and central governments and the Bank of China for approving the conversion 
into shareholding enterprises (Chow et al 1994: 115-116; Liu & Zhang 1996: 50-53). In addition, 
in order to keep close macroeconomic control, it is the government policy not to privatize some 
industries, such as the steel, transportation, power and telecommunication industries.
Geographically, Guangzhou and Shanghai have more shareholding enterprises than the other cities 
because they are close to the two stock exchanges and their economic development is earlier and 
faster than the other cities. In fact, Shenzhen has more shareholding enterprises than Guangzhou 
since one stock exchange is located at Shenzhen, but there are no enterprises in Shenzhen selected 
for investigation in this study.
4.2.3 Total Assets
Total assets is defined as the sum of fixed assets and current assets. Measuring in terms of this 
criterion, the 20 SOEs are classified as follows (see Tables 1 A-IE in Appendix 1) :
Total A ssets* Beijing Shanghai Xiamen Guangzhou
25  - 100 BEEF(05)
BCRF(09)
SCM2(14) XFLT(02)
XLIG07)
GFDS(03)
GDDS(04)
101- 2 0 0 BIMT(IO) SMCW(06)
SCCW(12)
SMEF(13)
GNFB(08)
2 0 1 -  5 0 0 BCM3(18)
BFSH(19)
SXSW(15) GNFF(07)
GLIL(16)
Over 5 0 0 BPMH(20) SSW5(01)
SDSl(ll)
* In Rmb’m
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It is interesting to note the relationship between the total assets and number of employees of the 
20 SOEs if Linear Regression Model is applied as shown below :
Set the formula : Y = a + bX
Where : Y = Total Assets (in Rmb’m)
X = No. of Employees (in thousand) 
a & b = Constants
[There are 20 readings for Y and X as found in Tables 1 A-IE]
Equations £Y  = na + b(£X)
ZXY = a(£X) + b(£X2)
Solve Equations : Y = -277 + 203X*
[Y and X can be termed as independent and dependent variable 
respectively]
* See SPSS output per Table 4 in Appendix 1
The power of this linear equation (formula) to predict the total assets by the number of employees 
can be represented by the “Coefficient of Correlation” (R) which is within the range of either 
0 to +1 or 0 to -1. Based on the 20 readings for Y and X as shown in Tables 1A-1E, it is 
calculated that R=0.91507 (per Table 4) which means there is a close relationship between these 
two variables. From this statistical observation, both total assets value and number of employees 
can be used as indicators of the enterprise size in this study or perhaps in other research samples.
All the 8 listed or private shareholding enterprises as shown in 4.2.2(B) have revalued their total 
assets, in particular the fixed assets, before the conversion from wholly state-owned to 
shareholding enterprises. Under the supervision of the State Assets Administration Bureau, there 
are rules and regulations governing this specific purpose of asset revaluation before the 
shareholding transformation in order to determine the net worth or shareholders’ fund of the 
enterprise (see Section 2 of Data Analysis 3 in Volume 3 [p.56]). The Bureau has authorised over
1,000 CPA firms to perform the asset revaluation service and produce certification.
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4.3 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
4.3.1 Turnover
The turnover figures of the 20 SOEs during the years of 1992 to 1995 (some have not been 
disclosed) are shown in Tables 1A-1E of Appendix 1. Most of these SOEs have achieved 
different extents of growth in terms of turnover except there were some year to year fluctuations 
in 7 SOEs (i.e. Enterprise Nos.05,07,09,13,14,15,20) particularly in 1994 due to the effects which 
resulted from the macro-economic policies implemented by the government since July 1993 (see 
Section 3.5 of Case Analysis 7 in Volume 2 [p. 148]). The worst one is BCRF(09) whose sales 
have declined during these years and losses were incurred in 1994 and 1995 because of 
product/market strategic problems and keen competition (see Section 3.5 of Case Analysis 5 in 
Volume 2 [p.96]).
Going into more detail, Table 5 in Appendix 1 indicates the turnover growth percentages 
(compared with last year) of the 20 SOEs in the years of 1993, 1994 and 1995. The following 
5 SOEs have high turnover growth rates (over 20%) during this 3-year period :
Enterprise Business Nature Annual Turnover Growth %
Code 1993 1994 1995
GFDS(03) Department Store 52 27 —
GDDS(04) Department Store 74 50 —
SMCW(06) Instrument & Tool 
Manufacturing
61 44 37
GNFB(08) Department Store 53 24 —
XLIG(17) Beverage Manu. 89 38 —
The nationwide macroeconomic control mechanisms instituted since July 1993 has adversely 
affected the financial performance of most of the industries in China. However, the negative 
impact seems to have a lighter effect on the retailing industry or consumable products as 
evidenced by the above figures concerning the turnover growth rates of the three department 
stores in Guangzhou, the small measuring and cutting tools factory in Shanghai, and the Coca-
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Cola manufacturing plant in Xiamen. Obviously, the demands for these mainly consumable 
products remain high in respect of the fast growing economy and a huge population of 1.2 billion 
in China.
The decline of average growth percentages (i.e. 33% [1993], 16% [1994], 16%[1995]) of all 
these 20 SOEs as shown in Table 5 can reinforce the macroeconomic control effects (bank credit 
control, interest rate control, capital project control, etc.) which emerged significantly in 1994 and 
1995. Many economists around the world have forecasted the moderate and planned relaxation 
of these control measures in 1996 and 1997 which would keep the economic growth in China 
going in a fast, steady and healthy manner.
4.3.2 Profitability
Looking into the Profit Before Tax (PBT) of the 20 SOEs as shown in Tables 1A-1E, four 
enterprises, namely, BEEF(05), BCRF(09), SMEF(13) and BCM3(18), were either break-even 
or loss making in some of the years from 1992 to 1995. Further, Table 5 in Appendix 1 indicates 
the annual PBT growth rates (compared with last year) of the 20 SOEs during the same period 
of time. The overall annual growth rates of all the 20 SOEs were negative (i.e. -6% and -5% 
respectively) for 1994 and 1995. The major reasons leading to the poor financial performance 
of these enterprises during the last four years were :
(a) high inflation rates (1993-22.7%, 1994-21.7%, 1995-14.7%);
(b) substantial bank loan interest (1995 prime rate - 14%);
(c) accelerated depreciation*;
(d) bad debt written off1*;
(e) change of costing method from full absorption to manufacturing*
(f) obsolete products;
(g) outdated production facilities and technologies;
(h) lack of capital/fund for fixed assets investment;
(0 keen local and overseas’ competition;
0) short-sighted product/market strategies;
(k) quality of management and control;
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(1) large redundant workforce;
(m) non-productive wages and benefits for (1);
(n) higher value-added tax; and
(o) macroeconomic control measures (especially in Beijing).
* (c), (d) and (e) are related to the implementation of the first Enterprise Accounting Standards 
since July 1993.
For more details, refer to Section 3 of Case Analysis 5 [p.96], Case Analysis 9 [p. 196], Case 
Analysis 12 [p.272], Case Analysis 13 [pp.298-299] and Case Analysis 18 [pp.431-432] in 
Volume 2.
Tables 1A-1E in Appendix 1 also show the PBT as percentages of Turnover for the 20 SOEs 
during the years from 1992 to 1995. The last column in Table 5 indicates the average PBT as a 
percentage of Turnover of the 20 SOEs over the same period of years. The latter set of figures 
reveals that 9 SOEs attained less than 5% of average profit margin in the last four years, and two 
of them (i.e. BCRF(09) and SMEF(13)) even had an average loss margin.
Among the 8 shareholding enterprises, except GNFB(08) and SCM2(14), their average profit 
margins over the years were above the overall average of 5.3% (all 20 SOEs) especially the two 
listed enterprises (i.e. GLIL(16) and BPMH(20)). The two wholly SOEs, XLIG(17) and 
BFSH(19), also attained average profit margins of 9.1% and 11.3% respectively due to the 
booming demands for their products and services.
4.4 ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACT SYSTEM (ERCS)
4.4.1 ERC Periods
As shown in Tables 1 A-IE in Appendix 1, other than XFLT(02), BFSH(19) and BPMH(20), the 
other 17 SOEs have signed one or two ERCs with the local or municipal government in the last 
ten years. The normal duration o f the ERC was 5 years except the two ERCs of BEEF(05) and 
BCRF(09) which were standing and subject to annual review, and also the two ERCs of 
GNFF(07) which were three and two years respectively.
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Although ERC has not been formally applied to XFLT(02) and BFSH(19), nevertheless, these 
two enterprises have agreed with the local government similar terms and targets as the other 
SOEs in this study and therefore effectively are subject to ERC. BPMH(20) has not entered into 
any ERC since its establishment as a shareholding enterprise in 1993, but its holding SOE has 
been undertaking ERC since the mid-1980s.
4.4.2 ERC Targets
There are different forms of ERCs for the SOEs to choose from and with different financial and 
non-financial targets. The chosen format is usually mutually agreed between the enterprise and 
the government. The targets agreed in the old and existing ERCs of these enterprises as shown 
in Tables 1 A-IE are summarised below :
(a) PBT in the base (first) year1;
(b) PBT annual growth rate;
(c) Percentage of targeted PBT handover to the local government;
(d) Percentage of over-targeted PBT handover to the local government;
(e) Income tax (on PBT) rate or exemption;
(0 Foreign exchange to be gained;
(g) Gross wages linked up with targeted PBT;
0 0 Gross wages increase in line with over-targeted PBT2;
0) Expenditure levels i.e. R&D, depreciation, etc.;
(i) Bank loan repayment exempted from income tax;
(k) Technology improvement level; and
(1) Other qualitative targets (see Section 4.4 of Case Analysis 7 in Volume 2 [p. 149])
1 Usually determined according to the average annual profit of the three years preceding 
the base year for that specific enterprise.
2 The annual gross wages growth rate cannot exceed the profit growth rate and 
productivity per employee growth rate to ensure larger retained earnings for the enterprise and 
sufficient returns to the government.
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For a full- and real-example of ERC, see Section 4 of Data Analysis 6 in Volume 3 [pp. 140-144].
4.4.3 ERC Replacement
All the 8 shareholding enterprises ceased their operating ERCs when they were converted from 
wholly SOEs to shareholding enterprises in 1992 and 1993. According to the rules and 
regulations governing the shareholding enterprises, either listed or private-owned, they are 
subject to the new taxation system implemented since January 1994 and any existing ERCs must 
be abandoned. In fact, the other wholly SOEs are replacing their existing ERCs by the new 
taxation system just like the shareholding enterprises (see Section 4.7 of Case Analysis 6 in 
Volume 2 [p. 123]) (Liu & Zhang 1996: 140-141).
The sources of tax as shown in Tables 1 A-IE are mainly sales, income and other municipal taxes. 
In some cases (i.e. BEEF(05), SMCW(06), BCRF(09) and BIMT(IO)), the financial targets 
remain the same even though no formal ERCs have been carried on. Additional targets such as 
accounts receivable, zero PBT and capital expenditure can be found in some enterprises.
In general, the labour efficiency and productivity performances have been increased after 
shareholding conversion compared with the ERC system because without good profit there would 
be no handsome dividends distributed and for the listed enterprises the share market price would 
be affected as well. However, under the ERC system, once the target profit has been achieved, 
the predetermined wages, bonuses and benefits-in-kind will be awarded plus other favourable 
terms like bank loan repayment could be tax deductible. Therefore, the shareholding enterprises 
have been facing higher pressure and challenge to enhance the overall economic efficiency year 
after year (see Section 4 of Data Analyses 3 & 16 in Volume 3 [pp. 59-60 & 514-516]).
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4.5 SUMMARY
(1) Among the 20 SOEs investigated in this research, 75%(15) belong to the manufacturing 
business and 25%(5) are in the servicing business, (see 4.2.1(A))
(2) Among these 20 SOEs, there are 5 machine and equipment production plants and 4 
department stores which are the largest groups in the manufacturing and servicing 
industries respectively, (see 4.2.1(B))
(3) Measured in terms of number of employees, there are 9 medium-sized and 9 large-sized 
SOEs of which the latter group are mainly located in Beijing and Shanghai, (see 4.2.1(C))
(4) There are 12 entities which remain wholly SOEs before and after 1992 without any 
concrete plans of shareholding transformation because there are a lot of stringent rules and 
regulations imposed by the government and Bank of China, (see 4.2.2)
(5) There are 8 SOEs transformed into shareholding enterprises in 1992 and 1993. Half of 
these enterprises have been listed in either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
while the other 4 are private-owned shareholding enterprises. In all cases, the government 
is holding over 50% of the shares and, being the majority shareholder, the government can 
influence the planning and control systems of these shareholding enterprises, (see 4.2.2)
(6) By using the simple linear regression analysis, it is discovered that there is a close 
relationship between the total assets value and the number of employees in these 20 SOEs. 
It may be suggested that both parameters can be used for categorizing the size of the 
SOEs in this study or in other research samples, (see 4.2.3)
(7) The macroeconomic control measures enforced by the government since July 1993 have 
affected adversely the financial performance of these 20 SOEs in 1994 and 1995. 
Indications of stagnant or weakened turnover and profitability growth rates were revealed 
in the financial statements of most of these 20 SOEs. (see 4.3.1 & 2)
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(8) Other than the macroeconomic control effect, another 14 reasons explained by the 
interviewees of these 20 SOEs are listed as contributors to the unsatisfactory financial 
performance of these enterprises during the last few years, (see 4.3.2)
(9) The high demands on consumable products have maintained good turnover and profit 
growth in certain industries such as department store, printing, food and drinks as 
observed in this sample of enterprises, (see 4.3.1 & 2)
(10) In general, the shareholding enterprises (especially the listed enterprises) outperformed 
the wholly SOEs in terms of turnover and profitability in this sample of subjects during 
the period from 1992 to 1995.
(11) The normal duration of the ERCs in most of these 20 SOEs was 5 years with a few 
exceptions of 2 to 3 years or of a standing (yearly review) nature, (see 4.4.1)
(12) The general financial and a few specific non-fmancial targets agreed in the ERCs of these 
20 SOEs are listed, (see 4.4.2)
(13) Once a SOE is transformed into a shareholding enterprise, its operating ERC will be 
ceased and subject to different taxnets such as income, value-added, consumption, service 
and other municipal taxes, (see 4.4.3)
(14) In fact, most of the ERCs have been and will be phased out in these 20 SOEs irrespective 
of the enterprise ownership (wholly or shareholding SOE), and replaced by the new 
taxation system adopted since January 1994. (see 4.4.3)
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CHAPTER 5 : ANALYSIS OF DATA II - PLANNING 
INFLUENCE
5.0 INTRODUCTION
Goold and Campbell (1991: 36) describe planning as the influence which concerns top 
management's efforts to shape strategies as they emerge and before decisions are taken. It is a 
measure of the top-down involvement of the headquarters (or top management) in major 
decisions, and of the contribution that the headquarters makes to the strategy proposals developed 
in the business units. It is through planning influence that the headquarters seeks to improve the 
quality of thinking that surrounds major decisions.
The headquarters' influence on the proposals made by business managers is a function not only 
of the objectives that are set and the instructions given, but also the atmosphere within which the 
unit managers operate. The organization structure, the review processes, the type of guidance 
from the headquarters, the way overlaps are managed and the way scarce resources are allocated, 
all have an effect on the headquarters' planning influence.
Soon after the inception of the People's Republic of China in 1949, all the industrial, commercial 
and public enterprises were transformed into "state-owned" by 1953. A State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) means all its assets or shares are fully-owned by the government or all the people in China. 
Then different ministries, bureaus and councils under the direction of the State Council (central 
government) in Beijing are responsible to administer and supervise their respective enterprises. 
The 20 Chinese enterprises investigated in this study are all SOEs. They are either wholly SOEs
(12) with all the assets owned by the government or shareholding SOEs (8) whose major 
shareholders (over 50% of shareholding) are still the government. Therefore, in terms of agency 
theory, the government or its representatives (e.g. ministry, bureau, council, etc.) is/are the 
principal(s) and the enterprise management or managers is/are the agent(s).
These 20 SOEs are under the administration and supervision of their respective government
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SOE Code Government Authorities Notes
SSW5(01), SMEF(13), 
SXSW(15)
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 1
XFLT(02), SMCW(06) 
BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), 
SCCW(12), BPMH(20)
Ministry of Machine-Building 
Industry
2
GFDS(03), GDDS(04), 
GNFB(08), SD Sl(ll)
Ministry of Internal Trade 3
BEEF(05) Ministry of Electronics Industry 4
GNFF(07), GLIL(16), 
XLIG(17)
China National Light Industry 
Council
5
SCM2(14), BCM3(18) China National Textile Industry 
Council
6
BFSH(19) National Tourism Administration 
Bureau
7
Notes2
(1) Ministry of Metallurgical Industry
Its major duty is (a) to draw up strategies, plans, policies and economic regulations for the 
development of the metallurgical industry (including iron and steel works); and (b) to provide 
information services to enterprises while exercising supervision over them if necessary.
(2) Ministry of Machine-Building Industry
Its main duties are (a) to formulate strategies, policies, legislation and regulation for the
1 Different central and local government authorities/departments may have direct macro- 
economic control measures on their respective SOEs at various degrees. The associated planning 
differences are tested in the Secondary Hypotheses H3 (location) and H4 (industry) respectively.
2 See China: Government Organisation & Personnel (Voll: Central Government). 
Huanan Economic Journal Ltd. (Hong Kong) 1995. (Information from State Council of PRC) 
Words in italic indicate the government planning influence on the SOEs in various activities.
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development of the industry; (b) to give the industry guidance on the direction of its development;
(c) to progressively build up an indirect management system for the industry; and (d) to boost 
the machinery and motor vehicles industry according to state industrial policies.
(3) Ministry of Internal Trade
Its main duties are (a) to study and formulate principles, policies and commodity circulation 
system reform plans and to implement them; (b) to coordinate the planning, construction and 
management o f national and regional commodity markets so as to foster the development of a 
unified commodity market system; (c) to draw up development strategies for the commodity 
circulation sector, plan for the construction of major facilities for commodity circulation, assist 
the State Planning Commission in maintaining a supply-demand balance and sufficient national 
stock of daily life essentials, work out market forecasts and disseminate market information; and
(d) to administer the commodity circulation sector and promote reform o f the operation 
mechanism o f enterprises in the sector.
(4) Ministry of Electronics Industry
Its major duties are (a) to formulate strategies, policies and regulations for the development of 
the electronics industry; (b) to plan and coordinate the growth of the industry's different sectors; 
(c) to speed up the industry's technological progress; (d) to foster the electronics market and the 
development of group enterprises while regulating the development o f the industry at the macro­
level, and (e) to provide information services.
(5) China National Light Industry Council
Its major functions are (a) to improve planning for the light industry; (b) to implement industrial 
policies; and (c) to guide the industry at the macro-level and provide services.
(6) China National Textile Industry Council
Its main duties are (a) to administer the textile industry with the focus on improving planning, 
(b) to implement textile industrial policies; (c) to guide the industry at the macro-level, and (d) 
to provide information services.
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(7) National Tourism Administration Bureau
Its major functions are (a) to draw up and implement mid- and long-term as well as annual plans 
for the development of the industry; (b) to examine and approve the designation of travel agents 
and hotels serving foreigners while exercising administration over them; (c) to formulate and 
implement strategies for expanding the tourist market; (d) to administer the formulation of 
regulations on fees, charges and statistical surveys of the industry; (e) to map out, implement and 
supervise the tourist industry's financial and accounting systems, the system offoreign exchange 
revenues and expenditures, and the wage system.
The almost half-a-million industrial, commercial and public state enterprises (including their 
related organisations) makes it necessary for the ministries, councils and bureaus in the central 
government (Beijing) to delegate the work to their corresponding authorities located in all 
provinces and cities in order to supervise their respective SOEs scattered around the whole 
country. In addition to these government authorities, the SOEs are also under the administration 
of and influence from the local or municipal governments acting as additional supervisory bodies. 
This may cause the geographical or location differences in the planning influences on the 20 SOEs 
investigated in this study (tested in the Secondary Hypothesis H3).
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning system dictated all planning and 
control (long- and short-term) in the SOEs. Therefore, all the SOEs were just acting as a vehicle 
to carry out the activities according to the commands directed from their government authorities. 
After the economic reforms took off in the 1980s, most of these central government authorities 
under the State Council have been restructured. They started to work out the strategic or long­
term plans with the SOEs under their administration in a partnership style to enhance participation 
from the enterprise managements, but in many cases, the top managements were only consulted 
at the planning process.
Turning into the 1990s, the promulgation of the market economy and SOE operation mechanisms 
transformation have pushed further reconstruction of the State Council organisations and 
redefined their roles and functions. Hence the use of guidance and promotion of reform have been 
adopted as described in the earlier notes to the above 7 government authorities. The formulation
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of strategies, plans, policies and regulations are not totally top-down processes, but initiation and 
participation from the SOEs are required. However, the degree of involvement varies from 
industry to industry and from enterprise to enterprise depending on many factors. Some of these 
factors will be addressed in this chapter.
The measuring parameters used by Goold and Campbell (1991) are adopted in this study to gauge 
the extent of planning influence (as an external dimension) in each of the selected 20 SOEs from 
their respective government authorities. The degree of planning influence on each SOE will in 
turn affect the planning influence (as an internal dimension) of the top management (e.g. general 
manager, board of directors, etc.) in the responsibility centres within the enterprise3.
To measure the planning influences on the 20 SOEs and their responsibility centres (both external 
and internal dimensions) in this study, the following 7 variables are employed :
5.1 Organisation Structure*;
5.2 Review Process*;
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions*;
5.4 Long-Term Planning (Resource Allocation)*;
5.5 Short-Term Planning/Budgeting*;
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts#; and
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)*
* All the 6 planning influence variables used by Goold and Campbell are employed in this study.
# This is the additional variable which is the core of the responsibility accounting system adopted 
in the SOEs in China.
3 Because of this direct relationship between the external and internal dimensions of 
planning influence, the measurement procedures and the scores on the two dimensions are 
combined.
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Under each of the above 7 variables, there are 3 to 4 sub-variables or parameters to further 
measure and analyse the extent of planning influences before and after 1992. In each variable or 
parameter, the measurement is on a 5-point scale ranging from Greatest Planning Influence (0) 
to Least Planning Influence (4). The detailed ranges are as follows :
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 -1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6-2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 -2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 -3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6-4.0)
For each SOE, sub-variable scores are combined to give an average measure for a variable e.g. 
organisation structure. Each sub-variable has equal weighting and the scores pre- and post-1992 
are calculated in this way. Similar procedures are used to determine the planning scores of the 
other 6 variables pre- and post-1992. The higher the score, the lower planning influences for the 
external and internal dimensions in the responsibility accounting system of a SOE.
Then the 2 weighted-averages of all the 7 variables in each SOE are equal to the overall planning 
influences (external and internal dimensions combined) before and after 1992 (for comparison and 
hypothesis testing purposes). By going through Sections 5.1-5.7 of any one of the Case Analyses 
in Volume 2, the quantification process of this study is demonstrated. The justification and 
elaboration of the sub-variables are also provided at Volume 2.
Tables 2A-G in Appendix 1 summarize all the planning parameter scores before and after 1992 
for all the 20 SOEs. For better visual pictures of these planning scores and their changes before 
and after 1992, each variable and their corresponding parameters are depicted in the following 
High-Low Charts (see Appendix 2):
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Chart 5.1 Organisation Structure
Chart 5.1.1 Responsibility Centre
Chart 5.1.2 Decentralisation
Chart 5.1.3 Appointment
Chart 5.1.4 Interdependencies
Chart 5.2 Review Process
Chart 5.2.1 Central Planning
Chart 5.2.2 Operation
Chart 5.2.3 Participation
Chart 5.2.4 Review & Communication
Chart 5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
Chart 5.3.1 Themes
Chart 5.3.2 Thrusts
Chart 5.3.3 Suggestions
Chart 5.4 Long-Term Plans
Chart 5.4.1 Central Planning
Chart 5.4.2 Operation
Chart 5.4.3 Participation
Chart 5.4.4 Review & Communication
Chart 5.5 Short-Term Plans
Chart 5.5.1 Central Planning
Chart 5.5.2 Operation
Chart 5.5.3 Participation
Chart 5.5.4 Review & Communication
Chart 5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts
Chart 5.6.1 Target Bias
Chart 5.6.2 Participation
Chart 5.6.3 Review & Communication
Chart 5.6.4 Incentive
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Chart 5.7 Management of Interdependencies 
Chart 5.7.1 Characteristics
Chart 5.7.2 Participation
Chart 5.7.3 Review
High-Low Chart 5.0 in Appendix 2 is the overall weighted-average planning scores of all the 20 
SOEs in this study. Looking into this chart, it is noted that SDS1(11) has the highest planning 
score o f 3.3 after 1992 and the least planning influence (external and internal combined) compared 
with the other 19 SOEs. On the other extreme, BEEF(05), BCRF(09) and SCCW(12) have the 
lowest planning score of 2.3 after 1992 and the highest planning influence. The planning scores 
and influences of the other 16 SOEs are falling in between these two extremes of a continuum.
The explicit and implicit reasons behind the planning score and influence of each variable or 
parameter are explained in the following 33 sections (5.1-5.7) of this chapter. In each of the 
following 33 sections, firstly, some facts and changes relating to that specific variable or 
parameter are narrated, and secondly, some observations from the corresponding High-Low Chart 
are explained.
Finally, a summary of major facts and findings will be listed in the last section (5.8) of this chapter.
5.1 ORGANISATION STRUCTURE
Each one of these 20 SOEs in the research sample is under the administration of a certain local 
government authority categorised by industry as described in Section 5.0 above. Before the 
economic reform started in early 1980s, the planning and control systems of these SOEs were 
dictated by their respective government authorities. They acted just like cost centres with the 
major responsibility of meeting production quantities, mixes and costs.
Since the beginning of 1990s, in particular after 1992, the government authorities have delegated 
more autonomy in terms of planning and control to SOEs under their umbrella. Now the major 
roles played by the government authorities for their enterprises are (1) appointing the factory
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(general) manager and the communist party secretary; (2) maintaining a macroeconomic control 
or balance on the 5-year plans; (3) providing information services; and (4) acting as a bridge or 
facilitator between the government and the enterprises in policy matters such as capital 
investment, import and export autonomy, taxation, ownership transformation, mergers, etc.
The common organisational style which these 20 SOEs adopt is a “functional structure” type. A 
typical example is XFLT(02) where the organisation structure can be divided into six divisions 
under the direct control of the Factory (General) Manager who has a Management Office 
responsible for most of the enterprisewide planning and control functions. These 6 divisions are 
production, sales, finance, technical, administration and tertiary enterprises headed by the chief 
engineer, chief economist, chief accountant and 3 deputy factory managers respectively (see 
Section 2 of Data Analysis 2 in Volume 3 [pp.31-32],
The planning influences in respect of “organisation structure” from (1) the government on the 
enterprises (external dimension); and (2) the enterprise management on the different responsibility 
centres (internal dimension) are measured on the following 4 criteria :
5.1.1 Responsibility Centre;
5.1.2 Decentralisation;
5.1.3 Appointment (Personnel); and
5.1.4 Interdependencies.
The results of these 4 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 4 sections 
(i.e. 5.1.1-4) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 5.1.
(a) The planning influences (external and internal combined) on the organisation structures 
in the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SD Sl(ll)) and 3 
consumable products manufacturers (i.e. GNFF(07), GLIL(16) and XLIG(17)) are 
relatively less than the other enterprises. In other words, their planning scores are higher 
before and after 1992 because they are all producing or selling consumable products 
having very high demands from the domestic markets of over 1.2 billion of people.
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(b) The 7 SOEs as mentioned in (a) above were transformed into shareholding enterprises 
(XLIG(17) has an equity joint-venture with the US Coca-Cola) in 1992 and 1993. After 
these conversions, the ownership and management of these shareholding enterprises are 
supposed to be separated. The top management (e.g. board of directors) are vested with 
full autonomy to plan and control all the operations. Since then, the top management has 
been decentralising more responsibility to each department store such as initiating the 
annual budget and the internal responsibility contract. The profit responsibility lies with 
the centre or department store managers who should decide their own strategies in 
marketing, selling, purchasing, cost control, recruiting and training, etc., in order to 
achieve the targets set in the budgets or contracts on the one hand and to create a solid 
foundation for future sales or profit growth on the other hand.
(c) The planning influence (external and internal combined) on the organisation structures in 
the other manufacturing enterprises is comparatively higher than the retailing enterprises 
and consumable manufacturing enterprises as indicated in (a) above. Some suggested 
reasons are given in the next 4 sections (i.e. 5.1.1-4).
(d) From the overall increases in planning scores among these 20 SOEs, obviously higher 
autonomy of internal organisational planning and control has been delegated to the 
responsibility centres since 1992. Some interviewees mentioned that even their middle 
management have involved their subordinates (lower management) in planning, control 
and decision making.
5.1.1 Responsibility Centre
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.1.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
For most of the manufacturing concerns in the 20 SOEs (including the hotel BFSH(19)), the 
production workshops or factories were treated as "cost centres" before 1992. The cost centre 
managers or production managers were responsible for the volume/mix of outputs as well as the 
cost of production. After 1992, many of these production functions have been converted into 
"profit centres" whose managers have been delegated more autonomy in terms of setting transfer 
prices, cost management and production control (see Section 5.1 of Case Analysis 1 in Vol.2).
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However, in XFLT(02) and BCM3(18), in order to avoid the conflict in setting internal transfer 
prices and calculating internal profits, the production workshops or factories remain as cost 
centres after 1992. Another counter example is SCCW(12) whose production workshops had 
been classified as profit centres before 1992, but the difficulty of determining internal profits due 
to input materials mix and inflation, they have been converted back to cost centres after 1992.
An exceptional case is XLIG(17) whose production factories have been treated as profit centres 
before and after 1992. Further, the Coca-Cola manufacturing factory (with the US investment) 
is measured on return on investment as well. This is the only apparent "investment centre" among 
the 20 SOEs in this research sample.
Other than the production workshops or factories, the other functions or service departments (e.g. 
sales, purchasing, accounting, personnel, etc.) are usually treated as "expense centres" under tight 
expense budgets which are either given by or agreed with the top management without extensive 
negotiation.
As far as the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SD Sl(ll)) are 
concerned, their selling functions or stores have been treated as "profit centres" before and after 
1992. They are held accountable for their bottom lines (i.e. internal profit) which are directly 
linked with the amount of group bonus of individual stores. Some of these store managers are 
allowed to formulate their own short term tactics or strategies in the annual planning exercise.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.1.1.
(a) The internal planning influence on the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04),
GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) and 3 consumable product manufacturers (i.e. GNFF(07), 
GLIL(16) and XLIG(17)) is relatively less than the other enterprises. In other words, 
their planning scores are higher before and after 1992 because their selling and production 
units have always been treated as profit centres with higher autonomy in planning and 
operation (see Section 5.1 of Case Analysis 4 in Volume 2 [pp.75-77]).
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(b) The internal planning influence on 5 manufacturing enterprises (i.e. BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), 
SCCW(12), SXSW(15), BCM3(18)) is comparatively higher than the other enterprises 
with lower planning scores both before and after 1992. They are geographically located 
closer to the central government (Beijing) and subject to higher macro-economic measures 
from their respective government authorities (see Section 3 of Case Analysis 9 in Volume 
2 [pp. 196-197]).
(c) The internal planning influences reduce the greatest or planning scores increase the largest 
in SSW5(01), BEEF(05) and SMCW(06). They are trying to enhance the profit 
awareness of their responsibility centres in light of the stagnant turnover and deteriorating 
profit margin.
5.1.2 Decentralisation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.1.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Before the promulgation of "mechanisms transformation legislation" and the "market economy" 
started in 1992, most of these 20 SOEs and their division, factory, workshop or department 
managers were responsible for the production volumes and costs as agreed in the Economic 
Responsibility Contracts (ERCs between government and enterprises) and Internal Responsibility 
Contracts (IRCs between top management and centre managers). Therefore, classifying these 
SOEs and their operating units into cost centres were appropriate.
Under the increasing delegation of planning, control and management autonomies from the 
government to the top management, and then to the operating units down through the 
organisational hierarchy, the economic responsibility lies with the top management who initiates 
and negotiates the terms and conditions of the ERC with the government authorities. In turn, the 
internal operating units (e.g. factories and workshops) are responsible to fulfil their economic, 
financial and qualitative targets as agreed in their IRCs. In view of this decentralisation process, 
all the 20 SOEs have become profit centres and many of their internal operating units have been 
converted into profit centres as well, although they are still subject in some degree to planning and 
control influences from the government and top management respectively in light of different 
macro-economic control measures and local government policies and regulations.
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In addition to the turnover and profit targets as agreed in the IRCs, most of the store managers 
in the 4 department stores have been delegated certain operational decision-making in purchasing, 
selling, marketing, cost control and personnel.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.1.2.
(a) The extent of decentralisation in the 3 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GNFB(08), 
SDS1(11)) and the Coca-Cola manufacturer (i.e. XLIG(17)) are relatively higher than the 
other enterprises. In other words, their planning scores have been higher before and after 
1992 because higher autonomy in planning, control and management has been delegated 
to the top management by the Ministry of Internal Trade and National Light Industry 
Council, and in turn to the various levels of middle or even lower management.
(b) The degrees of decentralisation in 8 manufacturing enterprises (i.e. XFLT(02), BCRF(09), 
BIMT(IO), SCCW(12), SXSW(15), BCM3(18), BFSH(19), BPMH(20)) are 
comparatively lower than the other enterprises with lower planning scores after 1992. 
They are geographically located closer to the central government (i.e. all the 5 SOEs in 
Beijing) policy controls and subject to many product, market and personnel changes.
(c) Decentralisation has been extended most and planning scores have been increased the 
largest in the manufacturing industry such as SSW5(01), BEEF(05), SMCW(06), 
SMEF(13), GLIL(16). They are trying to motivate different levels of management to be 
more actively involved in the planning and control processes in order to cope with the 
uncertainties and changes (see Section 1 of Data Analysis 13 in Volume 3 [p.407]).
5.1.3 Appointment
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.1.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The appointments of the "communist party secretary" and "enterprise chief executive" in all of 
these 20 SOEs up to now are still decided by the government authorities. Even in cases of the 
shareholding enterprises of which the boards of directors can nominate the chairmen and vice- 
chairmen, yet these appointments require the approval of the local authorities (e.g. State Assets
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Administration Bureau). In fact, the party secretary is the representative from the government 
to ensure some macro-economic and political policies are under control. In some of the wholly 
SOEs (e.g. SSW5(01), BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), SMEF(13), etc.) the party secretaries are involved 
in the planning, control and decision making (both long- and short-term) processes.
Before the "operation mechanisms transformation" promulgated in 1992, some key or senior 
positions in the enterprises (particularly the wholly SOEs), such as the deputy general managers, 
chief engineers, chief economists and chief accountants were appointed by the government 
authorities. Similarly, these posts could be removed and the respective personnel could be 'laid 
off by the authorities as well (see Section 5.1 of Data Analysis 12 in Volume 3 [p.364]).
However, after 1992, as observed in these 20 SOEs, most of their top management can appoint 
their senior management staff such as the deputy general managers and the three chiefs4. For 
example in SSW5(01), the managers in the 14 production factories can decide their own 
organisation structures and personnel affairs but important changes should be approved by 
headquarters. In the Coca-Cola joint-venture of XLIG(17), the foreign partner (represented by 
Swire Bottle Hong Kong) can appoint a few senior management staff and decide the specific 
organisation structure and personnel affairs after discussion and agreement with the Chinese 
partner (this is allowed under the local government policies approved in Xiamen).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.1.3.
(a) Similar to 5.1.1. above, the staff appointment influence (both from the government 
(external) and top management (internal)) on the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), 
GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) and 3 consumable product manufacturers (i.e. 
GNFF(07), GLIL(16) and XLIG(17)) is relatively less than the other enterprises. In other 
words, their planning scores are higher before and after 1992 because they have always 
been treated as profit centres with higher autonomy in designing their organisational 
structures and determining personnel affairs (see Section 5.1 of Case Analysis 7 in V.2).
4 As reported by the Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 21 July 1997, 30% of the 
industrial SOEs in Shanghai have openly recruited their senior or middle management either 
within the enterprise/industry or in the labour market.
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(b) The appointment influences (both external and internal) on 8 manufacturing enterprises 
(i.e. XFLT(02), BEEF(05), SMCW(06), BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), SCCW(12), SMEF(13), 
BFSH(19)) are comparatively higher than the other enterprises with lower planning scores 
after 1992. They are geographically located closer to the central government (Beijing) 
and subject to various degrees of organisational changes during the recent years.
5.1.4 Interdependencies
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.1.4 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
There are 10 manufacturing enterprises which involve intra-enterprise supply of products within 
their own industries such as metallurgical (i.e. SSW5(01), SMEF(13), SXSW(15)), textiles (i.e. 
SCM2(14), BCM3(18)), equipment and instrument (i.e. BEEF(05), SMCW(06), BCRF(09), 
BIMT(IO), BPMH(20)). In most of the cases, the quantities and costs of cross-supplies are still 
planned and determined by the respective government or supervisory authorities.
Among these 20 SOEs, the production units of the 10 manufacturing enterprises have higher 
interdependencies due to the internal transfer of intermediate products or services (see Table 2G 
in Appendix 1). These organisational relationships cause debatable planning, control and 
measurement issues mainly in terms of transfer quantities and prices.
Before the operation mechanisms reform started in 1992, the quantities and costs of internal 
cross-supplies were largely determined by the top management after the centre managers had been 
consulted. However, in realising the autonomy delegation after 1992, most of the responsibility 
centres or operating units are allowed to negotiate the internal cross-supply transactions but some 
interference and arbitration by the top management are involved.
Before 1992, the internal transfer pricing method of these 10 manufacturing enterprises was 
"standard cost without markup" except SSW5(01) and BPMH(20) due to their arms-length 
transactions among their very large production factories. After 1992, the general methods used 
by these 10 enterprises are "standard cost plus" and "negotiated market price" giving room for 
the internal buyers and sellers to bargain, but of course, interventions from the top management 
are necessary to settle some unresolved arguments.
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(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.1.4.
(a) The arbitration influences (both from the government (external) and top management
(internal)) on the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) 
and the 3 manufacturing enterprises (i.e. SMEF(13), SCM2(14), GLIL(16)) are the least 
because of very minimal interdependencies within the enterprises and among the operating
units within an enterprise (see Section 2 of Data Analysis 3 in Volume 3).
(b) Contrary to (a), the arbitration influences (both external and internal) on SXSW(15) and 
BCM3(18) are the highest among the other enterprises because of the close 
interdependencies of internal transactions among the production units (see Section 2 of 
Data Analysis 1 in Volume 3 [pp.4-5]).
(c) SSW5(01), BEEF(05), SMCW(06), BCRF(09), BIMT(IO) are the 5 manufacturing SOEs 
which have the largest increases in planning scores which indicates that their top 
management has allowed greater freedom to the operating units to settle their 
interdependent issues.
5.2 REVIEW PROCESS
Since the economic reform started in the early 1980s, all the local and municipal governments and 
their agencies have complied with the national 5-year plans (e.g. the 5th plan from 1976-1980 and 
the 9th plan from 1996-2000) as laid down and directed by the central government in Beijing. In 
turn, these government authorities and agencies set out both the long- and short-term plans for 
those enterprises and entities to implement under their ambit of supervision. For example, the 
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and its hundreds of local authorities and agencies directed the 
long- and short-term plans of all the steel works and other related industries (e.g. iron ores, 
machines and equipment, import/export trade, etc.) across the country.
In parallel with the open-door policy and economic reform, every manufacturing and servicing 
industry has to adopt a more rigorous, dynamic and flexible planning process in order to keep 
abreast with the fast changing technologies and markets. Inevitably, higher autonomy has to be 
delegated to the local and municipal government authorities and agencies to formulate and review
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the long- and short-term plans with the enterprises under their regional umbrellas. As a result, 
the enterprise managements have been involved in the planning and review process with the 
government authorities since the 6th national plan (1981-1985). But of course the degree of 
participation is different from one industry to another (e.g. iron and steel versus retailing) and 
from one type of ownership to another type (e.g. wholly SOE versus shareholding SOE).
The promulgation of operation mechanisms transformation and market economy since 1992 have 
further opened the door of planning participation for the enterprise managements who can initiate 
their strategic or tactical plans on the one hand and have to formulate their own annual budgets 
on the other hand. Similarly, the extent of participation varies form enterprise to enterprise.
The planning influences in respect of "review process" from (1) the government on the enterprise 
(external dimension); and (2) the enterprise management on the different responsibility centres 
(internal dimension) are measured on the following 4 criteria :
5.2.1 Central Planning;
5.2.2 Operation;
5.2.3 Participation; and
5.2.4 Review and Communication.
The results of these 4 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 4 sections 
(i.e. 5.2.1-4) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 5.2.
(a) The 5 SOEs in Guangzhou (all are shareholding and 3 are department stores) and 2 listed 
enterprises, one in Beijing (i.e. BPMH(20)) and one in Shanghai (i.e. SDS1(11)), have 
indicated lower planning influences (both external and internal) since 1992 as compared 
with the other enterprises in this study. In other words, their planning scores have been 
higher before and after 1992 because they are producing or selling consumable products 
having continuous high demands from the domestic markets. Further, as implied in the 
shareholding enterprise legislation (e.g. Company Law 1994), the semi-privatization 
(government is still the majority shareholder in all cases) of a SOE should leave greater 
power of planning and control to the board of directors which is collectively held 
accountable to more diverse stakeholders (see Section 5.2 of Case Analysis 3 in Vol.2).
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(b) The 2 SOEs in Xiamen (i.e. XFLT(02), XLIG(17)) have encountered less and less 
external planning influences from the municipal government since 1992 because Xiamen 
is one of the five special economic zones in China which enjoys more favourable local 
government policies (at least ten) as compared with the other cities across the nation.
(c) Among the 20 SOEs in this study, most of the SOEs in Beijing and some in Shanghai are 
still experiencing certain external planning and review influences from the central and 
municipal governments mainly because of their (1) locations closer to the central 
authorities (i.e. the ministries of the State Council); (2) wholly state-ownership; and (3) 
unstable or unsatisfactory financial performance (see pp.411-412 of Volume 3).
5.2.1 Central Planning
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.2.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Before 1992, the enterprise long-term planning coincided with the national 5-year plans. For most 
of the 12 wholly SOEs investigated in this research, their long-term plans were initiated, 
monitored, reviewed and modified by the government authorities while the enterprise 
managements were only consulted. These long-term plans involved capital projects which 
required substantial investments in terms of funds injected from the government or borrowed from 
the state-owned banks but the high interest rate of over 15% indicated the tight monetary control 
policy adopted across the country in the last few years. Therefore, most of the long-term capital 
investment decisions had to be centralised by the government authorities (e.g. steel and machinery 
industries) in order to make the best use of the limited availability of capital funds.
Despite the shortage of funds in the capital market, the promulgation of mechanisms 
transformation and market economy in the SOEs after 1992 have encouraged the enterprises to 
be self-financed, self-managed, self-regulated and self-developed through careful and viable 
strategic plans equipped with some assistance from the government such as preferential bank 
loans, reduced tax rates and granting export rights. These measures have induced the SOEs to 
formulate their own long-term plans. With regard to the shareholding enterprises, the 
governmental influence on the long-term planning is less than the wholly SOEs because the board 
of directors has assumed this responsibility although the government's representative (e.g.
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communist party secretary appointed by the State Assets Administration Bureau) is usually sitting 
on the board, so a certain external planning influence can still be exerted.
As observed in these 20 case studies, it seems that the government authorities have delegated the 
annual planning or budgeting exercise to the enterprise management since 1992 irrespective of 
the form of ownership these SOEs are. The details will be discussed in Section 5.5 below.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.2.1.
(a) The central planning influence on most of the shareholding enterprises (i.e. GFDS(03),
GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11), GLIL(16), BPMH(20)) is relatively less than the other 
wholly SOEs among these 20 enterprises. Higher planning autonomy has been delegated 
to the board of directors of these shareholding enterprises according to Company Law.
(b) The 2 SOEs in Xiamen (i.e. XFLT(02), XLIG(17)) have been subject to less governmental 
planning influence than the other cities because Xiamen is a special economic zone which 
benefits from some favourable policies granted by the central government (see Section
5.2.1 of Case Analysis 2 in Volume 2 [p.34]).
(c) Contrary, the central planning influences on some wholly SOEs (i.e. BEEF(05),
SMCW(06), BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), SCCW(12), BCM3(18)) are comparatively higher 
due to their locations closer to the central government (Beijing) and lack of capital funds 
in these industries (i.e. machinery, instrument and textiles manufacturing).
5.2.2 Operation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.2.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
As mentioned in Section 5.2.1 above, before the 1990s, the enterprise long-term planning was 
running in line with the nationwide 5-year plans compiled by the central government. For most 
of the 12 wholly SOEs in this research, their long-term plans were driven by their supervisory 
agencies or government authorities while the participation from the enterprise managements were 
usually limited to consultation only. Therefore, other than the profit targets the enterprise
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managements were not really motivated to actualise the strategic milestones which were not 
promoted by themselves in the long-term plans (usually 3-5 years). Furthermore, the achievement 
of the financial targets agreed in the ERC during the contract period may induce the enterprise 
management to commit "short-term behaviour" such as overlooking the investment in 
product/market research and development, facilities, equipment (in particular computers), human 
resources (e.g. training and education).
On the other hand, the 8 shareholding SOEs, which are mainly engaged in retailing and 
consumable products, have started to initiate, review and modify their long-term plans since the 
early 1990s. Most of them are located further away from the central government and subject to 
less macro-economic controls and local government policies and regulations.
Before 1992, the annual planning or budgeting process did not involve much participation from 
the middle or lower management in most of the 12 wholly SOEs. In some cases, the top 
managements gave directions e.g. sales, production volume and mix, quality improvement, 
wastage rates, etc. to the responsibility centres for them to comply with. Since 1992, under the 
operation mechanisms reform and market economy promulgation, these SOEs have been 
encouraged to participate in the planning process and may extend their planning horizon beyond 
one year. Therefore, the top managements may exert less interference in divisional or 
departmental planning decisions, but without reducing the tight financial or budgetary control.
Since 1992, many enterprises visited in this research have implemented a regular formal planning 
process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual plans or budgets and the internal 
responsibility contracts. This budgeting process starts during the last quarter of the year and ends 
in February of the next calendar year. Based on some guidelines provided by the top management 
e.g. sales, profits, production value/mix, etc., each division or department initiates an annual plan 
or budget in which some key criteria are used as the measurement yardsticks of the internal 
responsibility contract. Iterative discussions and negotiations are carried out between the top 
management and the responsibility centres until compromises result and budgets are settled (see 
Section 5.2 of Data Analysis 6 in Volume 3 [pp. 145-147]).
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(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.2.2.
(a) There are 3 categories of enterprises having higher planning review autonomy :
(i) the shareholding department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), 
SDS1(11)) (see Section 5.2 of Case Analysis 3 in Volume 2 [pp.56-57]);
(ii) the listed enterprises (i.e. SDS1(11), SCM2(14), GLIL(16), BPMH(20)); and
(iii) the enterprises in Xiamen special economic zone (i.e. XFLT(02), XLIG(17)).
(b) The planning influences on the 5 wholly SOEs in Beijing (i.e. BEEF(05), BCRF(09), 
BIMT(10)5 BCM3(18), BFSH(19)) and another SOE SCCW(12) in Shanghai are higher 
as explained in Section 5.2. l(B)(c) [also see pp.257-258 of Data Analysis in Volume 3],
5.2.3 Participation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.2.3 of the 20 Cases Analyses in Volume 2.
As mentioned in Section 5.2.2 above, since the long-term planning process was a rather top-down 
approach before 1992, it seemed to be a discussion between the government authority and an 
enterprise in which the latter party had to undertake the final decisions made by the authority. As 
stipulated in the operation mechanisms transformation regulations implemented since July 1992, 
the top management of a SOE should be responsible for formulating and accountable for fulfilling 
the long-term plans. Then gradually the enterprise management has been learning to initiate their 
long-term plans under the guidance of their supervisory bodies, their internal strengths and 
weaknesses, and their external opportunities and threats. In doing so, some SOEs such as the 
shareholding enterprises consulted the middle management in reviewing the long-term plans 
(usually 3 to 5 years) as well (see Section 5.2 of Case Analysis 11 in Volume 2).
As far as the annual planning or budgeting process is concerned, the degree of participation from 
an enterprise would seem to depend very much on its (1) type of industry; (2) form of ownership; 
and (3) geographical location which will be mentioned in (B) of this section. In general, as from 
1992, the top managements of these 20 SOEs have been fully responsible for the short-term 
planning review process although their supervisory bodies might agree with or provide some key 
financial indicators (e.g. turnover, profit, production volume, etc.) to the top managements.
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(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.2.3.
(a) Among the 20 SOEs, the degrees of planning participation are the highest in 2 department 
stores (i.e. GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) and both of them are shareholding enterprises.
(b) The next higher degrees of planning participation are the other 2 department stores (i.e. 
GFDS(03), GDDS(04)) and 5 manufacturing enterprises (i.e. SMCW(06), GNFF(07), 
SMEF(13), SCM2(14), GLIL(16)). Most of them are shareholding enterprises producing 
and selling consumable products (see Section 5.2 of Data Analysis 16 in V.3 [p.518]).
(c) Because Xiamen is one of the five special economic zones, more open policies are 
available for the SOEs there. XFLT(02) and XLIG(17) have actually participated in both 
the long- and short-term planning exercises since the late 1980s.
5.2.4 Review & Communication
Although the long-term planning process in most of these 20 SOEs was a rather top-down 
process before 1992, the 5-year plans were still reviewed annually between the government 
authorities and the enterprise management. Significant changes (e.g. capital project abandonment, 
product development, etc,) must be approved by the government authorities, while minor changes 
(e.g. organisational structure, personnel, pricing, etc.) could be initiated and sometimes 
determined by the enterprise management. The major contents of the long-term plan were usually 
reported during the Annual Employees Congress (for wholly SOEs) or Annual General Meeting 
(for shareholding SOEs), but details would not be explained.
As from 1992, the enterprise management is quite eager to review their own-formulated long-term 
plans at least twice every year or even on a quarterly basis. Most of the wholly SOEs' supervisory 
bodies participate in this review process and sometimes suggestions or even directions are made. 
For the shareholding SOEs, their boards of directors usually have the full autonomy to review and 
amend their long-term strategies, although in some situations they need the assistance from their 
government authorities such as approval or recommendation for applying bank loans for capital 
investment (see Section 6.2 of Case Analysis 14 in Volume 2).
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The shareholding enterprises are usually more transparent in disclosing the long-term plans to 
their employees at different levels through meetings, documents and publications. They may also 
reveal the tactical or administrative plans leading to the long-term goals. However, for some 
wholly SOEs, the top managements are still reluctant to communicate the long-term plans to the 
middle or lower management because top managements' commitments to these plans are not 
strong and fear of changes made by their government authorities.
The fixed budget concept was employed in these 20 SOEs before 1992. The annual plans or 
budgets were reviewed between the top and middle management at least twice every year but 
amendments were made only due to significant changes (e.g. inflation, product mix, government 
policy, etc.) which would be reflected in the revised budgets and internal responsibility contracts.
In view of the dynamic market economy and higher budget participation since 1992, the annual 
plans, budgets and IRC are reviewed at least quarterly or even monthly and amendments can be 
made more frequently especially by using computers. The flexible budget model is gaining 
acceptability by both the management and employees as long as their rewards and incentives as 
agreed in the internal responsibility contracts are not affected too much.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.2.4.
(a) The planning review and communication process is most liberal in SD Sl(ll) mainly 
because it is one of the largest listed department stores in China and it is undergoing a lot 
of diversified businesses including a joint-venture of setting up Asia's largest shopping 
complex in Eastern Shanghai (Pudong) with Yohan in Japan.
(b) All the 5 shareholding enterprises (4 department stores and 1 consumable product 
manufacturer) and the listed printing machines manufacturer in Beijing (i.e. BPMH(20)) 
make extensive use of their planning review and communication processes because they 
are accountable to different stakeholders in terms of achieving targeted returns on 
investment, dividends and retained earnings for growth (see Section 1 of Data Analysis 
20 in Volume 3 [pp.619-621]).
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(c) The 2 SOEs (i.e. XFLT(02), XLIG(17)) in Xiamen special economic zone also indicate
higher concern in planning review and communication to cope with the changing product 
and market development (see Section 5.2 of Case Analysis 17 in Volume 2 [pp.410-1]).
5.3 STRATEGIC THEMES, THRUSTS & SUGGESTIONS
It is usual practice for the traditional (especially old) SOEs to promulgate various strategic themes 
to their employees through different means such as meetings, notice boards or banners. Some of 
these themes are disseminated by the government such as operation mechanisms transformation 
(1993), economic effectiveness (1992), quality control (1991), economic responsibility contract 
(1990), etc. They are the core spirits and supreme guidelines for the nationwide SOEs to observe 
and attain when planning, implementing and evaluating their activities.
To accommodate the changing external environments and internal expectations, the enterprise 
management reinforces the strategic themes by more specific strategic thrusts which are given 
to or agreed with the responsibility centres. Typical strategic thrusts discovered in these 20 SOEs 
are quality control, customer service, management control, technology improvement, etc. They 
are usually translated into concrete strategic, tactical and operational plans.
Sailing along the charted route, the captain (i.e. enterprise management) should ensure the ship 
is on the right direction. From time to time, the top management of an enterprise has to provide 
specific suggestions in the planning, review and control processes in every responsibility centre 
or unit so that not only the strategic themes and thrusts can be recognised, but in a more down-to- 
earth sense that the final financial targets can be achieved as well. As observed in these 20 SOEs, 
the ways and extents of conveying the specific suggestions to the business centres and units varies 
from one enterprise to another depending on many factors such as (1) central/local government 
influence; (2) macro-economic control; (3) form of ownership; (4) type of industry; (5) financial 
performance; and (6) management style.
A department store in Guangzhou (i.e. GNFB(08)) which is a shareholding enterprise is a good
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example to understand how they put various strategic themes, thrusts and suggestions into actions 
(see Section 5.3 of Data Analysis 8 in Volume 3 [pp.232-236]).
The planning influences in respect of "strategic themes, thrusts and suggestions" from (1) the 
government on the enterprises (external dimension); and (2) the enterprise management on the 
different responsibility centres (internal dimension) are measured on the following 3 criteria :
5.3.1 Themes;
5.3.2 Thrusts; and
5.3.3 Suggestions.
The results of these 3 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 3 sections 
(i.e. 5.3.1-3) which can firstly be summarised in the High-Low Chart 5.3.
(a) The 4 department stores in Guangzhou and Shanghai (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), 
GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) have the highest scores or the least planning influences compared 
with the other SOEs. They possess the following 5 characteristics :
(1) further away from the central government in Beijing;
(2) shareholding enterprises;
(3) retailing industry;
(4) higher profit margin; and
(5) strategic management emphasis.
(b) The 5 SOEs in Beijing (except BPMH(20)) have the lower scores or the higher planning 
influences (both external and internal) mainly due to the following different characteristics 
compared with the department stores just mentioned in (a) above :
(1) close to the central government in Beijing;
(2) wholly state-owned enterprises;
(3) manufacturing (i.e. textiles and machinery) and servicing (i.e. hotel) industry;
(4) lower profit margin (or loss-making); and
(5) financial control bias.
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(c) The high planning influences (both external and internal) as shown in SSW5(01) and
XFLT(02) are explained in the following sections.
5.3.1 Themes
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.3.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
In most of these 20 SOEs, the strategic themes promulgated by the top management before 1992 
were tied in with the slogans propounded by the central government. Examples were the further 
promotion or refinement of economic responsibility contract in 1990, the production and product 
quality control in 1991 and the enhancement of profitability in 1992. Therefore, these themes 
were enforced by both the government and the enterprise management so that all the employees 
in an enterprise had to bear them in mind when they were performing their duties.
After 1992, more diversified and balanced strategic themes have been suggested by the top 
management of these 20 SOEs. The followings are the major or more important ones :
(1) total quality assurance (e.g. SSW5(01), XFLT(02), GNFF(07), GLIL(16), XLIG(17), 
BPMH(20));
(2) customer satisfaction (e.g. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), SDS1(11), BFSH(19));
(3) product/market development (e.g. BEEF(05), SMCW(06), SCM3(18));
(4) production capacity/efficiency (e.g. SCCW(12), SMEF(13));
(5) cost reduction (e.g. BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), SXSW(15));
(6) corporate culture (e.g. GNFB(08)); and
(7) business diversification (e.g. SCM2(14)).
The middle management such as the responsibility centre managers are requested to achieve the 
above strategic themes by some means within the scope of their authorities and responsibilities.
(B) Observations from the High/Low Chart 5.3.1.
(a) The 4 department stores and the other 2 consumable product manufacturers in Guangzhou
have been allowing more freedom to their department or centre managers to crystallize 
the strategic themes by their own means and tactics (see p.64 in Volume 3).
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(b) The iron and steel plant in Shanghai (i.e. SSW5(01)) has the highest internal planning 
influence on their 12 production factories (with high interdependencies) in order to attain 
the strategic themes. It is because in such a large SOE of over 23,000 employees, 
unification of spirits, policies and procedures is very important for the attainment of 
strategic themes for the enterprise as a whole especially under the tight economic 
responsibility contract signed with the municipal government along the years.
5.3.2 Thrusts
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.3.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
According to Goold and Campbell (1991: 38), compared with strategic theme, strategic thrust 
is a related, but separate, type of influence or thrusts for particular business units. The holding 
company or headquarters may develop guidelines for each of its major businesses concerning 
broad product range goals, market development objectives and competitive position. Although 
the business units are free to devise plans to achieve these targets and to propose objectives 
consistent with them, the guidelines provide a framework for their strategic thinking. The 
importance of these strategic thrusts varies between companies.
As observed in these 20 SOEs, broad guidelines are always coming from the government 
authorities or agencies for these enterprises to lay down their strategic directions in their long­
term plans and to figure out their business decisions via the annual budgeting. This approach of 
fostering strategic thrust on the SOEs is regarded as a paramount vehicle for the government 
authorities to ensure the macroeconomic policies are complied with by their operating units. As 
suggested by Goold and Campbell (1991), the extent of this planning influence is varying between 
enterprises investigated in this research depending on an enterprise's (1) geographical location;
(2) type of ownership; and (3) economic performance.
Internally within an enterprise itself, the top management imposes or provides strategic thrusts 
for its responsibility centres or units to formulate their short-term plans, budgets and internal 
responsibility contracts. This happens in each enterprise and varies between one enterprise to 
another in these 20 SOEs as quantified by using the standardised planning scores.
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The followings are some typical strategic thrusts found in these 20 SOEs :
(1) quality control(e.g.BEEF(05), GNFF(07), BCRF(09), SCCW(12), GLIL(16),
BCM3(18));
(2) customer service (e.g. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), BFSH(19));
(3) management/operation control (e.g. SMEF(13), SCM2(14), XLIG(17));
(4) technology improvement (e.g. BIMT(IO), BPMH(20));
(5) efficiency enhancement (e.g. SSW5(01), SMCW(06));
(6) products variety (e.g. SDS1(11), SXSW(15)); and
(7) capacity expansion (e.g. XFLT(02)).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.3.2.
(a) Distinctively, the 4 department stores (shareholding enterprises) in Guangzhou (i.e.
GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08)) and Shanghai (i.e. SDS1(11)) have the least planning 
influences (both external and internal) on their responsibility centres in respect of strategic 
thrusts. Within the broad strategic themes and thrusts, individual departments (internal 
profit centres) are allowed to formulate their own tactics and strategies in terms of (see 
Section 5.3 of Data Analysis 4 in Volume 3 [pp.88-89]):
(1) sales promotion;
(2) commodity pricing;
(3) internal design and decoration;
(4) display arrangement; and
(5) after sales service.
(b) Most of the SOEs in Beijing (except the listed BPMH(20)) and 2 manufacturing SOEs in 
Shanghai (i.e. SSW5(01), SCCW(12)) have higher internal planning influences from the 
top managements on their responsibility centres in respect of strategic thrusts because of 
their locations closer to the central government (or subject to tighter macro-economic 
controls), larger scale of operation and unsatisfactory financial performance in some cases. 
Furthermore, all of them are wholly SOEs.
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(c) The fork lift truck manufacturing plant (i.e. XFLT(02)) in Xiamen is subject to the highest 
internal planning influence on the strategic thrusts because it has been undertaking a 
substantial joint-venture business with a German counterpart in the same industry during 
the last few years. Coping with many technology, capacity, market and human resource 
changes, the top management has to combine the different strategic thrusts into a unified 
and balanced direction.
5.3.3 Suggestions
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.3.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Gooid and Campbell (1991: 38) vividly describe that other than strategic themes and thrusts, 
another way for the headquarters to influence plans is by making specific suggestions. The degree 
to which headquarters or top management refrain from intervening with specific suggestions 
reflects their commitment to decentralisation. But even in companies that profess a high degree 
of decentralisation, top management will still from time to time make suggestions (e.g. the pricing 
of a major contract, pack size and design for a particular brand, factory layout, etc.). These may 
arise from regular budget or plan discussions, from formal reviews by head office 'experts', or 
from much less formal conversations. The suggestions may be based on wider central 
perspectives, external contracts, personal beliefs, detailed knowledge and even pure prejudice. 
Whatever the basis, they are unlikely to be ignored, and they form part of the top-down influence 
process.
From the many interviews of the senior managements in these 20 SOEs and some documents 
obtained from these personnel, Goold and Campbell's propositions reflect similar situations in the 
Chinese business environment. Firstly, from the government-enterprise perspective, due to the 
speeding up of economic reform and delegation of autonomy, the central and local governments 
have changed their roles from dictatorship to giving suggestions to the SOEs in respect of 
planning and control. The parameters of "organisation structure" and "review process" reported 
in Section 5.1 and 5.2 above have provided facts and observations to evidence this environment 
already.
Secondly, looking into the internal planning influences of these 20 SOEs, in most of the cases, the
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top managements from time to time made suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning 
review process such as selling prices, marketing strategies and production quantities and mixes. 
Most of the top managements of these 20 SOEs follow the financial indicators and performance 
closely on monthly and quarterly basis and were quick to make suggestions if they do not match 
the overall long- and short-term plans. This sort of closer planning influence is typical in most of 
the wholly SOEs, especially in Beijing (government policies and regulations are closely 
monitored), and the under-performed enterprises in this study.
On the other hand, those enterprises located in the southern provinces (i.e. Xiamen and 
Guangzhou), in particular the shareholding enterprises, have gradually left more freedom to their 
responsibility centres or units to adjust their plans and operations as long as they do not deviate 
much from the long-term plan and the annual budget in aggregate.
Specific suggestions may not only arise from the annual planning and review processes, but also 
from the monthly and quarterly performance evaluations and some ad hoc management meetings. 
The suggestions may be based on local government policies (e.g. macroeconomic policies), 
economic responsibility contracts agreed with the government authorities, personal beliefs, 
business knowledge5 and even bias and prejudice of the top management.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.3.3.
(a) Among the 20 SOEs, 60%(12) of them have changed from high internal planning 
influence (scores 1.0-1.5) to medium planning influence (score at 2.5) since 1992. This 
indicates that in general the specific suggestions given to the responsibility centres or units 
are still common although some relaxations have happened.
(b) Less specific suggestions are provided in the 3 department stores in Guangzhou (i.e. 
GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08)) which are all shareholding enterprises. This reflects 
higher commitment to decentralisation and delegation in strategic planning assuming the 
centre or department managers know better how to manoeuvre their businesses under 
certain strategic themes and thrusts (see p.79 of Volume 2).
5 Seniority is a very important factor to become chief executive(s) in the SOEs in China.
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5.4 LONG-TERM PLANS
Just four years after the inception of the PRC, the central government of China started its first 5- 
year national plan in 1953 but actually implemented since 1956. Then the second 5-year national 
plan covered the years from 1961 to 1965 and the third one from 1966 to 1970 and so on. The 
present 5-year national plan is the ninth one running across the period from 1996 to 2000 which 
signifies the turning point of China’s rapid economic development into the next century.
In each 5-year national plan, it used to set down many macroeconomic targets such as GDP, 
industrial output, agricultural output, inflation, balance of payment, capital expenditure, standard 
of living, etc. which affect the operation of almost 400,000 SOEs and the well being of millions 
of employees working in these SOEs. Therefore, since the first national plan adopted in the mid- 
1950s, each governmental department or authority has been formulating a 5-year long-term plan 
coinciding with the national plan for each SOE under its supervision.
For example, in line with the formation of each national plan, the Ministry of Textile (replaced by 
the China National Textile Industry Council in July 1993) has to compile the 5-year long-term 
plans for all the cotton mills, spinning and weaving machine manufacturing plants, and other 
related units (e.g. textiles import/export enterprises) which are under the same governmental 
ministry. The national macroeconomic targets act as the overall guidelines for the 5-year long­
term plan in each SOE. The summation of all the 5-year long-term plans in all the SOEs of a 
certain industry should achieve closely some of the national macroeconomic targets.
Before the economic reform took effect in early 1980s, most of the 5-year long-term plans in the 
SOEs were dictated by their respective government authorities. The SOEs acted just like cost 
centres to carry out the pre-determined plans, mainly production levels and costs, year after year. 
To further open the door of economic reform and introduce the concept of free market, the top 
managements of the SOEs have been invited to sit down with their supervisory bodies to 
formulate their individual long-term plans, but sometimes the enterprise managements were 
consulted only without much participation (see Section 5.4 of Data Analysis 5 in Volume [pp. 117- 
120]).
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Under the promulgations of operation mechanisms transformation and socialist market economy 
since 1992, most of the SOEs have been required to initiate and compile their own long-term 
plans, but subject to various extents of planning influence from their corresponding local 
government authorities. Internally, the top managements of these SOEs have involved, to various 
extents, their responsibility centres or units in formulating their respective long-term plans.
The planning influences in respect of “long-term planning” from (1) the government on the 
enterprises (external dimension); and (2) the enterprise management on the different responsibility 
centres (internal dimension) are measured on the following 4 criteria :
5.4.1 Central Planning;
5.4.2 Operation;
5.4.3 Participation; and
5.4.4 Review and Communication.
The results of these 4 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 4 sections 
(i.e. 5.4.1-4) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 5.4.
(a) In terms of the planning influence scores, there are little differences among the 20 SOEs 
and 15 of them have been subject to moderate external influences (2.3-2.6) from their 
local government authorities since 1992.
(b) Among these 20 SOEs, the government authorities have exerted less planning influences 
(scores 2.9-3.0) on the following 4 SOEs :
(1) GNFF(07) - flour manufacturing;
(2) SD Sl(ll) - department stores;
(3) GLIL(16) - cleaning consumables manufacturing; and
(4) XLIG(17) - beverage manufacturing.
They have the following common characteristics :
(1) further away form the central government in Beijing;
(2) shareholding enterprises (SDS1(11) is listed);
(3) retailing and consumable product industries; and
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(4) good financial performance and steady growth.
(c) Among the 20 SOEs, the steel works, SSW5(01) in Shanghai, is still facing higher central 
planning influence although there has been substantial improvement since 1992. The 
major reasons can be found in the Sections 5.4.2(B)(b) and 5.4.4(B)(b) below.
5.4.1 Central Planning
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.4.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The relationships between the government authorities and SOEs in respect of long-term planning 
is briefly narrated in Section 5.2.1 above. Before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
enterprise long-term plans (usually 5 years in duration) focused on the production capacities and 
volumes dictated by the government under the central planning system. Since the 1980s, some 
of the enterprise managements participated in the long-term planning discussions with the 
government authorities or supervisory bodies in terms of production facility, volume and mix, 
right to export, product and market development.
Both the operation mechanisms transformation and market economy promulgated by the 
government since 1992 have empowered higher autonomy in and enlarged the scope of long-term 
planning in the SOEs. The top managements of these 20 SOEs have to initiate their own long­
term plans and compromise with the government authorities who may insist on certain macro­
targets such as output volume and mix, turnover, profit before tax, sales and income tax some of 
which are usually incorporated in the ERC (see Section 5.4 of Case Analysis 2 in Volume 2).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.4.1.
(a) The central planning influence on XLIG(17) is the least among the 20 SOEs mainly 
because of two reasons as follows :
(1) XLIG(17) is located in Xiamen which is one of the five special economic zones 
in China enjoying more favourable economic policies (see Section 5.4 of Data 
Analysis 17 in Volume 3 [pp. 545-549]; and
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(2) XLIG(17) has entered into a joint-venture with US Coca-Cola/Hong Kong Swire 
Group to expand the softdrinks business in China.
(b) Two listed enterprises (i.e. SDS1(11), BPMH(20)) and another shareholding enterprise 
GNFF(07) show less central planning influences or higher planning scores compared with 
the other SOEs except XLIG(17). It is assumed that their boards of directors should have 
higher autonomy in formulating their long-term plans.
(c) The hotel in Beijing, BFSH(19), indicates the highest central planning influence. This 
SOE is directly under close supervision of the China National Tourism Administration 
Bureau (see Chapter 5, Section 5.0, Notes 7) and its operation is simpler than the other 
manufacturing or retailing industries.
5.4.2 Operation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.4.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Among the 20 SOEs, their degrees of involvement with the government authorities/departments 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and review the long-term plans are varying. On one 
extreme, a government authority may still decide the strategic plans without much discussion with 
the enterprise management such as the case before the economic reform started in early 1980s. 
On the other extreme, an enterprise’s top management has to initiate and compile the long-term 
plans on its own.
For some enterprises (e.g. XFLT(02), BEEF(05), BCRF(09), BCM3(18), etc.) whose freedom 
to decide their long-term plans are in between the two extremes, negotiations and compromises 
have to be made in order to determine feasible strategic plans acceptable to both the enterprises 
and their government authorities (see Section 5.4 of Case Analysis 5 in Volume 2 [pp. 102-103]).
For some enterprises (e.g. GNFF(07), SDSl(ll), GLEL(16), XLIG(19), etc.) whose planning 
autonomies are biased to the latter extreme, there are formal planning committees and procedures 
in existence to get middle management (e.g. responsibility centre managers) involved in the 
planning process. It is a way for the top management to allocate limited resources to different
190
Ch. 5 : Analysis of Data II
divisions and departments according to the market demand, product profitability and government 
suggestions (see Section 5.5 of Data Analysis 11 in Volume 3 [pp.344-345]).
Common long-term plans found in these 20 SOEs are listed below (with SOE’s numbers shown
only) :
( i) market penetration/diversification (01,02,05,06,07,08,09,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,20)
(2) product differentiation/diversification (01,02,05,06,07,09,10,12,13,14,15,16,18,19,20)
(3) joint-venture business (01,03,04,06,07,08,11,12,13,14,16,17,18,19,20)
(4) production capacity expansion (01,02,04,06,07,08,11,15,16,17,20)
(5) competitive edge/quality (01,05,06,09,10,12,13,14,18,20)
(6) sources of capital (07,08,09,11,12,13,15,16,20)
(7) business space expansion (03,04,08,09,11,13,15,19)
(8) business diversification (03,04,08,11,14,16,18,20)
(9) capital expenditure (06,07,12,13,15,18,20)
(10) research & development (05,06,09,10,20)
01) manpower & training (01,02,07,08,15,18)
(12) enterprise class promotion (01,03,07,16)
The product/market strategies and joint-venture business (a means of raising capital for 
maintenance and growth)6 are the most important long-term plans as viewed by the 20 SOEs. 
More details of the above long-term plans and their operations are described under Section 5.4 
of the 20 Data Analyses in Volume 3 (especially the appendix from pp.208-220) .
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.4.2.
(a) Lower central planning influence affects the listed department store SDS 1(11), the listed
cleaning consumable manufacturer GLIL(16), the flour manufacturer (shareholding) 
GNFF(07) and the beverage manufacturer XLIG(17). They belong to the retailing and 
consumable product industries having better financial performance than the other SOEs
6 These 3 strategies plus the competitive edge/quality(5) are the four most important 
economic plans promulgated by the State Commission for Economics and Trade in the 9th 
National Plan (1996-2000). (See Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Newspaper on 26 October 1996.)
191
Ch. 5 : Analysis of Data II 
in this study (see Section 5.4 of Data Analysis 3 in Volume 3 [pp. 65-68]).
(b) Among the 20 SOEs, the iron and steel manufacturer SSW5(01) has been subject to the 
highest central or external influence on long-term planning mainly because the government 
authority, Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, of this industry keeps tight macroeconomic 
controls in order to balance the production volumes and mixes, products import and 
export, buying and selling prices, and competition with the foreign counterparts7 during 
the 1990s (see Section 1 of Data Analysis 1 in Volume 3 [pp.2-3]).
(c) Apart from (a) and (b) above, the other 15 SOEs have been under moderate governmental 
influences on their long-term planning operation since 1992.
5.4.3 Participation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.4.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The governmental influences (external dimension) on the long-term planning in the 20 SOEs and 
the degrees of participation by their top managements have been briefly mentioned in Section 
5.4.2 above (see Section 5.4 of Case Analysis 15 in Volume 2 [pp.359-360]).
As far as the internal dimension is concerned, the involvement from middle management (e.g. 
responsibility centre managers) in formulating the long-term plans was limited to consultation only 
in most of the SOEs before 1992. In recent years, some SOEs (e.g. SSW5(01), GNFB(08), 
SDS1(11), etc.) have established formal planning committees and invited the centre managers to 
participate in the formation, evaluation, monitor and review of the long-term plans although they 
seldom initiated changes but mainly concerned the impact on their annual budgets and internal 
responsibility contracts which they are measured on.
Two contrasting examples of internal participation in long-term planning can be seen in Section
5.4 of Data Analyses 2 and 16 respectively in Volume 3 [pp.37-40 & pp.520-523].
7 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 22 October 1996.
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(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.4.3.
(a) Similar to 5.4.2(B)(a) above, the two consumable product manufacturers (i.e. GLIL(16), 
XLIG(17)) have the least internal influences on long-term planning.
(b) Contrary, a department store GDDS(04) is using a top-down approach in long-term 
planning with little involvement from the store managers or they are just limited to 
consultation only. The senior management group assumes the middle and lower 
management only care about the internal responsibility contracts because the incentive 
scheme is directly related to some financial and service targets. That is why its long-term 
internal planning influence is the highest.
(c) The long-term planning influences (internal dimension) on the other 17 SOEs are in the 
middle of the road with medium planning scores (i.e. 2.0-2.5).
5.4.4 Review & Communication
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.4.4 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Before 1992, in most of the 20 SOEs, the 5-year long-term plans were reviewed annually by the 
government authorities with the top management of the SOEs and changes made were notified 
to the various levels of management during the Annual Employees Congress in which all the 
employees could attend.
After 1992, in some of the 20 SOEs, the senior management groups or the planning committees 
in some cases, review the long-term plans every year before the annual planning cycle started and 
significant changes are reported to the government authorities for endorsement, and sometimes 
assistance such as seeking a long-term bank loan is required (see Section 5.5 of Data Analysis 1 
in Volume 3 [pp. 13-14]). A summary of long-term plans is reported to the Annual Employees 
Congress for wholly SOEs and the AGM for shareholding enterprises. Some enterprises (e.g. 
SSW5(01), XLFT(02), BEEF(05), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) prefer to describe their long-term 
plans in documents and booklets for limited circulation. Because of the fast changing market 
conditions and technology advancement, most of the enterprises review their long-term plans
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twice every year (e.g. SMCW(06), GNFF(07), BCRF(09), SCCW(12), SMEF(13), SCM2(14), 
GLIL(16), XLIG(17), BCM3(18), BFSH(19), BPMH(20)).
Again see Section 5.4 ofData Analyses 2 and 16 in Volume 3 [pp.37-40 & pp.520-523] for two 
different examples due to different types of business and ownership.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.4.4.
(a) The planning influence (both external and internal) is the least for the 4 department stores 
(i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) and the flour manufacturer GNFF(07) 
for similar reasons as explained before.
(b) The machinery and equipment manufacturing enterprises (i.e. XFLT(02), BEEF(05), 
BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), SCCW(12)) and the iron and steel manufacturing enterprises (i.e. 
SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) are subject to the highest planning influences mainly because of 
their downturn economic performance and specific macroeconomic control policies.
5.5 SHORT-TERM PLANS/BUDGETS
As explained in the above four sections (5.1-5.4) in this chapter, the government has been 
fostering less planning influence on the SOEs since the 1990s especially from 1992 after the 
promulgations of operation mechanisms transformation and socialist market economy which are 
supposed to delegate higher autonomy to the enterprise management and make the SOEs to be
(1) self-operated; (2) self-financed; (3) self-developed; and (4) self-regulated. To achieve these 
objectives, the government departments or authorities have relied on the SOEs to formulate, 
control, evaluate and review their short-term plans or budgets.
With less and less government influences on the short-term planning, some SOEs’ top 
managements have invited higher budget participation from the middle management or 
responsibility centre managers including their subordinates (lower management). The extent of 
participation depends on many factors some of which are mentioned as follows:
(1) intensity of macroeconomic control — lower participation by middle/unit managers in 
Beijing because of tighter government control;
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(2) form of ownership ~ higher participation in shareholding enterprises because of almost 
full autonomy delegated to the board of directors;
(3) type of industry -  higher participation in retailing business because of fierce competition 
and frontline interactions with customers;
(4) market conditions -- lower participation in iron and steel works because of fluctuation in 
marketing factors such as price, supply and demand;
(5) financial performance -- lower participation in downturn industry such as machine and 
equipment manufacturing;
(6) relationship between budgets and internal responsibility contracts ~  lower participation 
when high correlation between the two;
(7) management knowledge in budgeting — higher participation with better education and 
training; and
(8) use of computers — higher participation with better usage of computers.
Superficially, the budgeting process practised currently by these 20 SOEs is similar to the 
conventional steps described in the management accounting textbooks and equivalent to practice 
in the western countries (a master budget example is described from pp.287-294 in Volume 3). 
But when probing into the substance of this process, the roles of budgeting in terms of 
authorization, coordination, communication and accuracy are different from the western concepts 
because of the impacts from the external and internal factors as listed before this paragraph.
During an interview with the chief accountant of a steel work in Shanghai in September 1994, he 
demonstrated to the researcher how to estimate the profit and loss budget for the whole enterprise 
for the next year in about 20 minutes! It is no doubt that “budgeting” has tremendous potential 
for management accounting research in China.
The planning influences in respect of “short-term planning” from (1) the government on the 
enterprises (external dimension); and (2) the enterprise management on the different responsibility 
centres (internal dimension) are measured on the following 4 criteria :
5.5.1 Central Planning;
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5.5.2 Operation;
5.5.3 Participation; and
5.5.4 Review and Communication.
The results of these 4 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 4 sections 
(i.e. 5.5.1-4) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 5.5.
(a) For most of the 20 SOEs, the planning influences have been changing from high/medium 
(scores 1.6-2.5) to medium/low (scores 2.6-3.5) since 1992 indicating that the top 
managements are really responsible for the short-term planning or budgeting process 
which also involve the participation from various lower levels of management in the 
enterprises see Section 5.5 of Case Analysis 1 in Volume 2 [pp. 13-14]).
(b) Just 4 SOEs (i.e. BEEF(05), SCCW(12), SXSW(15), BFSH(19)) are subject to higher 
planning influences from the government authorities and in turn they are reluctant to allow 
higher participation from the middle and lower management. Possible reasons are 
explained in the following sections.
5.5.1 Central Planning
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.5.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
During the first ten years of economic reform started in the late 1970s, the government used 
various means (e.g. legislations, policies, direct control and involvement, etc.) to achieve the 5- 
year national planning goals and maintain an overall stable economic growth in the country. 
Inevitably, the government authorities were still involved in the short-term planning or budgeting 
process in the SOEs by providing guidelines or major targets derived from the 5-year long-term 
plans. Under these circumstances, the annual plans or budgets submitted by the enterprise 
managements were subject to negotiation and compromise with the respective government 
authorities.
As mentioned in Section 5.5 above, the government authorities have devolved much greater 
autonomy to the SOEs in their short-term planning or budgeting process in order to actualize the
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mechanisms transformation legislation implemented since July 1992. However, to cool down the 
overheated economic expansion since the beginning of 1990s, the central government has 
instituted 16 macroeconomic control measures some of which have important or critical bearings 
on the SOE’s budgets (e.g. interest rate, bank credits, capital investment, foreign exchange, etc.). 
To this end, some government authorities (e.g. textiles, iron and steel, machine and equipment, 
etc.) have to provide specific suggestions (i.e. production volume and mix, inventory level, sales 
and profit level, etc.) to their SOEs in order to ensure the control measures can take effect.
With less governmental planning influence on a SOE, the possible involvement and participation 
from the middle and lower management in the short-term planning or budgeting process would 
be higher as shown in Section 5.5.3.
(B) Observations form the High-Low Chart 5.5.1.
(a) The Shanghai municipal government has delegated full autonomy to the board of directors 
of the department store, SDS1(11), which has demonstrated substantial sales and profit 
growth since listing in 1992 and entered some potential and promising projects such as 
establishing the largest department store in Asia in collaboration with Japanese Yohan 
Department Store (opened in Pudong, Shanghai in December 1995).
(b) Moderate planning influence (score 3.0) can be seen in most of the SOEs in Beijing (i.e. 
BEEF(05), BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), BFSH(19)) and a few SOEs in Shanghai (i.e. 
SSW5(01), SCCW(12), SXSW(15)) which have some typical characteristics as suggested 
in Section 5.3(B)(b).
5.5.2 Operation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.5.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Under a more open market situation, most of the SOEs in this study adopt a general short term 
planning policy called “production determined by sales” which means sales is the initial driving 
force of all the activities (see Section 5.5 of Data Analysis 1 in Volume 3 [pp. 15-16]). Sales 
forecast is the primary budgeting or limiting factor as described by many management accounting 
textbooks.
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Section 5.2.2 above has briefly described the annual planning or budgeting process adopted in 
most of the 20 SOEs. For more details and specific examples, see Section 5.5 of Data Analyses 
2,3,12 & 14 in Volume 3 [pp.41-42, pp.69-71, pp.372-378 & pp.463-464],
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.5.2.
All the 20 SOEs have experienced less and less central planning influences on their budgeting 
operation since 1992, and in turn they have formalised and standardised their annual planning or 
budgeting exercise as far as possible. Listed below are some factors affecting the sophistication 
of short-term planning in these 20 SOEs :
(1) importance and priority perceived by top management;
(2) timing and duration allowed for this exercise;
(3) existence of formal and informal planning committee;
(4) involvement of accounting personnel and their expertise;
(5) information and data base available; and
(6) application of computer.
It is interesting to note that those large SOEs (e.g. SSW5(01), SMEF(13), SCM2(14), 
SXSW(15), BCM3(18), BFSH(19), BPMH(20)) which have higher top management influence 
on the annual planning or budgeting process, perhaps this is due to their sheer size of organisation 
and functional structure and workforce, and complexity in operation and management (see 
Sections 3 & 5.5 of Case Analysis 18 in Volume 2 [pp.431-432 & 440-441]).
5.5.3 Participation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.5.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Since the mid-1980s when the top managements of the 20 SOEs have assumed higher autonomy 
in formulating their annual plans or budgets, a top-down approach has been used internally. The 
middle management or responsibility centre managers were asked to discuss and compromise the 
budgets provided by the top management without much room for negotiation and effective 
communication.
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Turning into the 1990s, the implementation of internal responsibility contracts (which will be 
discussed in Section 5.6 below) and the mechanisms transformation legislation have changed the 
budgeting style by getting the divisional or centre managers’ active involvement in compiling the 
annual plans or budgets. Usually guidelines in terms of production volume and mix, sales volume 
and mix, inventory and expense levels, etc. are provided by the top management for the centre 
managers to formulate their own budgets and get the lower management involved in working out 
the details. Then iterative discussions and negotiations are carried out until all types of budgets 
are determined and finally approved by the Annual Employees Congress or AGM (see Section 5.5 
of Data Analysis 2 in Volume 3 [pp.41-42]).
This change of budgeting style maintains better understandings between the different levels of 
management at least to work out a set of more realistic budgets which are acceptable by the 
divisions or departments to be measured against.
As observed in the department stores of this research (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), 
SDS1(11)), the selling units are treated as profit centres with higher independence. More formal 
and rigorous meetings and processes are used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans or budgets between the headquarters and store (centre) managers (see pp.69-70 of Volume 
3). In such a competitive and dynamic retailing market having the largest population in the world, 
the top management has to rely on the profit centres to interact with and sell to the customers. 
Within the broad strategic themes and thrusts, the store managers are allowed to employ some 
short-term tactics, such as sales promotion, price cutting, special customer services, to attain the 
ultimate financial targets (e.g. turnover and internal profit).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.5.3.
(a) High internal participation (score 3.5) from the middle/lower management in the
budgeting process has been observed in 16 SOEs since 1992.
(b) The other 4 SOEs (i.e. BEEF(05), SCCW(12), SXSW(15), BFSH(19)) are in between
the medium and low internal planning influence (score 3.0) because of the following 
reasons:
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(1) BEEF (05) — small workforce and loss-making need closer budgetary control;
(2) SCCW(12) — keen competition and tight ERC terms;
(3) SXSW(15) ~  specific directions to increase turnover and cut costs with significant
redundant employees; and
(4) BFSH(19) — simple service operations, tight ERC terms and have redundant
employees.
(c) SSW5(01) has shown significant increase in budget participation in recent years due to:
(1) changing the production factories into profit centres;
(2) fierce competition and fast changing market conditions;
(3) flexible terms in the ERC; and
(4) promotion of management training.
5.5.4 Review & Communication
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.5.4 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The budgeting cycles practised in these 20 SOEs, especially the large enterprises, are relatively
short compared with companies of similar sizes in the western countries. A typical annual 
planning cycle is less than five months starting from the last quarter of a year to approving in the 
first quarter of next calendar year. The general insufficient management training and application 
of computers for various levels of managers have resulted in less sophistication in the budgeting 
exercise. For examples, inadequate support to key budgeting factors, lack of coordination 
between the budgets and inability to employ flexible budgets are frequently discovered in these 
20 SOEs.
Before 1992, the annual plans or budgets were reviewed in the middle of the year and 
amendments were seldom made except under significant environmental changes such as inflation 
and drop in sales. The budgets were translated into terms and conditions of the internal 
responsibility contracts which must be documented and communicated to almost every employee 
concerned (see Section 5.5 of Case Analysis 15 in Volume 2 [pp.361-362]).
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To increase the budget participation and cope with the dynamic market changes since 1992, the 
annual plans and budgets are reviewed at least quarterly or even monthly and amendments are 
made due to unavoidable internal and external factors (see Section 5.5 of Case Analysis 16 in 
Volume 2 [pp.389-390]). Fixed budget concept is still the main thrust but flexible budgeting is 
accepted by some SOEs which have been using computers more extensively. More formal budget 
meetings or committees and budget books have been deployed by some SOEs (e.g. SSW5(01), 
XFLT(02), SDS1(11), GLIL(16), BPMH(20)). The Annual Employees Congress or AGM is the 
usual occasion to explain the key budget areas to the employees.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.5.4.
(a) Similar to 5.5.3(B)(a) above, since 1992 high participation (score 3.5) in budget review
and communication from the middle/lower management has been observed in 12 SOEs 
which include all the SOEs in Guangzhou and Xiamen indicating that they have higher 
planning autonomy on the one hand but are facing more volatile market conditions in 
these special economic zones on the other hand.
(b) The other 8 SOEs are in between the medium and low internal planning influence (score 
3.0). They are located in Beijing and Shanghai and subject to some constraints such as 
tighter macroeconomic control measures and economic downturn in their industries (see 
Section 1 of Data Analysis 14 in Volume 3 [pp.445-447 & special notes pp.467-469]).
5.6 INTERNAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS (IRC)
In practice, Internal Responsibility Contract (IRC) is an extension of the Economic Responsibility 
Contract (ERC) of which the latter is an agreement between the government authority and a SOE 
as mentioned in Section 2.15.1 of Chapter 2. The major financial targets (i.e. production 
volume/mix, turnover, profit, etc.) determined in the ERC will usually be segregated down the 
organisational hierarchy to the responsibility centres such as production workshops, sales and 
purchasing departments, tertiary enterprises (businesses other than the core business), etc. This 
approach of sharing the overall economic targets of a SOE is reflected in the IRCs agreed and
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signed between the top management and the respective centre managers.
In parallel with the promulgation of ERC since the mid-1980s, all the 20 SOEs in this study have 
implemented their IRCs in the following years :
SOE Code Year SOE Code Year SOE Code Year SOE Code Year
SSW5(01) 1985 SMCW(06) 1991 SD Sl(ll) 1985 GLIL(16) 1986
XFLT(02) 1987 GNFF(07) 1989 SCCW(12) 1989 XLIG(17) 1994
GFDS(03) 1984 GNFB(08) 1989 SMEF(13) 1989 BCM3(18) 1988
GDDS(04) 1987 BCRF(09) 1991 SCM2(14) 1993 BFSH(19) 1988
BEEF(05) 1993 BIMT(IO) 1992 SXSW(15) 1988 BPMH(20) 1993
GFDS(03) was one of the first few pilot SOEs in Guangzhou testing the usefulness of the IRC 
application. Subsequently, it was found that this kind of internal delegation of responsibilities as 
well as authorities was particularly effective in the retailing industry such as department stores 
(e.g. GFDS(03)).
Going hand in hand with the annual planning and budgeting process, higher participation from the 
responsibility centres in formulating their IRCs can be observed in recent years. Perhaps the 
greater the linkage between the performance (both financial and non-financial) and remuneration 
(wages and bonus), the higher will be the participation in IRC design and negotiation, but of 
course this proposition is subject to future research in the Chinese enterprises.
The planning influence in respect of IRC from the enterprise top management on the different 
responsibility centres (internal dimension only) is measured on the following 4 criteria :
5.6.1 Target Bias;
5.6.2 Participation;
5.6.3 Review & Communication; and
5.6.4 Incentive.
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The results of these 4 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 4 sections 
(i.e. 5.6.1-4) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 5.6.
(a) Planning influence is significantly less on the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), 
GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) because greater reliance on the selling units, who are 
interacting with the customers directly all the times, to promote the sales and control the 
costs to achieve the profit targets. These unit managers should feel comfortable with the 
targets agreed in the IRC. On the other hand, the top management uses the linkage 
between the performance and bonus as leverage to motivate the unit managers.
(b) SSW5(01) and SXSW(15) are the two large iron and steel works who have given more 
freedom to their production and servicing units to formulate their own IRCs mainly 
because of minimizing the goal congruent disputes and keeping a steady operation in order 
to cope with the environmental uncertainties affecting this industry in recent years.
(c) Since Xiamen is a special economic zone, more favourable and open economic policies, 
in particular after 1992, have been granted to the SOEs operating there. Therefore, the 
two SOEs (i.e. XFLT(02), XLIG(17)) are subject to less planning influence from the 
municipal government, and in turn they are able to give a free hand for their responsibility 
centres to set the terms and conditions in the IRCs.
5.6.1 Target Bias
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.6.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Before 1992, the major quantitative targets in the IRCs of these 20 SOEs were production volume 
and mix, and standard costs while qualitative targets such as safety and quality, which had veto 
effects on the bonus determination, were also defined (see Section 5.6 of Data Analysis 5 in 
Volume 3 [pp. 123-124]). The IRC system was largely applied to the production units.
For the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11)), the key targets 
set in their IRCs were sales, profit and foreign exchange created (see Section 5.6 of Data Analyses 
3 & 4 in Volume 3 [pp.71-72 & pp.96-99]).
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Since 1992, many responsibility centres of the 20 SOEs have been changed into profit centres, 
then internal profit has become the key financial target in the IRCs (see Section 5.6 of Data 
Analysis 7 in Volume 3 [pp. 193-199]). The following quantitative targets are also found in these 
IRCs (see Section 5.6 of Data Analyses 6 & 12 in Volume 3 [pp. 156-160 & pp.379-387]) :
(1) production value;
(2) input/output ratio;
(3) energy consumption;
(4) working capital;
(5) inventory level;
(6) accounts receivable; and
(7) gross wages.
In addition, the following qualitative targets are also common to many of these 20 SOEs (see 
Section 5.6 of Data Analyses 15 & 18 in Volume 3 [pp.493-495 & pp. 577-579]) :
CD production technology;
(2) product quality;
(3) new product development;
(4) facility and equipment condition;
(5) repair and maintenance;
(6) management technique; and
(7) human resource management.
Detailed terms and conditions, such as the authorities and responsibilities of both the contractor 
and contractee, are also explicitly written down in the IRC (see Section 5.6 of Data Analyses 10, 
13 & 19 in Volume 3 [pp.316-320, pp.423-429 & 602-607]). In some SOEs the ERC system has 
been extended to the service departments such as technical support, sales and purchasing (see 
Section 5.6 of Data Analysis 2 in Volume 3 [pp.42-45]).
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By converting the production workshops back to cost centres in 1993, SCCW(12) has been using 
equivalent standard hour of output, material usage, product quality, operation management and 
production facility as the quantitative targets in their IRCs (see Section 5.6 of Data Analysis 12 
in Volume 3 [pp.379-387]). BCRF(09) has set some unique qualitative targets like environmental 
protection, standard compliance, employee training and family planning.
The 4 department stores have put more emphasis on some customer oriented targets such as 
service quality, discipline, decoration, display, sanity, daily operation, security, free delivery and 
after sales service. This is in response to the strategic theme of “customer is number one”!
(B) Observations from the High/Low Chart 5.6.1.
(a) For those 9 SOEs (in particular the 4 department stores) having a higher score of 3.0, 
they have simpler financial target(s) such as internal profit, and use more flexible 
qualitative targets like customer services, product quality, new product development and 
quality of management (see Section 5.6 of Case Analysis 4 in Volume 2 [pp.83-84]).
(b) While the other 11 SOEs (in particular the 5 SOEs in Beijing) are still using more 
traditional economic targets such as production volume, value, mix and cost. They also 
stress the minimum requirements on quality and safety.
5.6.2 Participation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.6.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
As a motivation factor in the IRC, the implementation of its targets is usually linked with the gross 
wages and bonus to be awarded to the corresponding workshop or department measured on a 
monthly, quarterly and yearly basis (see Section 5.6 of Data Analysis 16 in Volume 3 [pp.525- 
527]). According to the Expectancy Theory, the existence of this reward valence would induce 
the centre or unit managers to participate in negotiating the IRC targets with the top management.
205
Ch. 5 : Analysis of Data II
Before the promulgation of operation mechanisms transformation in 1992, the ERC was rather 
rigid in a sense that the top management or contractee of each SOE would strive to attain the 
major targets (e.g. turnover and profit) by all means. Further, the total remuneration to 
employees in every year and even the reappointment of the top management (e.g. factory manager 
or general manager) at the end of the contract period are also tied up with the achievement of the 
targets stipulated in the ERC. Therefore, in addition to the strategic themes and thrusts 
promulgated in the whole enterprise, specific suggestions to the responsibility centres during the 
annual planning or budgeting process are given as mentioned in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.5.3 above.
The internal planning influence from the top management to the responsibility centres on the 
annual planning or budgeting process would affect the targets set in the IRC because the latter 
is a subset of the former. Under the guidelines provided by the top management, the centre 
managers had to negotiate and compromise the IRC targets during the annual planning cycle.
The accelerated shareholding transformation process since 1992 and the new taxation system 
implemented in January 1994 have blurred the unique features of the ERC which is being phased 
out in some well-performing SOEs (e.g. retailing and consumable manufacturing industries) as 
noted in Tables 1A-E and explained in Section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4. By playing down or reducing 
the rigidity of the targets stipulated in the ERC, the top management of a wholly SOE can leave 
greater flexibility in setting the budget and IRC with the responsibility centres.
Speaking to the top management and senior managers in these 20 SOEs, it was indicated that in 
some cases, the centre managers have to initiate the major IRC targets before negotiating with 
the top management. More goal congruence arguments will occur when the performance-based 
wages and incentive scheme are discussed in setting the IRC.
All in all, as cited by a few interviewees in this study, the responsibility centres have been more 
proactive or sometime over-reactive in setting the terms and conditions in their IRCs. To 
maintain a holistic view of an enterprise, top management may exercise the overriding right to fix 
some key targets in the IRCs. But looking from the perspective of behavioural theory in 
budgeting, setting “aggressive” goals can harm the initiation and motivation of the centre 
managers. This concept may be more applicable in the planning and budgeting topics for the
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SOEs in China in view of the “slack” or “big rice pot” convention adopted for decades. Of 
course, the verification of this proposition is subject to intensive empirical research in the future.
(B) Observations from High-Low Chart 5.6.2.
(a) Reasons for 7 SOEs having higher participation from the middle management in setting
IRCs are suggested as follows :
(1) SSW5(01)
(2) XFLT(02)
(3) GDDS(04)
(4) GNFB(08)
(5)
(6)
SD Sl(ll)
SXSW(15)
(7) XLIG(17)
Stability is important to manage such a huge enterprise having 
over 23,000 employees. Top management has to balance the 
diverse goals of various groups through compromises in the IRCs. 
Xiamen is a special economic zone enjoying more favourable and 
open economic policies. Terms and conditions in the ERC are 
flexible and exert less pressure on the XFLT(02) which in turn 
exerts less internal planning influence in setting the IRCs.
The rapid growth in turnover and business expansion require 
higher participation in setting the IRCs in order to enhance greater 
commitment from the department stores.
Similar to GDDS(04) and in addition, the diversified tertiary 
enterprises (e.g. hotel, cargo store, restaurant) should be 
monitored by the IRC better.
Similar to GNFB(08) and subject to higher financial pressure since 
listed.
Substantial redundant employees reveals the entrenched power of 
the labour force who concern very much on the terms and 
conditions in the IRC.
This enterprise is a merger of 5 SOEs manufacturing consumable 
products. IRC is an acceptable means to balance the needs and 
resource allocations of different divisions.
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(b) Reasons for 3 SOEs having lower participation from the middle management in setting
IRCs are suggested as follows :
(1) BEEF(05) Loss-making for a couple of years has led a “life or death”
problem in this SOE which needs tighter directives and 
cooperation in setting the IRC.
(2) BCRF(09) Similar to BEEF(05) and in addition the chief executive has
changed hands three times in four years.
(3) BIMT(IO) A typical traditional wholly SOE under close government
supervision, party secretary influence and enterprise politics.
5.6.3 Review & Communication
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.6.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The frequency of reviewing the IRCs in these 20 SOEs depends on the following factors :
(1) changes in government legislations, policies and procedures;
(2) review and amendment to the annual plans or budgets;
(3) volatility of external economic conditions (e.g. market demand and supply);
(4) changes of internal limiting factors (e.g. production facilities); and
(5) changes in organisation structure and manpower planning.
Usually the IRCs are reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments can be made when 
mutually agreed by the top management and factory managers. Due to the variability of the 5 
factors above, some SOEs review their IRCs quarterly and amendments are made in order to 
reflect the rapid changing external factors such as inflation and maintain attainable targets.
Second-tier IRCs are signed between the factory manager and production line supervisors in some 
large SOEs (e.g. SSW5(01)) in order to delegate further the planning and control responsibilities 
to the lower levels of management.
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All the IRCs are expressed in the form of a written document which is usually in a standard format 
containing the following sections :
(1) Department and Duration
(2) Introduction and Guideline
(3) Responsibility Targets
3.1 Financial Targets
3.2 Production T argets
3.3 Management Targets
(4) Incentive Scheme
(5) Performance Evaluation
(6) Duties and Rights of Contractor (Top Management)
(7) Duties and Rights of Contractee (Centre Manager)
(8) Other Terms & Conditions (i.e. review and arbitration)
(9) Sign and Seal by Contractor and Contractee
Copies of these IRCs are distributed to respective departments for evaluation, reference and 
recording purposes. It is the responsibility of the centre/workshop/department managers to 
inform and explain the IRC’s terms and conditions to their subordinates.
Some interviewees in this study agree with the evidence that IRC is an effective way to achieve 
the short-term targets on the one hand and improve the budget communication between the 
different levels of management on the other hand. Furthermore, IRC can link performance with 
incentive scheme as a pre-determined means for resource (e.g. bonus, working capital, workforce, 
etc.) distribution among the responsibility centres within an enterprise.
However, the chief accountant of BCM3(19) in Beijing has reservation on this IRC system. He 
contends that the major drawback from the IRC model is “protectionism” in a sense that for a 
division or responsibility centre to ensure the accomplishment of its IRC targets and the monetary 
benefits for its employees, the divisional management or centre manager will act for his territory 
(or kingdom in his words) at the expense of the other division(s) or centre(s). In other words, the 
concept of “holistic” is lost and opportunistic behaviour or parochialism may occur. This is
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similar to the term “dysfunctional effect” explained in the management accounting literature (e.g. 
Merchant 1990; Jaworski & Young 1992).
(B) Observations from High-Low Chart 5.6.3.
(a) Because of the rapid changing and keen competition in the retailing market, the 4 
department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SD Sl(ll)) have to review 
their IRCs frequently and amend the key targets if necessary.
(b) The 2 iron and steel works (i.e. SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) also review their IRCs frequently 
due to fast changing external factors (i.e. prices, demand, supply, import and export of 
steel products) during recent years.
(c) The dynamic and open economic policies adopted in Xiamen require the SOEs there to 
be more flexible in operation, so that the IRCs have to be adjusted more often to cater for 
the internal and external environmental changes.
(d) The businesses of the 3 machine and equipment manufacturers in Beijing (i.e. BEEF(05), 
BCRF(09), BIMT(IO)) are declining. Caution has to be paid in settling and reviewing the 
IRCs in order to maintain a stable operation.
5.6.4 Incentive
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.6.4 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Incentive schemes are almost an indispensable part in the IRCs of these 20 SOEs. In fact, the 
philosophy of the Chinese IRC is to mingle responsibility with remuneration together to form a 
mechanism for achieving various functional targets (i.e. production value, sales, standard cost, 
internal profit, etc.) and the summation of which will fulfil the budgeted goals of the whole 
enterprise.
The gross wages and/or group bonus of a production workshop may depend on the 
accomplishment of the production volume and cost and/or internal profit as specified in the IRC 
on a monthly or quarterly basis. Similarly, the wages and bonus of a sales department are
2 1 0
Ch. 5 : Analysis of Data II 
calculated according to the levels of sales and/or accounts receivable as stipulated in the IRC.
Before 1992, a responsibility centre might fail to achieve the IRC targets because of some reasons 
such as :
(1) the centre managers did not participate much in setting the targets;
(2) some external factors (e.g. inflation, shortage of input materials, changes of product 
demand, etc.);
(3) unforeseen internal changes (e.g. production facility and technology, new product 
development, personnel turnover, etc.); and
(4) targets could not be amended to reflect the impacts from (2) and (3).
The increase in participation from the responsibility centres in formulating, reviewing and 
amending the IRCs since 1992 has encouraged the centre managers to initiate their own IRC 
targets in order to increase their remuneration under attainable standards. Other than the financial 
targets, some qualitative targets (i.e. production, operation, quality and safety management, 
education and training, family planning, repair and maintenance, customer service, etc.) are also 
linked with the bonus determination (see pp.243-246 in Volume 3).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.6.4.
(a) The qualitative targets (e.g. customer service levels) usually account for 30% of the bonus 
assessment in the four department stores of this study, therefore, less planning influence 
is exerted from the top management on the IRCs in order to make them flexible.
(b) The heavy emphasis on “product quality” to determine the wages and bonus in some 
SOEs (i.e. SSW5(01), XFLT(02), BEEF(05)) also leads to less planning influence in 
respect of IRC formulation.
(c) Higher planning influence exerted on or more rigid economic targets set in the IRCs still 
exist in some rather traditional, tighter control and under-performing SOEs (i.e. 
SCCW(12), SMEF(13), SCM2(14), BCM3(18), BFSH(19), BPMH(20)).
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5.7 MANAGEMENT OF INTERDEPENDENCIES (TRANSFER PRICING)
According to Goold and Campbell (1991: 39), central influence in the form of broad thrusts or 
specific suggestions is exercised particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
businesses or divisions need to be managed. The coordination of functional strategies; cross- 
supply and transfer pricing between units in a vertically integrated chain; sharing or transfer of 
expertise; exploitation of a shared resource lead to opportunities for intervention. The extent of 
overlaps is determined largely by decisions on the divisional and business structure of the 
company. The degree of influence which the central exerts, however, is a function of how active 
headquarters’ managers want to be in resolving the overlap issues.
Planning influence in respect of “management of interdependencies” in 10 SOEs (including the 
4 department stores and the hotel) of this study is not measured because of the following reasons:
Enterprise Code Reasons
1. XFLT(02) Internal transfers are determined by top management and the 
production workshops are measured against production volume 
and cost without any mark-up.
2. GFDS(03) All department stores are independent with very minimal 
interactions and interdependencies.
3. GDDS(04) Same as GFDS(03).
4. GNFF(07) Each flour production workshop is independent in manufacturing 
its own products without any transfer to other factories.
5. GNFB(08) Same as GFDS(03).
6. SD Sl(ll) Same as GFDS(03).
7. SCCW(12) The production workshops are manufacturing their own products 
without any interactions with the other workshops.
8. GLIL(16) Same as SCCW(12).
9. XLIG(17) Same as SCCW(12).
10 BFSH(19) All the departments are independent with very minimal 
interactions with other departments.
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For the other 10 SOEs, the planning influence in respect of “management of interdependencies” 
from the enterprise top management on the different responsibility centres (internal dimension 
only) is measured on the following 3 criteria :
5.7.1 Characteristics;
5.7.2 Participation; and
5.7.3 Review.
The results of these 3 yardsticks measured on the 10 SOEs are described in the next 3 sections 
(i.e. 5.7.1-3) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 5.7.
(a) The printing machines manufacturer BPMH(20) has the least central planning influence 
mainly because some internal transfers (i.e. sales commission, repair and maintenance, 
research and development, trademark using right, etc.) between BPMH(20) and its 
holding company BGC have to be discussed and negotiated at arms-length.
(b) The reasons for less central planning influence on the textile industry (i.e. SCM2(14),
BCM3(18)) and machinery and equipment industry (i.e. BIMT(IO), BCM3(18)) will be 
explained in Section 5.7.3(B) below.
(c) The main reasons for higher central planning influence in SMCW(06) will be explained in
Section 5.7.2(B)(c) below.
5.7.1 Characteristics
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.7.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
To assess the planning influences on the “interdependencies” in the 10 SOEs (all manufacturing 
concerns), seven characteristics (or parameters) have been used and are summarised as follow:
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SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
SSW5(01) All 16 production factories involved All 16 production factories involved
BEEF(05) Production & service workshops 
involved
Production & service workshops 
involved
SMCW(06) Production & service workshops 
involved
Production & service workshops 
involved
BCRF(09) Production workshop involved only Production workshops involved only
BIMT(IO) Production & service departments 
involved
Production & service departments 
involved
SMEF(13) Production & service departments 
involved
Production & service departments 
involved
SCM2(14) Production & service departments 
involved
Production & service departments 
involved
SXSW(15) All 7 production factories involved All 7 production factories involved
BCM3(18) Production & service departments 
involved
Production & service departments 
involved
BPMH(20) Production & service departments 
involved
Production/service departments & 
Holding Company involved
(2) Transfer Price Basis
SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
SSW5(01) Standard cost plus profit margin Adjusted market price
BEEF(05) Standard cost (historical + inflation) Standard cost + fixed profit margin
SMCW(06) Standard cost (historical + inflation) Market price less internal discount
BCRF(09) Actual cost of production Historical cost plus 16% as standard 
cost
BIMT(IO) Standard cost of production Standard cost plus & adjusted 
market price
SMEF(13) Standard cost and standard cost plus Market price less internal discount
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SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
SCM2(14) Standard cost and standard cost plus Market price less internal discount
SXSW(15) Standard cost Standard cost
BCM3(18) Standard cost Standard cost
BPMH(20) Standard cost plus Standard cost plus & % of sales or 
profit
(3) Transfer Price Negotiation
SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
SSW5(01) A little between the buyer and seller Some negotiations are allowed
BEEF(05) Very little between buyer and seller Some negotiations are allowed
SMCW(06) Very little between buyer and seller Some negotiations are allowed
BCRF(09) All determined by the top mgt. Little negotiations are allowed
BIMT(IO) Some negotiations for buyer/seller More negotiations for buyer/seller
SMEF(13) Very little between buyer and seller Some negotiations are allowed
SCM2(14) Very little between buyer and seller Some negotiations are allowed
SXSW(15) A little between the buyer and seller Some negotiations are allowed
BCM3(18) All determined by the top mgt. Very little between buyer and seller
BPMH(20) Mainly determined by the top mgt. Largely between buyer and seller
(4) Intermediate Product
SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
SSW5(01) Buy & sell were available in the 
market
Buy & sell are available in the 
market*
BEEF(05) Some buy & sell were available in 
the market
Some buy & sell are available in the 
market*
SMCW(06) Some buy & sell were available in 
the market
Some buy & sell are available in the 
market*
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SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
BCRF(09) Buy & sell were not available in the 
market
Buy & sell are not available in the 
market
BIMT(IO) Some buy & sell were available in 
the market
Some buy & sell are available in the 
market*
SMEF(13) Some buy & sell were available in 
the market
Some buy & sell are available in the 
market*
SCM2(14) Some buy & sell were available in 
the market
Some buy & sell are available in the 
market*
SXSW(15) Buy & sell were available in the 
market
Buy & sell are available in the 
market*
BCM3(18) Little buy & sell were available in 
the market
Some buy & sell are available in the 
market*
BPMH(20) Some buy & sell were available in 
the market
Some buy & sell are available in the 
market*
* First of all, the internal transfers must satisfy the needs of the manufacturing factories, and then 
any excess production can be sold to the external customers. Sometimes insufficient internal 
supplies are made up by purchasing from outside but approval is required from the purchasing 
department or top management in the headquarters.
(5) Transfer Quantity
SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
SSW5(01) All determined by the headquarters Excess output can be sold externally
BEEF(05) All determined by the top mgt. Excess service can be sold externally
SMCW(06) All determined by the top mgt. Excess service can be sold externally
BCRF(09) All determined by the top mgt. All sold internally
BIMT(IO) Mainly determined by the top mgt. Internal demands must be satisfied
SMEF(13) Mostly determined by the top mgt. Excess service can be sold externally
SCM2(14) Mostly determined by the top mgt. Excess output can be sold externally
SXSW(15) All determined by the headquarters Excess output can be sold externally
BCM3(18) All determined by the top mgt. Mostly determined by the top mgt.
BPMH(20) Mainly determined by the top mgt. Majority determined by the top mgt.
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SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
SSW5(01) Prices & quantities all determined by 
headquarters (HQ)
Mainly determined by HQ although 
negotiations are allowed
BEEF(05) Prices & quantities all determined by 
the top management (mgt.)
Mainly determined by top mgt. but 
negotiations are allowed
SMCW(06) Same as BEEF(05). Same as BEEF(05)
BCRF(09) Prices & quantities all determined by 
the top mgt.
Determined by the top mgt. with 
very limited negotiations
BIMT(IO) Prices & quantities mainly 
determined by the top mgt.
Decisions required by top mgt. to 
settle unresolved negotiations
SMEF(13) Prices & quantities mainly 
determined by the top mgt.
Mainly determined by the top mgt. 
although negotiations are allowed
SCM2(14) Same as SMEF(13). Same as SMEF(13)
SXSW(15) Prices and quantities all determined 
by the top mgt.
Mainly determined by the top mgt. 
although negotiations are allowed
BCM3(18) Prices and quantities all determined 
by the top mgt.
Mainly determined by the top mgt. 
with little negotiations
BPMH(20) Prices & quantities mainly 
determined by the top mgt.
Top mgt. made decisions on 
unresolved negotiations
(7) Government Influence
SOE Code Before 1992 After 1992
BPMH(20) No, only suggested output volumes 
and selling prices of products
Not at all, concern overall profit of 
the whole enterprise
All the other 
SOEs are 
the same
No, except the output volumes & 
selling prices of the final products
No, only suggest volumes and prices 
of the final products
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(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.7.1.
(a) There are many internal transfer of products and services between the BPMH(20) (a listed 
enterprise) and its holding company BGC (a wholly SOE) transacted at arm’s-length 
according to mutually agreed contracts signed between the two entities. Therefore, open 
discussions and negotiations on the terms of the internal transfer are carried out by the 
two parties at least once every year during the planning process. (For details, see Section
5.7 ofData Analysis 20 in Volume 3 [pp.640-642]). Internally, BPMH(20) allows certain 
degree of freedom for its production factories to determine the transfer quantities and 
prices, and selling intermediate products externally.
(b) As shown in the above 7 parameters, SSW5(01), BEEF(05), SMCYV(06), BCRF(09) and 
SXSW(15) have higher internal planning influences on the responsibility centres from the 
top managements. The 2 iron and steel works (i.e. SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) are subject 
to volatile market conditions (e.g. inflation, product demand and supply, product import 
and export, etc.), and the other 3 wholly SOEs are affected by past poor financial 
performance. These are some reasons leading to tighter control on the internal transfer 
issues (see Section 5.7 of Case Analyses 1 in Volume 2 [pp. 17-18]).
5.7.2 Participation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.7.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Looking into the 7 characteristics or parameters as summarised in Section 5.7.1 above, it is noted 
that before 1992, in most of these 10 SOEs, nearly all the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the headquarters or top management and the responsibility centres were consulted 
sometimes. Any conflicts were arbitrated by the top management. For those centres which were 
not measured in terms of internal profit, they would not care much about the internal transfer 
issues since they were mainly accounted for on production volume and cost (see Section 5.7 of 
Case Analyses 1 & 5 in Volume 2 [pp. 17-18 & pp. 108-109]).
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The conversion into profit centres and promotion of operation mechanisms transformation since 
1992 have allowed the centre managers to discuss and negotiate the internal transfer quantities 
and prices although interference from and arbitration by the headquarters happens from time to 
time. For example, the senior accountant in SSW5(01) has mentioned that because of the demand 
and supply of steel products in the market which has been quite volatile in the 1990s, so the 
headquarters, having more market information, could make better decisions on the internal 
transfer issues.
Another important reason for this higher internal planning influence in general is that the internal 
transfer quantities and prices would affect the attainment of the targets in the IRC as well as the 
extrinsic rewards which are linked with the IRC’s performance. Therefore, the top management 
has to balance the internal transfer issues carefully in order to maintain acceptable performance 
evaluation for all responsibility centres and motivate their efforts.
(B) Observations from High-Low Chart 5.7.2.
(a) As explained in Section 5.7.1(B)(a), the printing machine manufacturer, BPMH(20), 
which is a listed enterprise, has higher participation in determining the transfer quantities 
and prices with its holding company (BGC) in terms of sales commission, maintenance 
fees, research and development charges, etc. Internally, the nature of production flow 
involves a lot of arguments on intermediate product transfers which must be settled down 
by both the buyers and sellers mutually. As a result, almost equal negotiation power has 
been delegated to each production centre although, sometimes, arbitration from the 
headquarters is necessary and unavoidable.
(b) Similar to (a) above, the nature of production flows in BIMT(IO), SMEF(13), SCM2(14) 
are interrelated among the production units which necessitates higher participation in 
setting the internal transfer quantities and prices. However, the production units of these 
3 wholly SOEs have long been subject to top managements’ interference on the transfer 
issues without much room for negotiation among the units (see Section 5.7 ofData 
Analysis 13 in Volume 3 [pp.429-432]).
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(c) In SMCW(06), the internal transfers related to the repair and maintenance, material 
preparation, heat treatment and electroplating services which quantities (satisfy internal 
demand first) and prices (market price less discount) are determined by the top 
management with little participation from the production workshops. As long as the 
transfer-in costs are below the market prices, the workshops will not care much about the 
transfer prices which account for just a small portion of their total costs.
5.7.3 Review
(A) Evidence reported in Section 5.7.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The second characteristic or parameter (i.e. transfer price basis) as tabled in Section 5.7.1 above 
shows that before 1992, the “standard cost” and “standard cost plus” were the most common 
bases adopted by these 10 SOEs. The standard costs used to set the transfer prices were 
determined during the annual planning exercise without getting much inputs from the middle 
management. They were usually calculated as historical cost plus inflation and profit margin. 
These standard costs were reviewed and amended, if necessary, twice every year. The transfer 
quantities would be adjusted more frequently due to the changes in production schedules.
From the same table, after 1992, market prices have been employed by some SOEs as references 
in setting the internal transfer prices. Some market prices are volatile such as the steel products 
manufactured by SSW5(01) and have to be reviewed more frequently. In SSW5(01), market 
prices are reviewed monthly and for any changes of plus or minus 5%, transfer prices will be 
adjusted by the headquarters in consultation with the production factories. But in some industries 
(e.g. machine and equipment manufacturing), where the market price information is insufficient 
and inaccurate to reflect reasonable transfer prices, then the standard cost basis is preferred.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 5.7.3.
(a) The purchase price changes of raw materials (e.g. cotton) and fluctuations of textile 
products supply and demand since the early 1990s have pushed the two textile mills (i.e. 
SCM2 and BCM3) to review their transfer prices and quantities more frequently and 
negotiations between the internal buyers and sellers have become more intensive.
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(b) Concerning the two machinery and equipment manufacturers, one (i.e. SMEF(13)) is
facing sales decline and the other (i.e. BPMH(20)) is accountable to more shareholders. 
They both have to adjust their internal transfer prices and quantities regularly in order to 
meet the IRC targets on the one hand and to accomplish the goals committed in the ERC 
or AGM on the other hand.
5.8 SUMMARY
5.8.0 Corporate Planning Influence
(1) All the 20 wholly and shareholding SOEs investigated in this study are subject to the 
supervision of their respective ministries, bureaus and councils under the State Council 
of the central government in Beijing as tabled in Section 5.0. They are also under the 
direction and administration of the local governments where they are located, (see 5.0)
(2) Since the economic reforms started in 1979, the enterprise management has been 
consulted by the government authorities in formulating the strategic or long-term plans, 
(see 5.0)
(3) The promulgation of market economy and SOE operation mechanisms transformation 
since 1992, and the significant restructuring of the State Council organisations in 1993 
have encouraged the initiation and involvement of the enterprise managements to 
formulate both their long- and short-term plans, (see 5.0)
(4) The 6 planning influence variables used by Goold and Campbell and 1 additional variable 
called “internal responsibility contract” are employed as variables to measure the overall 
planning influence from the government to enterprises (external dimension) and from 
enterprise managements to divisions or responsibility centres (internal dimension) of all 
the 20 SOEs in this study, (see 5.0)
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5.8.1 Organisation Structure
(5) The planning influences (external and internal combined) on the organisation structures
in the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) in
Guangzhou and Shanghai and 3 consumable product manufacturers (i.e. GNFF(07),
GLIL(16), XLIG(17)) are relatively less than the other enterprises. Except XLIG(17), 
which is an equity joint-venture, the other 6 SOEs are shareholding enterprises. They are 
located further away from the central government in Beijing, (see 5.1)
(6) The planning influences (external and internal combined) on the organisation structures 
in the other manufacturing enterprises, mainly wholly SOEs and located in Beijing and 
Shanghai, are comparatively higher than the retailing enterprises and consumable 
manufacturing enterprises as indicated in (5) above, (see 5.1)
(7) The overall increases in planning scores among these 20 SOEs, indicate that higher 
autonomy of internal organisational planning and control has been delegated to the 
responsibility centres since 1992. (see 5.1)
(8) Most of the 20 SOEs have converted their responsibility centres from cost centres to 
profit centres whose managers have been delegated higher autonomy in terms of setting 
transfer prices, cost management and production control. Most of the non-production 
functions and service departments are usually treated as “expense centres” under tight 
expense budgets which are either given by or agreed with the top management without 
extensive negotiation, (see 5.1.1)
(9) The selling departments or units of the 4 department stores have been treated as “profit 
centres” before and after 1992. They are held accountable for their bottom lines (i.e. 
internal profit) which are directly linked with the amount of group bonus, (see 5.1.1)
(10) Under the increasing delegation of planning, control and management autonomies from 
the government to the top management, and then to the operating units down through the 
organisational hierarchy, the economic responsibility lies with the top management who 
initiates and negotiates the terms and conditions of the ERC with the government
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authority. In turn, the internal operating units (e.g. factories and workshops) are 
responsible to fulfil their economic, financial and qualitative targets as agreed in their 
IRCs. (see 5.1.2)
(11) In addition to the turnover and profit targets as agreed in the IRCs, most of the store 
managers in the 4 department stores have been delegated certain strategic decisions in 
purchasing, selling, marketing, cost control and personnel, (see 5.1.2)
(12) The appointments of the “communist party secretary” and “enterprise chief executive” in 
these 20 SOEs are still decided or influenced by the government. The party secretary is 
the representative from the government to ensure some macro-economic and political 
policies are under control. In some wholly SOEs, the party secretaries are involved in the 
planning, control and decision making processes. After 1992, most of the top 
managements can appoint their senior management staff and the centre managers can 
decide their own organisation structures and personnel affairs but important changes 
should be approved by headquarters, (see 5.1.3)
(13) Before the operation mechanisms reform started in 1992, the quantities and costs of 
internal cross-supplies were largely determined by the top management after the centre 
managers had been consulted. However, in realising the autonomy delegation after 1992, 
most of the responsibility centres or operating units are allowed to negotiate the internal 
cross-supply transactions but interference and arbitration by the top management are 
involved. (See 5.1.4)
5.8.2 Review Process
(14) In parallel with the open-door policy and economic reform started in 1979, every 
manufacturing and servicing industry has to adopt a more rigorous, dynamic and flexible 
planning process in order to keep abreast with the fast changing technologies and markets. 
As a result, the enterprise management has been involved in the planning and review 
process with the government authorities since the 6th national plan (1981-1985). (see 5.2)
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(15) The promulgations of SOE operation mechanisms transformation and market economy 
since 1992 have further opened the door of planning participation for the enterprise 
management who can initiate their strategic or tactical plans on the one hand and have to 
formulate their own annual budgets on the other hand, (see 5.2)
(16) Before 1992, the enterprise long-term planning coincided with the national 5-year plan. 
For most of the 12 wholly SOEs in this research, their long-term plans were initiated, 
monitored, reviewed and modified by the government authorities while the enterprise 
managements were only consulted, (see 5.2.1)
(17) With regard to the shareholding enterprises, the governmental influence on the long-term 
planning is less than the wholly SOEs because the board of directors has assumed this 
responsibility although the government’s representative (e.g. communist party secretary 
appointed by the State Assets Administration Bureau) is usually sitting on the board and 
a certain external planning influence can still be exerted. (See 5.2.1)
(18) As observed in these 20 case studies, it seems that the government authorities have 
delegated the annual planning or budgeting exercise to the enterprise managements since 
1992 irrespective of the form of ownership these SOEs are. (see 5.2.1)
(19) Before 1992, the annual planning or budgeting process did not involve much participation 
from the middle or lower management in most of the 12 wholly SOEs in this study. In 
some cases, the top managements gave directions to the responsibility centres for them 
to comply with. Since 1992, under the operation mechanisms reform and market 
economy promulgation, these SOEs have been encouraged to participate in the planning 
process and may extend their planning horizon beyond one year. Therefore, the top 
managements may exert less interference in divisional or departmental planning decisions, 
but without reducing the tight financial or budgetary control, (see 5.2.2)
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(20) Since 1992, many enterprises visited in this research have implemented a regular formal 
planning process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual plans or budgets and 
the internal responsibility contract (IRC). This budgeting process starts during the last 
quarter of the year and ends in February of the next calendar year. Based on some 
guidelines provided by the top management, each division or department initiates an 
annual plan or budget in which some key criteria are used as the measurement yardsticks 
of the IRC. Iterative discussions and negotiations are carried out between the top 
management and the responsibility centres until compromises result and budgets are 
settled, (see 5.2.2)
(21) In general, as from 1992, the top management of a SOE has been fully responsible for the 
short-term planning review process although its supervisory body might provide an overall 
financial target (i.e. profit before tax) for the top management to achieve. The degree of 
budget participation by an enterprise would seem to depend very much on its (1) type of 
industry; (2) form of ownership; and (3) geographical location which are the hypotheses 
to be tested, (see 5.2.3)
(22) Although the long-term planning process in most of these 20 SOEs was a rather top-down 
process before 1992, the 5-year plans were still reviewed annually between the 
government authorities and the enterprise managements. Significant changes must be 
approved by the government authorities, while minor changes could be initiated and 
sometimes determined by the enterprise managements. The major contents of the long­
term plan were usually reported during the Annual Employees Congress (for wholly 
SOEs) or AGM (for shareholding SOEs), but details would not be explained, (see 5.2.4)
(23) As from 1992, the enterprise managements are quite eager to review their own-formulated 
long-term plans at least twice every year or even on a quarterly basis. Most of the wholly 
SOEs’ supervisory bodies participate in this review process and sometimes suggestions 
or even directions are made. For the shareholding SOEs, their boards of directors usually 
have the full autonomy to review and amend their long-term strategies, although in some
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situations they need the assistance from the government authorities such as approval or 
recommendation for applying bank loans for capital investment, (see 5.2.4)
(24) Before 1992, the annual plans or budgets were reviewed between the top and middle 
management at least twice every year but amendments were made only due to significant 
changes which would be reflected in the revised budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts. In view of the dynamic market economy and higher budget participation since 
1992, the annual plans, budgets and IRCs are reviewed at least quarterly or even monthly 
and amendments can be made more frequently by using computers, (see 5.2.4)
5.8.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
(25) Operation mechanisms transformation (1993), economic effectiveness (1992), quality 
control (1991) and economic responsibility contract (1990) were the specific strategic 
themes promulgated by the central government. They were the core spirits and supreme 
guidelines for the nationwide SOEs to observe and attain when planning, implementing 
and evaluating their activities, (see 5.3)
(26) To accommodate the changing external environments and internal expectations, the 
enterprise management reinforces the strategic themes by more specific strategic thrusts 
which are given to and agreed with the responsibility centres. Typical strategic thrusts 
discovered in these 20 SOEs are quality control, customer service, management control, 
technology improvement, etc. They are usually translated into concrete strategic, tactical 
and operational plans, (see 5.3)
(27) From time to time, the top management of an enterprise has to provide specific 
suggestions in the planning, review and control processes in every responsibility centre or 
unit so that not only the strategic themes and thrusts can be recognised, but the final 
financial targets can be achieved as well, (see 5.3)
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(28) As observed in these 20 SOEs, the ways and extents of conveying the specific suggestions 
to the business centres and units varies from one enterprise to another depending on many 
factors such as (1) government influence; (2) form of ownership; (3) type of industry; (4) 
financial performance; and (5) management style, (see 5.3)
5.8.4 Long-Term Plans
(29) Both the operation mechanisms transformation and market economy promulgated by the 
government since 1992 have empowered higher autonomy and enlarged the scope of long­
term planning in the SOEs. The top management of these 20 SOEs have to initiate their 
own long-term plans and compromise with the government authorities who may insist on 
certain macro-targets such as output volume and mix, turnover, profit before tax, sales 
and income tax some of which are usually incorporated in the ERC. (see 5.4.1)
(30) In some of these 20 SOEs, there are formal planning committees and procedures in 
existence to get middle management (e.g. responsibility centre managers) involved whose 
planning, control and evaluation aspects are affected. It is a way for the top management 
to allocate limited resources to different divisions and departments according to the 
market demand, product profitability and government suggestions, (see 5.4.2)
(31) The involvement from middle management (e.g. responsibility centre managers) in 
formulating the long-term plans was limited to consultation only in most of the SOEs 
before 1992. In recent years, some SOEs in this research have established formal planning 
committees and invited the centre managers to participate in the formation, evaluation, 
monitor and review of the long-term plans although the responsibility centre managers 
seldom initiated changes but mainly concerned the impact on their annual budgets and 
internal responsibility contracts which they are measured on. (see 5.4.3)
(32) Before 1992, in most of the 20 SOEs, the 5-year long-term plans were reviewed annually 
by the government authorities with the top managements of the SOEs and changes made 
were notified to the various levels of management during the Annual Employees Congress 
in which all the employees could attend, (see 5.4.4)
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(33) After 1992, in some of the 20 SOEs, the senior management groups or the planning 
committees in some cases, review the long-term plans every year before the annual 
planning cycle started and significant changes are reported to the government authorities 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as seeking a long-term bank loan is 
required. A summary of long-term plans is reported to the Annual Employees Congress 
for wholly SOEs and the AGM for shareholding enterprises. Some enterprises prefer to 
describe their long-term plans in documents and booklets for limited circulation. Because 
of the fast changing market conditions and technology advancement, most of the 
enterprises review their long-term plans twice every year, (see 5.4.4)
5.8.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
(34) Superficially, the budgeting process practised currently by these 20 SOEs is similar to the 
conventional steps described in the management accounting textbooks and equivalent to 
practice in the western countries. But when probing into the substance of this process, 
the roles of budgeting in terms of authorization, coordination, communication and 
accuracy are different from the western concepts because of the impacts from the external 
and internal factors as listed in Section 5.5. (see 5.5)
(35) Under a more open market situation, most of the SOEs in this study adopt a general short 
term planning policy called “production determined by sales” which means sales is the 
initial driving force of all the activities. Sales forecast is the primary budgeting or limiting 
factor as described by many management accounting textbooks, (see 5.5.2)
(36) To increase the budget participation and cope with the dynamic market changes since 
1992, the annual plans and budgets are reviewed at least quarterly or even monthly and 
amendments are made due to unavoidable internal and external factors. Fixed budget 
concept is still the main thrust but flexible budgeting is accepted by some SOEs which 
have been using computers more extensively, (see 5.5.4)
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5.8.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
(37) In parallel with the more open annual planning and budgeting process, higher participation 
from the responsibility centres in formulating their IRCs can be observed in recent years. 
Perhaps the greater the linkage between the performance (both financial and non-financial) 
and remuneration (wages and bonus), the higher will be the participation in IRC design 
and negotiation, but of course this proposition is subject to future research in the Chinese 
enterprises, (see 5.6)
(38) Before 1992, the major quantitative targets in the IRCs of these 20 SOEs were production 
volume and mix, and standard costs while qualitative targets such as safety and quality, 
which had veto effects on the bonus determination, were also defined. The IRC system 
was largely applied to the production units. Since 1992, many responsibility centres of 
the 20 SOEs have been changed into profit centres, then internal profit has become the 
key financial target in the IRCs. (see 5.6.1)
(39) As a motivation factor in the IRC, the implementation of its targets is usually linked with 
the gross wages and bonus to be awarded to the corresponding workshop or department 
measured on a monthly, quarterly and yearly basis, (see 5.6.2)
(40) The accelerated shareholding transformation process since 1992 and the new taxation 
system implemented in January 1994 has blurred the unique features of the ERC which 
is being phased out in some well-performed SOEs. By playing down or reducing the 
rigidity of the targets stipulated in the ERC, the top management of a wholly SOE can 
leave greater flexibility in setting the budget and IRC with the responsibility centres 
although the overall financial targets have to be achieved as far as possible, (see 5.6.2)
(41) Speaking to the top management and senior managers in these 20 SOEs, in some cases, 
the centre managers have to initiate the major IRC targets before negotiating with the top 
management. More goal congruence arguments will occur when the performance-based 
wages and incentive scheme are discussed in setting the IRC. (see 5.6.2)
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(42) Usually the IRCs are reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments can be made 
when mutually agreed by the top management and factory managers. Some SOEs review 
their IRCs quarterly and amendments are made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain attainable targets, (see 5.6.3)
(43) Second-tier IRCs are signed between the factory manager and production line supervisors 
in some large SOEs in order to further delegate the planning and control responsibilities 
to the lower levels of management, (see 5.6.3)
(44) Some interviewees in this study agree with evidence that the IRC is an effective way to 
achieve the short-term targets on the one hand and improve the budget communication 
between the different levels of management on the other hand. Furthermore, IRC can link 
performance with incentive scheme as a pre-determined means for resources distribution 
among the responsibility centres within an enterprise, (see 5.6.3)
(45) Contrary to (44), a chief accountant in Beijing contends that the major drawback from the 
IRC system is “protectionism” in a sense that for a division or responsibility centre to 
ensure the accomplishment of its targets and the monetary benefits for its employees, the 
divisional management or centre manager may act for his unit at the expense of the other 
responsibility centres (dysfunctional effect), (see 5.6.3)
5.8.7 Management of Interdependencies
(46) Reasons for not measuring the “interdependencies” of 10 SOEs in this study are tabled in 
Section 5.7. (see 5.7)
(47) The 7 characteristics or parameters to assess the management of interdependencies of the 
10 manufacturing SOEs are tabled in Section 5.7.1. (see 5.7.1)
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(48) In these 10 SOEs before 1992, nearly all the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the headquarters or top management and the responsibility centres were 
consulted sometimes. Any conflicts were arbitrated by the top management. For those 
centres which were not measured in terms of internal profit, they would not care much 
about the internal transfer issues since they are mainly accounted for by production 
volume and cost, (see 5.7.2)
(49) The conversion into profit centres and promotion of operation mechanisms transformation 
since 1992 have allowed the centre managers to discuss and negotiate the internal transfer 
quantities and prices although interference from and arbitration by the headquarters 
happens on a monthly or quarterly basis, (see 5.7.2)
(50) The internal transfer quantities and prices would affect the attainment of the targets in the 
IRC as well as the extrinsic rewards which are linked with the IRC performance. 
Therefore, the top management has to interfere and balance the internal transfer issues 
carefully in order to maintain acceptable performance evaluation for all responsibility 
centres and motivate their efforts, (see 5.7.2)
(51) Before 1992, the standard costs used to set the transfer prices were determined during the 
annual planning exercise without getting much inputs from the middle management. They 
were usually calculated as historical cost plus inflation and profit margin. These standard 
costs were reviewed and amended, if necessary, twice every year. The transfer quantities 
would be adjusted more frequently due to the changes in production schedules, (see 
5.7.3)
(52) After 1992, market prices have been employed by some of these 20 SOEs as references 
in setting the internal transfer prices. The market prices need to be reviewed frequently 
if they are fluctuating, (see 5.7.3)
(53) The following table shows the overall changes of planning influence (in terms of scores 
and degrees [in brackets]) of all the 20 SOEs by averaging the 7 variables (6 used by 
Goold and Campbell) before and after 1992:
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Enterprise 
No. & Code
Planning Influence 
Before 1992
Planning Influence 
After 1992
Planning Influence 
Score Increase@
01 SSW5 1.1 (High) 2.5 (Medium) 1.4
02 XFLT 1.6 (High-Medium) 2.8 (Medium-Low) 1.2
03 GFDS*# 2.1 (Medium) 3.1 (Low) 1.0
04 GDDS*# 2.0 (High-Medium) 3.1 (Low) 1.1
05 BEEF 1.2 (High) 2.3 (Medium) 1.1
06 SMCW 1.3 (High) 2.4 (Medium) 1.1
07 GNFF* 1.8 (High-Medium) 2.8 (Medium-Low) 1.0
08 GNFB*# 2.1 (Medium) 3.2 (Low) 1.1
09 BCRF 1.2 (High) 2.3 (Medium) 1.1
10 BIMT 1.3 (High) 2.5 (Medium) 1.2
11 SDS1*# 2.2 (Medium) 3.3 (Low) 1.1
12 sccw 1.4 (High) 2.3 (Medium) 0.9
13 SMEF 1.5 (High) 2.6 (Medium-Low) 1.1
14 SCM2* 1.6 (High-Medium) 2.7 (Medium-Low) 1.1
15 sxsw 1.3 (High) 2.5 (Medium) 1.2
16 GLIL* 1.9 (High-Medium) 2.9 (Medium-Low) 1.0
17 XLIG 1.9 (High-Medium) 3.0 (Medium-Low) 1.1
18 BCM3 1.4 (High) 2.4 (Medium) 1.0
19 BFSH 1.5 (High) 2.4 (Medium) 0.9
20 BPMH* 1.7 (High-Medium) 2.7 (Medium-Low) 1.0
* Shareholding enterprises are subject to less planning influence than the other wholly state- 
owned enterprises after 1992. This general observation is statistically tested in Chapter 
7.
# Department stores are subject to the least planning influence among all the 20 SOEs after 
1992. This observation is statistically tested in Chapter 7.
@ Increase in planning scores denotes less planning influence.
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CHAPTER 6 : ANALYSIS OF DATA III ~  CONTROL 
INFLUENCE
6.0 INTRODUCTION
According to Goold & Campbell (1991: 40), “Control Influence” concerns the way in which the 
headquarters reacts to results achieved. Whereas planning influence is about the ‘inputs’ to 
decisions, control influence is about the results of decisions ~ the ‘outputs’ such as profit or 
market share. Control influence arises from the headquarters reaction to poor performance, and 
the frequency with which the headquarters monitors results1.
Control influence has its most immediate impact on day-to-day actions ~  how strategy is 
implemented. But it can also indirectly influence thinking and choices about future strategies. 
For example, a manager who follows a risky strategy that fails is likely to interpret his experience 
very differently depending on whether he receives a bonus that year or not. And his interpretation 
will affect the choices he makes about strategy in the future. The budget process, the capital 
appropriation system, and the strategic planning system provide the formal framework for control, 
which is essentially a linked process of agreeing objectives, monitoring results and applying 
pressure and incentives.
The management principles applied to the central and local governments in China are similar to 
the concepts and tools employed in the SOEs. Planning and Control are the two facets of the 
“coin of administration” adopted by the government in China. The National 5-Year Plan and its 
influence on the SOE’s strategic or long-term plans via the ERC have been described in Section
5.4 of Chapter 5. And in turn how the SOE’s top management exerts planning influence on the 
responsibility centres in formulating their annual plans, budgets and IRCs have also been discussed 
in Sections 5.5 & 5.6 of Chapter 5.
1 ‘Control’ in Goold & Campbell’s book relates to the sort of functions discharged by the 
headquarters or top management. They do not use the term control in the sense of having the 
power to decide or dispose of events.
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A plan without subsequent monitoring or control is like sailing a ship to a predetermined 
destination without a good and experienced captain. The captain of the “economic boat” in China 
is the State Council whose executive committee and various ministries are responsible to 
implement and control the legislation, plans and policies as laid down by the People’s Congress 
and the Communist Party. The economic reforms started in 1979 have changed the business 
practices of every industry in China and also imported tremendous amounts of investment and 
technology from different parts of the world. During the past 18 years of rapid economic 
development in China, ample wealth creating opportunities have induced many economic 
problems such as inflation, speculation, unemployment, commercial crime, etc., which cannot be 
solved by legislation alone. A well-structured control mechanism is needed.
An important economic weapon used by the government is the so called “macro-economic 
control” used to curb the overheated economy at the peak and boost the economic downturn at 
the trough of the average 5-year cycle as has happened in China. The present macroeconomic 
control measures (16 control mechanisms) have been implemented since July 1993 and have 
taken effect to cool down the overheated economy in 1995, such as to bring down the inflation 
rate from 21.7% (yearly average) in 1994 to 14.7% (yearly average) in 1995, and further, down 
to 4%-6% (yearly average) in 19962. Gradual relaxations of these control mechanisms (e.g. bank 
credits, investment control, domestic market sales, etc.) have been allowed since early 1996 in 
order to speed up the retarded economic growth in a steady and healthy manner as stated in the 
current 9th National 5-Year Plan (1996-2000).
Taking a micro point of view, the many different government authorities have to monitor the 
economic performance of all the SOEs which are under their respective administration as 
described in the Introductory Section (5.0) of Chapter 5. Therefore, different industries may be 
subject to various degrees of macroeconomic control influence from their government authorities 
according to the specific circumstances of individual industries. This kind of “control influence” 
is passed down from the top management of the SOE to the responsibility centres, and then to the
2 It was expected that the yearly average inflation rate in 1997 would be around 4% 
(reported by Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 26 July 1997).
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various departments, sections and finally individuals through the organisational hierarchy.
As highlighted in the first two paragraphs in this chapter, the measuring parameters used by Goold 
and Campbell (1991) are adopted in this study to gauge the extent of control influence (as an 
external dimension) on each of the selected 20 SOEs from its respective government authority. 
The degree of control influence on each SOE will in turn affect the control influence (as an 
internal dimension) on the responsibility centres within the enterprise from the top management 
(e.g. general manager, board of directors, etc.).
To measure the control influences on the 20 SOEs and their responsibility centres (both external 
and internal dimensions) in this study, the following 4 variables are employed :
6.1 Decentralisation & Control#;
6.2 Agreeing Objectives*;
6.3 Monitoring Results*; and
6.4 Rewards & Incentives*.
* All the 3 control influence variables used by Goold and Campbell are employed in this study.
# This is the additional variable which is a typical element of control in the responsibility 
accounting system adopted in the SOEs in China.
Except for “agreeing objectives” (which does not have any sub-variables) under each of the above 
3 variables, there are 3 to 4 sub-variables or parameters to measure and analyse the extent of 
control influences before and after 1992. In each variable or parameter, the measurement is on
a 5-point scale ranging from Tight Financial Control (0) to Tight Strategic Control (4). The
detailed ranges are as follows:
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6- 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6-3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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For each SOE, sub-variable scores are combined to give an average measure for a variable e.g. 
decentralisation & control. Each sub-variable has equal weighting and the scores pre- and post- 
1992 are calculated in this way. Similar procedures are used to determine the control scores of 
the other 3 variables pre- and post-1992. The higher the score, the lower control influences on 
financial controls for the external and internal dimensions, and also the more the tendency towards 
the strategic control style in the responsibility accounting system of a SOE.
Then the 2 weighted-averages of all the 4 variables in each SOE are equal to the overall control 
influences (external and internal dimensions) before and after 1992 (for comparison and 
hypothesis testing purposes). By going through Sections 6.1-6.4 of any one of the Case Analyses 
in Volume 2, the quantification process of this study is demonstrated. The justification and 
elaboration of the sub-variables are also provided at Volume 2.
Tables 3A-C in Appendix 1 summarizes all the control parameter scores before and after 1992 
for all the 20 SOEs. For better visual pictures of these control scores and their changes before 
and after 1992, each variable and their corresponding parameters are depicted in the following 
High-Low Charts (see Appendix 2):
Chart 6.1 Decentralisation & Control
Chart 6.1.1 Organisational Design
Chart 6.1.2 Personnel
Chart 6.1.3 Control Mechanism
Chart 6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Chart 6.3 Monitoring Results
Chart 6.3.1 Reporting Requirements
Chart 6.3.2 Performance Measurement
Chart 6.3.3 Review & Communication
Chart 6.4 Rewards & Incentives
Chart 6.4.1 Incentives
Chart 6.4.2 Performance Orientation
Chart 6.4.3 Participation
Chart 6.4.4 Review & Communication
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High-Low Chart 6.0 is the overall weighted-average control scores of all the 20 SOEs in this 
study. Looking into this chart, it is noted that the 4 department stores (i.e.GFDS(03), GDDS(04), 
GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) have the higher control scores of 2.6-2.8 after 1992 and are subject to 
lower control influence (external and internal combined) compared with the other 16 SOEs. They 
are moving towards the “strategic control” style as defined by Goold and Campbell (1991).
On the other hand, the other manufacturing SOEs have the lower control scores at or below 2.0 
after 1992 and are subject to higher control influences. They remain in the domain of “financial 
control” as defined by Goold and Campbell (1991).
The explicit and implicit reasons behind the control scores and influences of each variable or 
parameter are explained in the following 14 sections (6.1-6.4) of this chapter. In each of the 
following 14 sections, firstly, some facts and changes relating to the specific variable or parameter 
are narrated, and secondly, some observations from the corresponding High-Low Chart are 
explained.
Finally, a summary of major facts and findings will be listed in the last section (6.5) of this chapter.
6.1 DECENTRALISATION & CONTROL
Besides involving participation from various levels of management in planning, another major 
purpose of organisational decentralisation in a SOE is to monitor and control the performance and 
progress of different functions, divisions and departments which are classified as responsibility 
centres in this study.
As discussed in Section 5.1.2 in Chapter 5, under the increasing delegation of planning, control 
and management autonomy from the government to the top management of a SOE, and then to 
the responsibility centres down through the organisational hierarchy (usually in functional 
structure type), the economic responsibility lies with the chief executive who initiates and 
negotiates the terms and conditions of the ERC with the government authorities.
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In turn, the internal responsibility centres within a SOE have to fulfil their economic and 
qualitative targets as agreed in their IRCs. In view of this decentralisation process, all the 20 
SOEs in this study have become investment or profit centres and many of their responsibility 
centres have been converted into profit centres as well. Therefore, from an internal control 
perspective, these responsibility centres are accountable to their top management for whatever 
types of targets set in the budget or IRC.
Furthermore, the extent of decentralisation affects the way to design the organisational structure, 
the setting of personnel policies and the types of control mechanism to monitor the performance. 
Therefore, the control influence in respect of “decentralisation” from the enterprise management 
on the different responsibility centres (internal dimension only) are measured on the following 3 
criteria:
6.1.1 Organisational Design;
6.1.2 Personnel; and
6.1.3 Control Mechanism.
The results of these 3 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 3 sections 
(i.e. 6.1.1-3) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 6.1.
(a) The 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) are subject 
to less macro-economic control measures from their local government authorities, and 
therefore they are given more freedom or discretion to responsibility centre managers (i.e. 
more decentralization). Their management style is moving towards a “strategic control” 
type. The control process is an important influence mechanism for the top management. 
Targets are set for strategic objectives (such as customer satisfaction) as well as financial 
performance (such as sales), and store managers are expected to meet the targets. 
Budgets or IRCs can only be missed when important strategic objectives are at stake (e.g. 
keen market competition) (Goold & Campbell 1991: 43).
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(b) The responsibility centres of the other 16 SOEs are subject to higher control influence
from the top management. Their control style is biased to the type of “financial control” 
under which the headquarters’ influence is exercised mainly through the budget process. 
The centre manager’s role in developing strategies is limited, and long-term plans are not 
formally reviewed by the headquarters. Instead, the top management focuses on a close 
review of annual budget and IRC. Profit targets are set when the budget is approved, and 
careers are at stake if budgets are missed (Goold & Campbell 1991: 42).
6.1.1 Organisational Design
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.1.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
As far as the organisational design is concerned, the 12 wholly SOEs in this study used to have 
the following three distinct levels of management hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (General Manager, Deputy-GM, Party Secretary)
(2) Middle Management (Factory/Workshop Managers, Chief Engineer, Chief Economist,
Chief Accountant, Department Managers, Tertiary Enterprise
Managers)
(3) Lower Management (Factory/Workshop Foremen, Deputies of the (2) above,
Supervisors, Officers)
For the 8 shareholding SOEs, their “Boards of Directors (BOD)” are supposed to be the top 
policy and decision makers (according to Company Law 1993) despite the fact that the 
government authorities may still exert different extents of planning and control influences on 
them. In the case of GFDS(03), the BOD consists of the following members :
Chairman 
Deputy Chairman 
Deputy Chairman 
Director 
Director 
Director
General Manager (GM) 
Deputy-GM (Finance) 
Communist Party Secretary 
Deputy-GM (Sales) 
Deputy-GM (Purchasing) 
Labour Union Leader
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Except the Communist Party Secretary, who is appointed by the government (i.e. First Commerce 
Bureau of Guangzhou), the other board members are the top management (or employees) of the 
enterprise. Similar constitutions of BODs exist in 4 other shareholding enterprises (i.e. 
GDDS(04), GNFF(07), GNFB(08), GLIL(16)) in Guangzhou. Only 3 listed enterprises (i.e. 
SDS1(11), SCM2(14), BPMH(20)) have a few non-executive directors or outsiders sitting on 
their BODs. The Company Law of China implemented in January 1994 did not define the 
qualifications to be a director, nor forbid any enterprise employees to be directors.
According to the principles of management and company legislations practised in the western 
countries, the functions and personnel of the BOD are usually separated from the management 
and operation of the company in order to maintain the effects of supervision, moderation and 
independence (Chow et al 1993). However, during the early stage of this shareholding or 
privatization process in China, the government authorities and enterprise managers believe that 
if the board members are also the top management of an enterprise, they know the operation 
better and can make more appropriate decisions.
Although there are overlaps between the BOD and the top management such as in GFDS(03) who 
are playing dual roles in both levels, nevertheless, the segregation of duties are clearly defined. 
The general manager (also chairman of the BOD) is acting as an arbitrator to harmonize any role 
conflicts which happen among the members in the BOD (see pp.347-348 of Volume 3).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.1.1.
(a) The 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) have the
highest control scores or the least organisational influences exerted from the headquarters 
or top management. The store managers can decide on their own divisional structures, 
staffing and their roles and functions, and interactions between their sub-units or sections.
In addition, since 1992, the store managers have been vested with higher strategic
autonomy to manoeuvre their organisational and personnel changes but important 
modifications should be discussed with the headquarters before implementation.
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(b) The 5 wholly SOEs in Beijing and all the manufacturing SOEs in Shanghai are subject to 
higher control on organisational design from their head offices or top managements (i.e. 
high-medium scores 2.1-2.2). In these rather traditional enterprises (mainly wholly 
SOEs), some top managements are reluctant to change the organisation structures which 
may involve a “power struggle” and affect the benefits of different interest groups. They 
prefer to maintain a stable organisation structure with clear-cut lines of authority and 
responsibility which is an important prerequisite for implementing the IRC system.
6.1.2 Personnel
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.1.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
In the 12 wholly SOEs in this study, the factory, workshop and department managers are
responsible for certain personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation 
and remuneration (i.e. distribution of bonus). However, termination of employment of workers 
and staff is a difficult task which need approvals from the top management and party secretary. 
It is because the strategic theme to abolish the “Three Iron Bowls” (iron employment, iron 
position and iron wages) or “Life-Long Employment” has not been effectively implemented in 
most of these SOEs.
Suppose by cutting, say, 10%-20% of the employees in a SOE, it will create many social problems 
in light of the current insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existing in China. One 
way to tackle this headache, the “Big Rice Pot” problem, is to transfer the excess workers and 
employees to some “tertiary enterprises (businesses)” (i.e. restaurant, taxi fleet, grocery shop, 
etc.) established by the SOE. These tertiary businesses are self-financed under some assistance 
given by the host enterprise (Liu & Zhang 1996: 131).
Concerning the 4 department stores, their store managers are responsible for certain personnel 
functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation, remuneration and even termination 
of employment. Unlike Beijing, the labour markets in Shanghai and Guangzhou, in particular the 
latter city, are relatively free (or subject to less macro-economic control from the local 
government) which means employees can choose new jobs and resign from the old ones at their
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own will. On the other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay off their staff by giving 
advanced notice or compensation according to the terms of the employment contracts and the 
Labour Law enacted in January 1995. Furthermore, these shareholding department stores have 
implemented the “Employment Contract System” since 1992. To a great extent, the “big rice pot” 
or “three iron bowls” concept has almost been abolished (Liu 1995).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.1.2.
(a) Again, the headquarters or top management of the 4 department stores have given higher
autonomy to or exerted less control influence on the store managers to manage their 
personnel affairs. The Assistant General Manager of GNFB(08) mentioned that their 
store managers should know better who to hire, who to fire and how to arrange their 
subordinates in groups or teams so that both turnover and service levels can be enhanced. 
In addition, less influence (although enterprisewide policies, strategic themes and thrusts 
still have to be observed) has been exerted on the IRC formulation, implementation and 
review by the top management, then a free hand should be given to each store manager 
to handle his/her people in order to achieve the targets agreed in the IRC (see Section 5.1 
of Data Analysis 11 in Volume 3 [p.336]). These shareholding enterprises are moving
towards the “Strategic Control Style” as suggested by Goold and Campbell (1991: 43).
(b) The 2 textile mills (i.e. SCM2(14), BCM3(18)), the metallurgical equipment factory in 
Shanghai (i.e. SMEF(13)) and the hotel in Beijing (i.e. BFSH(19)) indicate the highest 
personnel control influence (or lowest control scores) exercised by the top management 
on their responsibility centres. Because of the fast expansion in the textile industry during 
the past few decades3, SCM2(14) and BCM3(18), in particular the latter mill having 7,000 
people, have created substantial redundant employees and subject to some macro- 
economic control measures from the local government in terms of labour policy.
3 Textile mills belong to the “secondary industry” in manufacturing input materials for 
making clothes which are consumed by over 1.2 billion people in China. The extremely high 
demand of cheap, durable and plain quality clothing in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s has changed 
to expensive, fashionable and colourful clothing but quantity demanded was reduced in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
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SCM2(14) is transferring more and more employees to its own “tertiary enterprises” (i.e. 
motel, restaurant, supermarket, trading company, etc.), while BCM3(18) is trying to 
enforce or encourage its employees to take early retirement and has stopped recruiting 
new employees. Therefore, both textile mills keep a tight control on the personnel affairs 
through top management with a long-term objective to cut the workforce.
Similarly, the Beijing hotel BFSH(19) has a significant proportion of redundant employees 
because it is the government central planning policy to appropriate a group of hotel and 
tourism training school graduates to this hotel every year. This began especially during 
the 1980s when the open-door policy and economic reform attracted millions of tourists. 
In recent years, the top management of BFSH(19) has not replaced many employees who 
have retired or resigned in order to reduce the size of the workforce naturally. Therefore, 
some elements of central planning and control of personnel linger on.
6.1.3 Control Mechanism
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.1.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management of these 20 SOEs to monitor 
the performance of their production functions and service departments are annual budgets and 
IRCs. As described in Section 5.6.1 in Chapter 5, the most important measurement criteria are 
financial targets (e.g. sales, profit, foreign exchange, etc.), quantitative targets (e.g. production 
volume, mix and value, etc.) and qualitative targets (e.g. product quality, production safety, 
customer service, etc.) as set in the budget and IRC. In general, the economic targets (i.e. both 
financial and quantitative types) account for much higher weightings in determining the 
performance-based group bonus under the IRC (Liu & Zhang 1996: 130-131).
The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the responsibility centres through the annual 
plans, IRCs and other enterprise policies, rules and regulations. Many interviewees in this study 
have mentioned that the control style has not changed so much before and after 1992 mainly 
because of the continuous government’s macroeconomic controls and many uncertainties existing 
in the market during the rapid economic reform in the last decade.
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(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.1.3.
(a) The control scores of the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), 
SD Sl(ll)) are exceptionally higher than all the other SOEs since 1992. Within each 
department store, as long as the store managers can meet the financial targets with growth 
from year to year, the headquarters will devolve the responsibility of tactical and strategic 
development, such as how to attract the customers to buy, to the managers without much 
interference (see Section 6.1 of Case Analysis 8 in Volume 2 [pp. 185-186]).
(b) The relatively tighter control influences exerted on 4 machine and equipment 
manufacturing SOEs (i.e. XFLT(02), BEEF(05), BCRF(09), BIMT(IO)) have not been 
changed much before and after 1992 (see Section 6.1 of Case Analysis 9 in Volume 2).
(c) The printing machine manufacturer BPMH(20) has shown a significant change in control 
influence on their responsibility centres after listing on the Shanghai and Hong Kong 
Stock Exchanges in 1993. The reduced planning influence exerted on the more 
decentralised responsibility centres and the increase in planning participation have resulted 
in lower financial control (see Section 6.1 of Case Analysis 20 in Volume 2 [pp.494-495]).
(d) The iron and steel work SSW5(01) has the highest control influence among the 20 SOEs. 
Traditionally, SSW5(01) has been using tight financial, quantitative and qualitative 
measures to control the performance of each responsibility centre, in particular the 
production factories, in order to manage the huge and diversified organisation with 23,000 
employees effectively and efficiently.
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Goold and Campbell (1991: 40) mention that the setting of objectives is the first step of the 
control process. Companies differ widely in how they establish objectives. The corporate 
objective of Wimpy is to be the ‘Marks & Spencer of the fast food industry’ — quality food for 
the average person. Some companies rely almost entirely on annual profit numbers when setting 
objectives (typical situation in the ERC system in China).
There are differences in the precision and detail of targets; the balance between objective and 
subjective measures; the time frame for achievement; the influence of the headquarters in 
proposing and agreeing objectives; the degree o f ‘stretch’ built into objectives; and the emphasis 
on financial versus non-financial targets (Goold & Campbell 1991: 40). These differences are 
important to the type of control influence adopted by the headquarters, and they are employed to 
measure this control variable in this study (see Section 6.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2).
In most of the 20 SOEs in this research, the top managements set similar objectives for their 
production functions and service departments — workshop and department managers must meet 
their agreed budget figures or IRC targets for the year and an improvement in performance year 
on year is expected except under adverse market conditions (i.e. high inflation during 1993 to 
1995, short supply of incoming materials, etc.). The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual 
budget review. For the profitable and competitive enterprises (i.e. XFLT(02), GFDS(03), 
GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll), GLIL(16), XLIG(17), BPMH(20)), their government 
authorities and top managements are trying to set more demanding standards of performance year 
after year for the responsibility centres to achieve (see Section 5.6 of Case Analysis 4 in Volume 
3 [pp.96-99] for a typical example).
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Two kinds of pressure are put on the responsibility centre managers at the annual or quarterly 
review — (1) to submit a budget that they can achieve; and (2) to aim for results that are, most 
likely, better than the previous year’s. The centre managers fully understand that their group 
bonuses are tied with the budget or IRC. Therefore, the top management does not tell the centre 
managers what their targets (e.g. production, sales, profit, expenses, etc.) should be, but tries to 
“energize” the ambition of the middle management teams to do better year by year. But in terms 
of costs and expenses, control is tighter and specific suggestions sometimes will be given by the 
top management (especially in the manufacturing industries).
In addition to the formal annual or quarterly review process, many ad hoc meetings and informal 
communication are made between the top and middle management, and also among the 
responsibility centres themselves.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.2.
(a) Distinctively, the control influences on “agreeing objectives” between the top 
managements and responsibility centres of the 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), 
GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) is much lower than all the other 16 SOEs before and 
after 1992. Objectives in these department stores emerge from the detailed discussion of 
the annual plans or budgets with the store managers. The financial objectives stem from 
the sales forecast, rather than vice versa. This is not to suggest that the objective-setting 
process is wholly bottom-up. The initiative lies in the first instance with the store 
managers, who formulate the plans, rather than with the headquarters, but top 
management in the headquarters can and do push and suggest for alternative targets as 
they see fit (see Section 6.2 of Case Analysis 8 in Volume 2 [p. 186]).
With long years of experience and information (financial and marketing) gathered by the 
chief executive (e.g. general manager) of GFDS(03) for example, he can give suggestions 
to individual store managers to amend the financial objectives both in the short- or long­
term. Furthermore, the general manager at headquarters has a holistic view to achieve the 
overall financial objectives year after year according to the long-term plan. Finally, the 
end-result is usually a compromise that both headquarters and department can live with.
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(b) For BEEF(05) and SMCW(06), in view of the fierce competition within this machine and 
equipment manufacturing industry, the production workshops feel passive in setting their 
objectives or targets in the budgets and IRCs because their activities are dependent on the 
sales demand. In terms of expenses, control is tighter and a system of standard costing 
has been implemented after 1992. There is an argument for greater decentralisation in 
terms of setting objectives and targets. Although the other service departments do not 
have the IRCs, they have agreed specific objectives and targets with the general manager, 
for example, marketing and selling expenses as a percentage of sales, purchase material 
price variances, tasks set by the accounting and finance department, etc. The promotion, 
salary and bonus of these functional staff are correlated with these quantitative and non- 
financial targets (for a detailed example of bonus evaluation and distribution policy, see 
Section 6.4 of Data Analysis 12 in Volume 3 [pp.391-398]). Therefore, the responsibility 
centres are subject to higher control influence in setting objectives.
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6.3 MONITORING RESULTS
One of the most worrying problems anticipated by the central government of China under the 
rapid economic reform and development since the early 1990s is the overheated economy which 
has resulted in many adverse national effects such as high inflation, capital fund misappropriation, 
unbalanced growth within various industries, unemployment, etc. To alleviate the impact or to 
prevent these unfavourable economic defects, the central government has imposed 16 
macroeconomic control policies (such as bank credit and capital investment controls) since July 
1993 and they are still in force, although with some relaxations such as bank credits, during the 
9th National 5-year Plan (i.e. 1996-2000).
Over half of the medium- and small-sized SOEs in China made financial losses at the end of 1996. 
How to revive the financial positions of these ailing SOEs has become and will be the top priority 
in the economic agenda of the State Council in the current 5-year government working plan (i.e. 
1996-2000). Therefore, it is understandable that those government authorities always keep tight 
control on the loss-making SOEs under their administration. For some well-performing 
industries, such as retailing and consumable goods manufacturing as shown in this research, the 
government authorities would adopt a “strategic control” style as defined by Goold and Campbell 
(1991: 43). Contrary, for some under-performing industries, such as machine and equipment 
manufacturing, textiles, iron and steel as indicated in this research, a “financial control” style is 
preferred as also defined by Goold and Campbell (1991: 43). The latter style tends to ensure that 
the financial targets (e.g. turnover and profit) as stipulated in the ERC can be achieved year by 
year. Hence, different industries may be subject to varying degrees of macro-economic control 
measures from their respective government authorities.
As evidenced in many of the case studies in this research, how the government authorities monitor 
the results of their SOEs will affect the ways and extents these SOEs exert control on the 
performance of their responsibility centres (e.g. production factories or workshops).
As suggested by Goold and Campbell’s (1991: 40-41) that most of the SOEs in this research ask 
their business units or responsibility centres to report results monthly, and for some there are 
weekly reports, ad hoc questions and many informal ways for the headquarters to check up on
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how well each responsibility centres are performing. The way in which the headquarters seeks 
out performance information, the type of information it asks for, and the arrangement it has for 
discussing the results with managers are all part of the control process. Some SOEs have half-a- 
day meetings every month between the top management and responsibility centre managers to 
review detailed figures on performance versus plan. Others are satisfied with weekly reports that 
are always discussed or commented on by the headquarters.
The control influence in respect of “monitoring results” from the enterprise management on the 
different responsibility centres (internal dimension only) are measured on the following 3 criteria:
6.3.1 Reporting Requirements;
6.3.2 Performance Measurement; and
6.3.3 Review and Communication.
The results of these 3 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 3 sections 
(i.e. 6.3.1-3) which can firstly be summarized in the High-Low Chart 6.3.
(a) The 4 department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SD Sl(ll)) exert less 
control influences in respect of monitoring results such as turnover, stock levels and profit 
margins on their responsibility centres (e.g. store managers). They belong to the more 
dynamic and volatile retailing industry with high growth prospects. Other explanations 
of this phenomenon are described in 6.3. l(B)(a) and 6.3.3(B)(a) below. As a result, they 
have been turning from the financial control style to strategic control style since 1992.
(b) On the other end, the two iron and steel works (i.e. SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) retain high 
control influences in terms of monitoring results on their responsibility centres (e.g. 
production managers). In recent years, the iron and steel industry has been facing many 
uncertainties relating to demand, supply, pricing, import, export, competition, etc. Other 
contributing factors are mentioned in Section 6.3. l(B)(b) below. Therefore, they remain 
in the domain of tighter financial control style in Goold and Campbell’s Style of 
Management Grid (see Section 6.3 of Data Analysis 15 in Volume 3 [pp.498-502]).
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6.3.1 Reporting Requirements
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.3.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The reporting requirements are similar in these 20 SOEs in the sense that it is essential to 
investigate the variances from budget or IRC before they have gone too far. To this end the top 
management monitor results on monthly and quarterly bases. The responsibility centre managers 
submit monthly results on standard forms to their respective divisional heads and also to the chief 
finance officer (i.e. chief accountant) for vetting and comparison with budgets and ERCs. For the 
production units, submission of production figures may be required on a weekly or even daily 
basis (see Section 6.3 of Data Analyses 19 & 20 in Volume 3 [pp. 609-611 & 644-646]).
The monthly report format is unique for each factory or department. The contents correspond 
to the budgeted line items from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted from 
this report. The monthly and quarterly actuals are compared with the fixed budgets (see Section
6.3 ofData Analysis 13 in Volume 3 [pp.434-436]). However, in many manufacturing concerns 
the qualitative targets set in the budgets or IRCs (especially non-production departments) are not 
measured in the monthly reports. Contrary, the 4 department stores and the hotel in this study 
are concerned with and evaluate objectively as far as possible the non-financial targets such as 
customer satisfaction and service attitude on a monthly basis.
Many of these monthly reports are compiled, some by using computer, by the accounting staff 
who may be seconded into the individual production factories or responsibility centres. 
Significant variances (usually without specifying tolerance limits) are highlighted in order to bring 
the attention to the top management.
For example, in SSW5(01), the monthly condensed report format is unique for each factory. The 
actuals are compared with the budgets or IRCs. Any variances plus or minus 5% will be 
highlighted in order to focus the attention of the factory managers and the headquarters. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the general manager or deputy-general managers 
will contact the respective factory manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining reasons 
or ask them to perform an investigation immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can 
be taken to remedy the situation as soon as possible (see pp.22-23 of Volume 3).
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Ten management control factors are used to measure the headquarters’ control on “reporting 
requirements” -- (1) policy; (2) frequency; (3) contents; (4) compilation; (5) review; (6) 
evaluation; (7) authorization; (8) feedback; (9) follow-up; and (10) computerization (see Section
6.3.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2).
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.3.1.
(a) The control influences on the reporting requirements in the 4 department stores (i.e. 
GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDS1(11)) are the least among the 20 SOEs before 
and after 1992. The contents of their monthly reports are simpler than the manufacturing 
industries. The key financial results such as sales and expenditures are the major concerns 
of the headquarters.
The non-financial measurement yardsticks (see Section 5.6 of Data Analysis 3 in Volume 
3 [pp.71-72] for an example) are assessed by the service evaluation department (e.g. 
enterprise management office) through continuous inspections. The comments and ratings 
of the service evaluation are written on the same monthly reports. Significant variances, 
both financial and non-financial, are highlighted in order to bring to the attention of top 
management. It is expected that remedial actions can be taken to handle the short-term 
problems as soon as possible (such as a sudden sales promotion by another department 
store). Whereas, strategic steps may be considered and implemented to solve some 
medium-term problems (such as the effect of advertising).
(b) The two iron and steel works (i.e. SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) exhibit the highest control 
influences on the reporting requirements of their responsibility centres in particular the 
production factories because of the following reasons:
(1) to monitor properly the operation and performance of the decentralised 
organisation structure in view of the huge working populations of 23,000 and 
7,000 in SSW5(01) and SXSW(15) respectively;
(2) to ensure the ultimate targets in the ERC and its components or IRCs can be met 
(see Section 6.3 of Case Analysis 15 in Volume 2 [pp.369-370]); and
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(3) to standardize and formalize the 10 reporting factors, as listed at the end of 
Section 6.3.1(A) above, for different and diversified responsibility centres.
6.3.2 Performance Measurement
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.3.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Before 1992, most of these 20 SOEs, in particular the manufacturing concerns, the responsibility
centres were mainly measured on production volume, mix and cost, but other quantitative and 
qualitative targets4 were also accounted for but usually contributed less than 30% of the 
performance measurement weightings (see Section 6.3 of Data Analysis 6 in Volume 3 [pp. 163- 
167]).
After 1992, with more responsibility centres changing to profit centres, internal profit has become 
the major measurement criterion but similar quantitative and qualitative targets are still used to 
measure the overall performance of these units. Profit growth, profit margin (e.g. profit as a 
percentage of sales) and profit/sales/production per employee are also employed to measure the 
financial efficiency in some SOEs (e.g. SSW5(01)). Some interviewees in this research have 
mentioned that financial indicators have become more important in the last few years in order to 
meet the overall economic targets as expected by the enterprise managements and their 
government authorities. Details of the performance measurement can be found in the IRC 
Sections (5.6) of the 20 Data Analyses in Volume 3.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.3.2.
(a) Most of the SOEs in this study remain with high to medium control influences on
measuring the performance of their responsibility centres because of the following possible 
reasons:
4 For examples, quality management, new product development, energy consumption, 
facility maintenance, production safety, production technology, management style, use of 
computer, environmental control, family planning, etc., could be commonly found in the annual 
plans and IRCs (Cai 1992).
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(1) to ensure the major IRC targets can be met;
(2) to fulfil the ultimate ERC targets, especially the financial ones, as agreed with the 
government authorities;
(3) to maintain a stable economic growth for the whole enterprise;
(4) to strive for survival for those deteriorating SOEs; and
(5) to motivate the employees through management by targets.
(b) The control influence exerted on the responsibility centres in the two iron and steel works 
(i.e. SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) is tighter than the other SOEs due to the same reasons as 
stated in Section 6.3.1(B)(b). Some contemporary issues related to this industry were 
described in the China Daily on 16 January 1998.
6.3.3 Review & Communication
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.3.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Most of the 20 SOEs in this study hold a monthly management meeting to discuss and review the 
important operational issues, including the performance measurement, within the enterprise. For 
example, in XFLT(02), during the monthly meeting of the senior management committee, the 
general manager will put forward the monthly results for open discussion. The production 
workshop managers and department heads may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances. The unsatisfactory results sometimes will make the workshop managers and 
department heads feel embarrassed if the poor performance are due to management fault. 
Consistent failure in meeting the targets which are controllable by a manager, probably means he 
will be replaced by somebody else. It is very common in a SOE to see a workshop manager step 
down from his office and go back to the shop floor and become a technician or worker again (Liu 
1995). On the other hand, the favourable results are openly praised by the top management. 
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed back to the accounting department 
for calculating the group bonus of each workshop and department for last month. Adjustments 
to the group bonus awarded will be made on a quarterly or annual basis according to the 
achievement of overall IRC and ERC targets (see Section 6.3 of Data Analysis 2 in Volume 3 
[pp.47-49]).
253
Ch.6 : Analysis of Data III
In general, these 20 SOEs make use of the monthly management meeting to review the 
performance reports, to ask the responsibility centre managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and incentives. Evaluation results are 
communicated to the lower management via individual factory or departmental meetings. 
Responsibility centre managers have been involved in determining the measurement criteria during 
the annual planning process.
These SOEs view a budget or IRC as a contract between the top management and the 
responsibility centre. The monitoring process is used to maintain the pressure for performance. 
Top management’s close surveillance of results enables them to ensure that no responsibility 
centre goes too far astray before remedial action is taken. It also gives top management an 
understanding of the reasons for variances from budget and IRC.
To a certain extent, the performance review and communication in these 20 SOEs are affected 
by their usage and application of computers which in general are not widely employed in the 
medium- and small-sized SOEs because of insufficient funds to invest in computer hardware, 
software, education and training. But XFLT(02) in Xiamen is an exceptional example among the 
20 SOEs in this research.
To facilitate the planning and control mechanisms, XFLT(02) has invested substantially since the 
early 1990s in installing a centralised mini-computer and tailor-made software packages. 
Furthermore, a post-graduate in computer science was recruited in 1989 from the Fudan 
University (one of the top universities in Shanghai) to head the computer centre. His staff 
relationship to the chief accountant reveals the emphasis of management accounting control 
system in the finance division. It is amazing that in a few years’ time, a Local Area Network 
System (LANS) has been built up to integrate the sales, purchasing, inventory, production, 
accounting (financial and management reporting), wages, fundflow (cash flow) systems.
Different levels of access to the LANS have been assigned to various levels of management. For 
example, the factory manager can access to all the systems in the network, whereas, the sales and 
marketing manager cannot access to the accounting information through his terminal. Passwords 
have been assigned to each system in the network and also every employee who is authorized to
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(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.3.3.
(a) The control influences on monitoring the responsibility centres’ performance in the 4 
department stores (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) are less than all the 
other 16 SOEs. The senior management of these 4 department stores review the 
performance reports monthly. Infrequent adverse variances can be tolerated if store 
managers can take remedial tactics or strategies to correct the unfavourable conditions 
and meet the budget at the year end.
(b) Similar to the situations and reasons described in Section 6.3. l(B)(b) above, the two iron 
and steel works (i.e. SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) exert higher control influences on their 
responsibility centres in terms of monitoring their results.
6.4 REWARDS & INCENTIVES
Again, Goold and Campbell (1991: 41) describe that the follow through on performance achieved 
is also important for determining rewards and incentives. Where bonuses are linked to 
performance targets, or where careers are at risk, the pressure of the control process is enhanced. 
Many western companies link promotion prospects to the achievement of planned targets or 
balanced scorecard measures (Kaplan & Norton 1996). But there are also successful firms that 
believe in a more flexible interpretation of objectives, and do not tie careers or bonuses to specific 
performance targets. The reaction of the headquarters to poor performance varies among 
companies and is an important influence both on the sorts of strategies that business managers are 
likely to propose and on the actions they take during the year.
In a developing country such as China, extrinsic rewards in terms of take-home pay for the 
employees in the SOEs is extremely important as a means to motivate their contribution to their 
working environment. Since the economic reforms started in the rural districts or agricultural 
industry in the late 1970s and then the SOEs in the urban cities in the early 1980s, concrete and 
substantial experience has been gained to support the “more work, more pay” philosophy.
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Further, “annual income per peasant/employee” is a very common and important economic 
indicator to measure the share of value-added created by the workforce in China.
The “Responsibility Accounting System” adopted in China since 1985 and widely applied in the 
majority of SOEs since the late 1980s has provided that it is a good management tool to distribute 
the profit and monetary rewards among the government, enterprises and individuals (or 
employees) (Yan & Long 1987; Yan & Chen 1988; Maschmeyer & Yang 1990). In the Chinese 
responsibility accounting system, an incentive scheme is an indispensible element which is 
incorporated into both the ERC and IRC systems as presented in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 and 
Section 5.6 of Chapter 5 respectively (also see Section 6.4 of Data Analysis 7 in Volume 3 
[pp.202-203]).
The rest of this section is dedicated to assess the control influence in respect of “rewards and 
incentives” from the enterprise management on the different responsibility centres (internal 
dimension only) by using 4 criteria, inter alia:
6.4.1 Incentives;
6.4.2 Performance Orientation;
6.4.3 Participation; and
6.4.4 Review & Communication.
The results of these 4 yardsticks measured on the 20 SOEs are described in the next 4 sections
(i.e. 6.4.1-4) which can firstly be summarised in the High-Low Chart 6.4.
(a) The overall control influences on the responsibility centres in the 4 department stores (i.e.
GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) are the lowest among the 20 SOEs.
Reasons can be found in Section 6.4.1(B)(a) and Section 6.4.2(B)(a).
(b) Contrary to (a), most of the other manufacturing SOEs exhibit higher control influences 
on their responsibility centres relating to the wages, incentives and benefits. Possible 
explanations are mentioned in Section 6.4.1(B)(b).
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6.4.1 Incentives
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.4.1 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
Despite different types of business, forms of ownership and geographical locations, the wages5 
and incentive systems of these 20 SOEs are very similar and they are usually linked with the 
economic performance of the enterprise as a whole6. For example, there is a nationwide policy 
(or macro-economic control measure) to govern the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth 
rate of all the SOEs in China. The annual remuneration growth rate for individual SOEs cannot 
exceed either one of the following limits (Liu & Zhang 1996: 130):
(1) “Income Before Tax” annual growth rate; and
(2) “Productivity Per Employee” annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, a SOE is allowed to increase the wages and bonus payable to its 
employees. Firstly, this rule is trying to motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their remuneration. Secondly, these limitations can 
help to control one of the factors contributing to high inflation rate in recent years. If approved 
by the municipal government, a SOE (e.g. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SD Sl(ll)) is 
allowed to exceed the above two wages limits or ceilings but the excess portion (wages and bonus 
paid) should be subject to enterprise income tax (standard rate 33%).
Eight factors are used to assess the control influences on the remuneration system applied to the 
responsibility centres of these 20 SOEs. They are (1) basic wages; (2) allowances; (3) monthly 
bonus; (4) annual bonus; (5) other benefits; (6) pension; (7) intangible recognition; and (8) 
redundancy. These 8 factors are briefly described as follows (for an example, see Section 6.4 of 
Data Analysis 1 in Volume 3 [pp.23-26]):
5 The term “wages” in China includes “salaries” paid to the white collars.
6 Over 70% of all the SOEs in China had adopted this performance and remuneration 
linkage at the end of 1992 according to State Statistics Bureau. 1992. Economic reform after 14 
year. China Statistics Press: 31.
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The annual review of “Basic Wages'’ is based on grade and seniority without paying much 
regard to qualification and technical skill. The increments are not substantial (e.g. 
RMB10-30 per month) and are not in line with inflation (see Section 6.4 of Data Analysis 
5 in Volume 3 [pp. 129-131] for an example). Another name for basic wages is called 
“File Wages” which means that any change of the basic wages for an employee will be 
recorded in his/her personal file. When he/she applies for a new job, his/her personal file 
will be transferred from the outgoing enterprise to the new employing enterprise.
There are two portions for the “Allowances”. The first part is determined by the 
Manpower and Wages Bureau of the local or municipal government at least once in each 
year to combat inflation. The second part is decided by the enterprise itself which may 
include housing, meals, transportation, child care, attendance, overtime, hair-dressing, 
festival gift, etc.
The calculation of “Monthly Bonus” is based on the accomplishment of the targets in the 
ERC. The IRC signed between the general manager and the factory or workshop manager 
decides what level of group bonus will be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop 
manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual subordinates 
according to individual performance (see Section 6.4 of Data Analyses 6 & 16 in Volume 
3 [pp. 167-169 & pp.531-533]). The bonus for the management and servicing staff is 
linked with the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on their 
performance and grades as well (see Section 6.4 of Data Analysis 2 in Volume 3 [pp.49- 
51] for an example). Some SOEs retain a certain portion (i.e. 10%-30%) of the bonus 
payable in a reserve in order to make up the low or zero bonus awarded during the months 
with poor performance.
For those SOEs which have entered into ERCs, they can transfer a certain percentage of 
the annual profit after tax (or retained earnings) to an “Employee Bonus Reserve Fund” 
which can be distributed as a “Year-End Bonus” to the employees according to the 
overall financial performance and the level of this reserve.
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(5) “Other Benefits” may include the housing provided by a SOE. Under the ERC system, 
a SOE can transfer a certain percentage of the profit after tax or retained earnings to an 
“employees welfare reserve fund” out of which the enterprise can build and purchase 
quarters and apartments for their employees but the persistence of retained earnings and 
cash availability are the limiting factors. The demand for this kind of housing benefit is 
much greater than the limited supply (long waiting queue indeed). Therefore, this most 
important employee’s benefit has always created a lot of arguments and debates among 
the employees within an enterprise and sometimes affects the morale.
(6) In addition to the wages and salaries paid to the present employees, a SOE has to pay 
pension and other allowances (e.g. medical) to the retired employees. In an old SOE 
having a great proportion of retired employees (e.g. in SCM2(14) the number of retired 
employees is equal to the number of in-service employees), the total payment of pension 
and benefits is a significant financial burden added to the profit and loss account. This is 
a kind of “social welfare policy” mandated by the government to be implemented in all the 
SOEs including the shareholding enterprises (see pp.476-477 of Volume 3).
After some years of debate and preparation, a retirement fund legislation was implemented 
in late 1993. Each SOE has to contribute 25.5% of the total monthly wages paid to the 
government’s central pension fund. The government is ultimately responsible for the 
pension payments to the present and future retirees. In other words, this heavy burden 
of pension payments is being shared by the government who is acting in a capacity similar 
to an insurance underwriter. Since late 1995, the government has been promulgating and 
implementing, province by province and city by city, a similar central fund for 
unemployment allowances, medical benefits, employment injury and disability 
compensations, home purchasing, etc. This scheme is similar to the central pension fund 
by asking the SOEs to contribute 16%-18% of their gross wages paid on a monthly basis. 
The employees have to contribute 4% to 8% of their monthly salary or wages to this 
central welfare fund as well. It is planned that this second “social welfare scheme” will 
be fully implemented by all the SOEs in China before the end of 1998.
259
Ch. 6 : Analysis of Data III
Apart from the extrinsic rewards as mentioned above, many SOEs employ other means 
of “Intangible Recognition” (or intrinsic rewards) to motivate the employees. For 
example, some SOEs in this study (e.g. SSW5(01), GDDS(04), SCCW(12), SCM2(14), 
BCM3(18)) make use of the large notice boards near the entrance gate to publicise the 
outstanding employees of the month or year. These employees’ stories, good deeds and 
photos are posted on the boards for open reading by all the employees and outsiders. 
Certificates, trophies, plaques, flags, free tours are usually presented to these “winners” 
to commemorate their outstanding contributions.
One of the 54 clauses in the “SOE Mechanisms Transformation Regulations” enacted in 
July 1992 is to assign the power and freedom to the top management to implement the 
“Employment Contract System” to replace the long-established “Life-Long Employment” 
or “Iron Bowl” practices. The spirit behind this new system is to initiate the self- 
motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose threat of termination (in a negative way) 
on the SOE’s employees.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of “Redundant Employees” (both production 
workers and supporting staff) may cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existing in China. Therefore, the 
changing to employment contract system may not really create a threat to the employees 
nor motivate their own initiatives. Furthermore, if managers at SOE face redundancy, 
usually the workers will be made redundant first.
In addition to the “employment contracts”, many SOEs have signed other “in-post 
contracts” with their employees for periods from one to five years since 1994. The latter 
contract signifies that an employee is qualified for that specific post and he or she is 
eligible to receive basic wages, allowances and bonus. Without such a contract, that 
employee is out of a job but he or she is treated as a retired employee of the enterprise and 
is allowed to receive a basic monthly subsidy of about RMB150-200. This measure may 
not impose a serious threat to the lazy employees, but it can motivate the marginal 
employees to work better.
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Another way to alleviate this problem is to transfer a portion of these redundant 
employees to the self-financed “tertiary enterprises” which are mainly service businesses 
such as retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading, etc. and unrelated to the core business 
(Liu 1995).
The Labour Law implemented in January 1995 further refined the terms and conditions 
of this employment contract system and made it mandatory for all the SOEs before the 
end of 1997. Furthermore, the open-door policy of the labour market and the huge influx 
of foreign enterprises (about 300,000 entities estimated in 1997) in recent years have 
created more opportunities for the SOE’s employees to change their occupations and jobs.
Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.4.1.
Compared with the manufacturing concerns in these 20 SOEs, the top management in the 
4 department stores exert less control influences on their responsibility centres in relation 
to rewards and incentives. Higher autonomy has been delegated to the responsibility 
centres (e.g. store managers) to distribute the monthly and annual bonuses, to determine 
some specific allowances, to decide the form of intangible recognition and to handle the 
redundant employees (see Section 6.4 of Case Analysis 4 in Volume 2 [pp. 88-90]).
Most of the manufacturing SOEs in this research, in particular the machine and equipment 
manufacturing enterprises, indicate higher remuneration control influences on their 
responsibility centres. The significant proportion of redundant and retired employees in 
these SOEs incurred a heavy payroll and bill for allowances (or benefits). Further, in view 
of many economic and business uncertainties confronting the manufacturing industry 
during the recent years, how to reduce the impact of this big chunk of fixed cost is crucial 
in order to maintain a low profit margin or break-even point instead of loss-making. 
Therefore, the top managements of these SOEs are very cautious in paying out every item 
of personnel expenses. After listing in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1993, GLIL(16) 
has been free from any ERC terms and conditions, and enjoyed higher autonomy in terms 
of rewards and incentives. SXSW(15) has significantly increased its remuneration to
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employees in recent years because of improved profit margin and cost control, and also 
high inflation rate in Shanghai.
6.4.2 Performance Orientation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.4.2 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The monthly bonus is mainly determined according to the accomplishment of the IRC and 
accounts for about 40% of the total wages. Some SOEs install their own detailed rules and 
regulations for calculating and distributing the bonuses among the employees in different 
responsibility centres and departments (see Section 6.4 of Data Analysis 6 in Volume 3 [pp. 167- 
172] for an example).
In recent years, the brackets in the wages scale have been widened and increments take skills, 
knowledge and competence into account instead of depending on seniority only. Some SOEs 
(e.g. XFLT(02), GNFF(07), GLIL(16)) have been increasing the proportion (60%-70% of gross 
wages) of the basic wages in which some allowances and benefits have been merged. Laying off 
redundant employees is possible but still difficult in Beijing and Shanghai.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.4.2.
(a) The control influences exert on the responsibility centres in the 4 department stores (i.e.
GFDS(03), GDDS(04), GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) are less than all the other SOEs in this
study. Provided the cost of operation is under control, the more a department store can 
sell, the higher will be the contribution and ultimately, the profit before tax as the bottom 
line. Therefore, the most important financial target in the IRCs adopted in the 4 
department stores is sales or turnover which is linked with the total remuneration (wages 
and bonus) of a responsibility centre or sales unit. The responsibility centres know the 
amount of bonus relates to actual sales exceeding the IRC targets (Merchant 1982; Taylor 
& Liu 1992).
(b) Compared with (a) above, the other manufacturing SOEs are more rigid in controlling and 
measuring the performance indicators relating to the determination of wages, bonus and 
other benefits. The reasons are similar to Section 6.4. l(B)(b) above.
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6.4.3 Participation
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.4.3 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The responsibility centres participate in determining the remuneration when setting the targets 
in the IRCs in which the two issues are closely related. The basic wages, allowances and pension 
are subject to the policies laid down by the local or municipal government without much 
participation except some involvement by the labour union in the planning process. The other 
benefits in kind provided mainly depend on the short-term economic performance and long-term 
prospect of the enterprise as a whole.
(B) Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.4.3.
(a) As explained in (A) above, there is no much room for the responsibility centres to 
participate in determining the 8 factors relating to their remuneration system. Therefore, 
all the 20 SOEs remain high to medium control influences on the personnel expenses in 
the responsibility centres. The control influence was relatively lower in XLIG(17) before 
1992 because it has been located in a special economic zone with more favourable policies 
and incentives.
6.4.4 Review & Communication
(A) Evidence reported in Section 6.4.4 of the 20 Case Analyses in Volume 2.
The incentive scheme (mainly bonus) is reviewed at the same time as the IRC which is held at 
least once every year. Since the IRC is usually expressed in a formal and written format and 
available to every responsibility centre concerned, so different levels of management and most of 
the employees within a responsibility centre should know the details and they are eager to 
understand the methods in calculating the bonus. The basic wages structure, allowances and other 
benefits are reviewed during the annual planning exercise and employees are informed of the 
changes of decisions and policies. The monthly performance and reward of a responsibility centre 
will be made known to employees via the centre manager after the review and approval by the top 
management.
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Observations from the High-Low Chart 6.4.4.
Similar to Section 6.4.3, the review and communication concerning the reward and 
incentive issues are mainly determined by the top management or sometime affected by 
the local government policies. Therefore, the control influence on this parameter falls in 
between the high to medium scores.
SUMMARY
Introduction
Following the proposition of Goold and Campbell (1991), the budget process, the internal 
responsibility contract system, and the strategic planning system provide the formal 
framework for control, which is essentially a linked process of agreeing objectives, 
monitoring results and applying pressure and incentives, (see 6.0)
The measuring parameters used by Goold and Campbell (1991) (i.e. agreeing objectives, 
monitoring results and incentives) plus an additional one (i.e. decentralisation and control) 
are adopted in this study to gauge the extent of control influence (as an external 
dimension) on each of the selected 20 SOEs from their respective government authorities. 
The degree of control influence on each SOE will in turn affect the control influence (as 
an internal dimension) on the responsibility centres within the enterprise from the top 
management (e.g. general manager, board of directors, etc.) (see 6.0)
For each control variable or parameter, the measurement of control influence is on a 5- 
point scale ranging from Tight Financial Control (0) to Tight Strategic Control (4). (see 
6 .0)
Looking into the overall weighted-average control scores of all the 20 SOEs in this study, 
it is noted that the 4 department stores have higher control scores after 1992 and are 
subject to lower control influence (external and internal combined) compared with the 
other 16 SOEs. They are moving towards the “strategic control” style as defined by 
Goold and Campbell (1991).
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On the other hand, the other manufacturing SOEs have the lower control scores after 
1992 and are subject to higher control influences. They can be differentiated and are more 
towards the “financial control” domain as defined by Goold and Campbell (1991) as well, 
(see 6.0)
Decentralisation & Control
Under the increasing delegation of planning, control and management autonomy from the 
government to the top management of a SOE, and then to the responsibility centres down 
through the organisational hierarchy, the economic responsibility lies with the top 
management which initiates and negotiates the terms and conditions of the ERC with the 
government authorities. In turn, the internal responsibility centres within a SOE have to 
fulfil their economic and qualitative targets as agreed in their IRCs. Therefore, from an 
internal control perspective, these responsibility centres are accountable to their top 
management for whatever types of targets are set in the budget or IRC. (see 6.1)
Furthermore, the extent of decentralisation affects the ways to design the organisation 
structure, the setting of personnel policies and the types of control mechanism to monitor 
the performance. The control variable/influence of “decentralisation & control” is 
measured on 3 criteria -- (1) organisational design; (2) personnel; and (3) control 
mechanism, (see 6.1)
In 5 shareholding SOEs out of the 8 in this study, most of the members in their “board of 
directors” are senior management or employees of the enterprises. According to the 
principles of management and company legislations practised in the western countries, the 
functions and personnel of the board of directors are usually separated from the 
management and operation of the company in order to maintain the effects of supervision, 
moderation and independence (Chow et al 1993). However, during the early stage of this 
shareholding or privatization process in China, the government authorities and enterprise 
managers believe that if the board members are also the top management of an enterprise, 
they know the operation better and can make more appropriate decisions, (see 6.1.1)
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(9) Most SOEs in this study have allowed the middle management (e.g. factory, workshop 
and department managers) to be responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. However, termination of 
employment of workers and staff is a difficult task which need approvals from the top 
management and party secretary, (see 6.1.2)
(10) Cutting a significant portion of the employees in a SOE may create many social problems 
in light of the current insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existing in China. 
One way to tackle this “Big Rice Pot” problem is to transfer the excess workers and 
employees to some “tertiary enterprises (businesses)” (i.e. restaurant, taxi fleet, grocery 
shop, etc.) established and assisted by the host enterprise (Liu & Zhang 1996: 131). 
Another means is to enforce or encourage some employees to take early retirement. 
Furthermore, some SOEs do not replace employees who have retired or resigned in order 
to reduce the size of the workforce naturally, (see 6.1.2)
(11) The major control mechanisms employed by the top management of these 20 SOEs to 
monitor the performance of their production functions and service departments are annual 
budgets and IRCs. The most important measurement criteria are financial targets (e.g. 
sales, profit, foreign exchange, etc.), quantitative targets (e.g. production volume, mix, 
and value, etc.) and qualitative targets (e.g. product quality, production safety, customer 
service, etc.) as set in the budget and IRC. In general, the economic targets (i.e. both 
financial and quantitative types) account for much higher weightings in determining the 
performance-based group bonus under the IRC (Liu & Zhang 1996: 130-131). (see 6.1.3)
6.5.2 Agreeing Obj ectives
(12) Goold and Campbell (1991) mention that the setting of objectives is the first step of the 
control process. There are differences in the precision and detail of targets; the balance 
between objective and subjective measures; the time frame for achievement; the influence 
of the headquarters in proposing and agreeing objectives; the degree of ‘stretch’ built into 
objectives; and the emphasis on financial versus non-financial targets. These differences
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are important to the type of control influence adopted by the headquarters, and they are 
employed to measure this independent control variable in this study, (see 6.2)
(13) In most of the 20 SOEs in this research, the top managements set similar objectives for 
their production functions and service departments. Workshop and department managers 
must meet their agreed budget figures or IRC targets for the year and an improvement in 
performance year on year is expected except under adverse market conditions, (see 6.2)
(14) Two kinds of pressure are put on the responsibility centre managers at the annual or 
quarterly review — (1) to submit a budget that they can achieve; and (2) to aim for results 
that are, most likely, better than the previous year’s. The centre managers fully 
understand that their group bonuses are tied in with the budget or IRC. (see 6.2)
6.5.3 Monitoring Results
(15) As suggested by Goold and Campbell’s (1991) that most of the SOEs in this research ask 
their business units or responsibility centres to report results monthly, and for some there 
are weekly reports, ad hoc questions and many informal ways for the headquarters to 
check on how well each responsibility centre is performing. The way in which the 
headquarters seeks out performance information, the type of information it asks for, and 
the arrangement it has for discussing the results with managers are all part of the control 
process, (see 6.3)
(16) The control influence in respect of “monitoring results” from the enterprise management 
on the different responsibility centres (internal dimension only) are measured on 3 criteria 
— (1) reporting requirements; (2) performance measurement; and (3) review and 
communication, (see 6.3)
(17) The reporting requirements are similar in these 20 SOEs in the sense that it is essential to 
investigate the variances from budget or IRC before they have gone too far. To this end 
the top management monitors results on monthly and quarterly bases. The monthly report 
format is unique for each factory or department. The contents are corresponding to the
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budgeted line items and all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted from this 
report, (see 6.3.1)
(18) Many of these monthly reports are compiled, some by using computer, by the accounting 
staff who may be seconded to the individual production factories or responsibility centres. 
Significant variances (usually without specifying tolerance limits) are highlighted in order 
to bring to the attention to the top management, (see 6.3.1)
(19) Ten management control factors are used to measure the headquarters’ control on 
“reporting requirements” — (1) policy; (2) frequency; (3) contents; (4) compilation; (5) 
review; (6) evaluation; (7) authorization; (8) feedback; (9) follow-up; and (10) 
computerization, (see 6.3.1)
(20) After 1992, with more responsibility centres changing into profit centres, internal profit 
has become the major measurement criterion but similar quantitative and qualitative 
targets (see paragraph (11) above) are still used to measure the overall performance of 
these units. Profit growth, profit margin (e.g. profit as a percentage of sales) and 
profit/sales/production per employee are also employed to measure the financial efficiency 
in some SOEs. Some interviewees in this research have mentioned that financial 
indicators have become more important in the last few years in order to meet the overall 
economic targets as expected by the enterprise managements and their government 
authorities, (see 6.3.2)
(21) Most of the 20 SOEs in this study hold a monthly management meeting to review the 
performance reports, to ask the responsibility centre managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and incentives. After the monthly meeting, 
all the approved results are passed back to the accounting department for calculating the 
group bonus of each workshop and department for last month. Adjustments to the group 
bonus awarded will be made on a quarterly or annual basis according to the achievement 
of overall IRC and ERC targets. Evaluation results are informed to the lower 
management via individual factory or department meetings. Responsibility centre
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managers have been involved in determining the measurement criteria during the annual 
planning process, (see 6.3.3)
(22) The 20 SOEs view a budget or IRC as a contract between the top management and the 
responsibility centre. The monitoring process is used to maintain the pressure for 
performance. Top management’s close surveillance of results enables them to ensure that 
no responsibility centre goes too far astray before remedial action is taken. It also gives 
the top management an understanding of the reasons for variances from budget and IRC. 
(see 6.3.3)
6.5.4 Rewards & Incentives
(23) Goold and Campbell’s (1991) proposition is really applicable in the Chinese SOEs in the 
sense that the follow through on performance achieved is important especially when 
bonuses are linked to performance targets, or where careers are at risk and hence the 
pressure of control process is enhanced. In the Chinese responsibility accounting system, 
the incentive scheme is an indispensible element which is incorporated into both the ERC 
and IRC systems, (see 6.4)
(24) To assess the control influence in respect of “rewards and incentives” from the enterprise 
management on the different responsibility centres (internal dimension only), 4 criteria or 
parameters are used -- (1) incentives; (2) performance orientation; (3) participation; and 
(4) review & communication, (see 6.4)
(25) Despite different types of business, forms of ownership and geographical locations, the 
wages and incentive systems of these 20 SOEs are very similar. Eight factors are used to 
assess the control influence on the remuneration system applied to the responsibility 
centres of these 20 SOEs. They are (1) basic wages; (2) allowances; (3) monthly bonus;
(4) annual bonus; (5) other benefits; (6) pension; (7) intangible recognition; and (8) 
redundancy, (see 6.4)
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(26) The monthly bonus is mainly determined according to the accomplishment of the IRC and 
accounts for usually about 40% of the total wages. Some SOEs install their own detailed 
rules and regulations for calculating and distributing the bonuses among the employees 
in different responsibility centres and departments. In recent years, the brackets in the 
wages scale have been widened and increments take skills, knowledge, competence into 
account instead of depending on seniority only. Some SOEs have been increasing the 
proportion (60%-70% of gross wages) of the basic wages in which some allowances and 
benefits have been merged. Laying off redundant employees is possible but still difficult 
in Beijing and Shanghai, (see 6.4.2)
(27) The responsibility centres participate in determining the remuneration when setting the 
targets in the IRCs. The basic wages, allowances and pension are subject to the policies 
laid down by the local or municipal government without much participation except some 
involvement by the labour union in the planning process. The other benefits in kind 
provided mainly depend on the short-term economic performance and long-term prospect 
of the enterprise as a whole, (see 6.4.3)
(28) The incentive scheme is reviewed at the same time with the IRC which is held at least 
once every year. Since the IRC is usually expressed in a formal and written format and 
available to every responsibility centre concerned, different levels of management and 
most of the employees within a responsibility centre should know the details and they are 
eager to understand the methods in calculating the bonus. The basic wages structure, 
allowances and other benefits are reviewed during the annual planning exercise and 
employees are informed of the changes of decisions and policies. The monthly 
performance and reward of a responsibility centre will be made known to employees via 
the centre manager after the review and approval by the top management, (see 6.4.4)
(29) The following table shows the overall changes of control influence (in terms of scores and 
degrees [in brackets]) of all the 20 SOEs by averaging the 4 variables (3 used by Goold 
and Campbell) before and after 1992:
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Enterprise 
No. & Code
Control Influence 
Before 1992
Control Influence 
After 1992
Control Influence 
Score Increase@
01 SSW5 1.0 (Tight Financial) 1.6 (Moderate Fin.) 0.6
02 XFLT 1.2 (Financial) 2.0 (Moderate Fin.) 0.8
03 GFDS*# 1.8 (Moderate Fin.) 2.8 (Strategic) 1.0
04 GDDS*# 1.8 (Moderate Fin.) 2.6 (Strategic) 0.8
05 BEEF 1.2 (Financial) 1.8 (Moderate Fin.) 0.6
06 SMCW 1.1 (Financial) 1.8 (Moderate Fin.) 0.7
07 GNFF* 1.2 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.7
08 GNFB*# 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 2.8 (Strategic) 0.9
09 BCRF 1.3 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.6
10 BIMT 1.2 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.7
11 SDS1*# 1.8 (Moderate Fin.) 2.8 (Strategic) 1.0
12 sccw 1.2 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.7
13 SMEF 1.1 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.8
14 SCM2* 1.1 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.8
15 SXSW 1.1 (Financial) 1.8 (Moderate Fin.) 0.7
16 GLIL* 1.2 (Financial) 2.0 (Moderate Fin.) 0.8
17 XLIG 1.3 (Financial) 2.0 (Moderate Fin.) 0.7
18 BCM3 1.1 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.8
19 BFSH 1.2 (Financial) 1.9 (Moderate Fin.) 0.7
20 BPMH* 1.3 (Financial) 2.1 (Moderate Stra.) 0.8
* Shareholding enterprises are subject to less control influence than the other wholly state- 
owned enterprises after 1992. This general observation is statistically tested in Chapter 
7.
# Department stores are subject to the least control influence among all the 20 SOEs after 
1992. This observation is statistically tested in Chapter 7.
@ Increase in control scores denotes less control influence.
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CHAPTER 7 : FINDINGS -  CASE STUDY RESULTS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the data analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, firstly this chapter summarizes the “planning’ 
and “controF influences in terms of the overall scores before and after 1992 in all the 20 SOEs 
investigated in this research (Section 7.2). These 2 sets of planning and control scores are then 
mapped into a 2-dimensional grid called “Responsibility Accounting Style” which is a modified 
version of the Goold and Campbell Management Strategies and Styles (Section 7.3).
Secondly, the “5 null hypotheses (defined in Section 1.5 of Chapter 1) claiming no change in 
responsibility accounting and the associated planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs 
before and after 1992 are tested in the following comparisons:
(1) All 20 SOEs - Primary Hypothesis (Section 7.4.1)
(2) Wholly SOEs to Wholly SOEs - Secondary Hypothesis 1 (Section 7.4.2)
(3) Wholly SOEs to Shareholding SOEs - Secondary Hypothesis 2 (Section 7.4.3)
(4) Geographical Locations - Secondary Hypothesis 3 (Section 7.4.4)
(5) Industrial Differences - Secondary Hypothesis 4 (Section 7.4.5)
Descriptive, parametric and non-parametric statistics are employed to test the above 5 null 
hypotheses which are believed to be affected by 2 general factors/variables (i.e. legislation and 
market economy) and 3 specific factors/variables (i.e. ownership, location and industry) as defined 
in Section 1.5 of Chapter 1.
Section 7.5 expands the previous analysis performed in Section 7.4 in order to combine the 
specific factors/variables (i.e. ownership, location and industry) and identify the underlying 
reasons for the changes in planning and control influences.
In conclusion, a summary of the key findings in this chapter is provided in Section 7.6.
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7.2 SUMMARY OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES
The following 3 sections (i.e. 7.2.1-3) are summaries of the planning and control measurements 
and scores as described in detail in Chapter 5 and 6. Then these scores are mapped into a 2- 
dimensional grid called “Responsibility Accounting Style” as shown in Section 7.3.
7.2.1 Planning Influences
As described in Section 5.0 of Chapter 5, to measure the planning influences on the 20 SOEs and 
their responsibility centres (both external and internal dimensions) in this study, the following 7 
variables are employed:
(1) Organisation Structure*;
(2) Review Process*;
(3) Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions:*;
(4) Long-Term Planning (Resource Allocation)*;
(5) Short-Term Planning/Budgeting*;
(6) Internal Responsibility Contracts#; and
(7) Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)*
* All the 6 planning influence variables used by Goold and Campbell are employed in this study.
# This is the additional variable which is the core of the responsibility accounting system adopted 
in the SOEs in China.
Under each of the above 7 variables, there are 3 to 4 sub-variables or parameters to further 
measure and analyse the extent of planning influences before and after 1992. In each variable or 
parameter, the measurement is on a 5-point scale ranging from Greatest Planning Influence (0) 
to Least Planning Influence (4).
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For each SOE, sub-variable scores are combined to give an average measure for a variable e.g. 
organisation structure. Each sub-variable has equal weighting and the scores pre- and post-1992 
are calculated in this way. Similar procedures are used to determine the planning scores of the 
other 6 variables pre- and post-1992. The higher the score, the lower planning influences for the 
external and internal dimensions on the responsibility accounting system of a SOE. Then the 2 
weighted-averages of all the 7 variables in each SOE are equal to the overall planning influences 
(external and internal dimensions combined) before and after 1992. Tables 2A-G (see Appendix 
1) summarizes all the planning parameter scores before and after 1992 for all the 20 SOEs.
7.2.2 Control Influences
As described in Section 6.0 of Chapter 6, to measure the control influences on the 20 SOEs and 
their responsibility centres (both external and internal dimensions) in this study, the following 4 
independent variables are employed:
(1) Decentralisation & Control#;
(2) Agreeing Objectives*;
(3) Monitoring Results*; and
(4) Rewards & Incentives*.
* All the 3 control influence variables used by Goold and Campbell are employed in this study.
# This is the additional variable which is a typical element of control in the responsibility 
accounting system adopted in the SOEs in China.
Except “agreeing objectives”, under each of the above 3 variables, there are 3 to 4 sub-variables 
or parameters to further measure and analyse the extent of control influences before and after 
1992. In each variable and parameter, the measurement is on a 5-point scale ranging from Tight 
Financial Control (0) to Tight Strategic Control (4).
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For each SOE, sub-variable scores are combined to give an average measure for a variable e.g. 
decentralisation & control. Each sub-variable has equal weighting and the scores pre- and post- 
1992 are calculated in this way. Similar procedures are used to determine the control scores of 
the other 3 variables pre- and post-1992. The higher the score, the lower control influences on 
financial controls for the external and internal dimensions, and also the more the tendency towards 
the strategic control style in the responsibility accounting system of a SOE. Then the 2 weighted- 
averages of all the 4 variables in each SOE are equal to the overall control influences (external and 
internal dimensions combined) before and after 1992. Tables 3 A-C (see Appendix 1) summarizes 
all the control parameter scores before and after 1992 for all the 20 SOEs.
7.2.3 Planning & Control Scores Summary
The final weighted-averages (or scores) in respect to the planning and control influences in these 
20 SOEs are summarized in the following table (refer to Tables 2A & 3 A).
Enterprises Planning Influence Control Influence
Before 1992 After 1992 Before 1992 After 1992
01 SSW5 1.1 2.5 1.0 1.6
02 XFLT 1.6 2.8 1.2 2.0
03 GFDS 2.1 3.1 1.8 2.8
04 GDDS 2.0 3.1 1.8 2.6
05 BEEF 1.2 2.3 1.2 1.8
06 SMCW 1.3 2.4 1.1 1.8
07 GNFF 1.8 2.8 1.2 1.9
08 GNFB 2.1 3.2 1.9 2.8
09 BCRF 1.2 2.3 1.3 1.9
10 BIMT 1.3 2.5 1.2 1.9
11 SDS1 2.2 3.3 1.8 2.8
12 SCCW 1.4 2.3 1.2 1.9
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Enterprises Planning Influence Control Influence
Before 1992 After 1992 Before 1992 After 1992
13 SMEF 1.5 2.6 1.1 1.9
14 SCM2 1.6 2.7 1.1 1.9
15 SXSW 1.3 2.5 1.1 1.8
16 GLIL 1.9 2.9 1.2 2.0
17 XLIG 1.9 3.0 1.3 2.0
18 BCM3 1.4 2.4 1.1 1.9
19 BFSH 1.5 2.4 1.2 1.9
20 BPMH 1.7 2.7 1.3 2.1
7.3 RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING STYLES
The planning and control scores summary as shown in Section 7.2.3 is graphically presented in 
Figure 1 (see Appendix 3) by mapping the scores into a 2-dimensional grid called “Responsibility 
Accounting Style” which is a modified version from the Goold and Campbell’s (1991: 36) 
Management Strategies and Styles.
The vertical-axis represents the “degree of planning influence” ranging from very high (0) to very 
low (4). The higher the scores in this dimension, the lower the planning influences from the 
government on the 20 SOEs (external dimension) and from the enterprise managements on the 
responsibility centres (internal dimension). The horizontal-axis represents the “degree of control 
influence” ranging from tight financial control (0) to tight strategic control (4). The higher the 
scores in this dimension, the lower the control influences from the government on the 20 SOEs 
(external dimension) and from the enterprise managements on the responsibility centres (internal 
dimension). The lower the control score, the more the tendency towards strategic control.
From the “Responsibility Accounting Style Grid’ (Figure 1), basically two types of “Style 
Changes” can be identified. Firstly, the following 15 enterprises have been moving from the 
“Financial Programming Style” to the “Financial Control Style” since 1992:
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EC* Location Industry Ownership 
Before 1992
Ownership 
After 1992
SSW5(01) Shanghai Iron & Steel Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
XFLT(02) Xiamen Machines & Equipment Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
BEEF(05) Beijing Machines & Equipment Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
SMCW(06) Shanghai Machines & Equipment Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
GNFF(07) Guangzhou Consumables (Food) Wholly SOE Shareholding
BCRF(09) Beijing Machines & Equipment Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
BIMT(IO) Beijing Machines & Equipment Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
SCCW(12) Shanghai Machines & Equipment Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
SMEF(13) Shanghai Machines & Equipment Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
SCM2(14) Shanghai Textiles Wholly SOE Shareholding
SXSW(15) Shanghai Iron & Steel Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
GLIL(16) Guangzhou Consumables (Cleaning) Wholly SOE Shareholding
XLIG(17) Xiamen Consumables (Beverage) Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
BCM3(18) Beijing Textiles Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
BFSH(19) Beijing Hotel Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
* Enterprise Code and Number.
Some observations from the above table are as follows:
(1) The 5 Beijing Wholly SOEs (i.e. BEEF(05), BCRF(09), BIMT(IO), BCM3(18), 
BFSH(19)) investigated in this research have changed from "high planning influence” 
and “financial control influence” to “medium planning influence” and “moderate 
financial control influence "since 1992.
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(2) Similarly, the 5 Shanghai Wholly SOEs1 (i.e. SSW5(01), SMCW(06), SCCW(12), 
SMEF(13), SXSW(15)) investigated in this research have changed from “high planning 
influence” and “financial control influence” to “medium planning influence” and 
“moderate financial control influence” since 1992.
(3) The 2 Xiamen Wholly SOEs (i.e. XFLT(02), XLIG(17)) investigated in this research have 
changed from “high-medium planning influence ” and “financial control influence ” to 
“medium-low planning influence ” and “moderate financial control influence ” since 
1992.
(4) Similar to (3), the 2 Guangzhou Shareholding SOEs (i.e. GNFF(07), GLIL(16)) 
investigated in this research have changed from “high-medium planning influence ” and 
“financial control influence” to “medium-low planning influence” and “moderate
financial control influence” since 1992.
(5) Comparatively, the planning and control influences in the 2 iron and steel works (i.e. 
SSW5(01), SXSW(15)) have been reduced by greater extents than the machine and 
equipment manufacturers (e.g. BEEF(05), SMCW(06), BCRF(09), SCCW(12)) since 
1992.
(6) The 2 consumable manufacturers (i.e. GLIL(16), XLIG(17)) have been moving towards 
the “moderatefinancial control” cmd “moderate strategic control” suggesting that their 
businesses have better prospects and their operations are more dynamic than the other 13 
SOEs.
Secondly, the following 5 enterprises have been moving from either the “Financial Programming
Style” or the “Financial Control Style” to the “Strategic Control Style” since 1992:
1 Except SCM2(14) which has been converted into a shareholding enterprise after 1992 
but still subject to medium planning and control influences.
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EC* Location Industry Ownership 
Before 1992
Ownership 
After 1992
GFDS(03) Guangzhou Department Store Wholly SOE Shareholding
GDDS(04) Guangzhou Department Store Wholly SOE Shareholding
GNFB(08) Guangzhou Department Store Wholly SOE Shareholding
SD Sl(ll) Shanghai Department Store Wholly SOE Shareholding#
BPMH(20) Beijing Printing Machines Manu. Wholly SOE Shareholding+
* Enterprise Code and Number.
# SDS1(11) is listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange.
+ BPMH(20) is listed in Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges.
Some observations from the above table are as follows:
(1) The 4 department stores in Guangzhou and Shanghai (i.e. GFDS(03), GDDS(04), 
GNFB(08), SDSl(ll)) investigated in this research have changed from “medium 
planning influence” and “moderate financial control influence” to “low planning 
influence” and “strategic control influence "since 1992.
(2) The listed printing machines manufacturer (i.e. BPMH(20)) in Beijing investigated in this 
research has changed from “high-medium planning influence ” and “financial control 
influence” to “medium-low planning influence” and “moderate strategic control 
influence”since 1992. Therefore, the style has changed faster from “Financial 
Programming’ to “Strategic control”.
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7.4 HYPOTHESES TESTING
As described in the “Research Problem and Hypotheses” section in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.5), 
the “Primary Hypothesis” as derived from the research problem is defined as follow:
HO ~  The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 20 SOEs investigated in this research have not 
changed before and after 1992.
The “Research Domain” as shown in Section 1.4 in Chapter 1 and Figure 1 in Appendix 3 
indicates that the following two general factors/variables are the major contributing factors to 
reject the above primary null hypothesis:
(1) Legislation (i.e. SOE Operational Mechanisms Transformation Regulation 1992);
(2) Socialist Market Economy.
The following four “Secondary Hypotheses” (or Sub-Hypotheses) can also be identified in 
association with the above primary null hypothesis. They are believed to be affected by the three 
specific factors/variables, inter alia, ownership changes (for HI and H2), local government 
policies and regulations (for H3) and macro-economic control measures (for H4) respectively.
HI The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 12 Wholly SOEs, which have remained as 
Wholly SOEs after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.
H2 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 8 Wholly SOEs, which have converted to 
Shareholding SOEs after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.
H3 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 20 SOEs, which are located in 4 different cities, 
have not changed before and after 1992.
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H4 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 20 SOEs, which belong to 6 different industries, 
have not changed before and after 1992.
The major purposes behind testing the above one primary and four secondary null hypotheses are 
as follow:
(a) to ascertain the changes of the styles of responsibility accounting adopted by the top 
management in the 20 SOEs investigated in this research before and after the related legal, 
ownership, economic and government policy transformations started in the early 1990s 
(both general and specific factors/variables started in 1992);
(b) to investigate how far the planning and control systems, which are pertinent to the styles 
of responsibility accounting, have changed, if at all, under the emergence of these legal, 
ownership, economic and government policy transformations;
(c) to identify the underlying reasons for these changes; and
(d) to understand how these changes are made and are there any external and internal 
constraints limiting the ways and extents of the changes.
The results of (a) are represented by Figure 2 (see Appendix 3) and explained in Section 7.3 
above. The details of (b), (c) and (d) are described in Chapters 5 and 6, and also Section 7.5 of 
this chapter.
The following 5 sections are dedicated to test the above defined primary null hypothesis and 4 
secondary null hypotheses by using both parametric and non-parametric statistical methods. 
Direct observations from the changes of planning and control influence scores of these 20 SOEs 
before and after 1992 are also compared to support the rejection of all the hypotheses.
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7.4.1 All 20 SOEs
This section is testing the “Primary Null Hypothesis : HO" stating that the Responsibility 
Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences of these 20 SOEs 
investigated in this research have not changed before and after 1992.
Referring to Table 6A (compiled by Microsoft Excel) in the Appendix 1, it is noted that the 
planning influence scores of these 20 SOEs have increased in the range of 0.9-1.4 since 1992. 
The overall planning influence score increase is 1.09 which is significant compared with the 
overall score of 1.61 before 1992. From the same Table 6A, the control influence scores of these 
20 SOEs have increased in the range of 0.6-1.0 since 1992. The average control influence score 
increase is 0.76 which is significant compared with the overall score of 1.31 before 1992.
By mapping the overall planning and control influence scores before 1992 (i.e. [1.61, 1.31]) and 
after 1992 (i.e. [2.69, 2.07]) of these 20 SOEs into the “Responsibility Accounting Style Grid” 
as shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix 3, the general trend has been moving from “Financial 
Programming' (high-medium planning influence and financial control) towards in between 
“Financial Control' and “Strategic Control' (medium-low planning influence and very moderate 
strategic control).
To verify the above observations statistically, a non-parametric test called “Wilcoxon Matched- 
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test” is employed as shown in Workings 1.1 A &B  (see Appendix 4 run by 
SPSS and data based on Table 6A). Both the Wilcoxon Z Scores for the planning and control 
mean differences (before and after 1992) of these 20 SOEs (n=20) are 3.92 and are significant at 
p<0.05.
In addition, a parametric statistical test called “T-Tests for Paired Samples” is used as shown 
in Workings 2.1 A & B (see Appendix 4 run by SPSS and data based on Table 6A) in order to test 
the hypothesis in a quantitative manner. The t-values for the planning and control mean 
differences (before and after 1992) of these 20 SOEs (n=20) are 42.69 and 29.75 respectively 
which are both significant at p<0.05.
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Therefore, it is concluded that the “Primary Null Hypothesis : HO" can be rejected or the 
Responsibility Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences o f these 
20 SOEs investigated in this research have changed since 1992. These changes are found to be 
due to two general factors/variables: (1) legislation; and (2) socialist market economy as 
described in Section 1.2.1 o f Chapter 1.
7.4.2 Wholly SOEs to Wholly SOEs
This section is testing the first “Secondary Null Hypothesis : HP ' stating that the Responsibility 
Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences of the 12 Wholly SOEs, 
which have remained as wholly SOEs after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.
Referring to Table 6B1 in the Appendix 1, it is noted that the planning influence scores of these 
12 Wholly SOEs have been increased in the range of 0.9-1.4 since 1992. The overall planning 
influence score increase is 1.11 which is significant compared with the overall score of 1.39 before 
1992. From the same Table 6B1, the control influence scores of these 12 Wholly SOEs have 
increased in the range of 0.6-0.8 since 1992. The overall control influence score increase is 0.70 
which is significant compared with the overall score of 1.17 before 1992.
By mapping the overall planning and control influence scores before 1992 (i.e. [1.39, 1.17]) and 
after 1992 (i.e. [2.50, 1.87]) of these 12 Wholly SOEs into the “Responsibility Accounting Style 
Grid” as shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix 3, the general trend is movement from “Financial 
Programming’ (high planning influence and financial control) towards the “Financial Control’ 
(medium planning influence and moderate financial control).
To verify the above observations statistically, a non-parametric test called “Wilcoxon Matched- 
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test” is employed as shown in Workings 1.2A &B  (see Appendix 4 run by 
SPSS and data based on Table 6B1). Both the Wilcoxon Z Scores for the planning and control 
mean differences (before and after 1992) of these 12 Wholly SOEs (n=12) are 3.06 and are 
significant at p<0.05.
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In addition, a parametric statistical test called “T-Tests for Paired Samples” is used as shown 
in Workings 2.2A &B  (see Appendix 4 run by SPSS and data based on Table 6B1) in order to 
test the hypothesis in a statistical manner. The t-values for the planning and control mean 
differences (before and after 1992) of these 12 Wholly SOEs (n=12) are 27.84 and 32.83 
respectively which are both significant at p< 0.05.
Therefore, it is concluded that the first “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H I" can he rejected or the 
Responsibility Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences o f these 
12 Wholly SOEs changed although they have remained as Wholly SOEs after 1992.
7.4.3 Wholly SOEs to Shareholding SOEs
This section is testing the second “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H2" stating that the 
Responsibility Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences of the 8 
Wholly SOEs before 1992, which have converted into Shareholding SOEs after 1992, have not 
changed before and after 1992.
Referring to Table 6B2 in the Appendix 1, it is noted that the planning influence scores of these 
8 Shareholding SOEs have increased in the range of 1.0-1.1 since 1992. The overall planning 
influence score increase is 1.05 which is significant compared with the overall score of 1.93 before 
1992. From the same Table 6B2, the control influence scores of these 8 Shareholding SOEs have 
increased in the range of 0.7-1.0 since 1992. The overall control influence score increase is 0.85 
which is significant compared with the overall score of 1.51 before 1992.
By mapping the overall planning and control influence scores before 1992 (i.e. [1.93, 1.51]) and 
after 1992 (i.e. [2.98, 2.36]) of these 8 Shareholding SOEs into the “Responsibility Accounting 
Style Grid” as shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix 3, the general trend has moved from “Financial 
Programming1’ (high-medium planning influence and financial control) towards the “Strategic 
ControE (medium-low planning influence and moderate strategic control).
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To verify the above observations statistically, a non-parametric test called “Wilcoxon Matched- 
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test” is employed as shown in Workings 1.3A &B  (see Appendix 4 run by 
SPSS and data based on Table 6B2). Both the Wilcoxon Z Scores for the planning and control 
mean differences (before and after 1992) of these 8 Shareholding SOEs (n=8) are 2.52 and are 
significant at p<0.05.
In addition, a parametric statistical test called “T-Tests for Paired Samples” is used as shown 
in Workings 2.3A &B  (see Appendix 4 run by SPSS and data based on Table 6B2) in order to 
test the hypothesis in a statistical manner. The t-values for the planning and control mean 
differences (before and after 1992) of these 8 Shareholding SOEs (n=8) are 55.56 and 22.49 
respectively which are both significant at p< 0.05.
Therefore, it is concluded that the second “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H2" can be rejected or 
the Responsibility Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences of 
these 8 Wholly SOEs before 1992, which have converted into Shareholding SOEs after 1992, 
have changed since 1992. Hence, as described in Section 1.2.2.1 o f Chapter 1, the change o f 
ownership affects the planning and control systems o f these 8 SOEs.
Are the Shareholding SOEs changing faster than the Wholly SOEs? To compare the changes of 
the planning and control influences of these 8 Shareholding SOEs with the 12 Wholly SOEs 
described in Section 7.4.2, a parametric “Independent Samples T-Test” is performed by SPSS 
as shown in Workings W3.1A, B, C & W3.2A, B, C (see Appendix 4) and the results are 
summarized below:
Comparing Samples Periods Planning Influence 
t-values
Control Influence 
t-values
8 Wholly SOEs (a) Vs Before 1992 5.46 (p=0.001*) 3.40 (p=0.003*)
12 Shareholding SOEs (b) After 1992 4.72 (p=0.001*) 3.92 (p=0.001*)
Mean Score Differences (b)-(a)# 1.13 (p=0.272) 3.73 (p=0.002*)
* Significant at p^0.05.
# The mean differences of planning and control scores before and after 1992 of each SOE in both 
samples (i.e. 12 Wholly SOEs and 8 Shareholding SOEs).
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(1) Both the planning and control influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 12 Wholly SOEs and 
8 Shareholding SOEs are signi ficantly different before and after 1992. In general, the 
8 Shareholding SOEs are moving towards the “Strategic Control Style ” with lower 
planning and control influences than the other 12 Wholly SOEs.
(2) The decreases o f planning influences (or increases in mean score differences) before 
and after 1992 o f the 12 Wholly SOEs and 8 Shareholding SOEs are not significantly 
different which implies that the magnitudes o f change in planning influence o f the two 
samples are the same.
(3) The decreases of control influences (or increases in mean score differences) before and 
after 1992 o f the 12 Wholly SOEs and 8 Shareholding SOEs are signi ficantly different 
which implies that the magnitude o f change in control influence o f the latter sample is 
higher than the former sample.
Therefore, the pace o f change is similar regardless o f ownership for planning but the 8 
Shareholding SOEs are moving more quickly in terms o f control changes.
7.4.4 Geographical Locations
This section is testing the third “Secondary Null Hypothesis: H3" stating that the Responsibility 
Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences of the 20 SOEs, which are 
located in 4 different cities (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen, Guangzhou), have not changed before 
and after 1992.
The changes of planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs categorized by the 4 cities are 
shown in Table 6C in the Appendix 1. By the same reasoning as described in Sections 7.4.1-3 
above, the planning and control influences of all these 20 SOEs have changed significantly before 
and after 1992 irrespective of their geographical locations. Their “Responsibility Accounting 
Styles” have changed in the following 3 directions (disregarding their geographical locations):
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RA Style Before 1992 RA Style After 1992 Enterprises
1 Financial Programming Financial Control 15 SOEs other than (2) and (3) 
below
2 Financial Control Strategic Control GFDS(03), GFDD(04), 
GNFB(08), SD Sl(ll)
3 Financial Programming Strategic Control BPMH(20)
To test the geographical differences, a non-parametric test called “Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks Test” is employed as shown in Workings 1.4A & B, 1.5A & B, 1.6A & B, 1.7A & 
B (see Appendix 4 run by SPSS and data based on Table 6C). The results are summarized as 
follows:
Cities Planning Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
Wilcoxon Z Scores
Control Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
Wilcoxon Z Scores
Beijing 2.20 (n=6; p=0.0277*) 2.20 (n=6; p=0.0277*)
Shanghai 2.37 (n=7; p=0.0180*) 2.37 (n=7; p=0.0180*)
Xiamen 1.34 (n=2; p=0.17972) 1.34 (n=2; p=0.1797)
Guangzhou 2.02 (n=5; p=0.0431*) 2.02 (n=5; p=0.0431*)
* Significant at p< 0.05.
In addition, a parametric statistical test called “T-Tests for Paired Samples” is used as shown 
in Workings 2.4A & B, 2.5A & B, 2.6A & B, 2.7A & B (see Appendix 4 run by SPSS and data 
based on Table 6C) in order to test the hypothesis in a statistical manner. The results are 
summarized as follows:
2 The Z-scores for the planning and control mean differences are not significant at p=0.05 
but since the sample (n=2) is too small, there are insufficient evidence to statistically reject the null 
hypothesis in respect of the 2 SOEs investigated in Xiamen.
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Cities Planning Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
t-values
Control Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
t-values
Beijing 24.52 (n=6; df=5; p<0.001*) 19.17 (n=6; df^ =5; p<0.001*)
Shanghai 19.96 (n=7; df^6; p<0.001*) 15.74 (n=7; df=6; p<0.001*)
Xiamen 23.00 (n=2; df=l; p<0.028*3) 15.00 (n=2; df=l; p<0.042*)
Guangzhou 42.46 (n=5; df=4; p<0.001*) 16.47 (n=5; df=4; p<0.001*)
* Significant at p<0.05.
Therefore, it is concluded that the third “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H3" can be rejected or 
the Responsibility Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences of 
these 20 SOEs, which are located in 4 different cities, have changed since 1992 disregarding 
their geographical locations. These changes are found to be due to the different local 
government policies and regulations as described in Section 1.2.2.2 o f Chapter 1.
Compared the changes in planning and control influence scores among these 4 cities, a summary 
is drawn as follow:
Cities* Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
1 Beijing High (1.38) to 
Medium (2.43)
Financial (1.22) to 
Moderate Fin. (1.92)
Fin. Programming to 
Financial Control
2 Shanghai High (1.49) to 
Medium-Low (2.61)
Financial (1.20) to 
Moderate Fin. (1.96)
Fin. Programming to 
Financial Control
3 Xiamen High-Medium (1.75) 
to Medium-Low (2.9)
Financial (1.25) to 
Moderate Fin. (2.00)
Fin. Programming to 
Financial Control
4 Guangzhou High-Medium (1.98) 
to Low (3.02)
Moderate Fin. (1.58) 
to Moderate Strategic 
(2.42)
Fin. Programming or 
Financial Control to 
Strategic Control
* The cities are ranked in the order from north to south. The capital is in Beijing.
3 Compared with the insufficient statistical evidence by using Wilcoxon Test as shown 
above (i.e. footnote 2), this t-test is justified to reject the null hypothesis in respect of the planning 
and control influences of the 2 SOEs investigated in Xiamen.
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To test statistically the changes of the planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs located 
in 4 different cities, a parametric “One-Way ANOVA Test”4 is performed by SPSS as shown in 
Workings W3.3A, B, C & W3.4A, B, C (see Appendix 4) and the results are summarized below:
Comparing Locations Periods Planning Influence 
F-Ratios
Control Influence 
F-Ratios
Beijing vs Shanghai vs 
Xiamen vs Guangzhou
Before 1992 5.79 (p=0.007*) 2.82 (p=0.072)
After 1992 6.40 (p=0.005*) 2.65 (p=0.084)
Mean Score Differences # 1.01 (p=0.412) 1.48 (p=0.258)
* Significant at p<0.05.
# The mean differences of planning and control scores before and after 1992 of the SOEs in 4
different geographical locations (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen, Guangzhou).
From the above results, 3 observations are offered.
(1) The planning influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs located in 4 different cities are 
signi ficantly different before and after 1992.
(2) The control influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs located in 4 different cities are 
not signi ficantly different before and after 1992.
(3) The decreases o f planning and control influences (or increases in the mean score 
differences) before and after 1992 o f the 20 SOEs located in 4 different cities are not 
signi ficantly different which implies that the magnitudes o f change in both planning and 
control influences o f the four samples are the same.
4 One-Way ANOVA Test has to be used because there are 4 sets of sample means (i.e.
4 cities) to compare instead of using Independent Samples T-Tests to compare 2 sets of sample 
means.
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Pursuant to observation (1) above, “Independent Samples T-Tests” are performed to identify 
that the following paired-comparisons indicate significant planning differences before and after 
1992 among these 4 cities5.
Comparing Cities Planning Influence 
(Before 1992) t-values
Planning Influence 
(After 1992) t-values
Beijing vs Xiamen Not significant 3.83 (p=0.009*)
Beijing vs Guangzhou 5.84 (p=0.001*) 6.18 (p=0.001*)
Shanghai vs Guangzhou 2.95 (p=0.014*) 2.52 (p=0.030*)
* Significant at p<0.05.
The above observations can suggest that the further away from the central government (i.e. in 
Beijing), the less planning influences are exerted from the local government on the SOEs 
(external dimension) and in turn, from the enterprise management on the responsibility centres 
within these SOEs (internal dimension). Furthermore, the more favourable economic policies 
granted to Xiamen and Guangzhou have enhanced the management independence o f the SOEs 
located in these two cities.
7.4.5 Industrial Differences
This section is testing the fourth “Secondary Null Hypothesis: H4" stating that the Responsibility 
Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences of these 20 SOEs, which 
belong to 6 different industries, have not changed before and after 1992 disregarding which 
industries they belong to.
The changes of planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs categorized by the 6 industries 
are shown in Table 6D in the Appendix 1. By the same reasoning as described in Sections 7.4.1- 
3 above, the planning and control influences of all these 20 SOEs have changed significantly 
before and after 1992 irrespective of which industries they belong to.
5 There are 6 combinations to compare 2 sample means among the 4 sample means (i.e.
4 cities) for the planning influence and similarly there are 6 combinations for the control influence. 
Only those paired-comparisons with significant differences are shown in the table.
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To verify the above observations statistically, a non-parametric test called “Wilcoxon Matched- 
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test” is employed as shown in Workings 1.8A & B, 1.9A & B, 1.1 OA & B, 
1.11 A & B, 1.12A &B (see Appendix 4 run by SPSS and data based on Table 6D). The results 
are summarized as follows:
Industries Planning Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
Wilcoxon Z Scores
Control Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
Wilcoxon Z Scores
Iron & Steel 1.34 (n=2; p<0.1797#) 1.34 (n=2; p<0.1797#)
Machines & 
Equipment
2.52 (n=8; p<0.0117*) 2.52 (n=8; p<0.0117*)
Department
Stores
1.83 (n=4; p<0.0679#) 1.83 (n=4; p<0.0679#)
Consumables 1.60 (n=3; p<0.1088#) 1.60 (n=3; p<0.1088#)
Textiles 1.34 (n=2; p<0.1797#) 1.34 (n=2; p<0.1797#)
Hotel N/A (i.e. n=l) N/A (i.e. n=l)
* Significant at p<0.05.
# The Z-scores for the planning and control mean differences are not significant at p=0.05 but 
since the sample sizes are small (i.e. n<5), there are insufficient evidence to statistically reject the 
null hypothesis in respect of these 4 industries.
In addition, a parametric statistical test called “T-Tests for Paired Samples” is used as shown 
in Workings 2.8A & B, 2.9A & B, 2.10A & B, 2.11A & B, 2.12A & B (see Appendix 4 run by 
SPSS and data based on Table 6D) in order to test the hypothesis in a statistical manner. The 
results are summarized as follows:
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Industries Planning Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
t-values
Control Influence (Before & 
After 1992 Mean Difference) 
t-values
Iron & Steel 13.00 (n=2; df=l; p<0.049*#) 13.00 (n=2; df=l; p<0.049*#)
Machines & 
Equipment
31.04 (n=8; df=7; p<0.001*) 24.15 (n=8; df=7; p<0.001*)
Department
Stores
43.00 (n=4; df=J; p<0.001*#) 19.32 (n=4; df=3; p<0.001*#)
Consumables 31.00 (n=3; df=2; p<0.001*#) 22.00 (n=3; df=2; p<0.002*#)
Textiles 21.00 (n=2; df=l; p<0.030*#) N/A (data sets are the same)
Hotel N/A (i.e. df=0) N/A (i.e. df=0)
* Significant at p<0.05.
# Compared with the insufficient statistical evidence by using Wilcoxon Test as shown before the 
T-Tests for Paired Samples (remark per #) on p.291, the above t-test is justified to reject the null 
hypothesis in respect of the planning and control influences of these 4 industries.
Therefore, it is concluded that the fourth “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H4" can be rejected or 
the Responsibility Accounting Styles and the associated Planning and Control Influences o f 
these 20 SOEs have changed since 1992 disregarding which industries they belong to. These 
changes are found to be due to the macro-economic control measures as described in Section 
1.2.2.3 o f Chapter 1.
Comparing the extents of changes in planning and control influences, and the resultant 
responsibility accounting styles among these 6 different industries, the following table is compiled:
Industries* Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
1 Iron & 
Steel
High (1.20) to 
Medium (2.50)
Financial (1.05) to 
Moderate Fin. (1.70)
Financial Programming 
to Financial Control
2 Machines 
& Equip.
High (1.40) to 
Medium (2.49)
Financial (1.20) to 
Moderate Fin. (1.91)
Financial Programming 
to Financial Control
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Industries* Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
3 Hotel High (1.50) to 
Medium (2.40)
Financial (1.20) to 
Moderate Fin. (1.90)
Financial Programming 
to Financial Control
4 Textiles High (1.50) to 
Medium-Low (2.55)
Financial (1.10) to 
Moderate Fin. (1.90)
Financial Programming 
to Financial Control
5 Consuma­
bles
High-Medium (1.87) 
to Medium-Low 
(2.90)
Financial (1.23) to 
Moderate Fin. (1.97)/ 
Moderate Strategic
Financial Programming 
to Financial Control/ 
Strategic Control
6 Depart­
ment Store
Medium (2.10) to 
Low (3.18)
Moderate Fin. (1.83) 
to Strategic (2.75)
Financial Control to 
Strategic Control
le industries are ranked in order of higher to lower planning and control influences.
Observed from the above table, it indicates that the responsibility accounting styles of the first 
4 industries (i.e. iron & steel, machines & equipment, hotel and textiles) have been changing from 
“Moderate Financial Programming Style” before 1992 to “Financial Control Style” after 1992. 
Whereas, the consumable industry is moving closer to the “Moderate Strategic Control Style” 
after 1992. Finally, the retailing industry (i.e. department stores) has already been in the 
“Financial Control Style” before 1992 and has entered into the “Strategic Control Style” after 
1992.
To test statistically the changes of the planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs which 
belong to 6 different industries, a parametric “One-Way ANOVA Test” is performed by SPSS 
as shown in Workings W3.5A, B, C & W3.6A, B, C (see Appendix 4) and the results are 
summarized below:
Comparing Industries Period Planning Influence 
F-Ratios
Control Influence 
F-Ratios
6 Different Industries Before 1992 17.19 (p=0.001*) 66.74 (p=0.001*)
After 1992 12.38 (p=0.001*) 54.48 (p=0.001*)
Mean Score Differences # 3.57 (p=0.027*) 5.10 (p=0.007*)
* Significant at p<0.05.
# The mean differences of planning and control scores before and after 1992 of the SOEs in 6 
different industries.
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From the above results, 3 observations are offered.
(1) The planning influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs belonging to 6 different
industries are significantly different before and after 1992.
(2) The control influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs belonging to 6 different
industries are signi ficantly different before and after 1992.
(3) The decreases o f planning and control influences (or increases in the mean score
differences) before and after 1992 of the 20 SOEs belonging to 6 different industries are 
significantly different which implies that the magnitudes o f change in both planning and 
control influences o f the six industries are different.
Pursuant to observation (1) and (2) above, “Independent Samples T-Tests” are performed to
identify that the following paired-comparisons indicate significant planning and control
differences before and after 1992 among these 6 industries.
Comparing
Industries#
Planning Influence (t-values) Control Influence (t-values)
Before 1992 After 1992 Before 1992 After 1992
(A) vs (B) Not Significant Not Significant 2.53 (p=0.035*) 2.55 (p=0.034*)
(A) vs (C) 10.4 (p=0.001*) 9.40 (p=0.001*) 16.01 (p=0.001*) 10.84 (p=0.001*)
(A) vs (D) 7.75 (p=0.004*) 5.37 (p=0.013*) 3.22 (p=0.049*) Not Significant
(B) vs (C) 7.09 (p=0.001*) 6.52 (p=0.001*) 14.81 (p=0.001*) 13.76 (p=0.001*)
(B)vs(D) 4.16 (p=0.002*) 3.40 (p=0.008*) Not Significant Not Significant
(C) vs (D) 4.18 (p=0.009*) 3.69 (p=0.014*) 14.55 (p=0.001*) 11.98 (p=0.001*)
(C) vs (E) 6.93 (p=0.002*) 5.36 (p=0.006*) 19.33 (p=0.001*) 11.33 (p=0.001*)
(D) vs (E) 4.26 (p=0.024*) Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant
* Significant at p<0.05.
# A = Iron & Steel D = Consumables
B = Machines & Equipment E = Textiles
C = Department Stores F = Hotel
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The above paired-comparisons support the previous observations in this section that the changes 
o f planning and control influences o f the Department Stores (C) and Consumables (D) industries 
are higher than the other four industries (i.e. Iron & Steel (A), Machines & Equipment (B), 
Textiles (E) and Hotel (F)) which are mainly Wholly SOEs and located closer to the central 
government in Beijing.
Finally, pursuant to observation (3) on p.294, “Independent Samples T-Tests” are performed 
to identify that the following paired-comparisons indicate significant planning and control mean 
score (increase in magnitude) differences before and after 1992 among these 6 industries.
Comparing 
Industries#
Planning Influence 
t-values
Control Influence 
t-values
(A) vs (B) 2.55 (p=0.034*) 3.52 (p=0.024*)
(A) vs (C) 3.13 (p=0.035*) Not Significant
(B) vs (C) Not Significant 3.97 (p=0.003*)
(C) vs (D) Not Significant 3.04 (p=0.029*)
* Significant at p<0.05.
The above figures further reveal the phenomenon that the magnitudes of changes of planning and 
control influences in the Department Stores (C) and Consumables (D) industries are higher than 
the other four industries (i.e. Iron & Steel (A), Machines & Equipment (B), Textiles (E) and Hotel
(F)) which are mainly Wholly SOEs and located closer to the central government in Beijing.
295
7.5 MATRIX ANALYSIS
Under the “legislation” and "market economy?' changes (or general factors/variables) since 1992, 
all the 20 SOEs investigated in this study enjoy greater discretion over development and operation 
of their planning and control systems at the responsibility centre level. This statement is 
statistically verified by testing (or rejecting) the “Primary Hypothesis as shown in Section 7.4.1 
above. This enlarged autonomy applies whether the SOEs are wholly or partly owned by the 
government or have a listing on a stock exchange. This proposition is also statistically verified 
by testing (or rejecting) the first and second “Secondary Hypotheses - H I & H2" as shown in 
Sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.3 above.
The pace of change as measured by the degree of discretion over planning and control appears 
to vary with form of “ownership” (or specific factor/variable). This phenomenon is statistically 
tested in Section 7.4.3 and found that the pace of change is similar regardless of ownership (12 
Wholly SOEs v. 8 Shareholding SOEs) but the 8 Shareholding SOEs are changing more rapidly 
in terms of control influences.
The different pace of change is associated with (a) the “location” of the SOEs; and (b) the 
“industry” sector which are found to be affected by the “local government regulations” and 
“macro-economic control measures (or specific factors/variables) respectively. These two 
associations are also statistically verified by testing (or rejecting) the third and fourth “Secondary 
Hypotheses - H3 & H4" as shown in Sections 7.4.4 and 7.4.5 above. These two sections also 
highlight statistically that there are some planning and control differences among the various 
locations and industries of these 20 SOEs before and after 1992.
The purpose of this Section is to expand the previous analysis performed in Section 7.4 in order 
to combine the specific factors/variables (i.e. ownership, location and industry) and identify the 
underlying reasons for the changes in planning and control influences.
6 To enhance the implementation policies of socialist market economy was the top agenda 
item of the 15th Communist Party Representatives Conference of China held in September 1997 
according to Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 25 August 1997.
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7.5.1 Planning & Control Influences Analysis by Ownership & Location
The captioned analysis is summarized in Table 7A in the Appendix 1. Since the hypothesis testing 
performed in Section 7.4 confirms that the planning and control influences in the 20 SOEs have 
changed before and after 1992 irrespective of different types of ownership, locations and 
industries, it is justified to analyse the planning and control scores after 1992 which reflect the 
prevailing situation. Going into the details of Table 7A, the following observations can be 
offered.
(1) Both of the average planning and control scores of the Shareholding SOE (i.e. BPMH: 
2.70/2.10) are higher (or influences lower) than the 5 Wholly SOEs (2.38/1.92) located 
in Beijing.
(2) Both of the average planning and control scores of the 2 Shareholding SOEs (3.00/2.35) 
are higher (or influences lower) than the 5 Wholly SOEs (2.46/1.80) located in Shanghai.
(3) Both of the average planning and control scores of the 5 Shareholding SOEs (3.02/2.42) 
in Guangzhou are slightly higher (or influences lower) than the 2 Shareholding SOEs 
(3.00/2.35) in Shanghai. And in turn, both of the average planning and control scores of 
the 2 Shareholding SOEs (3.00/2.35) in Shanghai are higher (or influences lower) than the 
Shareholding SOE (2.70/2.10) in Beijing (i.e BPMH).
(4) Similar to (3), both of the average planning and control scores of the 2 Wholly SOEs 
(2.90/2.00) in Xiamen are higher (or influences lower) than the 5 Wholly SOEs 
(2.46/1.80) in Shanghai. In addition, the average planning score of the 5 Wholly SOEs 
(2.46) in Shanghai is higher (or influence lower) than the 5 Wholly SOE (2.38) in Beijing.
(5) As a combined result of (3) and (4), the average planning and control scores are in a 
descending order of Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shanghai and Beijing.
From observations (1) and (2) above, it suggests that the Shareholding SOEs in both Shanghai 
and Beijing are subject to less planning and control influences from their local government than 
the Wholly SOEs mainly because of the higher autonomy delegated to the shareholding 
enterprises according to the Company Law (1993). This change is more significant to the
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Shanghai shareholding enterprises as shown in Table 7 A in respect of the score differences 
between the two forms of ownership compared with Beijing.
In relation to observations (3), (4) and (5) above, it can be seen that both the average planning 
and control scores of the 5 Shareholding SOEs in Guangzhou are the highest (or the lowest 
planning and control influences) among the 20 SOEs selected from 4 different cities. Other than 
the reason that these 5 SOEs are shareholding enterprises, Guangzhou is one of the earliest 
economic developing cities in China which can be dated back to the early Qing Dynasty (1644- 
1911). Since the economic reform formally started in 1979, the industrial and commercial 
enterprises in Guangzhou have been granted substantial favourable local government policies and 
regulations (i.e. import/export, tax, foreign exchange, land use, capital investment, labour, pricing, 
etc.). Furthermore, Guangzhou is the capital of Guangdong Province and close to Hong Kong 
which has acted as an economic window or gateway for Guangzhou and Guangdong Province.
The average planning scores of the 2 Wholly SOEs in Xiamen is significantly higher (or influences 
lower) than the 10 Wholly SOEs investigated in Shanghai and Beijing and even higher than the 
listed SOE (i.e. BPMH) in Beijing. Xiamen has been one of the five Special Economic 
Development Zones since 1984 and enjoyed many favourable local government policies and 
regulations similar to Guangzhou in order to encourage foreign investment especially from Taiwan 
which is just across the Taiwan Strait. Some of the details are described in Chapters 5 & 6 (e.g. 
Sections 5.2-6, 6.3-4), and also Data Analyses 2 & 17 in Volume 3.
Both the average planning and control scores of the 10 Wholly SOEs in Shanghai and Beijing are 
lower (or influences higher) than their counterparts in Xiamen and Guangzhou. The 5 Wholly 
SOEs investigated in Shanghai are relatively old and traditional large-sized SOEs which are still 
subject to certain local government policies and regulations, and also some macro-economic 
control measures from their respective government authorities. Tighter situations can be found 
on the 5 Wholly SOEs located in Beijing which is the central government of China.
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Finally, the analysis in Table 7 A supports the findings at the end of Section 7.4.4 that the planning 
influences after 1992 are significant only between (1) Beijing and Xiamen (2.43 v. 2.90); (2) 
Beijing and Guangzhou (2.43 v.3.02); and (3) Shanghai and Guangzhou (2.61 v. 3.02). 
Furthermore, the control influences of the 20 SOEs located in the 4 different cities are not 
significantly different.
In conclusion, it is found that the planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs located in 4 
different cities are different mainly due to the specific factor/variable of “local government 
policies and regulations ”
7.5.2 Planning & Control Influences Analysis by Ownership & Industry
The captioned analysis is summarized in Table 7B in the Appendix 1. From this table, the 
following observations can be offered.
(1) Both of the average planning and control scores of the Shareholding SOE (i.e. BPMH: 
2.70/2.10) are higher (or influences lower) than the 5 Wholly SOEs (2.43/1.88) in the 
same industry of machines and equipment manufacturing.
(2) The average planning and control scores of the Shareholding SOE (i.e. SCM2: 2.70/1.90) 
are higher (or influence lower) than and equal to the Wholly SOE (i.e. BCM3: 2.40/1.90) 
in the same industry of textiles manufacturing respectively.
(3) Both of the average planning and control scores of the Wholly SOE (i.e. XLIG: 
3.00/2.00) are higher (or influences lower) than the 2 Shareholding SOEs (2.85/1.95) in 
the same industry of consumables manufacturing.
(4) According to the average scores, the degree of planning and control influences among the 
6 different industries can be ranked as follow (the higher the rank, the lower the planning 
or control influences):
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1 Shareholding SOEs 1 \ Wholly SOEs 1 \All SOEs 1
Industries* PS Rank# CS Rank+ PS Rank CS Rank PS Rank CS Rank
I& S N/A N/A 2nd 5th 4th 6th
M & E 3rd 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 3rd
D. Stores 1st 1st N/A N/A 1st 1st
Consum. 2nd 3rd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd
Textiles 3rd 4th 4th 2nd 3rd 4th
Hotel N/A N/A 4th 2nd 5th 4th
* Types of Industry: I & S
M & E  
D. Stores 
Consum. 
Textiles 
Hotel
# Ranking of Planning Scores 
+ Ranking of Control Scores
- Iron & Steel Manufacturing
- Machines & Equipment Manufacturing
- Department Stores (Retailing/Servicing)
- Consumables Manufacturing
- Textiles Manufacturing
- Hotel Servicing
From observations (1) and (2) above, it can suggest that the Shareholding SOEs in both the 
machines & equipment and textiles manufacturing industries are subject to less planning and 
control influences from their government authorities than the Wholly SOEs in the same industries 
mainly because of the higher autonomy delegated to the shareholding enterprises according to the 
Company Law (1993). Furthermore, the 2 Shareholding SOEs in these two industries are listed 
companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange with frill management authority vested in their boards 
of directors.
However, observation (3) indicates that the planning and control influences on the Wholly SOE 
(i.e. XLIG) are slightly lower than the 2 Shareholding SOEs in the same industry of consumables 
manufacturing. As explained in Section 7.5.1 above, Xiamen and Guangzhou are special 
economic development cities in which their SOEs enjoy more favourable local government 
policies and regulations.
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In relation to observation (4), the enterprises (6 Shareholding SOEs and 1 Wholly SOE) 
investigated in the industries of department stores and consumable manufacturing are subject to 
less planning and control influences when compared with the 13 SOEs in the other 4 industries 
selected for this study. The possible reason is that their respective government authorities exert 
less macro-economic control measures (see Section 1.2.2.3 in Chapter 1) on them as described 
in Chapters 5 & 6 (e.g. Sections 5.1-3, 5.5, 6.0-1, 6.3-4). Contrary, the Wholly SOEs in the 
machines & equipment, hotel and iron & steel industries are subject to tighter macro-economic 
controls from their government authorities similarly described in Chapters 5 & 6.
Finally, the analysis in Table 7B supports the findings at the end of Section 7.4.5 that the planning 
and control influences after 1992 are significantly different between the following pairs of 
industries:
1 Comvarinz Industries 1 \Comnarinz PS after 1992 1 \Comvarinz CS after 1992 1
I & S v . M & E Not Significant 1.77 v. 1.91
I & S v. D. Stores 2.53 v. 3.18 1.77 v. 2.75
I & S v. Consum. 2.53 v. 2.90 Not Significant
M & E v. D. Stores 2.40 v. 3.18 1.91 v. 2.75
M & E v. Consum. 2.40 v. 2.90 Not Significant
D. Stores v. Consum. 3.19v. 2.90 2.75 v. 1.97
D. Stores v. Textiles 3.19v. 2.55 2.75 v. 1.90
In conclusion, it is found that the planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs which belong 
to 6 different industries are different mainly due to the specific factor/variable of “macro- 
economic control measures” exerted by their respective government authorities.
7.5.3 Planning & Control Influences Analysis by Ownership/Industrv/Location
The captioned analysis is summarized in Table 7C in the Appendix 1. From this table, the 
following observations can be offered.
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(1) Beijing
(A) Both of the average planning and control scores of the Shareholding SOE (i.e. BPMH: 
2.70/2.10) are higher (or influences lower) than the 3 Wholly SOEs (2.37/1.87) in the 
industry of machines and equipment manufacturing.
(B) Both of the average planning and control scores of the 2 Wholly SOEs in the industries 
of textiles manufacturing and hotels are the same (i.e. BCM3:2.40/1.90; BFSH: 
2.40/1.90), and they are both slightly higher than the 3 Wholly SOEs (2.37/1.87) in the 
industry of machines and equipment manufacturing.
As a combined result of (A) and (B), all the 5 Wholly SOEs investigated in Beijing are subject to
similar local government policies and regulations, and macro-economic control measures from
their respective government authorities. The listed SOE (i.e. BPMH) has higher autonomy in
respect of planning and control systems.
(2) Shanghai
(C) Both of the average planning and control scores of the Shareholding SOE (i.e. SDS1: 
3.30/2.80) in the industry of department stores and the Shareholding SOE (i.e. SCM2: 
2.70/1.90) in the textiles industry are higher (or influences lower) than the other 5 Wholly 
SOEs (2.53/1.77 & 2.35/1.85) in the industries of iron & steel and machines & equipment 
manufacturing.
(D) The 2 listed Shareholding SOEs (i.e. SDS1 & SCM2) are subject to less local 
government policies and regulations, and macro-economic control measures from their 
respective government authorities especially the department store SDSl.
(3) Xiamen
(E) The planning and control influences on the 2 Wholly SOEs (i.e. XFLT: 2.80/2.00 & 
XLIG: 3.00/2.00) in two different industries are similar, but they are lower than all the 
Shareholding and Wholly SOEs in Beijing and Shanghai except the department store 
SDSl (3.30/2.80). This implies that the favourable local government policies and 
regulations granted to the enterprises in this city is the major reason.
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(4) Guangzhou
(F) The average planning scores of the 3 Shareholding SOE (3.13) in the industry of
department stores are higher (or influences lower) than the 3 Wholly SOEs (2.85) in the 
industry of consumables manufacturing.
(G) The average control scores of the 3 Shareholding SOE (2.73) in the industry of
department stores are significantly higher (or influences lower) than the 3 Wholly SOEs 
(1.95) in the industry of consumables manufacturing.
(H) The planning and control influences on the 5 Shareholding SOEs in the industries of
department stores and consumables manufacturing are lower than all the Shareholding and 
Wholly SOEs in Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen except the department store SDSl and the 
beverage manufacturer XLIG. This implies that the favourable local government policies 
and regulations granted to the enterprises in this city is the major reason.
7.5.4 Responsibility Accounting Style Analysis bv Ownership/Industrv/Location
The captioned analysis is summarized in Table 7D in the Appendix 1. This analysis is an extension 
of the above 3 matrix analyses (7.5.1-7.5.3) by looking into what types of ownership, industry and 
location of the 20 SOEs affect the classification of their post 1992 responsibility accounting styles 
into Strategic Control and Financial Control according to Goold and Campbell categories. This 
would allow a contingency framework to be inferred as the overall conclusion of these matrix 
analyses.
The 20 SOEs are ranked in descending order according to their Responsibility Accounting Scores 
(RA Scores) which are calculated by multiplying their respective Post 1992 Overall Average 
Planning Scores and Overall Average Planning Scores as listed in Section 7.2.3 of this Chapter 
(e.g. SDS1(1 l)=3.3x2.8=9.24). The higher the RA Score indicates the lower the planning 
influence or control influence or both, and the more bias to the strategic control style of 
responsibility accounting.
From Table 7D, the following observations can be offered.
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(1) All the 8 Shareholding SOEs are ranked within the top ten with RA Scores over 5.00. By 
drawing a line separating the 8 Strategic Control Style SOEs and the 12 Financial Control 
Style SOEs, 6 SOEs of the former group are shareholding enterprises.
(2) All the 4 Department Stores fall into the Strategic Control Style after 1992 and they are 
all Shareholding SOEs. All the 3 Consumables Manufacturing SOEs attain RA Scores 
over 5.30 and 2 of them (i.e. XLIG(17) & GLIL(16)) are moving towards the Strategic 
Control Style after 1992.
(3) All the 7 SOEs located in Guangzhou and Xiamen are ranked within the top nine and 
except GNFF(07), 6 of them belong to the Strategic Control Style after 1992.
The above observations suggest that the responsibility accounting style to be adopted by these 20 
SOEs are affected at least by three contingent variables — ownership, industry and location which 
are influenced by the shareholding transformation, macro-economic control measures and local 
government policies and regulations respectively as shown in the Responsibility Accounting 
Research Domain (Figure 1 in Appendix 3).
From the same Table 7D, some propositions, which are subject to future empirical research, can 
be made as follow.
#  In the Chinese Retailing Industry (e.g. department store), the Shareholding SOEs located 
in the Southern Provinces (e.g. Guangzhou) tend to adopt Strategic Control Style of 
Responsibility Accounting subject to less planning and control influences from the 
government after the legislation changes and market economy reforms since 1992.
#  In the Chinese Consumables Manufacturing Industry (e.g. food & beverage, cleaning 
products, etc.), the Shareholding SOEs located in the Southern Provinces (e.g. Xiamen, 
Guangzhou, etc.) are moving towards the Strategic Control Style of Responsibility 
Accounting subject to less planning and control influences from the government after the 
legislation changes and market economy reforms since 1992.
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•  In the Chinese Machine and Equipment Manufacturing Industry (e.g. crane, conveyor, 
rectifier, measuring tools, etc.), the Wholly SOEs located in the Northern Provinces (e.g. 
Beijing, Shanghai, etc.) enter into the Financial Control Style of Responsibility 
Accounting subject to various degrees of planning and control influences from the 
government after the legislation changes and market economy reforms since 1992.
The following table is a further analysis based on Table 7D of the ownership, location and industry 
effects on the RA Styles of the 20 SOEs. The Rank Index is the average of ranks of a certain type 
of ownership or location or industry within the 20 SOEs. For examples,
Ownership: Shareholding (8 SOEs) = (l+2+3+4+6+7+9+10)/8 = 42/8 = 5.25
Location: Beijing (6 SOEs) = (7+12+13+13+16+19)/6 = 80/6 = 13.33
Industry: M&E Manu. (7 SOEs) = (7+8+12+16+16+18+19) = 96/7 = 13.71
The lower Rank Index indicates that type of ownership or location or industry is subject to less 
planning and control influences from the government and bias to the Strategic Control RA Style.
Ownership Rank Index Location Rank Index Industry Rank Index
Shareholding 42/8 =5.25 Guangzhou 25/5= 4.80 Depart. Store 10/4= 2.50
Wholly SOE 166/12=13.8 Xiamen 13/2= 6.50 Consum. Manu. 20/3= 6.67
Shanghai 91/7=13.00 Textiles Manu. 23/2=11.50
Beijing 80/6=13.33 Hotel Servicing 13/1=13.00
M&E Manu. 96/7=13.71
Iron/Steel Manu. 46/3=15.30
From the above table, the following suggestions can be offered.
#  After the “ownership transformation”, the Shareholding SOEs are subject to less planning 
and control influences from the government.
#  The SOEs located closer to the central government (i.e. Beijing) are subject to tighter 
“local government policies and regulations” in terms of planning and control influences.
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•  Different industries are subject to various degrees of “macro-economic control measures”
taken by their respective government authorities. For example, the retailing and 
consumables manufacturing industries are subject to less planning and control influences 
from their government authorities than the machines and equipment, and iron and steel 
industries.
All in all, Section 7.5 (Matrix Analysis) reinforces the significance of the Research Domain, as
depicted under Section 1.4 in Chapter 1 and also Figure 1 in Appendix 3, which develops a
contingent framework of this research study.
7.6 SUMMARY
(1) 15 SOEs (mainly the Wholly SOEs before and after 1992) have been moving from the 
“Financial Programming Style" to the “Financial Control Style" since 1992. (see 7.3)
(2) 5 Shareholding SOEs have been moving from either the “Financial Programming Style" 
or the “Financial Control Style" to the “Strategic Control Style" since 1992. (see 7.3)
(3) By applying the descriptive, parametric (T-Tests for Paired Samples) and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test) statistics on the planning and control 
scores, it is concluded that the following “Primary Null Hypothesis : HO" can be 
rejected (see 7.4.1):
“770 — The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences o f the 20 SOEs investigated in this research have not changed 
before and after 1992."
(4) By applying the descriptive, parametric (T-Tests for Paired Samples) and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test) statistics on the planning and control 
scores, it is concluded that the following first “Secondary Null Hypothesis : HI" can be 
rejected (see 7.4.2):
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“HI — The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences of the 12 Wholly SOEs, which have remained as Wholly SOEs 
after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.”
(5) By applying the descriptive, parametric (T-Tests for Paired Samples) and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test) statistics on the planning and control 
scores, it is concluded that the following second “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H2" can 
be rejected (see 7.4.3):
UH2 — The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences o f the 8 Wholly SOEs, which have converted into Shareholding 
SOEs after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.”
(6) To compare the changes of planning and control influences of the 8 Shareholding SOEs 
with the 12 Wholly SOEs, a parametric “Independent Samples T-Test” is performed and 
the following 3 observations are offered (see 7.4.3).
6.1 Both the planning and control influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 12 Wholly 
SOEs and 8 Shareholding SOEs are significantly different before and after 1992. 
In general, the 8 Shareholding SOEs are moving towards the “Strategic Control 
Style ” with lower planning and control influences than the other 12 Wholly 
SOEs.
6.2 The decreases o f planning influences (or increases in mean score differences) 
before and after 1992 o f the 12 Wholly SOEs and 8 Shareholding SOEs are not 
significantly different which implies that the magnitudes o f change in planning 
influence o f the two samples are the same.
6.3 The decreases o f control influences (or increases in mean score differences) 
before and after 1992 o f the 12 Wholly SOEs and 8 Shareholding SOEs are 
signi ficantly different which implies that the magnitude o f change in control 
influence o f the latter sample is higher than the former sample.
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(7) By applying the descriptive, parametric (T-Tests for Paired Samples) and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test) statistics on the planning and control 
scores, it is concluded that the following third “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H3" can 
be rejected (see 7.4.4):
“H3 — The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences o f the 20 SOEs, which are located in 4 different cities, have not 
changed before and after 1992.”
(8) To test statistically the changes of the planning and control influences of the 20 SOEs 
located in 4 different cities, a parametric “One-Way ANOVA Test” is performed and the 
following 3 observations are offered (see 7.4.4).
8.1 The planning influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs located in 4 different 
cities are signi ficantly different before and after 1992.
8.2 The control influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs located in 4 different 
cities are not significantly different before and after 1992.
8.3 The decreases o f planning and control influences (or increases in the mean score 
differences) before and after 1992 of the 20 SOEs located in 4 different cities are 
not signi ficantly different which implies that the magnitudes o f change in both 
planning and control influences o f the four samples are the same.
(9) Pursuant to observation 8.1 above, “Independent Samples T-Tests” are performed and the 
results indicate significant planning differences between the SOEs in Beijing and Xiamen 
(only after 1992), in Beijing and Guangzhou, and in Shanghai and Guangzhou before and 
after 1992. (see 7.4.4)
(10) The above observations in (8) and (9) can suggest that the further away from the central 
government (i.e. in Beijing), the less planning influences are exerted from the local 
government on the SOEs (external dimension) and in turn, from the enterprise 
management on the responsibility centres within these SOEs (internal dimension).
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Furthermore, the more favourable economic policies granted to Xiamen and Guangzhou 
have enhanced the management independence of the SOEs located in these two cities, 
(see 7.4.4)
(11) By applying the descriptive, parametric (T-Tests for Paired Samples) and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test) statistics on the planning and control 
scores, it is concluded that the following fourth “Secondary Null Hypothesis : H4" can 
be rejected (see 7.4.5):
“H4 — The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning 
and Control Influences o f the 20 SOEs, which belong to 6 different industries, have not 
changed before and after 1992 disregarding which industry they belong to.”
(12) To test statistically the changes of the planning and control influences of the 20 SOEs 
which belong to 6 different industries, a parametric “One-Way ANOVA Test” is 
performed and the following 3 observations are offered (see 7.4.5).
12.1 The planning influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs belonging to 6
different industries are significantly different before and after 1992.
12.2 The control influences (i.e. mean scores) o f the 20 SOEs belonging to 6 different
industries are significantly different before and after 1992.
12.3 The decreases o f planning and control influences (or increases in the mean score 
differences) before and after 1992 o f the 20 SOEs belonging to 6 different 
industries are significantly different which implies that the magnitudes o f change 
in both planning and control influences o f the six industries are different.
(13) Pursuant to observation 12.1 above, “Independent Samples T-Tests” are performed and 
the results indicate significant planning differences between the following pairs of 
industries before and after 1992 (see 7.4.5):
13.1 iron & steel vs department stores
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13.2 iron & steel vs consumables
13.3 machines & equipment vs department stores
13.4 machines & equipment vs consumables
13.5 department stores & consumables
13.6 department stores & textiles
13.7 consumables vs textiles (only before 1992)
(14) Pursuant to observation 12.2 above, “Independent Samples T-Tests” are performed and 
the results indicate significant control differences between the following pairs of 
industries before and after 1992 (see 7.4.5):
14.1 iron & steel vs machines & equipment
14.2 iron & steel vs department stores
14.3 iron & steel vs consumables (only before 1992)
14.4 machines & equipment vs department stores
14.5 department stores vs consumables
14.6 department stores & textiles
(15) Thepaired-comparisons in (13) and (14) above support the previous observations (11 & 
12) that the changes of planning and control influences of the Department Stores and 
Consumables industries are higher than the other four industries (i.e. Iron & Steel, 
Machines & Equipment, Textiles, Hotel) which are mainly Wholly SOEs and located 
closer to the central government in Beijing, (see 7.4.5)
(16) Pursuant to observation 12.3 above, “Independent Samples T-Tests” are performed and 
the results indicate significant planning and control mean score (increase in magnitude) 
differences between the following pairs of industries before and after 1992 (see 7.4.5):
Planning Influence
16.1 iron & steel vs machines & equipment
16.2 iron & steel vs department stores
Control Influence
16.3 iron & steel vs machines & equipment
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16.4 machines & equipment vs department stores
16.5 department stores vs consumables
(17) The test results in (16) above further reveal the phenomenon that the magnitude of 
changes of planning and control influences in the Department Stores and Consumables 
industries are higher than the other four industries as described in (15) above, (see 7.4.5)
(18) The degrees of planning and control influences on the 20 SOEs located in 4 different cities 
are in a descending order — Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shanghai and Beijing, (see 7.5.1)
(19) It is found that the planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs located in 4 different 
cities are different mainly due to the specific factor/variable o f11 local government policies 
and regulations”. (see 7.5.1)
(20) The 6 Shareholding SOEs and 1 Wholly SOE investigated in the industries of department 
stores and consumables manufacturing are subject to less planning and control influences 
when compared with the 13 SOEs in the other 4 industries selected for this study, (see
7.5.2)
(21) It is found that the planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs which belong to 6 
different industries are different mainly due to the specific factor/variable of “macro- 
economic control measured exerted by their respective government authorities, (see
7.5.2)
(22) The responsibility accounting style to be adopted by these 20 SOEs are affected at least 
by three contingent variables -- ownership, industry and location which are influenced by 
the shareholding transformation, macro-economic control measures and local government 
policies and regulations respectively as shown in the Responsibility Accounting Research 
Domain. (7.5.3)
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CHAPTER 8 : SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This final chapter summarizes the key purposes, findings and implications of the whole study. 
Firstly, the motive or importance to perform this research is highlighted (Section 8.2). Secondly, 
a summary of major research findings and some implications of this study, which are subjected 
to certain limitations, are provided (Sections 8.3-8.5). Thirdly, specific areas for future research 
in responsibility (management) accounting are described (Section 8.6). Fourthly, 
recommendations on SOE and responsibility (management) accounting reforms are listed for 
practice and research references (Section 8.7). Finally, an overview of this research (Section 8.8) 
is narrated before the ending conclusion (Section 8.9).
8.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH
At the conclusion of the State Economic Planning Conference held in Beijing from 6-8 December 
1996, the following 6 economic and social development plans were emphasized for further 
promulgation in 19971:
(1) to enhance the productivity of agricultural products;
(2) to provide appropriate external environments and policies for promoting the SOE’s
efficiency and profitability:;
(3) to maintain the high industrial output growth and enhance overall economic efficiency;
(4) to monitor and adjust the capital investment portfolio;
(5) to promote the science and technology education; and
(6) to adjust the foreign investment portfolio to increase overall contribution.
1 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 9 December 1996.
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To promote SOE efficiency and profitability, the following 4 action plans2 were approved:
(1) to establish a “modern enterprise system3” (or corporate governance in generic terms);
(2) to assess the top management performance and ability, and make replacements if
necessary;
(3) to enhance the enterprise management system; and
(4) to set appropriate policies to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; including:
(i) to purchase and use products made in China;
(ii) to diversify different channels to raise capital and reduce debts;
(iii) to forbid illegal appropriation of profits, funds and assets;
(iv) to expedite the social security system development; and
(v) to facilitate the re-employment scheme.
The purposes of establishing a “Modern Enterprise System” are to allow a SOE:
(1) to be independent from the government (subject to macroeconomic control only);
(2) to be self-financed and self-managed;
(3) to be market driven/oriented; and
(4) to employ scientific management.
The major context of “Modem Enterprise System” refers to the following 3 elements applicable 
to the SOEs4:
(1) Legal entity — the separation of ownership and management rights. The government is 
the ultimate owner of the SOE and is involved in strategic planning and selection of top 
management, but should not interfere in the daily operation.
(2) Limited liability -- allowed to be converted into shareholding enterprises.
(3) Scientific management — maintain independence and control among the division of
ownership, supervision, policy making and implementation within a SOE.
2 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 25 November 1996.
3 As from 1995, 2,500 SOEs have been selected to implement the “modern enterprise 
scheme” (including SSW5, GFDS, GDDS, GNFB, SDS1, SCM2, GLIL, BPMH).
4 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 15 March 1995.
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Apparently, the scope of “Scientific Management’ mainly covers the internal management 
aspects, including the planning and control systems, of the SOEs which rely on the responsibility 
accounting system. An understanding of the historical development and contemporary issues of 
the responsibility accounting system is crucial to reform this most important management 
accounting practice in China. More importantly, extensive and in-depth empirical research and 
experiments should be performed by the accounting academics and practitioners with specific 
attention paid to the feasibility of transplanting the western management accounting theories and 
techniques. This research study is to set an initial milestone to investigate and explain the current 
substance of the responsibility accounting system adopted by 20 SOEs from a cross-section of 
industries, and at the same time, observations from the case studies can suggest many propositions 
and hypotheses for future testing and comparisons with the western literature and research 
findings. The researcher strongly believes that management (responsibility) accounting is an 
indispensable tool to facilitate the economic well-being of the Chinese enterprises.
8.3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS
8.3.1 Planning System & Influence (see Chapter 5)
The promulgation of market economy and SOE operation mechanisms transformation (general 
factors/variables ascertained in Section 1.2.1 of Chapter 1) since 1992, and the significant 
restructuring of the State Council organisations in 1993 have encouraged the initiation and 
involvement of the enterprise managements to formulate both their long- and short-term plans. 
The planning influences from the government to enterprises (external dimension) and from 
enterprise managements to divisions or responsibility centres (internal dimension) of all the 20 
SOEs in this study have been reduced (by various degrees after 1992). This is gauged in terms 
of 6 planning variables: organisation structure; review process; strategic themes, thrusts and 
suggestions; long-term plans; short-term plans/budgets; internal responsibility contracts; and 
management of interdependencies.
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8.3.2 Control System & Influence (see Chapter 6)
Instead of direct control on the day-to-day operations of the SOEs, the government authorities 
have employed the macroeconomic control measures to monitor the economic performance of 
the SOEs since the economic reforms started in the early 1980s. As evidenced in this study, the 
control influences from the government to enterprises (external dimension) and from enterprise 
managements to divisions or responsibility centres (internal dimension) of these 20 SOEs have 
been reduced (by various degrees after 1992). This is gauged in terms of 4 control variables: 
decentralization and control; agreeing objectives; monitoring results; and rewards and incentives. 
It is noted that the 4 department stores in this study are moving towards strategic control style 
while the other 16 SOEs are entering into the domain offinancial control style.
8.3.3 Responsibility Accounting Style (see Chapter 7)
The various measured changes of planning and control influences of these 20 SOEs before and 
after 1992 are mapped into a 2-dimensional grid called “Responsibility Accounting Style Grid’ 
(adapted from Goold and Campbell 1991) as shown in Figure 2 (see Appendix 3). Basically two 
types of style changes can be identified. Firstly, the 4 department stores (in Shanghai and 
Guangzhou) and the listed printing machines manufacturing company in Beijing have been moving 
from either the “Financial Programming Style” or the “Financial Control Style” to the “Strategic 
Control Style” since 1992. They are all shareholding SOEs having higher product demand, better 
financial performance and less planning and control influences exerted by the government. 
Secondly, the other 15 SOEs have been moving from “Financial Programming Style” to the 
cFinancial Control Style” since 1992. Most of these 15 enterprises are wholly state-owned facing 
bss of market share, unsatisfactory returns and tighter governmental supervision.
1.3.■4 Hypotheses Testing (see Chapter 7)
After applying the descriptive, parametric and non-parametric statistics on the planning and 
control influence scores of these 20 SOEs, it is concluded that the following primary (HO) and 
secondary (HI-4) hypotheses can be rejected.
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HO The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning and 
Control Influences o f the 20 SOEs investigated in this research have not changed 
before and after 1992.
HI The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning and 
Control Influences o f the 12 Wholly SOEs, which have remained as Wholly SOEs 
after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.
H2 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning and 
Control Influences o f the 8 Wholly SOEs, which have converted into Shareholding 
SOEs after 1992, have not changed before and after 1992.
H3 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning and 
Control Influences o f the 20 SOEs, which are located in 4 different cities, have not 
changed before and after 1992.
H4 The Responsibility Accounting Systems (or Styles) and the associated Planning and 
Control Influences o f the 20 SOEs, which belong to 6 different industries, have not 
changed before and after 1992.
As a result of the hypothesis testing, the following propositions can be verified.
(1) Under the “legislation” and “market economy” changes (or general factors/variables 
changes) since 1992, all the 20 SOEs investigated in this study enjoy greater discretion 
over development and operation of their planning and control systems at the responsibility 
centre level (by rejecting the Primary Hypothesis HO).
(2) The enlarged autonomy applies whether the SOEs are wholly or partly owned by the 
government or have a listing on a stock exchange (by rejecting the Secondary Hypotheses 
HI & H2).
(3) The pace of change as measured by the degree of discretion over planning and control 
appears to vary with the form of “ownership” (or specific factor/variable).
(4) The different pace of change is associated with (a) the “location” of the SOEs; and (b) the 
“industry” sector which are found to be affected by the “local government policies and 
regulations” and “macro-economic control measures” (or specific factors/variables) 
respectively (by rejecting Secondary Hypotheses H3 & H4).
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The above findings reinforce the significance of the Research Domain, as depicted under Section
1.4 in Chapter 1, which develops a contingent framework for this research study.
8.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
8.4.1 Contingency Model
The researcher believes that the most significant implication induced from this exploratory case 
study is a Contingency Model as shown on the next page (p.317a) as well as in Figure 1 (see 
Appendix 3) which is employed as the research model of this study as defined in Section 1.4 of 
Chapter 1 (see p.38).
The Data Analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, the Hypotheses Testing in Chapter 7 and the Cases 
Writing in Volumes 2 and 3 can provide substantial evidence that the Responsibility Accounting 
Styles and the associated Planning and Control Systems practised in the 20 SOEs have been 
changing mainly due to impacts from the Specific and General Factors (or Independent 
Variables) as described in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1 (see pp.8-29). The researcher also believes 
that those Long-Term Factors have diffusion effects on the styles and systems as well although 
they have not been focused in this study.
The researcher expects that this Contingency Model can be verified in other Chinese SOEs and 
extended to some areas of future research as suggested in Section 8.6 below. In addition, cross- 
cultural comparisons and analyses can also be investigated based on this model.
8.4.2 Specific Contributions
In responding to the Research Significance described in Section 1.7 of Chapter, the following 
contributions to the responsibility accounting (or management accounting) development in China 
have been accomplished by undertaking this research study:
(1) to ascertain the diversity of practices in responsibility accounting system, adopted by 20 
SOEs in 6 industries and located in 4 cities, due to the legislation, ownership, economic
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and government policy changes in the 1990s (see Chapter 2: Part B & Chapters 4 to 6);
(2) to measure the pace of changes in the responsibility accounting styles and the associated 
planning and control systems before and after 1992 of these 20 SOEs under different 
ownerships, geographical locations and types of industries (see Chapter 7);
(3) to compare the western literature/research findings with the observations in this study in 
order to identify potential responsibility (management) accounting areas for future 
research (see Chapter 2: Part A & Data Analyses in Volume 3); and
(4) to recommend means and ways to improve the effectiveness of the responsibility 
accounting and the associated planning and control systems with an ultimate objective to 
enhance the economic performance in the Chinese SOEs (see Section 8.7 below).
8.4.3 General Contributions
It is important to recognise that case studies are concerned with induction, rather than prediction 
(see Section 3.3 in Chapter 3). Management accounting research will be greatly strengthened if 
case studies focus on explanation and theoretical generalisation. They will provide clearer 
understandings of management accounting practice and help both managers and accountants to 
work out their problems on a day-to-day basis. They may also act as a stimulus for resolving 
problems which have remained below the surface. Case study methods themselves will not 
provide the answers to such problems, but they should provide practitioners with a deeper and 
richer understanding of the social context in which they work and make them aware of the 
problems, and the possibilities for solutions (Scapens 1990: 278-279).
The detail descriptions of these 20 case studies (i.e. 20 SOEs) in Volume 2 and Volume 3 
attached with this dissertation provide accounting practitioners and academics with a deeper and 
richer understanding of the practices of responsibility (management) accounting systems in China, 
so that further investigations and research can be instigated in order to enhance the contributions 
of responsibility accounting in specific and the management accounting in general.
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8.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
As discussed in Section 1.9 of Chapter 1, this study has been subject to the following research
limitations.
(1) Literature Review — the lack of prior research has compelled the researcher to employ 
exploratory case study method (or Keating’s (1995) theory discovery approach) in this 
study.
(2) Research Methodology — the exploratory case study approach adopted in this research 
was difficult to come up with any “generalisation” since only 20 SOEs have been 
investigated.
(3) Questionnaire Design — the holistic ideal of studying all aspects of the responsibility 
accounting system in China is clearly unattainable and some limits on the subject matter 
had to be placed. This was influenced by the Goold and Campbell’s framework which is 
not the only framework available.
(4) Sample Size — was limited due to employing the case study method and investigating the 
objects over a number of years of time.
(5) Selection of Sample -- the freedom to choose a portfolio of SOEs to be investigated was 
limited. Although the researcher could suggest which types of enterprise to be included 
in the sample, the academic counterparts in China helped to gain access certain types of 
ownership profile, locations, etc.
(6) Extraneous Variables -- the rapid political, social and economical changes in China might 
have introduced a few unanticipated variables into this study but they have proved to be 
minor factors and have same effect on all the 20 SOEs.
(7) Quantitative Analysis — the original design of this research was based on fieldwork 
without the requirement of using very sophisticated quantitative methods to analyse the 
data, yet some parametric and non-parametric statistical methods have been employed to 
test the defined hypotheses and their implications quantitatively as far as possible. This 
was regarded as necessary in order to accommodate the mass of data collected. 
Nevertheless the cases provide the opportunity for other researchers to assess the 
interpretations offered here.
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(8) Cultural Difference — the insufficient working and learning experience gained in China by 
the researcher before undertaking this project has given rise to some extent of cultural 
difference, such as the management practice of the SOE, which has become less significant 
as the project went on.
(9) Language Barrier — the researcher’s proficiency in Putonghua (official language in China) 
has improved substantially during the years of working in China although there was a little 
barrier in communicating with the managers during the early interviews.
(10) Time Constraint -- it was difficult for the researcher, as a part-time PhD student having
a full-time teaching job, to visit the targeted SOEs more frequently than what have been
done in the last five years.
Despite the above 10 areas of limitations, the four major objectives/contributions of this research 
as stated in Section 8.4.1 above have been achieved.
8.6 FUTURE RESEARCH
Based on substantial literature review, interviews with enterprise managers, data and information 
collected and analysed for this study, the following specific areas are suggested for future research 
in relation to the Responsibility (Management) Accounting development in China.
(1) Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Although the ERCS has enhanced the economic efficiency and profitability of most of the SOEs 
in the last decade, yet this system has suffered from some drawbacks such as short-term 
behaviour, unrealistic target-setting, dysfunctional effect and government interference (see Section
2.15.1 in Chapter 2). Furthermore, over 50% of all the SOEs, which have been using the ERCS, 
were still incurring financial losses at the end of 1997. As a result, other than the shareholding 
enterprises, gradually many wholly state-owned enterprises are replacing their existing ERCs by 
the new taxation system (see Section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4). It may be worthwhile to further study 
the contemporary development and operation of the ERCS in and identify its implications on the 
SOEs in relation to the on-going legislation, ownership, economic and government policy 
changes.
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(2) Internal Responsibility Contract System (LRCS)
IRCS is still the core of the responsibility accounting system adopted by the SOEs despite the fact 
that the ERCS is losing its effect (see Section 2.14 in Chapter 2). It is suggested that this typical 
IRCS can further be investigated to understand its effects on the SOE’s planning and control 
systems in relation to (1) target setting (see Section 6.2 in Chapter 6); (2) internal transactions 
(transfers) (see Section 5.7 in Chapter 5); (3) performance evaluation (see Section 6.3 in Chapter 
6); and (4) rewards and incentives (see Section 6.4 in Chapter 6). In addition, its effective use 
can also be assessed and compared between the wholly and shareholding SOEs.
(3) Legislation Changes
This is one of the two general factors/variables (see Section 1.2.1.1 in Chapter 1) identified in this 
study to test its impact on the planning and control influences within the responsibility accounting 
systems adopted by a sample of 20 SOEs. It is found that the recent legislation changes (e.g. 
operation mechanisms transformation) has enlarged the SOE’s discretion over development and 
operation of their planning and control systems at the responsibility centre level. Specific focus 
can be placed in future research to assess the compliance of these legislations by the SOEs on the 
one hand, and to comprehend their effects in-depth on the planning and control systems in relation 
to long- and short-term planning, financial and non-financial targets setting, performance 
measurement, monetary and non-monetary rewards and incentives, social security and worker 
welfare, merger and acquisition, liquidation, privatisation, etc. on the other hand.
(4) Market Economy Changes
This is the other general factor/variable (see Section 1.2.1.2 in Chapter 1) which is verified to
have the same effect as legislation changes on the planning and control systems of these 20 SOEs. 
To deepen the implementation policies of socialist market economy in order to enhance the SOE’s 
economic efficiency was the top agenda item of the 15th Communist Party Representatives 
Conference of China held in September 1997. The existing policies relating to input/output 
pricing, market orientation (i.e. demand and supply effects), import/export right, and other new 
policies to be announced are specific factors or variables to be studied to understand their 
relationships with the SOE’s planning and control systems.
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(5) Ownership Changes
Ownership changes (or shareholding transformation) is a specific factor/variable (see Section
1.2.2.1 in Chapter 2) which is attributable to the greater planning and control changes in the 
shareholding SOEs compared with the wholly SOEs investigated in this study. This is related to 
the provisions of Company Law enacted in 1993 in terms of full management and operation 
autonomy delegated to the board of directors in the shareholding enterprises. Other than these 
two forms of ownership, joint-venture, leased, partnership and private-owned enterprises as 
defined in Section 1.2.2.1 can also be the objects for studying their responsibility accounting, 
planning and control systems.
(6) Local Government Policies and Regulations
This is another specific factor/variable (see Section 1.2.2.2 in Chapter 1) which is associated with 
the different pace of change in the planning and control systems adopted by these 20 SOEs 
located in 4 cities from north to south. In the future research, more specific local government 
policies and regulations can be identified to ascertain their planning and control effects on 
enterprises of different forms of ownership.
(7) Macro-Economic Control Measures
This is the third specific factor/variable (see Section 1.2.2.3 in Chapter 1) which can partly explain 
the difference pace of change in the planning and control system adopted by these 20 SOEs 
belonging to 6 different industries. Other than the 5 control measures identified in Section 
1.2.2.3, government budget, monetary supply, interest rate, capital investment, bank risk, stock 
market, commodity price, market and distribution are possible control measures to be studied in 
order to find their implications on the planning and control systems employed by enterprises of 
different types of ownership.
(8) Education & Training
It is envisaged in this study that education and training is the most important long-term 
factor/variable (see Section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1) which can enhance the knowledge of management
322
Ch. 8 : Summary & Conclusion
accounting principles, theories and practices for the accountants and managers in the Chinese 
enterprises to improve their economic effectiveness and efficiency. Research in this facet can be 
done in collaboration with the Chinese and foreign educational institutes, accounting professional 
bodies and business enterprises in order to promote the implementation of various management 
accounting systems in different enterprises and entities in China.
(9) Long-Term Planning (Strategic Planning)
Some strategic and operational aspects relating to the long-term planning practised in these 20 
SOEs are described in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 and the 20 Data Analyses (Volume 3) as well. 
Further research can be performed in this planning area with specific focus on its relationship with 
the variables of market economy, local government policies and regulations, and macro-economic 
control measures.
(10) Short-term Planning (Budgeting)ZReview Process
Much of this topic concerning the 20 SOEs are described in Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 and the 20 
Data Analyses (Volume 3). However, further research on many factors (see p. 194-195, 198 & 
208) envisaged in this study and related to this area can be conducted in order to understand 
better their interactions with the short-term planning and review process.
(11) Management Control System
The relationships and interactions between target setting (Section 6.2), performance measurement 
(Sections 6.3) and rewards and incentives (Sections 6.4) can be studied in detail for different 
types of Chinese enterprises (i.e. ownership). Participation, motivation, job specification, role 
ambiguity, job satisfaction, etc. can be treated as intervening variables in these future studies.
(12) Computer Application
As observed in this study, computer application in planning and control is one of the weaknesses 
when the SOEs operate their responsibility (management) accounting systems (see Sections
2.15.5 & 6.3.3). Specific research in this area may generate valuable and practical contributions 
for the future development of management accounting in China.
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(13) Quantitative Analysis
This study only employs simple statistical method in processing the data and testing the few 
hypotheses. In performing future research as suggested above, more advanced and sophisticated 
quantitative methods can be employed to analyse the information gathered from tailor-made 
questionnaires or other research instruments.
8.7 RECOMMENDATIONS
8.7.1 SOE Reforms
As noted in Chapter 7, other than the legislation, ownership, location and industry specific 
changes since the 1990s, there are many other subsidiary factors affecting the development and 
operation of responsibility (management) accounting in the SOEs. Therefore, SOE reforms (both 
external and internal environments) have become the prerequisites before the responsibility 
accounting (i.e. planning and control aspects) system could be properly and effectively operated 
in order to enhance the economic efficiency and performance of the SOEs. Bearing in mind that 
the medium-term national economic objective as laid down by the late Chinese top leader, Mr 
Deng Xiao Ping, in 1984 is to achieve four times of the 1980 GDP in the year of 2000.
In fact, the master blueprint to reform the weakening SOEs was clearly drawn out in March 1995 
when the Chinese Premier, Mr Li Pang, announced the Government Work Plan for 1996-20005 
(refer to Section 2.12 in Chapter 2 as well). The following is a summary of the relevant policies.
(1) Enhance the implementation of the “State-Owned Industrial Enterprises Operation 
Mechanisms Transformation Regulation” enacted in July 1992 by the government 
including —
1.1 to supervise the capitals and asset values of the SOEs;
1.2 to separate the ownership and management rights between the government and the 
SOEs;
5 See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong Newspaper) on 6 March 1996.
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1.3 to audit and ascertain the networth of the SOEs in order to ensure capital growth 
and avoid illegal loss of capital;
1.4 to establish supervisory committees in about 1,000 SOEs with government 
representatives sitting in;
1.5 to balance the ratios between capital and liabilities in the SOEs and solve the bad 
debts problems; and
1.6 to allow more avenues for the SOEs to raise working capital.
Identify a batch of SOEs by the government —
2.1 to establish Modern Enterprise System (2,500 SOEs before 2000)
2.2 to establish State-Controlled Holding Group Companies (about 15 SOEs); and
2.3 to supervise and develop the Shareholding SOEs through laws and regulations.
Request the loss-making SOEs that cannot be turned around —
3.1 to go into bankruptcy (liquidation);
3.2 to perform restructuring, merger and acquisition; and
3.3 to convert into joint-venture, cooperative shareholding (i.e. management-buy-out), 
leased-out, contracted-out and auctioned-off.
Determine SOE’s strategic focuses —
4.1 to improve product and market development and exploration;
4.2 to diversify the business and market portfolio; and
4.3 to reduce and adjust the management organisations.
Reduce the social responsibilities of the SOEs —
5.1 to make the social welfare businesses (e.g. hospital, school, restaurant, housing, 
etc.) become independent and self-financed;
5.2 to transfer some social welfare businesses to the local government; and
5.3 to arrange the surplus (redundant) employees (a) receiving reemployment training;
(b) changing jobs; and (c) subsidizing by the government.
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(6) Improve the SOE’s internal management system --
6.1 to strengthen the top management leadership ability;
6.2 to employ scientific management techniques;
6.3 to focus on product research and development;
6.4 to be market oriented in every aspect;
6.5 to enhance the competitive edge;
6.6 to promote enterprise culture and goodwill;
6.7 to compile with the laws and regulations;
6.8 to provide better education and training;
6.9 to improve financial and cost control;
6.10 to regulate the financial reporting; and
6.11 to facilitate the working capital utility and control.
(7) Refine the social security system and enforce the Labour Law (1995)—
7.1 to implement the retirement and unemployment insurance policies;
7.2 to improve the central pension fund system contributed by the government,
enterprises and employees;
7.3 to enhance the coverage and effectiveness of medical and work injury insurance 
schemes; and
7.4 to establish a systematic and cost-effective central home purchasing scheme.
8.7.2 Responsibility (Management) Accounting Reforms
In parallel with the different SOE reforms summarized in the last section, the responsibility 
(management) accounting adopted by the SOEs should also undertake some sort of reforms 
bearing two major objectives: (1) to enhance the economic (both financial and non-financial) 
performance in short- and long-term; and (2) to cope with the various and tremendous 
environmental (both internal and external) changes. Given the fact that the legislation, ownership 
and economic reforms have enhanced the planning and control systems in the SOEs as evidenced 
in this research, the followings are some broad suggestions based on the findings and observations 
in this study in order to make responsibility accounting more effective in future.
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(1) To ensure the compatibility and integration of the responsibility (management) accounting
system with the forthcoming accounting standards to be applied to all enterprises in China 
(30 SSAPs/GAAPs will be implemented before the year 2000).
(2) To instigate scientific and empirical research into the areas as suggested in Section 8.6
above.
(3) To study the relationships between the responsibility accounting and other AIS/MAS (e.g.
standard costing, marginal costing, cost-volume-profit analysis, common cost allocation, 
inventory control, working capital control, etc.) and identify their complementary effects.
(4) To invest in and use of computing systems extensively to operate the IAS/MAS as the
building blocks for the integrated MIS eventually.
(5) To explore the anticipated or possible impacts on the responsibility (management) 
accounting system due to the advanced manufacturing/operating environments (e.g. 
ABC, CIM, FMS, JIT, MRP, etc.) and prepare for the changes.
(6) To expand the education and training programmes in management accounting at 
undergraduate (including certificate and diploma) and postgraduate levels in tertiary 
institutions with the support from the government and other foreign professional bodies 
(e.g. CIMA, CMA, etc.).
(7) To promote management accounting research in the universities in collaboration with the 
SOEs, foreign invested joint-ventures, government authorities, Chinese and foreign 
accountancy institutions.
(8) To establish a professional institution in management accounting in China which should 
be promulgated by the government (i.e. Ministry of Finance), supported by the 
Accounting Society of China (ASC) and assisted by the foreign management accountancy 
institutions (e.g. CIMA, CMA, etc.).
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8.8 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
The State sector (e.g. SOEs) plays a vital role in China’s economy. Around 40% of the country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) is created by the State sector and enterprises whose shares are 
controlled by the State. More than 60% of the country’s revenue comes from SOEs. But because 
SOEs have long operated in the planned economy, many of them are backward in management, 
technology and resource allocation, resulting in low economic returns6.
With the deepening of economic reforms and developing of market economy, practice in recent 
years has repeatedly confirmed that the only way out for SOEs is deepening of reform. Without 
this, there would be much more erosion of State property. In addition, the absence of further 
reform would cause two serious consequences. First, there would be more redundant workers7, 
resulting in social instability because more SOEs would go bankrupt. Second, because SOEs 
could not repay bank loans, bank would have difficulty in maintaining capital circulation, 
damaging economic stability (see China Daily on 15 January 1998).
The country has tried four methods to revive its SOEs. From 1979-1982, it implemented the 
“profit-dividing” system. With this system, enterprises no longer return all profits to the State, 
but instead shared profits with the State. From 1983-1986, enterprises stopped paying profits to 
the State and began paying income tax. This enabled profitable enterprises to reinvest more. 
From 1987-1991, the State implemented the “economic responsibility contract system”. This 
system meant enterprises no longer paid taxes to the State but handed in profits in line with the 
agreement they had signed.
Since 1992, the State has implemented the system of “operation mechanisms transformation” and 
allowed the SOEs to be market driven. But no real effort has been made by the SOEs to 
transform their management mechanisms. Instead, the changes have merely delegated greater 
power to enterprises. However, it is hard to realize this power because the country’s
6 See China Daily on 28 January 1997.
7 In 1994, urban unemployment was 4.8 million or 2.9% of the workforce (increased to 
7 million in 1997), and 100 million rural unemployed. Further, it was estimated about 30 million 
workers in the SOEs, although on the payroll, are in fact idle (China Daily on 8 March 1995).
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administrative system has not been truly reformed, and enterprises are still subordinate to relevant 
government authorities.
As no substantial progress had been made in the reform of SOEs in more than a decade, the Third 
Plenary Session of the 14th Party Congress held in 1993 made it clear that the deepening of the 
reform of SOEs was aimed at establishing the modem business enterprise system, the State 
decided to initially select 100 pilot enterprises to implement the system. The trial implementation 
was set for 1996, but the experiment will continue and extend to 2,500 enterprises at the end of 
the year 2000. It is hard to make substantial progress in the reform of SOEs because opinions 
are divided as to what the modem enterprise system is; whether the corporate system is a modem 
enterprise system which meets the requirements of large-scale socialist production or an enterprise 
organization system typical of capitalism; whether the renovation of the mechanism of SOEs 
should start with the reform of the original property rights system; and whether the reform of the 
property rights system means privatization of State property. As a result, it cannot meet the 
demands of the modem business enterprise: a clear definition of property rights; the ending of 
government controls over enterprises; and scientific management. It is beyond doubt that an 
enterprise must create economic returns and improve its competitive edge. Otherwise an 
enterprise will fail no matter what the form of ownership (such as the shareholding enterprise 
SCM2 described in the case). These are the variables tested and observed in this research.
In the past 15 years inefficient SOEs have been exposed to market forces with reforms in taxation, 
prices and accounting. And their share of national output has continued to drop as non-State 
firms have mushroomed. According to the State Statistics Bureau, more than 40% of SOEs are 
incurring losses and their share in the national output value has dropped from 78.5% in 1979 to 
about 41% in 1996.
Bankruptcy and auctions have been adopted to handle small and inefficient firms. Medium-sized 
and some large ones have been improved through absorbing foreign investments and advanced 
management. Large enterprises that are quite essential to the national economy are to be 
supported with government subsidies as well as favourable policies. SOEs themselves have also 
been asked to strengthen their management, bolster technological innovation and adjust
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production mix based on market demands which could be assisted by the functions of 
management accounting.
In seeking to learn and assimilate western management accounting, being critical seems essential, 
at least in China. After a 15-year period of learning, more and more Chinese accountants have 
begun to realize that western management accounting itself is far from perfect and does not offer 
a panacea. This sentiment has been heightened when western criticisms of Anglo-American 
management accounting and of currently used research approaches, such as Kaplan (1983) and 
Scapens (1985) became known in China. It was noted that to avoid similar problems in China, 
it is necessary to undertake further research on the western prototype and to gain a clearer idea 
of its problems and trends (Ding & Yang 1984). The existing problems in the western system, 
such as the divorce of academic research from practice, the lopsided development of 
‘sophisticated’ quantitative techniques and models, and the lack of a sound theoretical basis 
(Bromwich & Hopwood 1986), may be seen as warning signs for the development of Chinese 
management accounting system.
Western management accounting (especially responsibility accounting) has been used and studied 
in China for over a decade, and can be said to have contributed greatly to Chinese accounting 
practice and thought. However, management accounting in China does have problems. Most of 
these problems result from the perceived unsuitability of the western techniques for the Chinese 
environment or the failure of the Chinese environment to meet the underlying assumptions 
necessary for these techniques to operate. To overcome these problems, it seems necessary for 
Chinese management researchers and accounting researchers to obtain a clearer understanding 
of present and possible future social and economic environments for enterprises and to develop 
techniques that can work properly in these environments (Scapens & Meng 1993).
As has been the case in the past, the future development of Chinese management accounting will 
largely depend upon the direction and pace of economic reforms, and particularly upon the future 
changes in the pattern of enterprise operation and management (Bromwich & Wang 1991). As 
such, inductive approach for research, such as the methodology adopted in this study, would be 
appropriate to understand and contribute to this development.
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8.9 CONCLUSION
During the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in September 1997, the 
Chinese government decided to turn ten thousands of debt-ridden SOEs around within three 
years. Reforming these enterprises is difficult, however, because so many different and 
interrelated changes must be made. For the external environment of SOEs, there must be 
fundamental changes in financial markets, the tax system, the legal, regulatory and accounting 
framework, and the worker welfare system. Internal to the enterprise there must be the creation 
of some kind of property rights (ownership), developing the right products/markets, reducing the 
redundant employees plus revamping of the internal incentive structure of the enterprise (Perkins 
1993). The prime objective envisaged by the Chinese government and leaders is to establish the 
so called “modem business enterpriset which possess the functional mechanisms (e.g. planning, 
controlling, coordinating, marketing, operating, etc.) of the counterparts in the capitalist 
countries and retain the traditional values (e.g. patriotic ideology, state ownership, communist 
party leadership, commonwealth, spiritual health, etc.) of the socialist countries.
This crucial part of economic reform in China has been proceeding on a trial-and-error basis or 
on an “experimental stage” in the words of the Chinese top leader, Mr Deng Xiao Ping, who was 
the “Chief Economic Architect” and has laid down a 66-year economic plan8 for his country. To 
accomplish this long-term vision, the Chinese enterprises must be reformed continuously in line 
with the global development in order to contribute wealth in enhancing the living standards of all 
the people in China. To this end, “scientific management (as described in Section 8.2 above) 
in the Chinese enterprises is the most important tool because it needs the managers to make 
decisions. Management accounting should play an important role in this management process.
8 In 1984, Mr Deng Xiao Ping set a long-term economic milestone which is to turn China 
into a developed country at medium level (perhaps equivalent to Japan in the 1980s) 
approximately in the year of 2050.
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Management accounting has been contributing its effectiveness to the economic well-being of all 
types of organisations in the western countries over the past 50 years (Kaplan 1984a). There are 
no reasons why management accounting cannot generate the same or similar effects in the Chinese 
enterprises irrespective of their types of ownership or industry although the differences between 
the capitalist and socialist environments are recognized. How to make management accounting 
(in particular the responsibility accounting) an effective management tool in the Chinese 
enterprises (or organisations) is also in a trial-and-error or experimental basis which should be 
greatly facilitated through theoretical and empirical research in the next 50 years.
This study is an exploratory attempt to reveal the past and present responsibility (management) 
accounting practices adopted in the Chinese enterprises, and more importantly, it sheds some light 
on those important areas related to the future development of management accounting for further 
investigations and research in China. Although the current accounting reform in China is still 
focusing on the setting and implementing financial accounting standards (30 SSAPs/GAAPs will 
be implemented before the year 2000), this researcher strongly believes that management 
accounting will have the highest development potential soon turning into the next century. The 
researcher wishes to continue his research in this direction after completion of this dissertation 
because he loves his country — China!
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APPENDIX 1
Table 1A : Enterprises Background Information (Part A)
Enterprise Code (No.) SSW5(01) XFLT(02) GFDS(03) GDDS(04)
Business Nature Iron & Steel
:
Fork Lift Truck Department Department
Manufacturing Manufacturing Store Store
Ownership - Before 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
After 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Shareholding Shareholding
Total Assets (Rmb’m) 5,000(1992) 52(1992) 100(1992) 45 (1992)
Turnover (Rmb’m) - 1992 2,800 102 466 230
1993 3,800 120 710 400
1994 4,500 150 900 600
1995 4,800 180 — —
PBT (Rmb’m) -1992 150 5.5 35 14
1993 190 7.5 50 22
1994 170 8.0 58 30
1995 175 9.0 — —
PBT % Turnover - 1992 5.4% 5.4% 7.5% 6.1%
1993 5.0% 6.3% 7.0% 5.5%
1994 3.8% 5.3% 6.4% 5.0%
1995 3.7% 5.0% — —
ERCS Periods 1983-1987 No Formal ERC 1987-1991 1987-1991
1988-1992
ERCS Targets PBT(G=5%, 7%) PBT (G=10%) PBT (G=10%) PBT(G=6%)
50% PBT 10% PBT 60% Target PBT 55% Target PBT
Handover Handover Handover Handover
Income Tax 33% Income Tax 15% 30% Over -Target 16.5% Over-
Gross Wages & PBT Handover Target PBT
Growth % Handover
ERCS Replacement Since 1992 - Since 1992 - Since 1992 - Since 1992 -
Sales, Income Sales, Income Sales, Income Sales, Income
(33%) & Other (15%) & Other (15%) & Other (15%) & Other
Taxes levied Taxes levied Taxes levied Taxes levied
Size of Enterprise Large Medium Medium Medium
No. of Employees 23,000 (1994) 1,100(1994) 2,300(1993) 950 (1993)
Notes :
1. Rmb’m = China currency Renminbi in million
2. PBT = Profit Before Tax (Income Tax)
3. ERCS = Economic Responsibility Contract System
4. SOE = State-Owned Enterprise
5. G = PBT Annual Growth Factor 12.02.97
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Table IB : Enterprises Background Information (Part B)
Enterprise Code (No.) BEEF(05) SMCW(06) GNFF(07) GNFB(08)
Business Nature Electrostatic 
Equip. Manu.
Instrument & 
Tool Manu.
Flour
Manufacturing
Department
Store
Ownership - Before 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
After 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Shareholding Shareholding
Total Assets (Rmb’m) 25 (1992) 108 (1992) 236(1993) 155 (1992)
Turnover (Rmb’m) - 1992 15 44 320 685
1993 12 71 370 1,050
1994 17 102 260 1,300
1995 18 140 400 —
PBT (Rmb’m) -1992 1.5 5.9 30 21
1993 1.1 6.5 33 26
1994 0.0 7.7 15 31
1995 0.0 3.3 20 —
PBT % Turnover - 1992 10.0% 13.4% 9.4% 3.1%
1993 9.2% 9.2% 8.9% 2.5%
1994 0.0% 7.6% 5.8% 2.4%
1995 0.0% 2.4% 5.0% —
ERCS Periods 1992 - no time 
limit
1988-1992
1993-1997
1988-1990
1991-1992
1987-1991
ERCS Targets Fixed PBT=1M 
(1992-1995) 
Actually Break­
even (1994-1996) 
Income Tax 33%
PBT 
Foreign 
Exchange 
55% PBT Hand­
over
PBT (G=7%) 
Income Tax 55% 
on Target PBT 
Income Tax 35% 
on Over-Target 
PBT
PBT(G=6%) 
55% Handover 
on Target PBT 
16.5% Handover 
on Over-Target 
PBT
ERCS Replacement Same as before Same as before Since 1992 - 
Sales, Income 
(15%) & Other 
Taxes levied
Since 1992 - 
Sales, Income 
(15%) & Other 
Taxes levied
Size of Enterprise Small Medium Medium Large
No. of Employees 600(1994) 1,550 (1994) 940(1994) 4,000(1994)
Notes :
1. Rmb’m = China currency Renminbi in million
2. PBT = Profit Before Tax (Income Tax)
3. ERCS = Economic Responsibility Contract System
4. SOE = State-Owned Enterprise
5. G = PBT Annual Growth Factor 12.02.97
333
Table 1C : Enterprises Background Information (Part C)
Enterprise Code (No.) BCRF(09) BIMT(10) SD Sl(ll) SCCW(12)
Business Nature Electronic Equip. 
Manufacturing
Tool Milling 
Machine Manu.
Department
Store
Crane/Conveyor
Manufacturing
Ownership - Before 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
After 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Listed Shares Wholly SOE
Total Assets (Rmb’m) 90(1992) 130 (1992) 1,101 (1994) 190(1994)
Turnover (Rmb’m) - 1992 41 42 — —
1993 33 48 1,780 190
1994 21 50 2,140 230
1995 22 55 — 260
PBT (Rmb’m) -1992 5.2 3.2 — —
1993 0.0 2.5 105 2.1
1994 (4.6) 2.5 110 3.3
1995 (4.5) 2.2 — 3.5
PBT % Turnover - 1992 12.7% 7.6% — —
1993 0.0% 5.2% 5.9% 1.1%
1994 -------- 5.0% 5.1% 1.4%
1995 -------- 4.0% — 1.4%
ERCS Periods 1992 (standing) 1991-1995 1987-1991 1988-1992
ERCS Targets Income Tax 15% 
40% PBT Hand­
over
Gross Wages 
Accerlarated Dep. 
R&D 1% Sales
PBT (G=8%) 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Gross Wages
Turnover
PBT
PBT Handover 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Gross Wages 
Technology 
Improvement
ERCS Replacement Same as above & 
1M Loan Repay­
ment tax deduct- 
able
Same as above Since 1992 - 
Sales, Income 
(15%) & Other 
Taxes levied
Since 1992 - 
Turnover, PBT, 
Income Tax, 
A/R
Size of Enterprise Medium Medium Large Medium
No. of Employees 970 (1994) 1,250(1994) 4,500(1994) 2,470(1994)
Notes :
1. Rmb’m = China currency Renminbi in million
2. PBT = Profit Before Tax (Income Tax)
3. ERCS = Economic Responsibility Contract System
4. SOE = State-Owned Enterprise
5. G = PBT Annual Growth Factor 08.10.96
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Table ID : Enterprises Background Information (Part D)
Enterprise Code (No.) SMEF(13) SCM2(14) SXSW(15) GLIL(16)
Business Nature Metallurgical 
Equip. Manu.
Textile
Manufacturing
Iron & Steel 
Manufacturing
Cleaning Consu­
mables Manu.
Ownership - Before 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
After 1992 Wholly SOE Listed Shares Wholly SOE Listed Shares
Total Assets (Rmb’m) 200(1994) 40(1994) 500 (1992) 279(1993)
Turnover (Rmb’m) - 1992 250 180 946 397
1993 360 200 1,335 530
1994 275 180 1,236 610
1995 400 200 1,300 —
PBT (Rmb’m) -1992 0.0 7.0 15 30
1993 5.2 4.0 19 43
1994 (13.7) 5.1 13 44
1995 0.0 4.0 10 —
PBT % Turnover -1992 0.0% 3.9% 1.6% 7.6%
1993 1.4% 2.0% 1.4% 8.1%
1994 — 2.8% 1.1% 7.2%
1995 0.0% 2.0% 0.8% —
ERCS Periods 1988-1992
1993-1997
1988-1992 1989-1993 1986-1990
1991-1992
ERCS Targets PBT
Gross Wages
PBT (G=2%) 
Gross Wages
PBT (G=5%) 
Gross Wages
PBT (G=5%) 
Income Tax 55% 
on Target PBT 
Income Tax 25% 
on Over-Target 
PBT
ERCS Replacement Zero PBT (1993- 
1995)
PBT review 
(1996-1997)
Since 1992 - 
Sales, Income 
(15%) & Other 
Taxes levied
Since 1992 - 
Sales, Income 
(33%) & Other 
Taxes levied
Since 1992 - 
Sales, Income 
(15%) & Other 
Taxes levied
Size of Enterprise Large Large Large Medium
No. of Employees 5,000(1994) 4,860(1994) 5,600(1994) 1,450(1993)
Notes :
1. Rmb’m = China currency Renminbi in million
2. PBT = Profit Before Tax (Income Tax)
3. ERCS = Economic Responsibility Contract System
4. SOE = State-Owned Enterprise
5. G = PBT Annual Growth Factor 08.10.96
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Table IE : Enterprises Background Information (Part E)
Enterprise Code (No.) XLIG(17) BCM3(18) BFSH(19) BPMH(20)
Business Nature Beverage
Manufacturing
e
Textile
Manufacturing
Hotel Service Printing Machine 
Manufacturing
Ownership - Before 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE
After 1992 Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Wholly SOE Listed Shares
Total Assets (Rmb’m) 56 (1993) 240(1994) 290(1993) 1,027(1994)
Turnover (Rmb’m) - 1992 110 300 — 265
1993 208 330 130 385
1994 287 410 200 426
1995 — 430 230 363
PBT (Rmb’m) -1992 11 1.2 — 52
1993 17 0.0 23 111
1994 27 1.5 20 122
1995 — 0.0 20 107
PBT % Turnover - 1992 10.0% 0.4% — 19.6%
1993 8.2% 0.0% 17.7% 28.0%
1994 9.4% 0.4% 10.0% 28.6%
1995 — 0.0% 8.7% 29.5%
ERCS Periods 1986-1990 1986-1990
1991-1995
N/A N/A
ERCS Targets PBT
Income Tax 55% 
(Exempted in 
1986 & 1987) 
Income Tax 42% 
since 1988
PBT (G=5%) 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Gross Wages 
Income Tax 55% 
(before 1992
N/A N/A
ERCS Replacement Since 1991 - Since 1992 - Turnover, PBT Sales, Income
Income Tax 42% Income Tax 33% Foreign 
Exchange 
Capital Exp.
(15%) & Other 
Taxes levied
Size of Enterprise Small Large Large Large
No. of Employees 540(1994) 8,000(1994) 3,800(1994) 2,800(1994)
States :
1. Rmb’m = China currency Renminbi in million
2. PBT = Profit Before Tax (Income Tax)
3. ERCS = Economic Responsibility Contract System
4. SOE = State-Owned Enterprise
5. G = PBT Annual Growth Factor 12.02.97
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Table 2A : Planning Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part A)
EC Parameters 5.0 5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4
01 SSW5 1.1/2.5 0.9/2.5 1.0/2.5 1.5/3.0
■
0.5/2.5 0.5/2.0
02 XFLT 1.6/2.8 1.3/2.3 ' 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
03 GFDS 2.1/3.1 2.0/3.3 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 1.5/3.0 2.5/3.5
04 GDDS 2.0/3.1 2.0/3.1 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 1.5/3.0 2.5/3.5
05 BEEF 1.2/2.3 0.9/2.4 1.0/2.5 1.5/3.0 0.5/2.0 0.5/2.0
06 SMCW 1.3/2.4 0.9/2.3 1.0/2.5 1.0/2.5 1.0/2.0 0.5/2.0
07 GNFF 1.8/2.8 1.9/2.9 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 1.0/2.0
08 GNFB 2.1/3.2 2.1/3.3 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 1.5/3.0 2.5/3.5
09 BCRF 1.2/2.3 0.9/2.1 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 0.5/2.0 0.5/2.0
10 BIMT 1.3/2.5 1.0/2.3 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 0.5/2.0 1.0/2.5
11 SDS1 2.2/3.3 2.1/3.3 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 1.5/3.0 2.5/3.5
12 SCCW 1.4/2.3 1.4/1.8 1.5/1.5 1.5/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.5/1.5
13 SMEF 1.5/2.6 1.4/2.6 1.5/2.5 1.5/3.0 1.0/2.0 1.5/3.0
14 SCM2 1.6/2.7 1.8/2.8 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.0 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.0
15 SXSW 1.3/2.5 1.0/2.1 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.5 0.5/1.5
16 GLIL 1.9/2.9 1.6/3.1 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 2.0/3.5 1.5/3.0
17 XLIG 1.9/3.0 2.1/2.9 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.0 1.5/2.0
18 BCM3 1.4/2.4 1.3/2.1 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/1.5
19 BFSH 1.5/2.4 1.3/2.1 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.5
20 BPMH 1.7/2.7 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
Mean 1.6/2.7 1.5/2.6 1.5/2.5 1.7/2.9 1.3/2.5 1.5/2.4
Std. Dev. .34/32 .45/.47 .41/.44 .53/.43 .60/.53 .73/.74
Notes:
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 5.0 = Corporate Planning Influence = [(5.1+5.2+5.3+5.4+5.5+5.6+5.7)/7]
Parameter 5.1 = Organisation Structure = [(5.1.1 +5.1.2+5.1.3+5.1.4)/4]
Parameter 5.1.1 = Responsibility Centre
Parameter 5.1.2 = Decentralization
Parameter 5.1.3 = Appointment
Parameter 5.1.4 = Interdependencies
x.x/y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Very High Planning Influence (0.0)---- > Very Low Planning Influence (4.0)
17.10.96
337
Table 2B : Planning Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part B)
EC Parameters 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.5 5.2.4
01 SSW5 1.4/2.6 1.0/2.5 1.5/3.0 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
02 XFLT 2.3/3.3 2.5/3.5 f 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0
03 GFDS 2.1/3.3 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0
04 GDDS 2.1/3.1 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0
05 BEEF 1.3/2.4 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.5 1.5/2.5
06 SMCW 1.3/2.6 0.5/2.0 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 1.5/2.5
07 GNFF 1.6/2.9 1.0/2.5 2.0/3.0 1.5/3.0 2.0/3.0
08 GNFB 2.1/3.4 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.0
09 BCRF 1.3/2.4 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.5 1.5/2.5
10 BIMT 1.3/2.4 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.5 1.5/2.5
11 SDS1 2.3/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5
12 SCCW 1.3/2.1 1.0/1.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5
13 SMEF 1.5/2.8 1.5/2.5 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 1.5/2.5
14 SCM2 1.5/2.8 1.5/2.5 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 1.5/2.5
15 SXSW 1.3/2.6 1.0/2.5 1.5/3.0 1.0/2.5 1.5/2.5
16 GLIL 2.3/3.3 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0
17 XLIG 1.9/3.1 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 1.5/3.0 2.0/3.0
18 BCM3 1.4/2.4 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
19 BFSH 1.4/2.4 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5
20 BPMH 2.0/3.1 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.0
Mean 1.7/2.8 1.5/2.7 1.9/3.0 1.5/2.8 1.8/2.8
Std. Dev. .40/.42 .59/.68 .48/.41 .40/.41 .30/.30
Notes:
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 5.2 = Review Process = [(5.2.1+5.2.2+5.2.3+5.2.4)/4]
Parameter 5.2.1 = Central Planning 
Parameter 5.2.2 = Operation 
Parameter 5.2.3 = Participation 
Parameter 5.2.4 = Review & Communication 
x.x./y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Very High Planning Influence (0.0)---- > Very Low Planning Influence (4.0)
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Table 2C : Planning Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part C)
EC Parameters 5.3 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3
01 SSW5 0.8/1.7 0.5/1.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
02 XFLT 0.8/1.8 0.5/1.5 f 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.5
03 GFDS 1.8/3.2 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
04 GDDS 1.8/3.2 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
05 BEEF 0.8/2.0 0.5/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.5
06 SMCW 1.2/2.3 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.5
07 GNFF 1.5/2.3 2.0/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0
08 GNFB 2.2/3.2 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0
09 BCRF 1.0/2.2 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.5
10 BIMT 1.0/2.2 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.5
11 SDS1 2.2/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 2.0/2.5
12 SCCW 1.0/2.2 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.5
13 SMEF 1.2/2.3 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.5
14 SCM2 1.2/2.3 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.5
15 SXSW 1.3/2.3 1.5/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0
16 GLIL 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
17 XLIG 1.0/2.2 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.5
18 BCM3 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
19 BFSH 1.3/2.2 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0 1.5/2.5
20 BPMH 1.3/2.3 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0
Mean 1.3/2.4 1.2/2.1 1.5/2.5 1.3/2.5
Std. Dev. .43/.44 .47/.48 .48/.61 .41/.43
Notes :
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 5.3 = Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions = [(5.3.1+5.3.2+5.3.3)/3]
Parameter 5.3.1 = Themes
Parameter 5.3.2 = Thrusts
Parameter 5.3.3 = Suggestions
x.x./y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Very High Planning Influence (0.0)---- > Very Low Planning Influence (4.0)
17.10.96
339
Table 2D : Planning Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part D)
EC Parameters 5.4 5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.3 5.4.4
01 SSW5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
02 XFLT 1.5/2.4 1.5/2.5 f 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.0
03 GFDS 1.8/2.5 1.5/2.5 2.0/2.5 1.5/2.0 2.0/3.0
04 GDDS 1.5/2.4 1.5/2.5 2.0/2.5 0.5/1.5 2.0/3.0
05 BEEF 1.5/2.4 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.0
06 SMCW 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
07 GNFF 1.6/2.9 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.0
08 GNFB 1.8/2.5 1.5/2.5 2.0/2.5 1.5/2.0 2.0/3.0
09 BCRF 1.4/2.3 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0
10 BIMT 1.4/2.3 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0
11 SDS1 1.9/2.8 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 1.5/2.0 2.0/3.0
12 SCCW 1.4/2.3 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0
13 SMEF 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
14 SCM2 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
15 SXSW 1.4/2.4 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0
16 GLIL 1.8/2.8 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 1.5/2.5
17 XLIG 2.0/2.9 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 1.5/2.0
18 BCM3 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
19 BFSH 1.4/2.4 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
20 BPMH 1.5/2.6 1.5/3.0 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
Mean 1.6/2.5 1.5/2.6 1.6/2.6 1.4/2.3 1.6/2.4
Std. Dev. 221.22 .30/.31 .28/.25 .351.21 .29/.41
Notes :
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 5.4 = Long-Term Plans = [(5.4.1+5.4.2+5.4.3+5.4.4)/4]
Parameter 5.4.1 = Central Planning 
Parameter 5.4.2 = Operation 
Parameter 5.4.3 = Participation 
Parameter 5.4.4 = Review & Communication 
x.x./y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Very High Planning Influence (0.0)---- > Very Low Planning Influence (4.0)
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Table 2E : Planning Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part E)
EC Parameters 5.5 5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.5 5.5.4
01 SSW5 1.5/3.3 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 1.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
02 XFLT 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 f 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
03 GFDS 2 A/3 A 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5
04 GDDS 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
05 BEEF 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0
06 SMCW 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
07 GNFF 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5
08 GNFB 2.4/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5
09 BCRF 2.0/3.4 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
10 BIMT 2.0/3.4 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.5
11 SDS1 2.5/3.6 3.0/4.0 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5
12 SCCW 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0
13 SMEF 2.0/3.3 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.0
14 SCM2 2.0/3.3 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.0
15 SXSW 1.6/3.0 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.0 2.0/3.0
16 GLIL 2.4/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5
17 XLIG 2.3/3.4 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5
18 BCM3 2.1/3.3 2.0/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0
19 BFSH 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0
20 BPMH 2.3/3.3 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0
Mean 2.1/3.3 2.1/3.4 2.1/3.2 2.1/3.4 2.2/3.3
Std. Dev. .27/. 19 36/29 .28/.26 .36/.21 .24/.25
Notes :
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 5.5 = Short-Term Plans = [(5.5.1+5.5.2+5.5.3+5.5.4)/4]
Parameter 5.5.1 = Central Planning 
Parameter 5.5.2 = Operation 
Parameter 5.5.3 = Participation 
Parameter 5.5.4 = Review & Communication 
x.x./y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Very High Planning Influence (0.0)---- > Very Low Planning Influence (4.0)
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Table 2F : Planning Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part F)
EC Parameters 5.6 5.6.1 5.6.2 5.6.3 5.6.4
01 SSW5 1.5/3.4 1.0/3.0 1.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 1.5/3.5
02 XFLT 1.6/3.4 1.5/3.0 f 1.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 1.5/3.5
03 GFDS 2.3/3.1 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.0
04 GDDS 2.3/3.4 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5
05 BEEF 1.4/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0 1.5/3.5
06 SMCW 1.3/2.6 1.0/2.5 1.0/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/3.0
07 GNFF 1.6/2.6 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 2.0/3.0
08 GNFB 2.3/3.4 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5
09 BCRF 1.4/2.4 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0 1.5/3.0
10 BIMT 1.4/2.4 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0 1.5/3.0
11 SDS1 2.3/3.4 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.5/3.5
12 SCCW 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
13 SMEF 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
14 SCM2 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
15 SXSW 1.6/3.3 1.5/3.0 1.5/3.5 2.0/3.5 1.5/3.0
16 GLIL 1.8/2.6 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 2.0/2.5 2.0/3.0
17 XLIG 2.1/3.3 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.5 2.5/3.5 2.0/3.0
18 BCM3 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
19 BFSH 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
20 BPMH 1.6/2.6 2.0/3.0 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
Mean 1.7/2.9 1.6/2.8 1.5/2.8 1.9/2.8 1.8/3.0
Std. Dev. .35/.42 .31/.26 .34/.57 .43/.59 .41/.40
Notes :
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 5.6 = Internal Responsibility Contracts = [(5.6.1+5.6.2+5.6.3+5.6.4)/4]
Parameter 5.6.1 = Target Bias
Parameter 5.6.2 = Participation
Parameter 5.6.3 = Review & Communication
Parameter 5.6.4 = Incentive
x.x./y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Very High Planning Influence (0.0)---- > Very Low Planning Influence (4.0)
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Table 2G : Planning Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part G)
EC Parameters 5.7 5.7.1 5.7.2 5.7.3
01 SSW5 0.5/1.7 0.5/2.0 0.5/1.5 0.5/1.5
02 XFLT N/A N/A < N/A N/A
03 GFDS N/A N/A N/A N/A
04 GDDS N/A N/A N/A N/A
05 BEEF 0.5/1.7 0.5/2.0 0.5/1.5 0.5/1.5
06 SMCW 0.7/1.3 0.5/1.5 0.5/1.0 1.0/1.5
07 GNFF N/A N/A N/A N/A
08 GNFB N/A N/A N/A N/A
09 BCRF 0.5/1.3 0.5/1.0 0.5/1.5 0.5/1.5
10 BIMT 1.3/2.3 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0
11 SDS1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
12 SCCW N/A N/A N/A N/A
13 SMEF 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
14 SCM2 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.5
15 SXSW 0.7/1.5 0.5/1.5 0.5/1.5 1.0/1.5
16 GLIL N/A N/A N/A N/A
17 XLIG N/A N/A N/A N/A
18 BCM3 1.2/2.2 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.5
19 BFSH N/A N/A N/A N/A
20 BPMH 1.8/2.8 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 1.5/2.5
Mean 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.1/2.0
Std. Dev. .49/.55 .58/.60 .58/.64 .44/. 50
Notes:
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 5.7 = Management of Interdependencies = [(5.7.1+5.7.2+5.7.3)/3]
Parameter 5.7.1 = Characteristics
Parameter 5.7.2 = Participation
Parameter 5.7.3 = Review
x.x./y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Very High Planning Influence (0.0)---- > Very Low Planning Influence (4.0)
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Table 3A : Control Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part A)
EC Parameters 6.0 6.1 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3
01 SSW5 1.0/1.6 1.1/2.0 1.1/2.1 1.4/2.7 0.9/1.2
02 XFLT 1.2/2.0 1.5/2.1 f 1.4/2.3 1.8/2.6 1.2/1.3
03 GFDS 1.8/2.8 2.0/3.0 2.0/3.1 2.3/3.3 1.8/2.7
04 GDDS 1.8/2.6 2.0/2.8 1.9/2.6 2.3/3.2 1.8/2.6
05 BEEF 1.2/1.8 1.4/1.9 1.4/2.1 1.6/2.3 1.2/1.3
06 SMCW 1.1/1.8 1.3/2.0 1.3/2.1 1.4/2.4 1.1/1.5
07 GNFF 1.2/1.9 1.4/2.0 1.4/2.1 1.6/2.5 1.1/1.5
08 GNFB 1.9/2.8 2.2/3.0 2.4/3.1 23/3.2 1.9/2.8
09 BCRF 1.3/1.9 1.5/1.9 1.5/2.1 1.8/2.4 1.2/1.3
10 BIMT 1.2/1.9 1.4/2.0 1.5/2.3 1.6/2.4 1.2/1.3
11 SDS1 1.8/2.8 2.0/3.1 2.1/3.1 2.2/33 1.8/2.8
12 SCCW 1.2/1.9 1.4/2.0 1.5/2.1 1.6/2.4 1.1/1.4
13 SMEF 1.1/1.9 1.3/2.0 1.4/2.1 1.5/2.3 1.1/1.5
14 SCM2 1.1/1.9 1.2/2.0 1.4/2.1 1.3/2.2 1.0/1.6
15 SXSW 1.1/1.8 1.4/2.0 1.5/2.1 1.7/2.6 0.9/1.3
16 GLIL 1.2/2.0 1.4/2.1 1.5/2.4 1.6/2.5 1.1/1.5
17 XLIG 1.3/2.0 1.5/2.2 1.5/2.4 1.8/2.6 1.3/1.6
18 BCM3 1.1/1.9 1.2/2.0 1.4/2.1 1.3/2.2 1.0/1.6
19 BFSH 1.2/1.9 1.3/2.0 1.4/2.1 1.3/2.2 1.1/1.7
20 BPMH 1.3/2.1 1.4/2.3 1.5/2.4 1.3/2.3 1.4/2.1
Mean 1.3/2.1 1.5/2.2 1.6/2.3 1.7/2.6 1.3/1.7
Std. Dev. .28/.37 .31/.40 .31/.36 .35/31 .31/.55
Notes :
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 6.0 = Control Influence (System) = [(6.1+6.2+6.3+6.4)/4]
Parameter 6.1 = Decentralisation & Control = [(6.1.1 +6.1.2+6.1.3)/3]
Parameter 6.1.1 = Organisational Design 
Parameter 6.1.2 = Personnel 
Parameter 6.1.3 = Control Mechanisms 
x.x/y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Tight Financial Control (0.0)---- > Tight Strategic Control (4.0)
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Table 3 B : Control Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part B)
EC Parameters 6.2 6.3 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.3
01 SSW5 1.0/2.0 0.9/0.8 0.7/1.3 1.0/0.5 1.0/0.5
02 XFLT 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.1/1.7 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
03 GFDS 2.2/3.1 1.6/2.7 1.8/2.5 1.0/2.0 2.0/3.5
04 GDDS 2.1/2.8 1.6/2.5 1.8/2.5 1.0/2.0 2.0/3.0
05 BEEF 1.0/1.6 1.0/1.9 1.0/1.7 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
06 SMCW 1.0/1.6 1.0/1.9 1.0/1.9 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
07 GNFF 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.0/1.7 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
08 GNFB 2.2/3.1 1.6/2.7 1.8/2.5 1.0/2.0 2.0/3.5
09 BCRF 1.1/2.0 1.4/1.9 1.1/1.7 1.5/2.0 1.5/2.0
10 BIMT 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.0/1.7 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
11 SDS1 2.2/3.0 1.6/2.8 1.9/2.8 1.0/2.0 2.0/3.5
12 SCCW 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.1/1.8 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
13 SMEF 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.0/1.7 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
14 SCM2 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.0/1.7 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
15 SXSW 1.0/2.0 0.9/1.1 0.7/1.3 1.0/0.5 1.0/1.5
16 GLIL 1.1/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.1/1.8 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
17 XLIG 1.0/2.0 1.4/1.9 1.1/1.8 1.5/2.0 1.5/2.0
18 BCM3 1.0/2.0 1.0/1.9 1.0/1,7 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
19 BFSH 1.0/2.0 1.2/1.7 1.1/1.7 1.5/1.5 1.0/2.0
20 BPMH 1.1/2.0 1.4/2.1 1.1/1.7 1.5/2.5 1.5/2.0
Mean 1.3/2.2 1.2/2.0 1.2/1.9 1.1/1.9 1.3/2.2
Std. Dev. .48/.45 .27/.48 .36/.40 .21/.49 .41/.71
Notes :
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 6.2 = Agreeing Objectives
Parameter 6.3 = Monitoring Results = [(6.3.1+6.3.2+6.3.3)/3]
Parameter 6.3.1 = Reporting Requirements 
Parameter 6.3.2 = Performance Measurement 
Parameter 6.3.3 = Review & Communication 
x.x/y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Tight Financial Control (0.0)---- > Tight Strategic Control (4.0)
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Table 3C : Control Parameter Changes Before/After 1992 (Part C)
EC Parameters 6.4 6.4.1 6.4.2 6.4.3 6.4.4
01 SSW5 1.0/1.7 1.6/1.7 0.5/1.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
02 XFLT 1.2/1.8 1.6/1.7 f 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
03 GFDS 1.5/2.2 1.8/2.2 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0
04 GDDS 1.5/2.2 1.8/2.2 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0
05 BEEF 1.2/1.8 1.6/1.7 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
06 SMCW 1.2/1.8 1.6/1.7 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
07 GNFF 1.2/1.8 1.7/1.8 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
08 GNFB 1.5/2.2 1.8/2.2 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0
09 BCRF 1.2/1.8 1.6/1.7 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
10 BIMT 1.2/1.8 1.6/1.7 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
11 SDS1 1.5/2.2 1.9/2.3 1.5/2.5 1.0/2.0 1.5/2.0
12 SCCW 1.2/1.8 1.6/1.7 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
13 SMEF 1.2/1.8 1.6/1.7 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
14 SCM2 1.2/1.8 1.7/1.8 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
15 SXSW 1.0/1.9 1.4/1.9 0.5/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
16 GLIL 1.1/2.0 1.4/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
17 XLIG 1.3/1.9 1.5/1.9 1.0/1.5 1.5/2.0 1.0/2.0
18 BCM3 1.2/1.8 1.7/1.8 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
19 BFSH 1.2/1.9 1.6/1.9 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
20 BPMH 1.2/1.8 1.7/1.8 1.0/1.5 1.0/2.0 1.0/2.0
Mean 1.3/1.9 1.6/1.9 1.1/1.7 1.0/2.0 1.1/2.0
Std. Dev. .15/.17 .13/.20 .28/.44 .11/.00 .21/.00
Notes :
EC = Enterprise Code
Parameter 6.4 = Rewards & Incentives = [(6.4.1+6.4.2+6.4.3+6.4.4)/4]
Parameter 6.4.1 = Incentives 
Parameter 6.4.2 = Performance Orientation 
Parameter 6.4.3 = Participation 
Parameter 6.4.4 = Review & Communication 
x.x/y.y = Index Before 1992/Index After 1992
Index = Tight Financial Control (0.0)---- > Tight Strategic Control (4.0)
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14 Oct 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
M U L T I P L E  R E G R E S S I O N  * *
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ASSETS
C
Block Number 1. Method: Enter EMPLOYEE
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. EMPLOYEE
Multiple R 
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error
.91507 
.83736 
.82833 
456.70014
Analysis of Variance
Regression 
Residual
DF
1
18
Sum of Squares
19329770.84908 
3754350.35092
Mean Square
19329770.84908 
208575.01950
F = 92 . 67539 Signif F = .0000
----------------------  Variables in the Equation----------------------
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
EMPLOYEE 203.408742 21.129412 .915075 9.627 .0000
(Constant) -276.498680 129.697125 -2.132 .0470
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
T a b le  4
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Table 5 : Annual Turnover and PBT Growth % (1992-1995)
Turnover Growth % PBT Growth % PBT % Turnover
EC 1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 92-95 Aerage
01 SSW5 36 18 1 27 -11 3 4.3 O
02 XFLT 18 25 20 36 7 13 5.4
03 GFDS 52 27 — 43 16 — 6.9
04 GDDS 74 50 — 57 36 — 5.4
05 BEEF -20 42 6 -27 -100 0 4.2 0
06 SMCW 61 44 37 10 19 -57 6.6
07 GNFF 16 -30 54 10 -55 33 7.3
08 GNFB 53 24 — 24 19 — 2.6 0
09 BCRF -20 -36 5 -100 0 0 -7.6 0
10 BIMT 14 4 10 -22 0 -12 5.3
11 SDS1 — 20 — — 5 — 5.5
12 SCCW — 21 13 — 57 6 1.3 0
13 SMEF 44 -24 45 100 -264 100 -0.7 0
14 SCM2 11 -10 11 -43 28 -22 2.6 0
15 SXSW 41 -7 5 27 -32 -23 1.2 0
16 GLIL 34 15 — 43 2 — 7.6
17 XLIG 89 38 — 55 59 — 9.1
18 BCM3 10 24 5 -100 100 -100 0.2 0
19 BFSH — 54 15 — -13 0 11.3
20 BPMH 45 11 -15 114 10 -12 27.2
Average 33 1 6 0 16 0 15 -6 0 -5 0 5.3
Notes :
Turnover Growth % = Turnover increase % compared with last year 
PBT Growth % = Profit Before Tax increase % compared with last year
= PBT as a percentage of Turnover 
= PBT % Turnover overall average during 1992 to 1995 
= Enterprise Code
12.02.97
PBT % Turnover 
92-95 Average 
EC
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CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES (ALL 20 SOES) TABLE 6A
OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE
' I i I ! I
OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE
EC* 5.0(Before 5.0(After) i5.0A-5.0B i 6.0(Before} 6.0(After) ;6.0A-6.0B
SSW5(01) 1.1 2.5 1.4 1! 1.6 0.6;
XFLT(02) 1.6 2.8 1.2 1.2^ 2 0.8
GFDS(03) 2.1 3 .1 1 1 1 - 8 u  _ _ _ 2.8 1
GDDS(04) 2 3.1 1.1 1.8; 2.6 0.8
BEEF(05) . 1.2 2.3 1.1 . . . . . .  1.2; ..... 1.8; 0.6
SMCW(06; 1.3 2.4 1.1. 1.1: 1.8 0.7
GNFF(07) 1.8 2.8 1 1.2 1.9 0.7
GNFB(08) 2.1 3.2 1 .1 : 1.91 2.8 0.9
BCRF(09); 1.2 L . . _ 2_.3: 1.1; ^ 1.3i" 1.9 0.6
BIMT(10) 1.3 2.5 1.2 1 2 l 1.9 0.7
SDS1 (11) , 2.2
3 V
1.11 1.8] .2,8, ___ 1
SCCW(12j| 1.4 2.3 : 0.9; 1.2; 1.9 0.7
SMEF(13) i 1.5 2.6. 1.1: 1.1! 1,9.. 0.8
SCM 2(14) ! 1.6 2.7 1.1 : 1 .1 : 1.9 0.8
SXSW(15) 1.3 2.5; 1.2 1.1; 1.8 0.7
GLIL(16) 1.9 2.9 1! 1.2; 2 0.8
XLIG(17) 1.9 3: 1.1; -  - - ' 8 i _ _ _ _ 2, 0.7
BCM3(18) 1.4 2.4 1i 1.1 i 1.9 0.8
BFSH(19) 1.5 2.4 0.9^ 1.2; 1.9 0.7
BPMH(20), 1.7 2 .7 1 1 1 1.3] 2.1 0.8
Mean ! 1.61 2.69; 1.09! 1.31| 2 .0 7 ; 0.76
j
N o tes: i
! ' i . . .  -
EC = Enterprise Code I i
5.0(Before) = Overall Planning Influnece Before 1992 i r
5.0(After) =  Overall Planning Influence After 1992 j
6.0(Before) =  Overall Control Influence Before 1992 j
6.0(After) =  Overall Control Influence After 1992 i
5.0A-5.0B = Difference of Planning Influence After and Before 1992
6.0A-6.0B = Difference of Control Influence After and Before 1992 j 29.11.96
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CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES
REMAIN AS WHOLLY SOEs BEFORE & AFTER 1992
! TABLE6B
(6B1)
EC*
OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
5.0(Before* 5.0(Afterj 5.0A-5.0B
OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE 
6 0(Before; 6.0(After) '6.0A-6.0B .
SSW5(01) 1.1 2 .5 j 1.4
XFLT (02)" 1.6 2.8 1 2
BEEF(05) ' 1.2 2.3* 1 .1
SMCW*(06;
BCRF(09)
1.3 ' 2.4 1.1'
1 2 2.3 “ 1".'1; . . . .  . . . L.
BIMT(10) * 1.3 2 .5 ^  " 1.2'
SCCW(12) 1 4 2.3 0.9
SMEF(13) 1.5 2.6' 1.1
SXSW(15) 1.3 2.5 ' 1.2
*XUG(17) 1.9*
2, s : _
1 .1
BCM3(18) 1.4 14-
BFSH (19j! 1.5 ! 2.4! 0.9;
Mean 1.39 2.50| 1.11!
1 : 
12r 
1 . 2 ' 
1.1 
1.3"
u t  
' \ . 2 r  
T.1r 
1.1: 
1.3 ' 
1.11 
1 .2 !
1 6 _2
1.8
o-6,.
0 8 i
0.6 i
1.8
1.9!
0.7!
0 .6 !
1.9! 
19' 
19; 
1.8 
2 
1.9|
1:91
0.71
°-4m
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.7
1.17! 1.87! 0.70
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES 1
WHOLLY SOEs BEFORE 1992 CHANGED TO SHAREHOLDING SOEs AFTER 1992 (6B2)
EC*
iOVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
|5.0(Before] 5.0(After) i5.0A-5.0B ;
GFDS(03);
GDDS(04)
GNFF(07)‘
GNFB(08)
SDS1 (11)
SCM2(14)T
GLIL(16j_ V ’ 
BPMH(20);
2 . 1 : 
2 
1.8  
2 A 
2.2 
1.6 ; 
19! 
1.7i
3.1
3.1 
2.8
3.2
3.3
2.7 
2.9
2.7
Mean 1.93 2.98
1
11
1
1.1
11
11
"_1
’ 1
OVERALL CONTROLJNFLUENCE 
6 .0( Before j 6.0( After j j 6.0A-6.0B"
1.81
1-C
1.2
i^T
1 8 |
11 '
1.2
1 3
1.05! 1.51
T'
2 .8 ;
2 .6:
1 9 |
2 .8"
2 . 8 *
19"
2
2.1
0.8
0.7
0.9
_JL
*0.8
0.8
0.8
2 .3 6 1 0.85
N o tes: ! .
EC = Enterprise C ode' I [ j_ I
5.0(Before) = Overall Planning Infiunece Before 1992 j  i
5.0(After) = Overall Planning Influence After 1992 ! I
6 .0(Before) = Overall Control Influence Before 1992 j_ j_
6.0(After) = Overall Control Influence After 1992 ___[ }
5.0A-5.0B_= Difference of Planning Influence After and Before 1992 
6.0A-6.0B = Difference of Control Influence After and Before 1992 ! 29.11.96
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BEEF(05) 1.2 2.3 1.1! 1 1.2 1.8 0.6
BCRF(09) j_ 1.2 2.3 1.1"!~ 1.3 1.9 0.6
BIMT(10) 1.3 2.5 1.2 1.2 1.9 0.7
BCM3(18) 1.4 2.4 1; 1.1 1.9 0.8 ]
BFSH(19) 1.5 2.4; 0 .9r 1.2j 1.9 0.7I
BPMH(20) 1.7 2.7; 1| 1.3 2.1 0.8;
Mean 1.38 2.43 1.05i 1.22 1.92 0.70
; - - -  ---I........ - - - - - __________
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES
SOEs LOCATED IN BIEJING (6C1)
TABLE 6C
EC*
OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
[5~.0(Before]" 5 O(After) 5.0A-5.0B
^OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES 
SOEs LOCATED IN SHANGHAI (6C2)
-+~
I z i z t
EC*
iOVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
!5.0(Before: 5.0(After) i5.0A-5.0B~: ""
OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE 
6 0 (B efore [6 .0  (Afte r) T6. OA-6.0 B i
SSW5(01) 1.1, 2.5
SMCW(06* 
SDS1 (11) !
1.3 2.4
2.2 3.3,
SCCW(12) 1.4 2.3
SMEF(13)! 1.5 2.6
SCM 2(14); 1.6 2.7,
SXSW(15)! 1.3; 2.5;
1.4
1.1
1.1
0.9
"11
1.1
1.2 :
Mean 1.49 2.61 1.13 1.20 1.96 0.76
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES 
SOEs LOCATED IN XIAMEN (6C3) > '
iOVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE^ 
[5.0(Beforey5.0(After) j5.0A-5.0B |
T
EC*
XFLT(02) I 
XLIG(17)
1.6,
1.9,
2.8
3
.1:2;
1.1
T
OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE 
6.0(Beforep3.0(After) l6.0A-6.0B
1.2
1.3
Mean 1.75 2.90 1.15; 1.25 2.00
0.8
0.7
0.75
I !  L ___ __ J______  ;
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES 
SOEs LOCATED IN GUANGZHOU i(6C4) :
EC*
iOVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
5 .0(Before; 5.0(Afterj j5.0A-5.0B j
G FDS(03)! 2.1! 3.1! 1!
GDDS(04): 2 3-1: 1.1:
GNFF(07); 1.8- 2 .81 1i
GNFB(08) | 2.1! 3.2, 1.1!
GLIL(16) i 1.9, 2.9; 1;
Mean 1.98| 3.02; 1.04;
iOVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE 
]6.0(Beforera0(After) j6.0A-6.0B
1.8i
1.8j
1.21
1.9*
1 . 2 1 
7581
2.8
2.6
1.9
2-8.
2|
Z42T
0.8
0.7
0.9 
" 0.8] 
0.84
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Notes:   _ _ _ L “  ; . " [TABLE 6C
EC = Enterprise Code _ j [ ,
5.0(Before) = Overall Planning Influnece Before 1992 , _______  I__________ j____________
5.0(After) = Overall Planning Influence After 1992 J _  , ____________ [
6.0(Before) = Overall Control Influence Before 1992 ^ j     2
6.0( After) = Overall Control Influence After 1992 ~[ _ [____
5.0A-5.0B = Difference of Planning Influence After and Before 1992  j
6.0A-6.0B = Difference of Control Influence After and Before 1992 ____________________ "[29.11.96
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CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES I !'TABLE 6D
SOEs IN IRON & STEEL INDUSTRY 1(601) . 1 : '!
i
OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE
EC* 5.0(Before 5.0( After) t5.0A-5.0B | ? 6.0(Before] 6.0(After) [6.0A-6.0B j
SSW5(01) 1.1 2.5 1.4 ■ 1, 1.6 0.6 j
SXSW(15) 1.3 2.5 1.2| 1.1 r 1.8 i 0.7 i
Mean 1.20 2.50 1.30; 1.05 1.70! 0.65!
■ — . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ■ -  — j _
: I
------- !
XFLT(02) 1.6 2.8 1.2; 1.21 .. 21 _ 0.8
r  -
BEEF(05) 1.2 2.3 1.1! 1-2; 1.8! 0.6,
SMCW(06) 1.3 2.4, 1.1 i 1.1! 1 ,81 0.7
BCRF(09) j 1.24 2 .3 1 1-11 ! 1.3: 1.9! "0.6
BIMT(10) i 1.3: 2.5: i .2 r 1.2| 1.9! 0.7J
SCCW(12) 1.4! 2 .3 ; 0.9 [ I 1.2! 1.9 | 0.7
SMEF(13); 1.5 2.6 1.1 i ! 1.1 191 0.8”
BPMH(20) 1.7 2 .7 1 1; | 1.3| 2.1”]” ‘ ' 0.8
Mean 1.40 2.49! 1.09! | 1.20| 1.91| 0.71-----------,----
! r ' ‘i
f ---- - ---  1----i I ! r '
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES
SOEs IN MACHINES & EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY (6D2)
EC*
OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
5.0(Before; 5.0(After) I5.0A-5.0B j
i OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE 
6.0(Before: 6.0(After) 76.0A-6.0B
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES 
SOEs IN DEPARTMENT STORES INDUSTRY (6D3)
EC*
iOVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
5!0(Before' 5.0(After) 5.0A-5.0B ;
OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE
GFDS(03) i 2.1 3.1! 1|
GDDS(04) 2 3 .1 1 1.1
GNFB(08)j 2.1 3.2T 1.1
S D S K 11)1 2.2 3.3| 1.1
Mean i 2.10 3.18! 1.08
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES 
SOEs IN CONSUMABLES INDUSTRY (6D4)
'OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE "
6.0(Before:[ 6.0(After) 6.0A-6.0B
1.8 2.8 I 1
1.8 2.6 r  0 .8]
1.9 2.8 0.9
1.8 2.8 1
1.83 2.75 0.93
r  '
-■ ------------
---------------
---------------
_________ --------------- ---------------
IOVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE
EC* 5.0(Before; 5.0(After) ,5.0A-5.0B ;
GNFF(07) 1.8! 2.8!
_______________ . . .
GLIL(16) ; 1.9 ...............2-9; 1!
XLIG(17) 1.9; 3; 1.1:
Mean 1.87! 2.90! 1.0 3 !
!6.0(Before; 6.0( After) 6.0A-6.0B
i 1 1.9 0.7
1.2 2 0J[
1.3 2 0 7
1.23 1.97 0.73
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CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES
SOEs IN TEXTILE INDUSTRY (6D5)
[TABLE 6Dl
I
- - I ------------
EC*
SCM2(14)
BCM3(18)
OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
5.0(Before“ 5.0(After) 5.0A-5.0B |
OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE 
i6.0(Beforej 6.0(After) i6.0A-6.0B ;
1.6
1.7
2.7]
2.7
1.1
1
1.1
1.1
1.9: 0.8
1.9: 0 .8 !
Mean 1.50 2.55: 1.05: 1.10 1.90 0.80
CHANGES OF PLANNING & CONTROL INFLUENCES 
SOEs IN HOTEL INDUSTRY (6D6) + -----------
EC*
OVERALL PLANNING INFLUENCE 
:5.0(Beforej 5.0(After) i5.0A-5.0B i "
BFSH(19) 1.501 2 .4 0 ! 0.90
OVERALL CONTROL INFLUENCE 
6.0(Before' 6.0(After) "6.0A-6.0B [ 
L20; 1 9 0  0 7 ^
N o tes:
EC = Enterprise Code j
5.0(Before) = Overall Planning Influnece Before 1992 i
5.0(After) = Overall Planning Influence After 1992 i
6.0(Before) = Overall Control Influence Before 1992
6.0(After) = Overall Controll nfluence After 1992
5.0A-5.0B =JDifference of Planning Influence After and Before 1992 
6.0A-6.0B = Difference of Control Influence After and Before 1992 ] 29.11.96
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Table 7A: Planning and Control Influences Analysis by Ownership and Location
Location/Citv 1 Beiiing I Shanghai Xiamen 1 Guanzzhou 1
o* EC@ PS(1) CS(2) PS(l)' CS(2) PS(1) CS(2) PS(1) CS(2)
S# BPMH 2.7 2.1
SDS1 3.3 2.8
SCM2 2.7 1.9
GNFB 3.2 2.8
GFDS 3.1 2.8
GDDS 3.1 2.6
GLIL 2.9 2.0
GNFF 2.8 1.9
Average 2.70 2.10 3.00 2.35 3.02 2.42
W+ BIMT 2.5 1.9
BCM3 2.4 1.9
BFSH 2.4 1.9
BCRF 2.3 1.9
BEEF 2.3 1.8
SMEF 2.6 1.9
SSW5 2.5 1.6
SXSW 2.5 1.8
SMCW 2.4 1.8
sccw 2.3 1.9
XLIG 3.0 2.0
XFLT 2.8 2.0
Average 2.38 1.88 2.46 1.80 2.90 2.00
Total Average 2.43 1.92 2.61 1.96 2.90 2.00 3.02 2.42
'lotes ;
(1) Planning Influence Scores after 1992.
(2) Control Influence Scores after 1992.
O* Types of Ownership
s# Shareholding Enterprises
w+ Wholly State-Owned Enterprises
EC@ Enterprise Codes
i
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Table 7B: Planning and Control Influences Analysis by Ownership and Industry
\lndustriesd) 1 I& S M & E D. Stores Consum. ill Textiles 11 Hotel 1
o* EC@ PS cs PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS
s# BPMH 2.7 2.1
SDS1 3.3 2.8
GNFB 3.2 2.8
GFDS 3.1 2.8
GDDS 3.1 2.6
GLIL 2.9 2.0
GNFF 2.8 1.9
SCM2 2.7 1.9
Average 2.70 2.10 3.18 2.75 2.85 1.95 2.70 1.90
W + SMEF 2.6 1.9
SSW5 2.5 1.6
SXSW 2.5 1.8
BIMT 2.5 1.9
BCRF 2.3 1.9
BEEF 2.3 1.8
SMCW 2.4 1.8
SCCW 2.3 1.9
XFLT 2.8 2.0
XLIG 3.0 2.0
BCM3 2.4 1.9
BFSH 2.4 1.9
Average 2.53 1.77 2.43 1.88 3.00 2.00 2.40 1.90 2.40 1.90
Total Average 2.53 1.77 2.40 1.91 3.18 2.75 2.90 1.97 2.55 1.90 2.40 1.90
Notes :
(1) Types of Industry: I & S - Iron & Steel Manufacturing
M & E - Machines & Equipment Manufacturing
D. Stores - Department Stores (Retailing/Servicing)
Consum. - Consumables Manufacturing
Textiles - Textiles Manufacturing
Hotel - Hotel Servicing
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PS Planning Influence Scores after 1992
cs Control Influence Scores after 1992
0* Types of Ownership
s# Shareholding Enterprises
w+ Wholly State-Owned Enterprises
EC@ Enterprise Codes
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Table 7C: Planning and Control Influences Analysis by Ownership/Industry/Location 
(1) Beijing
Industries(l) |/<fcS 1 M & E D. Stores Consum. 1 Textiles 1 1 Hotel
0* EC@ PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS
S# BPMH 2.7 2.1
Average 2.7 2.1
W + BIMT 2.5 1.9
BCRF 2.3 1.9
BEEF 2.3 1.8
BCM3 2.4 1.9
BFSH 2.4 1.9
Average 2.37 1.87 2.40 1.90 2.40 1.90
Total Average 2.45 1.93 2.40 1.90 2.40 1.90
(2) Shanghai
Tndustries(l) 1 I& S  1 M & E D. Stores Consum. 1 Textiles 1 Hotel 1
0* EC@ PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS
s# SDS1 3.3 2.8
SCM2 2.7 1.9
Average 3.3 2.8 2.7 1.9
W + SMEF 2.6 1.9
SSW5 2.5 1.6
SXSW 2.5 1.8
SMCW 2.4 1.8
SCCW 2.3 1.9
Average 2.53 1.77 2.35 1.85
Total Average 2.53 1.77 2.35 1.85 3.30 2.80 • 2.70 1.90
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(3) Xiamen
\lndiistries( 1) 1 I& S M & E D. Stores \Consum. 1 Textiles 1 Hotel
0* EC@ PS c s PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS
w+ XFLT 2.8 2.0
XLIG 3.0 2.0
Average 2.8 2.0 3.0 2.0
(4) Guangzhou
Industries(l) I& S M & E D. Stores Consum. 1 1 Textiles 1 Hotel 1
0* EC@ PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS PS CS
s# GNFB 3.2 2.8
GFDS 3.1 2.8
GDDS 3.1 2.6
GLIL 2.9 2.0
GNFF 2.8 1.9
Average 3.13 2.73 2.85 1.95
N otes:
(1) Types of Industry: I & S
M & E  
D. Stores 
Consum. 
Textiles 
Hotel
PS Planning Influence Scores after 1992
CS Control Influence Scores after 1992 
O* Types of Ownership 
S# Shareholding Enterprises
W+ Wholly State-Owned Enterprises 
EC@ Enterprise Codes
- Iron & Steel Manufacturing
- Machines & Equipment Manufacturing
- Department Stores (Retailing/Servicing)
- Consumables Manufacturing
- Textiles Manufacturing
- Hotel Servicing
28.12.97
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Table 7D: Responsibility Accounting Style Analysis by Ownership/Industry/Location
Rank Enterprise RA Score# RA Style@ Industry Location
01 SDSl(ll)* 9.24 SC Department Store Shanghai
02 GNFB(08)* 8.96 SC Department Store Guangzhou
03 GFDS(03)* 8.68 SC Department Store Guangzhou
04 GDDS(04)* 8.06 SC Department Store Guangzhou
05 XLIG(17) 6.00 FC/SC Consumables Manu. Xiamen
06 GLIL(16)* 5.80 FC/SC Consumables Manu. Guangzhou
07 BPMH(20)* 5.67 SC Mach./Equip. Manu. Beijing
08 XFLT(02) 5.60 FC/SC Mach./Equip. Manu. Xiamen
09 GNFF(07)* 5.32 FC Comsumables Manu. Guangzhou
10 SCM2(14)* 5.13 FC Textiles Manufacturing Shanghai
11 SMEF(13) 4.94 FC Iron & Steel Manu. Shanghai
12 BIMT(10) 4.75 FC Mach./Equip. Manu. Beijing
13 BCM3(18) 4.56 FC Textiles Manufacturing Beijing
13 BFSH(19) 4.56 FC Hotel Servicing Beijing
15 SXSW(15) 4.50 FC Iron & Steel Manu. Shanghai
16 SCCW(12) 4.37 FC Mach./Equip. Manu. Shanghai
16 BCRF(09) 4.37 FC Mach./Equip. Manu. Beijing
18 SMCW(06) 4.32 FC Mach./Equip. Manu. Shanghai
19 BEEF(05) 4.14 FC Mach./Equip. Manu. Beijing
20 SSW5(01) 4.00 FC Iron & Steel Manu. Shanghai
# Responsibility Accounting Score = Overall Average Planning Score x Overall Average Control 
Score (Post 1992)
@ Responsibility Accounting Style (Post 1992)
SC = Strategic Control 
FC = Financial Control
FC/SC = In between Financial Control & Strategic Control
* Shareholding State-Owned Enterprises
28.12.97
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APPENDIX 2
3.5
3.0-1I
2.51
i
2 . 0 - 
1.5-
10 i
.5 ]
Corporate Planning Influence (5.0) charts
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2A
-------------------------------------------------------- a-------- -----------------------------
M e a n
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
P5.0A
P5.0B
S O E
P5.0A = Mean After 1992 
P5.0B = Mean Before 1992
Organisation Structure (P5.1) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2A
M e a n  
P5.1A
.......................................................... I  P5.1B
BCM3 ' BEEF BIMT ' GDDS ' GLIL ’ GNFF ‘ SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 ' XFLT '
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG
S O E
P5.1A = Mean After 1992 
P5.1B = Mean Before 1992
3.0- 
2.5-
2 .0 -
1.0 -
.5.
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Responsibility Centre (P5.1.1) charts
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2A
3.5
3.0-
2 .5-
2 . 0 i
M e a n
P5.1.1A
P5.1.1B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG 
S O E
P5.1.1A = Mean After 1992 
P5.1.1B = Mean Before 1992
Decentralisation (P5.1.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2A
4.0
3.51
3.0-
2.5-
2 . 0 -
M e a n
P5.1.2A  
.. P5.1.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG 
S O E
P5.1.2A = Mean After 1992 
P5.1.2B = Mean Before 1992
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Appointment (P5.1.3) C h a r ts
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2A
M e a n
P5.1.3A
P5.1.3B0.0
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG
S O E
P5.1.3A = Mean After 1992 
P5.1.3B = Mean Before 1992
Interdependencies (P5.1.4) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2A
4.0-j
3.5-
3.0-
2.5-
2 . 0 -
M e a n
P5.1.4A
P5.1.4B0.0
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG 
S O E
P5.1.4A = Mean After 1992 
P5.1.4B = Mean Before 1992
Review Process (P5.2)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2B
C h a r ts
4.0
3.5-
2.5
2 .0  -i
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
M e a n
P5.2A 
.. P5.2B
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.2A = Mean After 1992 
P5.2B = Mean Before 1992
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Central Planning (P5.2.1) C h a r t s
Changes Before/After 1992
M e a n
P5.2.1A  
.. P5.2.1B
S O E
P5.2.1A = Mean After 1992 
P5.2.1B = Mean Before 1992
Operation (P5.2.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2B
4.0- 1--------------------- ;------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------- -
3-5‘ " T  i — — r  t  ~i— "
3,0' ~ r  ~ r  ~t ~ i — — — r
2.5- — — — — — — — — — _ L  _ L
2.0- -L- -L-
15 . J — L J — — L  J — L  J — — — L
1 n I
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
P5.2.2A = Mean After 1992 
P5.2.2B = Mean Before 1992
M e a n
" P5.2.2A  
.. P5.2.2B
Data Per Table 2B
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
0 . 0 .
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
Participation (P5.2.3)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2B
C h a r ts
3.5-
3.0
2.5-
2.0-I
M e a n
P5.2.3A
P5.2.3B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.2.3A = Mean After 1992 
P5.2.3B = Mean Before 1992
Review & Communication (P5.2.4) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2B
M e a n
P5.2.4A  
1 P5.2.4B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
P5.2.4A = Mean After 1992 
P5.2.4B = Mean Before 1992
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Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions C h a r t s
(P5.3) Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2C ff
3 .5 -------
3.0-
2.5
2 . 0 -
M e a n
P5.3A
P5.3B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.3A = Mean After 1992 
P5.3B = Mean Before 1992
Themes (P5.3.1) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2C
3.5
3.0-
2.5-
2 .0 -
M e a n
P5.3.1A  
.. P5.3.1B0.0
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.3.1A = Mean After 1992 
P5.3.1B = Mean Before 1992
367
Thrusts (P5.3.2) C h a r t s
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2C {(
3.5 ;
3.0
2 .5 l
M e a n
P5.3.2A  
.. P5.3.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.3.2A = Mean After 1992 
P5.3.2B = Mean Before 1992
Suggestions (P5.3.3) 
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2C
4.0
3.5-
3.0-
2.5-
2 . 0 -
M e a n
P5.3.3A
P5.3.3B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.3.3A = Mean After 1992
P5.3.3B = Mean Before 1992
Long-Term Plans (P5.4)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2D
C h a r ts
3.5
3.0-
2.0
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
M e a n
P5.4A 
.. P5.4B
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.4A = Mean After 1992
P5.4B = Mean Before 1992
Central Planning (P5.4.1)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2D
4.0
3.5-
3.0 -I
2.51
2 .0-1 M e a n
P5.4.1A
P5.4.1B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.4.1A = Mean After 1992 
P5.4.1B = Mean Before 1992
Operation (P5.4.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2D
3.5
3.0-
2.5-
2 . 0 *
M e a n
P5.4.2A
P5.4.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.4.2A= Mean After 1992 
P5.4.2B = Mean Before 1992
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Participation (P5.4.3) C h a r t s
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2D
3.5
3.0-
2 .5-
2 . 0 -
M e a n
P5.4.3A
P5.4.3B0.0
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
P5.4.3A = Mean After 1992 
P5.4.3B = Mean Before 1992
Review & Communication (P5.4.4) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2D
3.5
3.0*
2.5-
2 . 0 -
M e a n
P5.4.4A
P5.4.4B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG
S O E
P5.4.4A = Mean After 1992
P5.4.4B = Mean Before 1992
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Short-Term Plans (P5.5)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2E
C h a r t s
4.0
3.5 i
3.01
2.5
2.0
1.5-
1.0 J
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
P5.5A = Mean After 1992 
P5.5B = Mean Before 1992
M e a n
P5.5A 
.. P5.5B
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Central Planning (P5.5.1) C h a r t s
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2E
4.5
4.0
3.5-
3 .0 J
2.5- M e a n
2 . 0 -
P5.5.1A
P5.5.1B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG 
S O E
P5.5.1A = Mean After 1992 
P5.5.1B = Mean Before 1992
Operation (P5.5.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2E
4.0
3.0-
M e a n2 . 0 -
P5.5.2A
P5.5.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG
S O E
P5.5.2A = Mean After 1992
P5.5.2B = Mean Before 1992
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Participation (P5.5.3)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2E
C h a r ts
4.0
3.5-
3.0-
2.5-
2 . 0 - M e a n
P5.5.3A
P5.5.3B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.5.3A = Mean After 1992 
P5.5.3B = Mean Before 1992
Review & Communication (P5.5.4) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2E
4.0
3.5-
3.0-
2.5- M e a n
2 . 0 -
P5.5.4A
P5.5.4B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.5.4A = Mean After 1992 
P5.5.4B = Mean Before 1992
3 7 4
rtf ‘ivnfrfrfrwr- ; A iifefeaw,.
Internal Responsibility Contracts (P5.6) charts
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2F
4.0
3.5
3 .0 i
2.51
2 . 0 -
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.6A = Mean After 1992
P5.6B = Mean Before 1992
Target Bias (P5.6.1) charts
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2F
3.5
2.5-
2.0
M e a n
P5.6.1 A 
P5.6.1B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.6.1A = Mean After 1992 
P5.6.1B = Mean Before 1992
Participation (P5.6.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2F
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG
S O E
P5.6.2A = Mean After 1992
P5.6.2B = Mean Before 1992
M e a n
P5.6.2A  
.. P5.6.2B
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Review & Communication (P5.6.3) charts
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2F
4.0
3.51
3.0 -
2 .5 -
M e a n2.0 ]
P5.6.3A
P5.6.3B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.6.3A = Mean After 1992 
P5.6.3B = Mean Before 1992
Incentive (P5.6.4) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2F
4.0
3.5-
3.0-
2.5-
M e a n2 . 0 -
P5.6.4A
P5.6.4B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
P5.6.4A = Mean After 1992 
P5.6.4B = Mean Before 1992
3 7 7
Management of Interdependencies (P5.7)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2G
C hart
3.0
2.5- 
2 . 0 -
1.5-
1.01ii\
.5-
0.0
BCM3 BCRF BEEF BIMT BPMH SCM2 SMCW SMEF SSW 5 SXSW
M e a n
P5.7A 
.. P5.7B
S O E
P5.7A = Mean After 1992 
P5.7B = Mean Before 1992
Characteristics (P5.7.1) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2G
BCM3 BCRF BEEF BIMT BPMH SCM2 SMCW SMEF SSW 5 SXSW
S O E
P5.7.1A = Mean After 1992
P5.7.1B = Mean Before 1992
M e a n
P5.7.1A  
.. P5.7.1B
3 78
Participation (P5.7.2) C h a r ts
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 2G
3 .0 J
2 .5 i
M e a n
P5.7.2A
P5.7.2B0.0
BCM3 BCRF BEEF BIMT BPMH SCM2 SMCW SMEF SSW 5 SXSW
S O E
P5.7.2A = Mean After 1992 
P5.7.2B = Mean Before 1992
Review (P5.7.3) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 2G
M e a n  
P5.7.3A
P5 7 gg
BCM3 BCRF BEEF BIMT BPMH SCM2 SMCW SMEF SSW 5 SXSW  
S O E
P5.7.3A = Mean After 1992
P5.7.3B = Mean Before 1992
2.5- 
2 . 0 -
1.5-
1. 0 -
.5-
0.0..
Control Influence/System (C6.0)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3A
3.0
2.5-
2 . 0 -
1.5
1.0
~i 1--- 1-- ~i--- 1--- 1--- 1--- r
C h a r ts
M e a n
C6.0A 
1 C6.0B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.0A = Mean After 1992 
C6.0B = Mean Before 1992
Decentralisation & Control (C6.1) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 3A
3.5
3.0-
2.5-
2 . 0 -
M e a n
C6.1A 
.. C6.1B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
C 6.1A = Means After 1992 
C6.1B = Means Before 1992
■ >
3 8 0
Organisational Design (C6.1.1)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3A
3.5 -—
3.01 
2.51
2 . 0 ' i]
15 ; -
1.01
i
.5 J__
C h a r t s
M e a n
C6.1.1A  
.. C6.1.1B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.1.1A = Mean After 1992 
C6.1.1B = Mean Before 1992
Personnel (C6.1.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 3A
3.5
3.0-
2.5-
2 . 0 - M e a n
C6.1.2A
C6.1.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW  XLIG
S O E
C6.1.2A = Mean After 1992
C6.1.2B = Mean Before 1992
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Control Mechanisms (C6.1.3)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3A
C h a r t s
3.0
2.5i
2.0-
1.5- M e a n
1.0-
-I 1--- 1--- r
C6.1.3A 
.. C6.1.3B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.1.3A = Mean After 1992 
C6.1.3B = Mean Before 1992
Agreeing Objectives (C6.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 3B
M e a n
C6.2A 
1 C6.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 " SMCW' SSW5 ' XFLT '
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.2A = Mean After 1992
C6.2B = Mean Before 1992
3.01
2.5
2.0-
1.5-
1.0-
.5.
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Monitoring Results (C6.3)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3B
C h a r ts
M e a n
C6.3A
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.3A = Mean After 1992 
C6.3B = Mean Before 1992
Reporting Requirements (C6.3.1) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 3B
3.0
2.5-
2.0J
M e a n
C6.3.1A  
.. C6.3.1B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
C6.3.1 = Mean After 1992 
C6.3.2 = Mean Before 1992
,
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Performance Measurement (C6.3.2)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3B
C h a r t s
3.0t
2.0-
1.5-
1.0-
.5 J
ao l
M e a n
i i
C6.3.2A
C6.3.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.3.2A = Mean After 1992 
C6.3.2B = Mean Before 1992
Review & Communication (C6.3.3) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 3B
4.0 t
3.5-
3.0-
2.5-
2.0-
M e a n
C6.3.3A 
.. C6.3.3B0.0
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
C6.3.3A = Mean After 1992 
C6.3.3B = Mean Before 1992
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Rewards & Incentives (C6.4)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3C
C h a r ts
2.4 -
2.2 j 
2.0 ' 
1.8- 
1 . 6 -  
1.4- 
1.21 
1-0j 
.81
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
M e a n
C6.4A 
.. C6.4B
S O E
C6.4A = Mean After 1992 
C6.4B = Mean Before 1992
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Incentives (C6.4.1)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3C
C h a r ts
2 .4 -
i
2.2-
2 . 0 -
1-8"
1.6 -
1.4-j
1.2 :.
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.4.1A = Mean After 1992 
C6.4.1B = Mean Before 1992
M e a n
C6.4.1A 
.. C6.4.1B
Performance Orientation (C6.4.2) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 3C
3.0
2.5-
M e a n
i
C6.4.2A
C6.4.2B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
S O E
C6.4.2A = Mean After 1992
C6.4.2B = Mean Before 1992
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Participation (C6.4.3)
Changes Before/After 1992
Data Per Table 3C
2.2
2.0 -
1.8 -
1.6
1.4-
1.2J
1.0 'i
.8 i
S O E
C6.4.3A = Mean After 1992 
C6.4.3B = Mean Before 1992
C h a r t s
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT 
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG
M e a n
|  C6.4.3A 
1 C6.4.3B
Review & Communication (C6.4.4) 
Changes Before/After 1992 
Data Per Table 3C
2.2
2 .0 -
M e a n
C6.4.4A
C6.4.4B
BCM3 BEEF BIMT GDDS GLIL GNFF SCM2 SMCW SSW 5 XFLT
BCRF BFSH BPMH GFDS GNFB SCCW SDS1 SMEF SXSW XLIG 
S O E
C6.4.4A = Mean After 1992 
C6.4.4B = Mean Before 1992
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APPENDIX 4
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Mean Rank Cases
ff
10.50 20 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
20 Total
* N II -3.9199 2-Tailed P = .0001
Workings  1 .1 A
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
10.50
. 00
20 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
20 Total
Z = -3.9199 2-Tailed P = .0001
Workings 1.1B
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Rank Cases
6.50 12 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
12 Total
I = -3.0594 2-Tailed P = .
Workings 1.2A
390
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ - wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
6.50 12 - Ranks
.00 0 + Ranks
0 Ties
12 Total
HIS3
*
-3.0594 2-Tailed P = .0022
Workings !
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
4 .50 
. 00
8 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
Total
^  Z = -2.5205 2-Tailed P = .0117
Workings ]
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
- - - - - Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Rank Cases
4.50 8 - Ranks
.00 0 + Ranks
0 Ties
8 Total
Z = -2.5205
Workings ]
2-Tailed P = .0117
. 2B
. 3A
. 3B
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29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1
P5.0A 
with P 5 .OB
Mean Rank Cases
3.50 6 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
6 Total
Z = -2.2014 2-Tailed P = .0277
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings ]
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
3.50 6 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
6 Total
*  Z = -2.2014 2-Tailed P = .0277
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings
P5.0A 
with P 5 .OB
Mean Rank Cases
4 .00 7 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
7 Total
*  Z = -2.3664 2-Tailed P = .0180
i
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. 4 A
. 4B
.  5A
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1.5B
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
ff
4 .00 7 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
7 Total
z = -2.3664 2-Tailed P =
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ - wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1. 6A
P5.0A 
with P 5 .OB
Rank Cases
1.50 2 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
2 Total
Z = -1.3416 2-Tailed P =
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1.6B
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Rank Cases
1.50 2 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
2 Total
Z = -1.3416 2-Tailed P =
393
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1. 7A
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Mean Rank Cases
fr
3.00 5 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
5 Total
Z = -2.0226 2-Tailed P =
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1. 7B
C6. OA 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
3.00 5 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
5 Total
% z  = -2.0226 2-Tailed P = .0431
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1. 8A
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Mean Rank Cases
1.50 2 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
2 Total
X  Z = -1.3416 2-Tailed P = .1797
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29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1.8B
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
((
1.50 2 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
2 Total
Z = -1.3416 2-Tailed P =
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1.9A
P5.0A 
with P 5 .OB
Mean Rank Cases
4 .50 8 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P 5 .0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
8 Total
%  Z = -2.5205 2-Tailed P = .0117
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1. 9B
C6. 0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
4.50 8 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
8 Total
#  Z = -2.5205 2-Tailed P = .0117
395
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1.10A
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Mean Rank Cases
f?
2.50 4 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
4 Total
^  Z = -1.8257 2-Tailed P = .0679
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Working 1.10B
C 6 . 0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank Cases
2 .50 4 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
4 Total
*  Z = -1.8257 2-Tailed P = .0679
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Workings 1.11A
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Mean Rank Cases
2.00 3 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P 5 .0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
3 Total
JfC Z = -1.6036 2-Tailed P = .1088
396
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Workings ]
Rank Cases
2.00 3 - Ranks
f?
(C6.0B LT C6.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
3 Total
Z = -1.6036 2-Tailed P =
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
P5.0A 
with P5.0B
Workings 3
Rank Cases
1.50 2 - Ranks (P5.0B LT P5.0A)
.00 0 + Ranks (P5.0B GT P5.0A)
0 Ties (P5.0B EQ P5.0A)
2 Total
Z = -1.3416 2-Tailed P =
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
_ _ _ _ _ wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
C6.0A 
with C6.0B
Mean Rank
1.50
, . 00
*  Z =
Cases
'2 - Ranks (C6.0B LT C6.0A)
0 + Ranks (C6.0B GT C6.0A)
0 Ties (C6.0B EQ C6.0A)
2
■1.3416
Total
Workings 3
2-Tailed P = .1797
. 11B
. 12A
. 12B
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29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable 
P5 . OA 
P5 .OB
Number of 
pairs Corr
20 . 942
2-tail
Sig
. 0 0 0
f?
Mean
2.6900
1.6050
Workings  2 . 1A
SD
321
339
SE of Mean
.072
.076
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
1.0850 .114
95% Cl (1.032, 1.138)
.025
t-value
*  42.69
df
19
2-tail Sig
000
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.IB
Number of 2-tail
Variable pairs Corr Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
C6. 0A 
C6. 0B
20 975 . 0 0 0
2.0650
1.3050
.367
.278
082
062
Mean
Paired Differences
SD SE of Mean
.7600 .114
95% Cl (.707, .813)
.026
t-value
#  29.75
df
19
2-tail Sig
. 0 0 0
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable
P5.0A
P5.0B
Number of 
pairs
12
2-tail 
Corr Sig Mean
793 002
2.5000
1.3917
Workings 2.2A
SD SE of Mean
.213
.215
.062
.062
Mean
Paired Differences
SD SE of Mean
1.1083 .138
95% Cl (1.021, 1.196)
.040
t-value
*  27.84
df 2-tail Sig
11 . 0 0 0
398
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable 
C6. OA 
C6. OB
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig
12 732 .007
Mean
1.8667
1.1667
Workings  2 . 2B
SD
107
089
SE of Mean
031
026
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
.7000 .074
95% Cl (.653, .747)
021
t-value 
^  32.83
df
11
2-tail Sig
. 0 0 0
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.3A
Variable 
P5.0A 
P5. 0B
Number of 
pairs Corr
. 975
2-tail
Sig
. 000
Mean
2.9750
1.9250
SD SE of Mean
231
212
.082
.075
Mean
Paired Differences
SD SE of Mean
1.0500 .053
95% Cl (1.005, 1.095)
.019
t-value
55.56
df 2-tail Sig
000
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig Mean
Workings 2.3B
SD SE of Mean
C6.0A
C6.0B
985 000
2.3625
1.5125
424
340
.150
. 120
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
.8500 .107
95% Cl (.761, .939)
.038
t-value
*  22.49
df 2-tail Sig
. 0 0 0
399
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings  2 . 4  A
Number of 2-tail
Variable pairs Corr Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
P5.0A 2.4333 .151 .061
6 .844 .035
P5.0B ft 1.3833 .194 .079
Paired Differences
Mean SD SE of Mean ; t-value df 2-tail Sig
1.0500 .105 .043 ! *  24.52 5 .000
95% Cl (.940, 1.160) i
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples
Workings 2.4B
Number of 2-tail
Variable pairs Corr Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
C6.0A 1.9167 .098 .040
6 .495 .318
C6.0B 1.2167 .075 .031
Paired Differences
Mean SD SE of Mean t-value df 2-tail Sig
.7000 .089 .037 19.17 5 .000
95% Cl (.606, .794)
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.5A
Number of 
Variable pairs Corr
2-tail
Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
P5.0A
7
P5.0B
.906 .005
2.6143
1.4857
.329
.353
.124
.134
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean t -value df 2-tail Sig
1.1286 .150 
95% Cl (.990, 1.267)
.057 * 19.96 6 .000
400
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable 
C6. OA 
C6.0B
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig
. 987 . 000
f?
Mean
1.9571
1 . 2000
Workings  2 .5 B
SD SE of Mean
387
271
.146
. 1 0 2
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
.7571 .127
95% Cl (.639, .875)
.048
t-value
*  15.74
df 2-tail Sig
. 0 0 0
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable
P5.0A
P5.0B
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig Mean
1 . 0 0 0 . 000
2.9000
1.7500
Workings 2.6A
SD SE of Mean
141
212
. 100  
. 150
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
1.1500 .071
95% Cl (.515, 1.785)
050
t-value df 2-tail Sig
*  23.00 .028
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.6B
Variable
Number of 
pairs Corr
2-tail
Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
C6.0A 
C6. 0B
2 . 0 0 0 0
1.2500
000
071
. 0 0 0
.050
Mean
Paired Differences
SD SE of Mean
.7500 .071
95% Cl (.115, 1.385)
050
t-value
#  15.00
df 2-tail Sig
.042
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29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable
P5.0A
P5.0B
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig
.957 Oil
Mean
3.0200
1.9800
W orkings  2 .7 A
SD
164
130
SE of Mean 
.073 
.058
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
1.0400 .055
95% Cl (.972, 1.108)
024
t-value
*  4 2 - 46
df 2-tail Sig
. 0 0 0
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.7B
Variable 
C6. 0A 
C6. 0B
Number of 
pairs Corr
.983
2-tail
Sig
003
Mean
2.4200
1.5800
SD
438
349
SE of Mean
.196
.156
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
.8400 .114
95% Cl (.698, .982)
.051
t-value
*  16.47
df 2-tail Sig
. 000
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable
P5.0A
P5.0B
Number of 
pairs Corr
2-tail
Sig Mean
2.5000
1 . 2000
Workings 2.8A
SD SE of Mean
000
141
. 0 0 0
. 100
Mean
Paired Differences
SD SE of Mean
1.3000 .141
95% Cl (.029, 2.571)
. 100
t-value
*  13.00
df 2-tail Sig
.049
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29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable
C6.0A
C6.0B
Number of 
pairs Corr
1 . 0 0 0
2-tail
Sig
. 000
Mean
1.7000
1.0500
Workings  2 .8 B
SD SE of Mean
141
071
. 100
.050
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean t-value
.6500 .071
95% Cl (.015, 1.285)
.050 *  13.00
df 2-tail Sig
049
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.9A
Variable
P5.0A
P5.0B
Number of 
pairs Corr
. 8 6 6
2-tail
Sig Mean
005
2.4875
1.4000
SD
196
185
SE of Mean
.069
.065
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
1.0875 .099
95% Cl (1.005, 1.170)
035
t-value
$  31.04
df 2-tail Sig
000
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.9B
Variable
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
C6.0A
C6.0B
.572 .138
1.9125
1 . 2000
099
076
035
027
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
.7125 .083
95% Cl (.643, .782)
.030
t-value
£  24.15
df 2-tail Sig
. 000
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29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples
Variable
P5.0A
P5.0B
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig
853 147
Mean
3.1750
2 . 1 0 0 0
Workings  2 .1 0 A
SD
096
082
SE of Mean
.048
.041
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
1.0750 .050
95% Cl (.995, 1.155)
025
t-value 
#  43.00
df 2-tail Sig
000
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.10B
Variable
C6.0A
C6.0B
Number of 
pairs Corr
2-tail
Sig Mean
333 .667
2.7500
1.8250
SD SE of Mean
100
050
.050
.025
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
.9250 .096
95% Cl (.773, 1.077)
.048
t-value
*  19.32
df 2-tail Sig
000
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.11A
Variable
Number of 
pairs
2-tail 
Corr Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
P5.0A
P5.0B
866 .333
2.9000
1.8667
100
058
.058
.033
Mean
Paired Differences
SD SE of Mean
1.0333 .058
95% Cl (.890, 1.177)
.033
t-value
$  31.00
df 2-tail Sig
.001
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29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings  2 . 11B
Variable
Number of 
pairs
C6. OA 
C6.0B
2-tail 
Corr Sig
.500
Mean
. 6  §7
1.9667
1.2333
SD SE of Mean
058
058
.033
.033
Paired Differences !
Mean SD SE of Mean !
j
.7333 . .058 .033 i
95% Cl (.590, .877) j
t-value 
* 22 . 0 0
df 2-tail Sig
002
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.12A
Variable
P5.0A
P5.0B
Number of 
pairs Corr
1 . 0 0 0
2-tail
Sig Mean
000
2.5500
1.5000
SD
212
141
SE of Mean
. 150 
. 1 0 0
Paired Differences 
Mean SD SE of Mean
1.0500 .071
95% Cl (.415, 1.685)
050
t-value
% 2 1 . 0 0
df 2-tail Sig
030
29 Nov 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Paired Samples Workings 2.12B
Variable
Number of 
pairs Corr
2-tail
Sig Mean SD SE of Mean
C6.0A
C6.0B
1.9000
1 . 1000
. 000
. 000
. 000
. 0 0 0
>Warning # 11836. Command name: T-TEST
>The standard error of the difference is 0. This analysis cannot be 
>performed.
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04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t-tests for Independent Samples of OWNER W orkings  3 . 1A
Variable
Number 
of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean
P5.0B
OWNER 1 
OWNER 2
12
8
,1.3917 
i .9250
.215
.212
.062
.075
Mean Difference = -.5333
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .086 P= .772
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff
95% 
Cl for Diff
Eaual -5.46 
Unequal -5.48
18
15.31
000
000
.098
.097
(-.739, 
(-.741, -.
328)
326)
Workings 3.IB
Number
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean
P5.0A
OWNER 1 12 
OWNER 2 8
2.5000
2.9750
.213
.231
.062
.082
Mean Difference = -.4750
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .758 P= .395
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff
95%
Cl for Diff
Eaual &  -4.72 18 
Unequal -4.64 14.26
000
000
.101
.102
(-.686, -.264) 
(-.694, -.256)
04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6 .1
t-tests for Independent Samples of OWNER Workings 3.1C
Number
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean
P5.0D
OWNER 1 12 
OWNER 2 8
1.1083 
1.0500
.138
.053
.040
.019
Mean Difference = .0583
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.671 P= .212
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff
95%
Cl for Diff
Eaual 1.13 18 
Unequal 1.32 15.30
.272
.205
.052
.044
(-.050, .167) 
(-.035, .152)
41)6
04 Dec 96; SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
t
t-tests for Independent Samples of OWNER Workings  3 . 2A
Variable
C6.0B
OWNER 1 
OWNER 2
Number 
of Cases
12
Mean
,1.1667
"1.5125
SD SE of Mean
089
340
.026
. 1 2 0
Mean Difference = -.3458
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 96.718 P= .000
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig
Equal #  -3.40
Unequal -2.81
SE of Diff
18
7.64
.003
.024
.102
.123
95%
Cl for Diff
(-.560, -.132) 
(-.632, -.060)
Variable
C6.0A
OWNER 1 
OWNER 2
Number 
of Cases
12
Mean
1.8667
2.3625
SD
107
424
Workings 3.2B 
SE of Mean
.031
.150
Mean Difference = -.4958
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 74.284 P= .000
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal
*  -3.92 
-3.24
18
7.60
. 0 0 1
.013
SE of Diff
.127
.153
95%
Cl for Diff
(-.762, -.230) 
(-.852, -.140)
04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Independent Samples of OWNER Workings 3.2C
Variable
C6.0D
OWNER 1 
OWNER 2
Number 
of Cases
12
8
Mean
7000
8500
SD SE of Mean
074
107
. 0 2 1
.038
Mean Difference = -.1500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 2.492 P= .132
t-test for Equality of Means 95%
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff Cl for Diff
Equal -3.73 18 .002 .040 (-.235, -.065)
Unequal -3.46 11.43 .005 .043 (-.245, -.055)
407
04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
04 Dec 96 SPSS
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
04 Dec 96 SPSS
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
O N E WA Y
P5.0B
OWNER
W orkings  3 .3 A
Analysis of Variance
D.F,
3
16
19
Sum of 
Squares
1.1396
1.0499
2.1895
Mean
Squares
.3799
.0656
Ratio Prob. 
*  5.7889 .0071
for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
P5.0A
OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings 3.3B
D.F.
3
16
19
Sum of 
Squares
1.0681
.8899
1.9580
Mean
Squares
.3560
.0556
Ratio Prob. 
*  6.4013 .0047
for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
P5.0D
OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings 3.3C
D.F,
3
16
19
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
.0392
.2063
.2455
.0131
.0129
Ratio Prob. 
*  1.0139 .4124
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04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Variable C6.0B 
By Variable OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings  3
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
D.F,
3
16
19
Sum of 
Squares
.5082
.9613
1.4695
Mean
Squares
. 1694 
.0601
Ratio Prob.
2.8192 .0722
04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Variable C6.0A 
By Variable OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings 3
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
D.F.
3
16
19
Sum of 
Squares
.8520
1.7135
2.5655
Mean
Squares
. 2840 
. 1071
Ratio Prob. 
*  2.6520 .0840
04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Variable C6.0D 
By Variable OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings 3
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
D.F,
3
16
19
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
.0539
.1941
.2480
.0180
.0121
Ratio Prob. 
^  1.4795 .2578
. 4 A
. 4B
. 4C
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04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
04 Dec 96 SPSS
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
04 Dec 96 SPSS
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
P5.0B
OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
W orkings  3 .5 A
D.F.
5
14
19
Sum of 
Squares
1.8828
.3067
2.1895
Mean
Squares
.3766
.0219
Ratio Prob. 
*  17.1911 .0000
for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
P5.0A
OWNER
O N E W A Y  - - -  - -
Workings 3.5B
Analysis of Variance
D.F.
5
14
19
Sum of 
Squares
1.5968
.3613
1.9580
Mean
Squares
.3194
.0258
Ratio Prob. 
*  12.3762 .0001
for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
P5.0D
OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings 3.5C
D.F.
5
14
19
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
.1376
.1079
.2455
.0275
.0077
Ratio Prob. 
*  3.5697 .0273
410
04 Dec 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
04 Dec 96 SPSS
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
04 Dec 96 SPSS
Variable 
By Variable
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
C6.0B
OWNER
D.F,
5
14
19
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
ff
Sum of 
Squares
1.4103
.0592
1.4695
Mean
Squares
.2821
.0042
W orkings  3 .6 A
Ratio Prob. 
$  66.7425 .0000
for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
C6.0A
OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings 3.6B
D.F.
5
14
19
Sum of 
Squares
2.4401
.1254
2.5655
Mean
Squares
. 4880 
.0090
Ratio Prob,
*  54 .4763 0000
for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1
C6.0D
OWNER
O N E WA Y
Analysis of Variance
Workings 3.6C
D.F.
5
14
19
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
.1601
.0879
.2480
.0320
.0063
Ratio Prob. 
■fr 5.0984 .0072
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Case Analysis 1 
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the responsibility 
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 1" (28 January 1994) .
Name of SOE : Shanghai No.5 Steel Works (SSW5)
Staff Interviewed
Dates of Visits
Mr Huang Han Bin, Assistant Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprises : 15 years
First Visit 
Second Visit 
Third Visit 
Fourth Visit 
Fifth Visit 
Sixth Visit 
Seventh Visit
13 September 1991 
25 January 19 92 
16 September 1992 
27 May 1993
10 September 1993
6 September 1994
7 February 19 9 5
1
S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d  ( Q .1 . 1 - 5 )
1.1 SSW5 is a wholly state-owned enterprise established in 1958 
and is situated at the North-Eastern suburb (Baoshan 
District) of the Shanghai city. SSW5 has over 40 factories 
and buildings scattered in between the Sitang River stream 
and the busy Tongji Road. They have covered a big piece of 
land and actually formed a small town of its own. SSW5 has 
its own two railway lines connecting to the Shanghai Central 
Station. Therefore, SSW5 can make use of the river, main 
road and railway to transport raw materials in and finished 
goods out. (refer to Q.1.1)
1.2 SSW5 is one of the top 5 iron and steel products 
manufacturers in Shanghai with an annual production volume
of 1 ,.3 million tons in 1993. (Q.l. 2)
The major products of SSW5 can 
following 12 categories : (Q.1.3)
be classified into
(1) Carbon Construction Steel (7) Spring Steel
(2) Alloy Constructure Steel (8) Carbon Tool Steel
(3) High Speed Tool Steel (9) Stainless Steel
(4) Heat Resisting Steel (10) Alloy Tool Steel
(5) Anchor Chain Steel (11) Super Alloy
(6) Titanium & Titanium Alloy (12) Rearing Steel
1.4 About 90% of SSW5's products are sold domestically and the 
rest are exported to the USA, Japan and other Southeast 
Asian countries. (Q.1.4)
1.5 SSW5 has granted the "Import/Export Right" by the government 
in 1993, so that it can further explore the overseas markets 
during the coming 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) . However, 
the Assistant Chief Accountant, Mr Huang Han Bin, has 
mentioned that because of the old production technology, low 
productivity and high overheads, the selling prices of 
SSW5's products are higher than the imported iron and steel 
products, therefore, the export proportion may be lower than 
10% in the next few years. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 SSW5 has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next five years because it is 
the government policy to keep a macroeconomic control over 
the steel industry in China. (Q.2.1)
2
2 . 2  SSW5 i s  h o l d i n g  some s e l f - f i n a n c e d  an d  s m a l l  t e r t i a r y
e n t e r p r i s e s  ( i . e .  r e t a i l i n g ,  r e s t a u r a n t ,  t r a d i n g ,  e t c . )
w h i c h  a r e  n o t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c o r e  b u s i n e s s .  ( Q. 2 . 4 )
2.3 The organisation structure of SSW5 can be divided into three 
major parts, inter alia, Management, Production and Service 
functions. (Q.2.3)
2 . 4
2 . 5
The management function is represented 
in which there are 8 departments ( 
including : (Q.2.5)
(1) General Manager Office
(2) Accounting & Finance Department
(3) Production & Control Department
(4) Production Technology Department
(5) Sales & Marketing Department
(6) Personnel & Manpower Department
(7) Estate & Development Department
(8) Employees Welfare Department
by the "Headquarters" 
all expense centres)
(General Manager) 
(Chief Accountant) 
(Chief Engineering) 
(Deputy-GM)
(Deputy-GM)
(Deputy-GM)
(Deputy-GM)
(Deputy-GM)
The production function is composed of 12 manufacturing 
factories and 4 supporting factories which are all treated 
as separate divisions or profit centres with some 
interdependencies due to the process production nature. 
These 16 factories are listed below : (Q.2.5 & 2.9)
Manufacturing Factories*
(1) N o .1 Melting & Casting Factory
(2) N o .2 Melting & Casting Factory
(3) Initial Rolling Factory
(4) Forge Pressing Factory
(5) N o .1 Refine Rolling Factory
(6) N o .2 Refine Rolling Factory
(7) N o .3 Refine Rolling Factory
(8) Steel Tube Factory
(9) Cold Drawing Factory
(10) Strip Drawing Factory
(11) Wire Drawing Factory
(12) Converter Factory
[output goto (3) 
[output goto (3) 
[output goto (5) 
[output goto (5) 
[output goto 
[output goto 
[output goto 
[output for sales] 
[output for sales] 
[output for sales] 
[output for sales] 
[output for sales]
Sc (4) ] @
Sc (4)]
(6) Sc (7)] 
(6) Sc (7)]
8 )]
9) Sc (10)]
9) , (10) Sc (11) ]
* Each factory manager has its own functional staff like 
marketing and sales, purchasing and supply, repair and 
maintenance, transportation, accounting, personnel, etc. 
These functional staff are reporting to the corresponding 
departments in the headquarters as well.
@ The intermediate outputs of factories (1) to (7) can also 
be sold externally although it is not the general policy 
adopted.
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S u p p o r t i n g  F a c t o r i e s * *
(13) Durable Material Factory (i.e. bricks)
(14) Coal Gas Factory
(15) Electricity Factory
(16) Oxygen Factory
** These supporting factories supply their outputs to the 
above 12 manufacturing factories and also to the other 
management and service departments.
2.6 The service function is headed by another Deputy-GM and 
contains the following departments which are all expense 
centres : (Q.2.5 & 2.9)
(1) Purchasing Department
(2) Inventory Control Department
(3) Transportation Department
(4) Repair & Maintenance Department
(5) Quality Control Department
(6) Computer Department
2.7 SSW5 is under the administration of the Shanghai Municipal
Government and the Shanghai Metuallurgical Bureau who 
dictated all planning and control systems of SSW5 before 
1992 . (Q . 2 . 6 & 2.7)
2.8 SSW5 is a large SOE having 23,000 employees. Mr Huang has 
said that about 20% of SSW51 s employees are redundant but 
the life-long employment concept still exists. (Q.2.10)
# Since SSW5 is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to SSW5.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets
3.2 Turnover
RMB5,0 00M (historical cost) (Q.3.1)
RMB2,800M 
RMB3,800M 
RMB4,500M 
RMB4,800M
(1992)
(1993)
(1994)
(1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 8c 1 )
3.3 Income before tax
7)
* The decrease of profit margin was mainly due to inflation. 
3.4 Income tax rate : 33% (before and after 1992) (Q.3.6)
RMB 150M (1992) - 5.4% of sales
RMB 190M (1993) - 5.0% of sales
RMB 170M (1994) - 3.8% of sales*
RMB 175M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.5, 6 Sc
4
I3.5 SSW5 is planning to maintain an average growth rate in 
turnover from 15% to 20% during 1996 to 2000. Mr Huang is 
quite optimistic on this forecast since the overall demand 
of iron and steel products is in parallel with the uprising 
trend of the economic development in China. (Q.3.7 & 8)
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to SSW5 because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 SSW5 signed the first 5-year's ERC (1983-1987) with the
Shanghai Municipal Government in 1983. (Q.4.1)
4.2 Based on the actual performance of 1980 to 1982, the 
following major targets were set in the ERC : (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
(1) Profit target RMB10M in 1983 and then 5% annual growth
(2) Handover 50% of target profit to government
(3) Income tax of 33%
4.3 There were different forms of ERCs for the state-owned
enterprises to choose from and which had different financial 
and non-financial targets. The chosen format was mutually 
agreed between the government and SSW5. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government in setting the above targets. Mr Huang 
believed that the growth rate of 5% was underestimated and 
proved by the actual results subsequently. (Q.4.5, 7-10)
4.5 The second ERC (1988-1992) increased the profit growth rate 
to 7%. SSW5 achieved the targets all the years. (Q.4.5 &9)
4.6 The second ERC was ceased in 1991 and SSW5 has been subject
to sales, profit and other taxes. Furthermore, the annual 
gross wages growth rate cannot exceed the profit growth rate 
and productivity per employee growth rate. Despite the 
removal of with the ERC, Mr Huang has said that in the 
recent years SSW5 still had to agree the output volume and 
turnover level with the government. (Q.4.12 & 13)
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(0.9)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992
After 1992
all the 16 production factories were "cost centres" 
managed by the factory managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expense 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
all the 16 production factories have become "profit 
centres" managed by the factory managers with more 
autonomy in management and operation. All the 
other management and service departments remain 
"expense centres" whose managers participate in the 
budgeting process. Mr Huang has said that there 
would be no significant changes in SSW5's 
organisation structure in the next few years.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5) "
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0) Greatest Influence
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3) \/
some of the parameters or Very Low (4) Least Influence
variables)
Very High [VH] (0 . 0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1-1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2 . 6 -3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 -3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3 .6 - 4.0)
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 the factory managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management. 
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
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After 1992 : the primary profit responsibility lies with the 
factory managers who initiate the annual budgets 
and IRCs and get their subordinates (middle and 
lower management) involved. Obviously, changing 
into profit centres is reasonable.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992
After 1992
the general manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the government, and other senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required government1s approval.
the general manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the government. The general manager 
can appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
factory managers. The factory managers can decide 
their own organisation structures and personnel 
affairs but important changes should be approved by 
the headquarters. Mr Huang has mentioned that in 
fact the party secretary was the representative 
from the government to ensure some sort of macro- 
economic policies are under control.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2.5)»
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4) 
Before 1992
"Very High (0.5)" to "Medium
After 1992
the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the headquarters by using standard 
cost plus fixed profit margin.
the transfer prices are based on market prices and 
negotiations are allowed but final decisions are 
made by the headquarters.
"Very High (0.5)" to "High-MediumCorporate Planning Influence 
( 2 ) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence
Factors Before 1992
Responsibility Centre VH-H (1. 0)
Decentralization High (1. 5)
Appointment VH (0. 5)
Interdependencies VH (0. 5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0. 9)
After 1992
Medium (2.5) 
M-L (3.0)
Medium (2.5) 
H-M (2.0)
Medium ( 2 . 5 )
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5 . 2  R e v i e w  P r o c e s s  ( P l a n n i n g  & B u d g e t i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 3 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium-Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 6 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long-term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the government while the 
top management was in consultation only. The 
annual budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the government.
After 1992 : the government has delegated the long term planning 
and annual budgeting autonomy to the top management 
but Mr Huang has said that strategic plans still 
have to be reviewed, discussed and modified with 
the government.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures were in 
existence to formulate, evaluate, approve and 
review the long term plans and annual budgets but 
initiation from the middle management was limited.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the factory managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was a top-down process but 
middle management (i.e. factory managers) did 
participate in the annual planning & budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  ( 1) "  t o  "Medium
( 2 . 5 ) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 19 92 : the government reviewed and amended the long term 
plans with the top management annually. Changes 
were notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management twice every year but amendments 
were made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : Long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with the government and 
informed the employees during the AGM. The annual 
budgets are reviewed quarterly between the top and 
middle management and amendments can be made but 
flexible budgets are not used.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) M-L (2.6)
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(0.8)" before 1992 to "High-Medium Corporate (1.7)" after 
1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "Quality" has been the major strategic theme given 
to and imbedded into the planning and control 
system. Different types of national and interna­
tional quality standards have been adopted by the 
top management.
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After 1992 : as before 1992 except that factory managers have
participated in setting some production and product 
quality standards. This is very important under 
the prevailing open market economy environment.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "Very
High-High (1) "
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : technology improvement, efficiency enhancement and 
capacity expansion have been the major strategic 
thrusts which were incorporated into long term 
plans with consultation from the middle or lower 
management only.
After 1992 : as before 1992 but factory managers have been
encouraged to make strategic or tactical suggestions 
to realise these strategic thrusts which are the 
crucial elements to compete with many strong 
counterparts all over China.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, transfer price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : the headquarters has left more freedom to the 
factory managers to adjust their planning and 
operation as long as they would not deviate much 
from the long term plan and annual budget.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
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Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0.8) H-M (1.7)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(1)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the government 
in terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
right to export, product and market development.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long
term plans and compromise with the government who
may insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and mix. The current 5-year planning (1991- 
1995), includes production differentiation and 
diversification, production technology and facility 
enhancement, production capacity expansion, market 
penetration and diversification, manpower and 
training, and financial planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the government 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. It was a mean for the 
government to allocate limited resources, such as 
capital, to SSW5 according to the central plans.
After 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures are in 
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. It is a way for 
the top management to allocate limited resources to 
different divisions according to the market demand, 
product profitability and government suggestions.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the involvement from middle management (i.e.
factory managers) was limited to consultation only.
After 1992 : factory mangers are members of the planning
committee but they seldom initiate changes but 
mainly concern the impact on their annual budgets 
and IRCs which they are measured on.
Corporate Pla n n i n g  Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
i
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
government with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the government 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking a long term bank loan. A summary of the 
long term plans is distributed to all members of 
the planning committee.
Corporate P l a nning Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Operation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.1)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because SSW5 caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 3 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government interfered into the process and provided 
major targets. Top management had to negotiate 
and compromise for approval.
After 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and inventory level.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management initiated the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
then compromised with the factory managers.
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different profit 
and cost centres.
After 1992 : top management provided major guidelines to the
factory managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins as shown on Appendix A attached.
Long term plans, special projects, product demands 
and profitability are considered in this annual 
resource allocation exercise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : middle management i.e. factory managers were asked 
to discuss and compromise the budgets provided by 
the top management without much rooms for 
negotiation and effective communication.
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After 1992 : factory managers have to formulate their own
budgets and get the lower management involved but 
top management's expectations should be observed. 
This change of budgeting style maintains better 
understandings between the different levels of 
management at least to work out a set of more 
realistic budgets which are acceptable by the 
factories and departments to be measured against. 
(This favourable comment has been expressed by 
Mr Huang.)
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Low
(3.5) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed in the
middle of the year and amendments were seldom made 
except under signifcant environmental changes. 
Annual plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in document twice every year.
After 1992 : planning committee reviews the annual plans and 
budgets quarterly and amendments are made due to 
unavoidable internal and external factors. A fixed 
budget concept is still in force. Other than AGM 
and budget book, the budget information is further 
communicated between top and middle management 
during the monthly performance evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation VH-H (1.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Low (3.3)
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5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)"
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : major targets set were production volume and mix,
and standard costs while qualitative targets such
as safety, quality, resource consumption etc. were 
also defined. Since most of these targets were top 
down without much negotiations, therefore, factory 
or department managers did not have much control. 
The IRC system was started in 1985 during the first 
ERC (1983-1987) period. The IRCs mainly applied to 
the production factories.
After 1992 : major target is internal profit to be achieved by
the factory managers. Quantitative targets such as 
production volume and mix, energy consumption, and 
other qualitative targets like product quality, 
new product development, production facilities and 
technology, management techniques, safety etc. are 
also included but they carry much less weightings 
than the internal profit. A sample of IRC is shown 
in section 5.6 of the Data Analysis Set 1.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"Medium-Low (3)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : factory managers negotiated and compromised the
given IRC targets during the annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate, quantify and 
justify the major IRC targets before negotiating 
with the top management. According to Mr Huang, 
the factory managers are more proactive in setting 
the targets in the IRC.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : IRCs were reviewed in the middle of the year and 
amendments could be made when mutually agreed by 
the top management and factory managers. IRCs were 
documented and informed to the respective factory 
managers and their employees.
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After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. Second-tier IRCs are signed 
between the factory manager and production lines in 
order to further delegate the planning and control 
responsibilities. Mr Huang agreed that IRC was an 
effective way to achieve the short term targets on 
one hand and improve the budget communication 
between the different levels of management on the 
other hand. Furthermore, IRC can link up 
performance with the incentive scheme as a fair 
means for resource (i.e. bonus) distribution.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
factory managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) " to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias VH-H (1.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Incentive High (1.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Low (3.4)
16
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High Corporate (0.5)" 
before 1992 to "High-Medium Corporate (1.7)" after 1992]
(1) Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Interdepen­ All 16 production All 16 production
dencies factories involved factories involved#
1. 2 Transfer Standard cost plus Adjusted market
Price Basis fixed profit margin price
1. 3 Transfer Price A little between the Some negotiations
Negotiation buyer and seller are allowed
1.4 Intermediate Buy and sell available Buy and sell*
Product in the market available in market
1.5 Transfer All determined by the Excess over quota
Quantity headquarters can sell externally
1. 6 Arbitration Prices and quantities Mainly determined by
all determined by HQ HQ although negotia-
ions are allowed
1. 7 Government No, except the output No, only suggest
Interference volumes & selling volumes & prices of
prices of final products final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium
(2 ) "
# Please refer to the organisation structure in section 2.5 above 
to show the inter-relationships of the 16 production factories.
* First of all, the internal transfers must satisfy the needs of 
the manufacturing factories, and then any excess production can 
be sold to the external customers. Sometimes insufficient 
internal supplies are made up by purchasing from outside but 
approval is required from the purchasing department in the 
headquarters.
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : nearly all the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the headquarters and the factory 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflicts 
were arbitrated by the headquarters. Factory 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by production volume & cost.
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After 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities are
still controlled by the headquarters although some 
negotiations are allowed for the factory managers 
because they are measured on internal profit. 
Interference from and arbitration by the 
the headquarters are quite often. Mr Huang said 
that it was because the demand and supply of steel 
products in the market have been quite volatile in 
the 1990s, so the headquarters, having more 
information, could make better decisions on 
transfer quantities and prices.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 : the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
without much inputs from the middle management. It 
was historical cost plus inflation plus profit 
margin. The transfer prices were reviewed in the 
middle of the year and some amemdments were allowed
After 1992 : the market prices have been volatile since 1993,
the transfer prices are reviewed monthly. For any 
changes of plus or minus 5%, transfer prices will 
be adjusted by the headquarters. Information is 
available in the market and sufficient to make the 
changes reflecting reasonable transfer prices.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics VH (0.5) H-M (2.0)
Participation VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Review VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH (0.5) H-M (1.7)
18
S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.0)* VH-H (1.0)
1 . 2 Staffing VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 3 Roles & functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1.4 Interactions H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
High (1-1) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0 . 0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2 . 6 -3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel# (Q.6,.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2.1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
2.2 Assignment H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
2 .3 Training H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
2.5 Remuneration High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
2.6 Termination VH (0.0) VH (0.5)
High (1.4) M-L (2.7)
# Mr Huang said that since 1992, more delegation has been given 
to the factory managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the headquarters and 
the party secretary.
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(3) C o n t r o l  M ech an ism s  ( Q. 6 . 1 . 2 - 3 ,  Q . 6 . 4 . 8 )
Before 1992 After 1992
3 . 1 Budget VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
3 . 2 IRC VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
3 . 3 Financial targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) High (1.5)
3 . 6 Communication* VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
VH-H (0.9) High (1.2)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
factories and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations. Mr Huang said that 
the control style has not been changed so much mainly because of 
the government's macroeconomic influence and many uncertainties 
existed in the market.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms
High
High
VH-H
(1.1)
(1.4)
(0.9)
Medium
M-L
High
(2.1)
(2.7)
(1.2)
Overall Control Influence High (1.1) H-M (2.0)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q.6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1) " before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Mahangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
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6 . 3  M o n i t o r i n g  R e s u l t s
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " T i g h t  F i n a n c i a l  ( 0 . 9 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  " T ig h t  F i n a n c i a l  ( 0 . 8 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH (0.5) VH (0.5)
1. 2 Frequency VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 3 Contents VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Compilation VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 5 Review VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 6 Evaluation VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Authorization VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1 .10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (0.7) High (1.3)
# Mr Huang has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each factory. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any variances plus or minus 5% will be 
highlighted in order to bring the attention to the factory 
managers and the top management. For any serious adverse 
variances shown on any report, the general manager or 
deputy-general managers will contact the respective factory 
manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining reasons 
or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is expected 
that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the situation as 
soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production factories were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets* (listed below) accounted for 
for less than 30% of the performance measurement 
weightings.
After 1992 : internal profit becomes the major measurement
criterion and similar non-financial targets* are 
accounted for less than 30% of the performance 
measurement weightings. The master budget compiled 
by the headquarters indicates profit before tax, 
profit % of sales, profit/sales/production per 
employee as well. Mr Huang said that financial 
indicators have been employed more in the last few 
years in order to meet the overall economic target 
as expected by the top management and government.
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C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H ig h - H ig h  (1)" t o  "Very High
( 0 . 5 )  "
* Non-financial targets : quality management, new product
development, energy consumption, facility maintenance, production 
safety, production technology, management style, use of computer, 
environment control., family planning etc.
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
factory or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the planning committee holds a monthly meeting to 
review the performance reports, to ask the factory 
managers for explanations, to decide corrective 
actions, and to determine penalties and incentives. 
Evaluation results are informed to the lower 
management via individual factory or departmental 
meetings. Middle management has been involved in 
determining the measurement criteria during the 
annual planning process.
Corproate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Very High
(0.5)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements 
Performance Measurement 
Review & Communication
VH-H
VH-H
VH-H
(0.7)
(1.0)
(1.0)
High
VH
VH
(1.3)
(0.5)
(0.5)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (0.9) VH-H (0.8)
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6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1) " before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.7)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16#22-23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1. 2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy# Very Low(4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regard to qualification and technical 
skill. The increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. 
RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SSW5 which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the top management 
and the factory management decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. Whereas, the second-tier IRCs agreed 
between a factory manager and his production lines are used as a 
basis to distribute that total amount of group bonus to the 
respective production lines. In turn, it is up to a production 
line supervisor to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or 
her individual subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
# According to Mr Huang's comment, about 20% employees in SSW5 
are redundant. But it is quite difficult to lay off these 
redundant staff because insufficient employment welfare and 
benefits have been established in China.
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One way to alleviate this problem is to transfer a small portion 
of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary enterprises" 
which are mainly service businesses such as retailing, 
restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated to the 
SSW5' s core business. Another way is to send some of employees 
home without giving them a job or post but still provide them the 
basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and
contributed to 50% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was almost impossible.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 50% of total wages. Basic 
wages has been increased and increments take 
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. Laying off 
redundant employees is possible but still difficult
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "Very
High-High (1)"
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating I R C s  
targets to be measured on. Basic wages, allowances 
, pension and other benefits were decided by the 
headquarters and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's targets 
and negotiate with top management. The policies 
for basic wages, allowances and other benefits 
have involved the labour union and planning 
committee. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and 
then underwritten by the government.
Corporate Cont r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u nicat ion  ( Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees
every month via the factory or department managers.
After 1992 : I R C s  targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Planning committee reviews 
the basic wages, allowances and other benefits 
during the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers.
Corporate Cont r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1. 6) H-M (1. 7)
Performance Orientation VH (0. 5) VH-H (1. 0)
Participation VH-H (1. 0) H-M (2. 0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1. 0) H-M (2. 0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1. 0) H-M (1. 7)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai No. 5 Steel Work (SSW5) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* Very High 
to High (0.9) Medium (2.5)
Review Process*
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
High (1.3)
Very High 
to High (0.8)
Medium to 
Low (2.6)
High to 
Medium (1.7)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
Very High 
to High (1.0) Medium (2.1)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting* High (1.5) Low (3.3)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.5) Low (3.4)
Management of Inter­
dependencies*
Very
High (0.5)
High to 
Medium (1.7)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.1) Medium (2.5)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.1)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (0.9)
Tight
Financial (0.8)
Rewards & Incentives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.7)
Overall Control Influence Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.6)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
2---------------------------- 2---------------------------- 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.6, 2.5) - SSW5 Post-1992 X (1.0, 1.1) - SSW5 Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai No. 5 Steel Works (SSW5) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial 
Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very 
strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style as 
described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
21 J u l y  1995 0 9 . 0 4 . 9 6
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 2" (4 February 1994).
Name of SOE : Xiamen Fork Lift Truck Plant (XFLT)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Wang Zhao Liang, Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 4 years)
Mr Huang Tian Qing, Ass. Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 20 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 22 September 1992
Second Visit - 8 June 1993
Third Visit - 15 September 1993
Fourth Visit - 14 September 1994
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 XFLT is a wholly state-owned enterprise established in 1957 
specialized in manufacturing fork lift trucks. It is
located close to the city centre of Xiamen. As one of the 
key enterprises in Fujian Province, the plant was conferred 
a title "Advanced Enterprise" in 1987 by the provincial 
government. XFLT is the largest fork lift truck
manufacturing plant in the Southern China. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 XFLT is the largest fork lift truck manufacturing plant in 
the Southern China with an annual production volume of 2,000 
trucks in 1993 but could not satisfy the national demands. 
(Q.1.2)
1.3 The major products of XFLT are the 2-14 tons new scissor 
fork lift trucks, 3-6 tons side loading trucks and 1-2.5 
tons electric fork lift trucks, all together in 19 
categories. (Q.1.3)
1.4 Over 90% of the trucks are sold domestically (60% to Fujian 
and Guangdong Province), while about 10% of the products are 
exported to the USA, UK, Canada, Southeast Asia and Hong 
Kong. (Q.1.4)
1.5 XFLT has granted the "Import/Export Right" by the government 
in 1993, so that it can further explore the overseas markets 
during the coming 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). The major 
competitors are the Sino-Japanese joint-ventrues which are 
exploring the high potential Asian markets. Mr Wang and Mr 
Huang has mentioned that in order to enhance the production 
teachnology, product quality and output capacity, XFLT 
should enter into joint-venture with the western countries, 
such as Germany. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 XFLT has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because 
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 XFLT is holding three self-financed and small tertiary 
enterprises running the property, tourism and retailing 
businesses. (Q.2.4)
2.3 The organisation structure of XFLT can be divided into six 
divisions under the direct control of the Factory Manager 
(FM) who has a Management Office and a Planning & Technology 
Office directly reporting to him (staff functions). (Q.2.3)
2.4 The six divisions are listed as follow : (Q.2.5 & 2.9)
(1) Production Division (Deputy-FM)
1.1 Production Management Office
1.1.1 Framework Workshop
1.1.2 Metalwork Workshop
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1.1.3 Painting Workshop
1.1.4 Assembly Workshop
1.1.5 Repair & Maintenance Workshop
1.1.6 Testing Centre
1.2 Purchasing & Supply Department
1.3 Facility Department
1.4 Transportation Department
(2) Technical Division (Deputy-FM)
2.1 Design Department
2.2 Production Technology Department
2.3 Inspection Department
2.4 Quality Control Department
2.5 Technology Management Department
2.5.1 Technology Information Section
2.5.2 Record Section
2.5.3 Computer Centre
(3) Economic Division (Chief Economist)
3.1 Sales & Marketing Department
3.2 Technical Support Department
(4) Finance Division (Chief Accountant)
4.1 Accounting Department
4.2 Cost Reuction Department
4.3 Internal Audit Department
4.4 Legal Department
(5) Administration Division (Deputy-FM)
5 .1 Personnel Department
5.2 Education & Training Department
5.3 Building & Facility Department
5.4 Security Department
5.5 Medical Department
5.6 General Affairs Department
5.6.1 Canteen
5.6.2 Nursary
2.5 XFLT is under the administration of the Xiamen Municipal
Government and the Fujian Provincial Machinery Bureau who
dictated all planning and control systems of XFLT before 
1992. (Q.2.6 & 2.7)
2.6 XFLT is a medium SOE having 1,100 employees. Mr Huang has
said that about 200 employees have been reduced since 1990s.
(Q.2.10)
# Since XFLT is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to XFLT.
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S e c t i o n  3 : F i n a n c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s ( Q . 3 . 1 - 8 # )
3.1 Total assets : RMB 52M (historical cost) (Q.3.1)
3.2 Turnover : RMB102M (1992)
RMB12 0M (1993)
RMB150M (1994)
RMB18 0M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 & 7)
3.3 Income before tax : RMB5.5M (1992) - 5.4% of sales
RMB7.5M (1993) - 6.3% of sales
RMB8.OM (1994) - 5.3% of sales*
RMB9.0M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
* The decrease of profit margin was mainly due to inflation.
3.4 Income tax rate 15! (before and after 1992) (Q.3.6)
3.5 XFLT is entering into a joint-venture with one of the 
largest fork lift truck manufacturers and expect to increase 
the production capacity to at least five times (10,000 to 
20,000 trucks per year) during the period of 1997 to 2000. 
It is expected that the new XFLT will be the largest fork 
lift truck plant in China. (Q.3.7 & 8)
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to XFLT because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 Since there have been special policies applied to the five 
special economic zones (including Xiamen) in early 1980s, 
XFLT has not signed any formal ERC with the municipal 
government. (Q.4.1)
4.2 However, since 1984, XFLT has agreed the following three 
targets with the municipal government :
(a) "Income Before Tax" with 10% annual growth rate;
(b) handover 10% of the "Income Before Tax" to government;
(c) "Income Tax" rate of 15%. (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
4.3 The chosen terms were mutually agreed between the government 
and SSW5. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government in setting the above targets. Mr Huang 
believed that the growth rate of 5% was underestimated and 
proved by the actual results subsequently. (Q.4.5,7-10)
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4.5 Since 1992, XFLT has been subject to income tax of 15% only 
and more income after tax could be retained for business 
development. (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
V
Before 1992 : all the production workshop were "cost centres" 
managed by the workshop managers responsible for 
production volume and cost. All the other service 
departments were "expense centres" control by 
expense budgets.
After 1992 : To avoid the setting of internal transfer prices
and calculating internal profits, all the workshops 
are treated as cost centres with higher autonomy in 
planning and control. All the "expense centres" 
whose managers participate in the budgeting process 
Mr Huang has said that there would be significant 
organisational changes in 1996 after the joint- 
venture with the German counterpart has taken off.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High (1 5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0) Greatest Influence
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3) \/
some of the parameters or Very Low (4) Least Influence
variables)
Very High [VH] (0..0 - 0..5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0..6 - 1..0)
High [H] (1..1 - 1,.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1..6 - 2..0)
Medium CM] (2..1 - 2,.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2..6 ■- 3 ,.0)
Low [L] (3,.1 - 3,.5)
Very Low [VL] (3,.6 - 4,.0)
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(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 : the workshop managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed'in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management.
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : although the workshops are still treated as cost 
cost centres, the workshop managers can initiate 
the annual budgets and IRCs and compromise with the 
top management similar to the profit centres.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 19 92 : the factory manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the government, and other senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required government's approval. Mr Huang has 
mentioned that in fact the party secretary was the 
representative from the government to ensure some 
sort of macro-economic policies are under control.
After 1992 : the factory manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the government. The factory manager 
can appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
workshop managers. The workshop managers can decide 
their own organisation structures and personnel 
affairs but important changes should be approved by 
the factory manager.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : all the quantities and costs of internal cross­
supplies were determined by the top management 
after the workshop managers being consulted.
After 1992 : the workshops are allowed to negotiate and
compromise the internal cross-supply affairs but 
interference and arbitration were required from the 
top management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
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Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Decentralization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Appointment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Interdependencies VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.3)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : since Xiamen is one of the five special economic
zones, some favourable policies have been given to
the SOEs by the central government in terms of 
lower taxes, free import/export rights and generous 
land use rights which in some ways have left more 
freedom to the SOE's planning and control aspects 
but interferences from the government still existed
After 1992 : in order to speed up the implementation of the "SOE
Mechanism Transformation Legislation" enacted in 
1992, the Xiamen municipal government issued ten 
specific additional policies for the SOEs at the 
end of 1992. These 10 policies explain the 
different rights that the SOEs in Xiamen could 
exercise in order to enjoy futher autonomy in 
planning and controlling their businesses.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : long term plans were initiated by the top manage­
ment after consultation with the middle management. 
Most of the long term plans had to be discussed and 
compromised with the government. The middle 
management had to formulate, evaluate, approve and 
review the annual budgets with the top management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
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(3)  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q. 5 . 7 . 6 - 8 )
Before 1992 : the middle management was consulted in the long
term planning which was almost a top-down process 
but did involved in the annual planning and 
budgeting processes actively.
After 1992 : middle management is involved in the formal long 
term planning process but decisions still rest in 
the hands of the top management. Workshop and 
department managers have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed and amended the long 
term plans with the middle management annually. 
Changes were notified to the employees during the 
AGM. The annual budgets were reviewed between the 
top and middle management twice every year but 
amendments were made due to significant changes 
which were communicated to lower management through 
revised budgets.
After 1992 : the long term plans are reviewed by the top and
middle management twice every year and significant 
changes are made at the year end and informed the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notify to 
lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.3) Low (3.3)
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5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(0.8)" before 1992 to "High-Medium Corporate (1.8)" after 
1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992
After 1992
"Quality" has been the major strategic theme given 
to and imbedded into the planning and control 
system. Testing centre, inspection department and 
quality control department were established to 
ensure and enhance the product quality.
as before 1992 except that workshop managers have 
participated in setting some production and product 
quality standards. The quality control standard 
has been highly recognised by the government and 
awards have been granted.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992
After 1992
technology improvement, efficiency enhancement and 
product development have been the major strategic 
thrusts which were incorporated into long term 
plans formulated by the government and the top 
management.
as before 1992 and in addition capacity expansion 
(long and short term) is emphasized in order to 
capture higher market share which is expanding.
Corporate Planning Influence
(1.5) "
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
"Very High-High (1) " to "High
Before 1992 top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as selling prices, 
marketing strategies and production quantity and 
mix. Financial indicators and performance were 
followed closely by the top management who was 
quick to make suggestions if they did not match 
with the overall long and short term plan.
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After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the workshop managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH (0.5) High (1..5)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) High (1..5)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) Medium (2..5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0.8) H-M (1..8)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the government 
in terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
right to export, product and market development.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long
term plans and compromise with the government who
may insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and mix. The current 5-year planning (1991- 
1995), includes production differentiation and 
diversification, production technology and facility 
enhancement, production capacity expansion, market 
penetration and diversification, manpower and 
training.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
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(2) O p e r a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 4 . 3  & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the government 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. workshop 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. It is a way for 
the top management to allocate limited resources to 
different divisions according to the market demand, 
product profitability and government suggestions.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the involvement from middle management (i.e.
workshop managers) was limited to consultation only
After 1992 : workshop and department mangers are members of the 
planning committee (i.e. senior management 
committee) but they seldom initiate changes but 
mainly concern the impact on their annual budgets 
and IRCs which they are measured on.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
government with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan
twice every year before the annual planning cycle 
and significant changes are reported to the 
government for endorsement and sometimes assistance 
such as seeking a long term bank loan. A summary 
of the long term plans is distributed to all 
members of the planning committee.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
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F a c t o r s B e f o r e  1992 A f t e r  1992
Central Planning 
Operation 
Participation 
Review & Communication
Overall Planning Influence
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because XFLT caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
(2) "
Before 1992
After 1992
government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and inventory level.
top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the workshop managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the workshop managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
After 1992 : top management provided major guidelines to the
workshop managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
39
(3) P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 5 . 3  & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed in the
middle of the year and amendments were seldom made 
except under signifcant environmental changes. 
Annual plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in term of a budget book.
After 1992 : senior management committee reviews the annual
plans and budgets quarterly and amendments are made 
due to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than AGM and budget book, the budget information is 
further communicated between top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
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5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.6)" before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : major economic targets set were production quantity 
and cost control while qualitative targets such as 
quality and safety had the veto effects on the 
bonus which was linked up with the IRC performance. 
The IRC system was started in 1987 and mainly 
applied to the production workshops.
After 1992 : in addition to the economic and qualitative targets 
set before, production facilities, technology and 
inventory management are also measured. IRC system 
has been extended to the service departments such 
as technical support, sales and marketing.
Samples of IRC are shown in section 5.6 of the Data
Analysis Set 2.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : workshop managers negotiated and compromised the
given IRC targets during the annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : workshop managers have to initiate, quantify and 
justify the major IRC targets before negotiating 
with the top management. According to Mr Huang, 
the workshop managers are more proactive in setting 
the targets in the IRC.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : IRCs were reviewed in the middle of the year and 
amendments could be made when mutually agreed by 
the top management and workshop managers. IRCs were
documented and informed to the respective workshop 
managers and their employees.
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After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. Mr Huang agreed that IRC was an 
effective way to achieve the short term targets on 
one hand and improve the budget communication 
between the different levels of management on the 
other hand. Furthermore, IRC can link up 
performance with the incentive scheme as a fair 
means for resource (i.e. bonus) distribution.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
workshop managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias 
Participation 
Review & Communication 
Incentive
High
High
H-M
High
(1.5)
(1.5) 
(2.0)
(1.5)
Medium
Low
Low
Low
(3.0)
(3.5)
(3.5)
(3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6) Low (3.4)
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Since all the departments in the Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) 
are treated as cost centres and the production workshops are 
measured against production volume and cost, therefore, internal 
transfer pricing does not exist.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.5)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH-H (1.0)* H-M (2.0)
1 . 2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0. 0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2 . 6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel# (Q.6..1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
2.5 Remuneration H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.6 Termination VH (1.0) H-M (2.0)
ii it 
i
ii 
3:
ii ii ii ii
(1.8) M-L (2.6)
# Mr Huang said that since 1992, more delegation has been given 
to the workshop managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and 
the party secretary.
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(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6,.1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.2) High (1.3)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
workshops and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
Personnel H-M (1.8) M-L (2.6)
Control Mechanisms High (1.2) High (1.3)
Overall Control Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.1)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q.6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
(2.0)on setting targets VH (0.5) H-M
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
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6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1.0) 1 
before 1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
# Mr Huang has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any variances plus or minus 5% will be 
highlighted in order to bring the attention to the factory 
manager. For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, 
the factory manager or deputy-factory managers will contact the 
respective workshop manager and his subordinates to dig out the 
underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production workshops were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
are accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production quantity and cost control are still the 
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production technology, facilities 
and inventory are measured.
C o r p o r a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
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(3) R e v ie w  & C om m u nica t ion  ( Q. 6 . 4 . 3 - 7 ,  Q . 6 . 4 . 9 - 1 2 )
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
workshop or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the planning committee holds a monthly meeting to
review the performance reports, to ask the workshop 
managers for explanations, to decide corrective 
actions, and to determine penalties and incentives. 
Evaluation results are informed to the lower 
management via individual workshop or departmental 
meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  Control Influence : 
"High-Medium (2)"
"Very H i g h -High (1) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements 
Performance Measurement 
Review & Communication
High
VH-H
VH-H
(1.1)
(1.0)
(1.0)
H-M
H-M
H-M
(1.7)
(2.0)
(2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22-23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1. 2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
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* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on grade and 
seniority without paying' much regard to qualification and 
technical skill. The increments from year to year are not 
substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Xiamen 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the XFLT which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the factory manager 
and the workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
One way to alleviate this problem is to transfer a small portion 
of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary enterprises" 
which are mainly service businesses such as retailing, 
restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated to the 
XFLT's core business. Another way is to send some of employees 
home without giving them a job or post but still provide them the 
basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and
contributed to 50-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 45-50% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " t o  "High
( 1 . 5 ) »
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(3) P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q. 6 . 5 . 1 6 - 1 7
Before 1992 workshop managers were involved in formulating 
I R C s  targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 workshop managers have to initiate the I R C s  
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
planning committee. A nationwise pension policy is 
still undergoing with enterprise's contribution and 
then underwritten by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8,13-14,20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
After 1992 : I R C s  targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Planning committee reviews 
the basic wages, allowances and other benefits 
during the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "V e r y  High- H i g h (1) "
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1.8)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Xiamen Fork Lift Truck Plant (XFLT) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
Review Process* Medium (2.3) Low (3.3)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Very High to 
High (0.8)
High to 
Medium (1.8)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.5)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts#
High to 
Medium (1.6) Low (3.4)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* N/A N/A
Overall Planning Influence High to 
Medium (1.6)
Medium 
to Low (2.8)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.5)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.1)
Agreeing Objectives* 
Monitoring Results* 
Rewards & Incentives* 
Overall Control Influence
Tight
Financial (1.0) 
Tight
Financial (1.0)
Financial (1.2) 
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
Control Influence
Strategic | Financial
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
2---------------------------- 2---------------------------- 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (2.0, 2.8) - XFLT Post-1992 X (1.2. 1.6) - XFLT Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the Xiamen 
Fork Lift Truck Plant (XFLT) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial 
Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very 
strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style as 
described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
7 A p r i l  1996 0 9 . 0 4 . 9 6
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameters;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the responsibility 
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 3" (23 February 1994) .
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Zhu Zu Xuan, Deputy-Chairman of Directors
and Deputy General Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 25 years) 
Mr Ho Li Qian, Deputy-Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 7 years)
Dates of Visists : Frist Visit - 7 July 1993
Second Visit - 29 October 1993
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 GFDS is a wholly state-owned enterprise established in 1959. 
(refer to Q.1.1)
1.2 GFDS is one of the top 5 department stores in Guangzhou with
a total shopping area of 15,000 square metres in 1994. 
(Q.1.2)
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1.3 Since 1959, the Chinese government has established many
friendshop stores in the big cities in order to provide
different Chinese-made export commodities of better quality
for the foreigners to purchase by paying either foreign 
currencies or Reminbi The operation scale of these early 
friendship stores was rather small because the customers 
were all foreigners. Then, in 1981, GFDS was opened to the 
general public including the local Chinese. Now GFDS is 
selling over 3,000 items of commodities and operating four 
branches located in other hotels and buildings in Guangzhou 
other than the main store. (Q.1.3)
1.4 All the GFDS's commodities, including the imported ones, are 
selling locally in Guangzhou without any export. (Q.1.4)
1.5 In addition to enhance the quality and variety of the 
commodities sold, GFDS is planning to develop the 
supermarket chain, retailing shops, wholesale, import and 
export, property and tourism businesses maninly on 
joint-venture basis. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 GFDS was converted into a private shareholding enterprise in 
November 1992 by issuing 15% of the total shares to the 
employees while the government was the majority shareholder 
holding 85% of the shares. (Q.2.1-2)
2.2 The organisation structure of GFDS can be divided into three 
levels : (Q.2.3 & 5)
(1) Board of Directors (BOD)
1.1 Chariman (GM)
1.2 Deputy Chairman (Deputy-GM[Finance] )
1.3 Deputy Chairman (Party Secretary)
1.4 Director (Deputy-GM[Sales] )
1.5 Director (Deputy-GM[Purchases] )
1.6 Director (Labour Union Leader)
(2) Headquarters
2.1 General Manager (GM)
2.2 Accounting & Finance Department
2.3 Marketing & Sales Department
2.4 Purchasing Department
2.5 Planning Department
2.6 Personnel Department
2.7 Transportation Department
2.8 Service Evaluation Department
2.9 General Affairs Department
52
(3) Department Stores
3.1 Cosmetic & Medicine Department
3.2 Ladies 1 Wear Department
3.3 Men's Wear Department
3.4 Arts & Craft Department
3.5 Furniture & Appliance Department
3.6 Supermarket Department
2.3 GDFS (main store) is holding four branches located in other
hotels and buildings in Guangzhou. (Q.2.4)
2.4 GFDS is under the administration of the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government and the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau who 
dictated all the planning and control systems of GFDS before 
the enconomic reforms started in 1979. (Q.2.6)
2.5 Since the beginning of 1990, the Bureau has been delegating
more planning, control and operating autonomy to GFDS and 
just scruitinising the major development projects, mainly 
long term ones, recommended by GFDS. (Q.2.7)
2.6 Most of the board members are chief executives managing the
headquarters under which there are 6 department stores 
selling different categories of commodities. The 6 
department stores are separate divisions or profit centres 
having their own functional staff or using the matrix 
management. (Q/2.9)
2.7 GFDS is a medium SOE having a total of 2,300 employees.
# Since GFDS is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
question Q.2.8 is not applicable to GFDS.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets
3.2 Turnover
3.3 Income before tax
RMB100M (revaluated 1992) (Q.3.1)
RMB4 66M (1992)
RMB710M (1993)
RMB90 0M (1994 forecast) (Q.3 .2 Sc 7)
: RMB3 5M (1992) - 7.5% of sales
RMB50M (1993) - 7.0% of sales*
RMB58M (1994) - 6.4% of sales
* The decrease of profit margin in 1993 was due to inflation
and higher sales and related taxes. (Q.3.5, 6 Sc 1 )
3.4 Income tax rate 15% (Q.3.6)
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3 .5 GFDS is planning to maintain an average growth rate in 
turnover from 15% to 20% before 2000 despite the fact that 
competition in the retailing business is very keen in China. 
In view of the high input costs and inflation, to keep 
income before tax at 5% of sales will be considered to be 
satisfactory. (Q.3.7 & 8)
# Since GFDS is not a holding enterprise and without any export, 
questions Q 3 .3 & 4 are not applicable to GFDS.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 GFDS signed first 5-year's ERC (1987-1991) with the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government in 1987. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The major targets set in the ERC were :
(1) Profit target RMB10M in 1987 and then 10% annual growth
(2) Handover 6 0% of target profit to government.
(3) If actual profit exceeds target, only handover 30% of 
the excess to government. (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
4.3 There were different forms of ERCs for the state-owned 
enterprises to choose from and which had different financial 
and non-financial targets. The choosen format was nutually 
agreed between the government and GFDS. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with 
the government in setting the above targets. Mr Zhu said 
that the growth rate of 10% was underestimated and proved by 
the actual results subsequently. (Q.4.5, 7-10)
4.5 The second ERC (1992-1996) was terminated in November 1992 
when GFDS was transformed into a shareholding enterprise and 
then onwards, GFDS has been subject to an income tax of 15%. 
(Q.4.11-13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the 6 department stores were independent
"profit centres" and held accountable for their 
results.
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After 1992 : the 6 department stores have to formulate their own 
short term strategies in the annual planning 
exercise.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0) Greatest Influence
(consistent with the sacle High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3) \/
some of the parameters or Very Low (4) Least Influence
variables)
Very High [VH] (0 . 0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2 .1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2 . 5 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 -3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 : the store managers were responsible for the income
and profit as agreed in the annual budget and
internal responsibility contracts.
After 1992 : the store managers should also decide their own
strategies in marketing, purchasing, selling, cost 
control and personnel.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the chairman, party secretary and a few chief
executives were appointed by the government. The 
general manager appointed the management staff of 
the department stores.
After 1992 : only the chairman and party secretary are appointed
by the government. The general manager appoints 
other senior staff including the store managers who 
can decide their own organisation structures and 
personnel affairs but important changes should be 
approved by the headquarters.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium-Low (3) "
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(4) I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( Q . 5 :. 1 . 4 )
Before 1992 : the interactions between the department are minimal
because they are selling different categories of 
commodities. Any conflicts were settled by the 
headquarters.
After 1992 : similar to 1992 and before but store managers are
encouraged to solve the conflicts by themselves 
before headquarters' arbitration.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3 .5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Decentralization H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Appointment High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Interdependencies Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.3)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term plans were initiated by the top
management before discussion and negotiation with 
the government. Short term planning and budgeting 
were delegated by the government to the enterprise 
except agreeing key targets like sales, profit and 
inventory.
After 1992 : significant long term plans are submitted to the 
government for review or raising capital. Short 
term planning and budgeting have been completely 
delegated to the enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures were
existed to formulate, evaluate, approve and review 
the annual plans and budgets for submission to the 
government. Initiation from the middle management 
was required.
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After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and internal responsibility contracts. Major 
guidelines are provided by the top management to 
the store managers to formulate their own budgets 
and IRCs. They are also involved in the long term 
planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was a top-down process but 
middle management (i.e. store managers) did 
participate in the annual planning & budgeting 
processes and initiation was required.
After 1992 : middle management is being involved on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the government reviewed and amended the long term
plans with the top management annually. Changes 
were notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed quarterly between the 
top and middle management and amendments could be 
made and communicated to the lower management 
through the revised budgets and IRCs.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed and approved by the government 
before informing the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets are reviewed quarterly or monthly 
between the top and middle management and 
significant amendments can be made and then notify 
the lower management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
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Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Autonomy H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.1) Low (3.3)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "courteous service attitude to customers" and 
"reasonable selling prices" were major themes 
laid down by the top management for employees.
After 1992 : allow the department stores to promote their own 
themes such as "high quality of commodity" and 
"comfortable environment for customers" which 
should not contradict the basic themes.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : strategic thrusts decided by the headquarters after 
discussion with department stores.
After 1992 : department stores are allowed to formulate own
strategic thrusts or tactics such as pricing, sales 
promotion, counter design, display arrangement, 
delivery and after sales service.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management sometimes made suggestions on 
specific strategic issues such as commodity 
varities, prices, promotion tactics, etc.
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After 1992 : top management has left more freedom to the 
department stores to adjust their strategies 
and tactics as long as they do not deviate 
from the basic themes, thrusts and budgets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme High (1.5) Medium (2 .5)
Thrust H-M (2.0) Low (3 ,.5)
Suggestions H-M (2.0) Low (3 .5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8) Low (3,.2)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : the early 5-year long term plans before the
economic reform started in 1979 focused on the 
commodity varieties and prices dictated by the 
government. Top management participated in the long 
term planning negotiations since the early 1980s.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate the long term 
plans of which some have to discuss with the 
government for assistance such as source of finance 
for large capital projects.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was responsible to the
government to formulate, evaluate, implement, 
monitor and review the long term plans.
After 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures are 
existed to get middle management (i.e. store 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2)" t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 )
59
(3) P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 4 . 4 &  6)
Before 1992 : the involvement from middle management (i.e. store 
managers) was limited to consultation.
After 1992 : store mangers are members of the planning committee
but they seldom initiate changes but mainly concern 
the annual budgets and IRCs which they are measured 
o n .
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by
the government with the top management and changes 
made were notified to the employees during the 
annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan
every year before the annual planning cylce and 
significant changes are reported to the government 
A booklet summarised the long term plans is distri­
buted to all members of the planning committee.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "High-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8) Medium (2.5)
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.4) 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 19 92 : government has devolved the planning autonomy to
the top manageemnt but specific suggestions may be 
provided i.e. commodity varieties and prices
After 1992 : government has completely delegated the short term 
planning autonomy to the enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management initiated the key budgets and
discussed and compromised with the store managers.
After 1992 : top management provide major guidelines to store 
store managers for intitiating their own budgets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : store managers were asked to discuss and comprise 
the key budgets with the top management before 
working out the details.
After 1992 : store managers have to formulate their own budgets 
and get the lower management involved formulating 
the details.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans/budgets were reviewed quarterly and 
amendments made in line with the changing 
environmental factors. Annual plans & budgets 
were documented and copied to every department.
After 1992 : planning committee reviews the annual plans and
budgets monthly and amendments are made in view of 
the fast changing market economy.
Budget information is futher communicated in the 
monthly performance reporting.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "  t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.4) Low (3.4)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.5)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.1)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : major targets set were sales, profit & foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : major targets are similar but some emphasis on
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, day-to-day 
operation and security.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : store managers negotiated and compromised the given
IRC targets during the annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : store managers have to initiate, quantify and
justify the major IRC targets before negotiating 
with the top management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : IRCs were reviewed twice every year and amendments
could be made when mutually agreed by the top 
management and store managers. IRCs were documented 
and informed to respective departments & employees.
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After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect attainable targets. 
Second-tier IRCs are signed between the store 
manager and sales sections/counters in order to 
further delegate the planning and control 
responsibilities.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of
the economic targets set in the IRCs which were not
difficult to attain.
After 1992 : both the economic (90%) and qualitative (10%)
targets are linked up with the bonus so the store 
managers are eager to initiate the IRC targets in 
order to increase the bonus under attainable 
standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Incentive Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.5) Low (3.1)
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the 6 department stores in GFDS are selling different 
categories of commodities with very minimal interactions, 
therefore, internal transfer pricing does not exist.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Financial (2)" 
before 1992 to "Strategic (3)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design# (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure High (1.5)* Medium (2.5)
1.2 Staffing H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
1. 3 Roles & functions Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
1. 4 Interactions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
H-M (2.0) Low (3.1)
# Mr Zhu said that since the late 1980s, more delegation has been 
given to the store managers in deciding their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units.
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) Low(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(0)
Tight Strategic<-------------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2 .1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel® (Q.6..1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.2 Assignment M-L (3.0) VL (4.0)
2.3 Training M-L (3.0) Low (3.5)
2.4 Evaluation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.5 Remuneration Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.6 Termination VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Medium (2.3) Low (3.3)
@ Mr Zhu further mentioned that since 1992, the store managers 
have been vested with higher strategic autonomy to manoeuvre 
their organisational and personnel changes but important changes 
should be discussed with headquarters before implementation.
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Control Mechanisms* (Q.,6.1.2-3, Q.6. 4 .8)
Before 1992 After 1992
Budget H-M (2. 0) Medium (2. 5)
IRC H-M (2. 0) M-L (3. 0)
Financial targets VH-H (1. 0) H-M (2. 0)
Quantitative targets H-M (2. 0) M-L (3 .0)
Qualitative targets H-M (2. 0) M-L (3 .0)
H-M (1. 8) M-L' (2. 7)
* Mr Zhu expressed that as long as the department stores can meet 
the financial targets with growth from year to year, the 
headquarters will devolve the responsibility for strategy 
development to the stores without much interference. This change 
in control style was mainly because of the government's 
macroeconomic influence and many uncertainties existed in the 
market.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms 
Overall Control Influence
H-M
Medium
H-M
(2.0)
(2.3)
(1.8)
Low
Low
M-L
(3.1)
(3.3)
(2.7)
H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q .6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Strategic (2.
before 1992 to "Tight Strategic (3.1)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Medium (2.2) Low (3.1)
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6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Financial (1.6)" 
before 1992 to "Strategic (2.7)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.2 Frequency H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1 . 3 Contents VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1 . 4 Compilation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1 . 5 Review H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 6 Evaluation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1. 7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Feedback Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
1. 9 Follow-up Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1.10 Computerization H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.5)
# Mr Zhu has mentioned that for any serious advverse variances 
shown on the monthly report, the general or deputy-general 
managers will contract the respective store managers to dig out 
the underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : department stores were mainly measured on the
financial targets such as sales, profit and foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : other than the previous financial targets, a set of 
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, day-to-day 
operation and security are also measured.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication* (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12))
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance report 
monthly and discuss with store managers for 
corrective actions.
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After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the performance
report monthly. Infrequent adverse variances can 
be tolerated if store managers can take remedial 
tactics or strategies to correct the unfavourable 
conditions and meet the budget at the year end.
Corporate Control Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
* Mr Zhu said that it was expected that remedial actions can be 
taken to handle the short term problems as soon as possible (such 
as a sudden sales promotion by a counterpart). Whereas, 
strategic steps may be considered and implemented to solve some 
medium term problems (such as the effect of advertisement) .
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements 
Performance Measurement 
Review & Communication
H-M
VH-H
H-M
(1.8)
(1.0)
(2.0)
Medium
H-M
Low
(2.5) 
(2.0)
(3.5)
Overall Control Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (2.7)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.5)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15 -16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1 . 1 Basic wages Medium (2.5) H-M (2.0)
1. 2 Allowances Medium (2.5) Medium (2.5)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.8 Redundancy H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.2)
= = = = = = = ~  1- — = = = = = = = =  =  =  =  =
* The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regards to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10-20, 
therefore, it is no substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is the major source of income 
which is determined according to the IRC.
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There are two portions for the "allowances". The firest part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Guangzhou government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GFDS which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
IRC. An IRC signed between the general manager and a store 
manager decides what level of group bonus will be given to the 
department. Of course, it is up to the store manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates according 
to individual performance, such as the sales achieved by a 
salesgirl in a certain month.
The "bonus" for the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is linked up with the average bonus of the employees 
in all department stores, and is based on their performance and 
grades as well.
(2) Performance Orientation# (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 19 92 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and took over 
50% of total wages. Basic wages was low and 
depended on seniority. Too many types of 
allowances all unrelated to performance but to 
combat inflation. Pension was totally borne by the 
enterprise. Laying off redundant employees was 
difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 50% of total wages. Basic 
wages has been increased and increaments take skills 
, knowledge, competance into account instead of 
seniority only. Some allowances and benefits are 
merged with the basic wages. Pension is partly 
contributed by the government. Laying off redundant 
employees is easier after implementing the 
employment contract system.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
# Mr Zhu said that unlike Beijing and Shanghai, the labour market 
in Guangzhou is rather free which means employees can choose new 
jobs and resign from the old ones at their own will. On the 
other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay off their 
staff b y .giving advanced notice according to the terms of the 
employment contracts. GFDS has fully implemented the "employment 
contract system" since 1992 and the "big rice pot" or "three iron 
bowls" concept has been abolished.
6 8
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : store managers were involved in formulating IRC's
targets to be measured on. Basic wages, allowances 
, pension and other benefits were decided by 
headquarters and government.
After 1992 : store managers have to initiate the IRC's targets 
and negotiate with top management. The policies 
for basic wages, allowances and other benefits have 
involved the labour union and planning committee. 
Pension policy is still decided by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8, 13-14, 20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
on a monthly basis.
After 1992 : IRC's targets are reviewed twice every year and can
be modified. Planning committee reviews the basic
wages, allowances and other benefits during the 
annual planning cycle and employees are informed of 
these decisions and policies. Performance and 
reward are made known to employees every month.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.8) Medium (2.2)
Performance Orientation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.2)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Friendship Department Store 
(GFDS) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences 
Organisation Structure*
Review Process*
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Long-Term Plans*
(Resource Allocation)
Short-Term Planning/
Before 1992 After 1992
High to 
Medium (2.0)
Medium (2.1)
High to 
Medium (1.8)
High to 
Medium (1.8)
Low
Low
Low
(3.3)
(3.3)
(3.2) 
Medium (2.5)
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
Medium (2 .4) Low (3 .4)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# Medium (2 .5) Low (3 .1)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* ---- ---
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2 .1) Low (3 .1)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control#
Moderate
Financial (2. 0) Strategic (3.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate
Strategic (2. 2)
Tight
Strategic (3.1)
Monitoring Results* Moderate
Financial (1. 6) Strategic (2.7)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1. 5)
Moderate
Strategic (2.2)
Overall Control Influence Moderate
Financial (1. 8) Strategic (2.8)
iiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiii = = = : = =
i 
n 
i 
ii 
i 
n 
i 
ii
■ 
n 
i 
ii 
i 
ii 
i 
ii 
i 
ii
■ 
ii — — — — —
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been?employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic I Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming
H/M
Medium
M/L
 2 2 2
X
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (2.8, 3.1) - GFDS Post-1992 X (1.8, 2.1) - GFDS Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) before and after 
1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting 
Style" has been changed from "Moderate Financial Control" 
(Pre-1992) to "Strategic Control" (Post-1992) although it has not 
yet reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of strategic 
control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic 
Style.
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameters;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 4" (1 March 1994).
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Chen Hang, Deputy-Chairman of BOD and
Deputy General Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 26 years)
Dates of Visists : Frist Visit - 10 July 1993
Second Visit - 30 October 1993
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 GDDS is a wholly state-owned enterprise established in 1956. 
(refer to Q.l.l)
1.2 GFDS is one of the top 5 department stores in Guangzhou with
a total shopping area of 8,416 square metres in 1994. 
(Q.1.2)
1.3 The commodities sold by GDDS has been increased from 1,000 
items in the 1980s to about 3,000 items in 1994. (Q.1.3)
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1.4 All the GDDS1s commodities, including the imported ones, are 
selling locally in Guangzhou without any export. (Q.1.4)
1.5 Other than the main store, GDDS has no other branches in 
Guangzhou but he board of directors is planning to erect a 
new building adjacent to the present one. The long term 
plan is to increase total shopping space to over 15,000 
square metres in 1997. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure ( Q . 2 . 1 - 1 1 # )
2.1 GDDS was converted into a private shareholding enterprise in 
December 1 9 9 2  by issuing 20% of the total shares to the 
employees while the government was the majority shareholder 
holding 80% of the shares. ( Q . 2 . 1  Sc 2)
2 . 2  The organisation structure of GFDS can be divided into three 
levels : (Q.2.3 & 5)
(1) Board of Directors (BOD)
1.1 Chariman (GM)
1.2 Deputy Chairman (Deputy-GM[Finance])
1.3 Deputy Chairman (Party Secretary)
1.4 Director (Deputy-GM[Sales])
1.5 Director (Deputy-GM[Purchases])
1.6 Director (Deputy-GM[Planning])
1.7 Director (Deputy-GM[Personnel])
1.8 Director (Labour Union Leader)
1.9 Director (First Commerce Bureau Representative)
(2) Headquarters
2.1 General Manager (GM)
2.2 Accounting Sc Finance Department
2.3 Marketing Sc Sales Department
2.4 Purchasing Department
2.5 Planning Department
2.6 Personnel Department
2.7 Transportation Department
2.8 Service Evaluation Department
2.9 General Affairs Department
(3) Department Stores
3.1 Cloth Department 
3 . 2 Clothing Sc Fashion Department 
.3.3 Knit Wear Department.
3.4 Furniture Department
3.5 Electricity Appliance Department
3.6 Houseware Department
3 . 7 Watch Sc Clock Department
3.8 Arts & Craft Department
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3 . 9 Chinaware Department
3.10 Stationery & Toy Department
3.11 Consumables Department
3.12 Food Department
2.3 GDDS is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise.
2.4 GDDS is under the administration of the Guangzhou Municipal
Government and the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau. who 
dictated all the planning and control systems of GFDS before 
the enconomic reforms started in 1979. (Q.2.6)
2.5 Since the beginning of 1990, the Bureau has been delegating
more planning, control and operating autonomy to GDDS and
just scruitinising the major development projects, mainly
long term ones, recommended by GDDS. (Q.2.7)
2.6 Most of the board members are chief executives managing the
headquarters under which there are 12 department stores 
selling different categories of commodities. The 12 
department stores are separate divisions or profit centres 
having their own functional staff or using the matrix 
management. (Q.2.9)
2.7 GDDS is a medium SOE having a total of 950 employees.
# Since GDDS is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
question Q.2.8 is not applicable to GDDS.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets
3.2 Turnover
RMB45M (revaluated 1992) (Q.3.1)
RMB23 0M (1992)
RMB4 0 0M (1993)
RMB6 00M (1994 forecast) (Q.3.2 & 7)
3.3 Income before tax : RMB 14M (1992) - 6.1% of sales
RMB 22M (1993) - 5.5% of sales*
RMB 30M (1994) - 5.0% of sales
* The decrease of profit margin in 1993 was due to inflation
and higher sales and related taxes. (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
3.4 Income tax rate : 15% (Q.3.6)
3.5 GDDS is planning to maintain an average growth rate in
turnover from 15% to 20% before 2000 despite the fact that
competition in the retailing business is very keen in China.
In view of the high input costs and inflation, to keep 
income before tax at 5% of sales will be considered to be 
satisfactory. (Q.3.7 & 8)
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# Since GDDS is not a holding enterprise and without any export, 
questions Q 3 .3 & 4 are not applicable to GDDS.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 GDDS signed first 5-year's ERC (1987-1991) with the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government in 1987. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The major targets set in the ERC were :
(1) "Income Before Tax" with 6% annual growth rate;
(2) handover 55% of targeted profit to government; and
(3) if actual profit exceeds target, only handover 16.5% of 
the excess to government. (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
4.3 There were different forms of ERCs for the state-owned 
enterprises to choose from and which had different financial 
and non-financial targets. The choosen format was nutually 
agreed between the government and GDDS. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government in setting the above targets. Mr Chen said 
that the growth rate of 6% was underestimated and proved by 
the actual results subsequently. (Q.4.5, 7-10)
4.5 The second ERC (1992-1996) was terminated in December 1992 
when GDDS was transformed into a shareholding enterprise and 
then onwards, GDDS has been subject to an income tax of 15%. 
(Q.4.11-13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.1)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the 12 department stores were independent
"profit centres" and held accountable for their 
results.
After 1992 : the 12 department stores have to formulate their 
own short term strategies in the annual planning 
exercise.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
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* By using a 5-point scale - 
(consistent with the sacle 
used in the questionnaire 
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify 
some of the parameters or 
variables)
Very High (0)
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Very Low (4)
G r e a t e s t  I n f l u e n c e
\ /
Least Influence
Very High [VH] (0,.0 - 0 ,.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0,.6 - 1 ,.0)
High [H] (1..1 - 1 ,.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1..6 - 2 ,.0)
Medium CM] (2,.1 - 2 .5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2..5 - 3 .0)
Low [L] (3..1 - 3 .5)
Very Low [VL] (3..6 - 4 .0)
(2) Decentrali zation (Q.5.UL.2)
Before 1992 : the store managers were responsible for the income 
and profit as agreed in the annual budget and 
internal responsibility contracts.
After 1992 : the store managers should also initiate their own 
strategies in marketing, purchasing, selling, cost 
control and personnel.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the chairman, party secretary and a few chief
executives were appointed by the government. The 
general manager appointed the management staff of 
the department stores.
After 1992 : only the chairman and party secretary are appointed 
by the government. The general manager appoints 
other senior staff including the store managers who 
can decide their own organisation structures and 
personnel affairs but important changes should be 
approved by the headquarters.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the interactions between the department are minimal 
because they are selling different categories of 
commodities. Any conflicts were settled by the 
headquarters.
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After 1992 : similar to 1992 and before but store managers are 
encouraged to solve the conflicts by themselves 
before headquarters' arbitration.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5) " to "Low (3 .5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Decentralization H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Appointment High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Interdependencies Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.1)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.1)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term plans were initiated by the top
management before discussion and negotiation with 
the government. Short term planning and budgeting 
were delegated by the government to the enterprise 
except agreeing key targets like sales, profit and 
inventory.
After 1992 : significant long term plans are submitted to the 
government for review or raising capital. Short 
term planning and budgeting have been completely 
delegated to the enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures were
existed to formulate, evaluate, approve and review 
the annual plans and budgets for submission to the 
government. Initiation from the middle management 
was required.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and internal responsibility contracts. Major 
guidelines are provided by the top management to 
the store managers to formulate their own budgets 
and IRCs. They are being consulted in the long 
term planning.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e - :  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was a top-down process but 
middle management (i.e. store managers) did 
participate in the annual planning & budgeting 
processes and initiation was required.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the government reviewed and amended the long term 
plans with the top management annually. Changes 
were notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed quarterly between the 
top and middle management and amendments could be 
made and communicated to the lower management 
through the revised budgets and IRCs.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed and approved by the government 
before informing the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets are reviewed quarterly or monthly 
between the top and middle management and 
significant amendments can be made and then notify 
the lower management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Autonomy H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.1) Low (3.1)
78
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "courteous service attitude to customers" and 
"reasonable selling prices" were major themes 
laid down by the top management for employees.
After 1992 : allow the department stores to promote their own 
themes such as "high quality of commodity" and 
"comfortable environment for customers" which 
should not contradict the basic themes.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : strategic thrusts decided by the headquarters after 
discussion with department stores.
After 1992 : department stores are allowed to formulate own
strategic thrusts or tactics such as pricing, sales 
promotion, counter design, display arrangement, 
delivery and after sales service.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management sometimes made suggestions on 
specific strategic issues such as commodity 
varities, prices, promotion tactics, etc.
After 1992 : top management has left more freedom to the 
department stores to adjust their strategies 
and tactics as long as they do not deviate 
from the basic themes, thrusts and budgets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
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F a c t o r s B e f o r e  1992 A f t e r  1992
Theme High (1..5) Medium (2,.5)
Thrust H-M (2,.0) Low (3,.5)
Suggestions H-M (2,.0) Low (3 ,.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1..8) Low (3..2)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : the early 5-year long term plans before the
economic reform started in 1979 focused on the 
commodity varieties and prices dictated by the 
government. Top management participated in the long 
term planning negotiations since the early 1980s.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate the long term 
plans of which some have to discuss with the 
government for assistance such as source of finance 
for large capital projects.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was responsible to the
government to formulate, evaluate, implement, 
monitor and review the long term plans.
After 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures are
existed for the top management to formulate, 
evaluate, implement, monitor and review the long 
term plans.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium (2.5)
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the formulation of long term plans was a top-down
approach with litte involvement from the department 
store manager.
After 1992 : the involvement from middle management (i.e. store
managers) is limited to consultation.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H ig h  ( 0 . 5 ) "  t o  "High ( 1 . 5 ) "
80
(4) R e v iew  & C om m u nicat ion  ( Q . 5 . 4 . 7  & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by
the government with the top management and changes 
made were notified to the employees during the 
annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan 
every year before the annual planning cylce and 
significant changes are reported to the government 
A booklet summarised the long term plans is distri­
buted to all members of the planning committee.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "High-Low
(3) »
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2) 1 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the planning autonomy to 
the top manageemnt but specific suggestions were 
provided i.e. commodity varieties and prices
After 1992 : government has completely delegated the short term 
planning autonomy to the enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management initiated the key budgets and
discussed and compromised with the store managers.
After 1992 : top management provide major guidelines to store 
store managers for intitiating their own budgets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : store managers were asked to discuss and comprise 
the key budgets with the top management before 
working out the details.
After 1992 : store managers have to formulate their own budgets 
and get the lower management involved formulating 
the details.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans/budgets were reviewed quarterly and 
amendments made in line with the changing 
environmental factors. Annual plans & budgets 
were documented and copied to every department.
After 1992 : planning committee reviews the annual plans and
budgets monthly and amendments are made in view of 
the fast changing market economy.
Budget information is futher communicated in the 
monthly performance reporting.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium ( 2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.3)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : major targets set were sales, profit & foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : major targets are similar but some emphasis on 
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, daily 
operation, security, after sales service.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : store managers negotiated and compromised the given 
IRC targets during the annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : store managers have to initiate, quantify and
justify the major IRC targets before negotiating 
with the top management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : IRCs were reviewed twice every year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed by the top 
management and store managers. IRCs were documented 
and informed to respective departments & employees.
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After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect attainable targets. 
Second-tier IRCs are signed between the store 
manager and sales sections/counters in order to 
further delegate the planning and control 
responsibilities.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of
the economic targets set in the IRCs which were not
difficult to attain.
After 1992 : both the economic (70%) and qualitative (30%)
targets are linked up with the bonus so the store 
managers are eager to initiate the IRC targets in 
order to increase the bonus under attainable 
standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5) " to "Low (3 .5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Incentive Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.3) Low (3.4)
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the 12 department stores in GDDS are selling different 
categories of commodities with very minimal interactions, 
therefore, internal transfer pricing does not exist.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Financial (2)" 
before 1992 to "Strategic (2.8)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design# (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure High (1.5)* H-M (2.0)
1. 2 Staffing H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 3 Roles & functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1. 4 Interactions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
H-M (1.9) M-L (2.6)
# Mr Chen said that since the late 1980s, more delegation has 
been given to the store managers in deciding their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units.
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(0)
Tight Strategic<--------------------------------------Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0 . 0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2 . 6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel® (Q.6..1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2.1 Recruitment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.2 Assignment M-L (3.0) Low (3.5)
2.3 Training M-L (3.0) Low (3.5)
2.4 Evaluation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.5 Remuneration Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.6 Termination VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Medium (2.3) Low (3.2)
@ Mr Chen further mentioned that since 1992, the store managers 
have been vested with higher strategic autonomy to manoeuvre 
their organisational and personnel changes but important changes 
should be discussed with headquarters before implementation.
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(3) C o n t r o l  M echanism s*  ( Q. 6 . 1 . 2 - 3 ,  Q . 6 . 4 . 8 )
Before 1992 After 1992
3 . 1 Budget H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
3.2 IRC H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
3 . 3 Financial targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
H-M (1.8) M-L (2.6)
* Mr Chen expressed that as long as the department stores can 
meet the financial targets with growth from year to year, the 
headquarters will devolve the responsibility for strategy 
development to the stores without much interference. This change 
in control style was mainly because of the g o v e rnment's 
macroeconomic influence and many uncertainties existed in the 
market.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design H-M (2.0) M-L (2.6)
Personnel Medium (2.3) Low (3.2)
Control Mechanisms H-M (1.8) M-L (2.6)
Overall Control Influence H-M (2.0) M-L (2.8)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q.6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Strategic (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Strategic (2.8)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After :1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
(3) Achieving targets
(2.5)Timeframe H-M (2.0) Medium
(4) Stretch built into
the targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
(6) Manangement influence
(3.0)on setting targets Medium (2.5) M-L
Medium (2.1) M-L (2.8)
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6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Financial (1.6)" 
before 1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After L992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 2 Frequency H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 3 Contents VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 4 Compilation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1. 5 Review H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 6 Evaluation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1. 7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.8 Feedback Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1. 9 Follow-up Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1. 10 Computerization H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.5)
# Mr Chen has mentioned that for any serious advverse variances 
shown on the monthly report, the general or deputy-general 
managers will contract the respective store managers to dig out 
the underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : department stores were mainly measured on the
financial targets such as sales, profit and foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : other than the previous financial targets, a set of 
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, daily 
operation and security are also measured.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication* (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12))
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance report 
monthly and discuss with store managers for 
corrective actions.
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After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the performance
report monthly. Infrequent adverse variances can 
be tolerated if store managers can take remedial 
tactics or strategies to correct the unfavourable 
conditions and meet the budget at the year end.
Corporate Control Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* Mr Chen said that it was expected that remedial actions can be 
taken to handle the short term problems as soon as possible (such 
as a sudden sales promotion by a counterpart). Whereas, 
strategic steps may be considered and implemented to solve some 
medium term problems (such as the effect of advertisement).
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements H-M (1.8) Medium (2.5)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Control Influence H-M (1.6) Medium (2.5)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.5)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7, 15-16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages Medium (2.5) H-M (2.0)
1. 2 Allowances Medium (2.5) Medium (2.5)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible ) H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.8 Redundancy H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.2)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regards to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10-20, 
therefore, it is no substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is the major source of income 
which is determined according to the IRC.
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There are two portions for the "allowances". The firest part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Guangzhou government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GDDS which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
IRC. An IRC signed between the general manager and a store 
manager decides what level of group bonus will be given to the 
department. Of course, it is up to the store manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates according 
to individual performance, such as the sales achieved by a 
salesgirl in a certain month.
The "bonus" for the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is linked up with the total monthly sales performan
(2) Performance Orientation# (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and took over 
55-65% of total wages. Basic wages was low and 
depended on seniority. Too many types of 
allowances all unrelated to performance but to 
combat inflation. Pension was totally borne by the 
enterprise. Laying off redundant employees was 
difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for 50% of total wages. Basic wages has 
been increased and increaments take skills, 
knowledge, competance into account instead of 
seniority only. Some allowances and benefits are 
merged with the basic wages. Pension is partly 
contributed by the government. Laying off redundant 
employees is easier after implementing the 
employment contract system.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
# Mr Chen said that unlike Beijing and Shanghai, the labour 
market in Guangzhou is rather free which means employees can 
choose new jobs and resign from the old ones at their own will. 
On the other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay off 
their staff by giving advanced notice according to the terms of 
the employment contracts. GDDS has fully implemented the 
"employment contract system" since 1992 and the "big rice pot" or 
"three iron bowls" concept has been abolished.
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(3) Participation (Q.6 .5.16-17)
Before 1992 : store managers were involved in formulating IRC's
targets to be measured on. Basic wages, allowances 
, pension and other benefits were decided by- 
headquarters and government.
After 1992 : store managers have to initiate the IRC's targets 
and negotiate with top management. The policies 
for basic wages, allowances and other benefits have 
involved the labour union and planning committee. 
Pension policy is still decided by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8, 13-14, 20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
on a monthly basis.
After 1992 : IRC's targets are reviewed twice every year and can
be modified. Planning committee reviews the basic
wages, allowances and other benefits during the 
annual planning cycle and employees are informed of 
these decisions and policies. Performance and 
reward are made known to employees every month.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1 .5) " to "High-Medium (2)
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.8) Medium (2.2)
Performance Orientation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.2)
= = = = = = — =  =  =  =  = = = = = = = = = = = = =
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.1)
Review Process* Medium (2.1) Low (3.1)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*.
High to 
Medium (1.8) Low (3.2)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation) High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.5)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# Medium (2.3) Low (3.4)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* ------- ----- ----- -----
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.0) Low (3.1)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control#
Moderate 
Financial (2.0) Strategic (2.8)
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate 
Strategic (2.1) Strategic (2.8)
Monitoring Results* 
Rewards & Incentives* 
Overall Control Influence
Moderate 
Financial (1.6)
Financial (1.5)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.5)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.2)
S t r a t e g i c  ( 2 . 6 )
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic | Financial
2 --------------------- 1 -------------------------o
0 Financial Programming 0High Strategic Programming
H/M
Medium
M/L
X-
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (2.6, 3.1) - GFDS Post-1992 X (1.8, 2.0) - GFDS Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) before and after 1992, 
it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
has been changed from "Moderate Financial Control" (Pre-1992) to 
"Strategic Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of strategic control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 5" (7 March 1994) .
Name of SOE : Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Quo Zhong Mao/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 31 years)
Miss Li Xiao Min/Cost Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 7 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 22 May 1993
Second Visit - 30 August 1993
Third Visit - 3 September 1994
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.l.1-5)
1.1 BEEF is a wholly state-owned enterprise established in 1964 
and specialized in manufacturing electrostatic equipment for 
various industrial uses. It is located in the southern 
district of Beijing, the capital of China, and is not far 
away fromt he "heart" of Beijing city (i.e. the Forbidden 
Palace) by taking a bus for about 15 minutes. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 BEEF is one of the largest electrostatic equipment
manufacturers in China but is competing with its strong
counterparts in Dalian, Shanghai and Fuzhou. (Q.1.2)
1.3 BEEF is currently producing the following five types of 
products which are all sold domestically in China :
1.3.1 Electrostatic Precipitators
1.3.2 Electrostatic Air Separation Percipitators
1.3.3 Electrostatic Spray Equipment
1.3.4 Disc Electrostatic Power Spraying Equipment
1.3.5 Electrostatic Transformer (Q.1.3)
1.4 Nearly all the BEEF's products are sold domestically. 
(Q.1.4)
1.5 To enhance the product quality and diversify the product
range are the product strategies of BEEF on one hand, and to
explore the overseas' markets is an important marketing 
strategy on the other hand. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 BEEF has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because 
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 BEEF is neither a holding or subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 The organisation structure of BEEF can be divided into four
divisions under the direct control of the Factory Manager.
(Q.2.3)
2.4 The six divisions are listed as follow : (Q.2.5 & 2.9)
(1) Production Division (Chief Engineer)
1.1 Production Workshop No.l*
1.2 Production Workshop No.2*
1.3 Production Workshop No.3*
1.4 Production Workshop No.4*
1.5 Research & Development Department
1.6 Quality Control Department
1.7 Repair & Maintenance Department
(2) Operation Division (Deputy-FM)
2.1 Sales & Marketing Department
2.2 Purchasing Department
2.3 Supply (Inventory) Department
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(3) Finance Division (Chief Accountant)
3.1 Accounting & Finance Department
3.2 Planning Department
(4) Administration Division (Deputy-FM)
4.1 Personnel Department
4 . 2 Security & Estate Department
4.3 General Affairs Department
4.3.1 Education & Training
4.3.2 Medical
4.3.3 Canteen
* All the 4 production workshops are classified as "profit 
centres" and they have signed Internal Responsibility 
Contracts (IRC) with the factory manager.
2.5 BEEF is under the administration of the Beijing Municipal 
Government and the Beijing Instrument Bureau. In 1983, the 
Bureau was transformed into a quasi-government body called 
Beijing International Instrument Corporateion (BIIC) as an 
initail step to delegate the governing role to this 
self-regulated institution composed of all the electronic 
instrument manufacturing industries in Beijing.
Since then, more autonomy in terms of planning an control 
decisions has been authorised by the Beijing Government to 
the BIIC and turning into this decade, BIIC's major roles 
played for its subordinate enterprises are (1) appointing 
the factory manager and the communist party secretary; (2) 
maintaining a macoreconomic control or balance on the 
5-year's plans suggested by its enterprises; and (3) acting 
as a bridge or facilitator between the government and its 
enterprises in policy matters such as capital invetment, 
import and export autonomy, taxation, legal form 
transformation etc. (Q.2.6 & 2.7)
2.6 BEEF is a small SOE having 600 employees. (Q.2.10)
# Since BEEF is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise,
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to BEEF.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets : RMB 25M (historical cost) (Q.3.1)
3.2 Turnover : RMB 15M (1992)
RMB 12M (1993)
RMB 17M (1994)
RMB 18M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 &
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3.3 Income before tax : RMB1.5M (1992) - 10.0% of sales
RMB1.1M (1993) - 9.2% of sales
RMB 0M* (1994)
RMB 0M* (1995 forecast) (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
* The breakeven situation was mainly due to inflation and 
low selling prices.
3.4 Income tax rate : 33% (Q.3.6)
3.5 Both the sales and profit has been deteriorating because of 
the following reasons : (Q.3.7 & 8)
(1) before a new product was launched in the market, a 
competitive product had been available to the potential 
customers in mide-1993;
(2) the market economy policy allows head to head 
competition from the other three major compititors in 
Dalin, Shanghai and Fuzhou; and
(3) the market penetration and diversification strategies 
are not vigorous enough.
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to BEEF because it is neither a holding
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 BEEF entered into an ERC with the Beijing Municipal 
Government in 1992. It was a standing contract without 
duration (time limit) specified but subject to review by 
both parties every year. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The terms and conditions of this contract were similar to 
the "Policy No.180)" recommended by the Inland Revenue 
Dpeartment under which BEEF has to undertake a "Profit 
Before Tax" (PBT) of RMB1 million for the four years from 
1992 to 1995 inclusive. (Q.4.2 & 4)
4.3 This PBT base was determined according to the average annual 
profit of the last three years before 1992 and it would be 
subject to review in 1996. On this PBT target, an income 
tax of 33% was levied which was less than the standard 
income tax rate of 55% for the state-owned enterprises in 
Beijing by that time. (Q.4.3)
4.4 Another favourable term provided for BEEF was to deduct the
bank loan repayment from the PBT before income tax 
assessment. (Q.4.6)
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4.5 Since the financial performance has been deteriorating as
from 1993, BIIC requested BEEF to achieve the breakeven 
(i.e. PBT = RMB 0) in 1994 and 1995. (Q.4.5)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government and BIIC in setting the above targets. The
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the BIIC, government 
and BEEF. (Q.4.7-10)
4.7 Mr Quo has mentioned that in view of the current product and
market position and potential, the top management believe
that the PBT targets would be positive figures after 1995. 
The terms and conditions of the informal ERC would not be 
changed significantly in the next few years. (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(0.9)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the 4 production workshops were "cost centres" 
managed by the workshop managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expenses 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
After 1992 : it went to some length in 1993 to convert the 4
production workshops into "profit .centres" managed 
by the workshop managers with higher autonomy in 
management and operation. All the other management 
and service departments remain "expense centres" 
whose managers participate in the budgeting process 
Mr Quo has said that there would be no significant 
changes in BEEF'S organisation structure in the 
next few years.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5)"
* By using a 5-point scale - 
(consistent with the scale 
used in the questionnaire 
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify 
some of. the parameters or 
variables)
Very High (0)
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Very Low (4)
Greatest Influence
\ /
Least Influence
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Very High [VH] (0,.0 - 0,.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0,. 6 - 1..0)
High [H] (1..1 - 1..5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1..6 - 2,.0)
Medium CM] (2..1 - 2,.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2..6 -- 3 ,.0)
Low [L] (3..1 - 3 ,.5)
Very Low [VL] (3..6 - 4..0)
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 : the workshop managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as given in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management.
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : the primary profit responsibility lies with the
workshop managers who initiate the annual budgets 
and IRCs and get their subordinates (middle and 
lower management) involved. Obviously, changing 
into profit centres is reasonable.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the factory manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the BIIC, and other senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required BIIC's approval.
After 1992 : the factory manager and party secretary are still
appointed by the BIIC. The factory manager can
appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
workshop managers. The workshop managers can 
suggest changes in organisation structure and 
personnel affairs to the factory manager for 
approval. Mr Quo has mentioned that in fact the 
party secretary was the representative from the 
government/BIIC to ensure some sort of macro- 
economic policies are under control.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium
( 2 ) "
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production without any profit margin.
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After 1992 : the transfer prices are based on standard cost plus 
10% across the board. Although the transfer prices 
may be lower than the market prices, nevertheless, 
they provide a profit margin to the workshop or a 
buffer to cover the underestimateion of inflation 
rates in setting the standard cost.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium
( 2 ) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre VH-H (1..0) Medium (2,.5)
Decentralization High (1..5) M-L (3,.0)
Appointment VH (0..5) H-M (2,.0)
Interdependencies VH (0..5) H-M (2,.0)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0..9) Medium (2,.4)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the BIIC while the top 
management was in consultation only. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the BIIC.
After 1992 : BIIC has delegated the long term planning and
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
Mr Quo has said that strategic plans still have to 
be reviewed, discussed and modified with BIIC.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between BIIC and 
the top management to formulate, evaluate, approve 
and review the long term plans and annual budgets 
but initiation from the middle management was 
limited.
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After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the workshop managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but
middle management (i.e workshop managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : BIIC reviewed and amended the long term plans with
the top management annually. Changes were notified 
to the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
were reviewed between the top and middle management 
twice every year but amendments were made due to 
significant changes which were communicated to 
lower management through revised budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with BIIC and informed the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notify to 
lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
1 0 0
Summary of Corporate Planning 
Factors
Central Planning
Operation
Participation
Review & Communication
Overall Planning Influence
I n f l u e n c e  :
B e f o r e  1992 A f t e r  1992
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.3) Medium (2.4)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(0.8)" before 1992 to "High-Medium Corporate (2)" after 
1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "economic efficiency" and "cost reduction" were the 
major strategic themes given to and imbedded into 
the planning and control system.
After 1992 : "product and market developments" have been added 
for all the employees to observe and keep in mind 
when they are performing their duties.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : to provide the management with relevant information 
for quality control, the finance division is 
developing a "quality control accounting" system 
which is based on cost and benefit analysis.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
1 0 1
(3) S u g g e s t i o n s  ( Q . 5 . 3 . 2  & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, transfer price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the workshop managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5)»
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH (0.5) High (1..5)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) H-M (2,.0)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) Medium (2..5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0.8) H-M (2..0)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the BIIC in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long
term plans and compromise with the BIIC who may
insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and mix.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
1 0 2
(2) O p e r a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 4 . 3  & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the BIIC 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. workshop 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1991-1995), includes competitive 
edge, research and development, product and market 
development and cost reduction program.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow BEEF to participate in the 5- 
year's planning with the BIIC and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : BEEF has to formulate their own long term strategic 
plan since 1990. For capital expenditure below 
RMB5M, BEEF can decide on its own. For amount in 
between RMB5-2 0M, approval from BIIC is required. 
For amount over RMB20M, approval must be sought 
from the Beijing Commission of Economic Reform.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the 
BIIC with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the BIIC for 
endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking a long term bank loan.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "High-Medium (2)"
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because BEEF caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992
After 1992
government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and inventory level.
top management has higher autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the workshop managers.
Corporate Planning Influence
(3) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
"High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
Before 1992
After 1992
top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the workshop managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
top management provided major guidelines to the 
workshop managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
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Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) »
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 19 92 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed in the
middle of the year and amendments were seldom made 
except under signifcant environmental changes. 
Annual plans were communicated to.middle and lower 
management in written forms.
After 1992 : senior management committee reviews the annual
plans and budgets quarterly and amendments are made 
due to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 4 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : The IRC system was started in 1993 and mainly
applied to the production workshops. Before 1992, 
production workshops were given certain targets 
such as production quantity and costs.
After 1992 : major economic target is internal profit while 
quality and safety have the veto effects on the 
bonus which was linked up with the IRC performance. 
Other qualitative factors, such as production, 
quality, inventory and safety management, are also 
emphasized.
A sample of IRC is shown in section 5.6 of the Data 
Analysis Set 5.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : workshop managers are given the production quantity 
and cost targets without much negotiation.
After 1992 : workshop managers negotiate and compromise the IRC
targets with the general management during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate P l a n n i n g  Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets given to the workshop managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective workshop managers and 
their employees.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium (2) "
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
workshop managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias
Participation
Review & Communication
Incentive
High
VH-H
High
High
(1.5) 
(1.0)
(1.5)
(1.5)
Medium (2.5) 
H-M (2.0) 
H-M (2.0) 
Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.5)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  from "Very H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 0 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  "High-Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 7 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Interdepen­ Production & service Production & service
dencies workshops involved workshops involved
1 . 2 Transfer standard cost (histori­ standard cost plus
Price Basis cal + inflation) fixed profit margin
1. 3 Transfer Price Very little between Some negotiations
Negotiation buyer and seller are allowed
1.4 Intermediate Some buy and sell are Some buy & sell are
Product available in market available in market
1. 5 Transfer All determined by the Excess service can
Quantity top management be sold externally
1. 6 Arbitration Prices and quantities Mainly determined by
all determined by top top management but
management negotiations allowed
1. 7 Government No, except the output No, only suggest
Interference volumes & selling volumes & prices of
prices of final products final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium
(2 ) "
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : nearly all the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the top management and the workshop 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflects 
were arbitrated by the factory manager. Workshop 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by production volume and cost.
After 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities are 
still controlled by the top management although 
some negotiations are allowed for the workshop 
managers because they are measured on internal 
profit. Interference from and arbitration by the 
factory manager are quite often.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 : the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
without much inputs from the middle management. It 
was historicial cost plus inflation. The transfer 
prices were reviewed in the middle of the year and 
some amendments were allowed.
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A f t e r  1992 the standard cost plus a fixed profit margin is 
used for setting the transfer prices which are 
reviewed quarterly.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5) 
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
to "High (1.5)"
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics VH (0.5) H-M (2.0)
Participation VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Review VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH (0.5) H-M (1.7)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.5)* VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Roles & functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1.4 Interactions High (2.0) M-L (3.0)
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in t
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L ow(3
Tight Strategic<----
Control
Medium(2 High(1) Very High(0) 
■Tight Financial 
Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2 . 1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
2 . 5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 6 Termination VH (0.5) H-M (1.0)
H-M (1.6) Medium (2.3)
# Mr Quo said that since 1992, more delegation has been given to 
the workshop managers in the personnel functions such as recruit­
ment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. But 
termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6..1.2-3, Q. 6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.2) High (1.3)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
workshops and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms 
Overall Control Influence
After 1992
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
H-M (1.6) Medium (2.3)
High (1.2) High (1.3)
High (1.4) H-M (1.9)
= = = = = = = —  —  — . —  —
1 1 0
6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q. 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " T i g h t  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 0 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "M oderate  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 6 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) High (1.5)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) Migh (1.5)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.6)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (l.i
before 1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1 -3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management cont:
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0)
iiii
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i 
II
m 
ii
(1.7)
1 1 1
# Mr Quo has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the factory manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the factory 
manager or deputy-factory managers will contact the respective 
workshop manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the
situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production workshops were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other
non-financial targets such as quality and safety
are accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : internal profit and production volume are the
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production technology, facilities 
and inventory are measured.
C o r p o r a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
workshop or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the workshop managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual workshop or 
departmental meetings.
C orp r o a t e  Control I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
1 1 2
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards &. Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22-23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) High (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the BEEF which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the factory manager 
and the workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the BEEF'S core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 40-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 30-40% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : workshop managers were involved in formulating 
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : workshop managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u nica t ion  (Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic 
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives
Performance Orientation
Participation
Review & Communication
H-M
VH-H
VH-H
VH-H
(1.6)
(1.0)
(1.0)
(1.0)
H-M
High
H-M
H-M
(1.7)
(1.5)
(2.0)
(2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1.8)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory 
(BEEF) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* Very High 
to High (0.9) Medium (2.4)
Review Process* High (1.3) Medium (2.4)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Very High 
to High (0.8)
High to 
Medium (2.0)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
.Medium (2.0)
Medium
to Low (3.0)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.4) Medium (2.5)
Management of Inter­
dependencies*
Very
High (0.5)
High to 
Medium (1.7)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.2) Medium (2.3)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.4)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.6)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards &. Incentives*
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Overall Control Influence Moderate
Financial (1.2) Financial (1.8)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
Low 4 Strategic Control
------------4--------------3-------
0 (1.8, 2.3) - BEEF Post-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
4 Financial Control 4
 2 1 0
X (1.2. 1.2) - BEEF Pre-1992
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) before and after 
1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting 
Style" has been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) 
to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet 
reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial 
control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic 
Style.
30 A p r i l  1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 6" (15 June 1994).
Name of SOE : Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool 
Works (SMCW)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Tao Yi Seng/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 31 years) 
Mr Ju Wei Ya/Ass. Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 25 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 17 September 1992
Second Visit - 7 September 1993
Third Visit - 12 September 1994
Fourth Visit - 10 February 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 SMCW is a wholly state-owned enterprise established in 1966
and is manufacturing measuring and cutting tools for various 
industrial and private users. It is located in the 
southwest suburb district of Shanghai of a distance about 25
km from the city centre. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 SMCW is one of the largest measuring and cutting tools 
m a n u f a c t u r e r s  in China and is competing with many 
counterparts in other provinces especially those small 
enterprises in Guangdong. The overall demand of the 
products is lower than the supply and as a result inventory 
has been built up. (Q.1.2)
1.3 SMCW is currently producing the following three types of
products :
1.3.1 Measuring Tools
1.3.2 Cutting Tools
1.3.3 Measuring Instruments (Q.1.3)
1.4 S M C W 1s products are 75% sold domestically and 25% exported 
to 3 0 overseas countries. (Q.1.4)
1.5 The overall demand of measuring and cutting products is
lower than the supply in China, and as a result SMCW's 
inventory has been built up. SMCW has been actively 
undertaking marketing and sales strategies to promote sales 
and reduce the capital tied up in stock. The production and 
sales ratio was 1:0.94 in 1994, but the major problem is the 
delay in collecting accounts receivable. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 SMCW has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because 
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 SMCW is neither a holding nor subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 The organisation structure of SMCW is based on functional 
basis under the direct control of the Factory Manager who 
has an Enterprise Management Office. (Q.2.3)
2.4 The organisation structure is listed as follow:(Q.2.5 & 2.9)
(1) Production Deputy-Factory Manager
1.1 Production Workshop No.l (Cutting Tools)*
1.2 Production Workshop No.2 (Measuring Tools-Caliper)
1.3 Production Workshop No.3 (Measuring Tools-Others)
1.4 Production Workshop No.4 (Measuring Instruments)
1.5 Production Workshop No.5 (Chibao New Factory)
1.6 Production Support Workshop®
1.6.1 Materials Preparation
1.6.2 Heat Treatment
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1.6.3 Electroplating
1.6.4 Tools
1.6.5 Machine Repairs
(2) Chief Engineer
2.1 Production Planning Department
2.2 Research & Development Department
2.3 Quality Control Department
2.4 Inspection Department
2.5 Safety & Technology Department
2.6 Energy & Facility Department
(3) Purchasing & Sales Deputy-Factory Manager
3.1 Purchasing & Supply Department
3.2 Marketing & Sales Department*
(4) Chief Accountant
4.1 Accounting & Finance Department
4.2 Internal Audit Department
(5) Personnel Deputy-Factory Manager
5.1 Manpower & Wages Department
5.2 Personnel Department
(6) General Affairs Deputy-Factory Manager
6.1 Estate & Development Department
6.2 Security Department
6.3 Administration Department
6.3.1 Education & Training
6.3.2 Medical
(7) Communist Party Office & Trade Union Office
(8) Tertiary Enterprises
8.1 Canteen
8.2 Sales Outlets (retail shops)
8.3 Engineering & Consultancy
8.4 Retailing
8.5 Restaurant
8.6 Employee Quarters
8.7 Motel
8.8 Nursary & Kidnergarten etc.
* All the 5 production workshops and the sales department 
have signed Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRCs) with 
the factory manager. The 5 production workshops are mainly 
based on good production and efficiency to determine bonus. 
The bonuses for the sales department are linked up with the 
turnover and cash received from sales.
1 2 0
@ After fulfilling the internal requirements, the production 
support workshop can provide its repair and maintenance 
services to the outsiders. Therefore, it is an independent 
profit centre by itself having 100 employees. Half of the 
external profit made can be retained by the workshop.
2.5 SMCW is under the administration of the Shanghai Mechanical 
Equipment and Instrument Bureau. In 1992, the Bureau was 
transformed into a semi-governmental body called Shanghai 
Mechanical Equipment & Instrument Corporation. The 
corporation now oversees the major development and projects, 
mainly long term ones, recommended by SMCW.
Furthermore, the corporation regulates and suggests the 
product pricing policy for the enterprises within its 
industry although the ultimate price ranges are determined 
by the enterprises themselves through regular meetings. In 
addition, the corporation arranges capital to finance the 
approved projects or investments for the enterprises under 
its umbrella. Another important function of the corporation 
is to provide market information for its industry to produce 
the right products and sell to the right markets at the 
right time. (Q.2.6 & 2.7)
2.6 SMCW is a medium SOE having 1,550 employees. One-third of 
the employees are involved in the direct production and 350 
employees are working in the 14 tertiary enterprises. All 
the employees have signed employment contracts with duration 
from one to three years. (Q.2.10)
# Since SMCW is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise,
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to SMCW.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets : RMB 108M (historical cost) (Q.3
3.2 Turnover : RMB 44M (1992)
RMB 71M (1993)
RMB 102M (1994)
RMB 140M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.2
3.3 Income before tax : RMB 5 . 9M (1992) - 13.5% of sales
(Q.3.5, 6 & 7) RMB 6.5M (1993) - 9.2% of sales
RMB 7 . 7M (1994) - 7.6% of sales
RMB 3 . 3M (1995) 2.4% of sales
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% before 1995
33% from 1995 (Q.3.6)
1 2 1
3.5 Both the sales and profit has been deteriorating because of 
the following reasons : (Q.3.7 & 8)
(1) The reduction of profit margin is mainly due to the
inflation of input materials, wages and overheads. In 
addition, the total long and short term bank loan 
amounted to RMB120 million and had to pay RMB13 million 
interest in 1994.
(2) The accounts receivable and payable at the end of 1995
were RMB85 million and RMB65 million respectively 
indicating a significant amount of bad and doubtful 
debts but without any provision. In fact, about RMB6.5 
million of bad debts was identified in 1995 and 
reported to the Shanghai State Assets Administration 
Bureau. The income before tax in 1995 would be greatly 
reduced because of this bad debts was written off at 
the year end.
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to SMCW because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 SMCW entered into the first ERC with the Shanghai Mechanical 
Equipment & Instrument Bureau and ' the Shanghai Finance 
Bureau in 1988. It was a 5-year contract which terms and 
conditions were subject to review by both parties every 
year. (Q.4.1) [Details of the ERC are shown in section 4 
of the Data Analysis 6.]
4.2 This first ERC was based on the "Three Guarantees and One 
Linkage" concept which means the contractee (SMC) had to 
guarantee : (Q.4.2 & 4)
(1) income tax handed over to the government;
(2) technology improvement;
(3) foreign exchange created from export; and
the total remuneration payable to the employees was linked 
up with the overall economic (or financial) performance.
4.3 The following basic targets for 1988 were determined
according to the actual performance in 1987 :
(1) Profit before income tax = RMB6,350,000
(2) Income tax handed over (55%) = RMB3,494,000 (zero
growth rate for 5 years)
(3) Foreign exchange from export = (not available)
1 2 2
(4) If income tax exceeds RMB3,494,000 by less than 5%, 
then 70% of the excess will be refunded to SMCW.
(5) If income tax exceeds RMB3,494,000 by more than 5%, 
then 80% of the excess (over 5%) will be refunded to 
SMCW. (Q.4.3)
4 . 4  Other targets such as sales tax, loan repayment, technology 
improvement, fixed assets increase and new product sales 
were also determined. ( Q . 4 . 6)
4.5 SMCW achieved all the basic (financial) targets and most of
the other targets in all the 5 years. (Q.4.5, 4.9, 4.10)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government and bureau in setting the above targets. The
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the three parties. 
(Q.4.7-8)
4.7 Due to the fact that some controversial problems, such as 
the determination of initial targets and subsequent growth 
rates and the short term behaviour of the enterprise 
management, have been encountered since the implementation 
of ERC system in the mid-1980s, many state-owned enterprises 
are now very careful in renewing their ERCs. Under this 
circumstance, SMCW signed the second ERC just for two years 
as from 1993 to 1994 with similar terms and conditions as 
the first one. Eventually, all the major targets have been 
achieved. Instead of entering into another ERC, the 
Corporation would just agree the basic (financial) targets 
with SMCW on an annual basis. (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(0.8)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the 4 production workshops were "cost centres" 
managed by the workshop managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expenses 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
After 1992 : it went to some length in 1993 to convert the 4
production workshops into "profit centres" managed 
by the workshop managers with higher autonomy in 
management and operation. All the other management 
and service departments remain "expense centres" 
whose managers participate in the budgeting process
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e *  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " t o  "Medium
( 2 . 5 ) "
By using a 5-point scale - 
(consistent with the scale 
used in the questionnaire 
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify 
some of the parameters or 
variables)
Very High (0)
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Very Low (4)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0 . 6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 -3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 19 92 : the workshop managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as given in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) by the top management. 
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : the primary profit responsibility lies with the
workshop managers who initiate the annual budgets 
and IRCs and get their subordinates (middle and 
lower management) involved. Obviously, changing 
into profit centres is reasonable.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5) "
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the factory manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the Bureau, and other senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required Bureau's approval.
After 1992 : the factory manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the Bureau. The factory manager can 
appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
workshop managers. The workshop managers can 
suggest changes in organisation structure and 
personnel affairs to the factory manager for 
approval.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e
"High-Medium ( 2) "
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992
"Very High-High (1)" to
After 1992
the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production without any profit margin.
the transfer prices are based on market prices less 
discounts to provide for some profit margins. The 
top management still interfere into the setting of 
transfer prices.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2 ) "
"Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre VH-H (1..0) Medium (2,.5)
Decentralization VH-H (1..0) Medium (2..5)
Appointment VH (0,.5) H-M (2..0)
Interdependencies VH (0..5) H-M (2..0)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0.,8) Medium (2..3)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.6)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992
After 1992
long term planning was initiated, monitored, 
reviewed and modified by the Bureau while the top 
management was in consultation only. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the Bureau.
Bureau has delegated the long term planning and 
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
Mr Tao has said that strategic plans still have to 
be reviewed, discussed and modified with the Bureau
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e
( 2 )  "
"Very H ig h  ( 0 . 5 ) "  t o  "High-Medium
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(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5) f
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans and annual 
budgets but initiation from the middle management 
was limited.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the workshop managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but
middle management (i.e workshop managers) did 
participate in the annual planning, and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management twice every year but amendments 
were made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with the Bureau and informed to 
the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
are reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notified 
to the lower management immediately.
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Corporate Planning Influencef : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)" 
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH (0.5) H-M (2.0)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) M-L (2.6)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "improve efficiency" and "increase profit" were the
major strategic themes given to and imbedded into 
the planning and control system.
After 1992 : "product development" and "enhance management" have
been added for all the employees to observe and 
keep in mind when they are performing their duties.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : to observe the recent laws and regulations enacted
in the last few years and related to improving the 
state-owned enterprise's autonomy and efficiency 
are to be complied with.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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(3) S u g g e s t i o n s  ( Q . 5 . 3 . 2  & 3)
Before 1992
After 1992
top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, selling price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the workshop managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate.
Corporate Planning Influence 
(2.5)"
"Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Theme
Thrust
Suggestions
Overall Planning Influence
VH-H
High
VH-H
High
(1 .0)
(1.5)
(1 .0)
(1 .2)
After 1992
H-M (2.0) 
Medium (2.5) 
Medium (2.5)
Medium (2.3)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992
After 1992
before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
the top management has to initiate its own long 
term plans and compromise with the Bureau who may 
insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and mix.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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(2) O p e r a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 4 . 3  & 5 ) f
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. workshop 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1991-1995), includes competitive 
edge, research and development, product and market 
development and new production plant.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow SMCW to participate in the 5- 
year1s planning with the Bureau and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : SMCW has to formulate their own long term strategic 
plans which are submitted to the Bureau for review 
and approval. Some projects involved significant 
capital investment require financial arrangement by 
the Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
Bureau with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the Bureau for 
endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because SMCW caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume
and mix, sales and inventory level.
After 1992 : top management has the full autonomy in the annual
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the workshop managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the workshop managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
After 1992 : top management provided major guidelines to the
workshop managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium ( 2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
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(3)  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 5 . 3  £ 5)
Before 19 92 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed in the
middle of the year and amendments were seldom made 
except under signifcant environmental changes. 
Annual plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in written forms.
After 1992 : top and middle management review the annual plans
and budgets quarterly and amendments are made due
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
After 1992Factors Before 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0)
Operation H-M (2.0)
Participation H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0)
Low (3.5)
Low (3.5)
Low (3.5)
Low (3.5)
Low (3.5)
= = = =  = =  =  =  =  =  =  =
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5.6 Internal ResponsibilityfContracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.6)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : The IRC system was started in 1991 and mainly
applied to the production workshops. Before 1992, 
production workshops were given certain targets 
such as production mix, quantities, and costs.
After 1992 : major economic targets are equivalent standard
hour, product mix and overheads while quality and 
safety have the veto effects on the bonus which was
linked up with the IRC performance.
Samples of IRC are shown in section 5.6 of the Data
Analysis Set 6.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5) "
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : workshop managers were given the production
quantity and cost targets without much negotiation.
After 19 92 : workshop managers negotiate and compromise the IRC
targets with the general management during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5)»
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets given to the workshop managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective workshop managers and 
their employees.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e f : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16) 1
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
workshop managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) M-L (2.6)
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High Corporate (0.7)" 
before 1992 to "High Corporate (1.3)" after 1992]
(1) Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Interdepen­ Production & service Production & service
dencies workshops involved workshops involved
1.2 Transfer standard cost (histori­ market price less
Price Basis cal + inflation) internal discount
1.3 Transfer Price Very little between Some negotiations
Negotiation buyer and seller are allowed
1.4 Intermediate Some buy and sell are Some buy & sell are
Product available in market available in market
1.5 Transfer All determined by the Excess service can
Quantity top management be sold externally
1.6 Arbitration Prices and quantities Mainly determined by
all determined by top top management but
management negotiations allowed
1.7 Government No, except the output No, only suggest
Interference volumes & selling volumes & prices of
prices of final products final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : nearly all the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the top management and the workshop 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflects 
were arbitrated by the factory manager. Workshop 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by production volume and cost.
After 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities are 
still controlled by the top management although 
some negotiations are allowed for the workshop 
managers because they are measured on internal 
profit. Interference from and arbitration by the 
factory manager are quite often.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "Very High-
High (1) "
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 : the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
without much inputs from the middle management. It 
was historicial cost plus inflation. The transfer 
prices were reviewed in the middle of the year and 
some amendments were allowed.
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After 1992 : the market pride less internal discount is used for 
setting the transfer prices which are reviewed 
quarterly.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics
Participation
Review
VH
VH
VH-H
(0.5)
(0.5)
(1.0)
High
VH-H
High
(1.5) 
(1.0)
(1.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0.7) High (1.3)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.3)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.5)* High (1.5)
1. 2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
High (1.3) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic- (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) P e r s o n n e l #  ( Q . 6 . 1 . 1 )
Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH (0.5) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.5 Remuneration High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
2 . 6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
# Mr Tao said that since 1992, more delegation has been given to 
the workshop managers in the personnel functions such as recruit­
ment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. But 
termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6..1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.1) High (1.5)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
workshops and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms 
Overall Control Influence
High
High
High
(1.3)
(1.4) 
(1 .1)
High (1.3)
After 1992
Medium (2.1) 
Medium (2.4) 
High (1.5)
H-M (2 .0)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q . 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  from " T ig h t  F i n a n c i a l  (1) 11 b e f o r e
1992 t o  "M oderate  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 6 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) High (1.5)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.6)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1) 1 befi
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1 -3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management cont:
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
-
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.7)
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# Mr Tao has mentioned that? the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the factory manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the factory 
manager or deputy-factory managers will contact the respective 
workshop manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the
situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production workshops were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other
non-financial targets such as quality and safety
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production volume, efficiency and overheads are the 
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production technology, facilities 
and quality are measured.
Co rporate Control Influ e n c e  : "Very H i gh-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
workshop or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the workshop managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual workshop or 
departmental meetings.
Corproate Control I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
138
Summary of Corporate ControlfInfluence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) i 3 (1.9)
6.4 Rewards &. Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2) " bef<
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1. 8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22 -23)
Before 1992 After :1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SMCW which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the factory manager 
and the workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the SMCW's core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 40-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 20-30% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 19 92 : workshop managers were involved in formulating 
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : workshop managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u n ica t ion  ( Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "V e r y  High- H i g h ( i ) 1
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M ( 1 . 6 ) H-M (1.7)
Performance Orientation VH-H ( 1 . 0 ) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H ( 1 . 0 ) H-M ( 2 . 0 )
Review & Communication VH-H ( 1 . 0 ) H-M ( 2 . 0 )
Overall Control Influence High (1.2)
iiiiii
£ 
ii 
i 
ii 
K 
II
( 1 . 8 )
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting 
Tool Works (SMCW) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* Very High 
to High (0.8) Medium (2.3)
Review Process*
High (1.3)
Medium
to Low (2.6)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions* High ■ (1.2) Medium (2.3)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.5)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.3)
Medium
to Low (2.6)
Management of Inter­
dependencies*
Very High 
to High (0.7) High (1.3)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.2) Medium (2.4)
Control Influence Before :1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.3)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.6)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Overall Control Influence Moderate
Financial (1.1) Financial (1.8)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have beenf employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic | Financial
High ( 
:
H/M
Medium -
) Strategic Programming (
:
) Financial Programming 
.
X
M/L
Low
! : 
Strategic Control ^
0
1
t Financial Control
----------- 4-------------3------------ 2------------ 1------------- 0
0 (1.8, 2.4) - SMCW Post-1992 X (1.1, 1.2) - SMCW Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) before 
and after 1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility 
Accounting Style" has been changed from "Financial Programming" 
(Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not 
yet reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial 
control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic 
Style.
12 May 1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 7" (30 April 1995).
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Cheng Qi Chang/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 26 years) 
Mr Lai Ping/Managing Director 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 11 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 11 December 1993
Second Visit - 11 August 1994
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 GNFF was established as a wholly state-owned enterprise in 
1960 and was converted into a shareholding enterprise in 
October 1992 having a paid-up capital of RMB82 million (13 
million shares). (Q.1.1)
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1.2 It is one of the largest flour mills in China having four
flour manufacturing workshops, one processed food plant and 
three supporting workshops. It also has its own shipping 
port (for 10,000 tons of ships) and railways system for 
transporting the raw materials and finished products out 
respectively. (Q.1.2)
1.3 GNFF is currently producing the following three classes (12
brand names of products) of flour : (Q.1.3)
1.3.1 Higher Class - for making high quality bread & noddle
1.3.2 Middle Class - for making bread, bun, noddle & cakes
1.3.3 Lower Class - for making sauce, battery and pastry.
Apart from the above three classes of flour products, GNFF 
has a production line imported from Italy manufacturing 1 
ton of bread per day mainly to test the quality of the flour 
produced on one hand and diversify the business sales on the 
other hand.
The by-proudct is the shell of the wheat which, after
grinding, is a kind of high demanding foodstaff for the 
livestock. It is sold to the government desginated 
liverstock farms.
1.4 GNFF's products are 95% sold domestically and 5% exported to
Vietnam, Macau and Hong Kong. (Q.1.4)
1.5 GNFF has maintained a customer information filing system and
visited the existing and potential customers periodically to 
obtain feedback on quality and services in order to increase 
the sales outlets and market share. GNFF always promulgates 
high product quality in order to explore the overseas 
markets in Southeast Asia, South America and Europe. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 GNFF has been a wholly state-owned enterprise since 1960 and 
it was converted into a private shareholding enterprise in 
October 1992 by issuing 16% of the authorized shares to the
employees. The local government is the majority shareholder
by holding 84% of the shares. (Q.2.1 & 2.2)
2.2 GNFF is neither a holding nor subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 Under the Board of Directors,* the organisation structure of
GNFF is based on functional basis led by the General Manager 
who has an Enterprise Management Office. (Q.2.3)
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2.4 The organisation structure is listed as follow:(Q.2.5 & 2.9) 
Board of Directors :
Chairman (also the Managing Director)
Vice-Chairman - General Manager 
- Party Secretary 
Directors - Deputy-General Manager (Chief Engineer) 
Deputy-General Manager (Chief Economist)
Finance Manager (Chief Accountant)
A Government Representative (Guangzhou Food & 
Oil Bureau)
Factory Management :
(1) Production Department (headed by Chief Engineer)
1.1 N o .1 Flour Workshop
1.2 No.2 Flour Workshop
1.3 No.3 Flour Workshop
1.4 N o .4 Flour Workshop
1.5 Pastry Workshop
1.6 Raw Material Workshop
1.7 Repair & Maintenance Workshop
1.8 Energy & Power Workshop
1.9 Production Planning
1.10 Research & Technology
1.11 Quality Control
1.12 Inspection
(2) Sales Department (headed by Chief Economist)
(3) Accounting & Finance Department (headed by Chief
Accountant)
(4) Purchasing Department
(5) Personnel Department
(6) General Affairs Department
6.1 Safety & Security
6.2 Transportation
6.3 Education & Training
6.4 Medical
6.5 Canteen
6.6 Housing
(7) Planning & Development Department
7.1 Information
7.2 Computer
7.3 Filing
(8) Communist Party Office
(9) Fully-Owned Subsidiaries
9.1 Guangzhou Anshin Transportation Company
9.2 Guangzhou Yuanchun Food Godown
9.3 Guangzhou Livestock Foodstaff Factory
9.4 GNFF Research & Development Laboratory
(10) Other Subsidiaries & Associate Companies
10.1 Guangzhou Commercial Import & Export Trading 
Company Limited
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10.2 China Jia Guangzhou International Auction Company 
Limited
10.3 Fanyu Lijiang Resort Garden (Hotel)
10.4 Guangzhou Noodle Product Factory
(11) Joint-Ventures
11.1 Hong Kong Nanxin Trading Company
11.2 Guangzhou Nanfang (Hong Kong) Flour Company 
Limited
11.3 Spainish Lasi Islands Flour Company Limited
2.5 GNFF is under the administration of the Guangzhou Food and 
Oil Bureau. Since the economic reforms started in 1979, the 
government and Bureau have delegated the following autonomy 
to GNFF : (Q.2.6 & 2.7)
1981 - instead of following strictly the orders and
directives from the Bureau and acting as a production cost 
centre, GNFF obtained its own production autonomy and 
retained profit after tax for development purposes.
1983 - started the economic responsibility targets system 
and employees' remuneration was linked up with economic 
performance and individual performance.
1985 - started the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" 
and delegated more operation and management autonomy to the 
factory general manager.
1990 - signed the ERC with the local government and
integrated the responsibilities, rights and benefits of the 
enterprise.
Since 1992, the Bureau has delegated the planning and 
control responsibilities to the top management of GNFF to 
run their own business. Furthermore, the investment 
autonomy has been delegated and raising capital for project 
investment can be arranged by the Bureau and GNFF together.
2.6 GNFF is a medium SOE having 940 working and 300 retired 
employees. All the employees have signed employment 
contracts with duration from one to ten years. (Q.2.10)
# Since GNFF is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to GNFF.
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S e c t i o n  3 : F i n a n c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s  ( Q . 3 . 1 - 8 # )
3 .1 Total assets : RMB 236M (1993)* (Q.3.1)
* The total assets (fixed + current) have been revaluated
once when changing into shareholding in October 1992.
3.2 Turnover : RMB 320M (1992)
RMB 370M (1993)
RMB 2 6 0M (1994)
RMB 4 00M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 & 7)
3.3 Income before tax : RMB 3 0M (1992) - 9.4% of sales
(Q.3.5, 6 & 7) RMB 33M (1993) - 8.9% of sales
RMB 15M (1994) - 5.8% of sales
RMB 2 0M (1995) - 5.0% of sales
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% (before October 1992)
15% (from October 1992) (Q.3.6)
3.5 Both the sales and profit has been deteriorating because of
the following reasons : (Q.3. 7 & 8)
(1) The significant financial performance decline in 1994
(vs budgeted sales of RMB400M) was mainly due to the 
effects resulted from the macro-economic policies 
implemented by the government in July 1993, and also 
the high input inflation i.e. wheat (27%), electricity 
(18%) , wages (30%) and packaging (40%) .
(2) Before 1994, GNFF was exempted from sales tax, but as
from January 1994, GNFF's sales has been subject to 13%
of VAT. As a result, pricing policy have not been well 
planned to capture the changes in sales demand and 
supply.
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to GNFF because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 GNFF entered into the first ERC with the Guangzhou Finance 
Bureau in 1988. It was a 3-year contract (1988-1990) which 
terms and conditions were subject to review by both parties 
every year. (Q.4.1) [Details of the ERC are shown in 
section 4 of the Data Analysis 7.]
4.2 The first year sales and profit targets set was based on the 
p r e v i o u s  three y e a r s  (1985-1987) and s u b s t a n t i a l  
negotiation. (Q.4.3)
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4.3 The first year target profit was set at RMB13.5 million with
an annual growth rate of 7%. The income tax for the traget
profit level was 55% and any excess profit over the target
would be subject to 35% income tax. (Q.4.2 & 4)
4.4 The first ERC set the following quantitative targets over
the 3 years : (Q.4.6)
(1) total flour proudction quantities with annual growth 
rates;
(2) industrial output values with annual growth rates;
(3) net profit before tax with annual growth rates; and
(4) net asset value increase with annual growth rates.
The ERC also s t i p u l a t e d  the following management 
(qualitative) targets as well :
(1) enterprise grading promotion awarded by the government
(i.e. from third class to second class);
(2) labour production efficiency (i.e. output value per
worker);
(3) net profit before tax per employee;
(4) quality product awards;
(5) new products development;
(6) energy and material consumptions;
(7) technology improvement;
(8) safety production;
(9) management techniques;
(10) manpower training; and
(11) employees remuneration and welfare improvement.
4.5 The adoption of ERC seperated the management autonomy out 
from the government and defined the duties, rights and 
benefits between the government and the enterprise. It made 
GNFF to be really a self-operating, self-financing, 
self-developing and sel-regulating enterprise and to 
initiate the motivation of the management and workers.
To facilitate the attainment of the above targets, GNFF has 
set up regular meetings between the top and middle 
management; and also guidelines for decision-making 
procedures. As a result, GNFF achieved all the quantitative 
targets in all the 3 years. (Q.4.5, 9 & 10)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with 
the Finance Bureau in setting the above targets. The chosen 
terms were mutually agreed by both parties. (Q.4.7 & 8)
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4.7 Subsequently, the second 3-year ERC (1991-1993) was signed 
with similar terms and conditions as shown above. This 
second ERC was ceased in October 1992 when GNFF was 
transformed into a shareholding enterprise and subject to 
income tax of 15%. Now the only major target agreed with 
the Guangzhou Food & Oil Bureau is the annual profit before 
income tax which is also the measuring yardstick for the 
factory manager under the "Factory Manager Responsibility 
System". (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.9)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.9)" after 
1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992
After 1992
all the 5 production workshops and 3 supporting 
workshops were "cost centres" managed by the 
workshop managers. All the other management and 
service departments were "expenses centres" under 
expense budgets control.
it went to some length in 1992 to convert the 5 
production workshops and 3 supporting workshops 
into "profit centres" and "semi-profit centres" 
respectively managed by the workshop managers with 
higher autonomy in management and operation. All 
the other management and service departments remain 
"expense centres" whose managers participate in 
the budgeting process.
Corporate Planning Influence*
(3)"
"High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
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(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 : the workshop managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) between the top management and 
workshop managers. Therefore, classifying the 
factories into cost centres wer6 appropriate.
After 1992 : the primary profit responsibility lies with the
workshop managers who initiate the annual budgets 
and IRCs and get their subordinates (middle and 
lower management) involved. Obviously, changing 
into profit centres is reasonable.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the general manager and party secretary were
appointed by the Bureau. The general manager could 
appoint the other senior staff and recommended 
major organisational changes for Bureau's 
endorsement.
After 1992 : the chairman and party secretary are appointed by 
the Bureau whereas the BOD can appoint the top 
top management such as the general and deputy 
managers. The general manager can appoint all the 
other senior staff such as the workshop managers. 
The workshop managers can suggest changes in 
organisation structure and personnel affairs to the 
factory manager for approval.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were
determined by the top management by using standard
cost after the workshop managers being consulted.
After 1992 : the transfer prices are based on the standard cost
plus or market prices less discounts to provide for 
some profit margins. Most of the transfer prices 
setting are still determined by the Enterprise 
Management Office.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P la n n in g .  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre H-M (2..0) M-L (3..0)
Decentralization H-M (2..0) M-L (3..0)
Appointment Medium (2..5) Low (3..5)
Interdependencies VH-H (1..0) H-M (2..0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1..9) M-L (2..9)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.6)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.9)" after 
1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term plans were initiated, monitored, reviewed 
and modified by the Bureau while the top management 
was in consultation only. The annual budgeting 
process was initiated by the top management but 
sanction should be required after discussion with 
the Bureau.
After 19 92 : the government and Bureau have delegated the long 
term planning and annual budgeting autonomy to the 
borad of directors and top management but Mr Cheng 
said that strategic issues and annual profit target 
are still have to be discussed with the Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans and annual 
budgets but initiation from the middle management 
was limited.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the workshop managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. The Staff 
and Worker Representatives Committee is involved in 
making decision of both long term and annual 
planning exercises.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e f : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Medium-Low
( 3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but
middle management (i.e workshop managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : through the Staff and Worker Representatives
Committee, the middle management is involved in the 
long term planning. They have to discuss with the 
lower management in formulating their own annual 
budgets and IRCs although some specific suggestions 
and directions are coming from the board and top 
management during the negotiation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans 
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management twice every year but amendments 
were made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 19 92 : long term plans are reviewed by the board and top 
management during year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with the Bureau and informed to 
the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
are reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notified 
to the lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium-High (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning
Operation
Participation
Review & Communication
VH-H
H-M
High
H-M
(1.0)
(2.0)
(1.5)
(2.0)
Medium
M-L
M-L
M-L
(2.5)
(3.0)
(3.0)
(3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (2.9)
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5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : in 1990, GNFF has engaged Guangzhou Scientific
Research Laboratory to suggest means to improve the 
operation and management systems. A policy-book 
was published in October 1991. Wholistic concept, 
stringent management control, business advancement 
and harmony working environment were suggested in 
in this policy publication.
After 1992 : the above four themes are under implementation and
expanded into different planning and control 
systems in order to improve the total quality of 
management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium
(2.5)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand. A Total 
Quality Management Committee" was established in 
1988 to set up policies for management control.
After 1992 : the following 4 quality thrusts are promulgated :
1. to formulate quality management policies;
2. to plan for product quality innovation;
3. to design quality responsibility system; and
4. to collect quality control and cost information.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the
planning and review process such as sales quantity 
and mix, selling price, marketing strategy and 
production quantity and mix in order to ensure the 
"profit before income tax" as agreed with the 
Bureau could be achieved.
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A f t e r  1992 after the promotion of the legislation in 1992, the 
top management still sometimes make suggestions on 
the above issues. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given some freedom to the workshop 
managers and department heads to compile their own 
plans or budgets and to adjust their plans and 
operations as long as they do not deviate much from 
the ultimate sales and profit targets.
Corporate Planning Influence 
"High-Medium (2) "
"Very High-High (1)" to
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Theme
Thrust
Suggestions
Overall Planning Influence
H-M
High
VH-H
High
(2
(1
(1
0)
5)
0)
(1.5)
After 1992
Medium (2.5) 
Medium (2.5) 
H-M (2.0)
Medium (2.3)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.6)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.9)" after 
1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : the board of directors has to initiate its own long 
term plans and compromise with the Bureau who may 
insist on certain macro-targets such as sales and 
profit targets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
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(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5) f
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
feasible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. workshop 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1991-1995), includes sources of 
capital, research and development, product and 
market development, production capacity, joint- 
venture, computerisation and manpower development.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
. Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979
started to allow GNFF to participate in the 5- 
year1s planning with the Bureau and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : GNFF has to formulate their own long term strategic 
plans which are submitted to the Bureau for review 
and approval. Some projects involved significant 
capital investment require financial arrangement by 
the Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
Bureau with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the board of directors reviews the 5-year plan
twice every year before the annual planning cycle 
and significant changes are reported to the Bureau 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "H igh-M edium  ( 2) "  t o  "Medium-Low
(3) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e
Factors Before 1992 A f t e r  1992
Central Planning High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (2.9)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because GNFF caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.5)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992
After 1992
government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. sales and profit
top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the workshop managers.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
"Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
Before 1992
After 1992
top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the workshop managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
after transforming into a shareholding enterprise, 
reference has also been made to the 5-year plan 
especially to estimate what the sales potential 
will be from the new product and market situation. 
Top management provides major guidelines to the 
workshop managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
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fC o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "  t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed in the
middle of the year and amendments were seldom made 
except under signifcant environmental changes. 
Annual plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in written forms.
After 1992 : top and middle management review the annual plans
and budgets quarterly and amendments are made due
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
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5.6 Internal Responsibility; Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.6)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.6)" after 
1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : the IRC system was started in 1989 and mainly
applied to the production workshops. The major 
quantitative targets were production quantities, 
mix and costs.
After 1992 : IRC system has been extended to the supporting
workshop and two service departments. The major 
economic target set is internal profit, whereas the 
equivalent standard hour is used for one supporting 
department. The wages and bonus are linked up with 
the IRC performance.
Samples of IRC are shown in section 5.6 of the Data 
Analysis Set 7.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : workshop managers had to compromised with the top 
management on the production and cost targets.
After 1992 : workshop managers negotiate and agree the IRC
targets with the top management during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets agreed with the workshop managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective workshop managers and 
their employees.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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(4) I n c e n t i v e  ( Q . 5 . 6 . 1 6 )
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus determination, so both the 
workshop managers and their subordinates are eager 
to initiate the IRC targets in order to increase 
the bonus under attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (2.6)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
Since each flour production workshop of GNFF is independent in 
manufacturing its own products without any transfer to other 
factories, the transfer pricing is not applicable. The transfer 
of some flour products to the pastry workshop for manufacturing 
bread, the services provided by the supporting workshops (i.e. 
raw material treatment, repair and maintenance, energy and 
power), and the transportation services provided by the vehicle 
fleet do involve transfer prices which are all determined 
according to the standard or market prices as fixed by the 
Enterprise Management Office and Accounting Department on a 
quarterly basis.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.5)* VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Staffing High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1. 4 Interactions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<------------------------------------Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0 . 0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) P e r s o n n e l #  ( Q . 6 . 1 . 1 )
Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
2.2 Assignment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2 . 5 Remunerat ion High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 6 Termination High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) Midium (2.5)
# Mr Cheng said that since 1992, more delegation has been given 
to the workshop managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6..1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.1) High (1.5)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
workshops and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms 
Overall Control Influence
High
H-M
High
(1.4)
(1 .6)
(1 .1)
High (1.4)
After 1992
Medium (2.1) 
Medium (2.5) 
High (1.5)
H-M (2 .0)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q . 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.7)
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# Mr Cheng has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the factory manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the factory 
manager or deputy-factory managers will contact the respective 
workshop manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production workshops were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production volume and internal profit are the
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production technology, facilities 
and quality are measured.
C o r p o r a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
workshop or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the workshop managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual workshop or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  Control Influ e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2) " before
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1 -7,15-16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1. 2 Allowances H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.7) H-M (1.8)
* Since 1994, GNFF has unified the basic wages and bonus together 
which is ddetermined by two elements i.e. post wages (include 
allowance) and ability wages. Each post has five to six grades 
according to technical skill assessed annually. The ability 
wages include the actual performance which may be assessed 
according to the IRC on a monthly basis. The poor performance of 
an individual in a group may be transferred out for education and 
training or other assignments or even leave the enterprise.
Some jobs, such as the packing workers in the flour production 
workshops and the dock carriers, have employed the "piece rate" 
wages system. Furthermore, canteen staff's wages are based on 
its own operating income.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Guangzhou 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GNFF which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
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The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the factory manager
and the workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will
be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to send some of
employees home without giving them a job or post but still
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 40-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 30-40% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : workshop managers were involved in formulating 
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the top management and government.
After 1992 : workshop managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
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c
C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 )  " t o
"High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8,13-14 , 20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.7) H-M (1.8)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2)
iiiiii
£ 
II 
i 
ii li
(1.8)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are 
following table in order to assess what are 
accounting styles that Guangshou Nan Fang 
belonged to before and after 1992.
summarised in the 
the responsibility 
Flour Mill (GNFF)
Planning Influences Before 1992 After :1992
Organisation Structure* High to 
Medium (1.9)
Medium 
to Low (2.9)
Review Process* High to 
Medium (1.6)
Medium 
to Low (2.6)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions* High (1.5) Medium (2.3)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (1.6)
Medium 
to Low (2.9)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.6)
Medium 
to Low (2.6)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* N/A N/A
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8) M-L (2.8)
Control Influence Before 1992 After :1992
Decentralisation & 
Control#
Agreeing Objectives* 
Monitoring Results* 
Rewards & Incentives* 
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.4) 
Tight
Financial (1.0) 
Tight
Financial (1.0)
Financial (1.2) 
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been Employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
Control Influence
Strategic I Financial
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
  . 2  2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.9, 2.8) - GNFF Post-1992 X (1.2, 1.8) - GNFF Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to 
"Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
24 May 1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameters;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 8" (23 May 1995).
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Zheng Jian Zhong/Assistant General Mgr.
(No. of years in this enterprise : 12 years)
Mr Shaw Tim/Accounting & Finance Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 13 years)
Dates of Visists : Frist Visit - 10 December 1993
Second Visit - 13 August 1994
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 The predecessor of GNFB was the privately owned Da Xin 
Department Store established in 1918 and was burnt down 
during the Second World War in 1938. Then the building was 
rebuilt and named Nan Fang Building in 1954. Its first four 
floors (6,0 00 square metres) were used to engage in selling 
general merchandise, named Xi Ti Department Stores, and in 
1973, changed into GDFB. (refer to Q.1.1)
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1.2 GNFB is one of the top S department stores in Guangzhou with
a total shopping area of 22,600 square metres selling 80,000 
kinds of commodities in 1994. (Q.1.2)
1.3 Turning into the 1990s, under the guidance of the Guangzhou
Municipal Commercial Management Committee, GNFB has been 
undertaking new trials, from having only one department 
store to a large synthetic group enterprise with 16 
strategic business units including retailing, tourism, 
catering, import and export trade and joint venture 
businesses. (Q.1.3)
1.4 About 10% of the commodities sold by GNFB are imported and 
most of the commodities are sold locally. After gaining the 
"import and export right" in April 1984, GNFB has 
successively set up trade ties with some countries and 
regions. (Q.1.4)
1.5 Since 1993, GNFB's development plans have been to explore Xi 
Ti business district by using joint-venture captial, to 
establish a lot of chain shops and co-selling centres, to 
develop cargohouse and super wholesale market, to enter into 
the real estate market and financial market, to build up 
transnational corporation, and to develop overseas market. 
GNFB is t r a n s f o r m i n g  into a m o d e r n i s e d  b u s i n e s s  
organisation, which has the first class goods, service, 
s e l l i n g  c o n c e p t ,  q u a l i t y  of s t a f f  and b u s i n e s s  
diversification. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 GNFB was converted into a private shareholding enterprise in
1992 by issuing 25% of the authorized shares to the
employees while the government was the majority shareholder 
holding 75% of the shares. (Q.2.1 & 2)
2.2 The organisation structure of GNFB can be divided into three
levels : (Q.2.3 & 5)
(1) Board of Directors (BOD)
1.1 Chairman (GM)*
1.2 Deputy Chairman (Party Secretary)*
1.3 12 Directors -
Deputy Party Secretary 
Deputy General Manager of Sales
Deputy General Manager of Purchasing
Deputy General Manager of Administration
Deputy General Manager of Planning & Development
Assistant General Manager (also head of Finance)
Chairman of Labour Union
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Secretary of Disciplinary Committee 
General Manager of Nan Feng Shopping Mall 
General Manager of Underground Shopping Mall 
General Manager of Guang Ke Long Superstore 
Head of the Legal Department 
* T h e y  are a p p o i n t e d  by the g o v e r n m e n t  as 
representatives to the board of directors.
(2) Headquarters (under the General Manager)
2.1 General Manager Office (Assistant GM)
2.1.1 Internal Audit
2.1.2 Compliance
2.1.3 Legal Advice
2.1.4 Computer Centre
2.2 Finance Department (Assistant GM)
2.3 Marketing & Sales Department (Deputy GM)
2.4 Purchasing Department (Deputy GM)
2.5 Planning & Development Department (Deputy GM)
2.6 Administration Department (Deputy GM)
2.6.1 Personnel
2.6.2 Information & Record
2.6.3 Business Centre
2.6.4 Power & Supply
2.6.5 Repair Sc Maintenance
2.6.6 Security & Safety
2.6.7 Environmental Protection
2.6.8 Education Sc Training
2.6.9 Medical
2.6.10 Canteen@
2.6.11 Nursary@
2.6.12 Resort House@
2.6.13 Transportation®
@ GNFB has been considering to convert these business 
units into self-financed profit centres (or tertiary 
enterprises) which can provide services both internally 
and externally.
(3) Department Stores (under the GM Office)#
3.1 Man's Clothing
3.2 Lady's Clothing
3.3 Children World
3.4 Electrical Appliances
3.5 Audio Visual Appliances 
3 . 6 Clocks Sc Watches
3 . 7 Gold Sc Jewelry
3.8 Furniture
3.9 Comestics
3.10 Famous Brand Square
3.11 Gifts Sc Delicated Goods
3.12 Sportsware
3.13 Wines & Drinks
3.14 Chocolate & Candies
3.15 Supermarket
3.16 Coffee Hall
172
* Each department store is an independent profit centre 
usually having one manager, two deputy managers and 
some supporting staff for purchasing, marketing, 
accounting, personnel and transportation functions. 
They are reporting to and are supported by the 
respective departments in the headquarters. Each store 
has entered into Internal Responsibility Contracts 
(IRC) with the.General Manager.
(4) Subsidiaries (uner the GM Office)@
4.1 Nanfeng shopping Mall
4.2 Underground Shopping Mall
4.3 Nansheng Shopping Mall
4.4 Nantong shopping Mall
4.5 Taishan Co-selling Shop
4.6 24-Hour Convenient Shop
4.7 Guang Ke Long Superstore
4.8 Nanfang Storage & Transportation Company
4.9 Nanfang Wholesale & Trading Company
4.10 Nanfang Import & Export Company
4.11 Zhuhai Nanxin Industrial Co. Ltd.
4.12 Nanjiang Garment Manufacturing Company
4.13 Nanqiao Food Manufacturing Company
4.14 Ye Ming Zhu Hotel
4.15 Pu Ti Yuen Hotel
4.16 Red House Restaurant
4.17 Nanfang Real Estate Development Company
@ Each subsidiary or joint-venture is an independent 
venture or business unit with its own management staff 
who are reporting to and supported by the respective 
departments in the headquarters.
2.3 GNFB is holding the above 17 subsidiaries. (Q.2.4 & 8)
2.4 GNFB is under the administration of the Guangzhou Municipal
Government and the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau who 
dictated all the planning and control systems of GNFB before 
the enconomic reforms started in 1979. (Q.2.6)
2.5 Since the beginning of 1990, the Bureau has been delegating
more planning, control and operating autonomy to GNFB and
just scruitinising the major development projects, mainly
long term ones, recommended by GNFB. (Q.2.7)
2.6 Most of the board members are chief executives managing the
headquarters and subsidiaries as explained in 2.2 above. 
(Q.2.9)
2.7 GNFB is a large SOE having a total of 4,000 employees in 
1994. (Q.2.10 & 11)
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S e c t i o n  3 : F i n a n c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s  ( Q . 3 . 1 - 8 # )
: RMB155M (revaluated 1992) (Q.3.1)
: RMB 685M (1992)
RMB1,050M (1993)
RMB1,3 00M (1994) (Q.3.2 & 7)
: RMB21M (1992) - 3.1% of sales
RMB26M (1993) - 2.5% of sales*
RMB31M (1994) - 2.4% of sales*
* The decrease of profit margin in 1993 and 1994 was due to 
high inflation, higher sales and related taxes (i.e. 17% of
VAT and other urban development taxes) and macro-economic 
policies implemented by the government to cool down the 
overheated economy since July 1993. (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
3.4 Income tax rate : 15% (Q.3.6)
3.5 GNFB is planning to maintain an average growth rate in
turnover from 20%-30% before 2000 despite the fact that
competition in the retailing business is very keen in China. 
In view of the high input costs and inflation, to keep
income before tax at 3%-5% of sales will be considered to be
satisfactory. (Q.3.7 & 8)
# Information for Q.3.3 & 4 was not available.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 GNFB signed first 5-year's ERC (1987-1991) with the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government in 1987. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The major targets set in the ERC were :
(1) Profit target RMB10M in 1987 and then 6% annual growth
(2) Handover 55% of target profit to government.
(3) If actual profit exceeds target, only handover 16.5% of
the excess to government. (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
4.3 There were different forms of ERCs for the state-owned 
enterprises to choose from and which had different financial 
and non-financial targets. The choosen format was mutually 
agreed between the government and GNFB. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government in setting the above targets. Mr Zheng said 
that the growth rate of 6% was underestimated and proved by 
the actual results subsequently. (Q.4.5, 7-10)
3.1 Total assets
3.2 Turnover
3.3 Income before tax
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4.5 The second ERC (1992-1996) was terminated at the end of 1992 
when GNFB was transformed into a shareholding enterprise and 
then onwards, GNFB has been subject to an income tax of 15%. 
(Q.4.11-13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the department stores and subsidiaries were
independent "profit centres" and held accountable 
for their results based on the IRCs.
After 1992 : the department stores and subsidiaries have to
formulate their own short term strategies in the 
annual planning and budgeting process
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0) Greatest Influence
(consistent with the sacle High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3) \/
some of the parameters or Very Low (4) Least Influence
variables)
Very High [VH] (0 .0 - 0..5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0 .6 - 1..0)
High [H] (1 .1 - 1,.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1 .6 - 2,.0)
Medium [M] (2 .1 - 2,.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2 .5 - 3,.0)
Low [L] (3 .1 - 3,.5)
Very Low [VL] (3 .6 - 4,.0)
(2) Decentrali zation (Q.5.:1.2)i
Before 1992 : the store and subsidiary managers were responsible 
for the income and profit as agreed in the annual 
budget and internal responsibility contracts.
After 1992 : the store and subsidiary managers should also 
decide their own strategies in marketing, 
purchasing, selling, cost control and personnel.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "  t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the chairman, party secretary and a few chief
executives were appointed by the government. The 
general manager appointed the management staff of 
the department stores and subsidiaries.
After 1992 : only the chairman and party secretary are appointed 
by the government. The chairman appoints all the 
chief executives including the store and subsidiary 
managers who can decide their own organisation 
structures and personnel affairs but important 
changes should be approved by the headquarters.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the interactions between the department and
subsidiaries are minimal because they are selling 
different categories of commodities. Any conflicts 
were settled by the headquarters.
After 1992 : similar to 1992 and before but store and subsidiary 
managers are encouraged to solve the conflicts by 
themselves before headquarters' arbitration.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5) " to "Low (3 . 5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Decentralization Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Appointment High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Interdependencies Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.1) Low (3.3)
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5 . 2  R e v ie w  P r o c e s s  ( P l a n n i n g  & B u d g e t i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  fro m  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 1 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 4 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term plans were initiated by the top
management before discussion and negotiation with 
the government. Short term planning and budgeting 
were delegated by the government to the enterprise 
except agreeing key targets like sales, profit and 
inventory.
After 1992 : significant long term plans are submitted to the
government for review or raising capital. Short 
term planning and budgeting have been completely 
delegated to the enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures were
existed to formulate, evaluate, approve and review 
the annual plans and budgets for submission to the 
government. Initiation from the middle management 
was required for the budgets but not the long term 
plans which was finally determined by government.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and internal responsibility contracts. Major 
guidelines are provided by the top management to 
the store and subsidiary managers to formulate 
their own budgets and IRCs. They are also involved 
in the long term planning during the annual 
planning review before starting the budget cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was a top-down process but 
middle management (i.e. store managers) did 
participate in the annual planning & budgeting 
processes and initiation was required.
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After 1992 : middle management is being involved on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiation in order to meet the profit target.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the government reviewed and amended the long term
plans with the top management annually. Changes 
were notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed quarterly between the 
top and middle management and amendments could be 
made and communicated to the lower management 
through the revised budgets and IRCs.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the BOD during
every year end and significant changes should be 
discussed with the government before informing the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly or monthly between the top and 
middle management and significant amendments can be 
made and then notify the lower management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Autonomy H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low . (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.1) Low (3.4)
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5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "sincerity", "efficiency", "aggressiveness" and
"thoughtfulness" were the 4 major strategic themes 
laid down by the top management for employees.
After 1992 : in addition to the above 4 strategic themes, GNFB
is creating its enterprise civilization/corporate
culture and to be a first class enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : service and commodity quality are the major thrusts 
promulgated by the top management after discussion 
with department stores.
After 1992 : "commodity", "service", "environment", "management"
"sales & marketing" and "quality of employee" are 
the 6 areas to strive for first class.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management sometimes made suggestions on 
specific strategic issues such as commodity 
varities, prices, promotion tactics, etc. in order 
to enhance economic efficiency.
After 1992 : suggestions/actions have been made on "customer 
service", "service quality assurance", "public 
relations & promotion", "retail networking" and 
"management information & control" in order to 
realise the first class enterprise image.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2)" t o  "Medium-Low
(3) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e
Factors Before 1992 A f t e r  1992
Theme H-M (2,.0) M-L (3,.0)
Thrust Medium (2..5) Low (3,.5)
Suggestions H-M (2,.0) M-L (3..0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2..2) Low (3..2)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992
After 1992
the early 5-year long term plans before the 
economic reform started in 1979 focused on the 
commodity varieties and prices dictated by the 
government. Top management participated in the long 
term planning negotiations since the early 1980s.
the board of directors has to initiate the long 
term plans of which some have to discuss with the 
government for assistance such as source of finance 
for large capital projects.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5) 
Before 1992
"High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
After 1992
the top management was responsible to the 
government to formulate, evaluate, implement, 
monitor and review the long term plans.
formal planning committee and procedures are 
existed to get middle management (i.e. store 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The time span of 
long term planning is extended to 15 years to be 
formulated by the board of directors.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium (2.5)
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the involvement from middle management (i.e. store 
managers) was limited to consultation.
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After 1992 : store and subsidiary managers are members of the
planning committee but they seldom initiate changes 
but mainly concern the annual budgets and IRCs 
which they are measured on.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by
the government with the top management and changes 
made were notified to the employees during the 
annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan
every year before the annual planning cylce and 
significant changes are reported to the government. 
Details of the long term plans are made known to 
various levels of management through meetings and 
internal documentation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "High-Low
(3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8) Medium (2.5)
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t ?
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  fro m  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 4 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the planning autonomy to
the top manageemnt but specific suggestions may be 
provided i.e. commodity varieties and prices
After 1992 government has completely delegated the short term 
planning autonomy to the board of directors as long 
as satisfactory profit level can be maintained.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4) 
Before 1992
"Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
top management initiated the key budgets and 
discussed and compromised with the store managers.
After 1992 : board of directors provides major guidelines to
store and subsidiary managers for intitiating their 
own budgets which are subject to negotiation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : store managers were asked to discuss and comprise 
the key budgets with the top management before 
working out the details.
After 1992 : store and subsidiary managers have to formulate
their own budgets and get the lower management
involved formulating the details which affect their 
performance and rewards directly.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans/budgets were reviewed quarterly and
amendments made in line with the changing 
environmental factors. Annual plans & budgets 
were documented and copied to every department.
A f t e r  1 9 9 2 planning committee reviews the annual plans and 
budgets monthly and amendments are made in view of 
the fast changing market economy.
Budget information is futher communicated in the 
monthly performance reporting.
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Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5) " to "Low (3 .5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.4) Low (3.5)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.3)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : major targets set were sales, profit & foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : major targets are similar but more emphasis on 
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, day-to-day 
operation and security in accordance with the 
strategic themes and thrusts.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : store managers negotiated and compromised the given
IRC targets during the annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : store and subsidiary managers have to initiate,
quantify and justify the major IRC targets before 
negotiating with the top management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
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(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 19 92 : IRCs were reviewed twice every year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed by the top 
management and store managers. IRCs were documented 
and informed to respective departments & employees.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect attainable targets. 
Second-tier IRCs are signed between the store 
manager and sales sections/counters in order to 
further delegate the planning and control 
responsibilities.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of
the economic targets set in the IRCs which were not
difficult to attain.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus so the store managers are 
eager to initiate the IRC targets in order to 
increase the bonus under attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)" 
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Incentive Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.3) Low (3.4)
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the department stores, branches and subsidiaries in GNFB 
are selling different categories of commodities and services with 
very minimal interactions, therefore, internal transfer pricing 
does not exist.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Strategic (2.2)" 
before 1992 to "Strategic (3)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design# (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992
1.1 Structure High (1.5)*
1.2 Staffing Medium (2.5)
1.3 Roles & functions Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions Medium (2.5)
Medium (2.3)
After 1992 
Medium (2.5) 
M-L (3.0)
Low (3.5)
Low (3.5)
Low (3.1)
# Mr Zhu said that since the late 1980s, more delegation has been 
given to the store managers in deciding their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units.
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L ow(4) L ow(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(0)
Tight Strategic<------------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0 . 0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel® (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.2 Assignment M-L (3.0) Low (3.5)
2.3 Training M-L (3.0) Low (3.5)
2.4 Evaluation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.5 Remuneration H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.6 Termination High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Medium (2.3) Low (3.2)
@ Mr Zheng further mentioned that since 1992, the store managers 
have been vested with higher strategic autonomy to manoeuvre 
their organisational and personnel changes but important changes 
should be discussed with headquarters before implementation.
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(3) C o n t r o l  M echan ism s*  ( Q. 6 . 1 . 2 - 3 ,  Q . 6 . 4 . 8 )
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
3.2 IRC High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
3.4 Quantitative targets H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
H-M (1.9) M-L (2.8)
* Mr Zheng expressed that as long as the department stores can 
meet the financial targets with growth from year to year, the 
headquarters will devolve the responsibility for strategy 
development to the stores without much interference. This change 
in control style was mainly because of the government's 
macroeconomic influence and many uncertainties existed in the 
market.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design Medium (2.3) Low (3.1)
Personnel Medium. (2.3) Low (3.2)
Control Mechanisms H-M (1.9) M-L (2.8)
Overall Control Influence Medium (2.2)
iiiiiinii
1 
ii
2 
ll
(3.0)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q .6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed fromi "Moderate Strategic (2.)
before 1992 to "Tight Strategic (3.1)“ after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Medium (2.2) Low (3.1)
iiiiiiiiiiiin — iiiiiiiiiiiin = = = = =
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6 . 3  M o n i t o r i n g  R e s u l t s  ?
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  from  " M o d e ra te  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 6 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  " S t r a t e g i c  ( 2 . 7 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 2 Frequency H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 3 Contents VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.4 Compilation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.5 Review H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 6 Evaluation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Feedback Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
1. 9 Follow-up Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1.10 Computerization H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.5)
# Mr Zheng has mentioned that for any serious adverse variances 
shown on the monthly report, the general or deputy-general 
managers will contract the respective store managers to dig out 
the underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : department stores were mainly measured on the
financial targets such as sales, profit and foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : other than the previous financial targets, a set of 
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, day-to-day 
operation and security are also measured.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication* (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12))
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance report 
monthly and discuss with store managers for 
corrective actions.
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After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the performance
report monthly. Infrequent adverse variances can 
be tolerated if store managers can take remedial 
tactics or strategies to correct the unfavourable 
conditions and meet the budget at the year end.
Corporate Control Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
* Mr Zheng said that it was expected that remedial actions can be 
taken to handle the short term problems as soon as possible (such 
as a sudden sales promotion by a counterpart) . Whereas, 
strategic steps may be considered and implemented to solve some 
medium term problems (such as the effect of advertisement).
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements 
Performance Measurement 
Review & Communication
H-M
VH-H
H-M
(1.8)
(1.0)
(2.0)
Medium
H-M
Low
(2.5) 
(2.0)
(3.5)
Overall Control Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (2.7)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.5)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,IE>-16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages Medium (2.5) H-M (2.0)
1.2 Allowances Medium (2.5) Medium (2.5)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 8 Redundancy H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.2)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regards to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10-20, 
therefore, it is no substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is the major source of income 
which is determined according to the IRC.
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There are two portions for the "allowances". The firest part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Guangzhou government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GNFB which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
IRC. An IRC signed between the general manager and a store 
manager decides what level of group bonus will be given to the 
department. Of course, it is up to the store manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates according 
to individual performance, such as the sales achieved by a 
salesgirl in a certain month.
The "bonus" for the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is linked up with the average bonus of the employees 
in all department stores, and is based on their performance and 
grades as well.
(2) Performance Orientation# (Q.6.5.9-12 ,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and took over 
50% of total wages. Basic wages was low and 
depended on seniority. Too many types of 
allowances all unrelated to performance but to 
combat inflation. Pension was totally borne by the 
enterprise. Laying off redundant employees was 
difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 50% of total wages. Basic 
wages has been increased and increaments take skills 
, knowledge, competance into account instead of 
seniority only. Some allowances and benefits are 
merged with the basic wages. Pension is partly 
contributed by the government. Laying off redundant 
employees is easier after implementing the 
employment contract system.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
# Mr Zheng said that unlike Beijing and Shanghai, the labour 
market in Guangzhou is rather free which means employees can 
choose new jobs and resign from the old ones at their own will. 
On the other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay off 
their staff by giving advanced notice according to the terms of 
the employment contracts. GNFB has fully implemented the 
"employment contract system" since 1992 and the "big rice pot" or 
"three iron bowls" concept has been abolished.
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(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : store managers were involved in formulating I R C s
targets to be measured on. Basic wages, allowances 
, pension and other benefits were decided by- 
headquarters and government.
After 1992 : store managers have to initiate the IRC's targets 
and negotiate with top management. The policies 
for basic wages, allowances and other benefits have 
involved the labour union and planning committee. 
Pension policy is still decided by the government.
Corporate Cont r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8, 13-14, 20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
on a monthly basis.
After 1992 : I R C s  targets are reviewed twice every year and can
be modified. Planning committee reviews the basic
wages, allowances and other benefits during the 
annual planning cycle and employees are informed of 
these decisions and policies. Performance and 
reward are made known to employees every month.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.8) Medium (2.2)
Performance Orientation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.2)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. 
(GDFB) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences
Organisation Structure*
Review Process*
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Long-Term Plans*
(Resource Allocation)
Short-Term Planning/
Before 1992 
Medium (2.1) 
Medium (2.1)
Medium (2.2)
High to 
Medium (1.8)
After 1992 
Low (3.3)
Low (3.4)
Low (3.2)
Medium (2.5)
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
Medium (2 .4) Low (3 .5)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# Medium (2 .3) Low (3 .4)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* ---- ---
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2 .1) Low (3 .2)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control#
Moderate
Strategic (2. 2) Strategic (3.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate
Strategic (2. 2)
Tight
Strategic (3.1)
Monitoring Results* Moderate
Financial (1. 6) Strategic (2.7)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1. 5)
Moderate
Strategic (2.2)
Overall Control Influence Moderate
Financial (1. 9) Strategic (2.8)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
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# Additional parameters used, to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic I Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming
H/M
Medium
M/L
 2  2  2
X
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (2.8, 3.2) - GNFB Post-1992 X (1.9, 2.1) - GNFB Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) before and 
after 1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility 
Accounting Style" has been changed from "Moderate Financial 
Control" (Pre-1992) to "Strategic Control" (Post-1992) although 
it has not yet reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of 
strategic control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's 
Strategic Style.
31 May 1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 9" (26 August 1995).
Name of SOE : Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF)
Staff Interviewed : Mr He Gao Hua/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 13 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 13 August 1993
Second Visit - 30 August 1994
Third Visit - 12 September 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 BCRF is a state-owned enterprise established in 1960. It is 
the earliest specialized factory in manufacturing power 
semiconductor devices and electornic convertor and equipment 
in China. (Q.1.1)
1.2 BCRF is a key enterprise under the administration of the 
Ministry of Electronics Industry as well as in the Power 
Convertor Industry in China. Compared with the other 
competitors in Shanghai, Xian and Qingdao, BCRF has the most 
varieties and types of convertor products. (Q.1.2)
193
1.3 BCRF is currently producing the following two major
categories of convertor products of which over 95% are sold 
domestically in China :
1.3.1 Power Semiconductor Devices
1.3.2 Convertor Equipment (Q.1.3)
1.4 Less than 5% of BC R F 1 s products are exported to the
Southeast Asian countries and nearly all the raw materials
and components are produced in China. (Q.1.4)
1.5 It is the government's policy to be self-satisfied the
demands in this industry without any imported products from
overseas. Therefore, BCRF's major marketing strategy is to 
penetrate and explore the domestic markets. Since the late 
1980s, BCRF has been importing international advanced 
technology from the UK, USA and Japan in manufacturing its 
various types of products. While making effort in research 
and deevelopment, BCRF has pursued modern management in 
order to produce high quality, multi-applicable, reasonable 
price and prompt delivered power semiconductor devices and 
convertor equipment for every end-user. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 BCRF has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 BCRF is neither a holding or subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 The organisation structure of BCRF can be divided into 8
divisions under the direct control of the Factory Manager 
who has an Enterprise Management Office. (Q.2.3)
2.4 The 8 divisions are listed as follow : (Q.2.5 & 2.9)
(1) Production Division (Deputy Factory Manager)
1.1 Production Workshop No.l - Power Semincontor
Devices
1.2 Production Workshop No.2 - Convertor Devices
1.3 Production Workshop No.3 - Convertor Equipment
Assembly
1.4 Production Workshop No.4 - Fabrication &
Processing
1.5 Production Workshop No.5 - Materials Handling
(2) Technical Support Division (Chief Engineer)
2.1 Production Planning Department
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2.2 Production Technology Department
2.3 Environment & fSafety Department
2.4 No.l Product Design Department
2.5 No.2 Product Design Department
2.6 Power & Energy Department
2.7 Computer & Information Department
(3) Quality Control Division (Deputy FM)
3.1 Quality Management Department
3.2 Product Inspection Department
3.3 Repair & Maintenance Department
(4) Marketing & Sales Division (Chief Economist)
4.1 Marketing Department
4.2 Sales Department
(5) Purchasing & Supply Division (Deputy FM)
5.1 Purchasing Department
5.2 Inventory & Supply Department
(6) Finance Division (Chief Accountant)
6.1 Accounting Department
6.2 Internal Audit Department
(7) Manpower & Wages Division (Deputy FM)
7.1 Personnel Department
7.2 Education & Training Department
(8) Administration Division (Deputy FM)
8.1 Security Department
8.2 Estate & Development Department
8.3 General Affairs Department
8.3.1 Medical
8.3.2 Centeen
8.3.3 Nursary
2.5 BCRF is under the administration of the Beijing Municipal 
Government and the Beijing Instrument Bureau. In 1983, the 
Bureau was transformed into a quasi-government body called 
Beijing International Instrument Corporation (BIIC) as an 
initial step to delegate the governing role to this 
self-regulated institution composed of all the electronic 
instrument manufacturing industries in Beijing.
Since then, more autonomy in terms of planning an control 
decisions has been authorised by the Beijing Government to 
the BIIC and turning into this decade, BIIC's major roles 
played for its subordinate enterprises are (1) appointing 
the factory manager and the communist party secretary; (2) 
maintaining a macoreconomic control or balance on the 
5-year's plans suggested by its enterprises; and (3) acting 
as a bridge or facilitator between the government and its 
enterprises in policy matters such as capital invetment, 
import and export autonomy, taxation, legal form 
transformation etc. BIIC has delegated the planning and 
management responsibilities to BCRF although quarterly and 
annual reports have to be submitted to the BIIC for review. 
(Q.2.6 Sc 2.7)
195
2.6 BCRF has a total of 970 working employees (compared with 
1,200 in 1990) and 600 retired employees at the end of 1994. 
It is classified as a "medium size SOE" in China. (Q.2.10)
# Since BCRF is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to BCRF.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3 .1 Total assets : RMB 90M (historical cost) (Q.3. 1)
3 . 2 Turnover : RMB 41M 
RMB 33M 
RMB 21M 
RMB 22M
(1992)
(1993)
(1994)
(1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 Sc 7)
3.3 Income before tax : RMB5.2M 
RMB 0M 
(RMB4 . 6M) 
(RMB4.5M)
(1992) - 12.7% of sales
(1993) - breakeven
(1994) - loss making* 
(1995 forecast)# (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
* The decrease in income before tax to breakeven and even 
incurrance of loss in 1994 were due to high inflation, 
depreciation and loan interest, unsellable products, 
inefficient management, insufficient new products and the 
change of fully absorption costing method to manufacturing 
costing method under the new enterprise accounting 
regulations implemented since July 1993. The outstanding 
bank loan in 1995 was almost RMB30 million.
# This loss figure did not include an extraordinary income 
of RMB8 million due to leasing a piece of land (8,000 square 
metre) inside the factory to a Guangdong province for 
constructing a 5-storey commercial building with a small 
motel inside. Eventually, there would be a profit before 
tax of about RMB3.5M in 1995.
3.4 Income tax rate : 15%@ (before 1996)
33% (after 1996) (Q.3.6)
@ BCRF enjoyed a lower income tax rate compared with the 33% 
levied on the other state-owned enterprises because it is 
treated as a hightech manufacturing enterprise which can 
retain more earnings for research and development, and also 
replace the old plant and equipment. The net VAT (output 
VAT - input VAT) was about 9% in 1994 compared with 8% in 
the past.
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Without diclosing the exact amount, Mr He has admitted the 
fact that bad and doubtful debts are quite serious in BCRF. 
He has complained that VAT has to be paid on one hand while 
cash cannot be received from debtors on the other hand. But 
this situation was changed in 1995 by paying the net VAT 
upon receiving cash from the debtors.
3.5 In 1994, nearly all the manufacturing enterprises in this 
industry were loss-making mainly because of : (Q.3.7 & 8)
(a) lack of sources of capital to replace the old plant and
machinery due to the macro-economic control policies
implemented since July 1993;
(b) the existing products could not suit the changing 
demands in the national market;
(c) the cost of production is high mainly due to inflation
of raw materials and wages, and also small batch of 
production but incurring high fixed costs (i.e. set-up, 
scheduling);
(d) the end users prefer to import the same products from 
overseas suppliers at similar prices but higher 
quality; and
(e) the incompetent leadership ability of the top 
management.
In 1988, BCRF obtained a bank loan of RMB29 million to 
procure a set of machines form the UK for producing a series 
of new products. However, most of these products are still 
keeping in the inventory and as a result, 60% of the bank 
loan is still outstanding now. Of course, the loan interest 
affects the profit and loss account adversely. Adding up 
with the other working capital bank loan, BCRF paid RMB2.8 
million of bank interest in 1994.
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to BCRF because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 BCRF entered into an ERC with the Beijing Municipal 
Government represented by BIIC in 1992. It was a standing 
contract without duration (time limit) specified but subject 
to review by both parties every year. (Q.4.1)
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4.2 The terms and conditions of this contract were summarised 
below : (Q.4.2 & 4 )  f
(1) income tax rate was 15%
(2) income after tax was split 40:60 between the governemnt
and the enterprise (the split was 60:40 and 50:50
before 1992)
(3) income after tax was subject to tow local taxes, i.e.
energy and transportation development tax - 10% 
government budget adjustment tax - 15%
(4) total wages and bonus linked up with economic 
efficiency
(5) deducted bank loan repayment of RMB1 million from the
income before tax
(6) accerlarated depreciation by 3%
(7) provided 1% on sales for new product development
4.3 The terms and conditions stated in 4.2 above were based on
the past three financial performance before 1992. The
favourable income tax rate was explained in 3.4 above. 
(Q.4.3)
4.4 Another favourable term provided for BCRF was to deduct the
bank loan repayment (RMB1M for 1992) from the PBT before
income tax assessment. (Q.4.6)
4.5 Since the financial performance has been deteriorating as
from 1993, BIIC requested BCRF to achieve at least the
breakeven (i.e. PBT = RMB 0) in 1994 and 1995. (Q.4.5)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government and BIIC in setting the above targets. The
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the BIIC, government 
and BCRF. (Q.4.7-10)
4.7 Mr He has mentioned that in view of the current product and
market position and potential, the top management believe 
that the PBT targets would be positive figures after 1995. 
The terms and conditions of the informal ERC would not be 
changed significantly in the next few years. (Q.4.12 & 13)
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m c
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(0.9)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the 5 production workshops were "cost centres" 
managed by the workshop managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expenses 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
After 1992 it went to some length in 1992 to convert the 5 
production workshops into independent "semi-profit 
centres" managed by the workshop managers with 
higher autonomy in management and operation. All 
the other management and service departments remain 
"expense centres" whose managers participate in the 
budgeting process. Mr Quo has said that there would 
be no significant changes in BCRF's organisation 
structure in the next few years.
Corporate Planning Influence* 
"High-Medium (2)"
By using a 5-point scale - 
(consistent with the scale 
used in the questionnaire 
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify 
some of the parameters or 
variables)
Very High (0)
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Very Low (4)
"Very High-High (1)" to
Greatest Influence
\ /
Least Influence
Very High [VH] (0..0 -- 0..5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0,.6 -- 1,.0)
High [H] (1..1 -- 1,.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1..6 - 2,.0)
Medium [M] (2,.1 - 2,.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2,.6 - 3 ,.0)
Low [L] (3 ,.1 - 3 ,.5)
Very Low [VL] (3 ,. 6 - 4,.0)
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 19 92 : the workshop managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as given in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management. 
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
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After 1992 : top management has been decentralising more 
planning responsibility to each workshop and 
department such as initiating the annual budget and 
the IRC. The profit responsibility lies with the 
workshop manager but the top management keep a 
surveillance cost control on each production 
workshop through monthly or weekly report.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the factory manager, party secretary and some
deputy managers were appointed by the BIIC, any 
major organisational changes required BIIC's 
approval.
After 1992 : the factory manager, party secretary and some
deputy managers are still appointed by the BIIC.
The factory manager can appoint most of the other 
senior staff such as the workshop managers. The 
workshop managers can suggest changes in 
organisation structure and personnel affairs to the 
factory manager for approval. Mr He has mentioned 
that in fact the party secretary was the 
representative from the government/BIIC to ensure 
some sort of macro-economic policies are under 
control.
Corporate Planning Influence
( 2 ) "
"Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4) 
Before 1992
After 1992
the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production without any profit margin.
the transfer prices are based on standard cost plus 
16% across the board. Although the transfer prices 
may be lower than the market prices, nevertheless, 
they provide a profit margin to the workshop or a 
buffer to cover the underestimateion of inflation 
rates in setting the standard cost.
"Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium 
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Corporate Planning Influence 
( 2 ) "
2 0 0
Factors Before
c
1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Decentralization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Appointment VH (0.5) H-M (2.0)
Interdependencies VH (0.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0.9) Medium (2.1)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the BIIC while the top 
management was in consultation only. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the BIIC.
After 1992 : BIIC has delegated the long term planning and
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
Mr He has said that due to the present economic 
downturn in this industry, the BIIC now retains 
some controls in planning and operation including 
the manpower and wages increase.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between BIIC and 
the top management to formulate, evaluate, approve 
and review the long term plans and annual budgets 
but initiation from the middle management was 
limited.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the workshop managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
2 0 1
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
;
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but
middle management (i.e workshop managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : BIIC reviewed and amended the long term plans with
the top management annually. Changes were notified 
to the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
were reviewed between the top and middle management 
twice every year but amendments were made due to 
significant changes which were communicated to 
lower management through revised budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with BIIC and informed the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notify to 
lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.4)
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2 0 2
5 . 3  S t r a t e g i c  Themes,  T h r u s t s  & S u g g e s t i o n s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  "Very H i g h - H i g h  C o r p o r a t e
( 1) "  b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 2 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : since 1990, the following strategic themes have 
been promulgated :
- implement the management by exception principles
- enhance product and market development
- maintain flexible operation to cater for changes
- ensure proper marketable product mix
- ensure production target with good quality
- guarantee safety production
- measure monthly internal profit of workshops
- emphasize the cost reduction activities
- provide more education and training for employees
After 1992 : the above strategic themes are further reinforced 
with more inputs and suggestions from middle and 
lower management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : in 1993, the Quality Control Division was separated 
from the Technical support Division and became an 
independent unit. Quality has the veto power in 
determining bonus as stated in the IRCs.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, transfer price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
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After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the workshop managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5)»
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.2)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the BIIC in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long 
term plans such as capital projects, product and 
market development which need to be discussed with 
the BIIC who have been exercising macro-economic 
controls and provide directives and targets i.e. 
technology expertise and quality standards. BCRF 
has also been allowed to carry out feasible studies 
to ascertain the possibility of success in the 
capital projects to be taken.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
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(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
r
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the BIIC 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. workshop 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1993-1997), includes competitive 
edge, research and development, product and market 
development, cost reduction program, capacity 
expansion and leasing out spare land space.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow BCRF to participate in the 5- 
year's planning with the BIIC and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : BCRF has to formulate their own long term strategic 
plan since 1990. The workshop and department 
managers are consulted in the process. The long 
term planning and review exercises are rather a 
top-down approach.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very-High to High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the 
BIIC with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the BIIC for 
endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking a long term bank loan.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "High-Medium ( 2) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because BCRF caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and inventory level.
After 19 92 : top management has higher autonomy in the annual
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the workshop managers.
But BIIC still provides the major targets such as 
sales and profit level.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the workshop managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
After 1992 : top management provided major guidelines to the
workshop managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e f : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed quarterly
and amendments were seldom made except under 
signifcant environmental changes. Annual plans 
were communicated to middle and lower management 
in written forms.
After 1992 : top management reviews the annual plans and budgets
monthly and amendments are made due to unavoidable
internal and external factors. A fixed budget 
concept is still in force because computer is not 
widely used. Other than documentations, the budget 
information is further communicated between the top 
and middle management during the monthly 
performance evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Operation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.4)
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 4 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 4 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : The IRC system was started in 1991 and mainly
applied to the production workshops. The major 
targets set were production quantity and cost.
After 1992 : major economic target is internal profit while 
quality and safety have the veto effects on the 
bonus which was linked up with the IRC performance. 
Other qualitative factors, such as environment, 
sanity, training, compliance and family planning 
are also emphasized.
A general guideline for IRC is shown in Appendix B 
of the Data Analysis Set 9.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : workshop managers are given the production quantity 
and cost targets without much negotiation.
After 1992 : workshop managers negotiate and compromise the IRC
targets with the general management during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets given to the workshop managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective workshop managers and 
their employees.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2) "
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(4) I n c e n t i v e  ( Q . 5 . 6 . 1 6 )  ?
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
workshop managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards. But suggestions on financial 
targets are sometimes given.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Incentive High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High Corporate (0.5)" 
before 1992 to "High Corporate (1.3)" after 1992]
(1) Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Interdepen­ Production workshops Production workshops
dencies involved only involved only
1. 2 Transfer actual cost of historical cost plus
Price Basis production 16% as standard cost
1.3 Transfer Price Did not exist between Little negotiations
Negotiation buyer and seller are allowed
1.4 Intermediate Buy and sell were not Buy & sell are not
Product available in market available in market
1. 5 Transfer All determined by the All sold internally
Quantity top management
1. 6 Arbitration Prices and quantities Determined by top
all determined by top management with very
management limited negotiations
1. 7 Government No, except the output No, only suggest
Interference volumes & selling volumes & prices of
prices of final products final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "Very High-
High (1) "
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : all the transfer prices and quantities were
determined by the top management and the workshop 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflects 
were arbitrated by the factory manager. Workshop 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by their own production volume and cost.
After 1992 : the transfer prices and quantities are still
controlled by the top management although limited 
negotiations are allowed for the workshop managers 
because they are measured on internal profit. 
Interference from and arbitration by the factory 
manager are quite often.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 : the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
without much inputs from the middle management. It 
was based on actual cost of production. The 
transfer prices were reviewed annual and adjustment 
made due to inflation.
2 1 0
A f t e r  1992 the actual cost plus a fixed profit margin is used 
for setting the transfer prices which are reviewed 
in the middle of the year.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5) 
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
to "High (1.5)"
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
Participation VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Review VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH (0.5) High (1.3)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.5)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.5)* VH-H (1.0)
1. 2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Roles & functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1.4 Interactions Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in t
questionnaire :
Very Low(4) Low(3) Medium(2)
Tight Strategic<-------------------
Control
High(1) Very High(0) 
•Tight Financial 
Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
2 1 1
(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
f Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.3 Training Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
2.5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.4)
# Mr■ He said that since 1992 , more delegation has been given to
the workshop managers in the personnel functions such as
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration.
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6. 1.2-3, (2.6.4.8)
Before 1992 After :1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.2) High (1.3)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
workshops and departments through the annual plan, IRC and also 
the Internal Economic Evaluation System established in 1988 (see 
section 6.1 of Data Analysis 9).
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms 
Overall Control Influence
Before 1992 After 1992
High (1.5) Medium (2.1)
H-M (1.8) Medium (2.4)
High (1.2) High (1.3)
High (1.5) H-M (1.9)
2 1 2
6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q. 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH-H (1.0) M-M (2.0)
High (1.1) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1. 9 Follow-up High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
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# Mr He has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format is 
unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the factory manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the factory 
manager or deputy-factory managers will contact the respective 
workshop manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible. More details are described in the 
Internal Economic Evaluation System adopted in 1988 (see section
6.1 of Data Analysis 9).
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production workshops were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : internal profit, working capital and production 
volume are the major economic targets, however, 
more qualitative targets such as environment, 
sanity, training, compliance and family planning 
are measured.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
workshop or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the workshop managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual workshop or 
departmental meetings.
Corproate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
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Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.4) H-M (1.9)
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =  =  =  =  == =
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22-23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.8 Redundancy Very Low(4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the BCRF which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the factory manager 
and the workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
215
One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the BCRF' s core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation ( Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 40-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 25-40% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take 
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
(3) Participation ( Q .6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : workshop managers were involved in formulating 
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided 
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : workshop managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
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(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8,13-14,20-21)
r
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic 
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High- High (1) "
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1.8)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* Very High 
to High (0.9) Medium (2.1)
Review Process* High (1.3) Medium (2.4)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Very High 
to High (1.0) Medium (2.2)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.4)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
Management of Inter­
dependencies*
Very
High (0.5) High (1.3)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.2) Medium (2.3)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & Moderate
Control#
Agreeing Objectives* 
Monitoring Results* 
Rewards & Incentives* 
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.5) 
Financial (1.1) 
Financial (1.4) 
Financial (1.2) 
Financial (1.3)
Financial (1.9)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been?employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
- - 2 ------------------------------------------------------ 2 ------------------------------------------------------ 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.9, 2.3) - BCRF Post-1992 X (1.3. 1.2) - BCRF Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) before and after 1992, 
it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
has been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to 
"Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
15 June  199 6
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the responsibility 
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 10" (31 August 1995).
Name of SOE : Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Wu De Cheng/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 16 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 1 September 1993
Second Visit - 1 September 1994
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 BIMT is a state-owned enterprise established in 1956. It is 
one of the earliest specialized factories in manufacturing 
multi-purpose tool milling machines in China. (Q.1.1)
1.2 BIMT is a key enterprise under the administration of the 
Ministry of Machine Building Industry. (Q.1.2)
1.3 BIMT is currently producing the following three major 
categories of milling machines of which 60% are exported to 
30 countries :
1.3.1 Multi-purpose tool milling machines
2 2 0
1.3.2 Radial milling machines
1.3.3 Equipment for air-conditioning (Q.1.3)
1.4 The annual production output of various machine tools is 
about 700 sets of which 60% are exported to 30 countries, 
including the USA, France, Italy, South American and 
Southeast Asian regions. BIMT obtained the "import and 
export right" and created a foreign income of US$3M in 1992. 
(Q.1.4)
1.5 In recent years, BIMT has undertaken significant technical 
renovation by importing some advanced production equipment 
and established a 2,000 square metres constant-temperature 
workshop in order to enhance the manufacturing process and 
product quality. However, BIMT is losing out to the 
overseas competitors and was unlikely to maintain an export 
sales of US$3.6 million in 1994. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 BIMT has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992 . There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because 
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 BIMT is neither a holding or subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 The organisation structure of BIMT can be divided into 5 
divisions under the direct control of the Factory Manager 
who has an Enterprise Management Office. (Q.2.3)
2.4 The 5 divisions are listed as follow : (Q.2.5 & 2.9)
(1) Production Division (Deputy Factory Manager)
1.1 Production Workshop No.l#
1.2 Production Workshop No.2#
1.3 Production Workshop No.3#
1.4 Production Workshop No.4#
1.5 Purchasing & Supply Company*
(2) Production Technology Division (Chief Engineer)
2.1 Chief Engineer Office
2.2 Facility & Support Department
2.3 Quality Control Department
2.4 Inspection Department
■ 2.5 Research & Development Department
(3) Marketing & Sales Company* (Chief Economist)
(4) Finance Division (Chief Accountant)
4.1 Accounting Department
4.2 Internal Audit Department
2 2 1
(5) Administration Division (Deputy FM)
5.1 Security Department
5.2 Estate & Development Department
5.3 General Affairs Department
5.3.1 Medical
5.3.2 Centeen
5.3.3 Nursary
(6) Manpower & Wages Division (Deputy FM)
6.1 Personnel Department
6.2 Wages Department
6.3 Education & Training Department
(7) Communist Party Office
7.1 Discipline & Promotion
7.2 Political Education
(8) Labour Union Office
# All the 4 production workshops have signed Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the Factory Manager and 
are measured mainly on internal profit.
* The Purchasing and Supply Company is an independent and 
self-financed service entity (tertiary enterprise) which can 
buy from and sell to the external vendors and customers 
respectively. Similarly, the Marketing and Sales Company is 
an independent investment centre which represents BIMT 
selling the final products to local and overseas customers.
2.5 BIMT is under the administration of the Beijing Municipal 
Government and the Beijing Instrument Bureau. In 1983, the 
Bureau was transformed into a quasi-government body called 
Beijing International Instrument Corporation (BIIC) as an 
initial step to delegate the governing role to this 
self-regulated institution composed of all the electronic 
instrument manufacturing industries in Beijing.
Since then, more autonomy in terms of planning an control 
decisions has been authorised by the Beijing Government to 
the BIIC and turning into this decade, BIIC's major roles 
played for its subordinate enterprises are (1) appointing 
the factory manager and the communist party secretary; (2) 
maintaining a macoreconomic control or balance on the 
5-year's plans suggested by its enterprises; and (3) acting 
as a bridge or facilitator between the government and its 
enterprises in policy matters such as capital invetment, 
import and export autonomy, taxation, legal form 
transformation etc. BIIC has delegated the planning and 
management responsibilities to BIMT although quarterly and 
annual reports have to be submitted to the BIIC for review. 
(Q.2.6 Sc 2.7)
2 2 2
2.6 BIMT has a total of 1,250 working employees and 3 00 retired 
employees at the end off 1994. It is classified as a "medium 
size SOE" in China. (Q.2.10)
# Since BIMT is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to BIMT.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets 
3 .2 Turnover
3.3 Income before tax
RMB130M (historical cost) (Q.3.1!
RMB 42M 
RMB 4 8M 
RMB 50M 
RMB 55M
RMB3.2M 
RMB2.5M 
RMB2.5M 
RMB2.2M
(1992)
(1993)
(1994)
(1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 Sc 7)
(1992) - 7.6% of sales
(1993) - 5.2% of sales*
(1994) - 5.0% of sales*
(1995 forecast) (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
* The decrease in income before tax in 1993 and 1994 were 
due to high inflation, bank interest and incompetable 
selling prices.
3.4 Income tax rate : 33%@ (Q.3,6)
@ The net VAT (output VAT - input VAT) is about 7% which has 
to be paid upon sales but some accounts receivable may be 
doubtful. As a result, strain has been placed on the cash 
flow.
3.5 In 1994, nearly all the manufacturing enterprises in this
industry were loss-making mainly because of : (Q.3.7 & 8)
(a) lack of sources of capital to replace the old plant and
machinery due to the macro-economic control policies
implemented since July 1993;
(b) the existing products could not suit the changing 
demands in the national market;
(c) the cost of production is high mainly due to inflation
of raw materials and wages, and also small batch of
production but incurring high fixed costs (i.e. set-up, 
scheduling);
(d) the end users prefer to import the same products from 
overseas suppliers at similar prices but higher 
quality; and
(e) the incompetent leadership ability of the top 
management.
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In 1993, BIMT obtained a bank loan of RMB20 million to set 
up a R&D Centre in order to diversify into new products. 
Adding up with the other working capital bank loan, BIMT 
incurred an outstanding balance of RMB40 million and paid 
RMB4.5 million of bank interest in 1994.
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to BIMT because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Ecomnic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 BIMT entered into the first 5-year ERC (1991-1995) in 1991 
with the following 7 departments in Beijing :
4.1.1 Finance Bureau
4.1.2 Tax Bureau
4.1.3 Manpower & Wages Bureau
4.1.4 Economic & Trade Commission
4.1.5 State Assets Administrtion Bureau
4.1.6 Bank of China
4.1.7 Beijing International Instrument Corporation (Q.4.1)
4.2 The terms and conditions of this contract were summarised
below : (Q.4.2 & 4)
(1) profit before tax RMB3M in the first year;
(2) profit before tax growth rate 8% per year;
(3) foreign exchange income of US$3.6M each year; and
(4) for every 1% increase in profit before tax, the gross 
wages can be increased by 0.7%.
4.3 The terms and conditions stated in 4.2 above were based on
the past three financial performance before 1991. (Q.4.3)
4.4 Another favourable term provided for BIMT was to deduct
certain amount of bank loan repayment from the PBT before
income tax assessment. (Q.4.6)
4.5 Since the financial performance has been deteriorating as
from 1993, BIIC requested BIMT to achieve at least PBT of 
RMB2M in 1994 and 1995. (Q.4.5)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government and BIIC in setting the above targets. The
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the BIIC, government 
and BIMT. (Q.4.7-10)
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4.7 Mr Wu has m e n t i o n e d  that in view of the present 
promulgations of shareholding transformation, company law 
and modern enterprise sytem, BIMT expects that the ERC will 
be ceased after the current one is expired at the end of 
1995, instead BIMT will be subject to the new taxation 
system enforced since January 1994 and other laws and 
regulations governing the state-owned enterprises. (Q.4.12 
Sc 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate
(1)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992
After 1992
all the 4 production workshops were "cost centres" 
managed by the workshop managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expenses 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
it went to some length in 1992 to convert the 4 
production workshops into independent "semi-profit 
centres" managed by the workshop managers with 
higher autonomy in management and operation. All 
the other management and service departments remain 
"expense centres" whose managers participate in the 
budgeting process. Mr Wu has said that there would 
be no significant changes in BIMT's organisation 
structure in the next few years.
Corporate Planning Influence* 
"High-Medium (2)"
* By using a 5-point scale - 
(consistent with the scale 
used in the questionnaire 
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify 
some of the parameters or 
variables)
Very High (0)
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Very Low (4)
"Very High-High (1)" to
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
Very High [VH] (0.,0 -- 0 . 5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0..6 -- 1 ,.0)
High [H] (1..1 - 1..5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1,.6 - 2..0)
Medium [M] (2..1 - 2,.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2,.6 - 3,.0)
Low [L] (3,.1 - 3,.5)
Very Low [VL] (3,.6 - 4 ,.0)
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(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
t
Before 1992 : the workshop managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as given in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management.
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : top management has been decentralising more 
planning responsibility to each workshop and 
department such as initiating the annual budget and 
the IRC. The profit responsibility lies with the 
workshop manager but the top management keep a 
surveillance cost control on each production 
workshop through monthly or weekly report.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the factory manager, party secretary and some
deputy managers were appointed by the BIIC, any 
major organisational changes required BIIC's 
approval.
After 1992 : the factory manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the BIIC. The factory manager can 
appoint most of the other senior staff such as the 
workshop managers. The workshop managers can 
suggest changes in organisation structure and 
and personnel affairs to the factory manager for 
approval. Mr Wu has mentioned that in fact the 
party secretary was the representative from the 
government/BIIC to ensure some sort of macro- 
economic policies are under control.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High-Medium
(2 ) "
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production. The workshops were consulted 
in setting the prices and quantities.
After 1992 : the transfer prices are based on standard cost plus 
or revised market prices so as to leave a profit 
margin to the workshop or a buffer to cover the 
underestimateion of inflation rates in setting the 
standard cost.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o  "Medium
( 2 . 5 )  "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Decentralization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Appointment VH (0.5) H-M (2.0)
Interdependencies VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.3)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the BIIC while the top 
management was in consultation only. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the BIIC.
After 1992 : BIIC has delegated the long term planning and
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
Mr Wu has said that due to the present economic 
downturn in this industry, the BIIC now retains 
some controls in planning and operation including 
the manpower and wages increase.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between BIIC and 
the top management to formulate, evaluate, approve 
and review the long term plans and annual budgets 
but initiation from the middle management was 
limited.
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After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the workshop managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but
middle management (i.e workshop managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : BIIC reviewed and amended the long term plans with
the top management annually. Changes were notified 
to the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
were reviewed between the top and middle management 
twice every year but amendments were made due to 
significant changes which were communicated to 
lower management through revised budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with BIIC and informed the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notify to 
lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
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F a c t o r s
Central Planning 
Operation 
Participation 
Review & Communication
Overall Planning Influence
Before 1992 After 1992
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.3) Medium (2.4)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate
(1)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992
After 1992
since 1990, the following strategic themes have 
been promulgated :
- implement the management by exception principles
- enhance product and market development
- maintain flexible operation to cater for changes
- ensure proper marketable product mix
- ensure production target with good quality
- guarantee safety production
- measure monthly internal profit of workshops
- speed up the working capital cycle and cash 
collection
- emphasize the cost reduction activities
- provide more education and training for employees
the above strategic themes are further reinforced 
with more inputs and suggestions from middle and 
lower management.
Corporate Planning Influence 
"High-Medium (2)"
"Very High-High (1)" to
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 "quality" has been the major strategic thrust 
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
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After 1992 : it is clearly stipulated in the IRC that "quality" 
has the veto power in determining bonus. As far as 
hardware is concerned, BIMT has imported some 
modern manufacturing plant and equipment from the 
USA and Japan at a cost of over RMB30M since 1992.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, transfer price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the workshop managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.2)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the BIIC in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
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After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long 
term plans such as capital projects, product and 
market development which need to be discussed with 
the BIIC who have been exercising macro-economic 
controls and provide directives and targets i.e. 
technology expertise and quality standards. BIMT 
has also been allowed to carry out feasible studies 
to ascertain the possibility of success in the 
capital projects to be taken.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the BIIC 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order £o determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. workshop 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year rolling planning (1993-1997) , includes 
competitive edge, research and development, product 
and market development and cost reduction program.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979
started to allow BIMT to participate in the 5-
year's planning with the BIIC and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : BIMT has to formulate their own long term strategic
plan since 1990. The workshop and department
managers are consulted in the process. The long 
term planning and review exercises are rather a 
top-down approach.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very-High to High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
231
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
f
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the 
BIIC with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the BIIC for 
endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking a long term bank loan.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because BIMT caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and inventory level.
After 19 92 : top management has higher autonomy in the annual
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the workshop managers.
But BIIC still provides the major targets such as 
sales and profit level.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Medium-Low
(3) "
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(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
f
Before 1992 : top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales, 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the workshop managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
After 1992 : top management provided major guidelines to the
workshop managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed half-
annually and amendments were seldom made except 
under signifcant environmental changes. Annual 
plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in written forms.
After 1992 : top management reviews the annual plans and
budgets quarterly and amendments are made due to 
unavoidable internal and external factors. A fixed 
budget concept is still in force because computer 
is not widely used. Other than documentations, the 
budget information is further communicated between 
the top and middle management during the monthly 
performance evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
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F a c t o r s f B e f o r e  1992 A f t e r  1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Operation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.4)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : the IRC system was started in 1992 and mainly
applied to the production workshops. The major 
targets set were production quantity and cost.
After 1992 : major economic targets are sales, internal profit, 
working capital and wages while quality, repair and 
maintenance, inventory control are also linked up 
with the incentive scheme.
A general guideline for IRC is shown in section 5.6 
of the Data Analysis Set 10.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : workshop managers are given the production quantity 
and cost targets without much negotiation.
After 1992 : workshop managers negotiate and compromise the IRC
targets with the general management during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate P l a n n i n g  Influ e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets given to the workshop managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
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After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective workshop managers and 
their employees.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of
the production and cost targets which might not be
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
workshop managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards. But suggestions on financial 
targets are sometimes given.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After :1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Incentive High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H igh  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 3 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 3 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1)
1 .1
1 . 2
Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992
Interdepen­
dencies 
Transfer 
Price Basis
Production & service 
departments involved 
standard cost of 
production
1.3 Transfer Price Some negotiation for
Negotiation
1.4 Intermediate 
Product
1.5 Transfer 
Quantity
1.6 Arbitration
1.7 Government
Interference
buyer and seller 
Some buy and sell were 
available in market 
Mainly determined by 
the top management 
Prices and quantities 
mainly determined by 
the top management 
No, except the output 
volumes & selling 
prices of final product
After 1992
Production & service 
departments involved 
standard cost plus & 
adjusted market price 
More negotiation for 
buyer and seller 
Some buy & sell are 
available in market 
Internal demands 
must be satisfied 
Decision required to 
settle unresolved 
negotiation 
No, only suggest 
volumes & prices of 
s final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities were
determined by the top management after discussion 
with the workshop managers. Any conflects were 
were arbitrated by the factory manager.
After 1992 : the transfer prices and quantities are allowed to 
be discuss among the providers and receivers. 
Interference from and arbitration by the factory 
manager are required to settle down unresolved 
negotiation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 : the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
after discussion with the middle management. They 
were based on actual cost of production. Transfer 
prices were reviewed annually and adjustment were 
made due to inflation.
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After 1992 : standard cost plus and adjusted market prices are
used for setting the transfer prices which are 
reviewed half-annually.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High-
Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.5)* VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Roles Sc functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1.4 Interactions Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.3)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
? Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2 . 3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2 . 5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
H-M (1.6) Medium (2.4)
# Mr Wu said that since 1992, more delegation has been given to 
the workshop managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6.1.2-3, Q.6.4.8)
3.1 Budget
3.2 IRC
3.3 Financial targets
3.4 Quantitative targets
3.5 Qualitative targets
3.6 Communication
Before
VH-H
VH-H
High
VH-H
High
VH-H
1992
(1.0)
(1.0)
(1.5) 
(1.0)
(1.5) 
(1.0)
After
High
High
VH-H
High
VH-H
High
1992
(1.5)
(1.5) 
(1.0)
(1.5) 
(1.0)
(1.5)
High (1.2) High (1.3)
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms
High
H-M
High
(1.5)
(1.6) 
(1.2)
Medium
Medium
High
(2.3)
(2.4) 
(1.3)
Overall Control Influence High (1.4) H-M (2.0)
238
6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q. 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.7)
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# Mr Wu has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format is 
unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the factory manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the factory 
manager or deputy-factory managers will contact the respective 
workshop manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production workshops were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : internal profit, working capital and production 
volume are the major economic targets, however, 
more qualitative targets such as quality, safety, 
production and management control are measured.
C o r p o r a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
workshop or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the workshop managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual workshop or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7, 15-16,22 -23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) High (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible ) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) H-M (2.0)
i 
K
i 
i
i 
2 (1.6)
11
£ 
1 
I 
I
ffi 
1
(1.7)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the BIMT which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the factory manager 
and the workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the BIMT's core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and
contributed to 40-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 25-40% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take 
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : workshop managers were involved in formulating 
I R C s  targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided 
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : workshop managers have to initiate the I R C s
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u nica t ion  ( Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "V e r y  High- High ( i ) "
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1.8)
= = = = = = = : =  =  =  =  =  = = = = = = = : =  =  =  =  =  =
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works 
(BIMT) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* Very High 
to High (1.0) Medium (2.3)
Review Process* High (1.3) Medium (2.4)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Very High 
to High (1.0) Medium (2.2)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.4)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.5)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.4)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been* employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
Control Influence
Strategic I Financial
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
2---------------------------- 2---------------------------- 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.9, 2.5) - BIMT Post-1992 X (1.2. 1.3) - BIMT Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) before and after 
1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting 
Style" has been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) 
to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet 
reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial 
control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic 
Style.
17 June  1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameters;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 11" (29 December 1994) .
Name of SOE : Shanghai No.l Department Store Company (SDS1)
Staff Interviewed : Ms Lee Shu Hua/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 7 years)
Dates of Visists : Frist Visit - 11 September 1993
Second Visit - 5 September 1994
Third Visit - 10 February 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 The predecessor of SDS1 was the privately owned Daxin 
Department Store established in the 1920s. SDS1 is the 
first and largest state-owned department store in Shanghai 
established in October 1949 right after the birth of the 
PRC. (refer to Q.1.1)
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1.2 Since the early 1930s, SDS1 has been using the present old
building as the main store with an expansion from 5 floors
in 1960s to 7 floors in 1980s, and then 9 floors in 1994 
with a total shopping area over 20,000 square metres and 
another 5,000 square metres for administration offices. 
This famous old building is located in the central of 
Nanging Road which is recognised as the heart of West 
Shanghai business centre. SDS1 is selling over 30,000 items 
of commodities of which about 5% are imported from other 
countries. (Q.1.2)
1.3 In view of the fierce competition from local and 
foreign-invested department stores in Shanghai, SDS1 has 
been focusing on improving the service quality, modifying 
the commodity mix, expanding the wholesale market and 
diversifying into other businesses, in order to capture a 
bigger share in this vigorous retailing market. (Q.1.3)
1.4 About 5% of the commodities sold by SDS1 are imported and
most of the commodities are sold locally. After gaining the 
"import and export right" in the early 1990s, SDS1 has 
successively set up trade ties with some countries and 
regions. (Q.1.4)
1.5 Keeping growth in the retailing business is the major 
strategic plan of SDS1. At the same time, diversification 
in wholesales, manufacturing, import and export, investment 
and service businesses are the long term plans which have 
been decided by the board of directors. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 SDS1 was transformed into a public shareholding enterprise 
in mid-1992 in order to raise RMB470 million of capital to 
finance a few large investments. The shares were held by 
the govern m e n t  (60%), other enter p r i s e s  (21%) and 
individuals (19%) . The individual shares, issued to the 
employees and general public at a price of RMB8.9 per share, 
were listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange in July 1992. A 
right issue was made in July 1993 to raise an additional 
capital of RMB200 million which has also fully utilized to 
finance the major projects. (Q.2.1 & 2)
2.2 The organisation structure of SDS1 can be divided into three 
levels : (Q.2.3, 5 & 9)
(1) Board of Directors (11 members)
1.1 Chairman
1.2 1 Vice-Chairman
1.3 General Manager
1.4 1 Deputy General Manager
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1.5 1 Government Representative
1.6 1 Labour Union Representative
1.7 1 Party Representative
1.8 4 Enterprise Representatives (major shareholders)
(2) Executive Management
2.1 General Manager
2.2 Deputy General Manager - Operation
2.3 Deputy General Manager - Purchasing & Stores
2.4 Deputy General Manager - Marketing & Sales
2 . 5 Deputy General Manager - Planning
2 . 6 Deputy General Manager - General Affairs
2 . 7 Chief Accountant
7 Department Stores & 1 Wholesale Market*
3 .1 Women's Clothing
3.2 Men's Clothing
3.3 Electrical Household Appliances
3.4 Watches & Jewellery
3.5 Household Furniture
3.6 Daily Necessities
3.7 Supermarket
3 . 8 Wholesale Market
(Each department has its own manager, deputy managers,
accounting, personnel, general affairs staff and
section supervisors in charge of several counters
selling various commodities.)
(4) Other Branches*
4.1 Manager
4.2 2 Deputy Managers
4.3 Purchasing Officer
4.4 Accounting Officer
4.5 Personnel Officer
4.6 General Affairs Officer
4.7 Section Supervisors
(5) Joint Ventures, Subsidiaries & Tertiary Enterprises*
All the department stores, branches, joint-ventures,
subsidiaries and tertiary enterprises are treated as profit 
centres and have signed Internal Responsibility Contracts 
(IRC) with the General Manager. In turn, each department 
store has the autonomy to sign second tier IRCs with its 
various sections.
2.3 SDS1 is holding the above joint ventures, subsidiaries and
tertiary enterprises. (Q.2.4 & 8)
2.4 SDS1 is under the administration of the Shanghai Municipal 
Government and the Shanghai Commerce Bureau who dictated all 
the planning and control systems of SDS1 before the 
enconomic reforms started in 1979. (Q.2.6)
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2.5 After converting into a shareholding enterprise, the SDS1's
top management (i.e. board of directors) have experienced 
much higher pressure to develop and monitor both long and 
short term plans because now they are accountable to various 
shareholders, including the general public, other than the 
government who is the major shareholder. But on the other 
hand, their degree of freedom is higher than the wholly 
state-owned enterprises in terms of higher autonomy and 
motivation to manage their business activities. Now the 
government and bureau only oversee the major development and 
projects, mainly long term ones, recommended by SDS1. 
Furthermore, the bureau has fully delegated the pricing 
autonomy to SDS1 to compete in the fast developing and keen 
retailing market in Shanghai. (Q.2.7)
2.6 SDS1 is a large SOE having a total of 4,500 working 
employees and about 2,000 retired employees in 1994. 
(Q.2 .10 Sc 11)
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets
3.2 Turnover
3.3 Income before tax
RMB1,101M (revaluated 1992) (Q.3.1)
RMB1,780M (1993) 
RMB2,140M (1994) (Q.3.2 Sc 1 )
: RMB 105M (1993) - 5.9% of sales 
RMB 110M (1994) - 5.1% of sales*
* The decrease of profit margin in 1994 was mainly due to 
inflation of purchased goods, wages and overheads. (Q.3.5, 
6 & 7)
3.4 Income tax rate 15% (Q.3.6)
3.5 SDS1 is planning to maintain an average growth rate in 
turnover from 15%-20% before 2000 despite the fact that 
competition in the retailing business is very keen in China. 
In view of the high input costs and inflation, to keep 
income before tax at 4%-5% of sales will be considered to be 
satisfactory. (Q.3.7 & 8)
# Information for Q.3.3 & 4 was not applicable
Section 4 : Ecomnic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 SDS1 signed first 5-year's ERC (1987-1991) with the Shanghai 
Municipal Government in 1987. (Q.4.1)
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4.2 The major targets set in the ERC were turnover, profit, 
income and other taxes.f (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
4.3 There were different forms of ERCs for the state-owned 
enterprises to choose from and which had different financial 
and non-financial targets. The choosen format was mutually 
agreed between the government and SDS1. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government in setting the above targets. Miss Lee said 
that all the financial targets set for the five years had 
been overshot subsequently. (Q.4.5, 7-10)
4.5 No second ERC had been entered because SDS1 was transformed 
into a shareholding enterprise in July 1992, and then SDS1 
has been subject to an income tax of 15%. (Q.4.11-13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the department stores and subsidiaries were
independent "profit centres" and held accountable 
for their results based on the IRCs.
After 1992 : the department stores and subsidiaries have to
formulate their own short term strategies in the 
annual planning and budgeting process
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* By using a 5-point scale - 
(consistent with the sacle 
used in the questionnaire 
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify 
some of the parameters or 
variables)
Very High [VH] (0 . 0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.5 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
Very High (0)
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Very Low (4)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
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(2) D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 1 . 2 )
Before 1992 : the store and subsidiary managers were responsible 
for the income and profit as agreed in the annual 
budget and internal responsibility contracts.
After 1992 : the store and subsidiary managers should also 
decide their own strategies in marketing, 
purchasing, selling, cost control and personnel.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the chairman, party secretary and a few chief
executives were appointed by the government. The 
general manager appointed the management staff of 
the department stores and subsidiaries.
After 1992 : only the chairman and party secretary are appointed 
by the government. The chairman appoints all the 
chief executives including the store and subsidiary 
managers who can decide their own organisation 
structures and personnel affairs but important 
changes should be approved by the headquarters.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the interactions between the department and
subsidiaries are minimal because they are selling 
different categories of commodities. Any conflicts 
were settled by the headquarters.
After 1992 : similar to 1992 and before but store and subsidiary 
managers are encouraged to solve the conflicts by 
themselves before headquarters' arbitration.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Decentralization Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Appointment High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Interdependencies Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.1) Low (3.3)
251
5 . 2  R e v i e w  P r o c e s s  ( P l a n n i n g  & B u d g e t i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 3 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term plans were initiated by the top
management before discussion and negotiation with 
the government. Short term planning and budgeting 
were delegated by the government to the enterprise 
except agreeing key targets like sales, profit and 
inventory.
After 1992 : significant long term plans are submitted to the
government for review or raising capital. Short
term planning and budgeting have been completely 
delegated to the enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures were
existed to formulate, evaluate, approve and review 
the annual plans and budgets for submission to the 
government. Initiation from the middle management 
was required for the budgets but not the long term 
plans which was finally determined by government.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and internal responsibility contracts. Major 
guidelines are provided by the top management to 
the store and subsidiary managers to formulate 
their own budgets and IRCs. They are also involved 
in the long term planning during the annual 
planning review before starting the budget cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 19 92 : long term planning was a top-down process but 
middle management (i.e. store managers) did 
participate in the annual planning & budgeting 
processes and initiation was required.
After 1992 : middle management is involved in the long term 
planning. They have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e s  "High-Medium ( 2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 19 92 : the government reviewed and amended the long term
plans with the top management annually. Changes 
were notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed quarterly between the 
top and middle management and amendments could be 
made and communicated to the lower management 
through the revised budgets and IRCs.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the BOD during
every year end and significant changes should be 
notified to the government before informing the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly or monthly between the top and 
middle management and significant amendments can be 
made and then notify the lower management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5) to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Autonomy H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.3) Low (3.5)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (3)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : since the early 1990s, SDS1 has explicitly
promulgated the following :
- provide different varieties, choices, models, 
fashions and prices of commodities for various 
segments of customers
- guarantee the quality, return and delivery of the 
commodities sold
- adopt different flexible selling methods and 
styles
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- improve service quality to promote company 
reputation and goodwill
- use modern management techniques to enhance 
economic efficiency such as computerisation
After 1992 : the above strategic themes have been put into
action plans in order to materialise their positive 
effects on the financial targets at the end.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : SDS1 has been promulgating "commodity and price
variety" as the most important strategic thrust in 
order to provide a wide spectrum of goods for 
different segments of customers to choose from.
After 1992 : In parallel with the sharp increases of income, the 
purchasing power of the general public has been 
raised significantly in the last few years. As a 
result, SDS1 offers different classes or price 
levels of many categories of commodities for 
various segments of customers to choose from 
according to their purchasing abilities.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management sometimes made suggestions on 
specific strategic issues such as commodity 
varities, prices, promotion tactics, etc. in order 
to enhance economic efficiency.
After 1992 : suggestions are still made on specific issues such 
as department layout and decoration, promotion 
strategies, selling price, commodity mix, 
purchasing and manpower.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium
(2.5)"
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
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F a c t o r s  B e f o r e  1992 A f t e r  1992
Theme H-M (2,.0) M-L (3,.0)
Thrust Medium (2,.5) Low (3,.5)
Suggestions H-M (2,.0) Medium (2,.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2,.2) M-L (3..0)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.9)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.8)" after 
1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : the early 5-year long term plans before the
economic reform started in 1979 focused on the 
commodity varieties and prices dictated by the 
government. Top management participated in the long 
term planning negotiations since the early 1980s.
After 1992 : the board of directors has actively undertaken the 
the long term plans which are believed to be able 
contribute handsome returns to the shareholders and 
other stakeholders.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was responsible to the
government to formulate, evaluate, implement, 
monitor and review the long term plans.
After 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures are 
existed to get middle management (i.e. store 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The time span of 
long term planning is extended to 10 years to be 
formulated by the board of directors.
Details are shown under section 5.4 in the Data 
Analysis 11.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3)
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(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
;
Before 1992 : the involvement from middle management (i.e. store 
managers) was limited to consultation.
After 1992 : long term plans are initiated and discussed by the
top management and the BOD without much participa­
tion from the department store and business unit 
managers except playing a consultation role only.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by
the government with the top management and changes 
made were notified to the employees during the 
annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan
every year before the annual planning cylce and 
significant changes are reported to the government. 
Details of the long term plans are made known to 
various levels of management through meetings and 
internal documentation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "High-Low
(3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.9) M-L (2.8)
= = = = = = =  =  =  =  =  =  = =  =  =  =  =  :=  =  =  =  =  =  =
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  fro m  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Very Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 6 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the planning autonomy to
the top management and only made suggestions when 
it was necessary.
After 1992 government has completely delegated the short term 
planning autonomy to the board of directors who is 
fully responsible for the financial performance.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
"Medium-Low (3)" to "Very Low (4)"
Before 1992 : top management initiated the key budgets and
discussed and compromised with the store managers.
After 1992 : board of directors provides major guidelines to
store and subsidiary managers for intitiating their 
own budgets which are subject to negotiation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : store managers were asked to discuss and comprise 
the key budgets with the top management before 
working out the details.
After 1992 : store and subsidiary managers have to formulate
their own budgets and get the lower management
involved formulating the details which affect their 
performance and rewards directly.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans/budgets were reviewed quarterly and
amendments made in line with the changing 
environmental factors. Annual plans & budgets 
were documented and copied to every department.
A f t e r  1992 planning committee reviews the annual plans and 
budgets monthly and amendments are made in view of 
the fast changing market economy.
Budget information is futher communicated in the 
monthly performance reporting.
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Corporate Planning Influencef : "Medium (2.5)» to "Low (3 .5) «
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After :1992
Central Planning M-L (3.0) V. Low (4.0)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.5) V. Low (3.6)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.3)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : major targets set were sales, profit & foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : major targets are similar but more emphasis on 
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, day-to-day 
operation and security in accordance with the 
strategic themes and thrusts.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : store managers negotiated and compromised the given
IRC targets during the annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : store and subsidiary managers have to initiate,
quantify and justify the major IRC targets before 
negotiating with the top management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
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(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
r
Before 1992 : IRCs were reviewed half-annually and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed by the top 
management and store managers. IRCs were documented 
and informed to respective departments & employees.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect attainable targets. 
Second-tier IRCs are signed between the store 
manager and sales sections/counters in order to 
further delegate the planning and control 
responsibilities.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of
the economic targets set in the IRCs which were not
difficult to attain.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus so the store managers are 
eager to initiate the IRC targets in order to 
increase the bonus under attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)" 
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Incentive Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.3) Low (3.4)
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the department stores, branches and subsidiaries in SDS1 
are selling different categories of commodities and services with 
very minimal interactions, therefore, internal transfer pricing 
does not exist.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
c
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Financial (2)" 
before 1992 to "Tight Strategic (3.1)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design# (Q.6.1.1)
1.1 Structure
1.2 Staffing
1.3 Roles & functions
1.4 Interactions
Before 1992• 
High (1.5)* 
H-M ’ (2.0)
Medium (2.5) 
Medium (2.5)
After 1992 
Medium (2.5) 
M-L (3.0)
Low (3.5)
Low (3.5)
Medium (2.1) Low (3.1)
# Miss Lee said that since the early 1990s, more delegation has 
been given to the store managers in deciding their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units.
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) Low(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(0)
Tight Strategic<--------------------------------------Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0 . 0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2 .1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel® (Q.6..1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2.1 Recruitment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.2 Assignment Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.3 Training Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.4 Evaluation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.5 Remuneration H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.6 Termination High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Medium (2.2) Low (3.3)
@ Miss Lee further mentioned that since 1992, the store managers 
have been vested with higher strategic autonomy to manoeuvre 
their organisational and personnel changes but important changes 
should be discussed with headquarters before implementation.
260
(3) Control Mechanisms* (Q.6.1.2-3, Q.6.4.8)
f Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget * H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
3.2 IRC High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
3 . 3 Financial targets High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
3.4 Quantitative targets M-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
H-M (1.8) M-L (2.8)
* Miss Lee expressed that as long as the department stores can 
meet the financial targets with growth from year to year, the 
headquarters will devolve the responsibility for strategy 
development to the stores without much interference. This change 
in control style was mainly because of the government1s 
macroeconomic influence and many uncertainties existed in the 
market.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design Medium (2.1) Low (3.1)
Personnel Medium (2.2) Low (3.3)
Control Mechanisms H-M (1.8) M-L (2.8)
Overall Control Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.1)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q.6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Moderate Strategic (2.2)" 
before 1992 to "Strategic (3)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After :1992
(1) Precision & detail of 
targets High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
(2) Objective vs subjective 
targets H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
(3) Achieving targets 
Timeframe H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
(4) Stretch built into 
the targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
(5) Financial vs non- 
financial targets Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
(6) Manangement influence 
on setting targets Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Medium (2.2) M-L (3.0)
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6 . 3  M o n i t o r i n g  R e s u l t s  f
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  fro m  " M o d e ra te  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 6 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  " S t r a t e g i c  ( 2 . 8 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 2 Frequency H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1. 3 Contents High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Compilation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1. 5 Review H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 6 Evaluation Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
1.7 Authorization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1. 8 Feedback Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
1.9 Follow-up Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
1. 10 Computerization H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
H-M (1.9) M-L (2.8)
# Miss Lee has mentioned that for any serious adverse variances 
shown on the monthly report, the general or deputy-general 
managers will contract the respective store managers to dig out 
the underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : department stores were mainly measured on the
financial targets such as sales, profit and foreign 
exchange created.
After 1992 : other than the previous financial targets, a set of 
qualitative targets such as service quality, 
discipline, decoration, display, sanity, day-to-day 
operation and security are also measured.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication* (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12))
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance report 
monthly and discuss with store managers for 
corrective actions.
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After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the performance
report monthly1 Infrequent adverse variances can 
be tolerated if store managers can take remedial 
tactics or strategies to correct the unfavourable 
conditions and meet the budget at the year end.
Corporate Control Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
* Miss Lee said that it was expected that remedial actions can be 
taken to handle the short term problems as soon as possible (such 
as a sudden sales promotion by a counterpart). Whereas, 
strategic steps may be considered and implemented to solve some 
medium term problems (such as the effect of advertisement).
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements H-M (1.9) M-L (2.8)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Overall Control Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (2.8)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.5)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,IE>-16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages Medium (2.5) H-M (2.0)
1.2 Allowances Medium (2.5) Medium (2.5)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 8 Redundancy Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
H-M (1.9) Medium (2.3)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regards to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10-20, 
therefore, it is no substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is the major source of income 
which is determined according to the IRC.
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There are two portions for the "allowances". The firest part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Shanghai government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SDS1 which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
IRC. An IRC signed between . the general manager and a store 
manager decides what level of group bonus will be given to the 
department. Of course, it is up to the store manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates according 
to individual performance, such as the sales achieved by a 
salesgirl in a certain month.
The "bonus" for the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is linked up with the average bonus of the employees 
in all department stores, and is based on their performance and 
grades as well.
(2) Performance Orientation# (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and took over 
50% of total wages. Basic wages was low and 
depended on seniority. Too many types of 
allowances all unrelated to performance but to 
combat inflation. Pension was totally borne by the 
enterprise. Laying off redundant employees was 
difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 50% of total wages. Basic 
wages has been increased and increaments take skills 
, knowledge, competance into account instead of 
seniority only. Some allowances and benefits are 
merged with the basic wages. Pension is partly 
contributed by the government. Laying off redundant 
employees is easier after implementing the 
employment contract system.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : store managers were involved in formulating I R C s
targets to be measured on. Basic wages, allowances 
, pension and other benefits were decided by 
headquarters and government.
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After 1992 : store managers have to initiate the I R C s  targets 
and negotiate with top management. The policies 
for basic wages, allowances and other benefits have 
involved the labour union and planning committee. 
Pension policy is still decided by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8, 13-14, 20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
on a monthly basis.
After 1992 : I R C s  targets are reviewed twice every year and can
be modified. Planning committee reviews the basic
wages, allowances and other benefits during the 
annual planning cycle and employees are informed of 
these decisions and policies. Performance and 
reward are made known to employees every month.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1 .5)" to "High-Medium (2)
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.9) Medium (2.3)
Performance Orientation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.2)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai N o . 1 Department Store Company 
Limited (SDS1) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* Medium (2.1) Low (3.3)
Review Process* Medium (2.3) Low (3.5)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions* Medium (2.2)
Medium
to Low (3.0)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (1.9)
Medium
to Low (2.8)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
Medium (2.5)
Very
Low (3.6)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# Medium (2.3) Low (3.4)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* N/A -- N/A --
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.2) Low (3.3)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control#
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Tight
Strategic (3.1)
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate 
Strategic (2.2) Strategic (3.0)
Monitoring Results* Moderate 
Financial (1.6) Strategic (2.8)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.5)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.2)
Overall Control Influence Moderate 
Financial (1.8) Strategic (2.8)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have beenfemployed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic | Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium
M/L
X
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
 4  3 2 1 0
0 (2.8, 3.3) - SDS1 Post-1992 X (1.8, 2.2) - SDS1 Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai No.l Department Store Company Limited (SDS1) before and 
after 1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility 
Accounting Style" has been changed from "Moderate Financial 
Control" . (Pre-1992) to "Strategic Control" (Post-1992) although 
it has not yet reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of 
strategic control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's 
Strategic Style.
17 J u n e  1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 12" (18 January 1995).
Name of SOE : Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Zhu Mei Di/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 26 years) 
Miss Zhu Zhi Mei/Deputy Manager of Finance 
Department/Shanghai Heavy Mining Machinery 
Corporation (SHMMC)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 25 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 6 September 1994
Second Visit - 12 January 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.l.1-5)
1.1 SCCW was a state-owned enterprise established in 1956. It 
is located on the northern outskirt of Shanghai with a total 
land space of 188,000 square metres and only 10 kilometres 
away from Shanghai River (Huangpu River) from where its 
products can be shipped to other cities and abroad. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 SCCW is supplying a great variety of single units and
complete material handling systems to metalurgical, mining,
coal, construction material, light and textile, chemical and
machine-building industries as well as thermal, hydraulic 
and nuclear power stations, harbours, railway stations and 
airports. The annual turnout (output) can be up to 30,000 
tons. It is one of China's leading plants in designing and 
manufacturing of cranes, belt conveyors and special material 
handling equipment. (Q.1.2)
1.3 SCCW is currently developing and producing the second and 
third generation of the following ten major categories of 
products : (Q.1.3)
1.3.1 Cranes
1.3.2 Crane Components
1.3.3 Belt Conveyors
1.3.4 Conveyor Components
1.3.5 Vibration Conveyors
1.3.6 Elevators
1.3.7 Material Handling System (Customer Specifications)
1.3.8 Airport Equipment
1.3.9 Speed Reducers
1.3.10 Parts for Customer's Production Facilities
1.4 Material handling equipment play a very important role in 
various industries and are in great demand in the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the four m o d e r n i s a t i o n s  in China. 
Therefore, most of SCCW's products are sold domestically 
with less than 10% of the products are exported to some 
Southeast Asian countries and achieved a revenue of US$3 
million in 1994. (Q.1.4)
1.5 The major competitors of SCCW of similar scale of operation
come from Yingchuan, Dalin, Fuzhou and Guangzhou cities. 
SCCW is very active in searching new businesses in national 
and overseas markets and maintain close relationships with 
customers, industries and research institutions. The recent 
establishment of five affiliate plants in Shanghai suburbs, 
Jiansu and Guizhou provinces emboies SCCW's pace-keeping 
with the overall economic system reform in China. In recent 
years, SCCW has paid special attention to the switchover of 
its main products to special function, multi-function and 
technical intensification. (Q.1.5)
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Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
f
2.1 SCCW has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 SCCW is neither a holding or subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 The organisation structure of SCCW can be divided into 5
major functions under the direct control of the Factory
Manager who has an Enterprise Management Office. (Q.2.3)
2.4 The 5 major functions and other roles are listed as follow:
(Q.2.5 Sc 2.9)
(1) Deputy-Factory Manager (Production)
1.1 Crane Manufacturing Workshop*
1.2 Conveyor Manufacturing Workshop*
1.3 Customer Designed Products Manufacturing Workshop*
1.4 Speed Reducers Manufacturing Workshop*
1.5 Metal Framework Workshop#
1.6 Heat Treatment Workshop#
1.7 Packing Workshop#
1.8 Mechinery Repair Centre
1.9 Tool Supplies Centre
1.10 Safety & Environment Department
1.11 Production Planning Department
(2) Chief Engineer (with 2 Assistant Chief Engineers)
2.1 Quality Control Department
2.2 Quality Inspection Department
2.3 Technical Department
2.4 Research & Development Department
2.5 Information & Filing Department
2.6 Energy Supplies Department
2.7 Tool Department
2.8 Railway Department
(3) Deputy-Factory Manager (Sales)
[Acting by Factory Manager]
3.1 Equipment Sales Department
3.2 Components Sales Department
(4) Deputy-Factory Manager (Administration)
4.1 Personnel Department
4.2 Education Department
4.3 Estate Department
4.4 Security Department
4.5 General Affairs Department
4.6 Hospital
(5) Chief Accountant (Accounting & Finance)
5.1 Accounting Department
5.2 Auditing & Legal Department
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(6) Deputy-Factory Manager (Tertiary/Service Enterprises)
(7) Communist Party Office
(8) Labour Union Office
* All the production workshops and departments are treated 
as cost or expense centres.
# Production supporting workshops.
@ Most of the workshops and departments have signed 
Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the Factory 
Manager either on an annual basis or on a single project or 
job basis.
2.5 SCCW is under the administration of the Shanghai Heavy
Mining Machinery Corporation (SHMMC) which is an independent
organisation under the umbrella of the Shanghai Mechanical 
and Electrical Equipment Bureau. SHMMC has 17 fully
state-owned enterprises manufacturing heavy machinery and 
equipment for mining, steel, energy, transportation, 
construction and other industries. The major role played by
this corporation is to maintain an economical balance of the
production and sales among its member enterprises. It also 
arranges capital to finance the approved projects or 
investments for the enterprises. Another important function 
of the corporation is to provide market information for its 
industry to produce the right products and sell to the right 
markets at the right time.
Since 1992, the short term planning and operation autonomy 
have been delegated to SCCW. But the Bureau and SHMMC still 
oversee the long term development and projects recommended 
by SCCW and also appoint the top management of SCCW. The 
investment autonomy such as raising capital for project 
investment has to be arranged by the Bureau and SHMMC. 
(Q.2.6 & 2.7)
2.6 SCCW has a total of 2,470 working employees and 860 retired
employees at the end of 1994. It is classified as a "medium
size SOE" in China. (Q.2.10)
# Since SCCW is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to SCCW.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets : RMB190M (1994) (Q.3.1)
3.2 Turnover : RMB190M (1993)
RMB230M (1994)
RMB260M@ (1995  f o r e c a s t )  ( Q . 3 . 2  & 7)
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3.3 Income before tax : RMB2.1M (1993) - 1.1% of sales*
RMB3.3M# (1994) - 1.4% of sales*
RMB3.5M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
@ This is the figure compromised with the SHMMC but in fact 
the internal target agreed with the sales department is 
RMB280M in order to initiate salemen's motivation.
* The low profit margin was mainly because of open and keen 
competition under the market economy instead of the 
guaranteed production and sales budgets as assigned by the 
government before 1992, and also the purchased prices of raw 
materials like iron and steel (60% of turnover) which prices 
are fluctuating tremendously since 1993 due to significant 
import from other countries. In addition, selling prices in 
quotations have to be reduced in order to bid the contracts. 
Furthermore, inflation and heavy payroll and benefit in 
kinds (including retired employees) increased the total 
e x p e n d i t u r e s  or fixed overheads (RMB40M in 1993) . 
Improvement in 1994 was mainly due to product quality 
enhancement and other marketing strategies.
# Income before tax has deducted the value added tax already 
which amounted to RMB13.2M in 1994 or 5.7% of the turnover. 
The VAT related to new products approved by the municipal 
government can be refunded. In addition, conversion cost 
added to input materials imported from joint venture 
partners i.e. Japan can be exempted from VAT.
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% (before 1994
33% (from 1994) (Q.3,6)
3.5 Due to capital intensive nature and long production cycle (6 
to 18 months) , SCCW had an outstanding bank loan of over 
RMB90M (for both fixed assets and current assets financing 
purposes) at the end of 1994 and paid almost RMB10M of bank 
interest in the same year. In order to finance some long 
term investment projects, at least an additional RMB50M is 
required in the next few years. One way to capture 
additional capital is getting loans from foreign banks
through the joint-venture arrangement such as foreign loan 
from a German bank by entering a j oint-venture to 
manufacture underground compartments.
Another source of capital is to transform SCCW into a
shareholding enterprise and issue shares to its employees, 
other enterprises and individuals. But the latter avenue 
involves a lot of political and economic problems related to 
the government, bureau and corporation (SHMMC). (Q.3.7 & 8)
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# Q.3.4 is not applicable to SCCW because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.f
Section 4 : Ecomnic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 SCCW entered into the first 5-year ERC (1988-1992) in 1988
with the Shanghai Mechanical & Electrical Equipment Bureau 
and the Shanghai Finance Bureau in 198 8. (Q.4.1)
4.2 This first ERC was based on the "Three Guarantees and One 
Linkage" concept which means the contractee (SCCW) had to 
guarantee : (Q.4.2 & 4)
(1) income tax handed over to the government;
(2) technology improvement;
(3) foreign exchange created from export; and
the total remuneration payable to the employees was linked 
up with the overall economic (or financial) performance.
4.3 The terms and conditions stated in 4.2 above were based on
the past three financial performance before 1988. (Q.4.3)
4.4 Another favourable term provided for SCCW was to deduct
certain amount of bank loan repayment from the PBT before
income tax assessment. (Q.4.6)
4.5 Because of the reasons stated in 3.3 above, SHMMC allowed
SCCW to maintain a profit margin of 1% to 1.5% in the first
five years in the 1990s. (Q.4.5)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with 
the government and SHMMC in setting the above targets. The 
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the SHMMC, 
government and SCCW. (Q.4.7-10)
4.7 As from 1992, no formal ERC has been existed but targets on
production output value, sales, income tax and accounts 
receivable have been agreed between SCCW and the Corporation 
(SHMMC) . The production output is valued at 1990 price 
index except new or modified products i.e. 12% growth of 
sales in 1995. The SHMMC has also agreed similar targets 
with the Shanghai Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Bureau 
and Shanghai Municipal Economic Planning Committee subject 
to negotiation and review per quarter and allowed to revise 
if necessary.
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These targets are put in terms of growth percentages. The 
fulfilment of these targets by SHMMC will be awarded a lump 
sum bonus from the government assessed twice every year. In 
turn SHMMC will distribute this bonus to its 17 enterprise 
managers according to their achievement of predetermined 
targets.
Usually 40% of the bonus will be distributed during the 
mid-year and 60% will be given at the year end. This 
incentive system is similar to the "Factory Manager 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  System" adopted by the state - o w n e d  
enterprises in parallel with the ERC system promulgated 
since 1987. (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "High-Medium Corporate (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 the production workshops had been classified as 
profit centres, but the difficulty of determining 
internal profits due to input mix, they have been 
converted back into cost centres.
After 1992 all the production workshops and other departments 
are treated as cost or expense centres.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High (1..5) "
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
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(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
f
Before 1992 : the workshop managers were responsible for the
production volume and internal profit as agreed in 
the annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management.
After 1992 : top management has been decentralising more 
planning responsibility to each workshop and 
department such as initiating the annual budget and 
the IRC. The responsibility of production and 
cost control lies with the workshop manager but the 
top management keep a surveillance quantity and 
quality control on each production workshop through 
monthly or weekly report.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (1.5)" to "High-Medium
(2 ) "
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the factory manager, party secretary, deputy
managers and some workshop managers were appointed 
by the SHMMC, any major organisational changes 
required SHMMC's approval
After 1992 : the factory manager, party secretary and some
deputy managers are still appointed by the SHMMC. 
The factory manager can appoint most of the other 
senior staff such as the workshop managers.
The workshop managers can suggest changes in 
organisation structure and personnel affairs to the 
factory manager for approval. Miss Zhu has 
mentioned that in fact the party secretary was the 
representative from the government/BIIC to ensure 
some sort of macro-economic policies are under 
control.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production. The workshops were consulted 
in setting the prices and quantities.
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After 1992 : the 4 production workshops are manufacturing
different product lines and the other 5 production 
support workshops are providing components and 
services to the production departments according to 
the production schedules without charging any costs 
or profit margins. SCCW is using a job costing 
system by collecting all the direct production, 
supporting and other relevant costs to each 
individual job or product. Therefore, internal 
transfer pricing is not involved.
Corporate Planning Influence.:: "High (1.5) " to "High (1..5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre High (1.5) High (1.5)
Decentralization High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Appointment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Interdependencies High (1.5) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) H-M (1.8)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the SHMMC while the top 
management was in consultation only. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the SHMMC.
After 1992 : SHMMC has delegated the long term planning and
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
Miss Zhu has said that due to the present country­
wide macro-economic controls, the SHMMC now retains 
some controls in planning and operation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
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(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
[
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between SHMMC 
and the top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans and annual 
budgets but initiation from the middle management 
was limited.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the workshop managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but
middle management (i.e workshop managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : SHMMC reviewed and amended the long term plans with 
the top management annually. Changes were notified 
to the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
were reviewed between the top and middle management 
twice every year but amendments were made due to 
significant changes which were communicated to 
lower management through revised budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with SHMMC and informed the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notify to 
lower management immediately.
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Corporate Planning Influence?:: "High (1.5)» to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.1)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate
(1)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : the operation philosophy or strategic theme was to 
provide advanced products to its customers with 
least cost and maximum use value through modern 
design and upgraded products.
After 1992 : more specific strategic themes are listed in the
1994 annual plan as follow :
- increase planning participation and flexibility
- enhance product design (use value engineering)
- adjust product mix
- improve production technology
- simplify production process
- maintain production output growth
- improve pruchasing and supply process and quality
- enhance product quality
- strengthen internal management quality
- reduce redundent employees
- reform manpower and wages system
- continue and increase export and joint ventures
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
278
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
t
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : a quality control office to exercise unified
control over the entire process from raw material 
acceptance to after-sales service. SCCW has 
envisaged a vision to attain IS09000 certification 
before the year 2 000 but no concreate plans have 
been formulated yet.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 19 92 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, transfer price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the workshop managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH-H (1.0) H-M (2,.0)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) H-M (2,.0)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) Medium (2,.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) Medium (2,.2)
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5 . 4  L ong-T erm  P l a n s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 4 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 3 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the SHMMC in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long 
term plans such as capital projects, product and 
market development which need to be discussed with 
the SHMMC who have been exercising macro-economic 
controls and provide directives and targets i.e. 
technology expertise and quality standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the SHMMC 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 19 92 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. workshop 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 5- 
year planning (1996-2000), includes joint ventures, 
competitive edge, research and development, product 
and market development, production diversification, 
source of capital and computerisation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 19 92 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow SCCW to participate in the 5- 
year's planning with the SHMMC and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
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After 1992 : SCCW has to formulate their own long term strategic
plan since 1990. The workshop and department
managers are consulted in the process. The long 
term planning and review exercises are rather a 
top-down approach.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very-High to High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 19 92 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
BIIC with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the SHMMC for 
endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking a long term bank loan.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because SCCW caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and inventory level.
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After 1992 : top management has higher autonomy in the annual
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the workshop managers.
But SHMMC still provides the major targets such as 
sales and profit level.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 19 92 : top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales, 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the workshop managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
After 1992 : top management provided major guidelines to the
workshop managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
A brief description of the 1994 Annual Plan was 
presented in section 5.5 of the Data Analysis 12.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) »
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(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
f
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed half-
annually and amendments were seldom made except 
under signifcant environmental changes. Annual 
plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in written forms.
After 1992 : top management reviews the annual plans and
budgets quarterly and amendments are made due to 
unavoidable internal and external factors. A fixed 
budget concept is still in force because computer 
is not widely used. Other than documentations, the 
budget information is further communicated between 
the top and middle management during the monthly 
performance evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992
After 1992
the IRC system was started in 1989 and mainly 
applied to the production workshops. The major 
targets set were production quantity, internal 
profit and quality.
major economic targets are equivalent labour hours 
of output, product quality, operation management, 
production facility and material usage which are 
linked up with the wages and incentive scheme.
A sample of IRC is shown in section 5.6 of the Data 
Analysis Set 12.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e f : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : top management discussed with workshop managers to 
agreed with the targets set in the IRCs.
After 1992 : workshop managers negotiate and compromise the IRC 
targets with the general management during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 19 92 : targets compromised with the workshop managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 19 92 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective workshop managers and 
their employees.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 19 92 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of
the production and cost targets which might not be
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
rapid changing of external factors.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
workshop managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards. But suggestions on financial 
targets are sometimes given.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
(
Because the 4 production workshops in SCCW are manufacturing 
their own products without any interactions with the other 
workshops, therefore, internal transfer pricing does not exist. 
Although the other 5 supporting workshops or departments are 
supplying materials and services to the 4 production workshops 
according to the requirement of each job, however, they are all 
treated as cost centres and no internal profits or transfer 
prices have to be determined.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.5)* VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Roles & functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1.4 Interactions Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) Low(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<------------------------------------Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.. 0
Financial (1.. 1
Moderate Financial (1..6
Moderate Strategic (2,. 1
Strategic (2..6
Tight Strategic (3,. 1
(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
2.1 Recruitment
2.2 Assignment
2.3 Training
2.4 Evaluation
2.5 Remunerat ion
2.6 Termination
- 1 .0)
- 1.5)
- 2 .0)
- 2.5)
- 3.0)
- 4.0)
Before 1992 After 1992
VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
H-M ( 1 . 6 )  Medium ( 2 . 4 )
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# Miss Zhu said that since 1992, more delegation has been given 
to the workshop managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6,.1.2-3, Q.6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.6 Communication VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.1) High (1.4)
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design High (1.5) Medium (2.1)
Personnel H-M (1.6) Medium (2.4)
Control Mechanisms High (1.1) High (1.4)
Overall Control Influence High (1.4) H-M (2.0)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q.6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
(2.0)Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
(2.0)on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
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6 . 3  M o n i t o r i n g  R e s u l t s  ?
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  from " T ig h t  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 ) "  b e f o r e
1992 t o  "M oderate  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 9 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization . High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
High (1.1) H-M (1.8)
# Miss Zhu has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the factory manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the factory 
manager or deputy-factory managers will contact the respective 
workshop manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production workshops were mainly measured on
production volume and internal profit, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production quantity and cost are the major economic 
targets, however, more qualitative targets such as 
quality, safety, operation and facility management 
and material usage are measured.
C o rporate Control I n fluence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
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(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
f
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
workshop or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the workshop managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual workshop or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.8)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0)
ii 
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6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1. 8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22 -23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1. 1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.8 Redundancy Very Low(4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6)
ii 
W
 
ii 
i 
li 
£
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(1.7)
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* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work-, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB10-25.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SCCW which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the factory manager 
and the workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. It is up to a workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the SCCW's core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6 .5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and
contributed to 30-40% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 40-50% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " t o  "High
( 1 . 5 )  "
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(3) P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q. 6 . 5 . 1 6 ^ 1 7 )
Before 1992 : workshop managers were involved in formulating 
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : workshop managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8,13-14,20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the workshop or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n ce : "Ve ry H i g h - H i g h (1) ii
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.6) H-M (1. 7)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1. 5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2. 0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2. 0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1. 8)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
f
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure*
High (1.4)
High to 
Medium (1.8)
Review Process* High (1.3) Medium (2.1)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Very High 
to High (1.0) Medium (2.2)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0)
Medium
to Low (3.0)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* N/A -- N/A --
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.4)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Overall Control Influence Moderate
Financial (1.2) Financial (1.9)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
X
H/M
Medium
M/L
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.9, 2.3) - SCCW Post-1992 X (1.2. 1.4) - SCCW Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been c hanged from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to 
"Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
20 June  19 9 6
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"The Responsibility Accounting in China 
- Towards An Exploratory Framework" 
Case Analysis 13 
26 June 1996
Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1) ;
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 13" (6 February 1995).
Name of SOE : Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory 
(SMEF)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Weng Wei Shan/Finance Division Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 26 years) 
Miss Tao Wen Quen/Ass. Finance Division Mgr. 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 22 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 28 May 1993
Second Visit - 8 September 1994
Third Visit - 6 February 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 SMEF is a wholly state-owned enterprise established in 1956
and is manufacturing whole sets of metallurgical equipment, 
both mechanical and electrical, for the iron and steel 
industry. SMEF has two production sites. One is located at 
the Yangpu (Eastern Urban) District occupied a land area of
over 130,000 square metres and another one is situated at
the Putao (Western Urban) District with a land area of over
120,000 square metres. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 SMEF is one of the flargest metallurgical equipment 
manufacturers in China. It has a total fixed asset of over 
RMB200M at book value and an annual production capacity of 
over 70,000 tons. SMEF was qualified by the government as a 
"Second Class" enterprise in 1988. Over 60% of SMEF's 
products achieved high quality standard and received a 
Quality Management Award from the Ministry of Metallurgy in 
1989. Furthermore, SMEF was also qualified as first class 
"Information Management" and second class "Energy Saving" 
awards in 1990. (Q.1.2)
1.3 SMEF is currently producing the following three types of 
products :
1.3.1 Mechanical Equipment (Smelting, Pressing & Crushing)
1.3.2 Electrical Equipment (Large Size Transformers, 
Electronic Products and Others)
1.3.3 Commercial Casts & Forgings (Steel Casts, Iron Casts 
& Forging Steel) (Q.1.3)
1.4 Less than 5% of SMEF's products are directly exported and
less than US$5 millions foreign exchange has been achieved
which are unable to be qualified as a free import and export 
enterprise. SMEF is working closely with the bureau to 
negotiate with the government in obtaining the import and 
export right (alos the foreign exchange usage right) so that 
they can explore the overseas markets such as Southeast 
Asian, South American and Eastern European Countries. 
(Q.1.4)
1.5 Since the South China visit by the Chinese top leader, Mr
Deng Xiao Ping, the pace of economic development has been
speeded up. SMEF has made use of this opportunity in time 
to reform the internal operation and management systems on 
one hand, and react to the quick changes in the domestic and 
overseas markets in order to become a really self-managed, 
self-financed, self-regulated and self-developed modern 
enterprise on the other hand. These reforms included the 
following : (Q.1.5)
(1) Organisation Restructuring (see section 2 below)
(2) Strategic Themes & Thrusts (see section 5.3 below)
(3) Employee Evaluation & Contract (see section 6.4 below)
(4) Reward & Incentive Scheme (see section 6.4 below)
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Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
c
2.1 SMEF has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because 
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 SMEF is neither a holding nor subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 Under the General Factory Manager, the enterprise management 
office and 7 administrative divisions are the middle level 
of management which functions are servicing, coordination, 
planning and control. (Q.2.3)
2.4 The organisation structure is listed below : (Q.2.5 & 2.9)
(1) 7 Divisions (each has a Division Manager)
1.1 Production Division (supervising the 12 Production
Factories as shown in 2 below)
1.2 Sales & Marketing Division
1. 3 Technical & Quality Management Division
1.4 Accounting & Finance Division
1.5 Manpower & Personnel Division
1.6 General Affairs Division
1. 7 Enterprise Development Division
12 Production Factories* (each has a Factory Manager)
2 .1 Steel Casting & Forging Factory (Note 1)
2.2 Iron Casting & Forging Factory (Note 1)
2.3 No.l Rolling Steel Factory (Note 1)
2.4 Metallurgical Framework Factory (Note 2)
2.5 No.l Metallurgical Equipment Factory (Note 3)
2.6 No.2 Metallurgical Equipment Factory (Note 3)
2 . 7 No.3 Metallurgical Equipment Factory (Note 3)
2.8 Special Transformer Factory (Note 4)
2.9 Electrical Appliance Factory (Note 4)
2.10 Mechanical Appliance Factory (Note 4)
2 .11 Wooden Mould Factory (Note 5)
2.12 Electricity, Water & Gas Supplies Factory (Note 6)
(3) 12 Tertiary Enterprises* (each has a Unit Manager under
the direct supervision of the General Factory Manager)
3.1 Metallurgical Product Sales Company
3.2 Import & Export Sales Company
3.3 Material Supplies Company
3.4 Transportation Service Company
3.5 Food & Beverage Company 
'3.6 Asia Trading Company
3.7 Taiwan Steel & Metallurgy Limited Company
3.8 Asian Metallurgical Technical Equipment Company
3.9 Research & Development Centre
3.10 Metallurgical Equipment Inspection Centre
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3.11 Measurement & Precision Inpsection Centre
3.12 Education & Training Centre
* All the production factories and tertiary enterprises are 
treated as profit centres measured mainly by internal 
profits. Most of them have signed Internal Responsibility 
Contracts (IRC) with the General Factory Manager either on 
an annual basis or on a single project or job basis.
Notes : (summaries of internal transfer)
(1) The majority products of these 3 production factories 
are transferred to the framework factories, equipment 
factories, transformer factory and appliance factories 
as input materials.
(2) Most of the output of metallurgical framework factory 
will be transferred to the equipment factories, 
transformer factory and appliance factories as input 
components.
(3) The 3 m e t a l l u r g i c a l  e q u i p m e n t  f a c t o r i e s  are 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s t a n d - a l o n e  p r o d u c t s  w h i c h  are 
tailor-made to customer's specifications.
(4) The transformer factory and appliance factories are 
manufacturing various types and models of products in 
batch and selling to the end-users directly or via the 
tertiary enterprises.
(5) The wooden mould factory are producing moulds to all 
other production factories according to specifications.
(6) The supplies factory is providing electricity, water 
and gas to all the other production factories, tertiary 
enterprises and headquarters.
2.5 SMEF is under the administration of the Shanghai Metallurgy 
Bureau under which all the iron and steel and related 
industries in Shanghai are placed under its umbrella. The 
major role played by the Bureau is to maintain an economical 
balance of the product mix and sales among its member 
enterprises. It also appoints the top management, such as 
the party leaders and factory managers, of the enterprises 
under its supervision. It also assists the arrangement of 
capital to finance the approved projects or investments for 
the enterprises. Another important economic function of the 
Bureau or the government is to purchase the iron and steel 
raw materials at lower prices (80%-90%) and then sell to 
various enterprises as a means of maintaining reasonable 
input costs under high inflation. The short term planning 
and operation like purchasing, production and sales autonomy 
have been fully delegated to SMEF. The investment autonomy 
such as raising capital for project investment has to be 
discussed with the Bureau even though the interference is 
minimal at present. (Q.2.6 & 2.7)
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2.6 SMEF is a large SOE having 5,000 working employees, in which
3,000 are production workers, and 2,000 retired employees. 
About 500 of the working employees are involved in the 12 
"tertiary enterprises" (service enterprises) as listed in
2.4 above. On the other hand, another 500 redundant 
employees have stopped their jobs or posts and received only 
basic wages and welfare. All the employees have signed 
"employment contracts" since 1993 with duration from one 
year to no limit leaving an optional right to the employees. 
(Q.2.10)
# Since SMEF is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to SMEF.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets : RMB 200M (1994)@ (Q.3.1)
@ The total assets value was increased by 21.4% after a 
revaluation was performed by the government in 1993.
3.2 Turnover : RMB 250M (19 92)
RMB 360M (1993)
RMB 275M# (1994)
RMB 400M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 & 7)
# The 24% drop of turnover in 1994 was due to the relocation 
of a few production lines to the new plant in Wangdu and the 
market demand.
3.3 Income before tax : RMB 0M (1992) - breakeven
(Q.3.5, 6 & 7) RMB 5.2M (1993) - 1.4% of sales*
RMB-13.7M (1994) - loss making*
RMB 0M (1995 forecast)
* The low profit margin or loss making was mainly because of 
open and keen competition under the market economy instead 
of the guaranteed production and sales budgets as assigned 
by the government before 1992, and also the purchased prices 
of raw materials like iron and steel (over 52% of turnover) 
which prices were fluctuating tremendously since 1993 due to 
significant import from other countries.
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% before 1994
33% from 1994® (Q.3.6)
@ Due to the poor financial performance since 1991, both net 
value aded tax (about 6% of turnover) and income tax were 
exempted in 1991, 1992 and 1993 but VAT was resumed in 1994.
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3.5 Both the sales and profit has been deteriorating because of
the following reasons : f (Q.3.7 & 8)
(1) lack of capital to rennovate the production facilities
and invest into new projects to modify the product mix 
according to the market demands and improve the product 
q u a l i t y  in o r d e r  to c o m p e t e  n a t i o n a l l y  and 
internationally;
(2) insufficient market information for product mix and 
sales forecasts;
(3) increase in expenses due to high inflation but unable 
to increase the product selling prices in parallel due 
to competition and pricing guidance from the bureau;
(4) macro-economic control measures controlled by the 
government and inadequate assistance to the inefficient 
enterprises;
(5) quality of internal management and control in the 
enterprises due to insufficient education and training;
(6) heavy social responsibilities and financial burden to 
the enterprises but could not lay-off the redundant 
employees due to insufficient employment benefits (i.e. 
unemployment, medical, retirement etc.) offered by the 
government.
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to SMEF because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 SMEF entered into the first 5-year (1988-1992) ERC with the 
Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau and the Shanghai Fianance Bureau 
in 1988. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The form of ERC taken in 1988 was "Target Profit 
Underwritten". The major reason for adopting this basis was 
because SMEF was a low-profit making state-owned enterprise 
and required over RMB90 million of capital for the next five 
years investment in production facilities and equipment 
including RMB56M for relocating a few production factories 
from the existing plant to the New Plant. It was expected 
high borrowings and repayments would be incurred in this 
period. (Q.4.2 & 4)
4.3 The first year (i.e. 1988) profit target base was determined 
at RMB7.72M after considering the profit achieved in 1987 as 
shown in section 4 of Data Analysis 13. (Q.4.3)
4.4 Because of profit downturn since 1991, SMEF was exempted in
handing over any profit or tax to the municipal government 
in 1991, 1992 and 1993. (Q.4.6)
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4.5 SMEF achieved the profit targets in the first three years 
and then either loss making or breakeven since 1992. 
(Q.4.5, 4.9, 4.10)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with 
the government and bureau in setting the above targets. The 
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the three parties. 
(Q.4.7-8)
4.7 The second (1993-1997) E R C 's profit target is zero for the
first 3 years and then subject to review for the latter 2 
years. Although no profit or income tax would be levied, 
the net VAT (6% of turnover) had to be paid since 1994. 
SMEF is still negotiating with the government to refund and 
exempt their VAT until 1996. (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.6)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the production factories were "cost centres" 
managed by the factory managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expense 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
After 1992 : the organisation structure was restructured in 1993 
in order to streamline the operation efficiency and 
reduce the redundant employees. All the production 
factories and tertiary enterprises are treated as 
profit centres and measured mainly by internal 
profit. All the other management and service 
remain "expense centres" controlled by budgets 
initiated.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High (1 5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0) Greatest Influence
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3) \/
some of the parameters or Very Low (4) Least Influence
variables)
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Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium CM] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2 . 6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 : the factory managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management.
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : the primary profit responsibility lies with the
factory managers who initiate the annual budgets 
and IRCs and get their subordinates (middle and 
lower management) involved. Obviously, changing 
into profit centres is reasonable.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the general manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the Bureau, and other senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required Bureau 1s approval.
After 1992 : the general manager and party secretary are still
appointed by the Bureau. The general manager can 
appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
factory managers. The factory and department 
managers can suggest changes in organisation 
structure and personnel affairs to the general 
manager for approval.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production with or without markup.
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After 1992 : the transfer prices are based on market prices less 
discounts to provide for some profit margins. The 
top management tries to reduce interference in the 
setting of transfer prices, quantities and timings.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Decentralization High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Appointment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Interdependencies High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) M-L (2.6)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.8)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the top management after 
discussion and agreement with Bureau. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the Bureau.
After 1992 : Bureau has delegated the long term planning and
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
Mr Weng has said that strategic plans still have to 
be reviewed, discussed and modified with the Bureau
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans and annual 
budgets but initiation from the middle management 
(i.e. factory managers) was limited.
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After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the factory managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but 
middle management (i.e factory managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management twice every year but amendments 
were made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with the Bureau and informed to 
the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
are reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notified 
to the lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
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Factors Before 1992 After :1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) M-L (2.8)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "improve efficiency" and "increase profit or cost 
control" were the major strategic themes given to 
and imbedded into the planning and control system.
After 1992 : the following specific strategic themes have been 
promulgated since 1993 :
- improve the production efficiency and capacity in 
order to maintain a higher output growth
- enhance the economic efficiency and development 
potential
- increase employee's remuneration and their unity
- delegate more autonmy to middle/lower management
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : the following strategic thrusts have been 
promulgated since 1993 :
- convert the production cost centres into profit 
centres and deal with markets directly
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- reorganise and convert some administrative cost 
centres into?independent profit centres (i.e. 
tertiary enterprises) to provide services to 
other production and administration units on a 
self-financing basis
- establish "internal banking system" to determine 
the internal transfer prices and to handle the 
transactions between the production factories, 
administrative divisions and tertiary enterprises
- establish arms-length "internal marketing system" 
by entering into internal contracts when produc­
tion cooperation and service are required among 
the production factories, administrative division 
and tertiary enterprises
- penetrate existing markets and develop new market
- enhance product and production quality
- reduce resources consumptions
- improve customer before- and after-sales services
- shorten production cycles
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2&3)
Before 19 92 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, selling price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the factory managers and division heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate.
Corporate Planning Influence 
(2.5) "
"Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Theme
Thrust
Suggestions
Overall Planning Influence
VH-H
High
VH-H
High
(1 .0)
(1.5)
(1 .0)
(1 .2)
After 1992
H-M (2.0) 
Medium (2.5) 
Medium (2.5)
Medium (2.3)
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5 . 4  L ong-T erm  P l a n s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long
term plans and compromise with the Bureau who may 
insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and mix.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
feasible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1996-2000), includes competitive 
edge, research and development, product and market 
development, facility relocation, joint ventures, 
sources of capital and computerisation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979
started to allow SMEF to participate in the 5-
year's planning with the Bureau and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
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After 1992 : SMEF has to formulate their own long term strategic 
plans which are submitted to the Bureau for review 
and approval. Some projects involved significant 
capital investment require financial arrangement by 
the Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
Bureau with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the Bureau for 
endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because SMEF caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and working capital.
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After 1992 : top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the factory managers.
Corporate Planning Influence 
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4) 
Before 1992
"High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
After 1992
top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the factory managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
top management provided major guidelines to the 
factory managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed in the
middle of the year and amendments were seldom made 
except under signifcant environmental changes. 
Annual plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in written forms.
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A f t e r  1992 top and middle management review the annual plans 
and budgets quarterly and amendments are made due 
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence
(3) "
"High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.3)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : the IRC system was started in 1989 and mainly
applied to the production factories. Before 1992, 
production factories were measured against targets 
such as production mix, quantities, and costs.
After 1992 : financial target - internal profit
production targets - quantity, value, equivalent 
labour hours, quality
management targets - quality, safety, technology, 
material consumption, operation
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : factory managers had to discuss and compromise the 
production quantity and cost targets with the top 
management.
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After 1992 : factory managers negotiate and agree the IRC 
targets with the general manager during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets agreed by the production managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective factory managers and 
their employees.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets and qualitative 
factors such as quality and safety had veto effect 
on the bonus to be awarded.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
factory managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
310
5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992  t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Interdepen­ Production & service Production & service
dencies departments involved departments involved
1.2 Transfer standard cost and market price less
Price Basis standard cost plus internal discount
1.3 Transfer Price Very little between Some negotiations
Negotiation buyer and seller are allowed
1.4 Intermediate Some buy and sell are Some buy & sell are
Product available in market available in market
1.5 Transfer Mostly determined by Excess service can
Quantity the top management be sold externally
1. 6 Arbitration Prices and quantities Mainly determined by
mainly determined by top management but
top management negotiations allowed
1. 7 Government No, except the output No, only suggest
Interference volumes & selling volumes & prices of
prices of final products final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the top management and the factory 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflicts 
were arbitrated by the general manager. Factory 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by production volume and cost.
After 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities are 
still controlled by the top management although 
some negotiations are allowed for the factory 
managers because they are measured on internal 
profit. Interference from and arbitration by the 
general manager are necessary.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 : the standard costs and profit margins used to set 
the transfer prices were determined during the 
annual planning exercise without much inputs from 
the middle management. The transfer prices were 
reviewed in the middle of the year and some 
amendments were allowed.
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After 1992 : the market price less internal discount is used for 
setting the transfer prices which are reviewed 
quarterly. Standard costs plus is still used for a 
few factories.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)» to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.3)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Finance (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH-H (1.0)* High (1.5)
1.2 Staffing High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L ow(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
f Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.3)
# Mr Weng said that since 1992, more delegation has been given to 
the factory managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the general manager and 
the party secretary.
(3)
Budget
IRC
Financial targets 
Quantitative targets 
Qualitative targets 
Communication*
•2-3, Q .6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.1) High (1.5)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
factories and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence : 
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
Personnel High (1.5) Medium (2.3)
Control Mechanisms High (1.1) High (1.5)
Overall Control Influence High (1.3) H-M (2.0)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q .6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.7)
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# Mr Weng has mentioned that? the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each factory. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the general manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report/ the general 
manager or deputy-general managers will contact the respective 
factory manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the
situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production factories were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production/ but other
non-financial targets such as quality and safety
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production volume and internal profit are the
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production management, resource 
consumption and quality are measured.
C o r p o r a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
factory or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the factory managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual factory or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  Control Influ e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22-23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) High (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SMEF which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the general manager 
and the factory manager decides what level of group bonus will be 
given to the factory. It is up to a factory manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the SMEF's core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and
contributed to 30-50% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 20-30% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating 
I R C s  targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 )  " t o
"High-Medium (2)"
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u nicat ion  (Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees
every month via the factory or department managers.
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers.
Corporate Cont r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (l) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.6) H-M (1.7)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1 .8)
S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
f
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General 
Factory (SMEF) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences 
Organisation Structure*
Review Process*
Strategic Themes, Thursts
Before 1992 After 1992
High (1.4)
High (1.5)
Medium
to Low (2.6) 
Medium
to Low (2.8)
and Suggestions* High (1.2) Medium (2.3)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.3)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence
High (1.5)
Medium
to Low (2.6)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.3)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.1)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been? employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
2---------------------------- 2---------------------------- 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.9, 2.6) - SMEF Post-1992 X (1.1, 1.5) - SMEF Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) before 
and after 1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility 
Accounting Style" has been changed from "Financial Programming" 
(Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not 
yet reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial 
control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic 
Style.
26 June  1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 14" (28 February 1995).
Name of SOE : Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Zhou Wei Min/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 15 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 10 September 1993
Second Visit - 12 September 1994
Third Visit - 8 February 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.l.1-5)
1.1 SCM2 is a state-owned enterprise established in 1914 and is 
manufacturing cotton yarn and cloth of which the former 
products are the input materials for the latter products. 
SCM2 1 s long term visions' are to m a i n t a i n  textile 
manufacturing as the core business, enhance the product 
quality and increase export as the driving force, develop 
tertiary (service) enterprises as the diversification 
strategy, and establish advanced management techniques as a 
modern enterprise. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 Operating under the competitive market economy, SCM2 
aggressively adjust its product mix and organisation 
structure. To actualise the technology advancement as the 
first production strategy, since 1990s SCM2 has invested 
RMB5 0 million in importing 75 modern and advanced spinning 
and weaving machines in order to upgrade the product variety 
and quality. As a result, SCM2 was qualified as the "high 
count kingdom*" by the mayor of Shanghai in January 1994. 
SCM2 is devloping 75 new high grade products and trying to 
explore the overseas markets. (Q.1.2)
* The quality or grade of yarn is measured in terms of 
numbers of count which means the higher the count, the more 
refined the product.
1.3 The competitive edge of SCM2 is offering high count and high 
density (quality measurement of cloth) yarn and cloth to 
sustain the market share. Before the oil-shortage crisis in 
1993, SCM2 had produced cotton-synthetic (a by-product of 
crude oil) cloth and supplied to a large clothing factory 
for manufacturing the "Smart" shirt which was a famous brand 
name in Hong Kong as well.
In addition, SCM2 started to produce and supply low-price 
yarn (6-10 count) for other weaving factories to manufacture 
denim (jeans) in 1993. This low-price yarn used cheaper 
cotton (raw material) costing RMB10,000 per ton compared 
with those high count (80-120) using cotton costing 
RMB4 0 ,000 per ton. However, this low-count yarn could 
generate good profit because the production cycle was 
shorter and output volume was greater. In the same year, 
SCM2 produced high-count (80-100) cotton cloth and supplied 
to a large clothing factory for manufacturing a delux 
gentleman shirt with the brand name called "Seashell". 
(Q.1.3)
1.4 SCM2 supplies 92% of its yarn and cloth to other textile and
clothing industries for further processing and exporting 
most of their final products overseas. Only 3% of SCM21s 
products (mixture of cotton and linen cloth) exported 
directly (i.e. to Australia) and the other 5% are sold 
domestically. The production and sales ratio of SCM2 have 
been maintained at 1:0.95. (Q.1.4)
1.5 Under the economic reforms, open-door policies and operation 
mechanism transformation, SCM2 insists the strategic theme 
of "textile is the mainstream business and diversification 
is the breakthrough venture".
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Subsidiary to the main business of textile, SCM2 has 
reserved 20,000 square metres of land space for establishing 
various "tertiary enterprises" including commercial office 
b l o c k ,  s e c u r i t i e s  t r a d i n g  c o m p a n y ,  s t o r a g e  and 
transportation service, beverage wholesales market, food and 
oil future market, motel, restaurants and amusement centre 
which are expected to bring in RMB10 million of profit 
(before income tax) before the end of the year 2000. 
( Q . 1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 SCM2 has been a wholly state-owned enterprise since 1950 and 
under the administration of the Shanghai Textile Bureau. 
All the cotton mills and related industries such as textile 
machines manufacturing are under the umbrella of the 
Shanghai Textile Bureau. Since the textile industrial 
restructuring in early 1990s, many cotton mills have been 
grouped under three large corporations in Shanghai. One of 
these three large textile corporations is Xin Da Corporation 
which has the following subsidiaries :
(1) Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill
(2) Shanghai No.6 Weaving Factory
(3) Shanghai Industrial Cloth Factory
(4) Xin Da Real Estate Development Company
(5) 10 Trading/Import and Export Companies
(6) Representative Offices in the USA, Australia and Macau
In 1991, Xin Da Corporation was registered in Pudong 
(Eastern Shanghai) which is a special economic development 
zone enjoying many favourable policies granted by the 
municipal government, such as income tax of 15% for 
shareholding enterprises compared with the 33% of the 
counterparts registered in old Western Shanghai city.
In May 1992, Xin Da Corporation was transformed into a
shareholding entity by issuing shares to the government 
(63%), other enterprises (27%) and other individuals (10%)
including employees working for Xin Da Corporation (i.e. 
SCM2's employees). The shares owned by the individuals, at 
an issue price of RMB3 per share, were listed in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange at the same time. Therefore, SCM2 
is a 100% shareholding subsidiary of Xin Da Corporation.
The major role played by Xin Da Corporation is to supervise 
the financial performance and appoint the top management 
such as general manager and party secretary (rectified by 
the Shanghai Textile Bureau) of each subsidiary.
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Another important function of the corporation is to raise 
capitals for the approved projects or investments initiated 
by the subsidiaries. Despite the latter fact, SCM2 has the 
autonomy to obtain bank loan independently. (Q.1.1, 4, 6, 7)
2.2 Since SCM2 is a shareholding enterprise, it has a Board of 
Directors constituted by the following 11 members : (Q.2.3)
Chairman - Chairman of Xin Da Corporation
Vice Chairman - General Manager of SCM2
Directors - 3 representatives from other enterprises
holding shares of Xin Da
- 1 representative from Textile Bureau
- 1 representative from Party Office
- 1 representative from Labour Union
- Chief Accountant of Xin Da Corporation
- Deputy-General Manager (Production) of SCM2
- Deputy-General Manager (Operation) of SCM2
2.3 Under the Factory General Manager, who has an Enterprise 
Management Office, the organisation structure of SCM2 is 
listed as follow : (Q.2.5, 2.9)
(1) Production Department (Deputy-GM)
1.1 No.l Spinning Factory*
1.2 N o .2 Spinning Factory*
1.3 N o .3 Spinning Factory*
1.4 Weaving Factory*
1.5 Production Support Factory (supplying electricity, 
gas, water, consumables, spares, tools etc.)**
1.6 Technical Support Section (Chief Engineer)
1.7 Production Planning Section (Chief Engineer)
1.8 Production Facilities Section
1.9 Quality Control Section
(2) Operation Department (Deputy-GM)
2.2 Purchasing Section
2.3 Sales Section
(3) Organisation & Personnel Department®
3.1 Personnel Section
3.2 Manpower & Wages Section
3.3 Organisation & Discipline Section
3.4 Education & Training Section
(4) Safety & Security Department®
4.1 Safety Section
4.2 Security Section
@ headed by the same Deputy-GM
(5) Accounting & Finance Department (Chief Accountant)
5.1 Accounting & Finance Section@@
5.2 Internal Audit Section
(6) Promotion Department (Party Leader)
6.1 Promotion Department
6.2 Party Office
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(7) Labour Union Office
(8) Tertiary Enterprises®®® (Deputy-GM)
* All the production factories have a factory manager, a 
deputy factory manager, section supervisors and group 
leaders. Each factory is responsible for its own repair and 
maintenance work.
** All the production factories and tertiary' enterprises are 
treated as profit centres. But the production support 
factory is a cost centre and allocates its operating costs 
to the other production factories or departments according 
to actual usages.
*** All the production factories have signed Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the General Manager on 
an annual basis.
@@ In addition to the 21 staff in the accounting and finance 
department in the headquarters, there is one accounting 
staff in each production factory and tertiary enterprise 
reporting to both the unit manager and chief accountant.
@@@ The tertiary (service) enterprises are independent 
profit centres having their own management teams and bank 
accounts, and they have signed IRCs with the General Manager 
on an annual basis.
2.4 SCM2 had a total of 4, 860 working employees (10% are
administrative staff) and 5,200 retired employees (annual 
pension RMB14 million) at the end of 1994. It is classified 
as a medium-size SOE in China. About 350 of the working 
employees are involved in the tertiary enterprises 
established in mid-1993.
On the other hand, 3 50 redundant employees have stopped 
their jobs or posts and received about RMB3 00 basic wages 
per month. All the employees have signed "employment 
contracts" since 1993 with duration from one year to no 
limit leaving an optional right to the employees.
# Although SCM2 is a subsidiary enterprise, insufficient
information has been obtained for questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and
Q.2.11.
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Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
r
3.1 Total assets : RMB 40M (1994) (Q.3.1)
3.2 Turnover : RMB 18OM (1992)
RMB 200M (1993)
RMB 180M@ (1994)
RMB 200M@ (1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 & 1, 
@ Including sales of tertiary enterprises.
3.3 Income before tax : RMB 7.OM (1992) - 3.9% of sales
(Q.3.5, 6 & 7) RMB 4.OM (1993) - 2.0% of sales*
RMB 5.1M# (1994) - 2.8% of sales**
RMB 4.0M##(1995 forecast)
* The low profit margin was mainly because of a fire occured 
in May 1993 and No.l Spinning Factory was burnt down lossing 
RMB4 million of assets after claiming insurance. In 
addition, selling prices had to be reduced in order to bid 
the orders. Furthermore, inflation and heavy payroll and 
benefits in kind (including retired employees) increased the 
total expenditures or fixed overheads. The purchase prices
of raw materials (i.e. cotton) have been increased from
RMB11,000 per ton in 1993 to RMB18,000 per ton in 1994 (or 
64% increase) due to reduction of domestic production.
The farmers did not have the incentive to grow cotton 
because of low selling prices set by the government and high 
inflation of input materials like fertilisers. The domestic 
produced cotton is centrally purchased and distributed by 
the Ministry of Textile (and also the corporations under its 
umbrella), Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture 
at predetermined prices. In view of domestic short supply, 
45% of the cotton demand was imported from foreign countries 
in 1994. SCM2 is importing overseas cotton via the import 
and export right of its holding Xin Da Corporation.
** Income before tax has deducted the value added tax 
already which is 17% on sales but only 13% on cotton 
purchased can be deducted according to the new taxation 
system implemented in January 1994. As a result, the VAT 
paid in 1994 was RMB 10 million (6% of turnover) which is 
RMB500,000 higher than the previous known sales tax in 1993.
# The tertiary enterprises generated RMB2 million of profit 
before tax in 1994 which achieved only 40% of the budget. 
The target for 1995 will be RMB2.5 million of profit before 
tax.
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## To support a few capital projects started in 1990, SCM2 
obtained a RMB29 million 5-year bank loan and interest 
payment of RMB3 million has been capitalized into the 
work-in-progress. Since all the projects were completed in 
1994, both the interest of outstanding loan (RMB25 million) 
and the depreciation of a total RMB4.5 million has to be 
charged to profit and loss as from 1995. Therefore, the 
potential profit level of RMB8.5 million (including RMB2.5 
million coming from the tertiary enterprises) will be 
reduced to RMB4 million in 1995.
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% (before 1992)
15% (from 1992)### (Q.3.6)
### All the profit before tax belongs to the Xin Da
Corporation which is registered in Pudong (Eastern Shanghai) 
and subject to 15% of income tax rate in this economic 
development zone.
3.5 Unlike the last few decades, the demands of textile 
products, in particular the old cotton mills such as SCM2, 
in China have been declining since the early 1990s due to 
the following reasons : (Q.3.7 & 8)
(1) The production plants and equipment are rather
out-dated such as before 1994, SCM2 were still using 
very old machines manufactured in the 1920s, 1930s and
1940s. Productivity, efficiency and quality of these 
retiring machines are low compared with the other 
developed countries like the USA, Japan and Europe or 
even the many newly developed small-sized cotton mills 
located in small towns and cities all around China 
which have the ability to imported advanced equipment 
and machines from overseas.
(2) Lacking of capital, either coming from retained 
earnings or bank loans, makes the large- and 
medium-sized long-established cotton mills (there are 
3 0 cotton mills in Shanghai) unable to rennovate their 
out-dated plants and equipment. Therefore, they can 
mainly manufacture lower quality or class of products 
and only a small portion of them belong to the higher 
counts for further processing into high quality 
products such as the shirts and T-shirts with famous 
brand names as mentioned above.
(3) The surging of too many small-sized township cotton 
mills increases the total supply in excess of the total 
demand. Under this unfavourable situation, the old 
cotton mills including SCM2 can harly compete with them 
in terms of price and quality.
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(4) In the 1980s, SCM2 has entered into joint-ventures in 
terms of associated enterprise mode with two old cotton 
mills in Shandong and Jingsu provinces (major raw 
cotton producing places in China). SCM2 has invested 
capital, equipment and technology into these two 
enterprises in order to revive their deteriorating 
performance. This kind of assistant programme as 
imposed by the government has diverted the resources of 
SCM2 from own development purposes.
# Informtion for Q.3.4 was not available.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 SCM2 entered into the first 5-year (1988-1992) ERC with the
Shanghai Textile Bureau and the Shanghai Fianance Bureau in 
1988. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The major financial target set in this ERC was based on the
target income which was 55% of net profit. (Q.4.2 & 4)
4.3 The target income tax (base) in the first year (1988) was
agreed at RMB5 million with a 2% annual growth in the
subsequent years. (Q.4.3)
4.4 The annual total gross wages was linked up with the above 
financial targets. (Q.4.6)
4.5 SCM2 exceeded the target income tax every year until 1992. 
In general, the labour efficiency and productivity have been 
increased after shareholding conversion compared with the 
ERC system because without good profit there would be no 
handsome dividends distributed and the share market price 
would be affected as well. However, under the ERC system, 
once the target profit has been achieved, the predetermined 
wages, bonuses, and benefits-in-kind will be awarded plus 
other favourable terms like bank loan repayment could be tax 
deductable. Therefore, all the personnel in SCM2 have been 
facing higher pressure and challange to enhance the overall 
economic efficiency year after year. (Q.4.5, 9 & 10)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with 
the government and bureau in setting the above targets. The 
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the three parties. 
(Q.4.7-8)
4.7 The ERC was ceased in 1993 after SCM2 had been transformed 
into a shareholding enterprise and subject to a preferential 
income tax rate of 15%. (Q.4.12 & 13)
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m  ,
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.8)" after 
1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992
After 1992
all the production factories were "cost centres" 
managed by the factory managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expense 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
the organisation structure was consolidated from 
over 20 departments into 6 major departments in 
1992 when converting into a shareholding enterprise 
The production factories and tertiary enterprises 
are treated as profit centres and measured mainly 
by internal profit. All the other management and 
and service departments remain "expense centres" 
controlled by budgets.
to "Medium (2.5)" 
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High (1..5) "
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 the factory managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management. 
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
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After 1992 : the primary profit responsibility lies with the 
factory managers who initiate the annual budgets 
and IRCs and get their subordinates (middle and 
lower management) involved. Obviously, changing 
into profit centres is reasonable.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the general manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the Bureau, and some senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required Bureau1s approval.
After 1992 : the general manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the Corporation. The general manager 
can appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
factory managers. The factory and department 
managers can suggest changes in organisation 
structure and personnel affairs to the general 
manager for approval.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production as agreed with the factories.
After 1992 : the transfer prices are based on market prices less 
discounts to provide for some profit margins. The 
top management tries to reduce interference in the 
setting of transfer prices, quantities and timings.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Decentralization H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Appointment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Interdependencies H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8)
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5 . 2  R e v i e w  P r o c e s s  ( P l a n n i n g  & B u d g e t i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium-Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 8 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the top management after 
discussion and agreement with Bureau. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the Bureau.
After 1992 : Corporation has delegated the long term planning
and annual budgeting autonomy to the top management 
but strategic plans and annual financial targets 
still have to be reviewed, discussed and modified 
with the Corporation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans and annual 
budgets but initiation from the middle management 
(i.e. factory managers) was limited.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the board of directors to the factory managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
\3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8
Before. 1992
After 1992
long term planning was top-down process but 
middle management (i.e factory managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
middle management is being consulted on the long 
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
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Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
f
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans 
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management in mid-year but amendments were 
made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the board of
directors twice every year end and significant 
changes should be discussed with the Corporation 
and informed to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets are reviewed quarterly between the 
top and middle management and amendments can be 
made and notified to the lower management 
immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) M-L (2.8)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "improve efficiency" and "increase profit or cost 
control" were the major strategic themes given to 
and imbedded into the planning and control system.
After 1992 : "textile is the mainstream business" and
"diversification is the breakthrough venture" have 
been the strategic themes since the shareholding 
conversion in 1992.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2) " ?
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : the following strategic thrusts have been 
promulgated since 1992 :
- production facilities should be rennovated to 
further enhance product quality
- streamline the organisation structure and reduce 
the number of employees
- sustain steady profit growth and maintain a 
reasonable return to shareholders
- employ advanced management techniques to achieve 
a modern enterprise system
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, selling price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the factory managers and division heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the ultimate annual sales and profit targets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
(2.5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
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Factors Before
c ______
1992 After 1992
Theme VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Thrust High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.2) Medium (2.3)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : the board of directors has to initiate its own long 
term plans and compromise with the Corporation who 
may insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and profit level.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1996-2000), includes competitive 
edge, research and development, product and market 
development, facility relocation, joint ventures, 
and diversification through tertiary enterprises.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
f
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow SCM2 to participate in the 5- 
year's planning with the Bureau and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : has to formulate their own long term strategic
plans which are submitted to the Corporation for 
review and approval. Some projects involved 
significant capital investment require financial 
arrangement by the Corporation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the 
Bureau with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee’s representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 19 92 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the Corporation 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because SCM2 caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  from  "High-Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 3 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992
After 1992
government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and working capital.
top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the factory managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992
After 1992
top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the factory managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
board of directors provided major guidelines to the 
factory managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u n ica t ion  ( Q . 5 . 5 . 6  & 8)
Before 1992 annual plans and budgets were reviewed quarterly 
and amendments were seldom made except under 
significant environmental changes. Annual plans 
were communicated to middle and lower management 
in written forms.
After 1992 top and middle management review the annual plans 
and budgets monthly and amendments are made due 
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High -Medium to rt 0 Medium-
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.3)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : before the IRC system started in 1993, the
production factories were measured against targets 
such as production mix quantities and costs.
After 1992 after implementing the IRC in 1993, the major 
targets measured are output quantity, internal 
profit, operation management, quality and safety.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to 
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
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(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
f
Before 19 92 : factory managers had to discuss and compromise the 
production quantity and cost targets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : factory managers negotiate and agree the IRC 
targets with the general manager during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets agreed by the production managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective factory managers and 
their employees.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets and qualitative 
factors such as quality and safety had veto effect 
on the bonus to be awarded.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
factory managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1)
1 .1
1.2
Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992
Interdepen­
dencies 
Transfer 
Price Basis
Production & service 
departments involved 
standard cost and 
standard cost plus
1.3 Transfer Price Very little between
Negotiation
1.4 Intermediate 
Product
1.5 Transfer 
Quantity
1.6 Arbitration
1.7 Government
Interference
buyer and seller 
Some buy and sell are 
available in market 
Mostly determined by 
the top management 
Prices and quantities 
mainly determined by 
top management 
No, except the output 
volumes & selling 
prices of products
After 1992
Production & service 
departments involved 
market price less 
internal discount 
Some negotiations 
are allowed 
Some buy & sell are 
available in market 
Excess output can 
be sold externally 
Mainly determined by 
top management but 
negotiations allowed 
No, only suggest 
volumes & prices of 
final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the top management and the factory 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflicts 
were arbitrated by the general manager. Factory 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by production volume and cost.
After 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities are 
still controlled by the top management although 
some negotiations are allowed for the factory 
managers because they are measured on internal 
profit. Interference from and arbitration by the 
general manager are necessary.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 the standard costs and profit margins used to set 
the transfer prices were determined during the 
annual planning exercise without much inputs from 
the middle management. The transfer prices were 
reviewed quarterly and some amendments were allowed
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After 1992 : the market price less internal discount is used for 
setting the transfer prices which are reviewed 
monthly. Standard costs is still used as transfer 
prices for the production support factories.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Finance (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH-H (1.0)* High (1.5)
1.2 Staffing High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) Low(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<------------------------------------Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2 . 6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) P e r s o n n e l #  ( Q . 6 . 1 . 1 )
f Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.3 Training High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.4 Evaluation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.3) Medium (2.2)
# Miss Zhou said that since 1992, more delegation has been given 
to the factory managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the general manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6..1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.6)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
factories and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms 
Overall Control Influence
High
High
VH-H
(1.4)
(1.3)
(1 .0)
High (1 .2)
After 1992
Medium (2.1) 
Medium (2.2) 
H-M (1.6)
H-M (2 .0)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q . 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.7)
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# Miss Zhou has mentioned ? that the monthly condensed report 
format is unique for each factory. The actuals are compared with 
the budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be 
highlighted in order to bring the attention to the general 
manager. For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, 
the general manager or deputy-general managers will contact the 
respective factory manager and his subordinates to dig out the 
underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production factories were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production volume and internal profit are the
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production management, resource 
consumption and quality are measured.
Corpo r a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
factory or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the factory managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual factory or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1 -7,15-16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1..0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) H-M (2.0)
• H-M (1.7) H-M (1.8)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SCM2 which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the general manager 
and the factory manager decides what level of group bonus will be 
given to the factory. It is up to a factory manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the SCM2 ' s core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 30-50% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 20-30% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5)»
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating 
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u nica t ion  (Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees
every month via the factory or department managers.
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1..7) H-M (1..8)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1..0) High (1..5)
Participation VH-H (1..0) H-M (2..0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1..0) H-M (2.,0)
Overall Control Influence High (1..2) H-M (1..8)
346
S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* High to 
Medium (1.8)
Medium
to Low (2.8)
Review Process*
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
High
High
(1.5)
(1.2)
Medium
to Low (2.8) 
Medium (2.3)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0) Low (3.3)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High to 
Medium (1.6)
Medium
to Low (2.7)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.1)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have beenfemployed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic | Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
 4  3 2 1 0
0 (1.9, 2.7) - SCM2 Post-1992 X (1.1, 1.6) - SCM2 Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial 
Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very 
strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style as 
described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
3 J u l y  1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 15" (31 March 1995).
Name of SOE : Shanghai Xinhua Iron & Steel Works (SXSW)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Ni Zhong Fong, Deputy Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 4 years)
Mr Zhang Ke Qin (Financial Accountant)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 27 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 11 September 1993
Second Visit - 7 September 1994
Third Visit - 12 January 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 SXSW was founded in 193 9 and then transformed into a wholly 
state-owned enterprise in early 1950s. It is producing 
medium and small sized iron and steel products. After over 
56 years of development, SXSW has become one of the key 
enterprises under the Ministry of Metallurgy and is a large 
profit making enterprise in Shanghai. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 Employing 5,600 employees and covering an area of 204,000 
square metres, SXSW produces 600,000 tons of steel, 400,000 
tons of billet and 12,000 tons of rolled steel annually. 
SXSW was awarded the title of First-Class Enterprise of the 
State and National Labour Day (1st of May) Certificate of 
Merit in 1990. (Q.1.2)
1.3 The major products of SXSW can be classified into the 
following 10 categories : (Q.1.3)
(1) Rolled Steel (i.e. seamless steel pipe, thin plate)
(2) Window's Frame Steel (for buildings)
(3) Deformed (Thread) Bar (for building construction)
(4) Steel for automobiles and farm tools
(5) Steel for spinning and weaving machines
(6) Steel for standard parts
(7) Steel for sewing machine
(8) Steel for electrical appliance
(9) Steel for aviation and ship building
(10) Other section and figured bar steel
1.4 From 1973 to 1993, a total amount of 440,000 tons of rolled
steel had been exported and US$154 million had been earned. 
However, the export quantity has been declined since 1993 
because the average selling prices are higher than the steel 
products manufactured by other Asian countries such as 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia etc. Less than 2% of SXSW's
products were exported in 1994. (Q.1.4)
1.5 With, strong technical expertise and advanced manufacturing
technology, SXSW has kept on upgrading its production
facilities. At present, SXSW is installing an annual 
300,000-ton model steel and round bar production line, 
importing a newest continuous rolling mill from Pomini
Company of Italy and an electronic automatic control system 
from ABB Company of Sweden, which are expected to start 
production in 1995. SXSW is committed to satisfying its 
customers with products of more variety and higher quality. 
(Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 SXSW has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next five years because it is 
the government policy to keep a macroeconomic control over 
the steel industry in China. (Q.2.1)
2.2 SXSW is neither a holding or subsidiary enterprise. (Q,2,4)
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2.3 Under the General Manaer, who has an Enterprise Management 
Office, the organisation structure of SXSW can be divided 
into the following four divisions : (Q.2.3, 5 & 9)
(1) Production Division (Deputy-GM)
1.1 Production Planning Department (Deputy-Chief 
Economist*)
1.2 Production Technical Department (Deputy-Chief 
Engineer*)
1.3 Quality Control Department
1.4 No.l Refine Rolling Factory#
1.5 No.2 Refine Rolling Factory#
1.6 No.3 Rolling Factory#
1.7 No.l Steel Factory#
1.8 No.2 Steel Factory#
1.9 No.3 Steel Factory#
1.10 No.4 Steel Factory#
(2) Operation Division (Deputy-GM)
2.1 Operation Planning Department
2.2 Purchasing Department
2.3 Sales Department
2.4 Accounting & Finance Department (Deputy-Chief 
Accountant*)
2.5 Internal Audit Department
(3) Support Division (Deputy-GM)
3.1 Repair & Maintenance Department
3.2 Energy Supply Department (electricity, gas & water
(4) Administration Division (Deptuy-GM)
4.1 Personnel Department
4.2 Manpower & Wages Department
4.3 General Affairs Department
4.3.1 Education & Training
4.3.2 Safety & Security
4.3.3 Estate & Quarters
4.3.4 Medical
* The deputy chiefs are one rank lower than the depty 
general managers.
# Each production factory has a few production sections, 
support sections, 1 repair and maintenance section and 1 
administration section (including personnel, wages, 
accounting and statistics).
@ All the production factories and service departments are 
treated as cost centres.
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2.7 SXSW is under the administration of the Shanghai Municipal
Government and the Shanghai Metuallurgy Bureau who dictated 
all planning and control systems of SXSW before 1992. Since 
the e c o nomic reforms started in 1979, instead of 
dictatorship from the authorities, the top management of 
SXSW have been involved in the 5-year long term plan even 
though SXSW for most of the time had to take the directives 
from and give in their n e g o t i a t i o n s  to these two 
authorities. (Q.2.6 & Q.2.7)
2.8 SXSW is a medium SOE having 5,600 employees (4,0 00 workers) 
and 1,800 retired employees. Mr Huang has said that about 
20% of SXSW's employees are redundant but the life-long 
employment concept still exists. (Q.2.10)
# Since SXSW is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to SXSW.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets
3.2 Turnover
: RMB 500M (historical cost) (Q.3.1)
RMB 946M 
RMB1,335M 
RMB1,236M 
RMB1,3 00M
(1992)
(1993)
(1994)*
(1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 & 7)
* The 7.4% decrease in turnover (including 17% of VAT) was 
mainly due to the government macro-economic control policies 
(i.e. contraction of certain industries and availability of 
capital) and keen competition under the market economy.
3.3 Income before tax : RMB 15M (1992) - 1.6% of sales
RMB 19M (1993) - 1.4% of sales
RMB 13M (1994) - 1.1% of sales#
RMB 10M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.5, 6 & 7)
# The decrease in net profit margin was mainly due to 
reduced selling prices (affected by cheaper imported 
products) and high inflation (affected the cost of 
production). Another reason to cut selling prices was to 
r e d u c e  i n v e n t o r y  a n d  o b t a i n  c a s h  to r e p a y  the 
long-outstanding creditors. Contrary, SXSW had a total of 
doubtful debts (accounts receivable) of RMB200M at the end 
of 1994.
3.4 Income tax rate : 33% (before and after 1992) (Q.3.6)
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3 .5 SXSW is planning to maintain an average growth rate in 
turnover from 10% to 20% during 1996 to 2000. Mr Ni is 
quite optimistic on this forecast since the overall demand 
of iron and steel products is in parallel with the uprising 
trend of the economic development in China. (Q.3.7 & 8)
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to SXSW because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 SXSW signed the first 5-year's (1989-1993) ERC with the 
Shanghai Municipal Government in 1983. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The major target set in the ERC was income before tax of 
RMB2.4 million in the first year and then an annual compound 
growth rate of 5%. (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
4.3 There were different forms of ERCs for the state-owned 
enterprises to choose from and which had different financial 
and non-financial targets. The chosen format was mutually 
agreed between the government and SXSW. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government in setting the above targets. Mr Ni believed 
that the growth rate of 5% was underestimated and proved by 
the actual results subsequently. (Q.4.5,7-10)
4.5 The ERC was ceased at the end of 1993. Since 1994, SXSW has 
been subject to income tax of 33%. (Q.4.5, 9, 12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate 
(1)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the 7 production factories were "cost centres" 
managed by the factory managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expense 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
After 1992 : the 7 production factories are independent respon­
sibility centres that are run by individual factory 
managers with clear lines of responsibility.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e *  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2) " f
* By using a 5-point scale - 
(consistent with the scale 
used in the questionnaire 
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify 
some of the parameters or 
variables)
Very High (0)
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Very Low (4)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
Very High [VH] (0..0 - 0 ,.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0,.6 - 1 ,.0)
High [H] (1..1 - 1 . 5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1..6 - 2 ,.0)
Medium [M] (2..1 - 2 .5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2..6 - 3 ,.0)
Low [L] (3..1 - 3 .5)
Very Low [VL] (3..6 - 4 .0)
(2) Decentrali zation (Q.5.]L. 2)
Before 1992 : the factory managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management. 
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : it goes further in decentralising responsibility 
such as initiating the annual budget or internal 
responsibility contract and setting up of sections 
within individual factory. The production, 
manpower and cost control responsibilities lie with 
the factory managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the general manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the government, and some senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required government's approval.
After 1992 : the general manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the government. The general manager 
can appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
factory managers. The factory managers can decide 
their own organisation structures and personnel 
affairs but important changes should be approved by 
the headquarters.
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Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1)" to "Medium (2.5)"
e
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the internal transfer prices and quantities were
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost without any profit margin.
After 1992 same as before 1992 but discussions and comprises 
are allowed for the factories in concern.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5) 
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
to "High (1.5)"
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Decentralization High . (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Appointment VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Interdependencies VH (0.5) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.1)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.6)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992
After 1992
long-term planning was initiated, monitored, 
reviewed and modified by the government while the 
top management was in consultation only. The 
annual budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the government.
the government has delegated the long term planning 
and annual budgeting autonomy to the top management 
but Mr Ni has said that strategic plans still 
have to be reviewed, discussed and modified with 
the government.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2.5) «
"Very High-High (1)" to "Medium
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(2) O p e r a t i o n  ( Q .5 . 7 . 1 - 5 )
Before 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures were in 
existence to formulate, evaluate, approve and 
review the long term plans and annual budgets but 
initiation from the middle management was limited.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous processes are used for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual 
plans and IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by 
the top management to the factory managers to 
formulate their own budgets and IRCs. They are 
also consulted in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was a top-down process but 
middle management (i.e. factory managers) did 
participate in the annual planning & budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "Medium
(2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the government reviewed and amended the long term
plans with the top management annually. Changes 
were notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management quarterly but amendments were 
made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : Long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
during every year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with the government and 
informed the employees during the AGM. The annual 
budgets are reviewed monthly between the top and 
middle management and amendments can be made but 
flexible budgets are not used.
356
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
f
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) M-L (2.6)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : the following 3 strategic themes have always been 
promulgated as the spirit of the enterprises -
(1) Unity of all the employees
(2) Truthfulness to customers, employees and other 
outsiders
(3) Innovation of product and management quality
After 1992 : as before 1992 and the factory managers are
encouraged to make strategic or tactical suggestions 
to realise these themes and thrusts in both short 
and medium term i.e. suggest capital investment 
projects.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : technological improvement (long and short term), 
efficiency enhancement and capacity expansion are 
the strategic thrusts emphasized in the planning 
process. There have been significant manufacturing 
technology and production efficiency advancement 
since the late 1980s by importing new plants and 
machines form the Eruopean countries and the USA.
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These production facility renovations have always 
been receiving? top priorities in the capital 
appropriation budget which is formed an integral 
part of the anual planning exercise.
Ater 1992 : the following 4 strategic thrusts are spelt out 
by some means i.e. brochures and noticeboards :
(1) adjust product mix according to market needs
(2) enhance the product qualtiy
(3) develop new products
(4) develop existing and new markets
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, transfer price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : the headquarters has left more freedom to the 
factory managers to adjust their planning and 
operation as long as they would not deviate much 
from the long term plan and annual budget.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Thrust High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
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5 . 4  Long-Term  P l a n s  f
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 4 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 4 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
After 1992
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes suggested by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the government 
in terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
right to export, product and market development, 
the top management has to initiate its own long 
term plans and compromise with the government who 
may insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and mix. The current 5-year planning (1991- 
1995), includes product differentiation and 
diversification, production technology and facility 
enhancement, production capacity expansion, market 
penetration and diversification, manpower and 
training, cost reduction, merger and takeover, 
plant relocation and computerisation.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the government 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. It was a mean for the 
government to allocate limited resources, such as 
capital, to SXSW according to the central plans.
After 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures are in 
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. It is a way for 
the top management to allocate limited resources to 
different divisions according to the market demand, 
product profitability and government suggestions.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 the long term plans were compromises between the 
local government and the SXSW without any involve­
ment from the middle management of the factories.
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After 1992 : long term plans are formulated through substantial 
analysis, evaluation and discussion among the top 
management and the senior staff of the production
factories. Mr Ni anticipates that ist is very
difficult to formulate the 1996-2000 plan because 
of a lot of fast-changing external factors such as 
macro-economic control, market economy, enterprise 
reform, credit control and doubtful debts.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
government with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the government 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking a long term bank loan. A summary of the 
long term plans is distributed to all members of 
the planning committee.
Corporate Planning Influence : 
"High-Medium (2) "
"Very H i g h - H i g h (1) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning 
Operation 
Participation 
Review & Communication
High
High
High
VH-H
(1.5)
(1.5)
(1.5) 
(1.0)
Medium
Medium
Medium
H-M
(2.5)
(2.5)
(2.5) 
(2.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because SXSW caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h -M e d iu m  C o r p o r a t e
( 1 . 6 ) "  b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium-Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 ) " a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : the government involved in the process and provided 
major economic targets. The top management had to 
negotiate and compromise for approval.
After 1992 : both the mechanism transformation legislation and 
the market economy have given SXSW more freedom to 
plan ahead. The municipal government and bureau 
have almost completely devolved the short-term 
planning autonomy to SXSW, except to agree on the 
profit targets as agreed in the ERC.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management initiated the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
then compromised with the factory managers.
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different profit 
and cost centres.
After 1992 : top management provided major guidelines to the
factory managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins. Long term plans, special projects, product 
demands and profitability are considered in this 
annual resource allocation exercise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : middle management i.e. factory managers had to
discuss and compromise the budgets suggested by the 
top management without much rooms for negotiation 
and effective communication.
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After 19 92 : factory managers have to formulate their own
budgets and get the lower management involved but 
top management's expectations should be observed. 
This change of budgeting style maintains better 
understandings between the different levels of 
management at least to work out a set of more 
realistic budgets which are acceptable by the 
factories and departments to be measured against.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 19 92 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed in the
middle of the year and amendments were seldom made 
except under signifcant environmental changes. 
Annual plans were communicated to middle and lower 
management in document twice every year.
After 19 92 : planning committee reviews the annual plans and 
budgets quarterly and amendments are made due to 
unavoidable internal and external factors. A fixed 
budget concept is still in force. Other than AGM 
and budget book, the budget information is further 
communicated between top and middle management 
during the monthly performance evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Operation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (3.0)
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h -M e d iu m  C o r p o r a t e
( 1 . 6 ) "  b e f o r e  1992  t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 3 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : major targets set were production volume and mix,
and standard costs while qualitative targets such 
as safety, quality, resource consumption etc. were 
also defined. Since most of these targets were top 
down without much negotiations, therefore, factory 
or department managers did not have much control. 
The IRC system was started in 1988 and mainly 
applied to the production factories.
After 1992 : major targets are output volume, product quality, 
input/output ratio, cost of production, safety, 
energy consumption and new product success. These
targets are all linked up with the quarterly bonus
determination. A sample of IRC is shown in section
5.6 of the Data Analysis Set 15.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : factory managers negotiated and compromised the
targets suggested by the top management during the 
annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : the IRCs are initiated by the factory managers
during the budgeting process. After back and forth 
discussions and negotiations with top management, 
the IRCs are agreed and signed by the general 
manager and factory managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : IRCs were reviewed in the middle of the year and 
amendments could be made when mutually agreed by 
the top management and factory managers. IRCs were
documented and informed to the respective factory 
managers and their employees.
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After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. Second-tier IRCs are signed 
between the factory manager and production lines in 
order to further delegate the planning and control 
responsibilities. Mr Ni agreed that IRC was an 
effective way to achieve the short term targets on 
one hand and improve the budget communication 
between the different levels of management on the 
other hand. Furthermore, IRC can link up 
performance with the incentive scheme as a fair 
means for resource (i.e. bonus) distribution.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
factory managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-!Low (3)
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Incentive High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6) Low (3.3)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  fr o m  "Very  H i g h - H i g h  C o r p o r a t e
( 0 . 7 ) "  b e f o r e  1992  t o  "High C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Interdepen­ All 7 production All 7 production
dencies factories involved factories involved
1. 2 Transfer Standard cost Standard cost
Price Basis
1.3 Transfer Price A little between the Some negotiations
Negotiation buyer and seller are allowed
1. 4 Intermediate Buy and sell available Buy and sell
Product in the market available in market
1.5 Transfer All determined by the Excess over quota
Quantity headquarters can sell externally
1. 6 Arbitration Prices and quantities Mainly determined by
all determined by HQ HQ although negotia-
ions are allowed
1.7 Government No, except the output No, only suggest
Interference volumes & selling volumes & prices of
prices of final products final products
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0 .5)" to "High (1.5)"
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
Before 1992 : nearly all the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the headquarters and the factory 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflicts 
were arbitrated by the headquarters. Factory 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by production volume & cost.
After 1992 : most of the transfer prices and quantities are
still controlled by the headquarters although some 
negotiations are allowed for the factory managers 
although they are treated as cost centres. 
Interference from and arbitration by the 
the headquarters are quite often. Mr Ni said 
that it was because the demand and supply of steel 
products in the market have been quite volatile in 
the 1990s, so the headquarters, having more 
information, could make better decisions on 
transfer quantities and prices.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
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(3) R e v ie w  ( Q . 5 . 9 . 9 - 1 2 )
t
Before 1992 : the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
without much inputs from the middle management. It 
was historical cost plus inflation. The transfer 
prices were reviewed in the middle of the year and 
some amemdments were allowed
After 1992 : the standard costs are still used to determine the 
transfer prices during the annual planning exercise 
when the middle management is consulted. Material 
consumption and cost controls are crucial in order 
to avoid unfairness in internal transfers. The 
transfer prices were reviewed quarterly and some 
amendments were allowed when necessary.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics
Participation
Review
VH
VH
VH-H
(0.5)
(0.5)
(1.0)
High
High
High
(1.5)
(1.5)
(1.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (0.7) High (1.5)
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
f
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH (0.5)* VH-H (1.0)
1.2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Roles & functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1.4 Interactions Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L ow(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2 . 6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
2.2 Assignment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.3 Training Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.5 Remuneration H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.6 Termination VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
H-M (1.7) M-L (2.6)
# Mr Ni said that since 1992, more delegation has been given
the factory managers in the personnel functions such as recruit­
ment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. But 
termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the headquarters and 
the party secretary.
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(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.,6.1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
f Before 1992 After 1992
3.1 Budget VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.2 IRC VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) High (1.5)
3 .4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) High (1.5)
3 . 6 Communication* VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
VH-H (0.9) High (1.3)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
factories and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations. Mr Ni said that the 
control style has not been changed so much mainly because of the 
government’s macroeconomic influence and many uncertainties 
existed in the market.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms
High
H-M
VH-H
(1.5)
(1.7)
(0.9)
Medium
M-L
High
(2.1)
(2.6)
(1.3)
Overall Control Influence High (1.4) H-M (2.0)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q.6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1.0)" 
before 1992 to "Moderate Financial (2.0)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
(2.0)Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
(2.0)on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
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6 . 3  M o n i t o r i n g  R e s u l t s  i
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " T i g h t  F i n a n c i a l  ( 0 . 9 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  " F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 1 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 2 Frequency VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.3 Contents VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Compilation VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 5 Review VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 6 Evaluation VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Authorization VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (0.7) High (1.3)
# Mr Ni has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format is 
unique for each factory. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any variances plus or minus 5% will be 
highlighted in order to bring the attention to the factory 
managers and the top management. For any serious adverse 
variances shown on any report, the general manager or 
deputy-general managers will contact the respective factory 
manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining reasons 
or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is expected 
that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the situation as 
soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : since 1990, production factories have been measured 
on economic, quality, R&D, management and political 
targets as shown in section 6.3 of Data Analysis 15
After 1992 : same types of targets are measured but Mr Ni said 
that financial indicators such as internal profit, 
sales and inventory had been emphasized in order to 
meet the overall economic target as expected by the 
top management and government.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to "Very High 
(0.5)"
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(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
f
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
factory or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the planning committee holds a monthly meeting to 
review the performance reports, to ask the factory 
managers for explanations, to decide corrective 
actions, and to determine penalties and incentives. 
Evaluation results are informed to the lower 
management via individual factory or departmental 
meetings. Middle management has been involved in 
determining the measurement criteria during the 
annual planning process.
Corproate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements 
Performance Measurement 
Review & Communication
Overall Control Influence
VH-H
VH-H
VH-H
(0.7)
(1.0)
(1.0)
High
VH
High
(1.3)
(0.5)
(1.5)
VH-H (0.9) High (1.1)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1) " bef<
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
1.2 Allowances High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.8 Redundancy# Low (3.5) H-M (2.0)
High (1.4) H-M (1.9)
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* Since 1994, a "pointing system" has been using to determine the 
basic wages. The points are calculated based on grade, 
seniority, qualification, technical skill and supervisory duty 
etc. The total point or score of individual employee will be 
multiplied by a "wages per point" factor which is adjusted 
according to the financial performance of the enterprise as a 
whole on a monthly basis. Mr Ni said that in the past, the 
increments from year to year are not substantial and the parity 
between a factory manager and a front-line worker is not great. 
Now this pointing system can differentiate the basic rewards 
between different types of works and employees.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SXSW which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the top management 
and the factory management decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the factory. Whereas, the second-tier IRCs agreed 
between a factory manager and his production lines are used as a 
basis to distribute that total amount of group bonus to the 
respective production lines. In turn, it is up to a production 
line supervisor to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or 
her individual subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
# According to Mr N i 1 s comment, about 15% employees in SXSW are 
redundant. But it is quite difficult to lay off these redundant 
staff because insufficient employment welfare and benefits have 
been established in China. One way to alleviate this problem is 
to transfer a small portion of these employees to the 
self-financed "tertiary enterprises" which are mainly service 
businesses such as retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading 
etc. and unrelated to the SXSW's core business. Another way is 
to send some of employees home without giving them a job or post 
but still provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
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(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6 .5.9-12,17-19)
f
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and
contributed to 50% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was almost impossible.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and
accounts for 40%-45% of total wages. Basic wages 
has been increased and increments take skills, 
knowledge, competance into account instead of 
seniority only. Some allowances and benefits are 
merged with the basic wages. Laying off redundant 
employees is possible but still difficult.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High (0.5)" to "High (1.5)"
(3) Participation ( Q .6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating IRC's
targets to be measured on. Basic wages, allowances
, pension and other benefits were decided by the 
headquarters and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's targets
and negotiate with top management. The policies 
for basic wages, allowances and other benefits 
have involved the labour union and planning 
committee. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and 
then underwritten by the government.
Corporate C on t ro l I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8,13-14,20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees
every month via the factory or department managers.
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After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Planning committee reviews 
the basic wages, allowances and other benefits 
during the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers.
Corporate Co n tr o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives
Performance Orientation
Participation
Review & Communication
High
VH
VH-H
VH-H
(1.4)
(0.5)
(1.0)
(1.0)
H-M
High
H-M
H-M
(1.9)
(1.5)
(2.0)
(2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Xinhua Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before :1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* Very High 
to High (1.0) Medium (2.1)
Review Process*
High (1.3)
Medium 
to Low (2.6)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
' High to 
Medium (1.6)
Medium 
to Low (3.0)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts#
High to 
Medium (1.6) Low (3.3)
Management of Inter­
dependencies*
Very High 
to High (0.7) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.5)
Control Influence Before :1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & Moderate
Control#
Agreeing Objectives* 
Monitoring Results* 
Rewards & Incentives* 
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.4) 
Tight
Financial (1.0) 
Tight
Financial (0.9) 
Tight
Financial (1.0)
F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 1 )
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Financial (1.1)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
Control Influence
Strategic | Financial
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
2---------------------------- 2---------------------------- 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.8, 2.5) - SXSW Post-1992 X (1.1, 1.3) - SXSW Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Xinhua Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) before and after 1992, 
it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
has been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to 
"Financiail Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
9 J u l y  199 5
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data
Analysis 16" (7 April 1995).
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Huang Yan Qing/Finance Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 9 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 29 October 1993
Second Visit - 1 April 1994
Third Visit - 12 August 1994
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 The origin of GLIL was Guangzhou Chemical Oil Refinary 
F a c t o r y  w h i c h  was a w h o l l y  s t a t e - o w n e d  enterprise 
established in 1959. Since then, the company's name has 
been changed three times. 1993 was a critical turning point 
of GLIL since the Guangzhou municipal government approved 
Lonkey as one of the first four state-owned enterprises in 
Guangzhou to issue shares to the public and list in the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This breakthrough has brought GLIL 
more capital for future development and higher autonomy in 
operation and management. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 G L I L  is one of the l a r gest c l e a n i n g  c o n s u m a b l e s
manufacturers in China. Lonkey was ranked in the top 500
Chinese Industrial enterprises in the years of 1990, 1991
and 1992. The current plant site is located at the Eastern 
suburb of Guangzhou city occupying a total area of 100,000 
square metres. The production capacity is able to 
manufacture over 50 product types of 100,000 tons of washing 
powder (clothing), 10,000 tons of soap and 20,000 tons of 
liquid detergent. The total output quantity was 103,331 
tons in 1992 and 120,000 tons in 1993. (Q.1.2)
1.3 GLIL is manufacturing the following 3 major categories of
products : (Q.1.3)
(1) Washing Powder
1.1 Ordinary Type
1.2 Condense Type
1.3 BIO Special Type
(2) Detergent Liquid
2.1 Kitchen Use
2.2 Bathroom Use
2.3 Toilet Use
2.4 Glass Use
2.5 Matal Use
2 .6 Fabric Softener
2.7 Fabirc Pre-wash
(3) Bathing Consumables
3.1 Soap
3.2 Foam Bath
3.3 Shampoo
3.4 Hair Conditioner
1.4 Other than the domestic sales (95%) to various provinces and 
cities, GLIL has been approved the "import and export right" 
to sell its products to North America, Western Europe, 
Africa, Middle East, Hong Kong, Macau and other Sotheast 
Asian countries. (Q.1.4)
1.5 After the transformation into a listed public company in 
19 93, the growth rates of output value, turnover and income 
before tax were increased to 25%, 34% and 43% respectively. 
The joint-venture with P&G of the USA since 1993 would 
further increase the business volume and profit level in the 
next five years. (Q.1.5)
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Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
f
2.1 GLIL has been a wholly state-owned enterprise since 1959 and 
it was converted into a shareholding enterprise and listed 
in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on 8 November 1993 by issuing 
15% of the authorized shares to the employees and 25% to the 
general public. The local government is the majority 
shareholder by holding 60% of the shares. A total of RMB140
million of share capital was raised to finance a series of
long term projects. (Q.2.1 & 2.2)
2.2 GLIL is neither a holding nor subsidiary enterprise. (Q.2.4)
2.3 Under the Board of Directors, the organisation structure of
GLIL is based on functional basis led by the General Manager 
who has a General Manager Office. (Q.2.3)
2.4 The organisation structure is listed as follow:(Q.2.5 & 2.9)
Board of Directors* :
Chairman (also the General Manager)
Vice-Chairman (also the Party Secretary)
Directors - 3 Deputy-General Managers 
Chief Engineer 
Labour Union Representative
* The terms of the chairman is usually 5 years. The board 
of directors usually hold a meeting every month.
Factory Management :
(1) Production Department (Deputy-GM)
1.1 No.l Washing Powder Factory*
1.2 No.2 Washing Powder Factory*
1.3 Soap Factory* @
1.4 No.l Liquid Detergent Factory* @
1.5 No.2 Liquid Detergent Factory*
1.6 Energy & Power Factory*
(2) Production Planning Department )
(3) Technical Support Department j
(4) Engineering Department** J (Chief Engineer)
(5) Research Department J
(6) Quality & Inspection Department }
(7) Marketing Department J
(8) Sales Department j (Deputy-GM)
(9) Import & Export Department }
(10) Purchasing Department J
(11) Finance Department j (Deputy-GM)
(12)' Personnel Department J
(13) Security Department }
(14) Party & Labour Union Office
(15) Employee's Collective Companies#
15.1 Repair & Maintenance Service Company
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15.2 Transportation Service Company
15.3 Industrial Trading Service Company
15.4 Packaging & Container Service Company
15.5 Human Resource Service Company
(16) Branch Office in Hong Kong##
* The five production factories and the supporting factory 
are all treated as profit centres having a factory manager, 
a deputy manager, a few supervisors, technicians and 
clerical staff. There are three 8-hour production shifts in 
each factory. Each shift has a leader, deputy leader, group 
leaders and workers who are all concerning the production 
target setting very much. They all have entered into 
Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRCs) with the Factory 
General Manager on an annual basis.
** Mainly provides spare parts, repair and maintenance 
services.
@ The Soap Factory and No.l Liquid Detergent Factroy were 
transferred into a joint-venture with the P&G Corporation of 
the USA in 1994. Therefore, they have become a separate 
legal entity and their IRCs were ceased in the same year. 
Their products are sold back to GLIL for selling to the 
end-users.
# The five employee's collective companies are separated 
legal entities formed and managed by some GLIL's employees. 
In order to support the formation of these servicing or 
"tertiary enterprises", GLIL has charged them the rent of 
premises and other facilities including energy and power 
provided. They are providing various suporting services to 
the production factories and other departments of GLIL. 
They are free to sell their services to outside customers. 
However, they are formally included in the organisation 
structure of GLIL.
## The branch office in Hong Kong is responsible for 
importing raw materials (subject to 7% custom duties) for 
production in Guangzhou and exporting some final products to 
overseas countries.
2.5 GLIL is under the administration of the Guangzhou Light 
Industrial Bureau. In responding to and implementing of the 
"SOE Operation Mechanism Transformation Regulations" enacted 
by the People's Congress in July 1992, the bureau has 
delegated the planning and control responsibilities to the 
top' management of GLIL to run their own business. 
Furthermore, the investment autonomy has been delegated and 
raising capital for project investment can be arranged by 
GLIL on its own.
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The roles played by the Bureau are appointing the chief 
executives (i.e. chairman, general manager and party 
secretary), reviewing major capital investment projects and 
supplying information on government policies. (Q.2.6 & 2.7)
2.6 GLIL is a medium size SOE having 1,450 full-time (including
1,000 workers) and 500 retired employees. All the employees 
have signed employment contracts with duration from one to 
ten years since 1993. (Q.2.10)
# Since GLIL is neither a holding nor a subsidiary enterprise, 
questions Q.2.8 and Q.2.11 are not applicable to GLIL.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8#)
3.1 Total assets : RMB 279M (1993)* (Q.3.1)
* The total assets (fixed + current) have been revaluated
once when changing into shareholding in November 1993.
3.2 Turnover : RMB 3 97M (1992)
RMB 530M (1993)
RMB 610M (1994)# (Q.3.2 & 3.7)
# The slow down of sales growth was due to keen competition 
of this industry in Guangzhou and Shenzhen with foreign 
invested joint-ventures such as from Hong Kong. In 
addition, the effects of macro-economic control policies 
implemented by the government in July 1993 was surfaced out 
in 1994 and 1995.
3.3 Income before tax : RMB 30M (1992) - 7.6% of sales
(Q.3.5, 6 & 7) RMB 43M (1993) - 8.1% of sales
RMB 44M (1994) - 7.2% of sales@
@ In light of high inflation in Guangzhou (30% in 1993 and 
20% in 1994), G L I L 1s p r o f i t  m a r g i n  was d e c l i n e d  
significantly in 1994. However, GLIL is subject to some 
limitations from the government in raising the selling 
prices because its products are daily necessities for the 
general public.
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% (before November 1993)
15% (from November 1993)+ (Q.3.6)
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+ Since GLIL is a shareholding enterprise located in one of 
the 14 economic development cities, it can enjoy a reduced 
income tax rate of 15% instead of 55% (before 1994) or 33% 
(from 1994) applied to the other state-owned enterprises. 
Furthermore, the VAT is 17% instead of the previous sales 
tax of 14% and as result, the turnover tax has been 
increased by 0.5% as from 1993.
3.5 GLIL is expecting a continuous growth of turnover in the 
range of 10% to 30% in the 1990s. This financial objective 
is feasible since the P&G joint-venture can bring in 
production, marketing and management technologies among the 
other benefits as well. (Q.3.7 & 3.8)
# Q.3.4 is not applicable to GLIL because it is neither a holding 
nor a subsidiary enterprise.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 GLIL entered into the first 5-year (1986-1990) ERC with the
Guangzhou Finance Bureau in 1986. (Q.4.1)
4.2 Based on the profits of the previous three years and
substiantial negotiation, the first year target profit was
set at RMB14.55 million with an annual growth rate of 5%.
The income tax for the target profit level was 55% and any
excess profit over the target would be split 25/75 between 
the government and GLIL. An example is shown in section 4 
of Data Analysis 16. (Q.4.2-4 & Q.4.6)
4.5 The adoption of ERC seperated the management autonomy out 
from the government and defined the duties, rights and 
benefits between the government and the enterprise. It made 
GLIL to be really a self-operating, self-financing, 
self-developing and self-regulating enterprise and to 
initiate the motivation of the management and workers.
To facilitate the attainment of the above targets, GLIL has 
set up regular meetings between the top and middle 
management; and also guidelines for decision-making 
procedures. As a result, GLIL achieved all the quantitative 
targets in all the 5 years. (Q.4.5, 9 & 10)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with 
the Finance Bureau in setting the above targets. The chosen 
terms were mutually agreed by both parties. (Q.4.7 & 8)
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4.7 In 1991, GLIL signed the second 5-year (1991-1995) ERC with 
similar terms and conditions. This second ERC was 
terminated in November 1993 when GLIL was transformed into a 
shareholding enterprise and no profit target has been 
assigned since then. After changing into a shareholding 
enterprise, more autonomy has been delegated by the 
government to GLIL and almost all the policy and decision 
making are rest with the board of directors. (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.6)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (3)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992
After 1992
all the 5 production factories and the supporting 
factory were "cost centres" managed by the 
factory managers. All the other management and 
service departments were "expenses centres" under 
tight expense budgets.
it went to some length in 1993 to convert the 5 
production factories and the supporting factory 
into "profit centres" and "semi-profit centres" 
respectively managed by the factory managers with 
higher autonomy in management and operation. All 
the other management and service departments remain 
"expense centres" whose managers participate in 
the budgeting process.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High (1. 5) "
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
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(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
f
Before 1992 : the factory managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) between the top management and 
factory managers. Therefore, classifying the 
factories into cost centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : the primary profit responsibility lies with the 
factory managers who initiate the annual budgets 
and IRCs and get their subordinates (middle and 
lower management) involved. Obviously, changing 
into profit centres is reasonable.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the general manager and party secretary were
appointed by the Bureau. The general manager could 
appoint the other senior staff and recommended 
major organisational changes for Bureau's approval.
After 1992 : the chairman and party secretary are appointed by 
the Bureau whereas the BOD can appoint the top 
top management such as the general and deputy 
managers. The general manager can appoint all the 
other senior staff such as the factory managers.
The factory managers can suggest changes in 
organisation structure and personnel affairs to the 
general manager for approval.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production without any profit margin. Some 
discussions are allowed for the buyers and sellers.
After 1992 : the transfer prices are based on the standard cost 
plus or market prices less discounts to provide for 
some profit margins. Most of the transfer prices 
setting are suggested by the Enterprise Management 
Office to the respective units for discussion and 
compromise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
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F a c t o r s  ? B e f o r e  1992 A f t e r  1992
Responsibility Centre . High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Decentralization High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Appointment H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Interdependencies High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6) M-L (3.0)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.3)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed, compromised and approved the 
long term plans initiated by the top management.
The annual planning and budgeting processes have 
already been delegated to the top management but 
subject to review and modification by the Bureau.
After 19 92 : both the long term and annual planning exercises 
are fully responsible by the board of directors 
although some strategic issues are still have to be 
discussed with the Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to discuss and compromise 
the long term plans raised by latter. Formal and 
rigorous processes have been used for the annual 
planning and budgeting so that middle management 
started to be involved.
After 1992 : long term plans are submitted to the Bureau for
review and suggestions, whereas the annual plans or 
budgets are just sent to the Bureau for information 
Middle management have to initiated their budgets 
and get their subordinates involved.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
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(3) P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q. 5 . 7 . 6 - 8 )
Before 1992 : middle management was only consulted in the long 
term planning process but they did participate in 
the annual planning and budgeting processes.
After 1992 : through the formal planning meetings, the middle 
management is involved in the formulation and 
review of the long term plans. They have to 
discuss with the lower management in compiling 
their own annual budgets and IRCs although some 
specific suggestions and directions are coming from 
the board and top management during the negotiation
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 19 92 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans 
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management quarterly but amendments were 
made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the board and top 
management during year end and significant changes 
should be discussed with the Bureau and informed to 
the employees during the AGM. The annual budgets 
are reviewed monthly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notified 
to the lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High -Medium (2)" to "Medium-
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.3) Low (3.3)
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5 . 3  S t r a t e g i c  Themes,  T h r u s t s  & S u g g e s t i o n s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 )  11
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : GLIL has been emphasizing that "quality" is the 
strategic theme or life of its products. It has 
been acquiring washing powder and soap production 
lines from Italy which are capable to generate 
world-class products.
After 1992 : the production processes have adopted a "quality 
rejection" system so that to guarantee that all 
passed outputs attain national or international 
standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "product development" is a major strategic thrust 
focused by GLIL. Its research and development 
department is the most powerful cleaning consumable 
laboratory in the Guangdong province.
After 1992 : quality assurance staff are sent out to sample 
inspect its products selling in the market and 
listen to the opinion of the consumers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the
planning and review process such as sales quantity 
and mix, selling price, marketing strategy and 
production quantity and mix in order to ensure the 
"profit before income tax" as agreed with the 
Bureau could be achieved.
After 1992 : after the promotion of the legislation in 1992, the 
top management still sometimes make suggestions on 
the above issues. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given more freedom to the factory 
managers and department heads to compile their own 
plans or budgets and to adjust their operations
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Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5
e
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5
After 1992
Theme High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Thrust High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Suggestions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.8)" after 
1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992
After 1992
before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
the board of directors has to initiate its own long 
term plans and compromise with the Bureau who may 
insist on certain macro-targets such as sales and 
profit targets.
Corporate Planning Influence
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
"High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Before 1992
After 1992
the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
feasible long term plans acceptable to both sides
formal planning meetings and procedures are in 
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1991-1995), includes sources of 
capital, marketing & promotion, product and 
market development, production capacity, joint- 
venture, computerisation and diversification.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow GLIL to participate in the 5- 
year's planning with the Bureau and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : GLIL has to formulate their own long term strategic 
plans which are submitted to the Bureau for review 
and approval. Capital and finance required by some 
long term projects can be arranged by GLIL's board 
of directors and sometimes guaranteed by the Bureau
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q:5.4.7 & 9)
Before 19 92 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the 
Bureau with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the board of directors reviews the 5-year plan
twice every year before the annual planning cycle 
and significant changes are reported to the Bureau 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8) M-L (2.8)
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* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above ?long term plans because GLIL caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.4)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. sales and profit
After 1992 : top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the factory managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the factory managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different profit 
and cost centres.
After 1992 : after transforming into a shareholding enterprise, 
reference has also been made to the 5-year plan 
especially to estimate what the sales potential 
will be from the new product and market situation. 
Top management provides major guidelines to the 
factory managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
389
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed quarterly
and amendments were sometimes made when under 
significant environmental changes. Annual plans 
were communicated to middle and lower management 
in written forms.
After 19 92 : top and middle management review the annual plans
and budgets monthly and amendments are made due
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly general manager 
office meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Participation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.4) Low (3.5)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.6)" after 
1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : the IRC system was started in 1986 and mainly
applied to the production factories. The major 
quantitative targets were production quantities, 
mix and costs.
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After 1992 : IRC system has been extended to the supporting
factory and other service departments. The major 
economic target set is internal profit and growth 
rate. The wages and bonus are linked up with 
the internal profit directly. Sample of IRC is 
shown in section 5.6 of the Data Analysis Set 16.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : factory managers had to compromised with the top 
management on the production and cost targets.
After 1992 : factory managers negotiate and agree the IRC 
targets with the top management during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets agreed with the factory managers were
reviewed quarterly and amendments could be made 
when mutually agreed with the top management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed monthly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective factory managers and 
their employees.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium
(2.5) "
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets which might not be 
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not fully initiated by the middle 
management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus determination, so both the 
factory managers and their subordinates are eager 
to initiate the IRC targets in order to increase 
the bonus under attainable standards.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-M edium ( 2) "  t o  "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
Incentive H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8) M-L (2.6)
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
f
Since each of the five production factories of GLIL is 
independent in manufacturing its own products without any 
transfer to other factories, the transfer pricing is not 
applicable. The energy and power supplied by the supporting 
factory to the production factories or other departments are 
using "standard cost plus mark up" or "market price" as the 
transfer prices. Similarly, the transfer prices of the services 
provided by the five employee's cooprative companies are mainly 
market prices because they have the ability to render their 
services to the outside customers after they have satisfied the 
needs of internal users.
The transfer prices are mainly set by the headquarters, with the 
involvement of the accounting and finance department, and usually 
reviwed once every year during the annual planning process. The 
supplying and receiving departments would be consulted but 
without much room for negotiation in setting the IRCs.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH-H (1.0)* H-M (2.0)
1.2 Staffing High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L ow(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
f Before 1992 After 1992
2 .1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
2 . 2 Assignment High - (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2 . 5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 6 Termination High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.6) Midium (2.5)
# Miss Huang said that since 1992, more delegation has been given 
to the general managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the general manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6.1.2-3, Q.6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.1) High (1.5)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
factories and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
Personnel H-M (1.6) Medium (2.5)
Control Mechanisms High (1.1) High (1.5)
Overall Control Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q. 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH-H (1.0) M-M (2.0)
High (1.1) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.1) H-M (1.8)
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# Miss Huang has mentioned that the monthly condensed report 
format is unique for each factory. The actuals are compared with 
the budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be 
highlighted in order to bring the attention to the general 
manager. For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, 
the general manager or deputy-general managers will contact the 
respective factory manager and his subordinates to dig out the 
underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production factories were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production volume and internal profit are the
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production technology, facilities 
and quality are measured.
C o r p o r a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
factory or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the factory managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual factory or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.8)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.1) " befo
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2) " after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22 -23)
Before 1992 After :1992
1.1 Basic wages VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 2 Allowances VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1 . 3 Bonuses - monthly VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Low (3.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.4) H-M (2.0)
* After transforming into a shareholding enterprise, GLIL has 
merged the basic wages and bonus together which is evaluated 
mainly according to the accomplishment of the IRCs for the 
production factories and supporting factory. The basic salaries 
of other non-production or servicing departments are based on 
grades and points on the scale.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Guangzhou 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GLIL which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the general manager 
and the factory manager decides what level of group bonus will be 
given to the factory. It is up to a factory manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates. The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff 
is linked with the average bonus of the production workers, and 
is based on their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to send some of
employees home without giving them a job or post but still
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 40-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and
combined with the basic wages. Wages and bonus to 
individual employees is according to seniority, 
post, skill and performance. The middle management 
can lay off the redundant employees with good 
reasons.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages,
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the top management and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8,13-14,20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees
every month via the factory or department managers
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After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives High (1.4) H-M (2..0)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2..0)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2..0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2..0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.1) H-M (2..0)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangshou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. 
(GLIL) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* High to 
Medium (1.6)
Medium
to Low (3.0)
Review Process* Medium (2.3) Low (3.3)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions* High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (1.8)
Medium
to Low (2.8)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
Medium (2.4) Low (3.5)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts#
High to 
Medium (1.8)
Medium
to Low (2.6)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* N/A N/A
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.9) M-L (2.9)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.4)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.1)
Agreeing Objectives*
Financial (1.1)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.1)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
400
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been?employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
  2 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (2.0, 2.9) - GLIL Post-1992 X (1.2, 1.9) - GLIL Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) before and after 
1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting 
Style" has been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) 
to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet 
reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial 
control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic 
Style.
29 J u l y  1996
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"The Responsibility Accounting in China 
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Case Analysis 17 
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 17" (3 June 1995).
Name of SOE : Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company (XLIG)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Lin Chu Zhi, Deputy General Manager &
Finance Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 8 years)
Mr Ye Ren Chu, Administration Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 10 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 17 September 1993
Second Visit - 14 September 1994
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.l.1-5)
1.1 The Xiamen Beverage Factory was the largest beverage 
manufacturing enterprise in Xiamen established in 1985. On 
8 June 1993, Xiamen Beverage Factory merged with an old an 
small enterprise called Xiamen Preserved Fruits Factory to 
form the present Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company 
(XLIG) which is a state-owned enterprise. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 XLIG's core business is manufacturing and distributing 
domestically various kinds and brands of beverage including 
softdrinks, milkdrinks, fruitdrinks and tea. XLIG also 
produces preserved fruits selling domestically as well as 
export to overseas countries to gain foreign exchanges. 
(Q.1.2, 1.3 & 1.4)
1.3 XLIG is a holding enterprise (having 85 administrative staff 
in the headquarters) under which it has the following
subsidiaries and joint-ventures (Q.1.1-5)
(1) Xiamen Beverage Factory
1.1 Establishment date
1.2 Ownership (Joint-venture)
1.3 No. of employees (1994)
1.4 Products (Softdrinks)
1.5 Output quantity
1.6 Sales markets
1.7 Turnover
1.8 Income before tax
1 April 1985
XLIG (45%), Hong Kong Swire 
Bottle - Coca-Cola (55%)
325
Coca-Cola, Sprite, Fanda (in can, 
bottle & condensed container)* 
40,000 tons per annum 
domestic (Fujian, Guangdong, Jia- 
jiang, Suzhou, Northeast and some 
Western provinces)
RMB145 million (1993)
RMB200 million (1994)
RMB 11 million (1993)
RMB 18 million (1994)
* XLIG has entered into a franchaise contract with the 
Coca-Cola Corporation in the USA to manufacture and 
distribute the three brands of softdrink in China.
(2) Xiamen Preserved Fruits Factory
2.1 Establishment date 31 December 1955
2.2 Ownership wholly state-owned
2.3 No. of employees (1994) 26
2.4 Products over 8 0 types of preserved fruits
2.5 Output quantity 4,000 tons per annum
2.6 Sales markets mainly domestic with some export
2.7 Turnover RMB8 million (1993) 
RMB7 million (1994)
2.8 Income before tax RMB15,000 (1993) 
RMB10,000 (1994)
(3) Xiamen Huarong Food Factory
3.1 Establishment date : 1989
3.2 Ownership (Joint-venture): XLIG (65%), Hong Kong (35%)
3.3 No. of employees (1994) : 33
3.4 Products : paperbag milk & fruit drinks
3.5 Output quantity : 12,000 tons per annum
3.6 Sales markets : domestic (to many provinces in
China)
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3.7
3.8
(4) 
4 .1
4.2
4.3
4.4 
4 . 5 
4 . 6
4 . 7 
4 . 8
(5)
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5 . 5 
5 . 6
5.7
5.8
Turnover
Income before tax
Xiamen Huayi Food Factory 
Establishment date 
Ownership (Joint-venture)
No. of employees (1994) 
Products 
Output quantity 
Sales markets
Turnover
Income before tax
Xiamen Huacheng Packing 
Establishment date 
Ownership
No. of employees (1994) 
Products
Output quantity 
Sales markets
Turnover
Income before tax
RMB45 million (1993) 
RMB60 million (1994) 
RMB 4 million (1993) 
RMB 5 million (1994)
1987
XLIG (31%), Beijing (17%)
Xiamen (17%), Japan (35%)
20
Chinese tea leaves
export (to Japan, Taiwan, Macau, 
Hong Kong & other Southeast Asian 
countries)
RMB10 million (1993)
RMB20 million (1994)
RMB 2 million (1993)
RMB 4 million (1994)
Factory 
: 1993
: Collective owned with another 
enterprise in Xiamen 
: 25
: paper & cartoon boxes & packs for 
XLIG's products and external 
customers 
: 3 million square metres 
: other factories within the group 
and external customers in Xiamen
(6) Xiamen Huacheng Packing
6.1 Establishment date
6.2 Ownership
6.3 No. of employees (1994)
6.4 Products
6.5 Output quantity
6.6 Sales markets
6.7 Turnover
6.8 Income before tax
Factory 
: 5 January 1993
: Cooperative (owned by employees)
: 61
: shopping mall, import & export 
trade
: provide services to subsidiaries 
of XLIG and external customers
The headquarters and all the subsidiaries/joint-ventures are 
located in the same site having a land area of 48,500 square 
metres and building floor space of 59,300 square metres.
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Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11)
f
2.1 XLIG has been a wholly state-owned enterprise before and 
after 1992. There is no plan to transform into a 
shareholding enterprise in the next three years because 
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed 
by the local and central governments and the Bank of China 
for converting into a shareholding enterprise. (Q.2.1)
2.2 XLIG has six subsidiaries and joint-ventures as shown in 1.3 
above. (Q.2.2, 2.4, 2.8 & 2.11)
2.3 Under the General Manager, who has an Enterprise Management 
Office (mainly responsible for long term planning and 
development), the organisation structure of XLIG's 
headquarters is as follow : (Q.2.3, 2.5 & 2.9)
(1) Finance Department (Deputy-GM)
1.1 Accounting
1.2 Internal Audit
1.3 Computing Centre
(2) Research & Technology (Deputy-GM)
2.1 Product Reserch & Development
2.2 Production Technology & Facility
(3) Facility & Estate Department (Deputy-GM)
3.1 Power & Gas
3.2 Building & Facility
3.3 General Supply
(4) Administration Department (Deputy-GM)
4.1 Personnel
4.2 Safety & Security
4.3 Education & Training
4.4 Medical & Housing
4.5 Canteen
(5) Party Office (Party Secretary)
Under the headquarters of XLIG, the Xiamen Beverge Factory 
has the following decentralized structure :
(1) Factory Manager (in charge of sales as well)
(2) Deputy-Factory Manager (in charge of production,
purchasing and supply)
(3) Purchasing Department
(4) Production Department
(5) Quality Control & Inspection Department
(6) Sales Department
(7) Repair & Maintenance Department
(8) .Accounting Department
(9) Personnel & General Affairs Department
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The other three beverge, tea and packing material 
manufacturing factories have the similar organisation 
structure as above. All the factories and the trading 
company are treated as independent profit centres with high 
degree of operating, planning and control autonomy.
2.4 XLIG is under the administration of the Xiamen Economic and
Trade Commission which has delegated the planning and 
control responsibilities to the top management of XLIG to 
run their own business. (Q.2.6 & 2.7)
2.5 XLIG had a total of 540 working, 40 not in post 
(non-working) and 130 retired employees at the end of 1994. 
It is classified as a small size enterprise in China. All 
the employees have signed employment contracts with duration 
from one to ten years since 1993. (Q.2.10)
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8)
3.1 Total assets : RMB 56M (1993) (Q.3.1)
3.2 Turnover : RMB110M (1992)
RMB2 08M (1993)
RMB287M (1994)@ (Q.3.2 & 3.7)
@ Market demand for the softdrinks exceeds the supply which 
requires the expansion of the production capacity in the 
1990s.
3.3 Income before tax : RMB11M (1992) - 10.0% of sales
RMB17M (1993) - 8.2% of sales*
RMB27M (1994) - 9.4% of sales**
* In light of high inflation (25% in 1993 and 20% in 1994)
and wages increases in Xiamen, XLIG expects the profit 
margin will continue to be less than 10%. In order to 
maintain the profit growth, XLIG has to increase the 
production and sales volumes substaintially in the next few 
years. Fortunately, XLIG does not have cashflow problem 
. because most of the sales are "cash on delivery" especially 
during the peak (summer) seasons when demands for softdrinks 
are higher than supplies.
** The profit margin in 1994 was improved compared with 1993 
mainly because of great increase in turnover and selling 
prices for the products sold within Fujian province could be 
maintained at higher levels than the same products sold to 
the other provinces. Furthermore, production and management 
efficiency have been enhanced. (Q.3.5, 3.6, 3.7 & 3.8)
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3.4 Income tax rate : 15%# (Q.3.6)
f
# Since Xiamen is one of the five Special Economic 
Development Zones, most of- the state-onwed enterprises are 
subject of 15% income tax instead of 33% applied to the 
enterprises in other cities.
3.5 Information related to Q.3.4 is shown in 1.3 above. .
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 When Xiamen Beverage Factory (XBF), the major subsidiary of 
XLIG, was established in 1985, it signed the first 5-year 
ERC with the Xiamen Economic and Trade Commission. (Q.4.1)
4.2 The first year profit target was set at RMB2 million which
is subject to 55% of income tax. In order to repay the
initial bank loan, XBF was exempted from income tax in the
first two years. In 1988, the terms were changed to 15%
income tax rate and handing over 27% of income before tax to
the government. (Q.4.2-4 & 6)
4.3 The chosen terms were mutually agreed between the government 
and XLIG. (Q.4.7)
4.4 The top management did participate in the negotiation with
the government in setting the above targets. The new 
arrangement in 1988 made XBF better off in terms of retained 
earnings. (Q.4.5,7-10)
4.5 Although, no formal ERC has been continued since 1990, XBF 
was still subject to the 1988 terms until 1995 when XBF 
became an equity joint-venture enterprise with the Hong Kong 
Swire Group. As from 1995, 55% of the actual income before 
tax would belong to the Swire Group and subject to 15% 
income tax, whereas the XBF's 45% share of profit would be 
subject to 15% income tax and 27% hand-over to the 
government.
Compared with the pre-1995 type of ownership in which 100% 
of the income after tax was retained by XBF, the new equity 
joint-venture should at least double the turnover and profit 
in the next few years in order to be equal footing with the 
old joint-venture. This is very likely to be the case since 
the Hong Kong Swire Group will bring in not only capital for 
production capacity expansion, but alos production and 
management technology as well. XLIG is aiming at the long 
term growth in terms of turnover, e f f i c i e n c y  and 
profitability at the end of the day. (Q.4.12 & 13)
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s te m
f
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.9)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the production factories were treated as profit 
centres managed by the factory managers responsible 
for product volume, cost and internal profit which 
were compromises bewteen the factory managers and 
the headquarters.
After 1992 : the beverage factory is treated as an independent 
investment centre measured on the return as well. 
All the factory managers are responsible for the 
planning process including the formulation of the 
internal responsibility contact (IRC).
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High-Medium (2)" to " Medium-Low
(3) "
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the que s t i onna i re Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 : since the production factories were profit centres, 
the factory managers were responsible for the 
profit planning and control although specific 
guidelines and suggestions were provided by the 
headquarters and sometimes they were dominant.
After 1992 : the headquarters inserts less interference in the 
planning and control aspects related to the 
production factories as long as the agreed economic 
and quality targets can be achieved.
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Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
f
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : except the general manager and party secretary who 
were still appointed by the government, all the 
other management staff and production workers were 
recruited by the top management. The organisation 
structure was mainly decided by the headquarters.
After 1992 : the general manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the government. The foreign partners 
of the joint-ventures can appoint a few senior 
management staff and decide their own organisation 
structures and personnel affairs after discussion 
with the Chinese partner.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : although interdependencies among the factories or
profit centres were minimal, decisions were made by 
the headquarters if there was any.
After 1992 : some negotiations and compromises are allowed to
the profit centres as well as the foreign partners.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Decentralization Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Appointment Medium (2.5) M-L (3.0)
Interdependencies High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.1) M-L (2.9)
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5 . 2  R e v ie w  P r o c e s s  ( P l a n n i n g  & B u d g e t i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h -M ed iu m  C o r p o r a t e
( 1 . 9 ) "  b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 3 . 1 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : since Xiamen is one of the five special economic
zones, some favourable policies have been given to
the SOEs by the central government in terms of 
lower taxes, free import/export rights and generous 
land use rights which in some ways have left more 
freedom to the SOE's planning and control aspects 
but interferences from the government still existed
After 1992 : in order to speed up the implementation of the "SOE
Mechanism Transformation Legislation" enacted in 
1992, the Xiamen municipal government issued ten 
specific additional policies for the SOEs at the 
end of 1992. These 10 policies explain the 
different rights that the SOEs in Xiamen could 
exercise in order to enjoy futher autonomy in 
planning and controlling their businesses.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : long term plans were initiated by the top manage­
ment after consultation with the middle management. 
Most of the long term plans had to be discussed and 
compromised with the government. The middle 
management had to formulate, evaluate, approve and 
review the annual budgets with the top management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : the middle management was consulted in the long
term planning which was almost a top-down process 
but did involved in the annual planning and 
budgeting processes.
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After 1992 : middle management is involved in the formal long 
term planning process but decisions still rest in 
the hands of the top management. Factory and 
department managers have to discuss with the lower 
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 19 92 : the top management reviewed and amended the long 
term plans with the middle management annually. 
Changes were notified to the employees during the 
AGM. The annual budgets were reviewed between the 
top and middle management twice every year but 
amendments were made due to significant changes 
which were communicated to lower management through 
revised budgets.
After 1992 : the long term plans are reviewed by the top and
middle management twice every year and significant 
changes are made at the year end and informed the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
' management and amendments can be made and notify to 
lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Operation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Participation High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.9) Low (3.1)
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5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate
(1)" before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "Quality" has been the major strategic theme given 
to and imbedded into the planning and control 
system. XLIG has imported some modern plant and 
equipment to replace the old ones since the late 
1980s.
After 1992 : each factory has a quality control department 
responsible for designing policies, setting 
production and product standards, testing new 
products and providing training. The inspection 
section is responsible for controlling the input 
materials and output products quality, and 
enforcing the compliance of quality procedures in 
production.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : technology improvement, efficiency enhancement and 
product development have been the major strategic 
thrusts which were incorporated into long term 
plans formulated by the government and the top 
management.
After 1992 : the following strategic thrusts are clearly
written down in the company's information booklet :
1. Company's goodwill and reputation must be main­
tained at all times.
2. Every employee should be trustworthy and faith­
ful to the company.
3. Every employee should maintain good discipline 
in the company.
4. Product innovation and development should be the 
life-blood for company's grwoth.
5. Economic efficiency should be enhanced year 
after year.
6. Operation efficiency should be promoted at all 
times.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2) " f
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the
planning and review process such as selling prices, 
marketing strategies and production quantity and 
mix. Financial indicators and performance were 
followed closely by the top management who was 
quick to make suggestions if they did not match 
with the overall long and short term plan.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the factory managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the annual budget in aggregate. Furthermore, the 
top management allow certain degree of freedom to 
the factory manager to promulgate some strategic 
ideas if they are not out of line with those 
prescribed by the headquarters.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to. "Medium
(2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) Medium (2.2)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.9)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : since early 1980s, Xiamen has been one of the five 
special economic development zones. It has been 
authorized by the central government to enjoy many 
favourable economic policies. Xiamen Light 
Industry Committee started to allow XLIG to 
actively participate in the 7th 5-year (1986-1990) 
long term planning process.
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A f t e r  1992 the subsequent f8th 5-year (1991-1995) long term 
plan has further encourged XLIG to initiate its own 
blueprint for development.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992
After 1992
the top management was involved with the government 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
fesible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
the top management has to initiate its own long 
term plans and compromise with the government who 
may insist on certain macro-targets such as output 
volume and mix. The current 5-year planning (1996- 
2000), lays down the developments of all the joint- 
ventures and subsidiaries.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : factory and department mangers are members of the 
planning committee (i.e. senior management 
committee) but they seldom initiate changes but 
mainly concern the impact on their annual budgets 
and IRCs which they are measured on.
After 1992 : formal planning committee and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. It is a way for 
the top management to allocate limited resources to 
different divisions according to the market demand, 
product profitability and government suggestions.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) »
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
government with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee’s representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
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After 1992 : the planning committee reviews the 5-year plan
twice every year before the annual planning cycle 
and significant changes are reported to the 
government for endorsement and sometimes assistance 
such as seeking a long term bank loan. A summary 
of the long term plans is distributed to all 
members of the planning committee.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) M-L (2.9)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because XFLT caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.3)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government has devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions may be provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and inventory level.
After 1992 : top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes which involve the 
middle management such as the factory managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Low (3.5)"
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(2) O p e r a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 5 . 2  & 4)
Before 1992
After 1992
top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the factory managers. 
Expense budgets were suggested to the management 
and service departments. Annual planning was a 
means for the top management to allocate resources 
i.e. working capital and expenses to different cost 
and expense centres.
top management provided major guidelines to the 
factory managers for intitiating their own budgets 
before submission and then iterative negotiation 
begins until agreements are made.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed quarterly
and amendments were made under significant environ­
mental changes. Annual plans were communicated to 
middle and lower management in terms of a budget 
book.
After 1992 : senior management committee reviews the annual
plans and budgets monthly and amendments are made 
due to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than AGM and budget book, the budget information is 
further communicated between top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "  t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.3) Low (3.4)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : before the IRC was established in 1994, major
economic targets set were production quantity and 
cost control while qualitative targets such as 
quality and safety had the veto effects on the 
bonus which was linked up with the performance.
After 1992 : major targets included in the IRC are production 
quality, production management and material 
consumption. Volume of sales and cash collected 
are major economic targets for the sales function. 
Samples of IRC are shown in section 5.6 of the Data 
Analysis Set 17.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : factory managers negotiated and compromised the
suggested targets during the annual planning cycle.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate, quantify and 
justify the major IRC targets before negotiating 
with the top management. According to Miss Lin, 
the workshop managers are more proactive in setting 
the targets in the IRC.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
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(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets were reviewed in the middle of the year and
amendments could be made when mutually agreed by 
the top management and factory managers. Terms and 
conditions are documented and informed to the 
respective factory managers and their employees.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. Miss Lin agreed that IRC was an 
effective way to achieve the short term targets on 
one hand and improve the budget communication 
between the different levels of management on the 
other hand. Furthermore, IRC can link up 
performance with the incentive scheme as a fair 
means for resource (i.e. bonus) distribution.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of.
the production and cost targets which might not be
attainable or could be overshot mainly because 
they were not formulated by the middle management.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
factory managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) »
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Incentive H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.1) Low (3.3)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
Except the Xiamen Huacheng Packing Factory (XHPF), all the other 
production factories of Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company 
(XLIG) are independent in manufacturing their own products 
without any transfer to other factories. The packing materials 
supplied by XHPF internally are charged at the market prices less 
a small percentage for the savings of selling and administration 
expenses. The ultimate transfer prices are determined by the 
negotiation between the seller and buyer without interference 
from the XLIG.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s te m
f
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.5)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH-H (1.0)* High (1.5)
1.2 Staffing VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Roles & functions H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
1.4 Interactions H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L ow(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel# (Q.6,.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2.1 Recruitment High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
2.2 Assignment H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.3 Training H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.4 Evaluation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.5 Remuneration H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
2.6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
H-M (1.8) M-L (2.6)
# Miss Lin said that since 1992, more delegation has been given 
to the factory managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the factory manager and 
the party secretary.
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(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6..1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
r Before 1992 After 1992
3 . 1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 3 Financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) VH-H (1.0)
3.6 Communication* High (1.5) Medium (2.0)
High (1.3) H-M (1.6)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
workshops and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence : 
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
Personnel H-M (1.8) M-L (2.6)
Control Mechanisms High (1.3) H-M (1.6)
Overall Control Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.2)
6.2 Agreeing Objectives (Q.6.2.1-2)
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
(2.0)on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
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6 . 3  M o n i t o r i n g  R e s u l t s
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 4 ) "  b e f o r e
1992  t o  "Moderate  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 9 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
High (1.1) H-M (1.8)
# Miss Lin has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each workshop. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. The qualitative targets are usually subjectively 
measured by the factory manager and enterprise management office 
and written in the monthly reports as well. For any serious 
adverse variances shown on any report, the general manager or 
deputy-general managers will contact the respective factory 
manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining reasons 
or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is expected 
that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the situation as 
soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production factories were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
are accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production quantity and cost control are still the 
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production management and quality 
are measured.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
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(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
r
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
factory or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the planning committee holds a monthly meeting to 
review the performance reports, to ask the factory 
managers for explanations, to decide corrective 
actions, and to determine penalties and incentives. 
Evaluation results are informed to the lower 
management via individual factory or departmental 
meetings.
Corproate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.8)
Performance Measurement High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.4) H-M (1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.3)" before
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1 -7,15-16,22- 23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) High (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.8 Redundancy Low (3.5) H-M (2.0)
High (1.5) H-M (1.9)
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* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on grade and 
seniority, qualification and skill. There are totally eight 
grades in the wages scale and there are some points in- each grade 
for annual increase of wages but the parity between two 
consecutive points is only RMB10-20.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Xiamen 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the XLIG which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the general manager 
and the factory manager decides what level of group bonus will be 
given to the factory. It is up to a factory manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
One way to alleviate this problem is to send some of employees 
home without giving them a job or post but still provide them the 
basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 50-60% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 45-50% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
C o r p o r a te '  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " t o  "High
( 1 . 5 )  "
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(3) P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q. 6 . 5 . 1 6 ^ 1 7 )
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating 
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages, 
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's targets 
and negotiate with top management. The policies 
for basic wages, allowances and other benefits have 
involved the labour union and planning committee.
A nationwise pension policy is still undergoing 
with enterprise's contribution and then under­
written by the government.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.6.5.8,13-14,20-21)
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees
every month via the factory or department managers
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation very year. Planning committee reviews 
the basic wages, allowances and other benefits 
during the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "V e r y H i g h - H i g h (i)"
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives High (1.5) H-M (1.9)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.3) H-M (1.9)
= = = = = = = : =  =  =  =  =  = = = = = = = : =  =  =  =  =  =
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
:
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company 
(XLIG) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure*
Medium (2.1)
Medium
to Low (2.9)
Review Process* High to 
Medium (1.9) Low (3.1)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Very High 
to High (1.0) Medium (2.2)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0)
Medium
to Low (2.9)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation) 
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts#
Medium (2.3) 
Medium (2.1)
Low (3.4) 
Low (3.3)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* N/A N/A
Overall Planning Influence High to 
Medium (1.9)
Medium
to Low (3.0)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.5)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.2)
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial (1.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results*
Financial (1.4)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.3)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.3) 
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Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been?employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
.X
  2 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (2.0, 3.0) - XLIG Post-1992 X (1.3. 1.9) - XLIG Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the Xiamen 
Luquan Industries General Company (XLIG) before and after 1992, 
it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
has been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to 
"Financial Control" (Post-1992). Although it has not yet reached 
a very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control 
style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style, it 
is moving towards the "Strategic Control".
7 A u g u s t  1996
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 18" (5 December 1995).
Name of SOE : Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill (BCM3)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Hsu Ching Soon/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 38 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 4 September 1993
Second Visit - 31 August 1994
Third Visit - 13 September 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 BCM3 is a large, cotton cloth exported-oriented enterprise 
established in 1956 and started production since May 1957. 
It possesses 120,980 ring spindles, over 3,200 looms, 11,240 
twisting spindles, and 1,600 open-end heads. Among its 
counterparts in Beijing, it is the only one which has been 
awarded the state's first grade enterprise. As one of the 
major textile enterprises in China, BCM3 has provided a 
large number of execellent products to the clients at home 
and abroad. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 BCM3 upholds the principle of "customer first and quality 
first". Bearing in mind that quality is the life of the 
mill, BCM3 has been devoting to promote the quality of its 
products. Over 20 types of yarn and cloth have won 
national, municipal and ministerial prizes. Its Tex29 grey 
cotton cloth series which is mainly for export once won 
national gold prize, and Peng Chentex 19.5 and 29 grey 
cotton plain cloth series are highly acclaimed by the 
overseas customers. (Q.1.2)
1.3 The main products are cotton and T/R yarn, cotton and T/R 
cloth of full widths, cotton ramie yarn as well as Vinylon 
and Jinlun products. The annual production capacity is 
23,000 tons of cotton yarn and 90 million metres of grey 
cotton cloth which can earn over US$40 million. (Q.1.3)
1.4 Products of BCM3 are exported mainly to European Commom 
Market, accounting for 25% of total Chinese cotton cloth 
export to Europe. The products are also popularly received 
by overseas clients in the USA, Canada, Africa and Southeast 
Asian countries and regions. BCM3 enjoys a good reputation 
in the international market. (Q.1.4)
1.5 BCM3 attaches great importance to its equipment renovation.
During the current 8th 5-year plan (1991-1995), BCM3 has 
imported and will continue to import a great deal of 
advanced technology and critical machine parts from Germany, 
Switzerland and Japan. To become more competitive, BCM3 is 
steeping up the efforts for technical renovation. When the 
overall technical renovation plan is fulfilled at the end of 
1995, SCM3 will be equiped with the advanced fore-spinning 
equipment of the 1990s, and other machinery of the 1980s to 
1990s. The quality of the finished cotton yarn will reach 
upper middle international level. The international standard 
will be adopted for grey cloth production, and indirect weft 
will be used, consequently, the quality will reach level 
"A". (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 BCM3 has been a wholly state-owned enterprise since 1956 and 
previously under the administration of the Ministry of 
Textile in Beijing which was transformed into the National 
Textile Industry Council in 1994. All the cotton mills and 
related industries such as textile machines manufacturing 
are treated as subsidiaries under the Council which is one 
of the 8 institutions under the State Council and has less 
political influences on its member enterprises.
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The major role played by the Council, which is similar to a 
trade association, is to control the supply of cotton (raw 
materials), total number of employees and appointment of the 
top management such as general manager and party secretary 
of each member enterprise under its umbrella. Another 
important function of the Council is raising capitals for 
the approved projects or investments initiated by the member 
enterpirses. Depsite the latter fact, BCM3 has the autonomy 
to obtain bank loan independently. (Q.2.1, 4, 6 & 7)
2.2 Under the Factory General Manager, who has an Enterprise 
Management Office, the organisation structure of BCM3 is 
listed as follow : (Q.2.3, 5 & 9)
(1) Production Division (Deputy-GM)
1.1 No.l Spinning Factory*
1.2 No.2 Spinning Factory*
1.3 No.3 Spinning Factory*
1.4 No.4 Spinning Factory*
1.5 No.5 Spinning Factory (Macau Joint-Venture[JV])
1.6 N o .1 Weaving Factory*
1.7 No.2 Weaving Factory*
1.8 Production Support Factory (supplying electricity, 
gas, consumables, spares, tools etc.)**
1.9 Technical Support Department (Chief Engineer)
1.10 Production Facilities Department (Chief Engineer)
1.11 Quality Control Department (Chief Engineer)
(2) Operation Division (Deputy-GM)
2.1 Purchasing Department
2.2 Supplies Department
2.3 Sales Department
2.4 Accounting & Finance Department (Chief Accountant)
(3) Administration Division (Deputy-GM)
3.1 Personnel Department
3.2 Manpower & Wages Department
3.3 Safety & Security Department
3.4 Education & Training Department
3.5 Tertiary Enterprises#
3.5.1 No.l Knitting Factory (Shenzhen JV)
3.5.2 No.2 Knitting Factory (Shenzhen JV)
3.5.3 No.71 Cotton Weaving Factory (Shenzhen JV)
3.5.4 Beijing Colour Weaving Factroy (Hainan JV)
3.5.5 Cotton Printing Factory
3.5.6 Import & Export Company
3.5.7 Textile Retailing Shop
3.5.8 Repair & Maintenance Centre
3.5.9 Restaurant
3.5.10 Nursary
(4) Communist Party Office
(5) Labour Union Office
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* All the production factories have a factory manager, a 
deputy factory manager, section supervisors and group 
leaders. Each factory is responsible for its own repair and 
maintenance work. All the production factories are treated 
as cost c e n t r e s  and h av e e n t e r e d  into I n t e r n a l  
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the General Manager on 
an annual basis.
** The production support factory is a cost centre and 
allocates its operating costs to the other production 
factories or departments according to actual usages.
# The tertiary enterprises are independent investment 
centres having their own management teams and bank accounts, 
and they have signed IRCs with the General Manager on an 
annual basis.
2.4 BCM3 had a total of 8,000 working employees (10% are 
administrative staff) and 3,000 retired employees at the end 
of 1994. It is classified as a "large-size SOE" in China. 
(Q.2.10)
# Although BCM3 is a subsidiary enterprise, insufficient 
information has been obtained for questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and
Q.2.11.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8)
3.1 Total assets : RMB 240M (1994) (Q.3.1)
3.2 Turnover : RMB 3 00M (1992)
RMB 330M (1993)
RMB 410M (1994)
RMB 430M (1995 forecast) (Q.3.2 & 7)
3.3 Income before tax* 
(Q.3.5, 6, 7 & 8)
RMB 1.2M (1992) - 0.4% of sales**
RMB 0M (1993) - 0% of sales®
RMB 1.5M (1994) - 0.4% of sales#
RMB 0M (1995 forecast)
* Income before tax has deducted the value added tax 
already which is 17% on sales (output VAT) but only 13% on 
cotton purchased (input VAT) can be deducted according to
the new taxation system implemented in January 1994. As a 
result, the VAT paid in 1994 was higher than the previous 
known sales tax in 1993.
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** The low profit margin was mainly because of selling 
prices have to be reduced in order to bid the orders. 
Furthermore, inflation and heavy payroll and benefits in 
kind (including retired employees) increased the total 
expenditures or fixed overheads. The purchase prices of raw 
materials (i.e. cotton) have been increased from RMB11,000 
per ton in 1993 to RMB18,000 per ton in 1994 (or 64% 
increase) due to reduction of domestic production. The 
farmers do not have the incentive to grow cotton because of 
low selling prices set by the government and high inflation 
of input materials like fertilisers.
The domestic produced cotton is centrally purchased from the 
farmers and distributed to the mills by the National Textile 
Industry Council, Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of 
Agriculture at predetermined prices. In view of domestic 
short supply, 3 0% of the cotton demand was imported from 
foreign countries in 1995. BCM3 is importing about 30% of 
its cotton requirements from overseas countries.
@ Since BCM3 did not have the "import and export right" 
before 1994, the export products had to be sold to the 
trading entities under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) at a fixed exchange rate of 
US1=RMB5.8. Then these trading enterprises sold the 
products overseas at the market exchange rate of US$1=RMB8.7 
to make a handsome profit out from the exchange gap. 
Therefore, most of the export profit is taken away by the 
government.
# Another major reason of low or no profit before tax making 
was the annual payment of RMB3 6 million of bank interest due 
to capital investment and working capital loans of over 
RMB300 million in both 1994 and 1995.
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% (before 1992)
33% (from 1992) (Q.3.6)
.+ Since BCM3 is neither a holding or subsidiary enterprise, Q.3.4
is not applicable.
Section 4 : Ecomnic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
4.1 BCM3 is one of the earliest state-owned enterprises in 
B ei j i ng  entered into the first five- y ea r Economic 
Responsibility Contract with the Beijing Textile Bureau and 
the Beijing Finance Bureau (representing the Beijing 
Municipal government) in 1986. (Q.4.1)
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4.2 The major financial targets set in this ERC were income 
before tax and foreign exchange created from export. (Q.4.2 
& 4)
4.3 An annual growth factor was also set for the income before 
tax target. In addition, production quantity, product 
quality and safety are also other targets to be determined 
in the ERC as well. (Q.4.3)
4.4 The annual total gross wages was linked up with the above 
financial targets. (Q.4.6)
4.5 Under the ERC system, once the target profit has been 
a c h i e v e d ,  the p r e d e t e r m i n e d  wages, b o n u s e s  and 
benefits-in-kind would be awarded plus other favourable 
terms like bank loan repayment could be tax deductable. 
Therefore, all the personnel in BCM3 have been facing higher 
pressure and challenge to enhance the overall economic 
efficiency year after year. (Q.4.5, 9 & 10)
4.6 The top management did participate in the negotiation with 
the government and bureau in setting the above targets. The 
chosen terms were mutually agreed among the three parties. 
(Q.4.7-8)
4.5 BCM3 could easily achieve the foreign exchange target 
because its quality products were yarn and cloth which were 
input materials for the clothing industry having high 
demands overseas. Contrary, the clothing industry was 
constrainted by many customer factors like fashion, season, 
culture and taste!. The first ERC was successfully completed 
in 1990, and then the second 5-year ERC (1991-1995) was 
signed immediately. (Q.4.12 & 13)
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992
A f t e r  1992
all the production factories were "cost centres" 
managed by the factory managers. All the other 
management and service departments were "expense 
centres" under tight expense budgets.
the production factories are still treated as "cost 
centres" under budget/IRC control but higher 
autonomy of internal management and operation has 
has been delegated to the factory managers.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e *  : "V e r y - H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2) "
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4, to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2 .1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 -3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992 : the factory managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management.
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : the top management has been decentralizing more
planning responsibility to each production factory 
and department such as participation in formulating 
the annual plan and the IRC. The production and 
cost control responsibility primarily lies with the 
production managers but the top management keeps a 
surveillance quantity and quality control bn each 
production factory through monthly or weekly report
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 the general manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the Council, and some senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required Council's approval.
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After 1992 : the general manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the Council. The general manager 
can appoint all the other senior staff such as the 
factory managers. The factory and department 
managers can suggest changes in organisation 
structure and personnel affairs to the general 
manager for approval.
Corporate Planning Influence : '"High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Interdependencies (Q.5.1.4)
Before 1992 : the transfer prices of internal cross-supplies were 
determined by the top management by using standard 
cost of production without markup.
After 1992 : standard cost is still used for the transfer prices 
which together with the transfer quantities are 
set by the top management without much negotiation 
among the spinning and weaving factories because 
the spinning factories do not have much autonomy to 
sell the intermediate products externally.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Decentralization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Appointment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Interdependencies VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.1)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the top management after 
discussion and agreement with Bureau. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but sanction should be required after 
discussion with the Bureau.
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After 1992 : Council has delegated the long term planning and
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
strategic plans and annual financial targets still 
have to be reviewed, discussed and modified with 
with the Council.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans and annual 
budgets but initiation from the middle management 
(i.e. factory managers) was limited.
After 1992 : more formal processes are used for reviewing,
discussing and sanctioning the annual plans and 
IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by the general 
manager to the factory managers to formulate their 
own budgets and IRCs. They are also consulted in 
the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but 
middle management (i.e factory managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management in mid-year but amendments were 
made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
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After 19 92 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
twice every year and significant changes should 
be discussed with the Council and informed to the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notified 
to the lower management immediately.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "Very High-High Corporate
(1)" before 1992 to "High-Medium Corporate (2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992
After 1992
"improve efficiency" and "increase profit or cost 
control" were the major strategic themes given to 
and imbedded into the planning and control system.
the following strategic themes have laid down :
1. customer and quality are always number one
2. production facilities and technology should be 
renovated to further enhance product quality to 
international standards
3. expand the domestic market share and explore the 
overseas markets
4. employ advanced management techniques to 
achieve a modern enterprise system
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
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(2) T h r u s t s  ( Q . 5 . 3 . 1  & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : quality is still the most important strategic
thrust directed from the top management for all the 
employees to observe and keep in mind when they are 
performing their duties for the enterprise.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, selling price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the factory managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they 
would not deviate much from the long term plan and 
the ultimate annual sales and profit targets.
Corporate Planning Influence : 
"High-Medium (2)"
"Very High-High (1) "
Summary of Corporate Planning 
Factors
Influence : 
Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Thrust VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Planning Influence VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government.
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Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long
term plans and compromise with the textile council 
who may insist on certain macro-targets such as 
output volume and profit level.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
feasible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1996-2000), includes competitive 
edge, research and development, product and market 
development, facility relocation, joint ventures, 
and reducing headcount.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow BCM3 to participate in the 5- 
year's planning with the Bureau and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : has to formulate their own long term strategic
plans which are submitted to the textile council 
for review and approval. Some projects involved 
significant capital investment require financial 
arrangement by the council.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
f
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the 
Bureau with the top management and changes made 
were notified to the employee’s representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the council 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because BCM3 caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.1)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government had devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions were provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and profit level.
After 1992 : top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes yet compromises on 
key indicators still have been sought from the 
textile council.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
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(2) O p e r a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 5 . 2  & 4)
Before 1992
After 1992
top management reviewed the key budgets i.e. sales 
production volume and mix, labour and materials, 
and then compromised with the factory managers. 
Expense budgets were given to the management and 
service departments. Annual planning was a means 
for the top management to allocate resources i.e. 
working capital and expenses to different cost and 
and expense centres.
top managers provided major guidelines (see section
5.5 of Data Analysis 18) to the factory managers 
for intitiating their own budgets before submission 
and then iterative negotiation begins until 
agreements are made.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) »
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : The middle management had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed quarterly 
and amendments were seldom made except under 
significant environmental changes. Annual plans 
were communicated to middle and lower management 
in written forms.
After 1992 top and middle management review the annual plans 
and budgets monthly and amendments are made due 
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
441
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Medium-Low
( 3 ) "  f
Summary of Corporate Planning 
Factors
Central Planning 
Operation 
Participation 
Review & Communication
Overall Planning Influence
Influence :
Before 1992 After 1992
H-M (2..0) Low (3,.5)
H-M (2..0) M-L (3,.0)
Medium (2,.5) Low (3,.5)
H-M (2..0) M-L (3..0)
Medium (2..1) Low (3,.3)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : IRC was established in 1988 in order to motivate
the efficiency, profitability and cost reduction in 
the production workshops.
After 1992 : the following performance targets are set :
1. controllable targets
1.1 production quantities
1.2 product quality
1.3 materials and resources consumption
1.4 facility and equipment condition
1.5 production safety
2. management targets
2.1 production/operation management
2.2 human resource management
2.3 technology innovation/renovation management
2.4 scientific research management
2.5 education and training
2.6 sanity and environmental protection
3. other targets
3.1 serious accidents and fire events
3.2 serious quality incidents
3.3 repair and maintainence
3.4 family planning
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to 
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
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(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
f
Before 1992 : factory managers had to discuss and compromise the 
production quantity and cost targets with the top 
management.
After 1992 : factory managers negotiate and agree the IRC 
targets with the general manager during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets agreed by the production managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 : IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective factory managers and 
their employees.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of
the production and cost targets and qualitative
factors such as quality and safety had veto effect 
on the bonus to be awarded.
After 1992 : both the economic and qualitative targets are
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
factory managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
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5 . 7  Management o f  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g )
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 2 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 2 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
1.1 Interdepen­
dencies
1.2 Transfer 
Price Basis
1.3 Transfer Price 
Negotiation
1.4 Intermediate 
Product
1.5 Transfer
Quantity
1.6 Arbitration
1.7 Government
Interference
Before 1992 
Production & service 
departments involved 
standard cost
all determined by 
top management 
Little buy and sell are 
available in market 
All determined by
the top management 
Prices and quantities 
mainly determined by 
top management 
No, except the output 
volumes & selling 
prices of products
After 1992
Production & service 
departments involved 
standard cost
Very little between 
buyer and seller 
Some buy & sell are 
available in market 
Mostly determined by
the top management 
Mainly determined by 
top management with 
little negotiations 
No, only suggest 
volumes & prices of 
final products
Corporate Planning Influence 
Medium (2)"
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
"Very High-High (1)" to "High-
Before 1992
After 1992
All the transfer prices and quantities were 
determined by the top management and the factory 
managers were consulted sometimes. Any conflicts 
were arbitrated by the general manager. Factory 
managers didn't care much because they were 
measured by production volume and cost.
most of the transfer prices and quantities are 
still controlled by the top management although 
some negotiations are allowed for the factory 
managers. Interference from and arbitration by the 
general manager are necessary.
Corporate Planning Influence 
High (2)"
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
"Very High-High (1) " to "Medium-
B e f o r e  1992 the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
without much inputs from the middle management.
The transfer prices were reviewed half-yearly and 
some amendments were allowed.
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After 1992 : the transfer prices at standard cost are reviewed 
quarterly and amendments can be made after consul­
tation with the factory managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.2) Medium (2.2)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH-H (1.0)* High (1.5)
1.2 Staffing High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L ow(3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) P e r s o n n e l #  ( Q . 6 . 1 . 1 )
Before 1992 After 1992
2 . 1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2 . 2 Assignment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.3 Training High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.4 Evaluation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.3) Medium (2.2)
# Mr Hsu said that since 1992, more delegation has been given to 
the factory managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the general manager and
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6..1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3.1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3 . 6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.6)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to the 
factories and departments through the annual plan, IRC and other 
enterprise policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence : 
Factors Before 1992
Organisational Design 
Personnel
Control Mechanisms 
Overall Control Influence
High
High
VH-H
(1.4)
(1.3)
(1 .0)
High (1 .2 )
After 1992
Medium (2.1) 
Medium (2.2) 
H-M (1.6)
H-M (2 .0)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q. 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  from " T i g h t  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1) " b e f o r e
1992  t o  "M oderate  F i n a n c i a l  (2) " a f t e r  1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) ' H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Tight Financial (1) " before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.9)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (1.7)
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# Miss Hsu has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each factory. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the general manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the general 
manager or deputy-general managers will contact the respective 
factory manager and his subordinates to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production factories were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
i non-financial targets such as quality and safety
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : production volume and resources consumption are the 
major economic targets, however, more qualitative 
targets such as production management, product 
quality, human resource management are measured.
C o r p o r a t e  Control Influ e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
factory or department manager. Corrective actions 
might be initiated by the top management but the 
measurement criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the factory managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual factory or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 )  " t o
"High-Medium (2) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence VH-H (1.0)
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(1.9)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2) " before
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1 -7,15-16,22-23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1. 2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 3 Bonuses - monthly VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1. 5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1. 8 Redundancy Very L o w (4.0) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.7) H-M (1.8)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-3 0.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the BCM2 which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the general manager 
and the factory manager decides what level of group bonus will be 
given to the factory. It is up to a factory manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the B C M 2 's core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on IRC's accomplishment and
contributed to 30-50% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 20-30% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages,
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2)"
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(4) R e v ie w  & C om m u n ica t ion  ( Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 ,  2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic 
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers.
After 1992 IRC's targets are subject to situation and 
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers
Corporate C o n t r o l  
"High-Medium (2) "
I n f l u e n c e "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1..7) H-M (1..8)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1..0) High (1..5)
Participation VH-H (1..0) H-M (2..0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1..0) H-M (2..0)
Overall Control Influence High (1..2)
iiiiii
2 
II 
■ 
ii 
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H
(1..8)
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
f
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill (BCM2) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* High (1.3) Medium (2.1)
Review Process* High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
Very High 
to High (1.0)
High to 
Medium (2.0)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
Medium (2.1) Low (3.3)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* High (1.2) Medium (2.2)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & Moderate
Control#
Agreeing Objectives* 
Monitoring Results* 
Rewards & Incentives* 
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.2) 
Tight
Financial (1.0) 
Tight
Financial (1.0)
Financial (1.2) 
Financial (1.1)
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
Control Influence
Strategic I Financial
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
2---------------------------- 2 ---------------------------- 2
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
0 (1.9, 2.4) - BCM3 Post-1992 X (1.1, 1.4) - BCM3 Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial 
Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very 
strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style as 
described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
11 A u g u s t  1996
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"The Responsibility Accounting in China 
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Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1) ;
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 19" (12 January 1996) .
Name of SOE : Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Zhang Lin/Finance Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 20 years) 
Mr Sun Yu Qing/Assistant Finance Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 18 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 4 September 1993
Second Visit - 31 August 1994
Third Visit - 11 September 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.l.1-5)
1.1 Built in 1954, BFSH covers an area of 330,500 square metres 
and it has a construction area of 320,000 square metres. It 
is the largest hotel in Beijing in terms of land area. BFSH 
is situated at the west side of Beijing with a distance of 
33 km and 14km from the airport and city centre 
respectively. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 BFSH is a very traditional, cultural and elegant hotel
composed of a main building, four hotel buildings and 48 
stand-alone apartments. The gardens and recreation 
facilities occupy most of the space of this big piece of
land. Hundred kinds of trees and flowers are growing in the
gardens and along the lanes, so that the guests can enjoy 
the green peace all around the year. It is equipped with 
c o m p l e t e  s e r v i c e  a n d  r e c r e a t i o n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  of 
international standard. (Q.1.2)
1.3 BFSH has 2,600 standard rooms, suites, deluxe suites and
apartments, 3,000 beds, 9 restaurants and other facilities 
including conference building, academic hall, business 
centre, theatre, dancing hall, swimming pool, tennis court, 
fitness centre, sauna room, billard room, penthouse garden, 
coffee lounge, bars, department stores, foreign exchange 
counter, medical clinic, hair saloon, post office, bookshop, 
Photoshop, flowershop, etc. (Q.1.3)
1.4 BFSH has been under the administration of the State Foreign
Experts Bureau because during the 1950s and 1960s, BFSH 
mainly provided accommodations to the foreign experts, such 
as the previously USSR's experts, who were invited by and 
worked for the China government. Since the economic reform 
in late 1970s, BFSH has been opened up for customers from 
all kinds of walk. (Q.1.4)
1.5 BFSH is planning to increase the number of Guest Houses from 
48 to 13 0 in the next few years in order to provide more 
apartments for the higher demand from the foreign investors 
and expatriates in Beijing. On the other hand, BFSH will 
continue to expnad and diversify its tertiary enterprises in 
order to allocate the resources better on one hand and to 
transfer many excess employees to these independent 
self-financing entities on the other hand. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 BFSH has been a wholly state-owned enterprise since 1954. 
BFSH is under the administration of the State Foreign 
Experts Bureau because during the 1950s and 1960s, BFSH 
mainly provided accommodations to the foreign experts who 
were invited by and worked for China government. (Q.2.1)
2.2 Since the economic reform started in 1979, instead of 
dictatorship from the bureau, BFSH has been delegated 
autonomy in the business decisions and operations although 
the bureau still imposed influences on some affairs like 
personnel, pricing, investment, finance and wages.
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In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation 
Mechanism Transformation Regulations" enacted by the 
People's Congress in July 1992, both the government and 
b u r e a u  h a v e d e l e g a t e d  the p l a n n i n g  and c o n t r o l  
responsibilities to the top management of BFSH to run their 
own business. (Q.2.4, 6 & &)
2.2 Under the Factory General Manager, who has an Enterprise 
Management Office, the organisation structure of BFSH is 
listed as follow : (Q.2.3, 5 & 9)
Profit Centres -
1. Guest Houses Department (5 buildings)
2. Expert Houses Department (48 apartments)
3 . Customer Service Department
4 . Meal & Beverage Department
5. Commodity Selling Department
6. Transportation Service Department
7. Friendship Palace (entertainment complex)
8. Beidaihu Hotel*
9. Tertiary Enterprises :
Friendship Shopping Malls 
Trading Companies 
Engineering & Decoration Company 
Entertainment Company
Distill Water Company
Cost Centres -
10. Purchasing & Storage Department
11. Repair & Maintenance Department
12. Accounting & Finance Department
13. Personnel Department
14. Security Department
15. Quality Control Department
16. Education & Training Department
17. Organisation & Promotion Department
18. Labour Union Office
19. Communist Party Office
* This is a small hotel in Beidaihu which is about 150km
Northeast of Beijing. This small hotel has 180 employees.
2.4 BFSH had a total of 3,800 employees at the end of 1994 and 
about 600 retired employees whose wages and benefits had to . 
be borne by BFSH. It is classified as a medium size
state-owned enterprise in China. (Q.2.10)
# Although BFSH is a subsidiary enterprise, insufficient 
information has been obtained for questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and
Q.2.11.
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S e c t i o n  3 : F i n a n c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s  ( Q . 3 . 1 - 8 )
Total assets : RMB 2 90M (1993) (Q.3.1)
Turnover : RMB 130M (1993)
RMB 200M (1994)
RMB 230M (1995) (Q.3.2 & 7)
Income before tax* : RMB 23M (1993) - 17.7% of sales
(Q.3.5, 6, 7 & 8) RMB 2 0M (1994) - 10.0% of sales*
RMB 20M (1995) - 8.7% of sales*
* The significant reduction of profit margin in 1994 and 
1995 was mainly due to the inflation effect on the cost of 
sales. Despite the drop of profitability, BFSH's cash 
position is rather healthy. It repaid RMB30M in 1995 and 
had a bank credit balance of RMB20M at the end of the same 
year.
3.4 Income tax rate : 55% (before 1993)
15% (since 1993)# (Q.3.6)
# The income tax rate may be unified at 33% in 1996 pending for 
the government fianl decision.
Section 4 : Econmic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
BFSH has never entered into any formal ERC with the government 
but instead major financial targets such as turnover, profit, 
foreign exchange and capital expenditure have been assigned by 
the State Foreign Expert Bureau since the 1950s.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.1)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : all the departments were treated as "cost centres" 
managed by the department managers who were mainly 
responsible for the cost control and personnel 
affairs.
After 1992 : after some reorganisation, 9 departments as shown 
in section 2.3 above have been converted into 
"profit centres" and their managers are responsible 
for generating income.
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Corporate Planning Influence* : "High (1..5) »
* By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Very High [VH] (0.0 - 0.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0.6 - 1.0)
High [H] (1.1 - 1.5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1.6 - 2.0)
Medium [M] (2.1 - 2.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2.6 - 3.0)
Low [L] (3.1 - 3.5)
Very Low [VL] (3.6 - 4.0)
G r e a t e s t  I n f l u e n c e
\/
Least Influence
(2) Decentralization (Q.5.1.2)
Before 1992
After 1992
the department managers were responsible for the 
cost control and personnel affairs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility contract 
(IRC) with the top management.
the top management has been decentralizing more 
planning responsibility to each department such as 
initiating the annual plan and the IRC. The income 
profit and expense responsibilities primarily lie 
with the department managers but the top management 
keep a close eye on the financial performance of 
each profit or cost centre through monthly, weekly 
and daily report.
Corporate Planning Influence
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3) 
Before 1992
"High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
After 1992
the general manager, party secretary and key 
managers were appointed by the Bureau. Major 
organisational changes must be approval by the 
Bureau.
the general manager and party secretary are still 
appointed by the Council. The appointment of 
senior managers may be influenced by the Bureau. 
Top management can decide changes in organisation 
structure and personnel affairs.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e
"High-Medium (2) "
" V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
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(4) I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( Q . 5 . 1 . 4 )
Before 1992 : although inter-department product and service .
transfer was minimal, any such transactions were 
valued at either standard cost or selling price as 
determined by the top management annually.
After 1992 : similar to before 1992 except very limited
negotiation is allowed to the department managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Decentralization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Appointment VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Interdependencies VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.1) Medium (2.1)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the Bureau together with 
the top management. Given the key finanical 
targets by the Bureau, the top management initiated 
the annual budgets which should be discussed with 
and approved by the Bureau.
After 1992 : Council has delegated the long term planning and
annual budgeting autonomy to the top management but 
strategic plans and annual financial targets still 
have to be decided by the Bureau.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium
( 2 . 5 ) "
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(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5)
c
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans and annual 
budgets but initiation from the middle management 
(i.e. department managers) was limited.
After 1992 : more formal processes are used for reviewing,
discussing and sanctioning the annual plans and 
IRCs. Major guidelines are provided by the general 
manager to the department managers to formulate 
their own budgets and IRCs. They are also consulted 
in the long term planning.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 19 92 : long term planning was initiated by the Bureau 
although top management was actively involved. 
Annual planning and budgeting were initiated by the 
top management in consultation with the Bureau.
After 1992 : long term planning is initiated by the top
management in consultation with the Bureau. The 
top management is fully responsible for the annual 
plan and budgeting which involve the initiation 
from the department managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management in mid-year but amendments were 
made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the top management 
twice every year and significant changes should be 
be discussed with the Bureau and informed to the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notified 
to the lower management immediately.
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Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.2)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "improve efficiency" and "increase profit or cost 
' control" were the major strategic themes given to 
and imbedded into the planning and control system.
After 1992 : the following strategic themes are stressed :
1. friendly atmosphere;
2. considerate and quality service; and
3. beautiful surroundings.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust 
in order to compete with the counterparts in 
Beij ing.
After 1992 : quality of service is still the most important
strategic thrust directed from the top management 
for all the employees to observe and keep in mind 
when they are performing their duties for the 
enterprise.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "High-Medium (2)"
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(3) S u g g e s t i o n s  ( Q . 5 . 3 . 2  & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the
planning and review process such as cost control, 
personnel affairs, incentive scheme, and marketing.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the department managers to adjust their plans 
and operations as long as they would not deviate 
much from the long term plan and the ultimate 
sales and profit targets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Thrust High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
Suggestions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3) Medium (2.2)
5.4 Long-Term Plans
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.4)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.4)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the
5 -year long term plans focused on the service 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of service facilities, volume and mix, 
marketing and promotion.
After 1992 : the top management has to initiate its own long
term plans and negotiate with the Bureau who used 
to insist on certain macro-targets such as turnover 
and profit growth.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium (2)"
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(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
f
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
feasible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence between the Bureau and the top management, 
to formulate the strategic plans. The current 5- 
year planning (1996-2000), includes facilities 
expansion, joint ventures, import/export, retailing 
and other tertiary enterprises.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 
started to allow BFSH to participate in the 5- 
year's planning with the Bureau and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse
After 1992 : has to initiate their own long term strategic plans
which are negotiated with the Bureau for review and 
approval. Some projects involved significant 
capital investment require financial arrangement by 
the Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
Bureau with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice 
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the Bureau for 
endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting
incorporated into the above long term plans because BFSH caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government had devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions were provided i.e. service capacity and
mix, sales and profit level.
After 1992 : top management has the full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes yet compromises on 
key indicators still have been sought from the 
Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : top management initiated the financial budgets and 
discussed and compromised with the department 
managers. Annual planning was a means for the top 
management to allocate resources i.e. working 
capital and expenses to different cost and expense 
centres.
After 1992 : top managers provided major guidelines (see section
5.5 of Data Analysis 18) to the department managers
for intitiating their own budgets before submission 
and then iterative negotiation begins until 
agreements are made.
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C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e '  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Medium-Low
( 3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : top management involved the department management 
to formulate, evaluate, approve and review the 
annual budgets with the top management.
After 1992 : formal and rigorous meetings and processes are
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 1992 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed bi-annually
and amendments were seldom made except under 
significant environmental changes. Annual plans 
were communicated to middle and lower management 
in written forms.
After 19 92 : top and middle management review the annual plans
and budgets quarterly and amendments are made due
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A fixed budget concept is still in force. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 5 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : IRC was established in 1988 in order to motivate 
the various departments to attain at least the 
financial targets set in the ERC signed with the 
government.
After 1992 : the following performance targets are set :
1. income and profit targets
2. expense targets
3. total wages underwritten 
'4. service targets
5. materials supplied
(a sample of IRC is shown in section 5.6 of Data 
Analysis 19)
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to 
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
(2) Participation (Q.5.6.8)
Before 1992 : the I R C s  targets were suggested by the top
management so that the department managers had to 
negotiate and compromise the terms and conditions.
After 1992 : the top management and department managers develop 
the I R C s  terms and conditions during the annual 
planning process. More room for discussion and 
negotiation is allowed for the department managers.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets agreed by the department managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
A f t e r  1992 IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective department managers and
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their employees.
c
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16)
Before 1992 : the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the financial targets. The total basic wages for 
the whole department was also based on the 
achievement of the income/profit/expense levels.
After 1992 : apart from the financial targets, other qualitative 
targets such as service quality, facilities repair 
and maintenance, education and training are also 
measured against to determine wages and bonus.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication' High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
f
Because the 8 departments or profit centres in BFSH are all 
independent with very minimal interactions and interdependencies, 
therefore, if there is any internal product/service transfer, 
acutal or standard cost is used to settle the transactions.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.3)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Finance (2)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure VH-H (1.0)* High (1.5)
1.2 Staffing High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1..1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2.1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.3 Training High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.4 Evaluation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.6 Termination VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
High (1.3) Medium (2.2)
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# Mr Sun said that since 1992, more delegation has been given to 
the general managers in the personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration. 
But termination of employment with any employee has always been a 
difficult task which needs approvals from the general manager and 
the party secretary.
(3) Control Mechanisms (Q.6,.1.2-3, Q. 6.4.8)
Before 1992 After 1992
3 .1 Budget VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.2 IRC VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.3 Financial targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.4 Quantitative targets VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
3.5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
3 .6 Communication* VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
* The control mechanisms are clearly communicated to 1
departments through the annual plan, IRC and other enterpr
policies, rules and regulations.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
Personnel High (1.3) Medium (2.2)
Control Mechanisms High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Overall Control Influence High (1.3) H-M (2.0)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q. 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  from " T ig h t  F i n a n c i a l  ( 1) " b e f o r e
1992  t o  "Moderate  F i n a n c i a l  ( 2) " a f t e r  1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH (0.5) M-M (2.0)
VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.7)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
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# Mr Sun has mentioned that the monthly condensed report format 
is unique for each department. The actuals are compared with the 
budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the general manager. For any 
serious adverse variances shown on any report, the general 
manager or deputy-general managers will contact the respective 
department manager and his subordinates to dig out the 
underlining reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : the key financial results such as sales and
expenditures are the major concern of the top 
management. The non-financial measurement 
yardsticks are assessed by the top management and 
department through daily inspections. The comments 
and ratings of the service evaluation are written 
on the same monthly reports.
After 1992 : apart from the monthly reporting system, daily
performance or control reports are required for the 
profit centres since they receive cash around the 
clocak everyday. Examples of these daily reports 
are shown in section 6.3 of Data Analysis 19.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "High (1.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports 
monthly but not as formal and rigorous as the 
practices adopted after 1992. Assessed financial 
and qualitative results were notified to each 
department manager. Corrective actions might be 
initiated by the top management but the measurement 
criteria were seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the department managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual department or 
departmental meetings.
Corp r o a t e  Control Influence : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1)" to
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  :
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F a c t o r s Before 1992 
( —  —
A f t e r  1992
Reporting Requirements High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
Performance Measurement High (1.5) High (1.5)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2)
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(1.7)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2) 11 before
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1. 9)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1--7,15-16,22 -23)
Before 1992 After :1992
1.1 Basic wages High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
1.2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1. 7 Recognition (intangible) VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.8 Redundancy Low (3.5) Medium (2.5)
H-M (1.6) H-M (1.9)
* The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on 
seniority, knowledge of work, technical skill and training. The 
increments from year to year are not substantial i.e. RMB20-30.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the BFSH which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the general manager 
and the department manager decides what level of group bonus will 
be given to the department. It is up to a department manager to 
award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, entertainment, servicing, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the BFSH's core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and accounted 
for 30-50% of total wages. Basic wages were low 
and depend on seniority. There were many types of 
allowances which were all unrelated to performance 
but to combat inflation. Pension was totally borne 
by the enterprise. Laying off redundant employees 
was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 20-30% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees but 
subject to the approval of the general manager and 
party secretary.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5)»
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : department managers were involved in formulating
IRC's targets to be measured on. Basic wages,
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : department managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The 
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 ) "  t o
"High-Medium ( 2) "
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(4)  R e v ie w  & C om m u nica t ion  (Q. 6 . 5 . 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 )
Before 1992 : targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the department managers.
After 1992 : IRC's targets are subject to situation and
negotiation every year. Top management reviews the
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the department managers.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "Very H i g h - H i g h  (1) " to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.6) H-M (1.9)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1.9)
S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* High (1.1) Medium (2.1)
Review Process* High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions* High (1.3) Medium (2.2)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High (1.4) Medium (2.4)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
High to 
Medium (2.0)
Medium 
to Low (3.0)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts# High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Management of Inter­
dependencies* N/A N/A
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & Moderate
Control#
Agreeing Objectives* 
Monitoring Results* 
Rewards & Incentives* 
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.3) 
Tight
Financial (1.0)
Financial (1.2) 
Financial (1.2) 
Financial (1.2)
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Moderate 
Financial (1.7)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
Moderate 
Financial (1.9)
* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been?employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic I Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control 4
 4 3 _2 1 0
0 (1.9, 2.4) - BFSH Post-1992 X (1.2, 1.5) - BCM3 Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial 
Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very 
strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style as 
described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
1 S e p t e m b e r  1996
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- Towards An Exploratory Framework" 
Case Analysis 20 
5 September 1996
Based on the case writing (data transcription) of each state- 
owned enterprise investigated during the period from 1992 to 
1995, the following description is to :
(1) trace each planning and control parameter to the respective 
questions in the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 1);
(2) identify the factors affecting each planning and control 
parameter;
(3) quantify as objective as possible the degree of planning or
control influence on each factor and parameter;
(4) summarise all the planning and control parameters and 
represent the final result into the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
accounting style grid.
For further details, please refer to the case writing of "Data 
Analysis 20" (30 January 1996).
Name of SOE : Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Zhang Weifen/Finance Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 15 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 2 September 1993
Second Visit - 30 August 1994
Third Visit - 15 September 1995
Section 1 : History & Background (Q.1.1-5)
1.1 BPMH is a core member of Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) 
which specialises in the design, development, production and 
sale of various types of sheet-fed offset presses in China. 
BGC (formerly known as Beijing Renmin Machinery Factory) was 
established in 1952 through the merger of 21 small iron 
factories and machinery factories. (Q.1.1)
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1.2 BGC (including BPMH) is the largest manufacturer of offset
presses in the PRC and was accredited as a "Category 1" 
enterprise in 1990. "Category 1" enterprise is a national 
award given by the State to enterpries which have attained 
certain standards of management, product quality and 
profitability.
BPMH's head office and production facilities are located 
adjacent to the Beijing-Tianjin Express Highway in Beijing 
city. BPMH uses computers in the production and testing of 
key parts, components and fittings and has entered into an 
agreement with BGC whereby BPMH will undertaken research and 
development of new products using the research facilities of 
BGC. (Q.1.2)
1.3 The major business operations of BPMH are development, 
design, manufacturing and sales of printing machines, 
pressing machines, packing machines and parts and component 
of such machines. The other operations include technology 
consultancy and technical support services related to the 
above business. BPMH produces 61 different models of offset 
presses, which include single/double colour, multi-colour 
and multi-function sheet-fed offset presses. BGC has 
obtained the two Gold Quality Awards and two of the three 
Silver Quality Awards that have ever been given to the 
printing machinery industry by the State during the past 
decade. (Q.1.3)
1.4 BPMH is principally engaged in the production and sale of 
various types of sheet-fed offset presses in China. BPMH 
currently has more than 300 regular customers located 
throughout China, including printers of books, magazines, 
newspapers, notes, certificates and packaging materials. 
BPMH's products are principally sold to customers in the 
PRC. In addition, a small proportion of its products (less 
than 10%) are exported to a number of developing countries 
and regions including Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 
(Q.1.4)
1.5 BPMH's board of directors believe that BPMH has been able to 
maintain consistent profitability as a result of continuous 
improvement to existing models and introduction of new and 
improved models in accordance with market demand. Prices of 
most raw materials and components used by BPMH and its 
products were previously subject to state control, and most 
adjustments to prices had to be approved by the relevant 
authorities. However, since the latter part of 1992, such 
price control has been eliminated and currently, the prices 
of raw materials and components used by BPMH and its 
products are not subject to any form of state control.
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During this period, which was also a period of rapid 
economic growth in the ? PRC, BPMH's production costs have 
increased significantly, as a result of increases in 
material costs as well as labour costs. Nevertheless, 
throughout the period, BPMH has been able to adjust its 
sales prices in response to increases in such costs, and 
overall profit margins have been maintained. With its 
establised market position and competitive pricing policy, 
as against both domestic and imported products, and the 
strong market demand, the BOD expect that BPMH will be able 
to sustain its profit margins in the 1990s. (Q.1.5)
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure (Q.2.1-11#)
2.1 BPMH was established in Beijing, the PRC on 13 July 1993 as 
a joint stock limited company in accordance with the 
provisions set out in the Standard Opinion on Joint Stock 
Limited Companies issued as of 15 May 1992 by the State 
Commission for Restructuring the Economic System of the PRC. 
BPMH is registered as an overseas company in Hong Kong under 
Part XI of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance. Its ultimate 
holding company is Beiren Groyp Corporation (BGC), a legal 
entity owned by the PRC government (state-owned enterprise) .
Pursuant to the approval of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the State Council and other relevant 
authorities, BPMH issued H shares in Hong Kong in July 1993 
and A  shares in Shanghai in April 1994. The H shares were 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 6 August 1993 and 
the A shares (public shares) were listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange on 6 May 1994. Additional A shares (employee 
shares) were listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on 29 
November 1994.
As at 31 December 1994, the share capital structure of BPMH 
was as follow :
Million shares 
Nominal value 
RMB1 each
Shares not yet listed
State-owned legal person shares (A Shares)* 250 (62.5%)
Listed shares
PRC public shares (A Shares) 50 (12.5%)
Hong Kong public shares (H Shares) 100 (25.0%)
400 (100.0%)
* Represented by the Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) 
(Q.2.1 & 4)
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2.2 Under the BPMH, the company structure is shown as follow : 
(Q.2.3, 5 & 9) f
(1) Production Factories & Workshops*
1.1 Multi-colour Offset Press Factory
1.2 Single/Double Colour Offset Press Factory
1.3 Sheet-Fed Machine Factory
1.4 Gear Workshop
1.5 Foundry (casting)
* Each factory or workshop is an independent profit centre, 
having signed IRC with the General Manager, and has its own 
manager, deputy managers, foremen and other supporting 
staff, such as accounting and personnel. Therefore, a kind 
of m a t r i x  m a n a g e m e n t  exist with various repor t i n g  
relationships with the respective departments in the 
headquarters.
Headquarters
2.1 Enterprise Management Office (GM)
2.2 Internal Audit & Law Office (Deputy-GM)
2.3 Production Planning & Control Department (Chief
2.4 Technical & Quality Assurance Department Engineer)
2.5 Investment & Development Department (Chief
2.6 Sales & Marketing Department Economist)
2.7 Accounting & Finance Department (Chief
2 . 8 Computer Department Accountant)
2.9 Purchasing & Supply Department (Deputy-GM)
2 .10 Personnel & Manpower Department (same Deputy-GM)
Board of Directors
3.1 General Manager (Chairman)
3.2 Deputy General Manager (Deputy Chairman)
3.3 Deputy General Manager (Director)
3.4 Chief Engineer (Director)
3.5 Chief Economist (Director)
3.6 Assistant to General Manager (Director)
3.7 Deputy GM of BGC (Director)
3.8 Deputy GM of BGC (Director)
3.9 Senior Assistant to GM of BGC (Director)
3 .10 Two Government Officials (Non-executive
Directors)
(4) Supervisory Committee
4.1 Chairman (Chairman of BGC's Labour Union)
4.2 Supervisor (Supervisor of BGC's Supervisory Comm.)
4.3 Supervisor (Representative of BPMH Labour Union)
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2.3 BGC is an independent legal entity owned by the State. The
supervisory authority of BPMH and BGC is Beijing Industrial 
Machinery Bureau. BPMH and BGC are independent of such 
authority in respect of management decision relating to 
policy setting, strategy, planning and operations. As far 
as BGC is concerned, the major roles played by the Beijing 
Industrial Machinery Bureau before 1993 are to :
(a) appoint the factory manager (or general manager) and 
the communist party secretary;
(b) maintain macroeconomics control on the 5-year's plans 
suggested by its enterprises;
(c) provide guidance on product development, technology
improvement and market information; and
(d) act as a bridge or facilitator between the government
and its enterprises in policy matters such as capital 
investment, import and export autonomy, taxation, legal 
form transformation i.e. shareholding, etc. (Q.2.6 & 7)
2.4 At the end of 1994, BPMH had a workforce of 3,650 people, 
including 2,800 workers, 290 engineering and technical
personnel, 450 administration staff and 110 responsible in 
servicing and other duties. It is classified as a 
"large-size SOE" in China. (Q2.10)
# Although BPMH is a subsidiary enterprise, insufficient
information has been obtained for questions Q.2.2, Q.2.8 and
Q.2.11.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators (Q.3.1-8)
3 .1 Total assets : RMB1,027M (1994)
3.2 Turnover* : RMB 265M (1992)
RMB 385M (1993)
RMB 426M (1994)
RMB 362M (1995)
* BPMH generally commences production upon confirmation of 
orders. As a result of the recent rapid growth of printing 
industry, demand for BPMH's printing machines has significantly 
exceeded supply. Therefore, the customers are generally required 
to pay a cash deposit of 10%-20% of the purchase price at the 
time of order. The balance will be payable immediately prior to 
delivery or upon delivery. Coupled with the shares issued in 
1993 and 1994, BPMH had a total of cash and bank balance of 
RMB220M against a total of long term and short term borrowings 
balance of RMB83M at the end of 1994. Bad debt was quite 
minimal.
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3.3 Income before tax 
(Q. 3 .5, 6, 7 & 8)
3.4 Income tax rate
RMB 52M 
RMB f H I M  
RMB 122M 
RMB 107M
(1992)
(1993)
(1994)
(1995)
15% (Q.3.6)
19.6% of sales 
28.0% of sales 
28.6% of sales 
29.6% of sales
+ Since BPMH is not a holding enterprise, Q.3.4 is not 
applicable.
Section 4 : Ecomnic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
(Q.4.1-13)
BGC, the holding enterprise of BPMH, has entered into ERC with 
the municipal government since 1988. The inception of BPMH in 
1993 did not affect the ERC of BGC because BPMH is a public 
limited company which is not required to entered into any ERC 
with the government, but instead income and relevant taxes are 
the sources of revenue paid by BPMH to the government.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.5)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.5)" after 1992]
(1) Responsibility Centre (Q.5.1.1 & 5)
Before 1992 : before transferring the 5 factories to BPMH in July 
1993, these production factories were treated as 
cost centres in the parent enterprise BGC.
After 1992 : upon inception of BPMH, the 5 production factories 
have been established as independent profit centres 
that are controlled by individual factory managers 
with clear lines of authority and responsibility.
Corporate Planning Influence* : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
By using a 5-point scale - Very High (0)
(consistent with the scale High (1)
used in the questionnaire Medium (2)
e.g. 5.4.4 to quantify Low (3)
some of the parameters or Very Low (4)
variables)
Greatest Influence
\/
Least Influence
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Very High [VH] (0,.0 - 0 ,.5)
Very High-High [VH-H] (0,.6 - 1,.0)
High [H] (1..1 - 1..5)
High-Medium [H-M] (1..6 - 2 ,.0)
Medium [M] (2..1 - 2 ,.5)
Medium-Low [M-L] (2..6 - 3 ,.0)
Low [L] (3..1 - 3 ,.5)
Very Low [VL] (3..6 - 4 .0)
(2) Decentrali zation (Q • 5 . ]L.2)
Before 1992 : the factory managers were responsible for the 
production volumes and costs as agreed in the 
annual budgets and internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs) with the top management.
Therefore, classifying the factories into cost 
centres were appropriate.
After 1992 : the top management has been decentralizing more
planning responsibility to each production factory 
and department such as participation in formulating 
the annual plan and the IRC. Based on the IRC, they
are accounted for the production quantities and 
costs, as well as the fixed and working capital.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Appointment (Q.5.1.3)
Before 1992 : the general manager and party secretary were 
appointed by the Bureau, and some senior 
appointments and major organisational changes 
required Council1s approval.
After 19 92 : the appointments of chairman and party secretary 
are decided by the BGC or Bureau. The board of 
directors has full autonomy to appoint all the 
senior management staff in the headquarters and 
the managers of the 5 production factories.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
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(4) I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  ( Q . 5 . 1 . 4 )
Before 1992 : the transfer quantities and prices of internal
cross-supplies were determined by the headquarters 
by using standard cost plus various mark-ups.
After 1993 : the internal components and services transfer are 
fairly complex which are described in section 5.7 
of Data Analysis 20. Basically, standard cost plus 
is the common method for transfer pricing. Higher 
autonomy is allowed for negotiation among the 
production and service departments, and also 
between BPMH and BGC.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Responsibility Centre High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Decentralization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Appointment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Interdependencies High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
5.2 Review Process (Planning & Budgeting)
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate (2)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.1)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.1 & 8, Q.5.5.7, Q.5.8.9)
Before 1992 : long term planning was initiated, monitored,
reviewed and modified by the top management after 
discussion and agreement with Bureau. The annual 
budgeting process was initiated by the top 
management but major financial targets i.e. sales, 
profit should be agreed with the Bureau.
After 1992 : the board of directors is fully responsible for the 
long term and annual planning. Some huge capital 
investment projects may require BGC's or Bureau's 
support in terms of government's approval.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium ( 2) " t o  "Low ( 3 . 5 ) "
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(2) Operation (Q.5.7.1-5) ?
Before 1992 : formal planning meetings were held between the
Bureau and top management to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the long term plans. As long as 
the key financial targets could be achieved, the 
Bureau seldom influenced the annual budgets.
After 19 92 : long term plans decided by the board of directors
are submitted to the BGC and Bureau for endorsement 
and assistance when necessary. Summary of annual 
budgets is submitted to the Bureau for information.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.7.6-8)
Before 1992 : long term planning was top-down process but 
middle management (i.e factory managers) did 
participate in the annual planning and budgeting 
processes but initiation was constrained.
After 1992 : middle management is being consulted on the long
term planning. They have to discuss with the lower
management in formulating their own annual budgets 
and IRCs although some specific suggestions and 
directions are given by the top management during 
the negotiations.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (5.7.9-14, 5.8.8-11)
Before 1992 : the Bureau reviewed and amended the long term plans
with the top management annually. Changes were 
notified to the employees during the AGM. The 
annual budgets were reviewed between the top and 
middle management in mid-year but amendments were 
made due to significant changes which were 
communicated to lower management through revised 
budgets.
After 1992 : long term plans are reviewed by the board twice 
every year and significant changes should be 
notified to the Bureau and informed to the 
employees during the AGM. The annual budgets are 
reviewed quarterly between the top and middle 
management and amendments can be made and notified 
to the lower management immediately.
485
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High-Medium (2) " t o  "Medium-Low
( 3) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning H-M (2.0) Low (3.5)
Operation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (2.0) Low (3.1)
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts & Suggestions
[Planning Influence changed from "High Corporate (1.3)" 
before 1992 to "Medium Corporate (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Themes (Q.5.2.4-7*)
Before 1992 : "improve efficiency" and "increase profit or cost 
control" were the major strategic themes given to ■ 
and imbedded into the planning and control system.
After 1992 : the board of directors believe that the success of
the company is attributable to the following
strategic themes :
1. the growth of China's printing industry leading 
to increasing demand for advanced printing 
machines;
2. its association with BGC which is one of the 
market leaders;
3. its experienced management team and workers who 
have extensive experience and expertise in the 
printing machinery industry;
4. its continuous efforts in research and develop­
ment to improve the quality of the existing 
products and on the development of offset press;
5. its extensive product range of high-quality and 
competitively priced offset presses; and
6. the use of computer controlled facilities in the 
processing of key parts and components which 
enable the company to maintain its control over 
product quality and production schedules.
C o r p o r a t e  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "Medium ( 2 . 5 ) "
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* Q.5.2.1-3 are related to the life-long employment situation 
which has been a common strategic theme in the state-owned 
enterprises during the 1990s. This issue is presented in section
6.4 below.
(2) Thrusts (Q.5.3.1 & 4)
Before 1992 : "quality" has been the major strategic thrust
in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore 
the overseas market on the other hand.
After 1992 : in order to establish the quality assurance system 
for the full size paper offset presses, BPMH has 
adopted the IS09000 quality management and quality 
assurance standard since 1995. It is expected that 
the system will obtain the certification from the 
relevant PRC authorities of the State in 1996.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Suggestions (Q.5.3.2 & 3)
Before 1992 : top management always made suggestions on the 
planning and review process such as production 
quantity and mix, selling price, personnel, 
incentive scheme, sales and marketing etc.
After 1992 : to facilitate the implementation of the legislation 
in 1992, the top management is leaving more freedom 
to the factory managers and department heads to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they
would not deviate much from the long term plan and
the ultimate annual sales and profit targets.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Very High-High (1)" to
"High-Medium (2) "
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Theme High (1.5)
Thrust High (1.5)
Suggestions VH-H (1.0)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.3)
Medium (2.5) 
Medium (2.5) 
H-M (2.0)
Medium (2.3)
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5 . 4  Long-Term P l a n s
[ P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " H ig h  C o r p o r a t e  ( 1 . 5 ) "
b e f o r e  1992 t o  "Medium-Low C o r p o r a t e  ( 2 . 6 ) "  a f t e r  1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.4.2,4 & 8)
Before 1992 : before the economic reform started in 1979, the 
5-year long term plans focused on the production 
capacity and volumes dictated by the government. 
Since the 1980s, top management participated' in the 
long term planning discussions with the Bureau in 
terms of production facilities, volume and mix, 
product and market development.
After 1992 : both the Bureau and BGC have delegated the long 
term planning autonomy to the board of directors 
who focus on the following long term objectives :
1. improving the quality and performance level of 
its offset presses;
2. expanding the range of offset presses produced;
3. increasing its production capacity and improving 
its productivity.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (3)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.4.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the top management was involved with the Bureau 
to formulate, evaluate, implement, monitor and 
review the long term plans. Negotiations and 
compromises had to be made in order to determine 
feasible long term plans acceptable to both sides.
After 1992 : formal planning meetings and procedures are in
existence to get middle management (i.e. factory 
managers) involved whose planning, control and 
evaluation aspects are affected. The current 
5-year planning (1996-2000), long term investments, 
research and development, equipment and technology 
transfer, innovation, turnover/profit growth, 
product and market development and joint ventures.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.5.4.4 & 6)
Before 1992 : the commencement of the economic reforms in 1979
started to allow BGC to participate in the 5 -year's 
planning with the Bureau but specific directives 
and suggestions were always coming from the top by 
using the term "macroeconomic control and 
adjustment" as an excuse.
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After 1992 : has to formulate their own long term strategic 
plans which are submitted to the Bureau and AGM 
for review and approval. Some projects involved 
significant capital investment require financial 
arrangement by the Bureau.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.4.7 & 9)
Before 1992 : 5-year long term plan was reviewed annually by the
Bureau with the top management and changes made
were notified to the employee's representatives 
during the annual general meeting.
After 1992 : the top management reviews the 5-year plan twice
every year before the annual planning cycle and 
significant changes are reported to the Bureau 
for endorsement and sometimes assistance such as 
seeking long term bank loan.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) " to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning High (1.5) M-L (3.0)
Operation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence High (1.5) M-L (2.6)
* The questions in Section 5.8 : Capital Budgeting are
incorporated into the above long term plans because BCM3 caters 
for the capital budgets during the long term planning exercise.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets
[Planning Influence changed from "Medium Corporate (2.3)" 
before 1992 to "Low Corporate (3.3)" after 1992]
(1) Central Planning (Q.5.5.1)
Before 1992 : government had devolved the short term planning 
autonomy to the top management but specific 
suggestions were provided i.e. production volume 
and mix, sales and profit level.
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After 1992 : board of directors have full autonomy in the annual 
planning and budgeting processes although the 
financial expectation of the BGC and Bureau have to 
be considered.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(2) Operation (Q.5.5.2 & 4)
Before 1992 : production budgets were initiated by the factory 
managers and then discussed and compromised with 
the top management. Expense budgets were suggested 
to the service departments for negotiation and 
agreement. Annual planning was a means for the top 
management to allocate resources i.e. working 
capital and expenses to different cost and expense 
expense centres.
After 1992 : top managers provided major guidelines (see section
5.5 of Data Analysis 20) to the factory managers 
for intitiating their own budgets before submission 
and then iterative negotiation begins until 
agreements are made. Service departments have to 
formulate their own expense budgets as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Participation (Q.5.5.3 & 5)
Before 1992 : the production managers had to formulate, evaluate, 
approve and review the annual budgets with the top 
management. The service departments were consulted 
in identifying the expense budgets.
After 1992 : more formal and rigorous meetings and processes are 
used for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plans and IRCs between the top and middle 
management. The lower management is being 
consulted in the short term planning as well.
Corporate Planning Influence : "Medium (2.5)" to "Low (3.5)"
(4) Review & Communication (Q.5.5.6 & 8)
Before 19.92 : annual plans and budgets were reviewed quarterly 
and amendments were seldom made except under 
significant environmental changes. Annual plans 
were communicated to middle and lower management 
in written forms.
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After 1992 : top and middle management review the annual plans 
and budgets monthly and amendments are made due 
to unavoidable internal and external factors.
A flexible budget concept is started to use. Other 
than documentations, the budget information is 
further communicated between the top and middle 
management during the monthly performance 
evaluation meeting.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) »
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Central Planning Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Operation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation Medium (2.5) Low (3.5)
Review & Communication H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Overall Planning Influence Medium (2.3) Low (3.3)
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate
(1.6)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.6)" after 
1992]
(1) Target Bias (Q.5.6.1-6*)
Before 1992 : the previous B GC1s production factories were using
IRCs which targets focused on production quantity
and cost.
After 1992 : BPMH has been adotping IRC since its inception in
1993. The IRCs emphasized on the internal profit
for the 3 production factories and cost of 
production for the gearing and foundry workshops, 
(foundry workshop's IRC in 1994 is shown in section
5.6 of Data Analysis 20)
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
(3) "
* The procedures in setting the IRC (Q.5.6.7) are very similar to
the annual planning or short term planning cycle.
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(2) P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( Q . 5 . 6 . 8 )
B e f o r e  1992
After 1992
factory managers had to discuss and compromise the 
production quantity and cost targets with the top 
management.
factory managers negotiate and agree the IRC 
targets with the general manager during the 
annual planning cycle.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.5.6.9-15)
Before 1992 : targets agreed by the production managers were
reviewed in the middle of the year and amendments 
could be made when mutually agreed with the top 
management.
After 1992 IRCs are reviewed quarterly and amendments can be 
made in order to reflect the rapid changing 
external factors such as inflation and maintain 
attainable targets. IRCs are documented and 
informed to the respective factory managers and 
their employees.
Corporate Planning Influence
(4) Incentive (Q.5.6.16) 
Before 1992
"High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
After 1992
the bonus was determined by the accomplishment of 
the production and cost targets and qualitative 
factors such as quality and safety had veto effect 
on the bonus to be awarded.
both the economic and qualitative targets are 
linked up with the bonus determination, so the 
factory managers are eager to initiate the IRC 
targets in order to increase the bonus under 
attainable standards.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium-Low (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Target Bias H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review & Communication High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Incentive High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.6)
ii
i 
ii 
I 
ii
i 
i 
11 
i 
2 
ii
(2.6)
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
[Planning Influence changed from "High-Medium Corporate 
(1.8)" before 1992 to "Medium-Low Corporate (2.8)" after 
1992]
(1)
1 .1
1 . 2
Characteristics (Q.5.9.1-7)
Before 1992
Interdepen­
dencies 
Transfer 
Price Basis
Production & service 
departments involved 
standard cost 
plus
1.3 Transfer Price mainly determined
Negotiation
1.4 Intermediate 
Product
1.5 Transfer 
Quantity
1.6 Arbitration
1.7 Government
Interference
by top management 
Some buy & sell are 
available in market 
Mainly determined by 
the top management 
Prices and quantities 
mainly determined by 
top management 
No, only suggest out­
put volumes & selling 
prices of products
After 1992
Production/service & 
BGC(parent) involved 
standard cost plus & 
% of sales/profit 
largely between 
buyer and seller 
Some buy & sell are 
available in market 
Majority determined 
by top management 
top management made 
decisions on unre­
solved negotiations 
Not at all. Concern 
overall profit of 
the whole enterprise
Corporate Planning Influence
(3) "
(2) Participation (Q.5.9.8)
"High-Medium (2) " to "Medium-Low
Before 1992 production factories and service departments were 
allowed to negotiate the internal transfer prices 
and quantities although influences inserted and 
arbitration required.
After 1992 : products and services transfer between BGC and BPMH 
are arm's-length transactions which quantities and 
prices have to be agreed between both parties at 
least on an annual basis. Internal transfers 
within BPMH's factories and departments are allowed 
to negotiate both the prices and quantities but 
sometimes influences come from the top management.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High-Medium (2)" to "Medium-Low
(3) "
(3) Review (Q.5.9.9-12)
Before 1992 : the standard costs used to set the transfer prices 
were determined during the annual planning exercise 
after consultation with the middle management i.e. 
factory managers. The transfer prices were reviewed 
half-yearly and some amendments were allowed.
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After 1992 : the transfer prices between BGC and BPMH are
reviewed either annually (i.e. service charges) or 
quarterly (i.e. immediate products), and amendments 
can be made upon mutual agreement. Internal 
transfer prices among BPMH's production and service 
departments are reviewed quarterly and amendments 
can be made if the conditions warrant.
Corporate Planning Influence : "High (1.5) » to "Medium (2.5)"
Summary of Corporate Planning Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Characteristics H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Participation H-M (2.0) M-L (3.0)
Review High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Overall Planning Influence H-M (1.8) M-L (2.8)
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation & Control
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.3)" after 1992]
(1) Organisational Design (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Structure High (1.5)* H-M (2.0)
1.2 Staffing High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.3 Roles & functions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1.4 Interactions High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
* By using a 5-point scale which is exactly the same used in the 
questionnaire :
Very L o w (4) L o w (3) Medium(2) High(l) Very High(O)
Tight Strategic<----------------------------------- Tight Financial
Control Control
Tight Financial (0.0 - 1.0)
Financial (1.1 - 1.5)
Moderate Financial (1.6 - 2.0)
Moderate Strategic (2.1 - 2.5)
Strategic (2.6 - 3.0)
Tight Strategic (3.1 - 4.0)
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(2) Personnel# (Q.6.1.1)
Before 1992 After 1992
2.1 Recruitment VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
2.2 Assignment High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.3 Training High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.4 Evaluation High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2.5 Remuneration High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
2 . 6 Termination . VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
# Miss Zhang said that the deputy-general managers, factory 
managers and the three chiefs can decide on their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units (workshops or sections). 
They are also responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration.
(3) Control.Mechanisms (Q.6..1.2-3, Q .6.4.8)
Before 1992 After :1992
3 .1 Budget High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
3.2 IRC High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
3.3 Financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
3.4 Quantitative targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
3 . 5 Qualitative targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
3 . 6 Communication* High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
* Since BPMH is a listing enterprise with higher management 
autonomy delegated by the government authorities and is 
responsible to more stakeholders, including the shareholders as 
the general public, the board of directors and top management are 
compelled to focus on more strategic plans and tactical moves in 
order to maintain a balance of the different requirements. 
Therefore, the decentralisation and control in the context of 
organisation structure are more dynamic and flexible compared 
with the other wholly state-owned enterprises.
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Organisational Design High (1.5) Medium (2.4)
Personnel High (1.3) Medium (2.3)
Control Mechanisms High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
Overall Control Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.3)
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s  ( Q. 6 . 2 . 1 - 2 )
[ C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  c h a n g e d  f r o m  " F i n a n c i a l  ( 1 . 1 ) "  b e f o r e
1992  t o  "M oderate  F i n a n c i a l  (2) " a f t e r  1992]
Factors affecting the types and styles of control mechanisms :
Before 1992 After 1992 .
(1) Precision & detail of
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(2) Objective vs subjective
targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(3) Achieving targets
Timeframe VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(4) Stretch built into
the targets VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
(5) Financial vs non-
financial targets High (1.5) H-M (2.0)
(6) Manangement influence
on setting targets VH-H (1.0) M-M (2.0)
High (1.1) H-M (2.0)
6.3 Monitoring Results
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.4)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Strategic (2.1)" after 1992]
(1) Reporting Requirements# (Q.6.3.1-3)
Factors considered by the headquarters in management control
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Policy VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.2 Frequency VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.3 Contents VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Compilation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.5 Review VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.6 Evaluation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.7 Authorization VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1. 8 Feedback VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.9 Follow-up VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.10 Computerization High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
High (1.1) H-M (1.7)
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# Miss Zhang has mentioned that the quarterly and monthly 
condensed report format is unique for each factory (see examples 
shown in section 6.3 of Data Analysis 20) . The actuals are 
compared with the budgets or IRCs. Any significant variances 
will be highlighted in order to bring the attention to the 
general manager. For any serious adverse variances shown on any 
report, the general manager or deputy-general managers will 
contact the respective factory manager and his subordinates to 
dig out the underlining reasons or ask them to perform 
investigation immediately. It is expected that corrective 
actions can be taken to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
(2) Performance Measurement (Q.6.4.1-2)
Before 1992 : production factories were mainly measured on
production volume and cost of production, but other 
non-financial targets such as quality and safety 
were accounted for less weightings.
After 1992 : internal profit is the major financial target used
to measure against the production factories.
Working capital and expense control are other 
economic targets measured against the budgets or 
IRCs.
Corporate Control Influence : "High (1.5)" to "Medium (2.5)"
(3) Review & Communication (Q.6.4.3-7, Q.6.4.9-12)
Before 1992 : the top management reviewed the performance reports
monthly and discussed significant inefficiency and 
problems with the factory and department managers. 
Assessed financial and qualitative results were 
notified to each factory or department manager. 
Corrective actions might be initiated by the top 
management but the measurement criteria were 
seldom changed.
After 1992 : the top and middle management hold a monthly
meeting to review the performance reports, to ask 
the factory managers for explanations, to decide 
corrective actions, and to determine penalties and 
incentives. Evaluation results are informed to the 
lower management via individual factory or 
departmental meetings.
C o r p r o a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "High ( 1 . 5 ) "  t o  "High-Medium (2)"
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Summary o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  i n f l u e n c e  :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Reporting Requirements 
Performance Measurement 
Review & Communication
High
High
High
(1.1)
(1.5)
(1.5)
H-M
Medium
H-M
(1.7)
(2.5)
(2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.4) Medium (2.1)
6.4 Rewards & Incentives
[Control Influence changed from "Financial (1.2)" before 
1992 to "Moderate Financial (1.8)" after 1992]
(1) Incentives* (Q.6.5.1-7,15-16,22'-23)
Before 1992 After 1992
1.1 Basic wages H-M (2.0) VH-H (1.0)
1. 2 Allowances H-M (2.0) H-M (2.0)
1.3 Bonuses - monthly VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
1.4 Bonuses - annual H-M (2.0) Medium (2.5)
1.5 Other benefits VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
1.6 Pension VH (0.5) VH-H (1.0)
1.7 Recognition (intangible) High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
1. 8 Redundancy Low (3.5) H-M (2.0)
H-M (1.7) H-M (1.8)
* The absic wages are divided into 21 grades which entry point or 
promotion depends of post, skills, seniority and experience.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
municipal government at least once in each year to combat 
inflation. The second part is decided by the BPMH which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child care, attendance, overtime, 
hair-dressing, festival gift etc.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
targets in the IRC. The IRC signed between the general manager 
and the factory manager decides what level of group bonus will be 
given to the factory. It is up to a factory manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her individual 
subordinates.
The "bonus" for the management and servicing staff is linked with 
the average bonus of the production workers, and is based on 
their performance and grades as well.
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One way to alleviate the redundant employees is to transfer a 
small portion of these employees to the self-financed "tertiary 
enterprises" which are mainly service businesses such as 
retailing, restaurant, transportation, trading etc. and unrelated 
to the BPMH's core business. Another way is to send some of 
employees home without giving them a job or post but still 
provide them the basic wages of RMB200-300.
Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the "Decision on the 
Reformation of Pension Scheme of Retired Employees of the 
Enterprises" of the State Council, BPMH contributes 19% of the 
total payroll of its employees as basic employee's pension 
expense.
(2) Performance Orientation (Q.6.5.9-12,17-19)
Before 1992 : bonus relied on I R C s  accomplishment and
contributed to 30-40% of total wages. Basic wages 
were low and depend on seniority. There were many 
types of allowances which were all unrelated to 
performance but to combat inflation. Pension was 
totally borne by the enterprise. Laying off 
redundant employees was difficult.
After 1992 : bonus is mainly determined according to IRCs and 
accounts for less than 20-30% of total wages.
Basic wages has been increased and increments take
skills, knowledge, competance into account instead 
of seniority only. Some allowances and benefits 
are merged with the basic wages. The middle 
management can lay off the redundant employees.
Corporate Control Influence : "Very High-High (1) " to "High
(1.5)"
(3) Participation (Q.6.5.16-17)
Before 1992 : factory managers were involved in formulating
I R C s  targets to be measured on. Basic wages,
allowances, pension and other benefits were decided
by the headquarters and government.
After 1992 : factory managers have to initiate the IRC's
targets and negotiate with top management. The
policies for basic wages, allowances and other 
benefits have involved the labour union and 
management. A nationwise pension policy is still 
undergoing with enterprise's contribution and then 
underwritten by the government.
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C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : " V e r y  H i g h - H i g h  ( 1 )  " t o
"High-Medium ( 2) "  f
(4) Review & Communication (Q. 6.5.8,13-14, 20-21)
Before 1992
After 1992
targets set in IRC were reviewed annually but basic 
wages and allowances only changed with inflation. 
Pension and other benefits were seldom changed. 
Performance and reward were made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers.
IRC's targets are subject to situation and 
negotiation very year. Top Management reviews the 
basic wages, allowances and other benefits during 
the annual planning cycle and employees are 
informed of these decisions and policies. 
Performance and reward are made known to employees 
every month via the factory or department managers.
Corporate C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : "V e r y H i g h - H i g h (1) "
"High-Medium (2)"
Summary of Corporate Control Influence :
Factors Before 1992 After 1992
Incentives H-M (1.7) H-M (1.8)
Performance Orientation VH-H (1.0) High (1.5)
Participation VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Review & Communication VH-H (1.0) H-M (2.0)
Overall Control Influence High (1.2) H-M (1.8)
to
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influence are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beiren Printing Machinery Holding Ltd. 
(BPMH) belonged to before and after 1992.
Planning Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Organisation Structure* High (1.5) Medium (2.5)
Review Process*
Strategic Themes, Thursts 
and Suggestions*
High to 
Medium
High
(2.0)
(1.3)
Low (3.1) 
Medium (2.3)
Long-Term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation) High (1.5)
Medium
to Low (2.6)
Short-Term Planning/ 
Budgeting*
(Resource Allocation)
Medium (2.3) Low (3.3)
Internal Responsibility 
Contracts#
High to 
Medium (1.6)
Medium
to Low (2.6)
Management of Inter­
dependencies*
High to 
Medium (1.8)
Medium
to Low (2.8)
Overall Planning Influence High to 
Medium (1.7)
Medium
to Low (2.7)
Control Influence Before 1992 After 1992
Decentralisation & 
Control# Financial (1.4)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.3)
Agreeing Objectives*
Financial (1.1)
Moderate 
Financial (2.0)
Monitoring Results*
Financial (1.4)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.1)
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial (1.2)
Moderate 
Financial (1.8)
Overall Control Influence
Financial (1.3)
Moderate 
Strategic (2.1)
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* All the planning and control influences (parameters) used by 
Goold and Campbell have been employed in this study.
# Additional parameters used to measure the planning and control 
influences specifically in the China scenario.
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning
Influence
Control Influence
Strategic 1 Financial
High 0 Strategic Programming 0 Financial Programming 0
H/M
Medium ---2
M/L
X
Low 4 Strategic Control 4 Financial Control
 4 3 2 1 0
0 (2.1, 2.7) - BPMH Post-1992 X (1.3, 1.7) - BPMH Pre-1992
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the Beiren 
Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to 
"Strategic Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of strategic control style 
as described by Goold1s and Campbell's Strategic Style.
5 S e p t e m b e r  1996
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWS THE MANAGEMENT IN SOES
Name of Enterprise : 
Address :
Tel •
Staff Interviewed :
(1) Name s ___
Position :
No. of years - in enterprise : 
- in this position :
(2) Name : _______________________
Position :
No. of years - in enterprise : 
- in this position :
(3) Name :_____ _______________________
Position :
No. of years - in enterprise : 
- in this position : 
Date : Remarks :
Section 1 : History and Background
1.1 When was this enterprise formed or established?
1.2 Which manufacturing or service industry does the enterprise 
belong to?
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1.3 What were/are the major product (service) lines manufactured 
(provided) before and after 1992?
1.4 What were/are the major markets (local and overseas) for 
selling (rendering) the products (service) before or after 
1992?
1.5 What will be the future product/market development in the 
next five years?.
Section 2 : Legal Form and Organisation Structure
2.1 What was/is/will be the enterprise legal form in the past, 
present and future? (please tick)
Wholly SOE Shareholding SOE Other
Before 1992 
In 1992
After 1992
2.2 If the legal form was/is/will be a shareholding SOE, what 
percentages of share were/are/will be held by the respective 
parties?
Before 1992 In 1992 After 1992
Government % % %
Other SOEs % % %
Management % % %
Employees % % %
Individuals
(Outsiders)
% % %
Others : please specify
% % %
100% 100% 100%
Is it possible 
organisational
to have a copy 
chart(s)?
(copies) of the enterprise
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2.4 What is the position of this enterprise in the whole
organization? (please tick)
(a) ____ the holding enterprise
(b) ____ a subsidiary enterprise
(c) ____ an individual enterprise (neither holding nor
subsidiary
(d) Other (please explain) : _______________________________
2.5 Do you have the following posts in the top management elite? 
(If there are any, please indicate the numbers of people)
_______  Board of Directors (BOD)
Executive Directors in BOD
/___ Chairman/Vice Chairman(s) in BOD
  Chief Executive Officer/Enterprise General Manager
  Deputy CEO(s)/Deputy Enterprise General Manager
Chief Accountant
Chief Economist
_______  Chief Engineering
_______  Other (please specify)
2.6 Who has ultimate responsibility for determination of the 
enterprise's long-term plans or corporate mission before and 
after 1992?
2.7 In practice, are other management levels involved in the 
setting of enterprise long-term plans or corporate mission? 
If yes, please specify.
2.8 Can you briefly mention each of your subsidiary enterprises 
in terms of : (this question is for holding enterprises)
(a) name and year of establishment?
(b) manufacturing or service industry;
(c) major product or service lines;
(d) major markets (local and foreign)?
(e) wholly state-owned or shareholding;
(f) total number of employees; and
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(g) total turnover (sales) in last year;
(h) total income before tax in last year; and
(i) total income after tax in last year?
2.9 Can you briefly mention each of your major divisions or 
departments in terms of :
(a) number of employees (including workers);
(b) management structure (middle or lower management);
(c) major functions; and
(d) interactions with other divisions or departements?
2.10 What is the total number of employees in your enterprise 
overall at present?
2.11 What is the total number of employees in your part of the 
enterprise?
(3) Financial Indicators (this part of the enterprise)
3.1 What was the total assets in this enterprise last year?
3.2 What was the total turnover (sales) in last year?
3.3 What was the split of domestic and export turnover (sales)
in last year?
3.4 Do you have inter-transfer or internal sales to the holding
or other subsidiary enterprises? If yes, what was/were the 
proportion(s) to total turnover (sales) in last year? (This 
question applies to group enterprise.)
3.5 What was the net income before tax in last year?
3.6 What was the net income after tax in last year?
3.7 Can estimates or forecasts on any of the the above figures
(3.1 - 3.6) for this year be made now? If yes, please
provide the details.
3.8 Are there any long-term (say within 5 years) plans for the
above key financial indicators (3.1 - 3.6) at this moment?
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Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
4.1 Has your enterprise ever signed a "Economic Responsibility 
Contract" (ERC) with the government (central or local)? If 
yes, when?
4.2 What were the basic amounts of "gross turnover (sales)" and
"income after tax" agreed upon when signing such an ERC in 
the first year?
4.3 On what "bases" were the two figures arrived at in the above
question (4.2)?
4.4 How have the "growth factors" on the above two contracted 
financial targets been determined year by year since after 
the first year?
4.5 Do you think the "bases" (4.3) and "growth factors" (4.4) 
described above have been fairly and realistically set? 
Why?
4.6 What other important targets, other than the above mentioned 
two financial targets, have been set in the ERC?
4.7 Did you participate in determining the two financial targets 
(4.2) and other targets (4.6)?
4.8 Did you participate in determining the level at which the 
performance measures (i.e. "bases", "growth factors", etc.) 
are set?
4.9 What have been the actual performances achieved by your 
enterprises compared against the above pre-determined 
financial and non-finanicaal targets since the first year 
signing up the ERC?
4.10 If the actual performances have not been satisfactory in the 
past years, what were the major reasons, other than the 
possibilities raised in 4.5 above, for the real situations?
4.11 Has your enterprise withdrawn from the ERCS already? If 
yes, why?
4.12 Are you anticipating to withdraw from the ERCS in the near 
future? If yes, why?
4.13 What is or will be the alternative system to enhance the 
productivity and efficiency in your enterprise instead of 
using the ERCS?
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Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
5.1.1 How many in each type of the following responsibility
centres (RCs) have been set up in your enterprises?
______  Investment Centres
______ Profit Centres
______ Cost Centres
______ Expense Centres
______  Others, please specify : _______________________
5.1.2 What are the major criteria (e.g. products, markets,
geographic, clients, etc. ) in setting the
Investment Centres;
Profit Centres;
Cost Centres;
Expense Centres; and 
Other Centres?
5.1.3 Are there any major problems encountered in setting the
above RCs?
5.1.4 What are major relationships and interdependencies
among the RCs? Are any of them involved in the 
internal transfer of goods or services? Are central 
services provided for all the RCs?
5.1.5 Will there be any changes in setting and defining the
RCs in the next two years?
5.2 Strategic Themes
5.2.1 How is/was the abolishment of the "three iron bowls" 
(i.e. iron employment, iron position and iron wages) 
implemented?
5.2.2 What are the difficulties encountered in abolishing the 
"three iron bowls"? How can these difficulties be 
solved?
508
5.2.3 What are the results (i.e. employees1 motivation and 
incentives) in abolishing the "three iron bowls so far?
5.2.4 Are there any other strategic themes (e.g. quality 
control) or distinctive competences (e.g. industrial 
safety) explicitly stated by the top management?
5.2.5 Are these strategic themes or distinctive competences 
helpful in planning and actual implementation?
5.2.6 When and under what circumstances will these themes and 
competences be changed? Do you participate in the 
change process?
5.2.7 How are these themes and competences communicated to 
every level of management and employees within the 
enterprise?
5.3 Broad Strategic Thrusts
5.3.1 Are there any strategic thrusts or guidelines (e.g.
productivity, profitability, assets turnover, product 
or market diversification etc.) laid down by the top 
management?
5.3.2 How do these strategic thrusts or guidelines affect the 
strategic planning and setting targets or budgets in 
different levels of management?
5.3.3 When and under what circumstances will these strategic 
thrusts or guidelines be changed?
5.3.4 How are these strategic thrusts or guidelines 
communicated to every level of management within the 
enterprise?
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Management's Participation, Review and 
Modification)
5.4.1 Do the top management set long-term (within 5 years) 
strategic plans? If yes, how long is the time-frame?
5.4.2 What are major context of the strategic plans? (please 
tick and describe briefly)
_____ Product development :
diversification
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d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
Market development :
diversification
  penetration
Organisation Structure :
  merger and takeover
  shareholding
_____ joint-venture
divestment
_____ others, please specify -
  Others, please specify :
5.4.3 Is there any formal planning committee or equivalent 
existed? If yes, how is it operating in terms of 
membership composition, strategic plans formulation, 
evaluation and determination?
5.4.4 How far the different levels of management participate 
in formulating the above strategic plans? (please rank 
from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate proposals/plans and
discuss in planning committee
4 = make final decision)
Levels of Management : Top (a) Middle (b) Lower (c)
Product Development :
Diversification
Differentiation
Market Development :
Diversification
Penetration
Organisation Structure :
Merger & takeover
Shareholding
Joint-venture
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Divestment
Others (please specify) 
Others (please specify) :
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General 
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief 
Economist and Chief Engineering (assume the final 
decisions are made either by the government or the 
board of directors if ranking is not 4).
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.4.5 Is formulating strategic plans a way for the top
management to allocate the resources to different 
business units according to (please tick) :
long term business plan; 
project-by-project approach; 
relative importance of units; 
power of unit managers; 
other external factors;
_____ earning or profitability potentials; or
  other (please specify)?
5.4.6 How far can the participation in formulating the
strategic plans enhance the communication between 
different levels of management?
5.4.7 How freguent are the strategic plans reviewed either
formally by the planning committee or infromally by the 
top management?
  yearly
  half-yearly
  guarterly
_____ monthly
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Other (please specify) :
5.4.8 What are the major factors for justifying the 
modification of those strategic plans? (please tick) :
  central government plan
  local government plan
  long-term enterpriser benefit
_____ short-term enterpriser benefit
_____ management's knowledge and experience
  management's personal belief or bias
  other (please specify)?
5.4.9 How are the determined strategic plans be communicated 
to the various levels of management?
_____ meetings
_____ written report
_____ notice board
Others (please specify) : _______________
5.5 Short-Term Plan (Management's Participation, Review and 
Modification)
5.5.1 What is the extent of autonomy can the *top management
exercise in each of the following short-term (within 
one year) plans? (please rank from 0-4, i.e.
0 = no autonomy at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = make suggestions and discuss
3 = initiate plans and negotiate
4 = have full autonomy subject to
macro-economical adjustments)
*Top management is defined as the Enterprise General 
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief 
Economist and Chief Engineering.
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cR an k in g  0 1 2 3 4 R e a so n
Short-term Plan :
Sales -
Price
Volume
Mix
Production - 
Capacity 
Quantity 
Mix
Material - 
Price 
Quantity 
Mix
Labour -
Rates
Bonus
Number
In-take
Lay-off
Inventory - 
Level 
Valuation 
EOQ
Ordering time
Servicing Depts. - 
Headcount 
In-take 
Lay-off 
Salaries 
Expenses
Income Before Tax
Others (please specify) -
5.5.2 How the above short-term plans are developed? Is there
any formal planning committee or equivalent existed? 
If yes, how it is operating in terms of membership 
composition, short-term plans formulation, evaluation 
and determination?
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5.5.3 How far the middle and lower management participate in
determining the above (5.5.1) short-term plans? (please 
rank from 0 - 4 ,  iie. 0 = no participation at all
1 = consultation for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate proposals/plans and
discuss in planning committee
4 = make final decision)
Name of Department : ______________________________ _
Levels of Management : Middle (a) Lower (b)
Short-term Plan :
Sales -
Price
Volume
Mix
Production - 
Capacity 
Quantity 
Mix
Material - 
Price 
Quantity 
Mix
Labour -
Rates
Bonus
Number
In-take
Lay-off
Inventory - 
Level 
Valuation 
EOQ
Ordering time
Servicing Depts. - 
Headcount 
In-take 
Lay-off 
Salaries 
Expenses
,n
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Levels of Management : Middle (a) Lower (b)
f
Income Before Tax 
Transfer Pricing 
Others (please specify) -
(a) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(b) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.5.4 Is formulating short-term plans a way for the top 
management to allocate the resources to different 
business units according to (please tick) :
_____ long term business plan?
_____ project-by-project approach;
_____ relative importance of units;
_____ power of unit managers?
_____ other external factors?
_____ earning or profitability potentials? or
_____ other (please specify)?
5.5.5 How far can the participation in formulating the
short-term plans enhance the communication between 
different levels of management?
5.5.6 How frequent are the short-plans reviewed either
formally by the planning committee or infromally by the
top and middle management?
5.5.7 What are the major factors for justifying the
modification of these short-term plans? (please tick) :
_____ central government plan
_____ local government plan
_____ long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
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  management's knowledge and experience
  management's personal belief or bias
  other (please specify)?
5.5.8 How the determined short-term plans be communicated to
the various levels of management?
5.6 Setting Targets Through Internal Responsibility Contracts
[IRC] (Management's Participation, Review and Modification)
5.6.1 When was the IRC system started to be employed in this 
enterprise?
5.6.2 How are the IRCs correlated to the Economic 
Responsibility Contract signed with the government?
5.6.3 What is the duration of each IRC?
5.6.4 Which responsibility centres in this enterprise have 
signed the IRCs with the top management?
5.6.5 Can you provide me with a few samples of the IRCs 
(before and after 1992) for reference?
5.6.6 What are the major "targets" (both financial and 
non-financial) set in these few IRCs? (take a few 
responsibility centres, i.e. production, purchasing, 
sales etc., as examples)
5.6.7 What are the formal procedures (i.e. planning committee 
or equivalent) in setting these targets?
5.6.8 How far the middle and lower management participate in 
setting the various targets in their IRCs? (please rank 
from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consultation for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate targets and negotiate
in planning committee
4 = make final decision)
Name o f  D e p a r tm e n t  : ____________________________________________
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L e v e l s  o f  Management M id d l e  (a) Lower (b)
Targets :
(1)  
(2) _____________________
(3) ______________________
( 4 )  ______________________________
(5) _______________________
(a) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(b) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.6.9 Are the above targets related (or responsibility 
delegated) to the levels of management within the 
responsibility centre (or department)? How? (please 
tick and explain)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
♦Section *Sub-section Individual
Targets :
(1) __________________
(2) _______________
(3) ________________
( 4 )  _______________________
(5) _________________
* Please define these levels of management.
5.6.10 Is formulating targets in the IRCs a way for the top 
management to allocate the resources to different 
business units according to (please tick) :
  long term business plan;
  project-by-project approach?
  relative importance of units;
517
5.6.11
5.6.12
5.6.13
5.6.14
5.6.15
5.6.16
  power of unit managers;
  other external factors?
  earning or profitability potentials? or
  other (please specify)?
How far can the participation in formulating the 
targets in the IRCs enhance the communication between 
different levels of management?
How frequently are the targets in the IRCs reviewed 
either formally by the planning committee or informally 
by the top and middle management?
What are the major factors for justifying the 
modification of these targets? (please tick) :
  central government plan
_____ local government plan
_____ long-term enterprise's benefit
_____ short-term enterprise's benefit
_____ management's knowledge and experience
_____ management's personal belief or bias
  other (please specify)?
Are these targets modified in a way similar to the 
"flexible budget" concept (i.e. according to actual or 
current performance/condition)?
How the determined or agreed targets be communicated 
to the various levels of management?
What have been the results (i.e. turnover, 
profitability, labour productivity or effieiency, etc.) 
since the employment of the IRC system? How were they 
compared with the performance before using this system?
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5.7 Setting Targets Through Budgets (Management's Participation, 
Review and Modification)
5.7.1 When was the budgeting system started to be employed in 
this enterprise?
5.7.2 Can you outline the budgeting structure or hierarchy 
and indicate which responsibility centres (RCs) are 
involved?
5.7.3 What is the duration of each budget? What is the 
time-schedule of the budgeting cycle?
5.7.4 Can you provide me a few samples of proforma budgets 
for reference?
5.7.5 What are the formal procedures (i.e. budget committee 
or equivalent) in setting these budgets?
5.7.6 How far the middle and lower management participate in 
setting the various budgets in their RCs? (please rank 
from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate budgets and negotiate
in planning committee
4 = make final decisions)
Name of Department :  _________________________________
Levels of Management : Middle (a) Lower (b)
budgeted items :
(1)  
(2)  
(3) _______________________
(4) _______________________
(5) _______________________
(a) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(b) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
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5.7.7 Are the above budgets related (or responsibility
delegated) to the levels of management within the 
responsibility centre (or department)? How? (please 
tick and explain)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
♦Section *Sub-section Individual
budgeted items :
(1) __________________
(2)  
(3) __________________
(4)  ___________________
(5) _ _____________
* Please define these levels of management.
5.7.8 Is formulating the budgets a way for the top management 
to allocate resources to different business units 
according to (please tick) :
_____ long-term business plan;
_____ project-by-project approach?
_____ relative importance of units;
  power of unit managers?
  other external factors?
  earning or profitability potentials; or
  others (please specify)?
5.7.9 How far the process of budgettng can enhance the 
communication in the various levels of management?
5.7.10 How frequent the budgets in the RCs are reviewed either 
formally by the planning committee or informally by the 
top and middle management?
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5 . 7 . 1 1 What are the major factors for justifying the 
modification of these budgets? (please tick) :
_____ central government plan
_____ local government plan
  long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
_____ management's knowledge and experience
_____ management's personal belief and bias
_____ others (please specify)?
5.7.12 Are "flexible budgets" used? If yes, how?
5.7.13 How the determined or agreed budgets be communicated 
to the various levels of management?
5.7.14 What have been the results since the employment of the 
budgeting system? How were they compared with the 
performance before using this system?
5.8 Capital Budgeting (Management's Participation, Review and 
Modification)
5.8.1 When was the capital buegeting system started to be 
employed in this enterprise?
5.8.2 How long is the coverage of the capital budgets?
5.8.3 What are the formal procedures (i.e. budget committee 
or equivalent) in setting these capital budgets?
5.8.4 Can you provide me a few samples of capital budget 
forms for reference?
521
5.8.5 How far the various levels of management participate in
setting the capital budgets in their RCs? (please rank 
from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate budgets and negotiate
in planning committee
4 = make final decisions)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle(b) Lower(c)
capital budgeted items :
(1) Land & Building
(2) Plant & Machinery
(3) Motor Vehicles
(4) Fixtures & Fittings
(5) Research & Development
(6) Advertising
(7) Others (please specify) :
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountant, Chief
Economists and Chief Engineer. (Assume the final
decisions are made by either the government or the
board of directors if ranking is not 4).
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.8.6 What kinds of techniques (i.e. DCF, Pay-back, ROI, RI
etc.) have been used for evaluating the capital budgets 
at the planning stage?
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5.8.8
5.8.9
5.8.10
5.8.11
Is formulating the capital budgets a way for the top 
management to allocate resources according to (please 
tick) :
_____ long-term business plan?
  project-by-project approach;
  relative importance of units?
  power of unit managers?
  other external factors?
  earning or profitability potentials; or
_____ others (please specify)?
How frequent the capital budgets are reviewed either 
formally by the planning committee or informally by the 
top and middle management?
What are the major factors for justifying the 
modification of these capital budgets? (please tick) :
_____ central government plan
_____ local government plan
_____ long-term enterprise's benefit
_____ short-term enterprise's benefit
  management's knowledge and experience
  management's personal belief and bias
_____ others (please specify)?
How the capital budgets be communicated to the various 
levels of management?
What have been the results since the employment of the 
capital budgeting system? How were they compared with 
the performance before using this system?
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5.9 Transfer Pricing (Management’s Participation, Review and 
Modification) t
5.9.1 What kinds of transactions within your enterprise (or 
group of enterprises) involve the setting of transfer 
prices? (Please describe the divisions or departments 
involved, the nature of transfers and the purposes of 
setting transfer prices.)
5.9.2 On what bases are the transfer prices determined? Are 
negotiations allowed by the selling and buying 
divisions?
5.9.3 Are there any outside markets to sell the intermediate 
products instead of transfer internally? Are the 
market prices higher or lower than the internal 
transfer prices?
5.9.4 Are the intermediate products available from external 
suppliers instead of purchasing internally? Are the 
market prices for these external supplies higher or 
lower than the internal transfer prices?
5.9.5 On what bases are the transfer quantities determined? 
Are negotiations allowed by the selling and buying 
divisions?
5.9.6 Do the top management interfere with the setting of 
transfer prices and/or quantities? How?
5.9.7 Does the government determine or the economic 
responsibility contract stipulate the transfer prices 
and/or or quantities? How?
5.9.8 What is the extent of participation by the divisional 
managers in determining each transfer price in general? 
(Please rank from 0 - 4, i.e.
0 = no participation at all
1 = consult of ideas only
2 = suggest and discuss
3 = propose and negotiate
4 = determine on their own)
TP No. Nature of Transfer Rank Remarks
1
2
3
4 etc.
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5 . 9 . 9 How frequent the (transfer prices are reviewed either 
formally in the meetings or informally by the
(1) top management;
(2) middle management;
(3) top & middle management; and
(4) other (please specify)?
5.9.10 What are the major factors for justifying the
modification of these transfer prices? (please tick) ;
_____ central government plan
_____ local government plan
  long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
_____ management's knowledge and experience
_____ management's personal belief and bias
_____ others (please specify)?
5.9.11 Is internal and external information available for
negotiating and determining the transfer prices? Why?
5.9.12 Is internal and external information sufficient for
negotiating and determining the transfer prices? Why?
SECTION 6 S CONTROL SYSTEM
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
6.1.1 In gneral, how far the decentralisation in the
following few managerial aspects is delegated to the 
different levels of management? (please rank from 0 - 4  
and describe briefly, i.e. 0 = no autonomy is given
1 = low autonomy
2 = moderate autonomy
3 = high autonomy
4 = full autonomy
Major Division : ___________________________________
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Levels of Management Top(a) Middle(b) Lower(c)
Managerial Aspects :
Organisational design - 
Structure 
Staffing
Roles & functions 
Interactions
Employees/Workers - 
Recruitment 
Assignment 
Training 
Evaluation 
Remmuneration 
Termination
Operations -
Getting resources 
Using resources 
Disposing resources
Others (please sepcify) :
(a) General Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountant, 
Chief Economists and Chief Engineer. (Assume the final 
decisions are made by either the government or the 
board of directors if ranking is not 4).
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
6.1.2 What type(s) of control mechanism, both financial and
non-financial, is(are) used to ensure the effective 
performance of the following functions under certain 
degree of decentralisation?
(a) Personnel
(b) Production
(c) Purchasing and supplies
(d) Sales and distribution
(e) Finance and administration
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(f) Others (please specify)
r
6.1.3 What kinds of communication channels or information
systems (both formal or informal) are employed to make 
the above managerial aspects (6.1.1) and the associated 
control mechanisms (6.1.2) known to the various levels 
of management?
6.2 Agreeing Targets
6.2.1 How the following factors affect the types and styles
of control mechanisms employed by the different levels 
of management? i.e. 0 = no influence
1 = little influence
2 = moderate influence
3 = high influence
Major Division : ___________________________________
Control mechanisms employed : __________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle(b) Lower(c)
Factors or Variables :
♦Precision and detail of 
targets
♦Balance between objective 
and subjective target 
measurement
♦Timeframe for achieving 
the targets
♦Degree of "stretch" built 
into the targets
♦Emphasis on financial vs 
non-financial targets
♦Management inluence on 
setting targets
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(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountant, Chief
Economist and Chief Engineer.
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or
sectional supervisors or foremen.
6.2.2 What kinds of communication channels or information
systems (both formal or informal) are employed to make 
the above control mechanisms (6.2.1) known to the 
various levels of management?
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6.3 Reporting Requirements
r
6.3.1 What are the requirements for the *control reports to
be submitted to the top management? Please answer 
(with brief descriptions) the following checklist for 
the control report(s) which reflect the responsibility 
in each major division or department. Please also 
provide a sample (perhaps a blank one) of each control 
report if possible.
* This question refers to the control reports submitted 
by the middle management (i.e. divisional or 
departmental managers) to the top management.
Division/Department : __________________________________
Control Report No. : __________
(1) What is the title of the report?
(2) What is the purpose of the report?
(3) What is the frequency of the report?
(4) Is this a financial or a non-financial or a
combined control report?
(5) What are the major contains of the report?
(6) Who prepare the report?
(7) Who check the report?
(8) Who sumit the report?
(9) Who receive the report?
(10) Who review the report?
(11) Who evaluate the report?
(12) Will feedback be given by (9)-(11)?
(13) Will discussion held between sender and (9)-(11)?
(14) What follow-up actions will be taken?
(15) Will the report affect performance evaluation and
remuneration or incentive? How?
(16) Can computer aid in compiling this report?
(17) Is this report relate to, link up or integrate 
with other reports?
(18) What changes will be made in this report (1)-(17) 
in the next 12 months? Why?
6.3.2 What are the requirements for the *control reports to
be submitted to the middle management? Please answer 
(with brief descriptions) the following checklist for 
the control report(s) which reflect the responsibility 
in each major division or department. Please also 
provide a sample (perhaps a blank one) of each control 
report if possible.
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* This question refers to the control reports submitted 
by the lower management (i.e. departmental or sectional 
supervisors or foremen) to the middle management (i.e. 
divisional or departmental managers).
Department/Section : __________________________________
Control Report No. : __________
(1) What is the title of the report?
(2) What is the purpose of the report?
(3) What is the frequency of the report?
(4) Is this a financial or a non-financial or a
combined control report?
(5) What are the major contains of the report?
(6) Who prepare the report?
(7) Who check the report?
(8) Who sumit the report?
(9) Who receive the report?
(10) Who review the report?
(11) Who evaluate the report?
(12) Will feedback be given by (9)-(11)?
(13) Will discussion held between sender and (9)-(11)?
(14) What follow-up actions will be taken?
(15) Will the report affect performance evaluation and
remuneration or incentive? How?
(16) Can computer aid in compiling this report?
(17) Is this report relate to, link up or integrate 
with other reports?
(18) What changes will be made in this report (1)-(17) 
in the next 12 months? Why?
6.3.3 Is there (Will there be) any integrated (i.e. covered 
most of the key functions) "Accounting Information 
System (AIS)" or "Management Information System (MIS)" 
for overall managerial control purposes? If yes, how 
far it has been (will be) computerized? If no, what 
are the constraints in designing and implementing such 
a system?
6.4 Performance Measurement Criteria
6.4.1 What are the importance (or weightings) the following
"financial" criteria or indicators have been used to 
measure the performance of different divisions or 
departments? (please give reasons and rank from 0-4, 
i.e. 0 = do not use at all
1 = low weighting
2 = moderate weighting
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3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Ranking : 0 1 2  3 4 Reason
Residual income*
Return on investment 
Profit before tax 
Profit after tax 
Profit % sales 
Profit growth %
Profit per employee 
Sales growth %
Sales per employee 
Cash flow 
Added value#
Others : (please specify)
* Residual income = Income after tax - (notional interest 
rate x capital employed)
# Added value = Sales - Outside purchased materials and 
services costs
6.4.2 What are the importance (or weightings) the following
"financial11 criteria or indicators have been used to 
measure the performance of different levels of 
management? (please give reasons and rank from 0-4, 
i.e. 0 = do not use at all
1 = low weighting
2 = moderate weighting
3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
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Name of Department : ___________________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle (b) Lower(c)
Residual Income
Return on Investment
Profit before tax
Profit after tax
Profit % sales
Profit growth %
Profit per employee 
Sales growth %
Sales per employee 
Others : (please specify)
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief
Economist and Chief Engineer.
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
6.4.3 When the actual results of the above 11 financial"
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.4 How the actual results of the above "financial"
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.5 What happens when the actual results of the above 
"financial" criteria or indicators are received by the 
top or middle management?
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6 . 4 . 6  How frequent the above "financial" criteria or
indicators be reviewed by the top and middle 
management?
6 . 4 . 7  What are the factors affecting the mondification or
changes of the above "financial" criteria or 
indicators?
6 . 4 . 8  What are the importance (or weightings) the following
"non-financial" criteria or indicators have been used 
to measure the performance of different divisions or 
departments? (please give reasons and rank from 0-4, 
i.e. 0 = do not use at all
1 = low weighting
2 = moderate weighting
3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
Name of Department : _________________________________ _
Ranking : 0 1 2  3 4 Reason
Production quality 
Production capacity 
Production volume 
Product development 
Product quality 
Product mix 
Material consumptions 
Inventory levels 
Labour efficiency 
Labour cost 
Labour turnover 
Expenses levels 
Safety records 
Birth control 
Others : (please specify)
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6.4.7 What are the importance (or weightings) the following
"non-financial" criteria or indicators have been used 
to measure the performance of different levels of 
management? (please give reasons and rank from 0-4, 
i.e. 0 = do not use at all
1 = low weighting
2 = moderate weighting
3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle (b) Lower(c)
Production quality 
Production capacity 
Production volume 
Product development 
Product quality 
Product mix 
Material consumptions 
Inventory levels 
Labour efficiency 
Labour cost 
Labour turnover 
Expenses levels 
Safety records 
Birth control 
Others : (please specify)
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General 
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief 
Economist and Chief Engineer.
534
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
6.4.8 When the actual results of the above "non-financial" 
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.9 How the actual results of the above "non-financial" 
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.10 How frequent the above "non-financial" criteria or 
indicators be reviewed by the top and middle 
management?
6.4.11 What happens when the actual results of the above 
"non-financial" criteria or indicators are received by 
the top and middle management?
6.4.12 What are the factors affecting the mondification or 
changes of the above "non-financial" criteria or 
indicators?
6.5 Rewards and Incentives
6.5.1 What is (was) the average "basic wages" per worker in 
this (last) year?
6.5.2 What are the factors (i.e. performance, grade,
seniority, inflation, qualification, experience etc.) 
in determining the "basic wages" of the workers?
6.5.3 How frequent the "basic wages" is reviewed?
6.5.4 What are the factors (i.e. performance, grade,
seniority, inflation, qualification, experience etc.) 
in determining the "basic salaries" of the 
non-manufacturing staff?
6.5.5 How frequent the "basic salaries" is reviewed?
6.5.6 What are the types of "allowances" (i.e. housing,
meals, travel, child, attendance, overtime, inflation, 
stoppage etc.) paid to the workers and staff?
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6.5.7
6.5.8
6.5.9
6.5.10
6.5.11
6.5.12
6.5.13
What is (was) the average "total allowances" per worker 
in this (last) year?
How frequent these "allowances" are reviewed?
What are the weightings of the following measurement 
criteria used in the "incentive scheme" for workers in 
various divisions or departments? Are these criteria 
measured on "Group" (G) or "Individual" (I) basis?
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Measurement Criteria Weightings Basis (G)/(I)
(1) Production quality
(2) Production capacity
(3) Production volume
(4) Product development
( 5 ) Product quality
(6) Product mix
( 7 ) Material consumptions
(8) Inventory levels
(9) Labour efficiency
(10) Labour cost
(11) Labour turnover
(12) Expenses levels
(13) Safety records
(14) Birth control
Others : (please specify)
(15) _________________
(16) _________________
100%
How the above measurement criteria (6.5.9) is assessed 
i.e. actuals vs actuals, actuals vs budgets or targets 
etc. ?
How frequent the bonus is calculated and distributed to 
workers in the various divisions or departments based 
on the criteria listed in 6.5.9 above?
Are there any ceilings for the bonus?
If the above incentive system is formal, how the 
criteria, weightings and bases (6.5.9), the calculation 
and distribution (6.5.10) of bonus be communicated to 
the workers? How frequent are these rules reviewed and 
under what circumstances will they be modified? Do the 
workers participate in designing and reviewing this 
incentive scheme?
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6.5.14
6.5.15
6.5.16
6.5.17
6.5.18
6.5.19
How and when the workers know the amounts of bonus that 
they can get? In what forms the bonus are paid to the 
workers?
Will there be any penalties if the workers can not 
achieve any of the measurement criteria stated in 6.5.9 
above?
When was this "incentive scheme" for workers adopted? 
How this scheme is improving the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability of the enterprise as a 
whole?
What are the weightings of the following measurement 
criiteria used in the "incentive scheme" for 
non-manufacturing staff in various divisions or 
departments? Are these criteria measured on "Group" 
(G) or "Individual" (I) basis?
Name of Department : ___________________________________ .
Measurement Criteria Weightings Basis (G)/(I)
(1) Residual Income
(2) Return on Investment
(3) Profit before tax
(4) Profit after tax
(5) Profit % sales
(6) Profit growth %
(?) Profit per employee
(8) Sales growth %
(9) Sales per employee
Others : (please specify)
(10)
(11)
100%
How the above measurement criteria is assessed i.e. 
actuals vs actuals, actuals vs budgets or targets etc.?
How frequent the bonus is calculated and distirbuted to 
non-manufacturing staff in the various divisions or 
departments based on the criteria listed in 6.5.17 
above? Are there any ceilings for the bonus?
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6.5.20 If the above incentive system is formal, how the
criteria, weightings and bases (6.5.17), the 
calculation and distribution (6.5.19) of bonus be 
communicated to the non-manufacturing staff? How 
frequent are these rules reviewed and under what 
circumstances will they be modified? Do the staff 
participate in designing and reviewing this incentive 
scheme?
6.5.21 How and when the non-manufacturing staff know the
amounts of bonus that they can get? In what forms the 
bonus are paid to the staff?
6.5.22 Will there be any penalties if the non-manufacturing 
staff can not achieve any of the measurement criteria 
stated in 6.5.17 above?
6.5.23 When was this "incentive scheme" for non-manufacturing
staff adopted? How this scheme is improving the
productivity, efficiency and profitability of the
enterprise as a whole?
28 April 1993
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ultimate aim is to. classify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic
Financial
Strategic
Financial
Programming(1) 
Programming(2) 
Control (3)
Control (4)
Name of SOE : Shanghai No.5 Steel Works (SSW5)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Huang Han Bin, Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 13 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 13 September 1991
Second Visit - 25 January 1992
Third Visit - 16 September 1992
Fourth Visit - 27 May 1993
Fifth Visit - 10 September 1993
Sixth Visit - 6 September 1994
Seventh Visit - 7 February 1995
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B ack grou n d
Shanghai N o . 5 Steel Works (SSW5) is a wholly state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) established in 1958 and is situated at the
North-Eastern suburb (Baoshan District) of the Shanghai city. 
SSW5 has over 40 factories and buildings scattered in between the 
Sitang River stream and the busy Tongji Road. They have covered 
a big piece of land and actually formed a small town with its 
own. SSW5 has its own two railway lines connecting to . the
Shanghai Central Station. Therefore, SSW5 can make use of the
river, main road and railway to transport raw materials in and 
finished goods out. SSW5 is one of the top five steel
manufacturers in Shanghai municipal city in terms of output, 
turnover and number of employees.
The major products of SSW5 can be classified into the following 
12 categories :
(1) Carbon Construction Steel (7) Spring Steel
(2) Alloy Construction Steel (8) High Speed Tool Steel
(3) Carbon Tool Steel (9) Stainless Steel
(4) Alloy Tool Steel (10) Heat Resisting Steel
(5) Anchor Chain Steel (11) Super Alloy
(6) Rearing Steel (12) Titanium & Titanium Alloy
About 95% of its products are sold domestically and the rest are 
exported to the USA, Japan and some Southeast Asian countries. 
Under the "SOE Mechanism Transformation Regulations" and 
"Socialist Market Economy" promulgated by the central government 
in 1992, SSW5 was granted the "Free Import/Export Right" in 1993 
so that it can further explore the overseas markets during the 
coming Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000 inclusive).
To cater for the high demand of iron and steel products in this 
region, SSW5 increased its output volume from 1.3 million in 1993 
to 1.9 million tonnes in 1994 (83% of the potential full
production capacity). However, the booming demand was flattened 
by the over 20 million (20% of the total demands in China) tonnes 
imported iron and steel products (from the USA, Japan, Korea, 
etc,.) which quality were higher and selling prices were cheaper 
(after adding the import duties) than the Chinese products 
because the latter's outdated production facilities and 
technologies, and in addition the rapid increasing cost of 
production due to inflation.
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As a result, in 1995 stockpiling was very common in most of the 
iron and steel plants in China. They had to cut down the selling 
prices by 20% to 3 0% in order to reduce the inventory level even 
making losses. Another short term measure was to restrict the 
total quantity of imported iron and steel products by the 
government as actually happened in 1995. However, the long term 
solution should be to renovate the production hardware and 
technology and to enhance the manufacturing efficiency.
But in view of the bank's tight capital control after 
implementing the 16 macro economic control measures since late 
1993, the metallurgical industry would find very difficult, if 
not possible, to obtain sufficient funds for capital investments. 
On the other hand, the iron and steel output per employee in 
China was 2 to 3 times less than the counterparts in the USA, 
Japan and Korea, which of course resulted in higher unit cost per 
output. These problems affect the future development of SSW5 
during the 9th National Planning Cycle (1996-2000) in one way or 
another, although SSW5 is formulating strategic plans and 
undertaking possible tatics to alleviate these avderse situations 
and maintain a steady performance growth as highlighted in the 
section 5.4 below.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Shanghai N o . 5 Steel Works (SSW5) has been a wholly state-owned 
enterprise since its establishment in 1958 and there is no plan 
to transform into a shareholding enterprise in the next five 
years because it is a government policy to keep a macroeconomic 
control over the steel industry in China.
Since SSW5 is a wholly SOE, it is under the administration of the 
Shanghai Municipal Government and the Shanghai Metallurgical 
Bureau. Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central 
planning system dictated all the planning and control (long-term 
and short-term) in the SOEs. Therefore, SSW5 was just acted as a 
vehicle (or cost centre) to carry out the activities according to 
the commands directed from the Municipal Government and the 
Metallurgical Bureau.
Since the economic reforms started in 1979, instead of 
dictatorship from the authorities, the top management of the SSW5 
have been involved in the 5-year long range plan even though SSW5 
for most of the time had to take the directives from and give in 
their negotiations to these two authorities.
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The situation has been changing rapidly since 1992. Now the 
municipal government only oversees the major development and 
projects, mainly long term ones, recommended by the SSW5. On the 
other hand, the Metallurgical Bureau has resolved into Shanghai 
Metallurgical Corporation which is similar to a trade association 
and its objective is trying to maintain a balance of the overall 
steel production quantities and varieties produced by all the 
iron and steel plants located in Shanghai. In addition, it is 
providing marketing information for the steel industry in 
Shanghai in order to help those enterprises to sell their 
products to the right market at the right time.
Gradually, these authorities have been taking away their visible 
hands from and leaving more operating autonomy to the local steel 
industry since 1992 after the pronouncement of the legislative 
changes.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of SSW5 can be divided into three 
major parts, inter alia, Management, Production and Service 
functions.
The management function is represented by the "Headquarters" in 
which there are several departments (all cost centres) including:
(1) General Manager (GM) Office
(2) Accounting & Finance Department (headed by Chief-Accountant)
(3) Production Planning & Control (headed by Chief-Engineering)
(4) Production Technology Department (headed by one Deputy-GM)
(5) Personnel & Manpower Department (headed by one Deputy-GM)
(6) Sales & Marketing Department (headed by one Deputy-GM)
( 7 ) Estate & Development Department (headed by one Deputy-GM)
(8) Employees Welfare Department (headed by one Deputy-GM) 
overseeing the following sections :
(a) Housing (b) Medical
(c) Entertainment (d) Training
(e) Educations (kindergarten, primary, secondary & technical 
schools)
The production function is composed of 12 manufacturing factories 
and 4 supporting factories which are all treated as separate 
divisions or profit centres with some interdependencies due to 
the process production nature. These 16 factories are listed 
below :
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M a n u f a c t u r i n g  F a c t o r i e s ,
(1)
(2 )
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6 )
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10) 
(11) 
(12)
No.l Melting & Casting Factory 
No.2 Melting & Casting Factory 
Initial Rolling Factory 
Forge Pressing Factory 
No.l Refine Rolling Factory 
No.2 Refine Rolling Factory 
No.3 Refine Rolling Factory 
Steel Tube Factory 
Cold Drawing Factory 
Strip Drawing Factory 
Wire Drawing Factory 
Converter Factory
[output goto (3) & (4)]
[output goto (3) Sc (4)]
[output goto (5), (6) Sc (7)]
[output goto (5), ( 6 ) Sc (7)]
[output goto (8)j
[output goto (9) Sc (10)]
[output goto (9) , (10) Sc (11) ]
[output for sales]
[output for sales]
[output for sales]
[output for sales]
[output for sales]
* The outputs 
although it is
of (1) to (7) can also be sold externally, 
not the general policy adopted.
Supporting Factories
(13) Durable Materials Factory
(14) Coal Gas Factory
(15) Electricity Factory
(16) Oxygen Factory
(i.e. bricks)
# These supporting factories supply their outputs to the 
above 12 manufacturing factories and also to the other 
management and service departments.
Each manufacturing factory has its own functional staff like 
m a rketing and sales, purchasing and supply, repair and 
maintenance, transportation, accounting, personnel, etc. These 
functional staff have dotted line relationships with the 
corresponding departments in the headquarters.
The service 
centres) :
function contains the following departments (cost
(1) Purchasing Department
(2) Inventory Control Department
(3) Transportation Department
(4) Repair & Maintenance Department
(5) Quality Control Department
(6) Computer Department
SSW5 is planning to transform the above service departments into 
independent and self-financed "Tertiary Enterprises" in 1995 or 
1996. Furthermore, SSW5 owns a lot of tertiary enterprises 
(service enterprises) including restaurants, department stores, 
entertainments, retail shops, taxi fleets, motels, repair and 
maintenance centres, servicing and consulting companies, etc.
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Furthermore, SSW5 owns an Import & Export Company after obtaining 
the import and export right granted by the government. The 
performance of these tertiary enterprises is mainly measured by 
return on investment.
SSW5 had a total of 21,500 employees at the end of 1994 including 
1,500 employees working in the tertiary (service) enterprises. 
Furthermore, there were 9,000 retired employees at the end of 
1994. It is classified as a "Large SOE" in China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets 
Turnover
Income before tax
Income tax rate
RMB5,000M (1992 historical cost)
RMB2,800M (1992)
RMB3,8 00M (1993)
RMB4,500M* (1994)
RMB4,800M (1995 forecast)
RMB 150M (1992) - 5.4% of sales
RMB 190M (1993) - 5.0% of sales
RMB 170M (1994) - 3.8% of sales#
RMB 175M (1995 forecast)
33%
* Including export sales of US$13 million and expected to be 
US$20 million at the end of 1995.
#The significant decrease of profit margin in 1994 was due to 
inflation on cost of production (i.e. electricity amounted to 
RMB380 million which was higher than gross wages of RMB250 
million) and high interest payments.
At the end of 1994, both the accounts receivable and payable were 
over RMB300 million which obviously included certain significant 
amounts of bad and doubtful debts.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Shanghai No.5 Steel Works (SSW5) signed its first 5-year Economic 
Responsibility Contract (ERC) with the Shanghai Municipal 
Government in 1983. The major targets set in the ERC were :
(1) "Income Before Tax" with 5% annual growth rate; and
(2) "Total Tax" (sales tax, income tax & adjustment taxes
payable to the Municipal Government).
SSW5 was underwritten to hand over a fixed portion of the "Income 
Before Tax" per year to the Municipal Government irrespective of 
actual performance (profit or loss) achieved.
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For example,
(RMB'OOO) 1983 1984 1985
Budget Income Before Tax (5% growth) 10,000 10,500 11,025
Handover to Government (50%) 5, 000 5,250 5, 513
5, 000 5,250 5, 512
Income Tax (33% on IBT) 3,300 3,465 3, 638
Income After Tax left for SSW5 1, 700 1,785 1, 874
Say for example, if the actual "Income Before Tax" in 1983 was 
less or greater than the annual agreed target, then the senario 
might have become as follow :
(RMB'000) 1983 1983 1983
■ (Budget) (Actual) (Actual)
Income Before Tax (a) 10,000 8, 000 12,000
Handover to Government 5, 000 5, 000 5, 000
(fixed at 50% of budget)
5, 000 3, 000 7, 000
Income Tax (33% on actual IBT) 3,300 2, 640 3, 960
Income After Tax left for SSW5 (b) 1, 700 360 3, 040
IAT % of IBT (b)/ (a) 17% 5% 25%
* In this senario, the break-even point (no IAT left for SSW5
would be an Income Before Tax of RMB7,463,000.
The income after tax left for SSW5 could be transferred into the 
four reserves :
(1) Production development
(2) Employees bonus
(3) Employees welfare
(4) Special (Discretionary) i.e. new product development
For the actual income before tax increased by 2 0% of the budgeted 
IBT, the income after tax would be increased by 79%. Obviously, 
this system would encourage SSW5 to enhance its profitability in 
order to retain more income after tax for development, reserve, 
employee bonus and welfare purposes.
In the second 5-year ERC (1988-1992 inclusive), the "Income 
Before Tax" annual growth rate was increased to 7%. However, 
this second ERC was ceased in 1991 and was replaced by a 
"Profit-Reward Linked System" because the major drawback of the 
old system was "short-term behaviour" practised by many other 
Shanghai SOEs.
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In order to meet the targeted profits within the contract period, 
the top management did not concern the long term investment in 
fixed assets, research and development, and human resources. 
This new system does not fix the annual "Income Before Tax" level 
but only leave the actual turnover and profit subject to sales, 
income and adjustment taxes. Furthermore, the annual gross wages 
(including bonus) growth rate cannot exceed either one of the 
following two limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the SSW5 is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. Obviously, this new 
system is trying to motivate all the employees to enhance the 
productivity, efficiency and profitability in order to increase 
their remuneration.
The new SOE Mechanism Transformation legislation enacted in 1992 
has been providing more flexibility to SSW5 in distributing the 
retained earnings in terms of employees benefit and welfare.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The guiding theme of the structure of Shanghai No. 5 Steel Works 
(SSW5) is simplicity and accountability. It goes to some length 
to create stand-alone business units e.g. the 16 factories as 
independent profit centres that are run by individual factory 
nanagers with clear lines of responsibility. In this sense the 
structure is similar to that of Strategic Control companies. But 
SSW5 goes further in decentralizing responsibility such as 
initiating the annual budget or internal responsibility contract 
and setting up of sections within individual factory. The profit 
responsibility lies with the factory managers. Section, group 
and sub-group leaders are seen as extensions of each individual 
factory.
The selections and appointments of the factory managers and a few 
ley positions (e.g. senior engineers) are controlled by the 
headquarters' top management. Furthermore, any major changes of 
ihe organisation structure must seek approval from the 
headquarters. More autonomy of internal management and operation 
nas been delegated to the factory managers since 1992.
(Please refer to Q5.1.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
8
In summary, SSW5 has decentralized structures in which the 
individual factories report directly to the headquarters, and the 
factory managers play a linking and surveillance role between the 
factories and the headquarters.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Sdince 1992, Shanghai No.5 Steel Works (SSW5) has implemented a 
more formal and rigorous planning process - for reviewing, 
discussing and sanctioning the annual plan and internal 
responsibility contract (IRC) of each factory. This process 
starts in September each year and ends in February the next year. 
After intensive internal and external environmental studies by 
the general manager with his deputy managers, chief accountant 
and chief engineer, a set of preliminary sales and production 
targets are determined. The general manager provides these 
guidelines to all the factory and department managers for them to 
initiate their own annual plans or budgets in which some key 
criteria will be used as the measurement yardsticks in the 
subsequent agreed internal responsibility contracts.
The accounting & finance department in the headquarters validates 
and consolidates all the factory, management and service budgets 
into a master plan or budget for submission to the top management 
for review. Then, formal and informal meetings and discussions 
are held between the headquarters and the factories and 
departments either collectively or individually. This iterative 
exercise is finished until all the plans, budgets and contracts 
are mutally agreed in late January and subimitted to the annual 
gene r a l  m e e t i n g  (attended by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from the 
headquarters, factories and departments of all levels) for 
approval after the Chinese New Year in February.
Before 1992, the sole purpose of this annual budget review 
process was to agree with what should be done over the next 12 
months within the context of a few key indicators e.g. production 
volume and sales as agreed between the Shanghai Municipal 
Government and SSW5. Since 1992, under the legislative changes 
and market economy promulgation, SSW5 has been given higher 
automomy in formulating and reviewing its strategic directions. 
As a result, the 16 factories are encouraged to extend their 
planning horizon beyond one year but the contents are still 
mainly production and financial oriented. Therefore, the 
headquarters has less involvement in the factory level planning 
decisions, but without reducing their tight financial control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2 , Q5.5,6 & 5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
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Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
Shanghai No. 5 Steel Works (SSW5) has been promulgating "Quality" 
as the most important strategic theme which can be easily seen 
from the banners written "Quality is Number 1" hanging on many 
walls around every factory and building. SSW5 is very proud of 
its quality products which include for example cannons and 
weapons manufactured for the People's Liberation Army before the 
1980s. Also, SSW5 is ranked the top in Southern China in terms 
of its wide range (over 1,000 kinds) of product varieties. 
Quality is the most important guideline and element given to and 
imbedded into the planning and control system of SSW5. And there 
is no trade-off for any deterioration in quality in whatever 
aspects.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Technological improvement (long and short term), efficiency 
enhancement and capacity expansion (described in next section) 
are the strategic thrusts that SSW5 always emphasizes in the 
planning process. There have been significant manufacturing 
technology and production efficiency advancement since the late 
1980s by importing new plants and machines for the European 
countries and the USA. These production facility renovations 
have always been receiving top priorities in the capital 
appropriation budget which is formed an integral part of the 
annual budget.
The above strategic theme and thrusts are initiated by the 
headquarters which have positive roles to play in creating the 
strategic plans with the individual factories. However, since 
1992, the factory managers have been encouraged to make strategic 
or tactical suggestions to realise these themes and thrusts in 
both short and medium term. One example is to suggest capital 
investment projects.
Before 1992, the top management in SSW5 from time to time made 
suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning review 
process such as production quantity and mix amendments and 
transfer price adjustments. The headquarters followed financial 
indicators and performance closely on a monthly or quarterly 
basis and were quick to make suggestions if they did not match 
with the overall long and short term plan.
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To facilitate the implementation of the legislation in 1992, the 
headquarters has left more freedom to the factory manager to 
adjust their planning and operation as long as it would not 
deviate much from the long term plan and the annual budget in 
aggregate.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Shanghai No.5 Steel Works (SSW5) has been following the "Central 
5-Year Planning Policy" of the government since the 1960s. The 
early 5-year long term plans focused mainly on the production 
volume as directed by the government without paying due regards 
to the efficiency, profitability and market demand. After 
starting the economy reforms in 1979, these factors have been 
taken into account. In the current 5-year plan (1991-1995 
inclusive), the following strategic directions have been laid 
down.
(a) Product Differentiation and Diversification
The improvement of product features and varieties to match 
the changes of market demand under the present open-market 
economy. One example is to satisfy the rocketing demand for 
construction rod-steel due to the rapid infrastructure and 
property developments everywhere in China since 1992.
(b) Production Technology and Facility Enhancement
SSW5 has its own R&D Centre to undertake on-going projects 
for enhancing the production methods and technology. 
Advanced and improved production plants and facilities have 
been imported from the European countries and the USA since 
the late 1980s. Approximately, a total of RMB2 billion is 
required for the capital expenditure from 1996 to 2000 in 
order to increase the total production capacity to 2.8 
million tonnes.
11
(c) Production Capacity Expansion
SSW5 has been trying to expand the output volume of its 
existing production plants although there should be maximum 
limits. In order to increase the production capacity at a 
greater pace, SSW5 entered into a RMB1 billion joint-venture 
with a foreign -partner in 1993, ■ to build another Rod and 
Wire Steel Factory at the other side of the Sitang River. 
The main production facility was imported from Germany with 
very high quality and efficiency.
This new factory started to produce 300,000 tonnes iron and 
steel products in 1994 (16% of the total output) and made a
profit before tax of RMB95 millions which accounted for 56% 
of SS W 5 1s total PBT in 1994. The majority of the output 
products supplied to the large infrastructure projects in 
Shanghai such as the cross-river bridges and subway 
buidling.
The total output capacity of this new plant can be increased 
to 600,000 tonnes before 2000. Because of its high product 
quality, SSW5 is planning to export 50% of the output 
through an office or agent in Hong Kong.
(d) Market Penetration and Diversification
The national demand of various kinds of steel products, in 
particular construction steel as mentioned before, was 
greater than total steel output in China before 1995 because 
of ever increasing infrastructure projects and property 
developments everywhere in China. The State Council and the 
Metallurgical Bureau have set a national output target of 
100 million tonnes at the end of 1995. But SS W 5 1 s 
philosophy is that "not everyday is a sunny day", so that it 
should continue to penetrate and diversify their national 
markets such as the Northwest and Southwest provinces. On 
the other hand, SSW5 should adopt similar marketing 
strategies to promote its high quality products to the 
Eastern European, South American and Southeast Asian 
markets.
(e) Manpower and Training
The abolishment of "Three Iron Bowls" (iron employment, iron 
position and iron wages) or "Life-Long Employment" cannot be 
effectively implemented in SSW5 because cutting off the 
about 5,000 redundant employees (25% of the workforce) will 
create many social problems in the light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed 
in China. (Please refer to Q5.2.1-3 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
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One way to tackle this Jieadache problem ("Big Rice Pot") is 
to transfer the excess workers to the newly established 
"Tertiary Enterprises" (service enterprises) within the SSW5 
organisation structure. These tertiary enterprises include 
motels, restaurants, department stores, groceries, trading, 
taxi etc. so that they can be self-financed on their own. 
Another mean is to request early retirement of the redundant 
employees at 50 for male and 45 for female.
Of course, training and education are an indispensible 
planning element for SSW5 in order to crystalize its 
strategic themes and thrusts in long term. Therefore, SSW5 
is running an internal technical college to provide 
different kinds of technical and management (including 
accounting) courses for its own staff and even for the 
external students to generate income.
(f) Consolidated Financial Budgets
As from 1991, all the long term plans have been translated 
into monetary terms, as far as possible, and presented in a 
form of 5-year financial plans including the capital 
appropriation budgets. These financial plans will be served 
as the leading guide for subsequent annual planning review.
(g) Modern Enterprise
Since the end of 1994, the central government has been 
promulgating the "modern enterprises" which have the 
following four distinct management concepts :
(i) clearcut ownership;
(ii) defined lines of business;
(iii) separated politics and enterprise administration; and
(iv) applied scientific management techniques.
At the same time, 100 large state-owned enterprises were 
selected by the State Council to be converted into modern 
enterprises. SSW5 was one of the chosen 14 enterprises in 
. Shanghai to draw out a blueprint on how to become a modern 
enterprise which would be competable with a typical 
efficient and profitable foreign corporation.
Before the 1990s, the 5-year long term plans were compromises 
between the local government and the SSW5 without any involvement 
from the middle management from the factories. Since the current 
5-year plan, a Planning Committee has been formed and which 
members include all the top management in the headquarters (i.e. 
GM, Deputy-GMs, Chief Accountant, Chief Engineer, Department 
Heads) and the staff in charge of each factory (e.g. Factory 
Manager, Deputy-Factory Managers).
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The Planning Committee discusses and reviews the current 5-year 
plan before the formulation of annual plan or budget held in 
September every year. If it is in the fourth or fifth of the 
current 5-year plan, the next long term plans will also be 
initiated and discussed. In view of the rapid economic changes 
in China since 1992, ad hoc meetings discussing the long term 
plan may be held anytime in the year. All the agreed long term 
plans will be summarised into a booklet and distributed to all 
members of the Planning Committee.
During the annual planning review, suggestions may be directed by 
the headquarters because of government's macro-policy changes or 
market condition changes. However, the factory managers seldom 
initiate changes in their respectively plans. They mainly 
concern how the milestones set in the long term plan will affect 
their next year plans or internal responsibility contracts which 
will have tight financial surveillance coming from the 
headquarters at least on a monthly basis.
Therefore, the long term planning and review process is using a 
top-down approach in the belief that the top management in the 
headquarters have the better experience and knowledge of the 
external environment and even the internal operations of the 
factories.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, from no involvement in long term planning to some 
participation by the factory managers (middle management), it is 
a big step of advancement signifying that their participations 
are an important part of the responsibility accounting system 
through which they are being assessed and rewarded.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
f
Since 1991, it has been a usual practice of Shanghai No. 5 Steel 
Works (SSW5) to participate in the Annual National Steel Trade 
Fair held in Beijing during the last quarter of every year. In 
this trade fair, buyers and sellers get together to agree on 
contracts of billions Renminbi and some contracts may cover two 
to three years. This is the occasion where SSW5 can obtain the 
major sales orders for the next year. It is also an indicator of 
the business prospect in the near future of this industry and 
somehow may affect the SSW51s long term plan.
After having this income source figure plus other sales forecasts 
from the sales and marketing department, the general manager with 
his deputy managers, chief accountant and chief engineer further 
evaluate the internal and external environmental factors in order 
to determine a set of sales and production targets. At this 
point in time, the first budget meeting is held by all the 
members of the Planning Committee as mentioned in section 5.4 
above. The major purpose of this first meeting is to discuss 
with the individual factory managers to ascertain whether the 
aggregated production capacity can match the initial sales 
budget. If it exceeds the sales budget, it becomes the primary 
responsibility of the sales and marketing staff and even the top 
management to hunt for other sales avenues in order to fully 
utilize the production capacity. If it is the other way round, 
then the shortfall production values or quantities fall on the 
shoulders of individual factory managers who are given a short 
period of time for discussions among themselves and with their 
own management staff (including the lower management).
Before the next budget meeting, the factory managers have to send 
their budget proposals to the headquarters' finance personnel for 
validation and consolidation into a master budget for submission 
to the top management for review. Then the second, third or 
fourth meeting carries on until the gap between the sales 
forecast and production capacity can be closed. This iterative 
exercise is finished until all the plans, budgets and contracts 
are mutally agreed in late January and submitted to the annual 
general meeting for approval after the Chinese New Year in 
February. (Please see Appendix A at the end of this data 
analysis for a flow-chart of this process of annual planning or 
budgeting.)
The factory budgets mainly include sales (internal and external), 
production, material, labour, overhead and inventory which are 
broken down into quarterly budgets for periodic control and 
measurement. Furthermore, the quarterly production budget is 
split into monthly targets in order to meet the shipping 
schedules and reduce the inventory levels.
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Whereas, the other management and service departments (they are 
all discretionary or constrainted cost centres) should formulate 
their annual budgets as well in a similar fashion but with less 
negotiations. The whole budgeting system was computerized in
1992.
In the last three years, all the factory managers have been 
involved intensively in this budgeting process which they believe 
to be important in setting and negotiating the internal 
responsibility contracts with the headquarters subsequently.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions in 1993, the 
budget review period has been shortened from six months to three 
months. The Planning Committee now holds a formal review meeting 
at the beginning of each quarter and sizing targets, such as 
sales (quantities and prices), production (volume and mix), 
capacity (labour and shift), may be amended in order to provide 
more realistic targets for all levels of management.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism transformation legislation and the 
market economy have compelled the headquarters (top management) 
to get the factories (middle management) or even their 
subordinates (lower management) more involved in the annual 
planning and budgeting process which on one hand is a critical 
step in materializing the long term strategic plan, and on the 
other hand, it is an important motivational factor for the 
factory managers to manage their own businesses and to be 
rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from “High Corporate"
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Shanghai No. 5 Steel Works (SSW5) established its IRC system in 
1985. In January 1994, the headquarters signed another round of 
one-year IRCs with all the 16 factories which have been 
classified as profit centres.
Before 1993, the major targets set in the IRCs were production 
volumes and costs. SSW5 implemented a "Standard Costing System" 
in 1986 mainly for cost control purpose. Therefore, every 
factory was very conscious in meeting the target production costs 
set in the IRC. Sometimes, the factories adjusted the input 
material mixes in order to minimize or achieve the standard 
costs.
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Although the factory managers were involved in setting the 
costing targets, nevertheless, the headquarters' top management 
always had high involvement in the process or even sometimes gave 
specific suggestions on the figures.
As from 1993, the key target to measure in the IRCs is profit, 
either internal or external. This change can emphasize both the 
production and sales on one hand and also cost control on the 
other hand. The IRC acts as a yardstick to determine the total 
group bonus awarded to each factory on a monthly basis. The 
major contents of one IRC are highlighted below :
Factory : N o .3
Year : 1993
Guidelines :
Refine Rolling
Veto Factors
Headcount 
Gross Wages 
Economic 
Targets
Qualitative
Targets
Other Targets
(1)
(2 )
(3)
(1)
(3)
739
RMB
(1 )
(2 )
(3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2 )
(3)
Internal profit is the major economic 
target.
Production management emphasizes on the 
achievement of all qualitative targets. 
Bonus is determined on the degree of 
accomplishment of the economic, qualitative 
and other targets.
Quality (2) Safety
Major Facility Breakdown 
staff
XXXX (to be calculated)
Profitability - Internal Profit 
Production Management -
(a) Degree of IRC Completeness
(b) Transferred Finished Goods Quantity
(c) Transferred Finished Goods Monthly Rate 
Production Planning -
(a) Production Volume
(b) Production Mix
(c) Defective Production
(d) Against Production Planning Suggestions 
Quality Management
Technical Targets -
(a) New Products Development
(b) Attainment of International Standards 
Energy Consumption
Production Facilities -
(a) Maintenance Conditions
(b) Breakdown/Stoppage
(c) Repair & Maintenance Costs 
Modern Management Methods Used 
Technological Information Employed 
Qualitative Management i.e. Use of Computer
(4) Education and Training
(5) Order and Safety
(6) Environmental Protection
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(7) Family Planning 
Notes : (a) The economic and qualitative factors clearly set the
increase and decrease in bonus amounts.
(b) The other targets are assessed subjectively without 
specifying the addition or deduction of bonus.
(c) The veto factors can reduce the bonus to zero.
(d) The bonus is calculated on a group basis whereas the
distribution of group bonus to individual employees 
within the factory is determined by the factory 
management according to individual performance.
(e) The calculated group bonus should be matched with
the overall profit or loss achieved by the whole
enterprise. Upward or downward adjustments may be 
made accordingly by the headquarters.
Since 1993, the IRCs have been initiated by the factories during 
the budgeting process (September - January). After back and 
forth discussions and negotiations with the headquarters, the 
IRCs are agreed and signed by the general manager and the factory 
managers. In the same year, the factory managers started to sign 
second level of IRCs with their own production sections or 
production lines without any involvement from headquarters. The 
top management believe that this second-tier IRC system can 
further motivate the lower level of management and hold their 
accountability to the factory managers.
The IRCs are reviewed quarterly in parallel with the budget 
review but both the headquarters and the factories are trying to 
avoid adjusting the targets unless there are significant changes 
affecting their validity. Because frequent adjustment to the 
targets can cause confusion to all levels of management.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SSW51s headquarters have delegated more freedom to 
the factory managers in initiating and negotiating their own 
IRCs, and also the full autonomy to breakdown the responsibility 
or targets into the second-level of IRCs to be shared by their 
subordinates.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of Interdependencies means the central influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions needed to be managed. Cross-supply and
transfer pricing between the factories, and exploitation of a 
shared resource are examples that happened in Shanghai No.5 Steel 
Works (SSW5) and need headquarters' intervention.
As illustrated in the organisation structure in section 2 above, 
the 12 manufacturing factories are in a continuous process and 
have some interdependencies. In addition, the four supporting 
factories supply materials, gas, electricity and oxygen to the 12 
manufacturing factories. All these manufacturing and supporting 
factories are qualified as profit centres. Therefore, transfer 
pricing is an important issue to be determined especially during 
the budgeting process and IRC negotiation.
Before 1993, the transfer prices were determined by standard 
costs plus certain percentages of markup or called "standard
transfer prices". The standard costs were based on the
historical costs and the projected inflation rates.
Whereas, the profit margins were mainly determined by the
headquarters. Although the factories had little autonomy in 
fixing the transfer prices, however, they would not care too much 
because their IRCs are mainly measured on production costs but 
not on internal profit.
The siutation has changed since 1993 when internal profit was 
used as the major criterion in the IRC to measure the factory's 
performance. Instead of using the "standard transfer prices", 
the "adjusted market prices" are employed as the transfer prices. 
Since the great majority of the intermediate products of SSW5 are 
available for sales and purchases in the market, therefore, it is 
not difficult to identify the market prices at the end of the 
year which will be adjusted for some savings (i.e. administration 
and transportation costs) and expected inflation, and then used 
for the transfer prices in next year.
However, during the first quarter of 1993, the iron and steel
product prices were increased substantially due to the relaxation 
of government's price control on most of the commodities. 
Furthermore, the market prices were fluctuating up and down 
during the whole year. As a result, SSW5 decided to review the 
market prices at the end of each quarter and if any market price
has been increased or decreased by more than 5%, then an
adjustment of that market price would be made accordingly. This 
approach can keep the transfer prices reflecting the market 
conditions.
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Having had some experience ' in monitoring the "adjusted market 
prices", the headquarters started to allow the factory managers 
to initiate their own transfer prices during the last quarter in
1993. Their recommended transfer prices were vetted by the 
headquarters' accounting personnel before submitting to the top 
management for review or further negotiation with the factory 
managers.
There are some resource sharing problems that have happened among 
some factories such as the three Refining Rolling factories which 
are using the same outputs from the Initial Rolling and Forge 
Pressing Factory. Since 1993, instead of arbitration from the 
headquarters as practised in the past, these factories have been 
allowed to negotiate and compromise on their own. Of course, 
some deadlocks still need the interference from the headquarters.
(Please refer to Q5.9.1-12 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, since 1993, the headquarters has inserted less 
interference among the factories as far as transfer pricing and 
resource sharing are concerned.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High
Corporate" to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Shanghai No.5 
Steel Works (SSW5) has decentralised its production function into 
16 semi-autonomous factories or profit centres according to the 
nature of production in each factory. The factory managers can 
decide on their own organisation structures, staffing and their 
roles and functions, and interactions between their sub-units 
(sections and groups).
The IRC has agreed the target number of employees in each factory 
which is an important figure to calculate the gross wages to be 
paid out per annum. However, within the limit of the gross 
wages, a factory manager has the autonomy to increase (unlikely) 
or decrease its manpower. If some redundant staff resign or 
transfer to other factories and "tertiary enterprises", then less 
employees will share the fixed amount of gross wages (or a 
portion of the excess will be transferred to a designated welfare 
fund for that factory).
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The factory managers are also responsible for certain personnel 
functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation 
and remuneration (distribution of bonus). But termination of 
employment with any staff is a difficult task as explained in 
section 5.4(e) above.
The major control mechanisms employed by the headquarters to 
control the performance of the factories are by using annual 
budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the most 
important measurement criterion is internal profit set in the 
IRCs, although some other economic and qualitative targets 
(non-financial) are employed, however, they are subsidiary ones 
which do not have very significant effects on the group bonus 
calculation. But the infringement of veto factors will have 
substantial reductions in the group bonus.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are dominated in the control 
mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of SSW5.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Shanghai No.5 Steel Works (SSW5) sets similar objectives for its 
factories : factory managers must meet their agreed budget
figures or IRC targets for the year and performance improvement 
year on year except under adverse market conditions. The 
critical occasion, therefore, is the annual budget review. SSW5 
is trying to set for the next year a stretching standard of 
performance that factory managers are committed to achieve.
Two kinds of pressure are put onto the factory managers at the 
annual or quarterly review : to submit a budget they can achieve; 
and at the same time, to aim for results that are, if possible, 
better than the previous year's. They fully understand that 
their group bonuses are tied in with the budget or IRC and it 
also depends on the overall performance of the enterprise as a 
whole. Therefore, the headquarters do not tell the factories 
what their targets (e.g. internal profit) should be, but tries to 
"energize" the ambition of the factory management teams to do 
better year by year.
In addition to the formal annual or quarterly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings and informal communications are made between 
the headquarters and factories, and also among the factories 
themselves.
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(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.) •
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Shanghai No. 5 Steel Works (SSW5) regards it as essential to catch 
variances from budget or IRC before they have gone too far. To 
this end the headquarters monitor results on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. All the 16 factories submit monthly results 
directly to the headquarters on standard formats. They are also 
required to submit key production figures to the headquarters on 
a weekly basis.
The monthly condensed report format is unique for each factory. 
The contents are corresponding with the budgeted line items from 
which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted from 
this report. The monthly, quarterly and yearly accumulative 
actuals are compared with the budgets and the yearly accumulative 
actuals are also compared with the last year accumulative 
actuals.
These monthly reports are compiled, through the computer, by the 
accounting staff in each individual factory who have dotted line 
relationship with the headquarters' accounting and finance 
department. Any variances plus or minus 5% are highlighted in 
order to bring the attention to the factory managers and the top 
management in the headquarters.
Each monthly report must be reviewed and signed by the factory 
manager before submitting to the headquarters' accounting 
department for vetting and consolidating. The accounting 
personnel in the headquarters rearranges and consolidates some of 
the financial and non-financial figures to generate a master 
report, with similar comparisons with budgets, IRC and actuals of 
last year. Then the master and individual monthly reports are 
submitted to the top management for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general manager or deputy-general managers will contact the 
respective factory manager or his subordinates to dig out the 
underlining reasons or ask him to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the planning committee, the general 
manager put forward the monthly factory reports for open 
disscussion. The factory managers may be asked to explain 
briefly the significant variances.
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The unsatisfactory results sometimes make the factory managers 
embarassed if they are due to the results of management fault. 
Consistent failure (say over 10 months) the targets which are 
controllable by a factory manager, probably he will be replaced 
by somebody else. It is very common in an SOE to see a factory 
.manager step down from his office and go back to the shop floor 
and become a technician or worker again. On the other hand, the 
favourable results are openly praised by the top management and 
sometimes a special bonus is announced in the same occasion.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the headquarters' accounting department for calculating 
the group bonus of each factory for last month. The group bonus 
result sheets are sent to the personnel and manpower department 
for verification before submitting to the general manager for 
final approval. Then the accounting department processes the 
bonus payments at the end of the month (i.e. this month pays 
bonus for last month).
SSW5 views a budget or IRC as a contract between the headquarters 
and the factory. The monitoring process is used to maintain the 
pressure for performance. Headquarters' close surveillance of 
results enables them to ensure that no factory goes too far 
astray before remedial action is taken.
It also gives top management an understanding of the reasons for 
variances from budget. Where the business is stable, this 
knowledge enables the headquarters to judge next year's budget 
without too much elaboration during the planning process. But 
when the business environment is unpredictable such as the steel 
industry experienced in 1993, the headquarters may not be able to 
see the edge of the cliff or catch the factory manager before he 
hits the bottom. As a result, SSW5 appears to avoid unstable 
products and markets, especially those with fierce competition.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : remain "Tight Financial
Control" before and after 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
The take-home pay of each employee in SSW5 is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 25% - 30%
(2) Bonus 55% - 45%
(3) Allowances 20% - 25%
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The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB8,500 
in 1993. Under the fierce competition from the other steel works 
within the same Baoshan District (the second largest steel works 
in China - Baoshan Steel Works - is also located in this area), 
SSW5 increased this average figure to RMB11,500 in 1994. In 
addition, the high inflation rate (23% and 15% overall in China 
in 1994 and 1995) adds a lot of pressure to increase the 
remuneration for the workforce of SSW5 in 1995 (perhaps about 
RMB13,500 per employee).
The "basic wages" is reviewed every year depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regards to qualification and technical 
skill. The increments from year to year are not substantial which 
is similar to the salary scales of the civil servants in Hong 
Kong. A postman in Hong Kong knows what his salary will be after 
ten years from now (disregard the inflation factor) if he can 
stay with the post office for that long. The "basic salary" 
paying to all the management and administrative staff in SSW5 is 
very similar to the "basic wages" paid to the workers.
There are two portions for the "allowance". The frist part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
municipal government at least once every year mainly for the 
purpose of combatting inflation in food, transportation, gas and 
electricity. The second part is decided by the SSW5 which may 
include housing, meals, travel, childcare, attendance, overtime, 
inflation, production stoppage, hair-dressing, festival gifts 
etc., which are trying to balance the relatively low basic wages
or salaries and maintain a reasonable standard of living for the
employees.
The calculation of "bonous", as described in the above sections, 
is based on the accomplishment of the IRC. The IRC signed 
between the top management and the factory manager decides what 
level of group bonus will be given to the factory. Whereas, the 
IRCs agreed between a factory manager and his sections or 
production lines are used as bases to distribute that total 
amount of group bonus to the respective sections.
And of course, it is up to the section heads to award that lump 
sum of group bonus to his or her individual subordinates working 
in the section. The bonus is distributed in cash to all 
employees on a monthly basis but a certain percentage (10% - 20%) 
is retained in a reserve in order to make up the low bonus
obtained during the months with poor performance.
How is the bonus determined for the management and administrative 
staff? It can be described in the following steps :
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(1) Calculation of management score (may be over 100%) based on-
(a) performance according to targets set;
(b) discipline according to rules and regulations;
(c) management methods and styles; and
(d) security and safty.
(2) Calculation of average bonus by -
Management score % (1) x Monthly average bonus per worker in
all the factories.
(3) Calculation of individual bonus by -
Average monthly bonus (2) x Individual index*
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
General Manager = 2.0
Chief Accountant = 1.8
Department Manager = 1.7
Assistant Department Mgr. = 1.5
Supervisor = 1.3
Senior Clerk = 1 . 2
Junior Clerk = 1 . 1
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System), if there is an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the municipal government will award a lump 
sum of "special bonus" to the general manager at the end of the 
year. But under no circumstance, the remuneration package of the 
general manager can be greater than three times the total
earnings of a factory manager.
If the annual profit before tax can achieve much better than the 
planned level, an "additional bonus" may also be awarded to all 
the employees and distributed in a way very similar to the 
monthly bonus.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees. 
However, as mentioned earlier in section 5.4(e), that the 
redundant employees will create many social problems in light of 
the current insufficient empolyment social welfare and benefits 
existed in China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract 
system may not create a threat to the employees nor motivate 
their own initiatives.
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Despite the fact that many employees voiced their adverse opinion 
against this new system fin the Annual Staff and Worker 
Representative Meeting (or AGM) held in February 1993 (which is 
supposed to the highest decision-making authority in a SOE with 
representatives from all levels of employees), SSW5 decided to 
implement this contract employment system on the non-production 
staff first during 1993. Eventually, this system was fully 
implemented in 1995.
By doing so, firstly, the contract durations are vary from one to 
three years subject to review and renewal, and secondly, the 
basic wages and allowances will be combined into a single amount 
which is assessed according to technical skills, qualifications, 
job nature and seniority.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SSW5 believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992"
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Section 7 : Summary (
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai No. 5 Steel Work (SSW5) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Very High/
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High Corporate Medium/Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High/ 
High Corporate
High/Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
Very High/
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High Corporate Low Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High Corporate Low Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
Very High 
Corporate
High/Medium
Corporate
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight Financial Tight Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
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* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell. f
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financi
Program
[Pre-i.
al
ming)
992]
rlcUlUm \-,C>X jJOX dLtd ------ --
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\
[Post-199
(Financi
Control
/
2]
al
)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai No.5 Steel Works (SSW5) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial 
Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very 
strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style as 
described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
Revised : 7 February 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 21 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
December 1993 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t imate aim is to c l a ssify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Xiamen Fork Lift Truck Plant (XFLT)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Wang Zhao Liang, Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 4 years)
Mr Huang Tian Qing, Vice-Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise s 20 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 22 September 1992
Second Visit - 8 June 1993
Third Visit - 15 September 1993
Fourth Visit - 14 September 1994
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Section 1 : History & Background
f
Xiamen Fork Lift Truck Plant (XFLT) is a medium size state-owned 
enterprise specialized in manufacturing fork lift trucks. It is 
located close to the city centre of Xiamen (10 minutes by bus 
from the railway station) . Xiamen is an island of a hundred 
square miles with a population of over one million. There is a 
main road and a bridge for trains connected with the mainland - 
Fujian Province - which is at the northeast of Guangdong 
Province. As one of the key enterprises in Fujian Province, the 
plant was conferred a title "Advanced Enterprise" in 1987 by the 
Provincial Government. XFLT is the largest fork lift truck 
manufacturing plant in the Southern China.
Established in 1957, the plant possesses competent technical 
personnel, good educated staff and hard-working workers. There 
are high technological level and production condition in main 
workshops, such as, production by group technology in machining 
workshop, powder electrostatic coasting equipment from Nordson 
Corporation of the USA in painting workshop and step-by-step 
assembly workshop. There are also a testing platform and a 
testing ground in the plant to ensure the quality of the truck.
XFLT and Cascade Corporation of the USA established a Joint 
Venture called "Xiamen Cascade Co. Ltd." in 1987 to manufacture 
fork lift truck's spare parts which have achieved international 
standards. The major products of XFLT are the 2-14 tonnes new 
scissor fork lift trucks, 3-6 tonnes side loading trucks and 
1-2.5 tonnes electric fork lift trucks, all together in 19 
categories.
Over 90% of the trucks are sold domestically (60% to Fujian and 
Guangdong Province), while some products are exported to the USA, 
UK, Canada, Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. Under the "SOE 
Mechanism Transformation Regulations" and "Socialist Market 
Economy" promulgated by the central government in 1992, XFLT was 
granted the "Free Import/Export Right" in 1993 so that it can 
further explore the overseas markets during the coming Ninth 
Five-Year Plan (1996-2000 inclusive). The annual production 
volume was 2,000 trucks in 1993 but could not satisfy the 
national demands. The major competitors are the Sino-Japanese 
joint-ventures which are exploring the high potential Asian 
markets.
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Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
f
Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) has been a wholly state-owned 
enterprise since its establishment in 1957 and it is planning to 
change into a shareholding SOE in the next three years in order 
to raise capital from other enterprises, their employees and the 
general public (individuals) if it can be listed eventually. But 
there are a lot of stringent rules and regulations imposed by the 
local and central governments and the Bank of China for 
converting into a shareholding enterprise. Because XFLT is a 
wholly SOE, it is under the administration of the Xiamen 
Municipal Government and the Fujian Provincial Machinery Bureau.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all the planning and control (long term and short 
term) in the SOEs. Therefore, XFLT was just acting as a vehicle 
to carry out the activities according to the commands directed 
from the Municipal Government and the Machinery Bureau.
Since Xiamen has been one of the five special economic zones in 
1981, there are many favourable policies granted to the SOEs and 
other joint-ventures having operations in this city. These 
policies are mentioned in the long term planning section below. 
Now the municipal government only oversees the major development 
projects, mainly long term ones, recommended by the XFLT. On the 
other hand, the Machinery Bureau is resolving into a "Trade 
Association" (something like semi-governmental body) and its 
objective is mainly providing marketing information to the 
machinery manufacturing enterprises under its umbrella in order 
to produce the right kinds and the right quantities of products. 
The XFLT1s top management has experienced that these authorities 
have been taking away their visible hands from and leaving more 
operating autonomy to the machinery manufacturing industry even 
before 1992 when the mechanism transformation legislation was 
announced. (Please refer to Q2 .6 & Q2 .7 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of XFLT can be divided into six 
divisions under the direct control of the Factory Manager who has 
a Management Office and a Planning & Technology Office directly 
reporting to him (staff functions). The six divisions are listed 
as follow :
1. Production Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
1.1 Production Management Office
1.1.1 Framework Workshop*
1.1.2 Metalwork Workshop*
1.1.3 Painting Workshop*
1.1.4 Assembly Workshop*
1.1.5 Repairs & Maintenance Workshop*
1.1.6 Testing Center*
1.2 Purchasing & Supply Department*
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1.3 Facility Department*
1.4 Transportation Department*
2. Technical Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
2.1 Design Department*
2.2 Production Technology Department*
2.3 Inspection Department*
2.4 Quality Control Department* .
2.5 Technology Management Department
2.5.1 Technology Information Section
2.5.2 Record Section
2.5.3 Computer Centre
3. Economic Division (headed by the Chief Economist)
3.1 Sales & Marketing Department*
3.2 Technical Support Department*
4. Finance Division (headed by the Chief Accountant)
4.1 Accounting Department
4.2 Cost Reduction Department
4.3 Internal Audit Department
4.4 Legal Department
5. Administration Division (head by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
5.1 Personnel Department
5.2 Education & Training Department
5.3 Building & Facility Department
5.4 Security Department
5.5 Medical Department
5.6 General Affairs Department
5.6.1 Canteen
5.6.2 Nursary
6. Three Fully Owned Subsidiaries (Third Enterprises)
6.1 Property
6.2 Tourism
6.3 Retailing
* Workshops and departments which have entered into Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the Factory Manager.
Other than the three fully owned subsidiaries which are profit 
centres by themselves, all the other divisions, departments, 
offices and sections are classified as cost centres.
XFLT had a total of 1,100 employees at the end of 1993. It is 
classified as a "Medium size SOE" in China.
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Section 3 : Financial Indicators
r
Total assets : RMB 52M (1992)
Turnover : RMB102M (1992)
RMB120M (1993)
RMB150M (1994)'
Income before tax : RMB5.5M (1992) - 5.4% of sales
RMB7.5M (1993) - 6.3% of sales
Income tax rate : 15%
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Since there have been special policies applied to the five 
special economic zones (including Xiamen) in early 1980s, Xiamen 
Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) has not signed any formal ERC with the 
municipal government. However, since 1984, XFLT has agreed the
following two targets with the municipal government :
(1) "Income Before Tax" with 10% annual growth rate; and
(2) "Income Tax" rate of 15%.
XFLT was underwritten to hand over a fixed portion of the "Income 
Before Tax" per year to the Municipal Government irrespective of 
actual performance (profit or loss) achieved. For example,
(RMB'000) 1984 1985 1986
Budget Income Before Tax (10% growth) 1, 000 1,100 1, 210
Handover to Government (10%) 100 110 121
900 990 1,089
Income Tax (15% on IBT) 150 165 182
Income After Tax left for XFLT 750 825 907
If the actual "Income Before Tax" in 1984 was lower or greater
than the annual agreed target 
follow :
, then the senario would become as
(RMB’000) 1984 1984 1984
Budget Income Before Tax (a) 
Handover to Government 
(fixed at 10% of budget)
Income Tax (15% on actual IBT)
IAT % of IBT (b)/ (a)
(Budget) (Actual) (Actu
1, 000 800 1,200
100 100 100
900 700 1,100
150 120 180
(b) 750 580 920
75% 73% 77%
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* In this senario, the break-even point would be an Income Before 
Tax of RMB118,000. f
This system would encourage XFLT to enhance its profitability in 
order to retain more income after tax for development, reserve, 
empolyee bonus and welfare purposes.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The guiding theme of the structure of Xiamen Fork Lift Truck 
(XFLT) is simplicity and accountability. To avoid the setting of 
internal transfer prices and calculating internal profits, all 
the six departments under the production management office are 
treated as cost centres. Since 1992, XFLT has been decentralizing 
more responsibility to each department such as initiating the 
annual budget and the internal responsibility contract. The 
profit responsibility lies with the top management who keep a 
surveillance cost control on each division, department or office.
The selection and appointment of the Factory Manager is still 
decided by the Municipal Government. Since 1992, the factory 
manager has full autonomy to appoint the deputy-factory managers, 
chief economist, chief accountant (the two chiefs are equivalent 
to deputy-factory managers) and the department heads under the 
six divisions. Any major changes of the organisation structure 
in each division should be initiated by the deputy-factory 
managers and approved by the factory manager. However, more 
autonomy of internal management and operation has been delegated 
to the heads of divisions (deputy-factory managers) since 1992. 
And in turn, the deputy-factory managers have involved their 
department heads more in planning, control and decision making. 
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, XFLT has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual divisional heads report directly to the factory 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
divisions and the factory manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.2 Review Process
Since 1992, Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) has implemented a 
regular formal planning process - for reviewing, discussing and 
sanctioning the annual plan or budget and the internal 
responsibility contracts (IRCs). This process starts in October 
(i.e. fourth quarter) each year and ends in February the next 
year. Based on some guidelines provided by the factory manager, 
e.g. sales and profits, each workshop-and department initiates an 
annual plan or budget in which some key criteria are used as the 
measurement yardsticks of the internal responsibility contract. 
In fact, the IRC is a subset of the annual plan or budget in 
order to highlight the key variables to measure the performance 
and determine the group bonus for each workshop and department.
The finance division validates all the budgets and consolidates 
them into a master plan or budget for submission to the top 
management for review. Then, formal and informal meetings and 
discussions are held between the factory manager, deputy-factory 
m a n a g e r s  and d e p a r t m e n t  heads e i t h e r  c o l l e c t i v e l y  or 
individually. This iterative exercise is finished until all the 
plans, budgets and contracts are mutally agreed in January or 
February. Then the finance division publishes the final master 
plan and sends to all the management staff.
Before 1992, there was no such dedicated and formal annual budget 
review process and the top management gave directions to the 
departments on what should be done over the next 12 months within 
the context of a few key indicators e.g. sales, production volume 
and mix, quality improvement, wastage rates etc. Since 1992, 
under the legislative changes and market economy promulgation, 
XFLT has been given higher automomy in formulating its strategic 
directions. As a result, all the workshops and departments are 
encouraged to participate in the planning process and extend 
their planning horizon beyond one year. Therefore, the factory 
manager has less interference in departmental planning decisions, 
but without reducing the tight financial control. (Please refer 
to Q5.5.2, Q5.5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
f
Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) has been promulgating "Quality" as 
the most important strategic theme which can be easily seen for 
the organisation structure above (section 2) where there are 
testing center, inspection department and quality control 
department. XFLT is very proud of its quality control standard 
which has been highly recognised by the municipal government and 
a RMB40,000 bonus for quality was awarded by the government in 
1992. Also, XFLT is ranked the top within this sector of 
industry in Southern China in terms of product quality. Quality 
is the most important guideline and element given to and imbedded 
into the planning and control system of XFLT. And there is no 
trade-off for any deterioration in quality in whatever aspects.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Product development and capacity expansion (long and short term) 
are the strategic thrusts that XFLT always emphasizes in the 
planning process. There have been significant manufacturing 
technology and production effieiency advancement since the late 
1980s by importing new plants and machines for the USA. These 
production facility innovations have always received top 
priorities in the capital appropriation budget which is formed an 
integral part of the annual budget.
The above strategic themes and thrusts are initiated by the top 
management which have positive roles to play in creating the 
strategic plans for the whole XFLT.
Before 1992, the top management in XFLT from time to time made 
suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning review 
process such as selling prices, marketing strategies and 
production quantity and mix. The top management followed the 
financial indicators and performance closely on monthly and 
quarterly basis and were quick to make suggestions if they did 
not match the overall long and short term plan. To facilitate 
the implementation of the legislation in 1992, the top management 
has gradually left more freedom to the workshop managers and 
department heads to adjust their plans and operations as long as 
they would not deviate much from the long term plan and the 
annual budget in aggregate.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
f
As mentioned in section 2 above, since Xiamen is one of the five
special economic zones, some favourable policies have been given
to the SOEs by the central government, for example,
(1) lower income tax of 15% compared with.33% in Shanghai;
(2) lower import materials or components tax;
(3) less municipal taxes;
(4) free import and export rights; and
(5) generous land and building use rights.
In order to speed up the implementation of the "SOE Mechanism 
Transformation Legislation" enacted in 1992, the Xiamen Municipal 
Government issued ten specific additional policies for the SOEs 
at the end of 1992. These ten policies are related to :
(1) production planning right;
(2) investment right;
(3) product pricing right;
(4) import and export rights;
(5) asset appropriation right;
(6) organisational design right;
(7) manpower planning right;
(8) personnel management right;
(9) wages and bonus distribution right; and
(10) profit appropriation right.
The above ten policies or guidelines explain specifically the 
different rights that the SOEs in Xiamen could exercise in order 
to enjoy further autonomy in planning and controlling their 
businesses. They also indicate the committment of the Xiamen 
Municipal Government to actualise the spirit behind the 1992 
legislation.
Armed with so many favourable policies, Xiamen Fork Lift Truck 
(XFLT) can sweep away the worries of many restrictive rules, 
imposed from time to time by the government, and feel assured to 
plan ahead for 5 years or longer. In the current 5-year plan 
(1991-1995 inclusive), the following strategic directions have 
been laid down.
(a) Product Differentiation and Diversification
The improvement of product features and varieties can match 
the changes of market demand under the present open-market 
economy. One of the major missions of the technical 
division is to design and pilot test new products at least a 
few types in every year.
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(b) Production Capacity Expansion
f
In order to increase the production capacity to at least 
five times of the present level, XFLT is planning to 
relocate its own plant. XFLT has acquired a piece of land 
of 170,000 square metres in the Eastern Xiamen on which a 
new complex will be erected in about t h r ee-years 
(1994-1996). The new plant will accommodate 3,000 employees 
with a production capacity of 10,000 to 20,000 trucks during 
the period of 1997 to 2000. The present plant will be 
relocated to the new complex whereas the present land, 
except reserving 8,000 square metres for the three 
subsidiaries (third enterprises) , will be sold to Great 
Alantic Hong Kong Limited in ordr to raise RMB180M capital 
for the new building. It is expected that the new XFLT will 
be the largest fork lift truck plant in China.
(c) Market Penetration and Diversification
The present national demand of fork lift trucks is greater 
than total supply from a total of 17 manufacturing plants in 
China. The customers have to wait for at least six months 
to recieve the shipments. In order to finance the working 
capital and to combat the high inflation of input materials 
or components particularly during the last two years, it is 
the usual policy accepted by most of the customers to pay a 
high percentage of deposit to XFLT when an order is placed. 
However, under the fiercer competition coming from the 
counterparts and other Sino-Japanese joint-ventures, XFLT 
has been spending more effort in the market research to 
penetrate and diversify the domestic markets. In particular 
to expand in the inner provinces like the Northwest and the 
Southwest. On the other hand, with the free import and 
export right granted by the municipal government and the 
huge expansion plan in the coming few years, XFLT is looking 
at the new markets in the Southeast Asian countries.
(d) Manpower and Training
The abolishment of "Three Iron Bowls" (iron employment, iron 
' position and iron wages) or "Life-Long Employment" has not 
be effectively implemented in XFLT because cutting off, say, 
10% of the labour force will create many social problems in 
light of the current insufficient employment social welfare 
and benefits existing in China. One way to tackle this 
headache problem ("Big Rice Pot") is to transfer the excess 
workers to the three fully-owned subsidiaries (tertiary 
enterprises) as mentioned in the organisation chart in 
section 2 above.
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Another important consideration is that more than half of 
the present employees have been working in this plant for 
over 12 years. It seems to be emotional and reluctant for 
the management to lay off some of the redundent employees. 
Therefore, the same old "big rice pot" concept is still 
generally existed in XFLT. (Please refer to Q5.2.1-3 on the 
questionnaire extracts in Appendix 1.)
To face with the challenge of rapid expansion of capacity in
the c o m i n g  new plant, XFLT has been hiring more
post-graduates, graduates, and experienced technicians to 
prepare for the future. XFLT emphasizes external and
internal training very much and even counts this element in 
the internal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  contract and performance 
evaluation. They send staff to universities, technical 
colleges and overseas companies (e.g. USA and Germany) for 
formal training. Internal training courses are also 
organised from time to time.
Before the 1990s, the 5-year long term plans were agreements 
between the local government and the XFLT with very little 
involvement from the middle management such as the heads of
departments. When the current 5-year plan (1991-1995 inclusive) 
started to be discussed in 1990, a Senior Management Committee 
was formed and the members included all the top management, 
workshop managers and department heads. The senior management 
committee discusses and reviews the current 5-year plan before 
the formulation of annual plan or budget held in October every 
year. If it is in the fifth year of the current 5-year plan, the 
next long term plan will also be initiated and discussed. In 
view of the. rapid economic changes in China since 1992, ad hoc 
meetings to discuss the long term plan may be held anytime in the 
year. All the agreed long term plans will be summarised into a 
booklet and distributed to all members of the committee.
During the annual planning review, suggestions may be directed by 
the factory manager because of government's macro-policy changes 
or market condition changes. However, the workshop managers and 
department heads seldom initiate changes in their respective 
plans. They mainly concern with how the milestones set in the 
long term plan, will affect their next year plans or internal 
responsibility contracts which will have tight financial 
surveillance coming from the factory manager at least on a 
monthly basis. Therefore, the long term planning and review 
process is using a top-down approach in the belief that the 
factory manaager (over 20 years working experience in the plant) 
has experience and knowledge of the external environment and even 
the internal operations of the departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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In summary, from no involvement in long term planning to some 
participation by the heads o£ departments (middle management), is 
a big step of advancement signifying that their participation is 
an important part of the responsibility accounting system through 
which they will be assessed and rewarded.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
Since 1990, the general short term planning policy adopted by 
Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) is "production determined by sales" 
which means sales is the initial driving force of all the 
activities. As from October 1992, the XFLT has used the 
following annual budgeting process.
In the short term planning or budgeting cycle, it is the first 
responsibility of the Sales and Marketing Department together 
with other sales offices and agents located in the other cities 
to forecast the sales in next year. At this point in time, the 
sales and marketing personnel are involved in formal and informal 
discussions with the factory manager in order to determine a set 
of sales mix figures (i.e. sales budget). These sales forecasts 
are then provided to the respective departments, more importantly 
to the production workshops, for them to initiate their own 
budgets.
After having the sales budget, the first budget meeting is held 
by all the members of the Senior Management Committee as 
mentioned in section 5.4 above. The major purpose of this first 
meeting is to discuss with the individual manufacturing workshops 
and supporting departments to ascertain whether their production 
capacities can be matched with the initial sales budget. Since 
the domestic demand of fork lift trucks is greater than the 
supply, it was the case in 1993 that the production capacity of 
XFLT could not satisfy the sales forecast. The only solution was 
to defer some of the shipments (usually on a FIFO basis) to 1994. 
Therefore, there was a significant back-logged orders at the end 
of 1993. Expansion of production capacity is a must, otherwise, 
XFLT will lose its competitive edge to its counterparts.
Before the next budget meeting, the workshops and departments 
have to submit their budget proposals to the finance division for 
consolidation. Then the second, third or fourth meeting carries 
on until compromises and agreements have been reached among the 
divisions and departments. Since October 1992, the workshop 
managers and department heads have been involved intensively in 
this budgeting process which they believe to be important in 
setting and negotiating the subsequent internal responsibility 
contracts with the factory manager.
The budgets mainly include sales (domestic and export), 
production, material, labour, overhead, inventory and capital 
expenditure which are broken down into quarterly budgets for 
periodic control and measurement. Furthermore, the quarterly 
production budgets are split into monthly targets in order to 
meet the shipping schedules and reduce the inventory levels.
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Whereas, the other management and service departments should 
formulate their annual budgets as well in an expenditure control 
fashion and a more qualitative way but with less negotiations. 
The whole budgeting system was computerized in 1992.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions especially the 
input costs in 1993, the budget review period has been shortened 
from six months to three months. The senior management committee 
holds a formal review meeting at the beginning of each quarter 
and sizing targets, such as sales (quantities and prices), 
production (volume and mix), capacity (labour and shift), may be 
amended in order to provide more realistic targets for all levels 
of management.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given XFLT more freedom to plan ahead. The top management 
have involved the middle management or even their subordinates 
(lower management) in the annual planning and budgeting process 
which on one hand is a critical step in materializing the long 
term strategic plan, and on the other hand, it is an important 
motivational factor for the department heads to manage their own 
businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) established its IRC system in 1987 
in order to motivate the productivity and cost reduction in the 
production workshops. Gruadually, this system has been extended 
to other support or service departments (see organisation chart 
in section 2) in early 1990s.
The IRC of a production department is described below :
Department
Year
Guidelines
Veto Factors
Framework Workshop 
1993
(1) Production volume and cost are the major 
economic targets.
Production management emphasizes on the 
achievement of all qualitative targets. 
Bonus is determined on the degree of 
accomplishment of the economic, qualitative 
and other targets.
Quality 
Safety
(2)
(3)
(1)
(2)
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Headcount : XXX staff (per budget)
Economic : (1) Production Quantity
Targets (2) Production Cost
(3) Production Cost Reduction Percentage
Qualitative : (1) Production Management
Targets (2) Production Technology
(3) Quality Management
(4) Production Facilities Management
(5) Inventory Management
Other Targets : (1) Modern Management Methods Used
(2) Safety Management
(3) Education and Training
(4) Family Planning
Notes : (a) Specific amounts of group bonus will be awarded
according to the accomplishment of the economic 
targets.
(b) The qualitative and other factors will be scored to
determine the group bonus for management merits.
(c) The veto factors can reduce the bonus to zero.
(d) The bonus is calculated on a group basis whereas the
distribution of group bonus to individual employees 
within the workshop is determined by the workshop 
management according to individual performance.
The following is an IRC of a department under the economic 
division :
Department
Year
Guidelines
Economic
Targets
Other Targets
Bonus
Calculation
Technical Support Department 
1993
(1) The major responsibilities are -
(a) sales of spare parts;
(b) provide warranty service; and
(c) provide repairs & maintenace.
(2) The group bonus depends on sales and gross 
profit achieved.
(1) Total income from sales of spare parts,
warranty service and repairs & maintenance 
Gross profit 
Spare parts inventory 
Warranty service quality 
Repairs & maintenance service quality
(2 )
(1)
(2 )
(3)
(1)
(2 )
(3)
(4)
Total income RMB4M
RMB4M - 5.5M 
over RMB5.5M 
Gross profit RMB1.7M
RMB1.7M-2.3M 
over RMB2.3M 
Spare part repairs income 
Truck repairs income
2%
4%
6%
2%
4%
8%
25!
15!
(RMB80,000) 
(RMB60,000)
(RMB34,000)
(RMB24,000)
43
(5) 3% of potal income is allowed for sales 
expenses, and 20% of any savings will be 
given as group bonus
(6) The group bonus is calculated on a monthly 
basis.
Notes : (a) The other targets will be assessed according to
subjective measures.
(b) The bonus is calculated on a group basis whereas the 
distribution of group bonus to individual employees 
within the department is determined by the department 
management according to individual performance.
The following is an IRC of another department under the economic 
division :
Department 
Year 
Economic 
Targets 
Other Targets
Bonus
Calculation
Sales & Marketing Department 
1993
(1) Total sales of RMB149M
(1) Working capital employed :
(a) Month-end finished stock RMB12M (12- 
month's average)
(b) Month-end debtors RMB15M (12-month's 
average)
(2) Deduct from the group bonus of 2 0% of any 
loss caused by management mistake
(1) RMB23 per RMB10,000 of sales (i.e. if on 
budget sales RMB14 9M, then group bonus
= RMB342,700)
(2) Each employee pays RMB3 0 per month as risk 
premium (department head pays RMB60), if
(a) annual sales < 90% of budget, deduct 
60% of the total risk premium paid;
(b) 90%< annual sales <100%, deduct 30% of 
the total risk premium paid; and
(c) annual sales on budget, refund all the 
risk premium paid
(3) Selling expenses control limits :
(a) delivery charges - RMB305,000 per year
(b) discount allowed - 1% of total sales
(c) entertainment - RMB150,000 per year
(d) sales agents expenses - RMB756,000 p.a
(e) sales promotion bonus by employees in 
other departments - RMB60,000
* For any savings or overspending of (a)-
(e) above, charge 10% bonus or penalty
(f) travelling expenses - RMB355,000
(g) advertising expenditure - RMB416,000
(h) national trade fair expenses - 60% 
paid by the department
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(i) cigarette expenses - RMB20/000 per year 
(j) spare parts sales commission - 5% of 
income
(4) The group bonus is calculated on a monthly 
basis.
Notes : (a) The bonus is calculated on a group basis whereas the
distribution of group bonus to individual employees 
within the department is determined by the department 
management according to individual performance.
Since 1992, the IRCs have been initiated by the departments 
during the budgeting process (October - February). After 
iterative discussions and negotiations with the factory manager 
and finance division (acting as controller) , the IRCs are agreed 
and signed by the department heads and the factory managers.
The IRCs are reviewed quarterly in parallel with the budget 
review but the factory manager, workshop managers and department 
heads are trying to avoid adjusting the targets unless there are 
significant changes, i.e. material and overhead costs, affecting 
their validity.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the factory manager has delegated more freedom to the 
workshop managers and department heads in initiating and 
negotiating their own IRCs, and also involved the finance 
division intensively as a vetting mechanism in order to set the 
targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Since all the departments in the Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) 
are treated as cost centres and the production workshops are 
measured against production volume and cost, therefore, internal 
transfer pricing does not exist.
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Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Xiamen Fork 
Lift Truck (XFLT) has three distinct levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (factory and deputy-factory managers)
(2) Middle Management (workshop managers and department heads)
(3) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-factory managers can decide on their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units (groups, sections, shifts). 
In addition, since 1992, the workshop managers and department 
heads have been more active in suggesting organisational and 
personnel changes to their divisional deputy-factory managers.
The deputy-factory managers, workshop managers and department 
heads are also responsible for certain personnel functions such 
as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of emploment with any 
staff is a difficult task as explained in section 5.4(d) above.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the workshops and departments are by 
using annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 
above, the most important measurement criteria are sales and 
expenses set in the IRCs, although some other qualitative targets 
(non-financial) are employed, however, they are subsidiary ones 
which do not have very significant effects on the group bonus 
calculation.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the dominating factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of XFLT.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
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6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) sets similar objectives for its 
production and service departments : workshop and department
managers must meet their agreed budget figures or IRC targets for 
the year and expect improvement in performance year on year 
except under adverse market conditions. The critical occasion, 
therefore, is the annual budget . review. In view of the 
favourable market conditions, XFLT is trying to set for the next 
year a demanding standard of performance that workshop managers 
and department heads are committed to achieve.
Two kinds of pressure are put on department heads at the annual 
or quarterly review : to submit a budget tht they can achieve; 
and at the same time, to aim for results that are, most likely, 
better than the previous year's. They fully understand that 
their group bonuses are tied in with the budget or IRC and it 
also depends on the overall performance of the enterprise as a 
whole. Therefore, the top management does not tell the 
departments what their targets (e.g. sales, production and 
expenses) should be, but tries to "energize" the ambitions of the 
middle management teams to do better year by year. But in terms 
of costs and expenses, control is tighter and specific 
suggestions sometimes will be given by the top management.
In addition to the formal annual or quarterly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings and informal communications are made between 
the top and middle management, and also among the departments 
themselves.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) regards it as essential to catch 
variances from budget or IRC before they have gone too far. To 
this end the top management monitor results on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. All the departments submit monthly results on 
standard forms to their respective divisional heads and also to 
the chief accountant for vetting and comparison with budgets and 
IRCs. The production workshops are also required to submit 
production figures to the top management on a weekly basis.
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The monthly report format is unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly correspbnding with the budgeted line items 
from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted 
from this report. The monthly and quarterly actuals are compared 
with the fixed budgets. However, many of the qualitative targets 
set in the b u d g e t s  or IRCs (especially n o n - p r o d u c t i o n  
departments) are not measured in the monthly reports. These 
monthly reports are compiled, through the computer, by the 
accounting staff. Any significant variances (without specifying 
tolerance limits) are highlighted in order to bring the attention 
to the top management. Then all the monthly reports are 
submitted to the factory and deputy-factory managers for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
factory and deputy-factory managers contact with the respective 
workshop managers and department heads to dig out the underlining 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. And it 
is expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the senior management committee, 
the factory manager put forward the monthly results for open 
discussion. The workshop managers and department heads may be 
asked to explain briefly the significant variances. The 
unsatisfactory results sometimes will make the workshop managers 
and department heads feel embarassed if the poor performance are 
due to management fault. Consistent failure (say over 12 months) 
in meeting the targets which are controllable by a department 
head, probably he will be replaced by somebody else. It is very 
common in an SOE to see a workshop manager step down form his 
office and go back to the shop floor and become a technician or 
worker again. On the other hand, the favourable results are 
openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the accounting department for calculating the group bonus 
of each workshop and department for last month. Then the 
accounting department processes the bonus payments at the end of 
the month (i.e. this month pays bonus for last month).
To facilitate the planning and control mechanisms, XFLT has 
invested substantially since early 1990s in installing a 
centralised mini-computer and tailor-made software packages. 
Furthermore, a post-graduate in computer science was recruited in 
1989 from the Fudan University, which is one of the most famous 
colleges in Shanghai to head the computer centre. His staff 
relationship to the Chief Accountant reveals the emphasis of 
management accounting control system in the finance division. It 
is amazing that in a few years' time, a local network system 
(LANS) has been built up to integrate the sales, purchasing, 
inventory, production, accounting (financial and management 
reporting), wages, fundflow (cash flow) systems.
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Different levels of access f to the LANS have been assigned to 
various levels of management. For example, the factory manager 
can access to all the systems in the network, whereas, the sales 
and marketing manager cannot assess to the accounting information 
through his terminal. Passwords have been assigned to each 
system in the network and also every employee who is authorized 
to access to the LANS.
XFLT views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the department. The monitoring process is used to 
maintain the pressure for performance. Top management's close 
surveillance of results enables them to ensure that no department 
goes too far astray before remedial action is taken. It also 
gives top management an understanding of the reasons for 
variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
According to the Fujian Provincal Government's policy, the annual 
gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the SOEs can not 
exceed either one of the following limits : 
c
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the XFLT is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
The. take-home pay of each employee in XFLT is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 25% - 30%
(2) Bonus 55% - 45%
(3) Allowances 20% - 25%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB8,000 
in 1993. Under the current high inflation rate (overall average 
23% in China in 1994), the average annual gross wages per 
employee was increased to RMB9,500 in 1994.
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As from 1992, the "basic wages" is reviewed bi-annually depending 
on grade and seniority withfout paying regards to qualification 
and technical skill. Even though increments are made twice a 
year, they are not substantial and are not in line with 
inflation. The "basic salary" paid to all the management and 
administrative staff in XFLT is similar to the "basic wages" paid 
to the workers.
The "allowances" may include housing, meals, travel, childcare, 
attendance, overtime, inflation (now adjusted bi-annually in 
Xiamen), production stoppage, hairdressing, festival gifts etc., 
which are provided to balance the relatively low basic wages or 
salaries and maintain a reasonable standard of living for the 
employees.
The calculation of "bonus" is based on the accomplishment of the 
IRC. An IRC signed between the factory manager and a production 
workshop decides what level of group bonus will be given to the 
workshop. Of course, it is up to the workshop manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates according 
to invidual performance. The bonus is distributed in cash to all 
employees on a monthly basis but a certain percentage (20% - 30%) 
is retained in a reserve in order to make up the low bonus 
obtained during the months with poor performance.
How the bonus is determined for the management and administrative 
staff? It can be described in the following steps :
(1) Calculation of management score
(a) Job performance (60%)
(b) Rules & regulations (20%)
(c) Management methods (10%)
(d) Security and safty (10%)
(2) Calculation of average bonus
Management score % (1) x Monthly average production worker's
bonus
(3) Calculation of individual bonus
Average monthly bonus (2) x Individual index*
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
Factory Manager = 2.0
Deputy-Factory Manager = 1.8 
Department Head = 1.6
Deputy Department Head = 1.5 
Supervisor = 1.4
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Since the parity of annual salary between the factory manager and 
a department head is not bidf, the factory manager is allowed by 
the local government to be personnally awarded a lump sum of 
"special bonus" at the end of the year if the overall financial 
performance of XFLT can reach an annual target set by the 
government in the long term plan. But under no circumstances, 
the remuneration package of the factory manager can be greater 
than three times the total earnings of a production worker.
If the quarterly and annual profit before tax can achieve better 
than the planned levels, "additional bonus" is also awarded to 
all the employees and distributed in a way very similar to the 
monthly bonus.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees.
However, as mentioned earlier in section 5.4(d), to lay off the 
redundant employees will create many social problems in light of 
the current insufficient employment social welfare and benefits 
existed in China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract 
system may not create a threat to the employees nor motivate 
their own initiatives.
Despite this fact, XFLT has decided to implement this contract 
employment system which is applicable to those new employees who 
have joined since October 1992. Their contract durations vary 
from one to three years subject to review and renewal.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, XFLT believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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Section 7 : Summary r
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Xiamen Fork Lift Truck (XFLT) belonged to 
before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High to 
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High to Medium 
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High to Medium 
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
1 1 C  JL» Ll III ^  w  X  I* m  C
Low Corporate
[I
(Strategic
Control)
\/
’ost-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the Xiamen 
Fork Lift Truck before and after 1992, it can be concluded that 
the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been changed from 
"Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" 
(Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very strong-form 
(very low corporate) of financial control style as described by 
Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. Furthermore, it has 
observed that the control style is moving from financial control 
to strategic control with more decentralised structure and more 
autonomy given to middle management in short term planning.
As a matter of fact, both the degrees of planning and control 
influences are on two separate continua. The planning influence 
should run from high corporate, then medium corporate and down to 
low corporate. Similarly, there should be measurement in between 
tight strategic control and tight financial control.
4 February 1994
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991. to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t imate aim is to c l assify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Zhu Zu Xuan, Deputy-Chairman of Directors
and Deputy General Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 25 years) 
Mr Ho Li Qian, Deputy-Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 7 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 7 July 1993
Second Visit - 29 October 1993
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Section 1 : History & Background
Since 1959, the Chinese Government has established many 
"Friendship Stores" in the big cities in order to provide
different Chinese-made export commodities of better quality for 
the foreigners to purchase by paying either foreign currencies or 
Reminbi. The operation scale of these early friendship stores 
was rather small because the customers were all foreigners.
The major objective of the friendship stores was quite political, 
as the name implied to make friendship with the foreigners.
Therefore, every store was only a cost-centre without paying
regards to any profit or loss. In other words, friendship stores
were quasi-government supplying centres instead of separate 
accountable economic entities.
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) was established in 
1959. By that time, GFDS was only an attached department inside 
the Nanfang Building which was the largest department store in 
Guangzhou. In 1977, GFDS occupied 600 square meters of space 
inside the Nanfang Building. In April 1978, GFDS was moved to 
the present five-storey old building, which is situated at the 
heart of the city centre, by employing RMB2M invested by the 
lcoal government. Other than the foreigners, the Chinese 
visitors from Hong Kong and Macau were allowed to purchase in the 
GFDS. In 1980, a supermarket, the very first one in Guangzhou, 
was opened inside the GFDS. Then, in 1981, GFDS was opened to 
the general public including the local Chinese but all the 
customers must pay in "Foreign Exchange Certificate" (FEC) which 
could be exchanged by using foreign currencies.
Since 1978, GFDS was upgraded by the local government to a formal 
state-owned enterprise with certain level of autonomy in 
management and operation under the central planning economic 
system. In 1986, GFDS was expanded by adding the sixth floor on 
top of the old building for the purposes of adding shopping area, 
administrative offices and storage space. Now the total shopping 
area is 9,000 square meters. Since early 1993, another 
six-storey building adjacent to the present one has been under 
construction in order to increase the area of shopping mall to 
15, 000 square meters at the end of 1994. Other than the main 
stores in the present location, GFDS has four branches located in 
other hotels and buildings in Guangzhou.
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Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since 1978 and it was converted into a 
private shareholding enterprise in November 1992 by issuing 15% 
of the total shares to the employees. The local government is 
the majority shareholder by holding 85% of the shares. Before 
the legal form conversion, GFDS's total net assets were revalued 
(by an authorized CPA firm) at RMB85M which was equivalent to 85% 
of the share-value held by the government. Then, the employees 
subscribed for an additional RMB15M of new shares which is 
equivalent to 15% of the total share-value of RMB100M (i.e. 
RMB85M+RMB15M).
There is a ceiling, imposed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
the Bank of China (BOC) , that the total shares held by the 
employees of a shareholding enterprise cannot exceed 20%. The 
employees of GFDS had the free options to subscribe from one 
share up to some limits which were set for different staff 
according to their grades and seniorities. The shares are not 
transferrable among the employees or to any outsiders.
In June 1993, GFDS revalued its total net assets again in order 
to apply for a public listing in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
which is located just across the boarder of Hong Kong. However, 
this application was not successful because the MOF and BOC have 
v e r y  s t r i n g e n t  c r i t e r i a  in s c r e e n i n g  the c a n d i d a t e s . 
Tentatively, the Guanzhou Nanfang Building Group has been 
approved to be the first department store listed in the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange in 1994. Nevertheless, GFDS will not give up its 
ambition to apply for public listing in the near future.
All the friendship stores in China are under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Commerce which has delegated its supervision role to 
the provincial or municipal Commerce Bureau. Since 1978, GFDS 
has been reporting to the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau which 
is overseeing all the retailing enterprises in Guangzhou.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all the planning and control aspects (long term 
and short term) in the SOEs. Therefore, GFDS, as mentioned in 
the last section, was just acting as a quasi-government supplying 
centre instead of an independent economic entity. GFDS had to 
carry out the commands, including the quantities and varieties of 
commodities sold, as directed from the Bureau.
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Turning into the beginning of 1990s, the Guangzhou First Commerce 
Bureau has changed it role to just scrutinise the major 
development projects, mainly long term ones, recommended by the 
GFDS. In addition, the Bureau is providing marketing information 
to the retailing enterprises in Guangzhou in order to help them 
purchase and sell the right commodities to the right customers at 
the right time.
The GFDS1s top management has experienced that the Bureau has 
been taking away its visible hands from and leaving more 
operating autonomy to the retailing industry even before 1992 
when the mechanism transformation legislation was announced.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of GFDS can be divided into three 
levels which are listed below.
1. Board of Directors (BOD)
1.1 Chairman (also the General Manager)*
1.2 Deputy Chairman (also the Finance Deputy-General 
Manager)*
1.3 Deputy Chairman (also the Communist Party Secretary)*
1.4 Director (also the Sales Deputy-General Manager)
1.5 Director (also the Purchasing Deputy-General Manager)
1.6 Director (also the Labour Union Leader)
* They are appointed by the government as representatives to 
the board of directors.
2. Headquarters
2.1 General Manager Office (also Chairman of the BOD)
2.2 Accounting & Finance Department (headed by a Deputy-
General Manager who is also the Deputy Chairman of the 
BOD)
2.3 Marketing & Sales Department (headed by a Deputy-General 
Manager who is also a Director of the BOD)
2.4 Purchasing Department (headed by a Deputy-General 
Manager who is also a Director of the BOD)
,2.5 Planning Department
2.6 Personnel Department
2.7 Transportation Department
2.8 Service Evaluation Department
2.9 General Affairs Department
2.9.1 Security
2.9.2 Training & Education
2.9.3 Medical
2.9.4 Housing
2.9.5 Canteen
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3. Department Stores#
3.1 Cosmetic & MedicinefDepartment
3.2 Ladies■ Wear Department
3.3 Men's Wear Department
3.4 Arts & Craft Department
3.5 Furniture & Appliance Department
3.6 Supermarket Department
# Each department store has at least the following staff
(a) 1 Manager
(b) 2-3 Deputy Managers
(c) Marketing & Sales Section
(d) Purchasing Section
(e) Accounting Section
(f) Personnel Section
Therefore, GFDS is using a matrix management structure such as 
the departmental accounting staff have line function to the store 
managers and also staff function to the accounting and finance 
department in the headquarters.
All the six department stores are classified as "profit centres" 
with "Internal Responsibility Contracts" (IRCs) signed with the 
headquarters annually.
GFDS also, has a fully-owned restaurant adjacent to the present 
main building. This separate economic entity is treated as a 
self-financed "tertiary enterprise" employing less than 20 staff.
GFDS had a total of 2,300 employees at the end of 1993. It is 
classified as a "Medium size SOE" in China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB100M (1992)
Turnover : RMB466M (1992)
RMB710M (1993)
Income before tax : RMB 35M (1992) - 7.5% of sales
RMB 50M (1993) - 7.0% of sales
Income tax rate : 15% (for shareholding enterprises)
The decrease of profit margin in 1993 was due to inflation and 
higher sales and related taxes.
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Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) signed its first 
5-year Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) with the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government in 1987. The major target set in the ERC 
was "Income Before Tax" with 10% growth rate. GFDS was 
underwritten to hand over 60% of the targeted "Income Before Tax" 
per year to the Municipal Government irrespective of actual 
performance (profit or loss) achieved. If the actual income 
before tax exceeded the annual target, 3 0% of the excess would be 
paid to the government.
For example,
(RMB'000) 1987 1988 1989
Budget Income Before Tax (10% growth) 10,000 11,000 12,100
Handover to Government (60%) 6,000 6,600 7,260
Income After Tax left for GFDS 4,000 4,400 4,840
If the actual "Income Before Tax" in 1987 was lower or greater 
than the annual agreed target, then the senario would become as 
follow :
(R M B '000) 1987 1987 1987
(Budget) (Actual) (Actual) 
Budget Income Before Tax (a) 10,000 8,000 12,000
Handover to Government 6,000 6,000 6,000
(fixed at 60% of budget) ------  ----- ------
4,000 2,000 6,000
Tax on Excess Income     600
(12,000-10,000)x30% ------  ----- ------
Income After Tax left for GFDS (b) 4,000 2,000 5,400
IAT % of IBT (b)/ (a) 40% 25% 45%
The "Income After Tax" left for GFDS will be transfered to four 
reserves, namely,
(1) Business Development Reserve;
(2) Employee Bonus Reserve;
(3) Employee Welfare Reserve; and
(4) Special (Standard-by) Reserve.
According to the actual income after tax and the level of bonus 
reserve, • the employees might get an additional bonus at the end 
of the year.
This system would encourage GFDS to enhance its profitability in 
order to retain more income after tax for development, reserve, 
empolyee bonus and welfare purposes.
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After transforming into a shareholding enterprise in November 
1992, the second ERC (1992-1996 inclusive) was terminated at the 
end of 1992. As from 1993, GFDS has to pay an income tax of 15%. 
It would be interesting to compare the taxation impact between 
the ERC and Shareholding system by taking the performance of 1993 
as an example.
(RMB'000) ERC Shareholding
Budget Income Before Tax 30,000 ---
Actual Income Before Tax 
Handover to Government :
ERC (30,000x60% + 20,000x30%) 
Shareholding (50,000x15%)
50.000
24.000
50,000 
7,500
Income After Tax 
Assume 100% Dividend Declared : 
to Government (85%)
26,000 42,500 
36,125
Income After Tax left to :
GFDS's Four Reserves
GFDS's Employees as Dividend
26,000
6, 375
In terms of remuneration to the employees, if a year-end bonus of 
RMB6,375,000 (24.5% of income after tax i.e. RMB26M) under the
ERC system was paid to the employees in 1993, then the two 
systems would be similar. However, under the ERC system, GFDS 
had the flexibility to transfer the "Income After Tax" among the 
four reserves of which two of them (development and special 
reserves) were important for the growth of the business. But
under the shareholding system, GFDS would have nothing left for 
future development if the government decided to declare all the 
profit before tax as dividend. Furthermore, GFDS has lost the 
privilege previously allowed under the ERC system to deduct the 
bank loan repayment from the taxable profit in assessing income 
tax.
To tackle this potential problem, GFDS has been negotiating with 
the municipal government to allow them either :
(1) to borrow back the government's portion of distributed
dividend as a loan with interest below prime rate; or
(2) to carry on with the terms of the second ERC until 1996 when
some other arrangements can be made.
However, no compromise has been agreed between the government and 
GFDS yet. Therefore, the dividend for 1993 has not yet been 
declared and distributed to the employees yet.
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Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The organisation structure of Guangzhou Friendship Department 
Store (GFDS) is very similar to the type of "Strategic Control 
Companies" as mentioned on p. 87 of the "Strategic Management 
Styles" written by Goold and Campbell. Just to quote that 
section as follow :
"The predominant organizational theme in these companies has been 
the creation or reinforcement of independent, profit-responsible 
divisions that can devise their own strategies with little need 
for coordination between divisions, and that can be held 
separately accountable for their results. The businesses within 
these divisions often require coordinated strategies, and this is 
a prime f u n c t i o n  for the d i v i s i o n a l  m a n a gement level. 
Nevertheless, the divisions are broken up into profit centre 
units, which each report separately to the centre."
The six department stores in GFDS are independent profit centres 
which are allowed to formulate their own short term strategies in 
the annual planning and budgeting process. The interactions 
between the department stores are minimal because they are 
selling different types of goods and commodities. Therefore, 
they have little need for coordination and they can be held 
separately accountable for their results. The different sections 
within each department store require coordinated strategies, such 
as the relationship between the furniture section and household 
appliance section. Some people, like the newly married couples 
may intend to buy both furniture and household appliance together 
for their new homes. The coordination work among the sections is 
one of the prime functions for the manager and deputy managers in 
each department store.
After the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, the 
ownership and management of GFDS are supposed to be separated. 
The top management are vested with full autonomy to plan and 
control all the operations. Since then, the top management have 
been decentralizing more responsibility to each department store 
such as initiating the annual budget and the internal 
responsibility contract. The profit responsibility lies with the 
department store managers who should decide their own strategies 
in marketing, selling, purchasing, recruiting and training, cost 
controlling, etc., in order to achieve the targets set in the 
IRCs on one hand and creat a solid fundation for future sales or 
profit growth on the other hand.
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All the members in the Board of Directors (BOD) are employees in 
the GFDS. It has the disadvantage of conflicts and bias due to 
dual roles played by the board members, but the advantage is that 
they understand each facet of the business well. The selection 
and appointment of the board members are decided by the AGM but 
they should be approved by the First Commerce Bureau. In 
principle, all the top management (general manager, deputy 
general managers, department heads and store managers) should be 
appointed by the BOD. Any major changes of the organisation 
structure in the department stores should be initiated by the 
store managers and approved by the general manager.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, GFDS has a decentralized structure in which the store 
managers report directly to the general manager, and they play a 
linking and control role between the department and the general 
manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, 
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) has implemented a 
more formal planning process for reviewing, discussing and 
sanctioning the annual plan or budget and the internal 
responsibility contracts (IRCs). This process starts in November 
(i.e. fourth quarter) each year and ends in February the next 
year. After intensive internal and external environmental 
studies by the general manager with his deputy managers and the 
planning department, a preliminary sales target for next year can 
be decided. From this overall target, guidelines are provided by 
the general manager to the six department store managers to 
formulate their own annual plans and budgets. Other functions in 
the headquarters have to compile their manpower and expense 
budgets as well.
The budgets proposed by the department stores are used as the 
bases for setting the targets in the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts. In fact, the IRC is a subset of the 
annual plan or budget in order to highlight the key variables to 
measure the performance and determine the group bonus for each 
department store.
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The accounting and finance department validates all the budgets 
and consolidates them into a master plan or budget for submission 
to the top management for review. Then, formal and informal 
meetings and discussions are held between the general manager, 
deputy-general managers and store managers either collectively or 
individually. This iterative exercise is finished until all the 
plans, budgets and contracts are mutually agreed in February. 
Then the master budget is tabled in the AGM to be held in 
mid-February for approval.
Before 1992, the department stores and other functions in the 
headquarters were also required to participate in the budgeting 
process, but it was only for compiling the "Financial Plan" and 
"Commodity Turnover Plan" in standard formats for submission to 
the First Commercial Bureau annually. Due concerns and focus had 
not been given to these two pieces of planning documents by both 
sides provided the ERC's targets could be reached as appeared on 
the financial plan.
After the change into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, and 
under the legislative changes and market economy promotion, GFDS 
has been given higher automomy in formulating its strategic 
directions. As a result, all the department stores and functions 
are compelled to participate in the planning process and extend 
their planning horizon beyond one year.
The top management not only insert minimal interference in 
departmental planning decisions, but also leave the short and 
medium term tactical or strategic decisions to the department 
stores as well.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
As suggested by Goold and Campbell, a distinguishing feature of 
the strategic control companies is the decentralization of 
strategy formulation responsibility to divisional or business 
unit level. Thus, broad themes, major thrusts and specific 
suggestions are generally delivered, if at all, in low key.
In the case of Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS), 
different department stores have different strategic themes and 
thrusts because of different :
(1) seasonal periods;
(2) market segments;
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(3) age and sex of customers;
(4) customers preferences arid tastes;
(5) fashions and trends;
(6) quality requirements; and
(7) price acceptances.
As far as strategic theme and thrust are concerned, the six 
department stores are allowed to formulate their own tactics and 
strategies in terms of :
(1) sales promotion;
(2) commodity pricing;
(3) internal design and decoration;
(4) display arrangement; and
(5) delivery and after sales service.
However, the headquarters do insist a few basic and common themes 
and thrusts such as :
(1) courteous service attitude to customers;
(2) high quality of commodities sold;
(3) reasonable selling prices; and
(4) comfortable environment for customers.
Another very important strategic thrust that is being undertaking 
by GFDS is to expand the total area of the shopping mall as 
mentioned in the history and background (section 1) in order to 
increase the commodity varieties and compete with other local- 
and foreign-invested department stores.
Before 1992, the top management in GFDS sometimes made 
suggestions on specific strategic issues such as commodity 
varieties, selling prices, promotion tatics and even display 
arrangements. The top management followed the financial targets 
as agreed in the IRCs closely on monthly and quarterly basis and 
are quick to make suggestions if they do not match the overall 
long and short term plan. To facilitate the implementation of 
the legislation in 1992, the top management has left more 
freedom to the department stores to adjust their strategies and 
tactics as long as they would not deviate much from the basic 
themes,, thrusts and the annual budget. However, the purchasing 
policy or function is still controlled by the headquarters 
because this activity involves significant working capital 
investment.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 and Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
f
The Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) attempted a 
20-year long range planning in 1987. The top management of GFDS 
was trying to define some long term objectives for the enterprise 
although they realised that the economic environment in China was
changing rapidly. After a few days of discussion, the top
management eventually laid down the following three important 
missions for GFDS to achieve in the next two decades.
(1) Retailing (i.e. department stores) should remain the core
business.
(2) Retailing related businesses should be developed in the 
1990s (horizontal or vertical integration).
(3) Other lines of businesses should be considered in the 1990s
and beyond (diversification).
Since then, GFDS has actively initiated its first (1987-1991 
inclusive) and second (1992-1996 inclusive) 5-year plans. The 
current 5 -year plan has included the following projects.
(a) Expansion of Floor Space
The commodity varieties sold have been increased rapidly 
since mid-1980s and soon the office and storage areas had to 
be reduced in order to provide more space for the six 
department stores but it was still insufficient.
Since early 1993, another six-storey building adjacent to 
the present one has been under construction in order to 
increase the area of shopping mall to 15,000 square meters 
at the end of 1994. The construction work of the new 
building was completed in December 1993 and it was connected 
with the old building in a "L" shaped six-storey building. 
Each floor is occupied by one or two department stores. The 
5th floor (old plus new building) will be renovated and 
decorated first for the furniture and household appliances. 
After opening the new 5th floor for business, the 4th floor 
will be renovated and decorated for the men's wear. The 6th 
floor will be reserved for administrative offices, 
stockroom, canteen and other facilities.
This process of work will be done floor by floor in order to 
maintain the operation for the customers but the sales will 
be affected to a certain extent due to the inconvenience' 
caused by the work in progress. Therefore, it would be very 
difficult to forecast the turnover in 1994.
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(b) Expansion of Stockroom
f
A piece of land with 4,000 square meters has been purchased 
in the Guangzhou Special Economic Development Zone (located 
at the South Eastern District) in order to build up a 
stockroom for the imported goods which will enjoy lower 
import tax benefit.
(c) High Class Department Store
In order to enhance the status and image of GFDS and compete 
with the local- and foreign-invested (Japanese and Hong 
Kong) department stores, the following policies have been 
implemented :
(i) to sell higher quality commodities;
(ii) to increase the commodity varieties especially to add 
more imported goods;
(iii)to improve the internal decoration and display 
arrangement; and
(iv) to enhance the service quality such as salesgirl's 
hospitality, free delivery, after-sales service and 
replacement.
(d) Supermarket Chain
Since 1980, a supermarket was established in the present 
building (ground floor) of GFDS. In view of the popularity 
of supermarket in Guangzhou since early 1990s, GFDS has been 
searching suitable sites to establish a chain of supermarket 
in various places of the city.
(e) Investment Business
In 1993, GFDS purchased RMB10 million value of shares in the 
largest investment company in Guangzhou, Nanfang Security 
Company, and b e c a m e  a m a j o r  s h a r e h o l d e r  w i t h  a 
representative sitting on its board of directors. This 
strategic investment is the first step of diversification 
and on the other hand, it may help GFDS to raise future 
capital either through public listing or by other means.
(f) Tourism
Tourism has become a hot business in 1993 not only for 
foreign tourists coming to visit Guangzhou, but also for 
many rich local Chinese to travel abroad (e.g. Hong Kong, 
Macau, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia etc.). GFDS is 
forming a travel agency in 1994 which is related to the 
present retailing business.
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(g) Joint Venture Retailing
GFDS is looking for foreign partners, most likely from Hong 
Kong, to open a few specialized retailing shops such as 
selling clothing, fast food, bakery, ice-cream, gift and 
stationery etc.
(h) Commercial Joint Venture
GFDS is also searching for local and foreign partners to 
form a couple of joint ventures for commercial businesses 
such as wholesale, import and export activities.
(i) Property Development
GFDS is discussing with the Municipal Government and the 
First Commercial Bureau to acquire another piece of land 
with 150,000 square metres located inside the Special 
Economic Development Zone for developing commercial and 
residential buildings.
Apart from the long term plans of (a), (b), (c) and (d) above,
the other plans are not related to the six department stores and 
are totally initiated and executed by the board of directors or 
the top management. However, the store managers' participation 
in the first four long term plans is restricted to the extent of 
consultation. Therefore, the formulation of long term planning 
in GFDS is adopting a top-down approach with little involvement 
from the store managers.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The promulgation of "Market Economy" since 1992 has entrusted 
more freedom to GFDS for planning ahead on one hand but 
simultaneously has induced fiercer competition. Now many foreign 
invested department stores (i.e. Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
have been allowed to open up branches in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. In addition to the keen competition from 
the local department stores, GFDS is facing threats from these 
foreign counterparts as well. But this open-door policy is 
carefully monitored by the government in order to protect the 
state-owned department stores such as GFDS where management 
skills are not as sophisticated as the foreign department stores. 
In this respect, the central government has imposed certain 
restrictions on the foreign invested department stores such as :
(a) any proposed new branch must be approved by the Beijing 
central government;
(b) they are not allowed to perform wholesale business; and
(c) they are not entitled to special tax concession.
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All in all, retailing is t h e fmost vulnerable service industry (or 
called "tertiary enterprise") in China because of having a 
consumable market size of over 1.2 billion of people. There are 
too many unstable and unpredictable political, economical, social 
and demographical factors affecting the planning vision of GFDS 
especially the difficulty in long term planning.
Observation of Planning Influence : Shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
Before 1992, GFDS was required to submit the following two annual 
plans to the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau :
(a) Financial Plan - to highlight the incomes, expenses, 
profits, taxes, loan repayments and balance sheet items.
(b) Commodity Turnover Plan - to highlight the quantities and 
varieties of commodities to be purchased, sold and carried. 
(The purchasing is controlled by GFDS since the 1990s.)
These two plans were used by the Bureau to exercise its macro 
economic control on GFDS through directives or negotiation. 
After the implementation of the mechanism transformation 
legislations in 1992, these two plans were not required by the 
Bureau. As from November 1992, GFDS has used the following 
annual planning or budgeting process.
In late October or early November, the general manager asks the 
accounting and finance department to provide the year-to-date 
financial results. He also requests the planning department to 
supply information concerning the changes in local, national and 
international economic environments. Then he calls up a meeting 
with the top management in the headquarters and the six 
department store managers in order to review and discuss the. 
following aspects which have direct or indirect impacts on the 
next year's plan or budget.
(1) Capability Evaluation
(a) Financial performance
(b) Financial stability
(c) Borrowing capacity
(d) Space & facility availability#
(e) Manpower and training
# The new building will affect the space, facility and 
turnover as from 1994.
(2) Environmental Scanning*
(a) Worldwide economy changes
(b) China economy changes
(c) Guangdong province economy changes
(d) Guangzhou city economy changes
(e) Competitor analysis (other Chinese department stores
and foreign-invested department stores)
(f) . Consummer analysis (purchasing power, fashion, taste,
service expectation, etc.)
* Most of the environmental information is collected and 
analysed by the Planning Department through news cuttings, 
market or customer surveys and consulting experts.
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(3) Shareholder Expectations
(a) First Commerce Bureau expectations
(b) Board of Directors expectations
The general conclusion of this first meeting is to set a 
preliminary total sales target expected to be achieved in next 
year. Of course, a certain extent of stretch is built into this 
target in order to enforce the department store managers to plan 
their own budgets more agressively.
The next step is for the store managers to formulate their 
budgets by discussing with their own deputy managers, sales, 
accounting, personnel and other supporting staff. At the 
beginning of December, the store managers have to send their 
first budget drafts to the accounting and finance department for 
screening and consolidation before submitting to the top 
management in the headquarters for consideration. At this point 
in time, informal discussions may be held between the top 
management and the stores managers trying to bridge the gap of 
different expectations.
Then the second, third or fourth meeting carries on until 
compromises and agreements have been reached between the 
headquarters and the department stores. After the Chinese New 
Year in mid-February, the master budget is tabled in the Annual 
General Meeting for approval, and after that, implementation 
begins. The budgets and IRCs are broken down into quarterly 
targets for periodic control and measurement.
Since October 1992, the department store managers have been 
involved intensively in this budgeting process which they believe 
to be important in setting and negotiating the subsequent 
internal responsibility contracts with the general manager. 
Furthermore, the approved budgets and IRCs affect their 
strategies and tactics for short and medium term developments.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions especially the 
the retailing businesses all over China, the budget review period 
has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The top management 
in headquarters and all the department store managers hold a 
formal review meeting at the beginning of each month to review 
and discuss the financial performance of last month. Remedial 
actions are suggested to correct any significant controllable 
deviations from the quarterly budgets. The targets determined in 
the budgets and IRCs are seldom adjusted unless facing 
substantial uncontrollable environmental factors. Basically, a 
fixed budget concept is employed.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
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In summary, the shareholding system, the mechanism legislation 
and the market economy have driven GFDS spending more effort to 
plan ahead. The top management have involved the department 
store managers or even their subordinates (lower management) in 
the annual planning and budgeting process which on one hand is a 
critical step in materializing the long term strategic plan, and 
on the other hand, it is an important motivational factor for the 
store managers to manage their own businesses and to be rewarded 
accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) established its IRC 
system in 1984 in order to motivate the aggressiveness of the 
departments and to attain at least the financial targets set in 
the ERC signed with the government. This IRC system only applies 
to the six department stores.
The IRC of one of the department stores is described below :
Department
Year
Guidelines
Furniture & Household Appliance
1993
(1) Sales and profit are the major economic 
targets.
(2) Qualitative targets must be emphasised and 
measured as well.
(3) Bonus is determined on the degree of 
accomplishment of the economic and 
qualitative targets.
Headcount : XXX staff (per budget)
Economic : (1) Sales/Turnover (45%)
Targets (2) Profit Before Tax (27%)
(3) Foreign Exchange (18%)
Qualitative : (1) Service Attitude/Quality ( 3%)
Targets (2) Discipline ( 2%)
(3) Decoration/Display/Sanity ( 2%)
(4) Daily Operation ( 2%)
(5) Security and Safety 
Total Score for Bonus
( 1%) 
(100%)
Bonus : (1) Actual Sales x Bonus/10,000 of Sales(a)
Calculation (2) Actual Profit x Bonus/10,000 of Profit(a)
(3) Actual Foreign Exchange x Bonus/10,000 of 
Foreign Exchange(a)
(4) [ (1) + (2) + (3)] x Total Score for Bonus %
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Notes : (a) For example, RMB10 per RMB10,000 of sales, then if
actual sales i s fRMB8,000,000, then bonus = RMB8,000.
(b) The qualitative factors are assessed by the service 
evaluation department in the headquarters. They 
have intrinsic values to the employees although 
their weightings in calculating bonus are low. Good 
performance in these qualitative factors may be 
praised openly by individual or group on the notice 
board.
(d) The bonus is calculated on a group basis whereas the 
distribution of group bonus to individual employees 
within the department is determined by the manager 
according to individual performance (i.e. sales made
by a certain salesgirl for the month).
Since 1992, the IRCs have been initiated by the department stores
during the budgeting process (November - February). After 
iterative discussions and negotiations with the general manager 
and finance department (acting as controller), the IRCs are 
agreed and signed by the store managers and the general manager.
The IRCs are reviewed quarterly in parallel with the budget 
review but both the general manager and the store managers are 
trying to avoid adjusting the targets unless there are 
significant uncontrollable environmental changes affecting their 
validity.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
store managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, and 
also involved the finance department intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the six department stores in Guangzhou Friendship 
Department Store (GFDS) are all independent with very minimal 
interactions and interdependencies, therefore, internal transfer 
pricing does not exist.
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Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Guangzhou 
Friendship Department Store (GFDS) has four distinct levels of 
management hierarchy :
(1) Board of Directors (BOD)
(2) Top Management (general and deputy-general managers)
(3) Middle Management (department store managers, deputy
managers and other functional managers)
(4) Lower Management (section leaders under the store managers)
Although there are overlaps between the BOD and the top 
management who are playing dual roles in both levels, 
nevertheless, the seggregation of duties are clearly defined. 
The general manager (also chairman of BOD) is acting as an 
arbitrator to harmonize any role conflicts which happen among the 
members in the BOD.
The store managers can decide on their own divisional structures, 
staffing and their roles and functions, and interactions between 
their sub-units (sections). In addition, since 1992, the store 
managers have been vested with higher strategic autonomy to 
manoeuvre their organisational and personnel changes but 
important changes should be discussed with headquarters before 
implementation.
The store managers are also responsible for certain personnel 
functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation, 
remuneration (distribution of bonus) and even termination of 
employment. Unlike Beijing and Shanghai, the labour market in 
Guangzhou is rather free which means employees can choose new 
jobs and resign from the old ones at their own will. On the 
other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay off their 
staff by giving advanced notice according to the terms of the 
employment contracts. GFDS has fully implemented the "employment 
contract system" since 1992 and the "big rice pot" or "three iron 
bowls" concept has been abolished.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the department stores are by using 
annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the 
most important measurement criteria are sales and profits set in 
the IRCs,. although some other qualitative targets (non-financial) 
are employed. However, they account for 10% of the weighting in 
the group bonus calculation.
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As long as the department stores can meet the financial targets 
with growth from year to year, the headquarters will devolve the 
responsibility for strategy development to the stores without 
much interference.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : Shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Objectives in Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) emerge 
from the detailed discussion of the annual plans or budgets with 
the department stores. The financial objectives stem from the 
plans, rather than vice versa. This is not to suggest that the 
objective-setting process is wholly bottom-up. The initiative 
lies in the first instance with the department stores, who 
formulate the plans, rather than with the headquarters, but top 
management in the headquarters can and do push and probe for 
alternative objectives as they see fit. With the long years of 
experience and information (financial and marketing) gathered by 
the general manager, he can give suggestions to individual 
department stores to amend the financial objectives both in short 
or long term. Furthermore, the general manager has a holistic 
view to achieve the overall financial objectives year after year 
according to the long term plan. Finally, the result is usually 
a compromise that both headquarters and department can live with.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : In between "Moderate Strategic 
Control" and "Tight Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store (GFDS) has monthly and 
quarterly reporting systems to track actual results versus plan 
or budget. All the department stores send monthly results on 
prescribed formats to the accounting and finance department for 
calculating the profits and comparing with budgets before 
submission to the general manager for review.
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The contents of the monthly report are simpler than the
manufacturing industries. The key financial results such as
sales and e x p e n d i t u r e s  are the major concerns of the
headquarters. The non-financial measurement yardsticks (see IRC
in section 5.6) are assessed by the service evaluation 
department through continuous inspections. The comments and 
ratings of the service evaluation are written on the same monthly 
reports. These monthly reports are compiled, through the 
computer, by the accounting staff. Any significant variances 
(without specifying tolerance limits) are highlighted in order to 
bring the attention to the top management.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general or deputy-general managers will contact the respective 
store managers to dig out the underlining reasons or ask them to 
perform investigation immediately. It is expected that remedial 
actions can be taken to handle the short term problems as soon as 
possible (such as a sudden sales promotion by a counterpart). 
Whereas, strategic steps may be considered and implemented to 
solve some medium term problems (such as the effect of 
advertisement).
During the monthly meeting between the top management in 
headquarters and the store managers, the general manager put 
forward the monthly results for open discussion. The store 
managers may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances and any other potential problems. Infrequent failures 
in meeting the budget by the store managers can be tolerated as 
long as they are taking remedial tactics or strategies to put 
things back on the right track and attain the budget at the end 
of the year. Of course, if any serious uncontrollable 
environmental factors happened to hit any department store 
adversely, the manager should not be blamed. .
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the accounting department for calculating the bonus for 
last month.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : Shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Strategic Control" since 1992.
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6.4 Rewards and Incentives
According to the Guangzhou Government's policy, the annual gross 
wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the shareholding 
enterprises can not exceed either one of the following limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the GFDS is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
Under the previous ERC system, GFDS could transfer a certain 
percentage of its annual profit after . tax (or handover to 
government) to a "Employee Bonus Reserve" which could be
distributed as a year-end bonus to the employees according to the 
overall financial performance and level of this reserve. This 
kind of flexibility or buffer was lost when GFDS was tranformed 
into a shareholding enterprise in November 1992. In addition, 
GFDS is now subject to the above two limits or ceilings. As a 
result, the total annual wages increase can not cover the high 
inflation in Guangzhou (1993 - 35% the highest in China) . As an 
interim measure, GFDS has been approved by the municipal 
government to allow them to exceed the above two limits or
ceilings but the excess portion (wages paid) would be taxed at 
15%.
The take-home pay of each employee in GFDS is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 15% - 20%
(2) Bonus 60% - 50%
(3) Allowances 25% - 30%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB10,000 
in 1993. Under the current high inflation rate and the keen 
competition in the labour market of this industry, the average 
annual gross wages per employee was increased to RMB12,000 in 
1994.
The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regards to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10, 
therefore, it is not substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is the major source of income 
which is determined according to the IRC.
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There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Guangzhou Government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GFDS which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of "allowances" is trying to 
balance the relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable 
standard of living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus", as described in section 5.6 above, is 
based on the accomplishment of the IRC. An IRC signed between 
the general manager and a store manager decides what level of 
group bonus will be given to the department. Of course, it is up 
to the store manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his
or her subordinates according to individual performance, such as
the sales achieved by a salesgirl in a certain month. The bonus 
is distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a 
certain percentage (20% - 30%) is retained in a reserve in order 
to make up the low bonus obtained during the months of slack 
season. The payment of year-end bonus, if there is any, is also 
according to the annual performance of each department stores. 
Of course, it is possible for a department store to receive very 
low or even zero bonus if it performs much below the targets but 
it seldom happens in the past few years.
The bonus paid to the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is calculated as follow :
Monthly average bonus in all department stores x
Individual index*
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
General Manager = 2 . 0
Deputy-General Manager = 1.8 
Store Manager = 1 . 6
Supervisor = 1.4
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees. 
GFDS has implemented this contract employment system since 1992 
and now all the employees have signed employment contracts from 
one to three years subject to review and renewal. In general, 
the motivation of the employees has been improved.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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In summary, the enforcementfof financial objectives has both a 
stick and a carrot aspect. Evidence of the stick can be found in 
the reduction of monthly or year-end bonus and even manangement 
turnover in senior positions. The carrot is represented by 
substantial increase in bonus and perhaps career advancement. 
Due to the difficulty of defining long term strategic control 
objectives because of the volatility of this industry to the 
market conditions, the control process tends to stress control 
against budgeted financial results.
As mentioned by Goold and Campbell, due to the lack of precise 
"strategic" targets, the control contract focuses on short term 
profit and cash flow figures.
Observation of Control Influence : In bewteen "Finance Control"
and "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
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Section 7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Friendship Department Store 
(GFDS) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High/Medium
Corporate
Low Corporate 
Corporate
Review Process* Medium Corporate Low Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium Corporate Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Moderate
Financial Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate
Financial
Tight
Strategic
Monitoring Results* Moderate
Financial Strategic
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Strategic
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
ivit2 U .X  LLlll L U i p U X a L c "  — — — — — —
Low Corporate
[Post-1992]<-- 
(Strategic 
Control)
- [ P r e - 1 9 9 2 ]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Friendship Department Store before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been changed from "Financial Control" (Pre-1992) to "Strategic 
Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a very 
strong-form (very low corporate) of strategic control style as 
suggested by Goold and Campbell.
As a matter of fact, both the degrees of planning and control 
influences are on two separate continua. The planning influence 
should run from high corporate, then medium corporate and down to 
low corporate. Similarly, there should be measurement in between 
tight strategic control and tight financial control.
Revised : 6 March 1995
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ultimate aim is to classify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS)
Staff Interviwed : Mr Chen Hang, Deputy-Chairman of BOD and
Deputy General Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 26 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 10 July 1993
Second Visit - 30 October 1993
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Section 1 : History & Background
The original name of this department store was "May Hua" which 
was established by 57 American Chinese in 1948 by contributing 
US$65,000 as capital. In 1956, it was transformed into a 
state-owned enterprise with capital injected by the Chinese 
government and then the number of employees increased from 3 0 to 
250. In 1970, it was moved to the present Dongshan District 
(located at the Eastern part of Guangzhou city) and merged with 
another department store and then changed the name to Guangzhou 
Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) with 1,000 square metres of 
floor space in an old building. The turnover during the early 
1970s was around RMB10M.
After the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1977), GDDS was moved again 
to the. present 9-storey air-conditioned building with 8,416 
square metres of floor space in 1978. The construction cost of 
the present building was RMB3M borrowed from a bank in 1978 and 
this loan was repaid in 1981.
Other than this main store, GDDS has no other branches in 
Guangzhou but the board of directors is planning to erect a new 
building adjacent to the present one. The long term plan is to 
increase total shopping space to over 15,000 square metres in 
1997. This strategic plan of course needs capital injection 
which is to be obtained by listing the shares in the stock market 
or invite foreign investment (i.e. Hong Kong).
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since 1956 and it was converted into a 
private shareholding enterprise in December 1992 by issuing 20% 
of the authorized shares to the employees. The local government 
is the majority shareholder by holding 80% of the shares. Before 
the legal form conversion, GDDS's total net assets were revalued 
(by an authorized CPA firm) at RMB3 0M which was equivalent to 8 0% 
of the share-value held by the government. Then, the employees 
subscribed for an additional RMB7.5M of new shares which is 
equivalent to 20% of the total share-value of RMB37.5M (i.e.
RMB3 0M+RMB7.5M).
There is a ceiling, imposed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
the Bank of China (BOC) , that the total shares held by the
employees of a shareholding enterprise cannot exceed 20%. The 
employees of GDDS had the free options to subscribe from one
share up to some limits which were set for different staff
according to their grades and seniorities. The shares are not 
transferrable among the employees or to any outsiders.
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All the department stores in China are under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Commerce which hfas delegated its supervision role to 
the provincial or municipal Commerce Bureau. GDDS has been 
reporting to the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau which is 
overseeing all the retailing enterprises in Guangzhou.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all planning and control (long term and short 
term) in the SOEs. Therefore, GDDS had to carry out the 
commands, including the quantities and varieties of commodities 
purchased and sold, as directed from the Bureau.
Turning into the beginning of 1990s, the Guangzhou First Commerce 
Bureau has changed its role to just scruitinizing the major 
development projects, mainly long term ones, recommended by the 
GDDS. In addition, the Bureau is providing marketing information 
to the retailing enterprises in Guangzhou in order to help them 
purchase and sell the right commodities to the right customers at 
the right time.
The G D D S 's top management has experienced that the Bureau, has 
been taking away its visible hands from and leaving more 
operating autonomy to the retailing industry even before 1992 
when the mechanism transformation legislation was announced.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of GDDS can be divided into three 
levels which are listed below.
1. Board of Directors (BOD)
1.1 Chairman (also the General Manager)*
1.2 Deputy Chairman (also the Finance Deputy-General 
Manager)*
1.3 Deputy Chairman (also the Communist Party Secretary)*
1.4 4 Directors (also Deputy-General Managers of Departments 
shown below)
1.5 1 Director (representative from the Labour Union)
1.6 One representative from the First Commerce Bureau
* They are appointed by the government as representatives to 
the board of directors.
2. Headquarters
2.1 General Manager Office (headed by Chairman of the BOD)
2.2 Accounting & Finance Department (headed by a Deputy- 
General Manager who is also the Deputy Chairman of the 
BOD)
2.3 Marketing & Sales Department (headed by a Deputy-General 
Manager who is also a Director of the BOD)
2.4 Purchasing Department (headed by a Deputy-General 
Manager who is also a Director of the BOD)
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2.5 Planning Department (headed by a Deputy-General Manager 
who is also a Director of the BOD)
2.6 Personnel Department (headed by a Deputy-General Manager 
who is also a Director of the BOD)
2.7 Service Department
2.8 Transportation Department
2.9 General Affairs Department
2.9.1 Security
2.9.2 Training & Education
2.9.3 Housing
2.9.4 Medical
2.9.5 Canteen
3. Department Stores#
3.1 Cloth Department
3.2 Clothing & Fashion Department
3.3 Knit Wear Department
3.4 Furniture Department
3.5 Electricity Appliance Department
3.6 Houseware Department
3.7 Watch & Clock Department
3.8 Arts Sc Craft Department
3.9 Chinaware Department
3.10 Stationery & Toy Department
3.11 Consumables Department
3.12 Food Department
# Each department store has one manager, one to two deputy 
managers and some supporting staff for purchasing, 
marketing, accounting, personnel and transportation 
functions.
Therefore, GDDS is using a matrix management structure such as 
the departmental supporting staff have line functions to the 
departmental managers and also have staff functions to the 
respective departments in the headquarters.
All the 12 department stores are classified as "profit centres" 
with "Internal Responsibility Contracts" (IRCs) signed with the 
headquarters annually.
GDDS had a total of 950 employees at the end of 1993. It is 
classified as a "Medium size SOE" in China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB 45M (1992)
Turnover : RMB230M (1992)
RMB400M (1993)
Income before tax : RMB 14M (1992) - 6.1% of sales
RMB 22M (1993) - 5.5% of sales
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Income t a x  r a t e  : 15% ( f o r  s h a r e h o l d i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s )
The decrease of profit margin in 1993 was due to inflation and 
higher sales and related taxes (i.e. sales tax is 5% plus a 0.45% 
surcharge for urban development).
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) signed its first 
5-year Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) with the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government in 1987. The major target set in the ERC 
was "Income Before Tax" with 6% growth rate. GDDS was 
underwritten to hand over 55% of the targeted "Income Before Tax" 
per year to the Municipal Government irrespective of actual 
performance (profit or loss) achieved. If the actual income 
before tax exceeded the annual target, 16.5% of the excess would 
be paid to the government.
For example,
(RMB'000) 1987 1988 1989
Budget Income Before Tax (6% growth) 3, 000 3,180 3, 370
Handover to Government (55%) 1,650 . 1, 750 1, 850
Income After Tax left for GDDS 1,350 1,430 1, 520
If the actual "Income Before Tax" in 1987 was lower or greater 
than the annual agreed target, then the senario would become as 
follow :
(RMB'
Budget Income Before Tax 
Handover to Government 
(fixed at 55% of budget)
Tax on Excess Income 
(4,000-3,000)xl6.5% 
Income.After Tax left for
000)
(a)
1987 
(Budget) 
3,000 
1, 650
1987 
(Actual) 
2, 000 
1, 650
1987 
(Actual) 
4, 000 
1, 650
1, 350 350 2, 350 
165
GDDS (b)1,350 350 2,185
IAT % of IBT (b)/ (a) 45% 18% 55%
The "Income After Tax" left for GDDS could be transfered to four 
reserves, namely,
(1) Business Development Reserve;
(2) Employee Bonus Reserve;
(3) Employee Welfare Reserve; and
(4) Special (Standard-by) Reserve.
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According to the actual income after tax and the level of bonus 
reserve, the employees mightf get an additional bonus at the end 
of the year.
This system would encourage GDDS to enhance its profitability in 
order to retain more income after tax for development, reserve, 
empolyee bonus and welfare purposes.
After transforming into a shareholding enterprise in December 
1992, the second ERC (1992-1996 inclusive) was terminated at the 
end of 1992. As from 1993, GDDS has to pay an income tax of 15%. 
It would be interesting to compare the taxation impact between 
the ERC and Shareholding system by taking the performance of 1993 
as an example.
(RMB'000) ERC Shareholding
Budget Income Before Tax 15,000 ---
Actual Income Before Tax 22,000 22,000
Handover to Government :
ERC (15,000x55% + 7,000x16.5%) 9,400 ---
Shareholding (22,000x15%)   3,300
Income After Tax 12,600 18,700
Assume 100% Dividend Declared :
to Government (80%)   14,960
Income After Tax left to :
GDDS's Four Reserves 12,600
GDDS's Employees as Dividend 3,740
In terms of remuneration to the employees, if a year-end bonus of 
RMB3,740,000 (30% of income after tax i.e. RMB12.6M) under the
ERC system was paid to the employees in 1993, then the two 
systems would be similar. But according to the past experience, 
it was unlikely to distribute such a high percentage of year-end 
bonus to the employees. However, under the ERC system, GDDS had 
the flexibility to transfer the "Income After Tax" among the four 
reserves of which two of them (development and special reserves) 
were important for the growth of the business. But under the 
shareholding system, GDDS would have nothing left for future 
development if the government decides to declare all the profit 
after tax as dividend. Furthermore, GDDS has lost the privilege 
previously allowed under the ERC system to deduct the bank loan 
repayment from the taxable profit in assessing income tax.
To tackle this potential problem, GDDS has agreed with the 
municipal government to allow them either :
(1) to borrow back the government's portion of the declared and 
distributed dividend as a loan at favourable interest 20% 
lower than prime rate; or
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(2) to declare and distribute less than 100% of the profit after 
tax as dividend.
In general, GDDS favours the shareholding system under which the 
staff have become both employees and shareholders who will 
receive higher remuneration than the previous ERC system.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The organisation structure of Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store 
is similar to the type of "Strategic Control Companies" as 
mentioned on p.87 of the "Strategic Management Styles" written by 
Goold and Campbell. Just to quote that section as follow :
"The predominant organizational theme in these companies has been 
the creation or reinforcement of independent, profit-responsible 
divisions that can devise their own strategies with little need 
for coordination between divisions, and that can be held 
separately accountable for their results. The businesses within 
these divisions often require coordinated strategies, and this is 
a prime function for the divisional management level."
The 12 department stores in GDDS are independent profit centres 
which are allowed to formulate their own short term strategies in 
the annual planning and budgeting process. The interactions 
between the department stores are minimal because they are 
selling different types of goods and commodities. Therefore, 
they have little need for coordination and they can be held 
separately accountable for their results. The different sections 
within each department store require coordinated strategies, such 
as the relationship between the stationery and toy sections whose 
customers are largely children. The coordination work among the 
sections is one of the prime functions for the manager and deputy 
managers in each department store.
After the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, the 
ownership and management of GDDS are supposed to be separated. 
The top management are vested with full autonomy to plan and 
control all the operations. Since then, the top management have 
been decentralizing more responsibility to each department store 
such as initiating the annual budget and the internal 
responsibility contract. The profit responsibility lies with the 
department store managers who should decide their own strategies 
in marketing, selling, purchasing, recruiting and training, cost 
controlling, etc., in order to achieve the targets set in the 
IRCs on one hand and creat a solid fundations for future sales or 
profit growth on the other hand.
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All the members in the Board of Directors (BOD) are employees in 
the GDDS. It has the disadvantage of conflicts or bias due to 
dual roles played by the board members, but the advantage is that 
they understand each facet of the business well. The selection 
and appointment of the board members are decided by the AGM but 
they should be approved by the First Commerce Bureau.
In principle, all the top management (general manager, deputy 
general managers, department heads and department store managers) 
should be appointed by the BOD. Any major changes of the 
organisation structure in the department stores should be 
initiated by the store managers and approved by the general 
manager. It is interesting to note that a representative is sent 
by the First Commerce Bureau to sit on the BOD. He or she may 
have some influence on the planning decisions made by the BOD.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, GDDS has a divisionalised structure in which the 
department store managers report directly to the general manager, 
and they play a linking and control role between the department 
and the general manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, 
Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GFDS) has implemented a more 
formal planning process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning 
the annual plan or budget and the internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs). This process starts in November (i.e. fourth 
quarter) each year and ends in February the next year. After 
intensive internal and external environmental studies by the 
general manager with his deputy managers and the planning 
department, a preliminary sales target for next year is decided. 
From this overall target, guidelines are provided by the general 
manager to the 12 department store managers to formulate their 
own annual plans and budgets. Other functions in the 
headquarters have to compile their manpower and expense budgets 
as well.
The budgets proposed by the department stores are used as the 
bases for setting the targets in the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts. In fact, the IRC is a subset of the 
annual plan or budget in order to highlight the key variables to 
measure the performance and determine the group bonus for each 
department store.
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The accounting and finance department validates all the budgets 
and consolidates them into a master plan or budget for submission 
to the top management for review. Then, formal and informal 
meetings and discussions are held between the general manager, 
deputy-general managers and department store managers either 
collectively or individually.
This iterative exercise is finished until all the plans, budgets 
and contracts are mutually agreed in February. Then the master 
budget is tabled in the AGM to be held in mid-February for 
approval.
Before 1992, the department stores and other functions in the 
headquarters were also required to participate in the budgeting 
process, but it was only for compiling the "Financial Plan" and 
"Commodity Turnover Plan" in standard formats for submission to 
the First Commerce Bureau annually. Due concerns and focus had 
not "been given to these two pieces of planning documents by both 
sides provided the ERC's targets could be reached as appeared in 
the financial plan.
After the change to a shareholding enterprise in 1992, and under 
the legislative changes and market economy promotion, GDDS has 
been given higher automomy in formulating its strategic 
directions. As a result, all the department stores and functions 
are compelled to participate in the planning process and extend 
their planning horizon beyond one year.
The top management has been trying to insert minimal interference 
in departmental planning decisions, and also leave the short and 
medium term tactical or strategic decisions to the department 
stores as well. But if the headquarters think that the budget of 
a certain department store is too conservative, specific 
direction will be given to the store manager to build in stretch 
into the targets.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q5.5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
As suggested by Goold and Campbell, a distinguishing feature of 
strategic, control companies is the decentralization of strategy 
formulation responsibility to divisional or business unit level. 
Thus, broad themes, major thrusts and specific suggestions are 
generally delivered, if at all, in low key.
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In the case of Guangzhou Dongshan Department Stores, different 
department stores have different strategic themes and thrusts 
because of different :
(1) seasonal periods;
(2) market segments;
(3) age and sex of customers;
(4) customers preferences and tastes;
(5) fashions and trends;
(6) quality requirements; and
(7) price acceptances.
As far as strategic themes and thrusts are concerned, the 12 
department stores are allowed to formulate their own tactics and 
strategies in terms of :
(1) sales promotion;
(2) commodity pricing (agreed by headquarters);
(3) internal design and decoration;
(4) display arrangement; and
(5) after sales service.
However, the headquarters do insist on a few basic and common 
themes and thrusts such as :
(1) courteous service attitude to customers;
(2) good quality of commodities sold;
(3) reasonable selling prices; and
(4) comfortable environment for customers.
Another very important strategic thrust that is being undertaking 
by GDDS is to expand the total area of shopping mall as mentioned 
in the history and background (section 1) in order to increase 
the commodity varieties and compete with other local department 
stores.
Before 1992, the top management in GDDS sometimes made 
suggestions on specific strategic issues such as commodity 
varieties, selling prices, promotion tactics and even display 
arrangements. The top management followed the financial targets 
as agreed in the IRCs closely on a monthly and quarterly basis 
and was quick to make suggestions if they do not match the 
overall long and short term plan. To facilitate the 
implementation of the legislation in 1992, the top management 
has left more freedom to the department stores to adjust their 
strategies and tactics as long as they would not deviate much 
from the basic themes, thrusts and the annual budget. However, 
the puchasing function and policy are still controlled by the 
headquarters because it involves significant working capital 
investment.
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(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 and Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
The Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) is located at the 
Eastern side of the Guangzhou city which is close to the Special 
Economic Development Zone. Dongshan District is recognised to 
have the highest potential for business development in the 1990s 
and beyond, and it may become the centre of the city. The future 
underground, which frist line is expected to start running in 
1998, will have two stations in this district. As a result, both 
the. numbers of working population and residents in this district 
have been increased substantially since 1990. GDDS foresees that 
this trend will further boost their retailing business and some 
other lines of business should be considered in the long term.
Just before the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in 
December 1992, GDDS has formulated a five-year long term plan 
(1993-1997 inclusive) which was subsequently approved by the BOD. 
The top management of GDDS was trying to define some long term 
objectives for the enterprise although they realised that the 
economic environment in China was changing rapidly. The 
following three objectives have been laid down in this 5-year 
long term plan.
(1) Retailing (i.e. department stores) should remain the core
business.
(2) T a rget c u s t o m e r s  or market segment should aim at 
lower-middle and middle classes.
(3) Retailing-related or other lines of businesses should be 
developed in the 1990s and beyond (diversification).
The following are a few projects included in the current 5-year 
plan :
(a) Expansion of Present Site
The volumes and varieties of commodities sold have been 
increased rapidly since the 1990s and the floor space 
required by the 12 department stores have to be increased. 
GDDS is planning to erect a new 10-storey building adjacent 
to the present one to provide a total floor space of 20,000 
square metres in order to increase total shopping space by
8,000 square metres and to use the other 12,000 square 
metres for diversifying into other businesses and generating 
rental income.
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This strategic plan of tpourse needs a huge amount of capital 
investment which may be sourced from a combination of the • 
following means :
(1) retained earnings;
(2) dividend or tax payable to the government retained as
loan capital;
(3) bank loan;
(4) investment from other local enterprises;
(5) investment from Hong Kong companies; and
(6) public listing in the stock market (GDDS is one of the
10 SOEs selected by the government to be qualified for
public listing in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange).
This new building is planned to be completed in 1997.
(b) Expansion of Branches
A piece of land of 2,000 square meters in size has been 
purch a s e d  closed to the Guangzhou Special Economic 
Development Zone (located at the South Eastern District) in 
order to build up the first branch of GDDS.
(c) Joint Venture Retailing
GDDS is looking for foreign partners, most likely from Hong 
Kong, to open a few specialized retailing shops such as 
selling clothing, fast food, bakery, ice-cream, gift and 
stationery etc.
(d) Commercial Joint Venture
GDDS is also searching for local and foreign partners to 
form a couple of joint ventures for commercial businesses 
such as wholesale, import and export activities.
(e) Property Development
GDDS is discussing with the Municipal Government and the 
. First Commerce Bureau to acquire another piece of land 
located inside the Special Economic Development Zone for 
developing commercial and residential buildings.
The above long term plans are initiated and executed by the board 
of directors or the top management. The store managers' 
participation in some of these plans is restricted to the extent 
of consultation. Therefore, the formulation of long term plans 
in GDDS is a top-down approach with little involvement from the 
department store managers.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
92
The promulgation of "Marked Economy" since 1992 has entrusted 
more freedom to GDDS for planning ahead on one hand but 
simultaneously has induced fiercer competition. Now many foreign 
invested department stores (i.e. Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
have been allowed to open up branches in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. In addition to the keen competition from 
the local department stores, GDDS is facing threats from these 
foreign counterparts as well. But this open-door policy is 
carefully monitored by the government in order to protect the 
state-owned department stores such as GDDS whose management 
skills are not as sophisticated as the foreign department stores. 
In this respect, the central government has imposed certain 
restrictions on the foreign invested department stores such as :
(a) any proposed new branch must be approved by the Beijing 
central government;
(b) they are not allowed to perform wholesale business; and
(c) they are not entitled to special tax concession.
All in all, retailing is the most vulnerable service industry (or 
so-called "tertiary enterprise") in China because of having a 
market size of over 1.2 billion consumers. There are too many 
unstable and unpredictable political, economical, social and 
demographical factors affecting the planning vision of GDDS 
especially the difficulty in long term planning.
Observation of Planning Influence ; shift from "High Corporate" 
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
Before 1992, GDDS was required to submit the following two annual 
plans to the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau :
(a) Financial Plan - to highlight the incomes, expenses, 
profits, taxes, loan repayments and balance sheet items.
(b) Commodity Turnover Plan - to highlight the quantities and 
varieties of commodities to be purchased, sold and carried. 
(The purchase function is controlled by GDDS since 1990s.)
These two plans were used by the Bureau to exercise its macro 
economic control on GDDS through directives or negotiation. 
After the implementation of the mechanism transformation 
legislations in 1992, these two plans were not required by the 
Bureau. As from November 1992, GDDS has used the following 
annual planning or budgeting process.
In late October or early November, the general manager asks the 
accounting and finance department to provide the year-to-date 
financial results. He also requests the planning department to 
supply information concerning the changes in local,, national and 
international economic environment. Then he calls up a board 
meeting (top management of the headquarters) to review and 
discuss the following aspects which have direct or indirect 
impacts on the next year's plan or budget.
(1) Capability Evaluation
(a) Financial performance
(b) Financial stability
(c) Borrowing capacity
■(d) Space & facility availability
(e) Manpower availability
Environmental Scanning*
(a) Worldwide economy changes
(b) China economy changes
(c) Guangdong province economy changes
(d) Guangzhou city economy changes
(e) Competitor analysis (other Chinese department stores 
and foreign-invested department stores)
(f) Consummer analysis (purchasing power, fashion, taste, 
service expectation, etc.)
* Most of the environmental information is collected and 
analysed by the Planning Department through news cuttings, 
market or customer surveys and consulting experts.
(3) Shareholder Expectations
(a) First Commerce Bureau expectations
(b) Board of Directors expectations
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The general conclusion o f f this board meeting is to set a 
preliminary total sales target expected to be achieved in the 
next year. Of course, a certain extent of stretch is built into 
this target in order to enforce the department store managers to 
plan their own budgets more agressively. Then the general 
manager notifies this overall target to all the store managers.
The next step is for the department store managers to formulate 
their budgets by discussion with their own deputy managers and 
supporting staff. At the beginning of December, the store 
managers have to send their first budget drafts to the accounting 
and finance department for screening and consolidation before 
submitting to the top management in the headquarters for 
consideration. At this point in time, informal discussions may 
be held between the top management and the store managers trying 
to bridge the gap of different expectations.
Then formal and informal meetings are held until compromises and 
agreements have been reached between the headquarters and the 
department stores. After the Chinese New Year in mid-February, 
the master budget is tabled in the Annual General Meeting for 
approval, and after that, implementation begins. The budgets and 
IRCs are broken down into quarterly targets for periodic control 
and measurement.
Since November 1992, the department store managers have been 
involved intensively in this budgeting process which they believe 
to be important in setting and negotiating the subsequent 
internal responsibility contracts with the general manager. 
Furthermore, the approved budgets and IRCs affect their 
strategies and tactics for short and medium term developments.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions especially the 
retailing businesses all over China, the budget review period has 
been shortened from quarterly to monthly (sometimes ad hoc 
meetings are held on a weekly basis) . The top management in 
headquarters and all the department store managers hold a formal 
review meeting at the beginning of each month to review and 
discuss the financial performance of last month. Remedial 
actions are suggested to correct any significant controllable 
deviations from the quarterly budgets. The targets determined in 
the budgets and IRCs are seldom adjusted unless facing 
substantial uncontrollable environmental factors. Basically, a 
fixed budget concept is employed.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
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In summary, the shareholding system, the mechanism legislation 
and the market economy have driven GDDS spending more effort to 
plan ahead. The top management have involved the department 
store managers or even their subordinates (lower management) in 
the annual planning and budgeting process which on the one hand 
is a critical step in materializing the long term strategic plan, 
and on the other hand, it is an important motivational factor for 
the store managers to manage their own businesses and to be 
rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) established its IRC 
system in 1987 in order to motivate the departments to attain at 
least the financial targets set in the ERC signed with the 
government. This IRC system only applies to the 12 department 
stores.
Since 1993, the major targets set in the IRCs with the 12 
department stores are sales (turnover), net profit before tax and 
some other qualitative factors. The departmental bonus was 
determined by the accomplishment of these targets. But before 
going into the calculation of departmental group bonus, the 
headquarters have to set an upper limit for the monthly total 
bonus (for the whole enterprise) in the following steps.
(1) For monthly sales = RMB10M, then bonus = RMB250 per employee
For monthly sales = RMB20M, then bonus = RMB500 per employee
For monthly sales = RMB30M, then bonus = RMB750 per employee
For monthly sales = RMB40M, then bonus = RMB1,000/employee
e.g. if monthly sales = RMB15M, then average bonus =
R M B [250+(500-250)x (15-10)/(20-10)] = RMB375/employee#.
BUT, the prerequisite is that the whole enterprise must 
achieve a net profit margin of 5.6% before tax.
IF, net profit margin was 2.8% (half of the target 5.6%), 
then,
for monthly sales = RMB20M, then bonus = RMB250 per employee
for monthly sales = RMB40M, then bonus = RMB500 per employee
IF, net profit margin was 11.2% (double of the target 5.6%), 
then,
for monthly sales = RMB10M, then bonus = RMB500 per employee 
for monthly sales = RMB20M, then bonus = RMB1,000 per 
employee.
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(This measure was a precaution to over emphasis on sales 
volume without regards to prices and cost control.)
The above method can be summarised in the following table : 
PBT Required Monthly Sales Average Bonus/Employee
5 . 6-
2 . 8 -
1 1 .2 '
RMB10,000,000 
RMB2 0,000,000 
RMB30, 000,000 
RMB4 0,0 00,000
RMB20,000,000 
RMB40,000, 000 
RMB60,000,000 
RMB80,000,000
RMB10,000,000 
RMB20,000,000 
RMB30,000, 000 
RMB40,000, 000
RMB 250 
RMB 500 
RMB 750 
RMB1,000
RMB 250 
RMB 500 
RMB 750 
RMB1,000
RMB 500 
RMB1,000 
RMB1,500 
RMB2,000
(2) #The average bonus per employee per (1) x Budgeted total 
number of employees = Total monthly bonus for the whole 
enterprise (which was the ceiling).
(3) Then the departmental bonus was calculated according to the 
accomplishment of the targets set in the individual IRC.
As from 1993, GDDS has adopted the guidelines recommended by the 
Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau in setting both finanical and 
non-financial targets for its 12 department stores. The basic 
contents are described below :
Department : XXXX
Year : 1993
Headcount : YYY staff (per budget)
Principles :
(1) Each store manager should bear the ultimate profit or loss 
responsibility of his or her department. In turn, his or 
her employees should share the corresponding responsibility 
to achieve the profit targets.
(2) A ny financial loss incurred due to ineffective or
inefficient operation of a department, the store manager and
his or her subordinates should share this responsibiity
accordingly.
(3) A store manager will be warned or his/her salary be reduced
if his or her department incurs an overall loss in the first
year.
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(4) If a department incurs two consecutive years of loss, the 
store manager will be demoted, transferred or dismissed.
Guidelines :
(1) Sales and profit are the major economic targets.
(2) Qualitative targets must be emphasized and measured as well.
(3) Bonus is determined on the degree of accomplishment of the 
economic and qualitative targets.
Economic Targets :
Marks on 
Target
(1) Sales/Turnover 10
(2) Profit before Tax 40
(3) Sales/Employee ' 10
(4) PBT/Employee 10
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Qualitative Targets :
(5) Business Development* 10
(6) Store Management# 10
(7) General@ 10
100 (the actual score may be over 
===== or under 100%)
* Measurement criteria include new commodities and 
varieties, department renovation and decoration, usage of 
floor space, etc.
# Measurement criteria include daily operation, staff 
discipline, commodity display, etc.
@ Measurement criteria include service attitude, after sales 
service, security and safety, fictitious or competable 
commodities, cleanliness, customer's comments, etc.
Bonus : Similar to the steps above in determining the
Calculation "average bonus per employee" and "total bonus
for the whole department" but adjusted by the 
actual score assessed as above.
Notes :
(a) The qualitative factors are assessed by the headquarters. 
They have intrinsic values to the employees although their 
weighting in calculating bonus is only 30%. Good performance 
in these qualitative factors may be praised openly by 
individual or group on the notice board.
Over/Under (+)/(-) 
Target % Marks
3% 1
1% 1
3% 1
3% 1
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(b) The bonus is calculated on a group basis whereas the 
distribution of group bonus to individual employees within 
the department is determined by the manager according to 
individual performance (i.e. sales made by a certain 
salesgirl for the month).
Year-End Bonus :
In order to enhance the overall economic effectivenss of the 
enterprise and to motivate the profit-consciousness of each 
department store, the store manager will be awarded a "special 
year-end bonus" according to the following criteria :
Profit before Tax (PBT) % of PBT Cummulative Bonus*
RMB 500,000 - 1/ 000,000 1% RMB 5,000 - 10,000
RMB1,000,001 - 3, 000,000 7% RMB 10,000 - 150,000
RMB3,000,0 01 - 5, 000,000 5% RMB150,000 - 250,000
RMB5,000,0 00 - 10, 000,000 3% RMB250,000 - 400,000
For over RMB10, 000,000 2%
* How the "special year-end bonus" can be distributed to the 
employees of the department will be agreed between the store 
manager and his or her employees.
Since 1992, the IRCs have been developed by the department stores 
during the budgeting process (November - February). After 
iterative discussions and negotiations with the general manager 
and finance department (acting as controller) , the IRCs are 
agreed and signed by the store managers and the general manager.
The IRCs are reviewed quarterly in parallel with the budget 
review but both the general manager and the store managers are 
trying to avoid adjusting the targets unless there are 
significant uncontrollable environmental changes affecting their 
validity.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
store managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, and 
also involved the finance department intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objectively as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence i shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the 12 department stores in Guangzhou Dongshan Department 
Store (GDDS) are all independent with very minimal interactions 
and interdependencies, therefore, internal transfer pricing does 
not exist.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Guangzhou 
Dongshan Department Store (GFDS) has four distinct levels of 
management hierarchy :
(1) Board of Directors (BOD)
(2) Top Management (general and deputy-general managers)
(3) Middle Management (department store managers, deputy
managers and other functional managers)
(4) Lower Management (section leaders under the store managers)
Although there are overlaps between the BOD and the top 
management who are playing dual roles in both levels, 
nevertherless, the segregation of duties are clearly defined. 
The general manager (also chairman of BOD) is acting as an 
arbitrator to harmonize any role conflicts which happen among the 
members in the BOD.
The department store managers can decide on their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units (sections). In addition, 
since 1992, the store managers have been vested with higher 
strategic autonomy to manoeuvre their organisational and 
personnel changes but important changes should be discussed with 
headquarters before implementation.
The department store managers are also responsible for certain 
personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, 
evaluation, remuneration (distribution of bonus) and even 
termination of employment. Unlike Beijing and Shanghai, the 
labour market in Guangzhou is rather free which means employees 
can choose new jobs and resign from the old ones at their own 
will. On the other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay 
off their staff by giving advanced notice according to the terms 
of the employment contracts. GDDS has fully implemented the 
"employment contract system" since 1992 and the "big rice pot" or 
"three iron bowls" concept has been abolished. If a redundant or 
badly-performing employee cannot be transferred to another 
departement store, he or she will be asked to leave the 
enterprise.
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The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the department stores are by using 
annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the 
most important measurement criteria are sales and profits set in 
the IRCs, although some other qualitative targets (non-financial) 
are employed, however, they are subsidiary and account for only 
30% in the group bonus calculation.
As long as the department stores can meet the financial targets 
with growth from year to year, the headquarters will devolve the 
responsibility for strategy development to the stores without 
much interference.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Objectives in Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) emerge 
from the detailed discussion of the annual plans or budgets with 
the department stores. The financial objectives stem from the 
plans, rather than vice versa. This is not to suggest that the 
objective-setting process is wholly bottom-up although the top 
management initiates an overall financial target for all the 
store managers. It is still the primary function of the store 
managers to formulate their detailed budgets and IRCs. But top 
management in the headquarters can and do push and probe for 
alternative objectives as they see fit. With the long years of 
experience and information (financial and marketing) gathered by 
the general manager, he can give suggestions to individual 
department stores to amend the financial objectives both in the 
short or long term. Furthermore, the general manager has a 
holistic view to achieve the overall financial objectives year 
after year according to the long term plan. Finally, the result 
is usually a compromise that both headquarters and department can 
live with.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence s shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" and "Strategic Control" since 1992.
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6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) has monthly and 
quarterly reporting systems to track actual results versus plan 
or budget. All the department stores send monthly results on 
prescribed formats to the accounting and finance department for 
calculating the profits and comparing with budgets before 
submission to the general manager for review.
The contents of the monthly report are simpler than the 
manufacturing industries. The key financial results such as 
sales and e x p e n d i t u r e s  are the major concerns of the 
headquarters. The non-financial measurement yardsticks (see IRC 
in section 5.6) are assessed by the service department through 
daily inspections. The comments and ratings of the service 
evaluation are written on the same monthly reports. These 
monthly reports are compiled, through the computer, by the 
accounting staff. Any significant variances (without specifying 
tolerance limits) will be highlighted in order to bring to the 
attention to the top management.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general or deputy-general managers w i l l ’contact the respective 
store managers to dig out the underlining reasons or ask them to 
perform investigation immediately. It is expected that remedial 
actions can be taken to handle the short term problems as soon as 
possible (such as a sudden sales promotion by a counterpart). 
Whereas, strategic steps may be considered and implemented to 
solve some medium term problems (such as the internal decoration 
and display arrangement).
During the monthly meeting between the top management in 
headquarters and the store managers, the general manager puts 
forward the monthly results for open discussion. The store 
managers may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances and any other potential problems. Infrequent failures 
in meeting the budget by the store managers can be tolerated as 
long as they are taking remedial tactics or strategies to put 
things back on the right track and attain the budget at the end 
of the year. Of course, if any serious uncontrollable 
environmental factors happened to hit any department store 
adversely, the manager should not be blamed.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the accounting department for calculating the 
bonus for last month.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
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The financial results achieved by GDDS in 1992 were very 
encouraging and publicised m  two local newspapers. The sales 
and profit per employee of GDDS in 1992 was ranked the ninth in 
the retailing industry in China. Furthermore, measuring in terms 
of sales per square metre per year (RMB500,000) , GDDS was the 
number one among all the department stores in Guangdong province 
in the same year.
Observation of Control Influence : Shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
According to the Guangzhou Government's policy, the annual gross
wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the shareholding 
enterprises can not exceed either one of the following limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the GDDS is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
Under the previous ERC system, GDDS could transfer a certain 
percentage of its annual profit after tax (or handover to 
government) to an "Employee Bonus Reserve" which could be
distributed as a year-end bonus to the employees according to the
overall financial performance and level of this reserve. This 
kind of flexibility or buffer was lost when GDDS was tranformed 
into a shareholding enterprise in December 1992. In addition, 
GDDS is now subject to the above two limits or ceilings. If 
declared dividend for the employees is not high enough, then, the 
total annual wages increase cannot cover the high inflation in 
Guangzhou (1993 - 35% the highest in China) . As an interim
measure, GDDS has been allowed by the municipal government to 
exceed the above two limits or ceilings but the excess portion 
(wages paid) is not tax deductable.
The take-home pay of each employee in GDDS is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 15% - 20
(2) Bonus 65% - 55
(3) Allowances 20% - 25
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The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB9,500 
in 1993. Under the current* high inflation rate and the keen 
competition in the labour market of this industry, the average 
annual gross wages was increased to RMB12,000 in 1994.
The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regards to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10, 
therefore, it is not substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is the major source of income 
which is determined according to the IRC.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Guangzhou Government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GDDS which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of "allowances" is trying to 
balance the relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable 
standard of living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus", as described in section 5.6 above, is 
based on the accomplishment of the IRC. An IRC signed between 
the general manager and a store manager decides what level of 
group bonus will be given to the department. Of course, it is up 
to the store manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his 
or her subordinates according to individual performance, such as 
the sales achieved by a salesgirl in a certain month. The bonus 
is distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a 
certain percentage (20% - 30%) is retained in a reserve in order 
to make up the low bonus obtained during the months in slack 
season. The payment of year-end bonus, if there is any, is also 
according to the annual performance of each department store. It 
is possible that a department store will receive very low or even 
zero bonus if it performs much below the targets but it was 
seldom happened in the last few years.
The bonus paid to the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is calculated as follow :
(1) For monthly sales = RMB10M, then bonus = RMB250 per employee
For monthly sales = RMB20M, then bonus = RMB500 per employee
For monthly sales = RMB30M, then bonus = RMB750 per employee
For monthly sales = RMB40M, then bonus = RMB 1,000/employee
e.g. If monthly sales = RMB15M, then bonus =
R M B [250+(500-250)x(15-10)/(20-10) ] = RMB375/employee 
(irrespective the % of profit before tax).
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In addition to the remuneration paid to the in-service employees, 
GDDS has to pay pension and other allowances to 135 retired 
employees. This kind of life-long responsibility is common to 
most of the state-owned enterprises and sometimes it is adding a 
significant financial burden to the profit and loss account.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees. 
GDDS has implemented this contract employment system since 1992 
and now all the employees have signed employment contracts from 
one to three years subject to review and renewal. In general, 
the motivation of the employees has been improved.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the enforcement of financial objectives has both a 
stick and a carrot aspect. Evidence of the stick can be found in 
the reduction of monthly or year-end bonus and even manangement 
turnover in senior positions. The carrot is represented by
substantial increase in bonus and perhaps career advancement. 
Due to the difficulty of defining long term strategic control 
objectives because of the volatility of this industry to the 
market conditions, the control process tends to stress control 
against budgeted financial results. As mentioned by Goold and 
Campbell, due to the lack of precise "strategic" targets, the 
control contract focuses on short term profit and cash flow 
figures.
Observation of Control Influence : In bewteen "Finance Control"
and "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary f
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store (GDDS) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Hign/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Review Process* Medium Corporate Low Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Moderate
Financial
Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate
Financial
Strategic
Monitoring Results* Moderate
Financial
Moderate
Strategic
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Strategic
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on thre "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
r 1 QQOlrlSCllUlU v^ CJJL£JCJ£ ct L fci--------- —
Low Corporate
[Post-1992]<-- 
(Strategic 
Control)
—  1
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Dongshan Department Store before and after 1992, it can 
be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
shifted from "Financial Control" (Pre-1992) to "Strategic 
Control" (Post-1992) gradually although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of strategic control style 
as suggested by Goold and Campbell.
As a matter of fact, both the degrees of planning and control 
influences are on two separate continua. The planning influence 
should run from high corporate, then medium corporate and down to 
low corporate. Similarly, there should be measurement in between 
tight strategic control and tight financial control.
Revised : 6 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t imate aim is to classify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Quo Zhong Mao/Chief Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 31 years)
Miss Li Xiao Min/Cost Accountant
(No. of years in this enterprise : 7 years)
Miss Huang Jin Yu/Chief Accountant/Beijing 
International Instrument Corporation (BIIC)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 22 May 1993
Second Visit - 30 August 1993
Third Visit - 3 September 1994
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) is a small size 
state-owned enterprise established in 1964 and specialized in 
manufacturing electrostatic equipment for various industrial 
uses. It is located in the Southern District of Beijing, the 
capital of China, and is not far away from the "heart" of Beijing 
city (i.e. the Forbidden Palace) by taking a bus for about 15 
minutes.
BEEF is currently producing the following five types of products 
which are all sold domestically in China.
(1) Electrostatic Precipitators (Auto-control high-voltage)
(2) Electrostatic Air Separation Percipitators
(3) Electrostatic Spray Equipment
(4) Disc Electrostatic Power Spraying Equipment
(5) Electrostatic Transformer
In order to compete with its strong counterparts in Dalian 
(Northeast), Shanghai (Central Coast) and Fuzhou (Southeast), 
BEEF has been invested substantially in both hardware' and 
software for research and development since early 1990s. To 
enhance the product quality and diversify the product range are 
the product strategies of BEEF on one hand, and to explore the 
overseas1 markets is an important marketing strategy on the other 
hand.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since its establishment in 1964 and it 
does not have a concrete plan to convert into a shareholding 
enterprise in the next few years because of the stringent rules 
and regulations governed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
Bank of China (BOC). These bodies have selectively approved 
3,600 large and medium size SOEs, which have good financial 
performance track records, to transform into shareholding 
enterprises since 1990 to 1995.
Since BEEF is a wholly state-owned enterprise, it is under the 
administration of the Beijing Municipal Government and the 
Beijing Instrument Bureau. Under the central economic planning 
system before the 1980s, BEEF'S planning and control systems were 
dictated by these authorities and it was just acting as a vehicle 
(or a cost centre) to carry out the activities as scheduled by 
them.
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In 1983, the Beijing Instrument Bureau was transformed into a 
quasi-government body called Beijing International Instrument 
Corporation (BIIC) as an initial step to delegate the governing 
role to this self-regulated institution composed of all the 
instrument manufacturing industries in Beijing. Since then, more 
autonomy in terms of planning and control decisions has been 
authorised by the Beijing Government to the BIIC and turning into 
this decade, BIIC's major roles played for its subordinate 
enterprises are :
(1) appointing the factory manager (or general manager) and the 
communist party secretary;
(2) maintaining a macroeconomic control or balance on the 
5-year's plans suggested by its enterprises; and
(3) acting as a bridge or facilitator between the government# 
and its enterprises in policy matters such as capital 
investment, import and export autonomy, taxation, legal form 
transformation i.e. shareholding, etc.
# Some of the issues have to be discussed and approved by the 
Beijing Commission of Economic Reform as well.
In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Tranformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, the BIIC has delegated the planning and management 
responsibilities to the BEEF although quarterly and annual 
reports have to be submitted to the BIIC for review.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of BEEF can be divided into four 
divisions under the direct control of the Factory Manager. The 
departments in the four divisions are listed as follow :
1. Production Division (headed by the Chief Engineer)
1.1 Research & Development Department 
(headed by the Vice-Chief Engineer)
1.2 Quality Control Department
1.3 Repair & Maintenance Department
1.4 Production Workshop No.l*
1.5 Production Workshop No.2*
1.6 Production Workshop No.3*
1.7 Production Workshop No.4*
2. Operation Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
2.1 Marketing & Sales Department
2.2 Purchasing Department
2.3 Supply (Inventory) Department
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3. Finance Division (headed p y  the Chief Accountant)
3.1 Accounting & Finance Department
3.2 Planning Department
4. Administration Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
4 .1 Personnel Department
4.2 Security & Estate Department
4.3 General Affairs Department
4.3.1 Education & Training
4.3.2 Medical
4.3.3 Canteen
* All the four production workshops are classified as "profit 
centres" and they have signed Internal Responsibility 
Contracts (IRC) with the factory manager.
BEEF had a total of 600 employees at the end of 1993. It is 
classified as a "small size SOE" in China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB 25M (1992)
Turnover : RMB 15M (1992)
RMB 12M (1993)
RMB 17M (1994)
Income before tax : RMB1.5M (1992) - 10.0% of sales
RMB1.1M (1993) - 9.2% of sales
RMB 0M (1994)
Income tax rate : 33%
Both the sales and profit in 1993 were lower than 1992 because of
the following reasons :
(1) before a new product was launched in the market, a 
competitive product had been available to the potential 
customers in mid-1993;
(2) the market economy policy allows head to head competition 
from the other three major competitors in Dalin, Shanghai 
and Fuzhou; and
(3) the market penetration and diversification strategies are 
not vigorous enough.
I l l
S e c t i o n  4 : E conom ic  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t  S y s t e m  (ERCS)
Since 1986, the Chinese government has actively promoted the ERCS 
to the state-owned enterprises with an aim to enhance their 
economic efficiency (over one-third of them were running into 
losses) through the participation in the profit sharing. The 
first stage of the ERCS development was from 1986 to 1990. 
During the first three years of this stage, ERCS created effects 
as the government revenue and the labour remuneration were both 
increased. However, in the following two years, due to the 
macroeconomic contraction policy adopted by the government to 
curb down the overheated economy, the market demand for products 
and services declined and as a result, a lot of contracts could 
not be fulfilled. Therefore, during the second stage (1991-1995) 
of the ERCS development, many enterprises were not willing to 
enter into contracts with the government in 1991. Then the 
government had to give more favourable terms and conditions to 
the enterprises into order to induce them to go into the 
contracts.
Under the above situation, the Beijing Electrostatic Equipment 
Factory (BEEF) entered into an ERC with the Beijing Municipal 
Government in 1992. It is a standing contract without duration 
(time limit) specified but subject to review by both parties 
every year. The terms and conditions of this contract are 
similar to the "Policy No.180" recommended by the Inland Revenue 
Department under which BEEF has to undertake a "Profit Before 
Tax" (PBT) of RMB1 million for the four years from 1992 to 1995 
inclusive. This PBT base was determined according to the average 
annual profit of the last three years before 1992 and it will be 
subject to review in 1996. On this PBT target, an income tax of 
33% (i.e. RMBlMx3 3%=RMB33 0 ,00 0) was levied which was less than
the standard income tax rate of 55% for the state-owned
enterprises in Beijing by that time. As from 1994, the majority
of the state-owned enterprises have been subject to the unified 
income tax rate of 33%.
The top management (factory manager and four divisional heads) 
together with BIIC have had some negotiation and discussion with 
the government in setting the terms and conditions of the ERC.
In view of the current product and market position and potential,
the top management believe that the PBT target can be achieved 
even under the unfavourable situation in 1993.
Another favourable term provided for BEEF is to deduct the bank 
loan repayment from the PBT before income tax assessment, for 
example at the end of 1992,
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Income Before Tax 
Bank Loan Repayment
RMB1, 5 0 0 , 0 0 0
3 0 0 , 0 0 0
Taxable Income 1,200,000
Income Tax (33%) 396,000
Income After Tax RMB 804,000
Therefore, both the contractor (Government) and contractee (BEEF) 
are happy with the present arrangements in the ERC.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
In consideration of the relatively small operation of Beijing 
Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF), the guiding theme of the 
organisation structure is simplicity and accountability. It went 
to some length in 1993 to create stand-alone business units e.g. 
the 4 production workshops as independent profit centres (or 
divisions) that are controlled by individual workshop managers 
with clear lines of authority and responsibility.
Each production workshop is manufacturing different product lines 
but some finished products of a workshop become the input 
components of other workshops. Therefore, internal transfer 
pricing is involved among the four production workshops which 
will be described in another section below. Other than these 
four production workshops, all the other departments are 
classified as cost centres.
Since 1992, BEEF has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each workshop and department such as initiating 
the annual budget and the internal responsibility contract. The 
profit responsibility primarily lies with the workshop manager 
but the top management keep a surveillance cost control on each 
production workshop through monthly or weekly report.
The selection and appointment of the factory manager is still 
decided by the Beijing International Instrument Corporation 
(BIIC) and a "Factory Manager Responsibility System" is in force. 
This system takes the Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a 
basis to evaluate the performance of the factory manager. If an 
outstanding or above target performance has been achieved, the 
factory manager will be awarded a predetermined lump sum bonus at 
the year end.
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Since 1992, the factory manager has full autonomy to appoint the 
deputy-factory managers, chief engineer, chief accountant (the 
two chiefs are equivalent to deputy-factory managers) and the 
departmental managers under the four divisions. Any major 
changes of the organisation structure in each division should be 
initiated by the deputy-factory managers and approved by the 
factory manager. However, more autonomy of internal management 
and operation has been delegated to the heads of divisions 
(deputy-factory managers) since 1992. And in turn, the 
deputy-factory managers have involved their department heads more 
in planning, control and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, BEEF has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual divisional heads report directly to the factory 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
divisions and the factory manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since November 1992, Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory 
(BEEF) has implemented a regular formal planning process for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual plan or budget 
and the internal responsibility contracts (IRCs). First of all, 
the factory manager evaluates the internal and external 
environmental factors and then discusses with his deputy managers 
in order to determine the annual sales and profit targets for 
1993. Based on these preliminary targets, some guidelines are 
provided to the workshop managers and other department heads for 
them to initiate their own plans or budgets for the next year. 
As far as the four production workshops are concerned, their 
budget proposals contain the key criteria to be used as the 
m e a s u r e m e n t  y a r d s t i c k s  of t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  i n t e r n a l  
responsibility contracts.
During December, the planning department under the finance 
division validates all the budget drafts and consolidates into a 
master plan or budget for submission to the top management for 
review. Then, formal and informal meetings and discussions are 
held between the factory manager, deputy-factory managers and 
department heads either collectively or individually. This 
iterative exercise carries on until all the plans, budgets and 
contracts are mutually agreed and approved in the AGM (all the 
employees can attain) held during February 1994. Then the 
finance division publishes a set of the final master plan and 
sends to the top management and all the department heads.
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Before 1992, there was no such dedicated and formal annual budget 
review process and the BIIC and in turn the top management gave 
directions to the workshops and departments on what should be 
done over the next 12 months within the context of a few key 
indicators e.g. sales, production volume and mix, quality 
improvement, material consumption, etc. Since 1992, under the 
legislative changes and market economy promotion, BIIC has 
delegated higher automomy to BEEF in formulating its strategic 
directions. As a result, all the workshops and departments are 
encouraged to participate in the planning process and extend 
their planning horizon beyond one year in order to match the 
milestones set in the 5-year long term plan.
Therefore, the factory manager has less interference in 
departmental planning decisions, but without reducing the tight 
financial control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
operational mechanism (1993), economic effectiveness (1992), 
quality control (1991), economic responsibility contract (1990) , 
etc. As far as strategic themes are concerned, the Beijing 
Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) has explicitly written the 
following in the introductory section of the master plan or 
budget.
"The objectives of the 1993 plan are :
(1) to promote marketing and sales;
(2) to enhance research and development;
(3) to guarantee the quality standards;
(4) to raise the economic efficiency;
(5) to strengthen the internal management;
(6) to develop new products; and
(7) to emphasize the cost reduction activities."
The above strategic themes are directed from the top management 
for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when they are 
performing their duties for the enterprise.
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BEEF has been promulgating "Quality" as the most important 
strategic thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for 
the domestic market share on one hand and to explore the overseas 
markets (i.e. Southeast Asian countries) on the other hand. As 
far as hardware is concerned, BEEF has imported some modern 
manufacturing plant and equipment from the USA and Europe to 
replace the old ones since the 1990s.
To assist the management with relevant information for quality 
control, the finance division is developing a "Quality Control 
Accounting" system which will be implemented in 1995. In fact, 
this accounting system is a "cost and benefit" analysis. On the 
cost side, the following four items will be identified and 
quantified :
(1) preventative costs (i.e. maintenance costs);
(2) internal repairing costs (i.e. machine breakdown, worker's
careless mistake, product or production design, etc.);
(3) external repairing costs (i.e. repairing costs incurred to
correct the faults complained by the end-users); and
(4) quality maintenance costs (i.e. incoming and outgoing 
inspection costs, costs of QC department, education and 
training on quality control, etc.).
It is difficult to track down the "benefit" of spending money on 
quality control. The finance division is thinking along the 
following lines :
(1) to avoid loss on or delay in sales due to quality rejection;
(2) to increase revenue due to product quality improvement; and
(3) to reduce internal and external repairing costs due to 
spending on preventative and quality maintenance costs.
This strategic thrust relating to quality control is initiated by 
the chief accountant and is fully supported by the top management 
who have involved all the employees to participate in the design 
and subsequent implementation of this system.
Another interesting strategic thrust for the accounting and 
finance function to achieve is the "Accounting System Standard" 
upgrading. The Ministry of Finance classifies the accounting 
planning and control systems practised in the state-owned 
enterprises into five grades i.e. National Grade and Grade 1 to
4. This classification system has been adopted since mid-1980s 
and applied to all the state-owr.ed enterprises. There are too 
many criteria, in terms of both financial and management 
accounting systems, to assess which grade should be awarded to an 
enterprise. BEEF has attained the Grade 3 and is now actively 
pursuing Grade 2 through the following changes :
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(1) to transform the traditional financial accounting system 
into the new accounting standards (mandatory as from 1 July 
1993);
(2) to refine its planning and control aspects in the 
responsibility accounting system; and
(3) to implement the quality control accounting as mentioned 
above.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Before 1992, the top management in BEEF from time to time made 
suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning and 
review process such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, 
marketing strategy and production quantity and mix.
The top management followed the financial indicators and 
performance closely on monthly and quarterly basis and were quick 
to make suggestions if they did not match the overall long and 
short term plan.
To facilitate the implementation of the legislation in 1992, the 
top management has given some freedom to the department heads to 
compile their own plans or budgets and to adjust their plans and 
operations as long as they would not deviate much from the 
ultimate sales and profit targets. Nevertheless, the top 
management still provide guidelines and suggestions to the 
departments in the planning process.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the establishment of Beijing Electrostatic Equipment 
Factory (BEEF) in 1964, it has followed the national 5-year's 
planning cycle and carried out the missions as assigned in every 
5-year's plan directed by the municipal government under the 
central economic planning system. The commencement of the 
economic reforms in 1979 started to allowed BEEF to participate 
in the 5-year's planning with the BIIC and the municipal 
government but specific directives and suggestions were always 
coming from the top by using the term "macroeconomic control and 
adjustment" as an excuse.
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The changing role of BIIC since 1990 has encouraged BEEF, for the 
first time, to formulate their own long term strategic plan 
(1991-1995). Before 1992, all types of capital appropriation and 
expenditure budgets must be approved by the BIIC and/or the 
municipal government. After the implementation of the mechanism 
transformation legislation enacted in 1992, this capital 
expenditure policy has been changed in the following manner :
(1) for expenditure below RMB5M, BEEF can decide on its own;
(2) for expenditure above RMB5M but below RMB20M, approval must 
be obtained from BIIC; and
(3) for expenditure over RMB2 0M, approval must be sought from 
the Beijing Commission of Economic Reform.
Since then, the top management reviewed the long term plan at the 
end of each year. After lengthy discussion, another new 5-year 
plan will be emerged. In fact, a rolling 5-year plan is in 
operation. In the current 5-year plan (1993-1997 inclusive), the 
following strategic directions have been laid down.
(a) Competitive Edge
The major domestic competitors are the three electrostatic 
equipment factories located in Dalin (Northeast), Shanghai 
(Central Coast) and Fuzhou (Southeast) who all belong to 
forerunning economic development cities since early 1980s 
and benefit from the following favourable policies by the 
central government :
(i) lower income tax;
(ii) less municipal taxes;
(iii) more import and export autonomy;
(iv) lower import and export tax;
(v) more sources of finance for capital investment; and
(vi) generous land and building use rights.
Therefore, in order to sustain the market share and a 
competitive edge against these counterparts, BEEF has to 
enhance its product quality by various means as described in 
the strategic themes and thrusts section above.
(b) Research and Development
Related to the competitive edge strategy mentioned above, 
BEEF has taken the following steps to enhance its R&D 
function :
(i) to renew and upgrade the production equipment and 
facilities;
(ii) to improve the product design by using value analysis;
(iii)to investigate and improve the production technology;
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(iv) to strengthen the manpower and technical skills in the 
research and development department; and
(v) to provide more training in research and development.
(c) New Product Development
In 1992, about 80% of the profit before tax came from two 
major types of products which were also manufactured by the 
other competitors. BEEF has emphasized very much on the new 
product development which is one of the major missions of 
the res e a r c h  and . d e v elopment d epartment and their 
performance is partly measured against this objective.
(d) Overseas Markets
BEEF and BIIC are working hard to negotiate with the 
government in obtaining the export right (also the foreign 
exchange usage right) so that they can explore the overseas 
markets such as Southeast Asian, South American and Eastern 
European Countries.
(e) Cost Reduction
In order to enhance the competitive edge and to increase the 
profitability, BEEF has taken the following measures to 
reduce the total cost of operation :
(i) to cut production costs by value engineering;
(ii) to set up a standard (target) costing system;
(iii)to freeze the total number of employees;
(iv) to reduce overheads e.g. heat, light, etc.; and
(v) to tighten functional budgets i.e. accounting, 
personnel, sales, purchasing, etc.
A portion of the costs reduced or savings will be 
distributed to the employees as a kind of bonus.
The current 5-year plan was compiled after long discussions 
between the BIIC and the BEEF'S top management. It was eventually 
agreed and reflected in the ERC signed with the municipal 
government. Although the department heads (middle management) 
have been involved in this planning process, they were playing a 
consultation role only. Furthermore, the department heads are 
mainly concerned with how the milestones set in the long-term 
plan will affect their next ye a r  budgets or internal 
responsibility contracts which will have tight financial 
surveillance coming from the factory manager at least on a 
monthly basis. Therefore, the long term planning and review 
process are using a top-down approach in the belief that the 
factory manager (over 20 years in the plant) has better 
experience and knowledge of the external environment and even the 
internal operations of the departments.
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(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the BIIC has devolved its central planning role to 
individual enterprises under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the 
top management of BEEF is taking the initiative to formulate its 
own long term plan but participation from the middle management 
is limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s f ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
Since 1990, the general short term planning policy adopted by 
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) is "production 
determined by sales" which means sales is the initial driving 
force of all the activities. Reference should also be made to 
the rolling 5-year plan especially to estimate what the sales 
potential will be for the newly developed product (s) in the next 
year. As from November 1992, BEEF has employed the following 
annual budgeting process.
The factory manager is very active in performing some marketing 
activities himself such as going to the trade fairs and visits to 
exisiting and potential customers with his sales and marketing 
staff. (When I first visited BEEF on 22 May 1993, I had lunch 
with the factory manager who had just come back from a customer 
visit in Hainan Province - a big island [just 20% smaller than 
Taiwan] located between Hong Kong and Vietnam.) In early 
November, he evaluates the present and future internal capability 
with the chief engineer and the chief accountant. He also scans 
the external environment with the sales and marketing staff. 
Eventually, the factory manager tentatively determines a set of 
sales mix figures (i.e. sales budget). These sales forecasts are 
provided to the respective departments, more importantly to the 
production workshops, for them to initiate their own budgets.
The first budget submission is in December and the planning 
department under the finance division consolidates all the pieces 
into a master budget (financial plan) for factory manager's 
review before the first budget meeting is held with all the 
workshop managers and department heads. The major purpose of 
this first meeting is to discuss with the four workshop managers 
to ascertain whether their production capacities can be matched 
with the initial sales budget. If they exceed the sales budget, 
it becomes the primary responsibility of the sales and marketing 
staff and even the factory manager to hunt for other sales 
avenues in order to fully utilize the production capacity. If 
there is excess demand, then priorities are given to the 
customers for delivery and agreements must be made with the 
customers beforehand. Since the competition in this industry is 
very keen, BEEF has been under full capacity (about 80%) in the 
last two years.
Again, the second budget submission in January is consolidated by 
the planning department for further review by the factory manager 
who then discusses informally or formally with the workshop 
managers and department heads. Finally, the agreed master budget 
is tabled to the annual general meeting for approval by all the 
employees in February right after the Chinese New Year.
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Since November 1992, the workshop managers have been involved 
intensively in this budgeting process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts with the factory manager. The other 
department heads have also participated carefully in devising 
their expense budgets which they would be measured against as 
performance yardsticks.
The contents of the master budget are briefly described in 
Appendix A at the end of this case analysis. From this extract 
of the master budget, it is noted that before 1992, BIIC was 
involved in BEEF's budgeting process and provided expectations 
(or targets) to some of the line items. The master budget was 
computerised in 1993.
The workshops or departments are measured on their individual 
agreed budgets which are divided into, quarterly or monthly (for 
workshops) targets.
In view of the changing market conditions, the budget review 
period has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The factory 
manager and his deputy managers hold a formal meeting at the 
beginning of each month to review the financial performance 
against the master budget and individual departmental budgets. 
But the budgets are seldomly amended unless there are very 
significant factors affecting the overall sales target. 
Therefore, BEEF is using a fixed budgeting system.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given BEEF more freedom to plan ahead. The government 
representative, BIIC, has almost completely devolved the short 
term planning autonomy to BEEF, except to agree on the overall 
sales target. The top management have involved the middle 
management or even their subordinates (lower management) in the 
annual planning and budgeting process which on one hand is a 
critical step in materializing the long term strategic plan or 
the ERC, and on the other hand, it is an important motivational 
factor for the workshop managers and department heads to manage 
their own businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) established its 
IRC system in 1993, just one year after signing the first ERC 
with the municipal government, in order to motivate the 
efficiency, profitability and cost reduction in the production 
workshops.
The IRC of a production workshop is described below :
Department
Year
Guidelines
Electrostatic Precipitators Workshop
1993
(1) Internal profit is the major economic 
targets.
(2) Production management emphasizes on the 
achievement of all qualitative targets.
(3) Bonus is determined on the degree of 
accomplishment of the economic and 
qualitative targets.
Veto Factors : (1) Quality
(2) Safety
Headcount : XXX staff (per budget)
Economic : (1) Internal profit
Targets (standard selling price
(2) Output volume
Qualitative : (1) Production Management
Targets (2) Production Technology
(3) Quality Management
(4) Inventory Management
(5) Safety Management
(6) Education and Training
Notes : (a) Specific amounts of group bonus
according to the accomplishment 
targets.
- actual cost)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The qualitative factors will be scored to determine 
a minor part of the group bonus for management 
merits.
The veto factors can reduce the bonus to zero.
The bonus is calculated on a group basis whereas the 
distribution of group bonus to individual employees 
within the factory is determined by the factory 
management according to individual performance.
There is no formal IRC signed between the factory manager and the 
other non-production departments, however, it is interesting to 
note that the finance division has a very concise manual defining 
the authorities, responsibilities and duties of each post 
(altogether 8 staff from chief accountant to the cashier) in this 
division.
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Furthermore, the front page, of this manual has laid down the 
following targets to be achieved in 1993:
(1) to compile the annual financial plan (or master budget);
(2) to strengthen the cost management (or control);
(3) to enhance the working capital and fund management;
(4) to achieve Grade 2 in the "Accounting System Standard" to be 
assessed by the Ministry of Finance;
(5) to implement the "Quality Control Accounting" system;
(6) to carry out all the assignments delegated by the annual 
general meeting (acting in the capacity of company 
secretary); and
(7) to enhance the education and training for staff.
It took a few months for the factory manager and the workshop 
managers to negotiate with the terms and conditions for the first 
four IRCs signed after the master budget was approved by the
annual general metting in February 1993. This long process
indicated that the setting of IRC was not a top-down approach and 
the workshop managers were very eager on this issue upon which 
they would be measured against and rewarded thereupon. The 1993
IRCs were subject to at least quarterly review but no
adjustments had been made since agreed.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the factory manager has delegated more freedom to the 
workshop managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also involved the finance division intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the central influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the workshops, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Beijing Electrostatic 
Equipment Factory (BEEF) that need headquarters' intervention.
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Before 1993, the transfer pripes were determined by standard cost 
of production which was based on the historical cost and adjusted 
for projected inflation rates. Motivation to a workshop manager 
to transfer products to another workshop was low because there 
was no profit margin and most of the times, the actual cost of 
production was higher than the standard because of unexpected 
up-rising inflation rates. The workshop managers had little 
autonomy in fixing the transfer prices, however, they would not 
be concerned too much because they were measured as cost centres.
The situation has changed since 1993 when the four workshops were 
converted into profit centres and internal profit was used as the 
major criterion in the IRC to measure the workshop's performance. 
Instead of using the "standard cost of production", the "standard 
cost plus" method has been used. On top of the standard cost of 
production, an across the board 10% mark-up is added on to create 
the transfer price. Although the new transfer prices may be 
lower than the market prices of the intermediate products, 
nevertheless, they can provide a profit margin to the workshop or 
a buffer to cover the underestimation of inflation rates in 
setting the standard cost.
Since the new transfer pricing method has been implemented in 
1993, it is still under review and is too early to comment on its 
effectiveness. The top management is considering varying the 
mark-up percentage for different products and in doing so, it 
will allow more room for negotiation with the workshop managers 
other than the setting of standard costs.
Observation of Planning Influence : Shift from "Very High
Corporate" to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Beijing 
Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) has three distinct levels 
of management hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (factory manager, deputy-factory managers,
chief accountant and chief engineer)
(2) Middle Management (workshop managers and department heads)
(3) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
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The deputy-factory managersfand the two chiefs can decide on 
their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (sections). 
They are also responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of emploment with any 
staff is a difficult task which will be explained in the rewards 
and incentives section.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the workshops and departments are by 
using annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 
above, the most important measurement criteria are internal 
profit and production volume set in the IRCs, although some other 
qualitative targets (non-financial) are employed. However, these 
are subsidiary ones which have lower weightings in calculating 
the group bonus. (Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of BEEF.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) sets similar 
objectives for its production workshops : workshop managers must 
meet their agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement 
in performance year after year except under adverse market 
conditions. The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual 
budget review. In view of the fierce competition within this 
industry, the production workshops sometimes feel passive in 
setting their objectives or targets in the budgets or IRCs 
because their activities are depending on the sales demand.
A high pressure to achieve the budgeted production and internal 
profit is put on the workshop managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group bonus are 
tied in with the budget or IRC and it also depends on the overall 
performance of the enterprise as a whole. In terms of expenses, 
control is tighter and a system of standard cost is going to be 
implemented. Although the other departments do not have the 
IRCs, they have agreed specific objectives or targets with the 
factory manager, for example, marketing and selling expenses as a 
percentage of sales, purchasing material price variances, tasks 
set by finance division (see IRC section), etc. The promotion, 
salary and bonus of these functional staff are correlated with 
these quantitative and non-financial targets.
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In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) regards it as 
essential to catch variances from budget or IRC before they have 
gone too far. To this end the top management monitor results on 
a monthly and quarterly basis. All the workshops and departments 
submit monthly results on standard forms to their respective 
divisional heads and also to the chief accountant for vetting and 
comparison with budgets and IRCs. The production workshops are 
also required to submit production figures to the top management 
on a weekly basis.
The monthly report format is unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the budgeted line items 
from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted 
from this report. The monthly and quarterly actuals are compared 
with the fixed budgets. The qualitative targets are usually 
subjectively measured by the divisional heads and written in the 
monthly reports as well. These monthly reports are compiled, 
through the computer, by the accounting staff. Any significant 
variances (without specifying tolerance limits) are highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the top management. Then all 
the monthly reports are submitted to the factory manager for 
review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
factory manager will contact with the respective deputy managers, 
workshop managers or department heads to dig out the underlying 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the top management with the middle 
management, the factory manager puts forward the monthly results 
for open discussion. The workshop managers and the department 
heads may be asked to explain briefly the significant variances. 
Consistent failure (say over 12 months) in meeting the targets 
which are controllable by a workshop manager, probably he will be 
replaced by somebody else.
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It has happened once in the last two years that a workshop 
manager has been replaced. On the other hand, the favourable 
results are openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the accounting department for calculating the group bonus 
of each workshop or department for last month. Then the 
accounting department processes the bonus payments at the end of 
the month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by one month).
The importance of computerization is not well recognised by the 
top management even though a few stand-alone personal computers 
have been used for calculating payroll, compiling budgets and 
performing financial analysis. There is no plan for implementing 
a comprehensive integrated management or accounting information 
system. Perhaps the lack of capital for investment in computer 
hardware and software and the urgent needs to focus on the 
marketing strategies put computerization at the bottom of the 
priority list.
Now, BEEF views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the department or workshop. The monitoring process 
is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the BEEF is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
128
The take-home pay of each employee in BEEF is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 35% - 45%
(2) Bonus 40% - 25%
(3) Allowances 25% - 30%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB5,600 
in 1993. This wages level is at least 30% lower than the Southern 
cities like Xiamen and Guangzhou because the inflation rate is 
lower in Beijing (20% compared with 35% in Guangzhou in 1993). 
Nevertheless, under the current high inflation rate (overall 
average 23% in China in 1994), BEEF increased the average annual 
gross wages to RMB7,200 in 1994.
According to the general national standard adopted by most of the 
state-owned enterprises, BEEF'S production workers are classified 
into 8 classes and within each class there are two to three 
sub-classes. Promotion from one class (or sub-class) to the next 
higher class (or sub-class) mainly, depends on seniority, 
knowledge of work, technical skill and training. Usually, there 
is an annual assessment or test of every worker to determine his 
or her promotion. The pay scale of monthly basic wages to 
workers ranges from RMB60 to RMB180. Therefore, the wages 
difference between two successive classes is only about RMB15 and 
it may take over 20 years rising from the lowest class to the 
highest class. The annual wages increment can never catch up 
with the inflation.
There is another basic salary pay-scale divided into 16 classes 
(2 to 3 sub-classes in each class) for the technical and 
management staff and its range is from RMB80 (Class 1) to RMB300 
(Class 16) per month. For example,
Management Staff Technical Staff
Post Classes Post Classes
Factory Manager 15 - 16
Deputy Factory Mgr. 13 - 14
Chief Accountant 13 - 14
Chief Engineer 13 - 14
Department Head 10 - 12 Senior Engineer 10 - 12
Deputy Dept. Head 8 - 10 Engineer 8 - 1 0
Supervisor 6 - 8 Senior Technician 6 - 8
Section Leader 5 - 6 Technician 5 - 6
Senior Clerk 3 - 4 Junior Technician 3 - 4
Junior Clerk 1 - 2 Trainee 1 - 2
There are two portions for the "allowance". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
Government at least once in each year mainly for the purpose of 
combating inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity.
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The second part is decided by the BEEF which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, Attendance, overtime, hair-washing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowance" is about 
RMB115 to RMB140 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the workshops, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the factory manager and a 
workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will be given 
to the department. Of course, it is up to the workshop manager 
to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates 
according to invidual performance. The bonus is distributed in 
cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a certain percentage 
(10% - 20%) is retained in a reserve in order to make up the low 
bonus obtained during the months with poor performance.
How is the bonus determined for the management and administrative 
staff in the other departments? It can be described in the 
following steps :
(1) Calculation of management score
(a) Performance according to targets set
(b) Discipline according to rules and regulations
(c) Management methods and styles
(d) Security and safty
(2) Calculation of average bonus
Management score % (1) x Monthly average production bonus
(3) Calculation of individual bonus
Average monthly bonus (2) x Individual index*
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
Factory Manager = 2.0
Deputy-Factory Manager = 1.8 
Department Head = 1.6
Deputy Department Head = 1.5 
Supervisor = 1.4
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System) , if there is an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the BIIC will award a lump sum of "special 
bonus" to the factory manager at the end of the year. But under 
no circumstances, the remuneration package of the factory manager 
can be greater than three times the total earnings of a 
department head (middle management).
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If the annual profit before tax can achieve better than the 
planned levels, a "year-endfbonus" will be awarded to all the 
employees and distributed in a way very similar to the monthly 
bonus.
In addition to the wages and salaries to the present employees, 
BEEF has to pay pensions and other allowances (i.e. medical) to 
400 retired employees. The total payment for the retired 
employees was RMB750,000 in 1992 which was a significant burden 
added into the profit and loss account. This is a kind of 
"social welfare policy" mandated by the government to be 
implemented in all the state-owned enterprises.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. . The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
may cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
Instead of fully implementing this contract employment system, 
BEEF has signed "In-Post Contracts" with most of the employees 
for periods from one to five years. This contract signifies that 
an employee is qualified for that specific post and he or she is 
eligible to receive basic wages (according to class in 
pay-scale), allowance and bonus. Without such a contract, that 
employee is out of job but he or she is still an employee of BEEF 
and is allowed to receive a basic monthly subsidy of about 
RMB100. This measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy 
employees, but it can motivate the marginal employees to work 
better.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, BEEF believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary f
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory 
(BEEF) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Very High/High 
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High/High 
Corporate
High/Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
Very High 
Corporate
High/Medium
Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives*
Financial
Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and 
Campbell.
control influences 
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used by Goold &
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
1 X C  wL -L  I I I  w  w  <L w  JL d  b  ^
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\/
[Post-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Electrostatic Equipment Factory (BEEF) before and after 
1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting 
Style" has been shifting gradually from "Financial Programming" 
(Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not 
yet reached a strong-form (low corporate) of financial control 
style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. It 
seems to be in the "middle of the road" between this two styles.
Revised : 6 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ul t i m a t e  aim is to cla s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE
Staff Interviewed
Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool 
Works (SMCW)
Mr Tao Yi Seng/Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 31 years) 
Mr Ju Wei Ya/Assistant Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 25 years)
Dates of Visits First Visit 
Second Visit 
Third Visit 
Third Visit
17 September 1992 
7 September 1993 
12 September 1994 
10 February 1995
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Section 1 : History & Background
Shanghai Measuring Insturment & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) was 
established in 1958 by the Shanghai Municipal Government as a 
cooperative enterprise (i.e. partnership between state and 
private owners) by consolidating a few small private factories in 
the same industry. A certain portion of the initial capital was 
invested by the government who subsequently purchased all the
shares from the other partners. SMCW then became a wholly
state-owned enterprise as from October 1966. It is located in 
the Southwest Suburb District of Shanghai of a distance about 25 
km from the city centre.
SMCW is currently producing the following three types (14 
categories) of products which are 75% sold domestically and 25% 
exported to 30 countries overseas (e.g. mainly USA, Canada,
Eastern Europe, etc.).
(1) Measuring Tools
1.1 Calipers
1.2 Gauges
1.3 Protractors
1.4 Micrometers
(2) Cutting Tools
2.1 Flute End Mills
2.2 Slitting Saws
2.3 Milling Cutters
2.4 Hand Reamers
2.5 Gear Hobs
(3) Measuring Instruments
3.1 Gear Testers
3.2 Hob Testers
3.3 Parallelism Testers
3.4 Electronic Checkers
3.5 Micropole Controllers
The above products are made in compliance with the national and
international standards. SMCW is also manufacturing some 
tailor-made products according to customers' own specifications. 
The overall demand of the products is lower than the supply and 
as a result inventory has been built up. Therefore, SMCW has 
been actively undertaking marketing and sales strategies to 
promote sales and reduce the capital tied up in stock. As a 
result, the production and sales ratio was 1:0.94 in 1994. But 
the major'problem is the delay in collecting accounts receivable.
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Since the late 1980s, SMCW has introduced advanced technology and 
equipment (automated and computerised) from abroad (i.e. Sweden 
and Switzerland) in order to develop new products, enhance the 
product quality, mordernize the production process and explore 
the overseas' markets.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) has 
been a wholly state-owned enterprise since 1966 and it does not 
have a concrete plan to convert into a shareholding enterprise in 
the next few years because of the stringent rules and regulations 
governed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of China 
(BOC) . These bodies have so far approved 3,600 large and medium 
size SOEs, which have good financial performance track records, 
to transform into shareholding enterprises since 1990.
Since SMCW is a wholly state-owned enterprise, it is under the 
administration of the Shanghai Mechanical Equipment and 
Instrument Bureau which is a branch of the corresponding ministry 
in Beijing. Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the 
central planning system dictated all the planning and control 
systems of the state-owned enterprises. Therefore, SMCW acted 
just as a vehicle (or cost centre) to carry out the activities 
according to the commands directed from the bureau. Since the 
economic reform started in 1979, instead of dictatorship from the 
bureau, SMCW has been involved in the 5-year long range plan even 
though SMCW for most of the time had to take the directives from 
and give in their negotiations to the authority.
This situation has been changing rapidly since early 1990s. Now 
the bureau only oversees the major development and projects, 
mainly long term ones, recommended by SMCW. Furthermore, the 
bureau regulates and suggests the product pricing policy for the 
enterprises within its industry although the ultimate price 
ranges are determined by the enterprises themselves through 
regu l a r  meetings. In addition, under the bureau, a 
semi-governmental body called Shanghai Mechanical Equipment & 
Instrument Corporation was established in 1992. The major role 
played by this corporation is to maintain an economical balance 
of the production and sales among its 3 9 member enterprises 
(reduced from 43 to 39 in 1995 due to mergers). It also arranges 
capital to finance the approved projects or investments for the 
enterprises under its umbrella. Another important function of 
the corporation is to provide market information for its industry 
to produce the right products and sell to the right markets at 
the right time.
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In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Tranformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, both the bureau and the corporation have delegated the 
planning and control responsibilities to the top management of 
SMCW to run their own business. However, the investment autonomy 
has not yet been fully delegated and raising capital for project 
investment has to be arranged by the corporation.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Under the Factory Manager, who has an Enterprise Management 
Office, the organisation structure of SMCW is listed as follow :
1. Production Deputy-Factory Manager
1.1 Production Workshop No.l (Cutting Tools)*
1.2 Production Workshop No.2 (Measuring Tools-Calipers)@*
1.3 Production Workshop No.3 (Measuring Tools-Others)*
1.4 Production Workshop No.4 (Measuring Instruments)*
1.5 Production Workshop No.5 (Chibao Factory)&*
1.6 Production Support Workshop#@
1.6.1 Materials Preparation
1.6.2 Heat Treatment
1.6.3 Electroplating
1.6.4 Tools
1.6.5 Machine Repairs
@ 95% output for export in 1994.
& established in 1995 (see 5.4a below)
2. Chief Engineer
2.1 Production Planning Department
2.2 Research & Development Department
2.3 Quality Control Department
2.4 Inspection Department
2.5 Safety & Technology Department
2.6 Energy & Facility Department
3. Purchasing & Sales Deputy-Factory Manager
2.1 Purchasing & Supply Department®
'2.2 Marketing & Sales Department*®
4. Chief Accountant
4.1 Accounting & Finance Department
4.2 Internal Audit Department
5. Personnel Deputy-Factory Manager
5.1 'Manpower & Wages Department
5.2 Personnel Department
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6. General Affairs Deputy-Factory Manager
6.1 Estate & Development Department
6.2 Security Department
6.2 Administration Department
6.2.1 Education & Training
6.2.2 Medical
7. Communist Party Office
8. Trade Union Office
9. Tertiary Enterprises (14)
9.1 Canteen
9.2 Sales Outlets (Shops)
9.3 Engineering & Consultancy
9.4 Retailing
9.5 Restaurant
9.6 Employee Quarters
9.7 Motel
9.8 Nursary & Kidnergarten etc
* All the five Production Workshops and the Sales Department 
have signed Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRCs) with 
the Factory Manager. The 5 Production Workshops are mainly 
based on good production and efficiency to determine bonus. 
The bonuses for the Sales Department are linked up with the 
turnover and cash received from sales. For the details, 
please refer to section 5.6 : Internal Responsibility
Contracts below.
# After fulfilling the internal requirements, the Production 
Support Workshop can provide its repair and maintenance 
services to the outsiders. Therefore, it is an independent 
profit centre by itself having 100 employees. Half of the 
external profit made can be retained by the workshop.
@ The top management is planning to convert these few 
department into independent and self-financed tertiary 
enterprises in 1996.
SMCW had a total of 1,550 employees at the end of 1993. It is 
classified as a "medium size SOE" in China. One-third of the 
employees are involved in the direct production and 350 employees 
are working in the 14 "tertiary enterprises" (i.e. retailing). 
All the employees have signed "employment contracts" with 
duration from one to three years.
138
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
f
Total assets : RMB 108M (1992)
RMB 195M (1995)
Turnover : RMB 44M (1992)
RMB 71M (1993)
RMB 102M (1994)
Income before tax
RMB 140M+ (1995 forecast)#
: RMB 5.9M (1992) - 13.5% of sales##
RMB 6.5M (1993) - 9.2% of sales*
RMB 7.7M (1994) - 7.5% of sales*
RMB 3.3M (1995) - 2.4% of sales**
Income tax rate 55% (before 1995)
33% (from 1995)@
+ including export sales of US$4.6 million (equivalent to RMB4 0 
million).
# The 4 financial targets in 1995 were :
(1) production value - RMB100 million
(2) foreign exchange per employee - RMB10,000
(3) average production value per employee - RMB10,000
(4) annual average income per employee - RMB10,000
## Before implementing the new "Enterprise Accounting Standards" 
in July 1993, SMCW's inventories absorbed selling, distribution, 
administration and financial overheads. In theory, to comply 
with the new accounting standards, SMCW had to charge these 
non-manufacturing overheads from the opening inventories to the 
profit and loss at the end of 1993. In considering of the 
significant impact on the profitability in 1993, SMCW obtained 
the permission from the Shanghai Bureau of Finance to treat this 
amount of adjustment as deferred expenses and written off in not 
more than 5 years. Hence, this accounting policy would affect 
the profit and loss to a less extent from 1993 to 1997.
* The reduction of profit margin is mainly due to the inflation 
of input materials, wages and overheads. In addition, the total 
long and short term bank loan amounted to RMB12 0 million and had 
to pay RMB13 million interest in 1994.
@ The income tax (55% or 33%) and value-added tax (17% on sales) 
paid by SMCW to the Shanghai Finance Bureau have been refunded to 
the Shanghai Mechanical Equipment and Instrument Corporation, the 
administration authority of SMCW, for repaying a long term loan 
of RMB3 00 million from the World Bank used for technology and 
facility imports. This bank loan is guaranteed by the Shanghai 
Finance Bureau.
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** The accounts receivable and payable at the end of 1995 were 
RMB85 million and RMB65 million respectively indicating a 
significant amount of bad and doubtful debts but without any 
provision. In fact, about RMB6.5 million of bad debts was 
indentified in 1995 and reported to the Shanghai State Assets 
Administration Bureau. The income before tax in 1995 would be 
greatly reduced because of this bad debts was written off at the 
year end.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
The Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) 
entered into the first Economic Responsibility Contract with the 
Shanghai Mechanical Equipment & Instrument Bureau and the 
Shanghai Finance Bureau (representing the Shanghai municipal 
government) in 1988. This first ERC was based on the "Three 
Guarantees and One Linkage" concept which means the contractee 
(SMCW) had to guarantee :
(1) income tax handed over to the government;
(2) technology improvement;
(3) foreign exchange created from export; and
the total remuneration payable to the employees was linked up 
with the overall economic (or financial) performance.
The terms and conditions of this ERC are summarised as follow :
4.1 Duration
From 1st January 1988 to 31st December 1992 (5 years).
4.1 Basic Targets* (for 1988)
(1) Profit before income tax = RMB6,350,000
(2) Income tax handed over (55%) = RMB3,494,000 (zero 
growth rate for 5 years)
(3) Foreign exchange from export = (not available)
(4) If income tax exceeds RMB3,494,000 by less than 5%, then 70% 
of the excess will be refunded to SMCW (this is the first 
option of the 4 generally ERC options available for the 
Shanghai enterprises in 1988)
(5) If income tax exceeds RMB3,494,000 by more than 5%, then 80% 
of the excess (over 5%) will be refunded to SMCW
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4 . 2  O th e r  T a r g e t s *  ( from  1988 t o  1992)
(million of RMB) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
(1) sales tax 1.60 1. 68 1.87 1.87 1.87
(2) income tax 3.49 3.49 3.49 3.49 3.49
(3) loan repayment 2.26 2.80 3.60 3.60 3.60
(4) technology improvement 2 . 62 7.00 6.00
(5) fixed asset increase 8.02 12 . 00 16.50 15.50 14 .10
(6) improved products sales 3.14 3 .89 4.28 6 .72 7.87
(7) no. of new product 1 2 3 1 1
* The basic and other targets for 1988 were determined according
to the actual performance in 1987.
4.3 Contractee's (SMCW) Responsibilities
(1) If the income tax target cannot be achieved, SMCW has to
make up any deficit from the reserve.
(2) SMCW must comply with the government's principles, policies, 
laws and regulations in relation to the implementation of 
this contract..
(3) SMCW must make proportionate provisions for depreciation and
repair according to rules and regulations (under the new 
accounting standards implemented since 1 July 1993, these
depreciation and repair are charged to profit and loss on
actual expenditures).
(4) SMCW must pay due care to production safety in order to have 
zero death rate, 0.03% serious injury rate and 2% minor 
injury rate. No major production facility breakdown leading 
to stoppage is allowed. Any deviation from these standards 
will cause reduction of bonus and further liability on the 
management.
(5) SMCW must pay high regards on product quality which should 
attain the standards set by the bureau. During the quality
• inspection by the bureau, no sub-standard products could be 
allowed.
4.4 Contractee1s (SMCW) Rights
(1) SMCW has the right to employ and use its own fixed and 
current assets. SMCW also has the autonomy to manage its 
own operations i.e. purchasing, production and selling.
(2) Under the government policy and enterprise's financial 
capability, SMCW has the autonomy to. determine its wages 
distribution, recruiting and terminating of employees.
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(3) According to the enterprise's needs, SMCW has the right to 
decide its own organization structure and the number of 
staff establishment.
(4) SMCW has the right to terminate this contract if the 
contractor (bureau) has violated any terms and conditions of 
this contract.
(5) SMCW can exercise other rights empowered by the central 
government.
4.5 Contractee's (SMCW) Benefits
(1) S M C W 's benefits are according to the Document No. 12 
announced by the Shanghai Municipal Government in 1988.
(2) If SMCW achieves the basic targets (i.e. 4.1 above) and the 
other targets (i.e. 4.2 above), and does not have any major 
accidents occured, the factory manager will be awarded a 
special bonus which can exceed the average annual 
remuneration per employee. If actual performance is better 
than the targets, the special bonus can exceed twice the 
average annual remuneration per employee.
If actual performance is very outstanding, then the special 
bonus can be three times the average annual remuneration per 
employee. However, if SMCW cannot achieve the basic 
targets, 5%-10% of the factory manger's basic salary and 
bonus will be deducted. For each of the other targets which 
cannot be attained, 5% of the factory manager's basic salary 
and bonus will be deducted.
4.6 Contractor's (Bureau) Responsibilities
(1) To gaurantee the legal rights entitled by the contractee 
under this contract.
(2) To honour the benefits (i.e. 4.5 above) entitled by the
contractee if SMCW can achieve the targets set under this
' contract.
(3) To provide the service and environment in order to assist 
the contractee to manage the operation.
4.7 Contractor's (Bureau) Rights
(1) Through the finance, quality and audit authorities, the 
bureau has the right to inspect and supervise the operating 
activities of the contractee.
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(2) The bureau has the right to take legal action against SMCW 
if the latter has caused any loss to the financial interest
of the former (i.e. all the assets are supposed to be owned
by the state) .
(3) If the contractee cannot achieve the basic targets, the
bureau has the right to ask for economic compensation. If 
the contractee fails to attain the basic targets for two 
consecutive years, the bureau has the right to terminate 
this contract.
(4) If the contractee cannot achieve any of the basic or other
targets, the bureau has the right to deduct the remuneration 
of the factory manager according to the terms set above
(i.e. 4.5 above).
4.8 Contractor's (Bureau) Benefits
(1) According to the terms of this contract, the contractor has 
the right to receive the predetermined income and sales 
taxes from the contractee.
4.9 Remuneration Linkage with Economic Performance
The details of the employees' total remuneration linkage with the 
enterprise's economic performance are described in a seperated 
document.
The top management (factory manager, deputies and chiefs) have 
had some negotiation and discussion with the two bureaus in 
setting the terms and conditions of the ERC. In view of the 
product and market position and potential in the past, SMCW has 
successfully accomplished the basic targets from 1988 to 1992.
Another favourable term provided for SMCW was to deduct the bank 
loan repayment from the PBT before income tax assessment, for 
example at the end of 1988,
Income Before Tax 
Bank Loan Repayment*
Taxable Income 
Income Tax (55%)
Income After Tax
RMB7,350,000 
1 ,000,000
6.350.000
3.494.000
RMB2,856,000
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* The outstanding bank loan in September 1993 was about RMB5 0 
million which was equivalent to 50% of the total assets. In 
other words, a significant proportion of current assets was 
financed by the bank loan.
Due to the fact that some controversial problems, such as the 
determination of initial targets and subsequently growth rates 
and the short term behaviour of the enterprise management, have 
been encountered since the implementation of ERC system in the 
mid-1980s, many state-owned enterprises are now very careful in 
renewing their ERCs. Under this.circumstance, SMCW signed the 
second ERC just for two years as from 1993 to 1994 with similar 
terms and conditions as the first one. Eventually, all the major 
targets have been achieved. Instead of entering into another 
ERC, the Corporation would just agreed the basic (financial) 
targets with SMCW on an annual basis.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
F o l l o w i n g  the g u i delines, of the E n t e r p r i s e  M e c h a n i s m  
Transformation legislations promoted in July 1993, Shanghai 
Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) has simplified 
and streamlined its organisation structure as shown in section 2 
above. It went to some length in 1993 to create stand-alone 
business units e.g. the 4 production workshops and some tertiary 
enterprises as semi - independent profit centres that are 
controlled by individual workshop and enterprise managers with 
clear lines of authority and responsibility.
Each production workshop is manufacturing different product lines 
and the Production Support Workshop is providing material 
preparation, heat treatment, electroplating, tools, repair and 
maintenance services for the production departments. Therefore, 
internal transfer pricing is involved between the support 
workshop with the other production workshops which will be 
described in another section below. Other than these five 
production workshops, all the other departments are classified as 
cost centres.
Since 1992, SMCW has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each workshop and department such as initiating 
the annual plan and the internal responsibility contract. The 
profit responsibility primarily lies with the workshop manager 
but the top management keep a surveillance quantity and quality 
control on each production workshop through monthly or weekly 
report.
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The selection and appointment of the factory manager is still 
decided by the Shanghai Mechanical Equipment and Instrument 
Corporation and a "Factory Manager Responsibility System" is in 
force. This system takes the Economic Responsibility Contract 
(ERC) as a basis to evaluate the performance of the factory 
manager. If an outstanding or above target performance has been 
achieved, the factory manager will be awarded a predetermined 
lump sum bonus at the year end (see section 4.5 above).
Since 1992, the factory manager has full autonomy to appoint the 
deputy-factory managers, chief engineer, chief accountant (the 
two chiefs are equivalent to deputy-factory managers) and the 
other departmental managers. Any major changes of the 
organisation structure in each division should be initiated by 
the deputy-factory managers and approved by the factory manager. 
However, more autonomy of internal management and operation has 
been delegated to the deputy-factory managers and the chiefs 
since 1992. And in turn, the deputy-factory managers and chiefs 
have involved their department heads more in planning, control 
and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SMCW has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual divisional heads report directly to the factory 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
divisions and the factory manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since October 1992, Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool 
Works (SMCW) has implemented a formal planning process for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual plan or budget 
and the internal responsibility contracts (IRCs). Before 
starting the whole planning process, the top management formulate 
a Planning Policy which is treated as major guidelines for 
compiling the individual budgets and IRCs. The followings 
indicate the headings of the 1995 Planning Policy issued in 
September 1994 :
(1) general requirements and themes (see 5.3 below);
(2). achieve the 3 leadings, 2 developments and 1 reduction -
2.1 3 leadings
2.1.1 leading products
2.1.2 leading technology
2.1.3 leading quality
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2.2 2 developments
2.2.1 develop thefChibao Factory (see 5.4a below)
2.2.2 develop tertiary enterprises
2.3 1 reduction
2.3.1 reduce cost of production (via target costing 
system, variance analysis, wastage control)
(3) reinforce marketing and sales strategies -
3.1 make use of 4Ps' strategies
3.1.1 product strategy
3.1.2 pricing strategy
3.1.3 place (distribution) strategy
3.1.4 promotion strategy
3.2 in order to achieve
3.2.1 expand the export markets
3.2.2 penetrate the national markets
3.2.3 increase turnover by own sales personnel
3.2.4 decrease the collection period
3.2.5 40% national sales, 30% export sales, 30% sales 
by agents
(4) deepen the enterprise reform and promulgate modern 
enterprise system
(5) enhance the daily operation efficiency and safety management
(6) emphasize employee's education and training
Based on this planning policy to start the planning process, the 
factory manager evaluates the internal and external environmental 
factors and then discusses with his deputy managers and chiefs in 
order to determine the annual sales and profit targets for 1993. 
Based on these preliminary targets, some guidelines are provided 
to the workshop managers and other department heads for them to 
initiate their own plans or budgets for the next year. Much 
emphasis is placed on the production targets for the four 
production workshops which annual plans contained the key 
criteria to be used as the measurement yardsticks of their 
subsequent internal responsibility contracts.
At the end of November, all the workshops and departments submit 
their annual plans to the Enterprise Management Office for 
consolidation before review and discussion by the factory manager 
with the deputy managers and the two chiefs. The first annual 
planning meeting is held in December mainly to discuss the gaps 
between the submitted plans with the targets perceived by the top 
management. The top management try to help the production 
workshops solving their technical, financial and other problems 
in order to close the gaps as far as possible. Then, further 
formal and informal meetings and discussions are held between the 
factory manager, deputy-factory managers and department heads 
either collectively or individually. This iterative exercise 
carries on until all the annual plans and contracts (about 4 to 5 
verions) are mutually agreed and approved in the AGM (all the 
employees can attain) held during February.
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There is no consolidated financial or master budget prepared 
because the AGM only concerhed on the total production, sales, 
profit and wages figures without going into the individual plans. 
The approved annual production plans are broken down into 
quarterly and monthly plans to cater for demand and holiday 
factors.
Before 1992, there was no such formal annual planning review 
process and the government and in turn the top management gave 
directions to the workshops and departments on what should be 
done over the next 12 months within the context of a few key 
indicators e.g. sales, production volume and mix, quality 
improvement, material consumption, etc. Since 1992, under the 
legislative changes and market economy promotion, the government 
has delegated higher automomy to SMCW in formulating its 
strategic directions. As a result, all the workshops and 
departments are encouraged to participate in the planning process 
and extend their planning horizon beyond one year in order to 
match the milestones set in the 5-year long term plan.
Therefore, the factory manager has less interference in 
departmental planning decisions, but without reducing the tight 
financial control.
.(Please refer to Q5 . 5 . 2 , Q5 . 5 . 6 , & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In addition to the above review process, SMCW's factory manager 
started to issue an annual report (of 1994) in February 1995 for 
discussion during the "Enterprise Employee Representative 
Meeting" (AGM) . The followings are the headings of this 1994 
annual report :
(1) financial performance;
(2) change of management to achieve targets set;
(3) adjust product mix to satisfy market demands;
(4) focus on product development and facilitate technology 
renovation;
(5) emphasize sales strategies and enlarge sales channels;
(6) intensify mechanism transformation (management) reforms;
(7) ' reinforce enterprise image and be a civilized enterprise;
(8) enhance the supporting roles of the service departments; and
(9) internal weaknesses (1-8 above are mainly strengths) -
9.1 some management malpractice and inefficiency;
9.2 long new product development lead time;
9.3 inadequate management information system; and
9.4 some redundant, inactive and irresponsible employees.
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
f
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
operational mechanism (1993), economic effectiveness (1992),
quality control (1991), economic responsibility contract (1990), 
etc. As far as strategic themes are concerned, the Shanghai 
Measuring Insturment & Cutting Tool Works (SMWC) has explicitly 
written the following on a wall at the main entrance of the
factory.
(1) Develop new product variety.
(2) Improve product quality and maintain "Silver Prize" (a 
quality standard awarded by the government).
(3) Enhance management and develop potentials.
(4) Improve efficiency and increase profit.
Looking into the 1995 Planning Policy (refer to 5.2 above), the 
following requirements and themes were suggested :
(1) required to observe the following laws and regulations -
1.1 Labour Law (January 1995);
1.2 Comapny Law (January 1994);
1.3 Enterprise Law (May 1987);
1.4 Enterprise Mechanism Transformation Regulations 
(July 1993); and
1.5 Enterprise Assets Supervision Regulations; and
(2) achieve the 4 highs and 4 news :
2.1 high platform; 2.2 high standard;
2.3 high quality; 2.4 high efficiency;
2.5 new idea; 2.6 new strategy;
2.7 new policy; and 2.8 new development.
The above strategic themes are directed from the top management 
for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when they are 
performing their duties for the enterprise.
SMCW has been promulgating "Quality" as the most important 
strategic thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for 
the domestic market share on one hand and to explore the overseas 
markets on the other hand. As far as hardware is concerned, SMCW 
has imported some modern manufacturing plant and equipment from 
the USA and Europe to replace the old ones since the 1990s.
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The Quality Control Department is responsible for designing 
policies, setting production and product standards, testing new 
products and providing training. The Inspection Department is 
responsible for controlling the input materials and output 
products quality, and enforcing the compliance of quality 
procedures in production. Furthermore, each production workshop 
has its own inspection personnel to provide initial quality 
control. Since March 1994, the wages and bonus of these workshop
inspectors are linked up with the quantity of checked items and
passing rate which was increased from 65%-70% to 80%-85% in 1994.
Another strategic thrust emphasized by SMCW is "Production 
Efficiency" which has been measured in terms of "Equivalent 
Standard Hours" (ESH) since 1993. Based on the previous
statistics and work study, each type of product has assigned an 
ESH. The actual daily output quantity of a certain product is 
converted into ESH and then compared with the actual daily
man-hours spent in order to identify :
ESH of Actual Output (the higher the %, the
Efficiency Ratio =   better the efficiency)
Actual Man-Hours
In addition, the ESH of actual output is used to determine the 
gross wages and bonuses for the production employees which is 
described in the IRC section below.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in SMCW still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and review process 
such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, marketing strategy 
and production quantity and mix. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given some freedom to the department heads to 
compile their own plans or budgets and to adjust their plans and 
operations as long as they do not deviate much from the ultimate 
sales and profit targets.
The' top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on monthly and quarterly basis and are quick 
to make suggestions if they do not match the overall long and 
short term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
f
Since the establishment of Shanghai Measuring Instrument & 
Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) in 1966, it has followed the national 
5-year's planning cycle and carried out the missions as assigned 
in every 5-year's plan directed by the municipal government under 
the central economic planning system.
The commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 started to 
allowed SMCW to participate in the 5-year's planning with the 
Shanghai Mechanical Equipment and Instrument Bureau and the 
Shanghai Mechanical Equipment & Instrument Corporation but 
specific directives and suggestions were always coming from the 
top by using the term "macroeconomic control and adjustment" as 
an excuse.
The changing role of bureau and the corporation since 1990 has 
encouraged SMCW, for the first time, to formulate their own long 
term strategic plan (1991-1995). However, many internal factors 
and uncertainties have affected the validity and reliability of 
this long term plan which has been subject to review and changes 
every year. Every department had participated in formulating its 
own long term plan and submitted to the Enterprise Management 
Office for review and consolidation.
Since then, the top management reviewed the long term plan at the 
end of each year. After lengthy discussion, another new 5-year 
plan will be emerged. In fact, a rolling 5-year plan is in 
operation. In the current 5-year plan (1993-1997 inclusive), the 
following strategic directions have been laid down.
(a) New Factory
A new factory called Chibao Factory located in a suburb 
development zone has been built since 1993. Phase 1 was 
completed in 1995 and production started in the same year. 
It was expected to produce 200,000 pieces of measuring tools 
valued at RMB11 million of production cost in the first 
year. Phase 2 and 3 will continue to be completed in the 
new few years in order to expand the production capacity of 
high quality measuring tools at lower cost of production, 
higher efficiency and greater variety. It is expected to 
increase the total production value from RMB100 million in 
1994 to RMB400 in 2000.
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(b) Product Mix
f
Under the market economy promulgated since 1993, SMCW has
perform intensive and extensive market research to ascertain
the actual needs of the end-users and then delete the
out-dated products and development the demanding products. 
The macro-eoncomic measures installed by the government 
since July 1993 resulted in tight working capital and
material supplies, nevertheless, SMCW's agressive product 
mix strategies and employee's perseverance efforts reached 
the sales target of RMB100 million at the end of 1994.
(c) Production Development
In order to manufacture high precision and quality measuring 
instruments, SMCW has employed electronic measuring 
instruments and computer control equipment imported from the 
USA and Germany, in particular from 1990 to 1993. The 
modernisation of production hardware has been slowed down 
since 1994 because of lack of capital generated internally 
and borrowed externally.
(d) Market Development
To penetrate into the domestic market and capture higher 
market share, the sales personnel has been seggregated into 
geographic teams with different marketing strategies and 
tatics. The IRC signed with the Sales Department links up 
the remuneration directly with the sales volume and the 
accounts receivable (or cash collected) in order to motivate 
the sales and marketing effort. In addition, sales offices 
and agents were established in 9 big cities located in the 
Central China in 1994.
Furthermore, the pricing structure of various categories of 
products were adjusted (mostly downward) and used price 
differentiation geographically in 1994 in order to maintain 
or increase the market share.
(e) Competitive Edge
To maintain at least the market share and competitive edge 
against the counterparts (two in Shanghai) , SMCW has to 
enhance its product quality by various means as described in 
the strategic themes and thrusts section above. In terms 
promotion, SMCW produced a vedio in 1994 to promote the 
image and products through TV and other media. As far as 
the national markets are concerned, the followings 
strategies were determined in 1995 :
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(i) maintain the Northeast and Northwest markets in China;
(ii) develop markets in the Northern provinces near the 
boarder with the Russia; and
(iii)penetrate the markets in Central China.
In addition, the following tactics have been employed to 
enhance the competitive edge :
(i) market research;
(ii) forecasting and analysis;
(iii)production promotion through various media;
(iv) delivery services; and
(v) before- and after-sales services.
(f) Product Development
Another means to enhance the competitive edge is to develop 
new products. SMCW successfully launched 4 new products in 
1994 .
(g) Research and Development
Related to the competitive edge strategy mentioned above, 
SMCW has taken the following steps to enhance its R&D 
. function :
(i) to renew and upgrade the production equipment and 
facilities;
(ii) to enhance the present product quality;
(iii)to increase the product variety;
(iv) to design and develop new products;
(v) to investigate and improve the production technology;
(vi) to strengthen the manpower and technical skills in the 
research and development department; and
(vii)to provide more training in research and development.
(h) Overseas Markets
Currently, to export products, SMCW has to sell the products 
to an import and export enterprise of the Corporation at
agreed US dollar prices which are lower than the resale
prices to the foreign end users and also lower than the 
equivalent national selling prices in Reminbi. SMCW is 
working hard to negotiate with the government in obtaining 
the import and export right (also the foreign exchange usage 
right) so that they can determine the export prices and make 
higher foreign exchange and profit from the direct export 
sales. More than 200 products were exported to 10 foreign
countries at the end of 1994 via the external import and
export enterprise.
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The marketing and sales strategies in 1995 are to (i) 
develop Eastern Europenfand South American markets; and (ii) 
expand the USA and Thailand markets by setting agencies in 
Los Angelas and Bangkok.
(i) Joint-Venture
In mid 1995, SMCW entered, into a 50:50 (RMB1.6 million
capital) joint-venture with a Hong Kong Company to establish 
a production factory in Shenzhen to manufacture some 
components for the measuring tools, maily calipers, by
purchasing most of the raw materials locally. In addition, 
this joint-venture purchases some of SMCW final products and 
resales them in the southern provinces.
The current 5-year plan was compiled after long discussion
between the Bureau and the SMCW's top management. It was
eventually agreed and reflected in the ERC signed with the
municipal government. Although the department heads (middle 
management) have been involved in this planning process, they 
were playing a consultation role only. Furthermore, the 
department heads are mainly concerned with how the milestones set 
in the long term plan will affect their next year budgets or 
internal responsibility contracts which will have tight financial 
surveillance coming from the factory manager at least on a
monthly basis. Therefore, the long term planning and review 
process are using a top-down approach in the belief that the 
factory manager has better experience and knowledge of the 
external environment and even the internal operations of the 
departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Bureau has devolved its central planning role to 
individual enterprises under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the 
top management of SMCW is taking the initiative to formulate its 
own long term plan but participation from the middle management 
is limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
(
The general short term planning policy adopted by Shanghai 
Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) is "production 
determined by sales" and "sales determined by targeted income 
tax" which means income tax as agreed in the ERC with the 
government is the initial driving force of all the activities. 
However, under the fierce competition in this industry since 
1993, in particular under the influence of market economy policy, 
the barrier of entry has almost been uplifted. Furthermore, most 
of the customer orders are coming in randomly, therefore, it is 
difficult to predict the sales volume in the next year or even 
next quarter. To perform the sales forecast, reference should 
also be made to the rolling 5-year plan especially to estimate 
what the sales potential will be for the new product and market 
situation in the next year. As from October 1992, SMCW has 
employed the following annual planning or budgeting process.
During October, the factory manager reviews the financial 
performance of the year and the accomplishment of the ERC with 
the chief accountant. He also discusses the market situations, 
both domestic and overseas, with the sales deputy-factory manager 
in order to predict the sales potentials for next year. Derived 
from the sales forecasts, production targets can be set and acted 
as guidelines for the production workshops to initiate their own 
plans and IRCs for next year. The other non-production 
department heads are also required to draft their annual plans 
including manpower, task descriptions and required standards, and 
expenditures.
At the end of November, all the workshops and departments submit 
their annual plans to the Enterprise Management Office for 
consolidation before review and discussion by the factory manager 
with the deputy managers and the two chiefs. The first annual 
planning meeting is held in December mainly to discuss the gaps 
between the submitted production plans with the targets perceived 
by the top management. The top management is trying to help the 
production workshops solving their technical, financial and other 
problems in order to close the gaps as far as possible. Then, 
further formal and informal meetings and discussions are held 
between the factory manager, deputy-factory managers and 
department heads either collectively or individually. This 
iterative exercise carries on until all the annual plans and IRCs 
are mutually agreed and approved in the AGM (all the employees 
can attain) held during February. There is no consolidated 
financial or master budget prepared because the AGM only 
concerned on the total production, sales, profit and most 
important of all, the wages figures without going into the 
individual plans. The approval annual production plans are 
broken down into quarterly and monthly plans as shown below.
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P r o d u c t i o n  P l a n Department
f
Year
Product Full Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Qty PV* Qty PV Qty PV Qty PV Qty PV
* PV means the "Production Value" at the standard cost of last 
year.
# There is a consolidated production plan for the whole 
enterprise.
@ The quarterly production budget is further broken down into 
monthly figures taking into account of demand, holiday, 
maintenance or other factors.
Since October 1992, the workshop managers have been involved 
intensively in this planning process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the internal responsibility 
contracts with the factory manager. The other department heads 
have also participated carefully in devising their expense 
budgets which they would be measured against as performance 
yardsticks.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the annual 
planning review period has been shortened from quarterly to 
monthly. The factory manager and his deputy managers hold a 
formal meeting at the beginning of each month to review the 
financial performance against the annual plans. Amendments or 
revisions are made two to four times a year according to the 
significance of the factors affecting the annual plan.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given SMCW more freedom to plan ahead. The government 
representatives, the bureau and corporation, have almost 
completely devolved the short term planning autonomy to SMCW, 
except to agree on the minimum sales target as agreed in the ERC. 
The' top management have involved the middle management or even 
their subordinates (lower management) in the annual planning 
process which on one hand is a critical step in materializing the 
long term strategic plan or the ERC, and on the other hand, it is 
an important motivational factor for the workshop managers and 
department heads to manage their own businesses and to be 
rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
f
Shanghai Measuring Insturment & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) 
established its IRC system in 1991 in order to motivate the 
efficiency, profitability and cost reduction in the production 
workshops.
(A) The IRC of a production workshop is described below :
Department : Production Workshop No.3
Year : 1993
Guidelines :
Wages, bonuses, expenses and costs of wastage are determined and 
based on "Equivalent Standard Hours" of production transferred to 
finished goods.
Basic Indexes :
Productive Labour Hours (Capacity) 80%
Productivity Ratio 125%
Production Loss* 4.5%
* Production scrap and wastage was reduced from RMB1.6 million 
in 1992 to RMB1.2 million in 1993 for the whole enterprise.
Economic Targets :
(1) Each "Equivalent Standard Hour" (ESH) of planned production
transferred to finished goods will be awarded RMB2.62# for 
wages and bonuses.
(2) 100% completion of product mix/variety.
(3) Each ESH is allowed to incur RMB1.91 of expenditure*.
(4) Each ESH of production loss is allowed to incur RMB1.50 of 
expenditure*.
# This standard is calculated by dividing the actual total wages 
and bonuses by the actual total ESH in 1992. Similarly, the 
actual figures 1993 will determine the standard for 1994.
Qualitative Targets :
(1) New product pilot test is assessed according to Chief 
Engineer's plan.
(2) Safety is assessed according to the standard set by the 
Production Technology Department.
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I n c e n t i v e  Scheme :
f
(1) If actual production > planned production within 15%r then
(a) RMB1.20 of bonus for each excess ESH; and
(b) RMB3.50 basic wages increase for each excess ESH for all
employees.
(2) If actual production > planned production over 15%, then
(a) RMB3.00 of bonus for each excess ESH; and
(b) RMB3.50 basic wages increase for each excess ESH for all
employees.
(3) Bonus will be given for each successful trial test of new 
product as approved by the Chief Engineer.
(4) If actual expenditure.is less than the standards set per * 
above, 20% of the savings will be awarded as bonus.
Penalties :
(1) Equal amount of bonus (as stated in (3) of the incentive 
scheme above) will be deducted from the gross wages and 
bonuses for each failure of new product trial test.
(2) If actual expenditure is greater than the standards set per 
* above, 50% of the excess will be deducted from the gross 
wages and bonuses.
(3) For any sub-standard products discovered by the government 
quality inspection, 10% of the previously awarded bonuses 
(according to ESH system) should be deducted from the gross 
wages and bonuses.
(4) For any 1% (production quantity) shortfall of attaining the 
planned product mix, 0.1% of the gross wages and bonuses 
will be duducted.
(5) Bonus will be deducted if "professional management 
standards" (as described in "Monitoring Results" (6.3) 
below) assessed by the Enterprise Management Office cannot 
be attained.
Evaluation :
This IRC is evaluated on monthly, quarterly and yearly bases. 
The Head of Department should submit the actual performance data 
to the E nterprise M a n a g e m e n t  O ffice for aud i t i n g  and 
consolidation (the Chief Accountant is also involved) before 
review and approval by the Factory Manager. The Manpower and 
Wages Department is responsible for calculating the bonuses 
according to the approved performance reports.
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B o n u s e s  D i s t r i b u t i o n  :
(
The above methods are to calculate the total wages and bonus for 
the production department. The general rules for distributing 
the bonuses among the employees in the production department 
having had IRC are described under the "Rewards & Incentives" 
section (6.4) below.
(B) The IRC of the Sales Department is described below :
Department
Year
Guidelines
Sales
1991
The purpose of this IRC singed between the Factory Manager and 
the Sales Manager is to motivate the sales staff to achieve the 
mutually agreed sales targets which are linked up with the wages 
and bonuses of the sales employees.
Contracted Items & Targets :
(1) Basic Targets
1.1 Number of Staff : 47
1.2 Accounts Receivable : RMB5 million 
(Year-end Balance)
(2) Evaluation Targets (based on 1990 selling prices)
2.1 Self-Manufactured Products (SMP) Sales 
Domestic Sales (Turnover) :
Export Sales (Turnover) :
Total Sales (Turnover)
2.2 Joint-Venture Products (JVP) Sales
RMB22 million
RMB 8 million
RMB3 0 million
RMB 7 million
(3) Cash Collection Targets (from sales)
Quarter SMP Sales (RMB'000) JVP Sales (RMB'000)
1st 5,400 1,270
2nd 8,000 1,870
3rd 7,000 1,640
4th 8,000 1,870
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I n c e n t i v e s  & P e n a l t i e s
(1) Achieving the SMP Sales Targets (2.1 above)
1.1 Domestic Sales :
Bonus = RMB22 million x 0.16% = RMB32,500
1.2 Export Sales :
Bonus = RMB 8 million x 0.17% = RMB13,600
(2) Exceeding the SMP Sales Targets (Bonuses Calculation)
2 .1 RMB 3 0 million < Actual Sales < RMB40 million
Bonus = Every RMB1 million x 0 .50% = RMB5,000
2.2 RMB 4 0 million < Actual Sales < RMB50 million
Bonus = Every RMB1 million x 0 .60% = RMB6,000
2.3 RMB 50 million < Actual Sales < RMB60 million
Bonus = Every RMB1 million x 0 .70% = RMB7,000
2.4 RMB 60 million < Actual Sales < RMB 70 million
Bonus = Every RMB1 million x 0 .80% = RMB8,000
2.5 RMB 70 million < Actual Sales
Bonus = (Actual Sales - RMB70 million) x 0.85
(3) Below the SMP Sales Targets (Penalties Calculation)
3.1 RMB29.50 million < Actual Sales < RMB30 million :
Penalties = RMB0.50 million x 2.7% = RMB13,500
3.2 RMB29.00 million < Actual Sales < RMB29.50 million
Penalties = RMB0.50 million x 2.9% = RMB14/500
3.3 RMB28.50 million < Actual Sales < RMB29.00 million
Penalties = RMB0.50 million x 3.1% = RMB15,500
(4) Cash Collection Penalties
4 .1
4.2
No bonus will be awarded for achieving the "Cash 
Collection" quarterly targets (stated in (3) above)
0.02% of the amount below the "Cash Collection" 
quarterly targets will be deducted from the bonuses
Evaluation Methods :
(1) All the above agreed targets should be evaluated on 
quarterly basis. Actual performance data and calculated 
bonuses and penalties should be supplied by the Accounting & 
Finance Department, audited by the Internal Audit 
Department, reviewed by the Enterprise Management Office, 
approved by the Factory Manager and acted upon by the 
Manpower & Wages Department.
(2) The bonuses and penalties for achieving the JVP sales are 
determined separately by the Enterprise Management Office.
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(3) If the actual sales manpower exceeds the target (i.e. 47), 
the extra wages, allowances and bonuses should be borne by 
the Sales Department itself.
(4) For any uncontrollable factors affecting the achivement of 
the above targets, adjustments for the bonuses calculation 
can be made with the approval of the Enterprise Management 
Office and the Factory Manager.
(5) The Sales Department should also enhance the general 
management standards and the work safety.
(6) Distribution of the group wages and bonuses to individual 
sales employee is determined by the Sales Manager according 
to individual performance.
* Since 1994, the sales targets of this IRC have been seggregate 
down to individual saleman in order to motivate individual's 
effort. As a result, the turnover was increased by 40% compared 
with 1993.
It took a few months for the factory manager, workshop managers 
and sales manager to negotiate with the terms and conditions for 
their IRCs signed in parallel with the planning process started 
in October until final approval by the annual general meeting in 
February 1993. This long process indicated that the setting of 
IRC was not a top-down approach and the workshop managers are 
very eager on this issue upon which they would be measured 
against and rewarded thereupon. The 1993 IRCs were subject to at 
least quarterly review but no adjustments had been made since 
agreed.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the factory manager has delegated more freedom to the 
workshop managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also involved the finance division intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence ; shift from "High Corporate" 
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the central influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the workshops, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Shanghai Measuring 
Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) that need headquarters' 
intervention.
Since 1992, the Production Support Workshop has been a profit 
centre which provide repair and maintenance services to both the 
internal production departments as well as the external 
customers. Of course, this workshop must satisfy the internal 
demands first before it can accept outside business. This 
involves the transfer prices which are slightly lower than the 
market prices charged to the outside customers. The transfer 
prices for the repair and maintenance services, including 
materials and labour hours, are mutually pre-determined by the 
top management and the workshop on an annual basis. But the 
transfer prices might not be increased significantly in order to 
push the workshop to reduce cost of service consistantly.
The material preparation, heat treatment and electroplating work 
provided by the Production Support Workshop for the other four 
production workshops also involve the internal transfer prices 
which are based on the standard costs mainly determined by the 
top management without involvement by the supplier and the end 
users. These transfer prices are pre-determined on an annual 
basis.
Observation of Planning Influence : Shift from "Very High-High
Corporate" to "High Corporate" since 1992.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far. as the organisation structure is concerned, Shanghai 
Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) has three 
distinct levels of management hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (factory, deputy-factory managers, chief
accountant and chief engineer)
(2) Middle Management (workshop managers and department heads)
(3) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-factory managers and the two chiefs can decide on 
their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (sections).
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They are also responsible foi; certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of emploment with any 
staff is a difficult task which will be explained in the rewards 
and incentives section.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the workshops and departments are by 
using annual plans and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, 
the most important measurement criteria are production efficiency 
(ESH) and new product manufacturing set in the IRCs, although 
some other qualitative targets, such as quality and safety, are 
employed. However, these are subsidiary ones which have lower 
weightings in calculating the group wages and bonus.
(Please refer to Q 6 .1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of SMCW.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) sets 
similar objectives for its production workshops : workshop
managers must meet their agreed IRC targets for the year and 
expect improvement in performance year after year except under 
adverse market conditions. The critical occasion, therefore, is 
the annual planning review. In view of the fierce competition 
within this industry, the production workshops sometimes feel 
passive in setting their objectives or targets in the annual 
plans or IRCs because their activities are depending on the sales 
demands and the derived production volumes.
A high pressure to achieve the planned production quantity and 
efficiency is put on the workshop managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group wages and 
bonus are tied in with the annual plans or IRCs and it also 
depends on the overall performance of the enterprise as a whole. 
In terms of expenses, control is in terms of output efficiency or 
ESH. Although the other departments do not have the IRCs, they 
have agreed specific objectives or targets with the factory 
manager. The promotion, salary and bonus of these functional 
staff are c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  these q u a n t i t a t i v e  and some 
non-financial targets. (Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the 
questionnaire extracts in Appendix 1.)
162
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) 
implemented the following "Professional Management Standards" in 
1991 to provide some guidelines in order to enhance every 
management aspect, product quality, work quality, and to fulfil 
the targets as agreed in the ERC (external) and the IRC 
(internal).
(1) Scope
1.1 Every fundamental management aspect in order to improve the 
internal operational efficiency of the enterprise.
1.2 Every ad hoc and urgent assignment requested by the top 
management in relation to product quality, work quality and 
quality control.
1.3 Any other specific tasks as ordered by the Factory Manager.
(2) Principles
2.1 The setting of professional management standards in this 
guideline is the responsibility of the Factory Manager, 
Enterprise Management Office, Chief Engineer and Chief 
Accountant.
2.2 Technical and quality standards are managed by the Chief 
Engineer.
2.3 General and professional standards are managed by the 
Enterprise Management Office and the Chief Accountant.
2.4 The standards of all the other ad hoc and special
assignments are managed by the Factory Manager.
2.5 The standards (except some of 2.4 above) should be
pre-determined in the Annual Plan and which department 
responsible for managing each standard should be stipulated.
(3) Method
3.1 The standards should be mutually agreed by the top
management and the employees before final approval given in 
the Annual Plan.
3.2 Method of assessment should be stated together with the 
pre-determined standards established in the Annual Plan.
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3.3 The agreed standards should be achieved in time as planned.
3.4 After the attainment of a standard, the details of 
accomplishment or the ways to solve the problems should be 
reported to the top management via the department head.
3.5 If any unforeseeable events, factors or uncertainties 
affecting the achievement of standards in time, advanced 
notice should be reported to the top management via the 
department head. Any adjustments or corrective actions to 
be taken must be approved by the top management.
(4) Evaluation
4.1 A "Pointing System" is used as shown in (5) below. Points
will be deducted for any failure to achieve the standards.
4.2 For each failure of standard, RMB5 to RMB20 will be deducted 
from the salary of the employee who is directly responsible 
for the standard. The Enterprise Management Office is 
responsible for the assessment and deciding the amount of 
penalty for the Manpower and Wages Department to implement.
(5) Standards for Performance Evaluation of Production 
Department.
5.1 The Pointing System 
Evaluated Standard
1. Production Value (Quantity)
2. Production Mix
3. Production Rate
4. Quality
(a) Scrap & Wastage
(b) First Class Product %
(c) Inspection Passing Rate
5. Safety Production
6. Equivalent Standard Hours
7. Materials Consumptions
8. Energy Savings
9. Professional Management 
Standards
10. Scrap & Wastage Loss
11. Export Sales
12. Training & Education
T o t a l  :
Points Evaluation Department
5 Production Planning
10 Production Planning
5 Production Planning
30 Quality Control &
Inspection
5 Safety & Technology
5 Manpower & Wages
5 Purchasing & Supply
5 Energy & Facility
10 Enterprise Manage­
ment Office 
5 Accounting & Finance
5 Enterprise Manager-
ment Office 
10 Enterprise Manage­
ment Office
100
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5 . 2  A s s e s s m e n t  C r i t e r i a  & Methods
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
1 0 .
Production Value (Quantity)
1.1 +1 point for exceeding the standard
1.2 -1 point for under the standard
1.3 evaluate once per quarter
Production Mix
2.1 -1 point for every 1% below the standard production mix 
value
Production Rate
3.1 -0.3 point for every 1% below the standard daily 
production rate of 85% in every month
3.2 -2 points for failure the 10-days' ratio of 2:3:5 in 
every month for Production Department No.4
Quality
4.1 Scrap & Wastage : -1 point for every 0.1% exceeding the 
standard
4.2 First Class Product % : +1 point for every 5% exceeding 
the standard % and -1 point for every 5% below the 
standard %
4.3 Inspection Passing Rate : -1 point for every 5% below 
100%
Safety Production
5.1 -1 point for every minor injury incidence
Equivalent Standard Hours (production transferred to
finished goods)
6.1 -0.5 point for every 1% below the standard hours
Materials Consumptions
7.1 -1 point for every 5% exceeding standard consumptions
of tools and indirect materials
Energy Savings
8.1 -0.5 point for exceeding standard consumptions in water 
or electricity within 3%
8.2 -1 point for exceeding standard consumptions in water 
or electricity over 3%
Professional Management Standards
9.1 -2 points for failing each item of standards; or
9.2 for failing each item of standard, deduct RMB5 to RMB20
of the responsible employee's wages
Scrap & Wastage Loss
10.1 -0.5 point for every 1% exceeding the standard 
allowance (based on last year actual rate)
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11. Export Sales
11.1 -5 points for failing the agreed standard
12. Training & Education
12.1 deduction of points is recommended by the Enterprise 
Management Office and approved by the Factory Manager
Shanghai Measuring Instrument and Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) 
regards it as essential to catch variances from annual plan or 
IRC before they have gone too far. To this end the top 
management monitor results on a monthly and quarterly basis. All 
the workshops and departments submit monthly results on standard 
forms to their respective divisional heads and also to the chief 
accountant for vetting and comparison with budgets and IRCs. The 
production workshops are also required to submit production 
figures to the top management on a weekly basis.
The monthly report format is unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the annual plan from which 
all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted from this 
report. The monthly and quarterly actuals are compared with the 
targets. The qualitative targets are measured according to 5.1 
above and written in the monthly reports as well. Any significant 
variances (without specifying tolerance limits) are highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the top management. Then all 
the monthly reports are submitted to the factory manager for 
review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
factory manager contacts with the respective deputy managers, 
workshop managers or department heads to dig out the underlying 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the top management with the middle 
management, the factory manager puts forward the monthly results 
for open discussion. The workshop managers and the department 
heads may be asked to explain briefly the significant variances. 
Consistent failure (say over 12 months) in meeting the targets 
which are controllable by a workshop manager, probably he will be 
replaced by somebody else. On the other hand, the favourable 
results will be openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the wages and manpower department for calculating the 
group wages and bonus of each workshop or department for last 
month. Then the accounting department processes the bonus 
payments at the end of the month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus 
is lagged by one month).
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The importance of computerization is not well recognised by the 
top management even though a few stand-alone personal computers 
have been used for calculating payroll, compiling plans and 
performing financial analysis. There is no plan for implementing 
a comprehensive integrated management or accounting information 
system. Perhaps the lack of capital for investment in computer 
hardware and software and the urgent needs to focus on the 
marketing strategies put computerization at the bottom of the 
priority list.
Now, SMCW views the annual plan or IRC as a contract between the 
top management and the workshop or department. The monitoring 
process is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from plan.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
Since 1992, SMCW had the autonomy to recruit employees from the 
labour market without getting the Shanghai Manpower Bureau 
i n v o l v e d  w h i c h  is in c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the M e c h a n i s m  
Transformation. Furthermore, since 1993, all the employees have 
signed employment contracts which include the "employee contract" 
and the "in-post contract". The employee contract signed between 
the factory manager and an employee signifies that he or she has 
been employed by the enterprise. Whereas, the in-post contract 
means a formal assignment of a certain post to an employee who is 
expected to be capable for the job. For the employees without 
in-post contracts, they may be transferred to the Tertiary 
(Service) Enterprises which are fully-owned by SMCW and are 
self-financed. The effectiveness of implementing the employment 
contracts is reflected in the increase of production value of 
RMB40M in 1992 to RMB70M in 1993 and expected to be RMB100M in 
1994. This significant improvement in efficiency is due to the 
fact that bonuses are linked up with efficiency and productivity.
In parallel with the implementation of the IRC system, Shanghai 
Measuring Insturment & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) designed the 
following general rules for calculating and distributing bonuses 
among the employees in every department.
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(1) If any designated dutiefs or special assigned duties by the 
department head or supervisor cannot be completed, no bonus 
for the month should be awarded.
(2) If any unsatisfactory performance which causes monetary loss 
of RMB500 or above, the monthly bonus should not be awarded.
(3) For any serious problems occured, such as quality, facility 
or equipment, safety, health, food poisoning, fire etc, not 
only the group bonus will be deducted from the department, 
the respective involved section leader, supervisor, 
department head or deputy factory manager should not be 
awarded the monthly bonus as well.
(4) For absent of work due to sickness, injury, marriage, 
causal, maternity, condolence etc., RMB2.5 of bonus per day 
should be deducted. No bonus should be awarded if absent of 
work exceeds 5 days.
(5) For any study leave over 1 year, no bonus should be awarded.
For any study leave over 4 days in a month, RMB1.5 of bonus
should be deducted per day of excess. If monthly study 
leave exceeds 12 days, only 50% of the bonus should be 
awarded.
(6) Any employee transfer from another department can entitle to
two-third of the bonus if he or she works for over 20 days
in the month.
(7) No bonus should be awarded to any trainee for the first 6
months. 50% and 70% of bonus can be awarded to a trainee 
for working over 6 months and 2 years respectively.
(8) Any employee whose workload is reduced due to sickness or
other valid reasons as approved by the department head shall 
not receive bonus in the first 3 months and can be awarded 
50% of bonus after 3 months.
(9) Group bonues will be awarded to a department according to
, the attainment of the financial, technical and management
standards as agreed under the IRC. The department head has 
the right to distribute the bonues to individual staff 
according to individual performance and the rules as stated 
above.
(10) Late arrival to work and early dismissal without valid 
reasons may receive no bonus for the month.
(11) Any absent from work without valid reasons may cause no
bonus for the month. If accumulated days of absence from 
work over 3 days, no year-end bonus will be awarded.
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(12) For any administrative warning due to misconduct or 
wrongdoings, no bonus Will be awarded for 2 months. For 
serious mistakes or wrongdoings, no bonus will be awarded 
for 3 months.
(13) No bonus will be awarded to any employee during the period 
of detainment under charges of the police.
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the SMCW is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity,
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration. The take-home pay of each employee in SMCW is 
mainly composed of three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 55% - 60%
(2) Bonus 20% - 25%
(3) Allowances 25% - 15%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB8,080 
in 1993. Under the current high inflation rate (overall average 
23% and 21% in China in 1993 and 1994 respectively) , SMCW 
increased the average annual gross wages to RMB10,854 in 1994. 
It was expected that this figure would reach RMB12,000 in 1995 
depending on the enterprise performance per the terms and
conditions of the third ERC.
According to the general national standard adopted by most of the 
state-owned enterprises, SMCW's production workers are classified 
into 8 classes and within each class there are two to three 
sub-classes. Promotion from one class (or sub-class) to the next 
higher class (or sub-class) mainly depends on seniority,
knowledge of work, technical skill and training. Usually, there 
is an annual assessment or test of every worker to determine his 
or her promotion. The pay scale of monthly basic wages to 
workers ranges from RMB60 to RMB180. Therefore, the wages 
difference between two successive classes is only about RMB15 to 
RMB2 0 and it may take over 20 years rising from the lowest class 
to the highest class. The annual wages increment can never catch 
up with the inflation.
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There is another basic salary pay-scale divided into 16 classes 
(2 to 3 sub-classes in each class) for the technical and 
management staff and its range is from RMB80 (Class 1) to RMB300 
(Class 16) per month. For example,
Management Staff Technical Staff
Post Classes Post Classes
Factory Manager 15 - 16
Deputy Factory Mgr. 13 - 14
Chief Accountant 13 - 14
Chief Engineer 13 - 14
Department Head 10 - 12 Senior Engineer 10 - 12
Deputy Dept. Head 8 - 10 Engineer 8 - 1 0
Supervisor 6 - 8 Senior Technician 6 - 8
Section Leader 5 - 6 Technician 5 - 6
Senior Clerk 3 - 4 Junior Technician 3 - 4
Junior Clerk 1 - 2 Trainee 1 - 2
There are two portions for the "allowance". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
Government at least once in each year mainly for the purpose of 
combating inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity. 
This part of allowance was increased from RMB119 (per month) in 
1994 to RMB143 (per month) in 1995. The second part is decided 
by the SMCW which may include housing, meals, travel, education, 
attendance, overtime, hair-washing, festival gifts etc. The 
payment of monthly "allowance" is about RMB115 to RMB140 whose 
purpose is trying to balance the relatively low basic wages and 
maintain a reasonable standard of living for the employees. SMCW 
has been trying to build and purchase apartments for employee's 
quarters but retained profit and cash availability are the 
limiting factors. As a result, some employees are still living 
in a space of less than 4 square metres per person in 1995. They 
have registered with the government housing authority in charge 
of solving this headache problem in Shanghai.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the workshops, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the factory manager and a 
workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will be given 
to the department. Of course, it is up to the workshop manager 
to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates 
according to invidual performance. The bonus is distributed in 
cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a certain percentage 
(10% - 2 0%) is retained in a reserve in order to make up the low 
bonus obtained during the months with poor performance.
How is the bonus determined for the management and administrative 
staff in the other departments? It can be described in the 
following steps :
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(1) Calculation of management score
(a) Performance according to targets set
(b) Discipline according to rules and regulations
(c) Management methods and styles
(d) Security and safty
(2) Calculation of average bonus
Management score % (1) x Monthly average production bonus
(3) Calculation of individual bonus
Average monthly bonus (2) x Individual index*
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
Factory Manager = 1.50
Deputy-Factory Manager = 1.4 0 
Department Head = 1.3 5
Deputy Department Head = 1.3 0 
Supervisor = 1.25
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System) , if there is an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the government will award a lump sum of 
"special bonus" to the factory manager at the end of the year. 
But under no circumstances, the remuneration package of the 
factory manager can be greater than three times the total 
earnings of a department head (middle management).
If the annual profit before tax can achieve better than the 
planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to all the 
employees and distributed in a way very similar to the monthly 
bonus.
According to the social welfare legistlation implemented in 1993, 
SMCW has been contribution 25.5% of the total wages to the 
government for the central pension fund. Then the government is 
responsible for the pension payments to the present 650 and 
future.retired employees of SMCW. On the other hand, SMCW has to 
provide about 14% of the total payroll for other employee's 
benefits such as unemployment, medical, insurance etc. A central 
social welfare fund similar to the pension has been resolved and 
will be fully implemented across all the state-owned enterprises 
before the end of 1997.
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One of the 57 clauses in (the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
may cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
SMCW has fully implemented both the "employment contracts" and 
"in-post contracts" with all the employees for periods from one 
to five years since 1994. The latter contract signifies that an 
employee is qualified for that specific post and he or she is 
eligible to receive basic wages (according to class in 
pay-scale), allowance and bonus. Without such a contract, that 
employee is out of job but he or she is still an employee of SMCW 
and is allowed to received a basic monthly subsidy of about 
RMB150. This measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy 
employees, but it can motivate the marginal employees to work 
better.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SMCW believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992
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Section 7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting 
Tool Works (SMCW) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Very High to 
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High Corporate Medium to 
Low Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High to Medium 
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High
Corporate.
Medium to 
Low Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
Very High to 
High Corporate
High
Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
Rewards &. Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and 
Campbell.
control influences 
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used by Goold &
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financj
Progran
[Pre-:
\
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ning)
392]
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Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
[Post-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Measuring Instrument & Cutting Tool Works (SMCW) before 
and after 1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility 
Accounting Style" has been shifting gradually from "Financial 
Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) 
although it has not yet reached a strong-form (low corporate) of 
financial control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's 
Strategic Style. It seems to be in the "middle of the road" 
between this two styles.
Revised : 4 February 1996
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Joseph Yau Shiu Wing (Hong Kong)
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- Towards An Exploratory Framework" 
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ultimate aim is to c l a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic
Financial
Strategic
Financial
Programming(1) 
Programming(2) 
Control (3)
Control (4)
Name of SOE 
Staff Interviewed
Dates of Visits
Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF)
Mr Cheng Qi Chang/Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 2 6 years) 
Mr Lai Ping/Managing Director 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 11 years)
First Visit - 11 December 1993 
Second Visit - 11 August 1994
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B ack g ro u n d
Guanagzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) was established in 1960 and 
was converted into a shareholding enterprise in October 1992 
having a paid-up capital of RMB8 2 million (13 million shares). 
It is one of the largest flour mills in China with a total 
factory area of 120,000 square metres and 934 employees including 
180 management staff at the end of 1993.
Presently, GNFF has four flour manufacturing workshops, one 
processed food plant and three supporting workshops. It also has 
its own shipping port (for 10,000 tons of ships) and railways 
system for transporting the raw materials in and finished 
products out respectively. GNFF has imported two automated 
production lines from Switzerland (one in 1989 and one in 1993) 
which can process 30 types of products and 400 tons of wheat per 
day. In addition, GNFF has installed over 30 automatic flour 
inspection machines imported from the USA, Germany, Japan and 
Sweden. The total output capacity is 300,000 tons per annum. 
The output volume was 240,000 tons in 1993 and supplied 40% of 
the flour required in Guangdong province.
GNFF produces high quality of flour for manufacturing noodles, 
cakes, bread, biscuits, etc. Over 95% of the processed flour is 
sold domestically and less than 5% exported to Vietnam, Macau and 
Hong Kong. GNFF always promulgates high quality and customer 
satisfaction as its main business themes. To achieve these aims, 
quality management should be emphasised, in terms of imported 
modern prodcution technology and stringent quality control 
system, in order to maintain 100% passing rate consistantly.
On the marketing and selling side, GNFF has maintained a customer 
information filing system and visited the existing and potential 
customers periodically to obtain feedback on quality and services 
in order to increase the sales outlets and market share.
Staff development is another important thrust of GNFF. In the 
past 10 years, it has recruited over 30 qualified engineering 
personnel and 150 university graduates to strengthen the 
management calibre. GNFF has fully implemented the "employment 
contracts" for all the employees and improved the social welfare, 
insurance, medical, housing, wages and bonus benefits in order to 
enhance the motivation of all the employees and the development 
and operation of the enterprise as a whole.
Apart from the core business of flour manufacturing, GNFF has 
diversified into processed food, import and export trade (with 
one subsidiary in Hong Kong), resort facilities and auction 
businesses. On 25 June 1993, GNFF was granted the "import and 
export right" by the Guangdong Foreign Trade and Economic Bureau 
so that it can further explore the overseas markets, such as 
Russia and Hong Kong, in the near future.
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Under the more competitive market, GNFF has grown steadily from a 
medium size state-owned enterprise into a large enterprise in the 
flour industry. Financially, the compounded growth rate of net 
profit and fixed assets from 1981 to 1992 were over 20%. The net 
income before tax in 1992 was RMB30 million which was 13 times of 
the profit level before 1980. GNFF has been awarded as one of 
the top ten most economic efficient state-owned enterprises in 
Guangzhou and one of the hundred top quality control state-owned 
enterprises in China.
GNFF is currently producing the following three classes (12 brand 
names of products) of flour, 95% of which are sold domestically 
and less than 5% exported to Vietnam, Macau and Hong Kong.
(1) Higher Class - for making high quality bread and noddle.
(2) Middle Class - for making bread, bun, noddle and cakes.
(3) Lower Class - for making sauce, battery and pastry.
Five brand names of flour have been awarded as "quality products"
by the Guangdong government.
Apart .from the above three classes of flour products, GNFF has a 
production line imported from Italy' manufacturing 1 tonne of 
bread per day mainly to test the quality of the flour produced on 
one hand and diversify the business and sales on the other hand.
The by-product is the shell of the wheat which, after grinding, 
is a kind of high demanding foodstaff for the livestock e.g. 
chicken and pig. It is sold to the government designated 
livestock farms.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Guangzhou Nan Fung Flour Mill (GNFF) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since 1960 and it was converted into a 
private shareholding enterprise in October 1992 by issuing 16% of 
the authorized shares to the employees. The local government is 
the. majority shareholder by holding 84% of the shares. GNFF is 
trying very hard to list its shares in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in order to raise fresh funds for capital investments, 
explore the overseas markets and repay the bank loans. It is one 
of the ten recommended state-owned enterprises to be listed in 
Guangdong province. In fact, five enterprises have been listed 
and GNFF has been expected to be the next one in 1994. However, 
due to the unfavourable market conditions and significant drop in 
financial performance in 1994 (see Section 3 below) , GNFF has to 
postpone the listing plan to 1995 or 1996.
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The conversion of shareholding enterprise has improved the 
overall economic efficiency and employee motivation of GNFF. For 
example, because of the insufficient supply of electricity in 
Guangzhou, most of the enterprises have to stop production one 
day in every week. In the old days, workers and staff were very 
happy to have one day time-off due to no electricity supply, but 
when they have become shareholders, they prefer to keep the 
production running seven days a week. Furthermore, most of the 
workers are willing to maintain three shifts a day and 24 hours 
around the clock.
Since GNFF is a state-owned enterprise, it is under the 
administration of the Guangzhou Food and Oil Bureau. Since the 
economic reforms started in 1979, the government and bureau have 
delegated the following autonomy to GNFF.
1981 - instead of following strictly the orders and directives 
from the bureau and acting as a production cost centre, GNFF 
obtained its own production autonomy and retained profit after 
tax for development purposes.
1983 - started the economic responsibility targets system and
employees' remuneration was linked up with economic performance 
and individual performance.
1985 - started the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" and 
delegated more operation and management autonomy to the factory 
general manager.
1990 - signed the ERC with the local government and integrated 
the responsibilities, rights and benefits of the enterprise.
In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Tranformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, the bureau has delegated the planning and control 
responsibilities to the top management of GNFF to run their own 
business. Furthermore, the investment autonomy has been delegated 
and raising capital for project investment can be arranged by the 
bureau and GNFF together. However, the bureau is still in 
control of :
(1) appointing general manager and party secretary;
(2) compromising profit before tax target;
(3) setting some selling prices under certain circumstances 
(i.e. flooding) to secure the purchasing power of general 
public; and
(4) reviewing major capital investment projects.
Since early 1990s, GNFF's party secretary has inserted less and 
less influence on the planning and control systems. Basically, 
the roles played by the party secretary are as follows :
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(1) to assist the factory general manager in the operation and 
management but not to interfere his leadership;
(2) to be consulted by the factory general manager in making 
long term investment decisions; and
(3) to help the factory general manager in implementing the 
determined plans and policies.
GNFF's Board of Directors composed of the following members :
Chairman (also the Managing Director)
Vice-Chairman - General Manager 
- Party Secretary 
Directors - Deputy-General Manager (Chief Engineer)
Deputy-General Manager (Chief Economist)
Finance Manager (Chief Accountant)
A Government Representative (Guangzhou Food & Oil 
Bureau)
Under the Factory General Manager, who has an Enterprise 
Management Office (also in' charge of the listing or floatation 
plan), the organisation structure of GNFF is as follow :
(1) Production Department (headed by Chief Engineer)
1.1 No.l Flour Workshop* @
1.2 N o .2 Flour Workshop* @
1.3 N o .3 Flour Workshop* @
1.4 No.4 Flour Workshop* @
1.5 Pastry Workshop* @
1.6 Raw Material Workshop@
1.7 Repair & Maintenance Workshop®
1.8 Energy & Power Workshop®
1.9 Production Planning
1.10 Research & Technology
1.11 Quality Control
1.12 Inspection
(2) Sales Department (headed by Chief Economist)
(3) Accounting & Finance Department (headed by Chief Accountant)
(4) Purchasing Department
(5) Personnel Department
(6) General Affairs Department
6.1 Safety & Security
6.2 Transportation®
6.3 Education & Training
6.4 Medical
6.5 Canteen
6.6 Housing
(7) Planning & Development Department
7.1 Information
7.2 Computer
7.3 Filing
(8) Communist Party Office
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(9) Fully-Owned Subsidiaries#
9.1 Guangzhou Anshin Transportation Company
9.2 Guangzhou Yuanchun Food Godown
9.3 Guangzhou Livestock Foodstaff Factory
9.4 GNFF Research & Development Laboratory
(10) Other Subsidiaries & Associate Companies#
10.1 Guangzhou Commercial Import Sc Export Trading Company 
Limited
10.2 China Jia Guangzhou International Auction Company 
Limited
10.3 Fanyu Lijiang Resort Garden (Hotel)
10.4 Guangzhou Noodle Product Factory
(11) Joint-Ventures
11.1 Hong Kong Nanxin Trading Company
11.2 Guangzhou Nanfang (Hong Kong) Flour Company Limited*
11.3 Spainish Lasi Islands Flour Company Limited
* The four production workshops (except N o .4 Flour Workshop which 
is a joint venture with 11.2 above) are treated as cost centres 
having a workshop manager, a deputy manager, a few technicians 
and clerical staff. There are three 8-hour production shifts in 
each workshop. Each shift has a leader, deputy leader, group 
leaders and workers who are all concerning the production target 
setting very much. N o .2, No. 3 and N o . 4 Flour Workshop have been 
using imported Swiss plants and machinery since 1993 which can 
reach daily p r o d u c t i o n  of 4 00 tons in each workshop. 
Non-production overheads are apportioned among the 5 workshops 
for performance measurement of the whole cost centre.
# Most of the subsidiaries and associate companies are similar to 
the "tertiary enterprises" or "third enterprises" which are 
conducting businesses other than the core business of flour 
manufacturing.
@ Only the production workshops, supporting workshps and 
transportation fleet have entered into internal responsibility 
contracts (IRC) with the general manager.
GNFF had a total of 940 working (all in posts) and 300 retired 
employees at the end of 1993. It is classified as a "medium size 
state-owned enterprise" in China. All the employees have signed 
"employment contracts" with duration from one to ten years since 
1993 .
(Please refer to Q2 .6 & Q2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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S e c t i o n  3 : F i n a n c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s
Total assets 
Turnover
RMB 236M (1993)@@
RMB 320M (1992)
RMB 370M (1993)
RMB 260M (1994)®
RMB 30M (1992) - 9.4% of sales
RMB 33M (1993) - 8.9% of sales*
RMB 15M (1994) - 5.8% of sales@
55% (before October 1992)
15% (from October 1992)#
Income before tax
Income tax rate
* In light of high inflation in Guangzhou (30% in 1993 and 20% in 
1994), GNFF expects the profit margin will continue to be 
declined.
# Since GNFF is a shareholding enterprise located in one of the 
14 economic development cities, it can enjoy a reduced income tax 
rate of 15% instead of 33% applied to the other state-owned 
enterprises.
@ The significant financial performance decline in 1994 (vs 
budgeted sales of RMB400M) was mainly due to the effects resulted 
from the macro-economic control policies implented by the 
government in July 1993, and also the high input inflation i.e. 
wheat (27%) , electricity (18%) , wages (30%) and packaging (40%) . 
In addition, before 1994, GNFF was exempted from sales tax, but 
as from January 1994, GNFF sales has been subject to 13% of VAT. 
As a result, pricing policy have not been well planned to capture 
the changes in sales demand and supply. Another implication of 
poor financial performance may affect adversely the listing plan 
in Shanzhen Stock Exchange.
@@ The total assets (fixed + current) have been revaluated once 
when changing into shareholding in October 1992.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Guangzhou Nan Fung Flour Mill (GNFF) signed the first 3-year 
(1988-1990) ERC with the Guangzhou Finance Bureau. Based on the 
profits of the previous three years and substantial negotiation, 
the first year target profit was set RMB13.5 million with an 
annual growth rate of 7%. The income tax for the target profit 
level was 55% and any excess profit over the target would be 
subject to 35% income tax.
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The adoption of ERCS seperafed the management autonomy out from 
the government and defined the duties, rights and benefits 
between the government and the enterprise. It made GNFF to be 
really a self-operating, self-financing, self-developing and 
self-regulating enterprise and to initiate the motivation of the 
management and workers.
In 1987, GNFF implemented the "Factory Manager Responsibility 
Contract" system. After signing the 3 -year ERC with the local 
government, the factory general manager has become the agent or 
representative responsible to the government (principal), the 
bureau and all the employees. The ERC set the following 
quantitative targets over the 3 years:
(1) total flour production quantities with annual growth rates;
(2) industrial output values with annual growth rates;
(3) net profit before tax with annual growth rates; and
(4) net asset value increase with annual growth rates.
The ERC also stipulated the following management (qualitative) 
targets as well :
(1) enterprise grading promotion awarded by the government (i.e. 
from third class to second class);
(2) labour production efficiency (i.e output value per worker);
(3) net profit before tax per employee;
(4) quality product awards;
(5) new products development;
(6) energy and material consumptions;
(7) technology improvement;
(8) safety production;
(9) management techniques;
(10) manpower training; and
(11) employees remuneration and welfare improvement.
To facilitate the attainment of the above targets, GNFF has set 
up regular meetings between the top and middle management; and 
also guidelines for decision-making procedures.
Subsequently, the second 3-year ERC (1991-1993) was signed with 
similar terms and conditions as shown above. This second ERC was 
ceased in October 1992 when GNFF was transformed into a 
shareholding enterprise and subject to income tax of 15%. Now 
the only major target agreed with the Guangzhou Food & Oil Bureau 
is the annual profit before income tax which is also the 
measuring yardstick for the factory manager under the "Factory 
Manager Responsibility System".
Compared the present Shareholding system with the previous ERC 
system, which one is better from the standpoint of the enterprise 
and the employee? The following scenario can explain the general 
opinion within the top management of GNFF :
182
Assume (RMB'000) :
Actual profit before income tax 
Target 
Surplus
Income tax - ERC (Target 55:
(Surplus 35: 
Share (15%)
ERC S y s te m
20,000 
10,000
30,000 
(11,000) 
( 3,500)
S h a re  S y s te m
20,000 
10,000
30,000
4, 500
Profit after income tax 
Bonus from PAT (15,500 x 23.2%) 
Dividend pay-out (100%) - 
Employees (16%)
15,500 
3, 600
22,500
3,600
Retained earnings 11,900
Government dividends retained as loan 
Loan interest (10.98% x 80% = 8.784%)
18,900 
1,660
Total liability to government 20,560
Observations :
(1) Assume the employees receive the same monetary benefit of
RMB 3, 6 0 0, 000 (i.e. ERC system in a form of bonus and
Shareholding system in a form of dividend pay-out).
(2) Government receives less tax in the Shareholding system.
(3) Under the ERC system, GNFF has RMB11,900,000 retained 
earnings for future development.
(4) Under the Shareholding system, GNFF has a total liablility 
of RMB20,560,000 in which the preferential loan interst 
(i.e. RMB1,660,000) has to be paid in cash annually, whereas 
the retained dividend portion will be payable any time upon 
demand by the government.
(5) It seems that under the Shareholding system, GNFF has more 
capital (in the form of loan) or cash to use, but bear in 
mind that it is a liability to the government and may be 
repaid upon demand. However, under the ERC system, GNFF has 
the full autonmy to use the retained earnings left behind.
(6) For the long term growth, development and security, GNFF's 
top management prefer to the ERC system rather than the 
present Shareholding system.
(7) Under the present Shareholding system, GNFF can transfer 
more profit after income tax to the "statutory capital 
reserve" and "general capital reserve", so that less 
dividend will be paid out and less government loan and 
interest will be incurred. However, in view of listing 
potential, high dividend pay-out can paint a rosy picture.
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m  *
5.1 Organisation Structure
The guiding theme of the organisation structure of Guangzhou Nan 
Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) is simplicity and accountability. It went 
to some length in 1992 to create stand-alone business units e.g. 
the 7 production workshops as semi - independent responsibility 
centres that are controlled by individual workshop managers with 
clear lines of authority and responsibility.
Each production workshop is manufacturing different product lines 
and the production support workshops are providing material 
preparation, repairs and maintenance, energy and power to the 
production workshops. Other than these 7 production and 
supporting workshops, all the other departments are classified as 
expense centres as well.
Since 1992, GNFF has been decentralizing some planning 
responsibility to each workshop and department such as 
formulating their annual plans or budgets and negotiating the 
internal responsibility contracts. The production and cost 
control responsibilities primarily lie with the workshop manager 
but the top management keep a surveillance quantity and quality 
control on each production workshop through monthly or weekly 
report.
The selection and appointment of the factory manager and party 
secretary is still decided by the Guangzhou Food & Oil Bureau and 
a "Factory Manager Responsibility System" is in force. This 
system takes the Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a 
basis to evaluate the performance of the factory manager. If an 
outstanding or above target performance has been achieved, the 
factory manager will be awarded a predetermined lump sum bonus at 
the year end (see section 4.5 above).
Since 1992, the factory manager has full autonomy to appoint the 
chief economist, chief engineer, chief accountant (the three 
chiefs are equivalent to deputy-general managers) and the other 
departmental managers. Any major changes of the organisation 
structure in each division should be initiated by the 
deputy-general managers and approved by the general manager. 
However, more autonomy of internal management and operation has 
been delegated to the deputy-general managers and the chiefs 
since 1992. And in turn, the deputy-general managers and chiefs 
have involved their department heads more in planning, control 
and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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In summary, GNFF has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual department heads report directly to the general 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
departments and the general manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
In order to promote a democratic and participative management 
style, GNFF has established a "Staff and Worker Representatives 
Committee" which holds regular meetings to make the following 
important decisions :
1. long and medium term strategic plans;
2. operation and administration policies;
3. remuneration and incentive schemes; and
4. employees' welfare and benefits.
After operational quality inspection by the middle management and 
labour union representatives, the committee evaluates the 
operation and performance of the production function twice every 
month and recommends remedies and improvements to the factory 
general manager. In addition, the committee has formed a 
"Quality Circle" sytem to discuss and implement methods to 
improve the product quality.
Since changing into shareholding enterprise in October 1992, 
Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) has implemented a formal 
planning process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plan or budget and the internal responsibility contracts 
(IRCs). Before the annual planning process starts in October, the 
board of directors will discuss with the Guangzhou Food and Oil 
Bureau to ascertain the "profit before income tax" target which 
is the driving factor for the board and other senior staff to 
evaluate the internal and external environmental factors in order 
to determine the annual sales for next year. Based on these 
preliminary targets, some guidelines are provided to the workshop 
managers to initiate their own production plans or budgets. Much 
emphasis is placed on the production targets for the four 
production workshops which annual plans contained the key 
criteria to be used as the measurement yardsticks of their 
subsequent internal responsibility contracts.
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At the end of the calender year, all the workshops and
departments submit their annual plans to the Accounting and 
Finance Department for compiling the "financial plan" or "master 
budget" before submitting to the Enterprise Management Office for 
review and discussion by the general managers with the deputy 
managers and the three chiefs. The "Staff & Workers
Representatives Committee" (see below) holds a meeting in January
mainly to discuss the gaps between the submitted plans with the 
targets perceived by the top management. The top management 
tries to help the production workshops solving their technical, 
financial and other problems in order to close the gaps as far as 
possible. Then, further formal and informal meetings and 
discussions are held between the general manager, deputy-general 
m a n a g e r s  and w o r k s h o p  managers either c o l l e c t i v e l y  or
individually. This iterative exercise carries on until all the 
annual plans and contracts are mutually agreed by the board of 
directors and approved in the AGM (all the employees can attain) 
held during February. The approved annual production plans were 
broken down into quarterly and monthly plans to cater for demand 
and holiday factors.
Before 1992, there was no such formal annual planning review 
process and the government and in turn the top management gave 
directions to the workshops and departments on what should be 
done over the next 12 months within the context of a few key 
indicators e.g. sales, production volume and mix, quality 
improvement, material and energy consumption, etc. Since 1992, 
under the legislative changes and market economy promotion, the 
government has delegated higher automomy to GNFF in formulating 
its strategic directions. As a result, all the workshops and 
departments are encouraged to participate in the planning process 
and extend their planning horizon beyond one year in order to 
match the milestones set in the 5-year long term plan. However, 
the compromised "profit before income tax target" with the 
bureau is the primary objective to be accomplished even though 
directives have to be given from the top to lower levels of 
management.
Therefore, the board of directors and general manager has 
inserted less interference in departmental planning decisions, 
but without reducing the tight financial control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 3  S t r a t e g i c  Them es,  T h r u s t s  and S u g g e s t i o n s
In 1990, GNFF has engaged Guangzhou Scientific Reasearch 
Laboratory to suggest means to improve the operation and 
management systems. Finally a policy-book was published in 
October 1991. In this authoritative publication, the following 
four strategic themes are described in great detail :
(1) Wholistic - improve all the sub-systems (personnel, finance, 
resources, production, supply, sales etc.) and integrated 
them as a whole to enhance the economic efficiency. Quality 
enhancement is the aim, technology improvement is the tool, 
continuous reforms is the driving force, factory manager 
responsibility system is the core of management and to 
seggregate the responsibility down the hirarchy by using 
IRC.
(2) Stringent - tight management control through enterprise's 
rules and regulations, technology, management, job standards 
setting and assessment, remuneration link up with economic 
effectiveness and efficiency.
(3) Advancement - in business thinking and strategy. The motto
is "have somethings which the competitors do not have; have 
somethings better than what the competitors have" in terms 
of :
3.1 products - high product quality i.e. super refined 
flour by pursuing the international sandards;
3.2 technology and facilities - by improvement and import 
modern plants and equipment; and
3.3 human resources and expertise - recruit young and well 
educated management personnel and provide them with 
intensive training.
(4) Harmony - working environment and human relationship, 
dedicated employees, "humun resource" oriented management 
style, to motivate employees' sense of belongings and 
dedication to the enterprise.
GNFF has been promulgating "Quality" as the most important 
strategic thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for 
the domestic market share on one hand and to explore the overseas 
markets on the other hand. As far as hardware is concerned, GNFF 
has imported some modern manufacturing plant and equipment from 
the USA and European countries to replace the old ones since the 
1990s. Furthermore in 1988, GNFF established a "Total Quality 
Management Committee" to oversee the following activities :
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1. to formulate quality management policies;
2. to plan for product quality innovation;
3. to design quality responsibility system;
4. to collect quality control and cost information; and
5. to perform quality audit.
The Quality Control Department is responsible for designing 
policies, setting production and product standards, testing new 
products and providing, training. The Inspection Department is 
responsible for controlling the input materials and output 
products quality, and enforcing the compliance of quality 
procedures in production. Furthermore, each production workshop 
has its own inspection personnel to provide initial quality 
control.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in GNFF still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and review process 
such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, marketing strategy 
and production quantity and mix in order to ensure the "profit 
before income tax" as agreed with the bureau can be achieved. 
Despite this fact, the top management has given some freedom to 
the workshop managers and department heads to compile their own 
plans or budgets and to adjust their plans and operations as long 
as they do not deviate much from the ultimate sales and profit 
targets.
The top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on weekly and monthly basis and are quick to 
make suggestions if they do not match the overall long and short 
term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the establishment of Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) 
in 1960, it has followed the national 5-year's planning cycle and 
carried put the missions as assigned in every 5-year's plan 
directed by the municipal government under the central economic 
planning system.
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The commencement of the ecpnomic reforms in 1979 started to 
allowed GNFF to participate in the 5-year's planning with the 
Guangzhou Food & Oil Bureau but specific directives and 
suggestions were always coming from the top by using the term 
"macroeconomic control and adjustment" as an excuse.
The changing role of the bureau since 1990 has encouraged GNFF, 
for the first time, to formulate their own long term strategic 
plan (1991-1995) .■ However, many internal factors and external 
uncertainties have affected the validity and reliability of.this 
long term plan which has been subject to review and changes every 
year. The long term plan was formulated by GNFF's top management 
without much participation from the middle or lower management 
although they are consulted during the "Staff and Workers 
Representatives Committee".
Since then, the top management or board of directors subsequently 
reviewed the long term plan at the end of each year. Amendments 
have to be made in view of significant changes in the external 
environmental factors. Since the early 1990s, the following 
strategic directions have been laid down.
(a) Joint-Venture
Other than the import and export trading cooperation with a 
Hong Kong company, the major direction of joint-venture 
business is flour manufacturing and export such as the 
current one with a Hong Kong company (No.4 Flour Workshop) 
and another one in Spain to supply flour products to the 
European countries.
(b) Production Capacity
Relative to the other three workshops, the production plant 
and facilities of No.l Flour Workshop were inefficient 
because they were built in the late 1950s. Since the N o .4 
Flour Workshop's production started in early 1994, the No.l 
Flour Workshop was closed down in mid-1994, and as a result, 
the maximum production capacity can be maintained at 300,000 
, tons per annum as from 1995 to 2000. The original workers 
in No.l Flour Workshop have been transferred to the other 3 
flour workshops by adding one more shift in each workshop.
(c) Market Development
To penetrate into the domestic market and capture higher 
market share, GNFF has established many sales agencies in 
the major cities in China. In addition, the sales personnel 
have been seggregated into geographic teams with different 
marketing strategies and tatics.
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The IRC signed with the Sales Department links up the 
remuneration directly with the sales volume and the accounts 
receivable (or cash collected) in order to motivate the 
sales and marketing effort. To explore the overseas markets, 
selling top quality products to Hong Kong is the first 
choice after some market research and testings have been 
done by the j oint-venture partner in Hong Kong. Other 
preferred overseas markets will be the Southeast Asian 
countries such as Vietnam and also African countries.
The GNFF1s top management recognises that market development 
is the most crucial strategy to revive and sustain the 
financial performance in 1995 and beyond. Therefore, more 
market reseach, advertisement and promotion would be 
undertaken.
(d) Product Development
Since the present three flour production lines have geared 
up to the 1990s international standards, GNFF is changing 
the product mix and more bias to the high end to produce 
better quality products to satisfy not only the changing 
demand in Guangdong province, but also export to Hong Kong 
used by the hotels and high-class restaurants. On the other 
hand, GNFF has developed a "wheat essense" capsule which is 
a kind of health food selling domestically at the moment. 
Another developing product is wheat or barley instant cereal 
which is getting popular in Guangzhou.
(e) Sources of Capital
To finance the renovation of production facilities and 
importation of foreign-made plants and machines require 
substaintial amount of capital. Apart from joint-venture 
capital, GNFF has relied very much on bank loan to support 
mainly the quick return investment (i.e.two to three years). 
Nevertheless, public listing should be another means to 
acquire long term capital for business expansion and 
diversification which are restricted for the time being.
(f) Computerisation
Personal computers have been used intensively for production 
planning and control, and also for statistics and filing 
purposes. However, most of the accounting functions are 
still performed manually because the major problems are the 
difficulty to choose a .user-friendly accounting software and 
insufficient training for staff. During the recent visit to 
Hong Kong, the accounting and finance personnel have learnt 
a lot from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and also a 
few companies. GNFF is planning to computerise the whole 
accounting and finance department.
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But the top management do not have a committed plan to use 
mini-computer to implement any networking system. Perhaps 
source of capital and human expertise are the major hurdles.
(g) Manpower Development
During 1991, GNFF introduced the "Professional and Technical 
Staff System" which is an open and competitive system for 
the employees to be assessed for promotion. As a result, 2 
employees have been qualified as senior professional staff, 
10 as professional staff and 74 as junior professional 
staff. Furthermore, a policy called "The Best Employee 
Combination" was promulgated to encourage each individual in 
a workshop, shift, group, department and team contributing 
to their best and be fully cooperative. For example, with 
the consent of top management, an unsatisfactory team member 
may be transferred out to other teams or suspended working 
for a period of time for training.
(h) First Class Enterprise
In 1989, GNFF established an "Organisation Reform Committee" 
to restructure the whole organisation and prepare for the 
upgrading from third-class to second-class enterprise 
awarded by the government. This aim was achieved in 1990 
and GNFF is planning to be qualified as a "first-class" 
enterprise and its accounting system is second class before 
2000. To this end, GNFF has laid down strigent guidance in 
a policy-book which core contents are described after the 
end of this section below.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Bureau has devolved its central planning role to 
individual enterprises under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the 
top management of GNFF is taking the initiative to formulate its 
own long term plan but participation from the middle management 
is limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t ^  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
The general short term planning policy adopted by Guangzhou Nan 
Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) is "production determined by sales" and 
"sales determined by targeted profit before income tax" which 
means that profit before income tax, as agreed in the ERC or even 
under the present shareholding system, with the Guangzhou Food & 
Oil Bureau is the initial driving force of all the activities. 
After transforming into a shareholding enterprise, reference has 
also been made to the 5-year plan especially to estimate what the 
sales potential will be from the new product and market situation 
in the next year. As from October 1992, GNFF has employed the 
annual planning or budgeting process as described in Section 5.2 
above.
Since October 1992, the workshop managers have been involved in 
this budgeting process which they believe to be important in 
setting and negotiating the subsequent internal responsibility 
contracts with the general manager. However, apart from the 
sales department, the other non-production department heads do 
not take part in the annual planning except to be consulted only.
The two most important annual plans are consolidated production 
and finance budgets of which the latter one is a mean to ensure 
that the target profit before income tax can be met. 
Nevertheless the financial or master budget does not involve too 
much participation from the other non-production departments, but 
largely based on the guidelines from the top management and the 
experience of the finance manager. Eventually, the other 
departments or cost centres are constrainted by their allocated 
expense budgets. Therefore, it is quite a top-down process in 
terms of expense budget and also capital budget as well.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the budget 
review period has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The 
general manager and his deputy managers and chiefs hold a formal 
meeting at the beginning of each month to review the financial 
performance against the master budget and individual departmental 
budgets. Amendments are made when there are significant factors 
affecting the overall production, sales and profit targets.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
promulgations have given GNFF more freedom to plan ahead. The 
government have bureau have completely devolved the short term 
planning autonomy to GNFF except to agree on the overall profit 
before income tax target.
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The top management have finvolved the middle management, 
especially the sale and production functions, in the annual 
planning and budgeting process which on one hand is a critical 
step in materializing the long term strategic plan or the ERC, 
and on the other hand, it is an important motivational factor for 
the workshop managers and department heads to manage their own 
businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) started the Internal 
Responsibility Contract (IRC) System in 1989. Before the IRC, 
GNFF had set production quantity, input/output ratio and 
electricity consumption targets for the production workshops.
The followings are examples of some IRCs adopted by GNFF :
Department : No.l, No.2 & No.3 Flour Workshops
Year : 1992
Guidelines :
Provided the output quality can attain the prescribed standard, 
the ultimate performance target to be measured on the three flour 
manufacturing workshps is "Monthly Internal Profit" which is 
calculated by deducting actual cost of production from the 
standard sales revenue. The actual production mix multiplied by 
the respective standard or market selling prices equals to the 
standard sales revenue. The monthly group bonus for the whole 
workshop is determined according to the internal profit achieved 
every month.
Monthly Internal Profit : (based on target production mix)
Flour Manufacturing Factory
(RMB'000) No.l No. 2 No. 3
Internal Sales Revenue
Standard Sales Revenue* 6, 502 7, 220 8, 660
Internal Production Costs#
Cost of Production 6,441 7,110 8,460
Internal Profit 61 110 200
Profit Share@ xl00% x 72% x 27%
= 61 = 79.2 = 54
Bonus Ratio x 11% x 11% x 11%
Group Bonus = 6.71 = 8 .71 = 5 . 94
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f Flour Manufacturing Factory
(RMB*000) N o .1 N o .2 N o .3
# Including :
Cost Of Materials 946 946 1,000
Depreciation 130 203 224
Electricity (RMB0.37 per KWH)
Consumables (standard prices)
Wages (budgeted wages)
Overheads (direct and indirect)
@ Because of different production efficiency and mix and 
selling prices among the three workshops, therefore, the 
"profit share" is to balance the group bonus to be awarded.
* Standard or market selling prices are listed below :
RMB per Ton
Upper Class - Blend A 1,591
Blend B 1,474
Blend C 1,410
Middle Class - Blend D 1,371
Blend E 1,276
Blend F 1,207
Lower Class - Blend G 1,020
Blend H 618
Wheat Shell 438
The above internal profit targets are based on budgeted 
production mix and standard costs. The actual monthly internal 
profits are determined according to actual production mix and 
actual costs.
Department : Pastry Workshop
Year : 1989
Guidelines :
In order to further enhance the enterprise reform, improve the 
production management, and increase the incentives for employees, 
GNFF has decided to enter • into the following internal 
responsibility contract with the Pastry Workshop as from 1 
January to 31 December 1989.
Format :
Under the leadership of Factory General Manager (contractor) and 
according to the targets of the long term plan (1986-1990) , the 
Pastry Workshop Manager (contractee) has the autonomy to 
self-manage and self-finance its operation, and the performance 
bonus is linked up with the internal profit actually achieved.
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S c o p e  : f
The major business of the contractee is to manufacture bread and 
develop new pastry products in order to satisfy the needs of the 
market, and to improve the economic efficiency of the enterprise.
Economic Targets :
The following agreed economic targets are based on the actual 
performance attained in 1989.
(1) Total pastry production quantity
(2) Input (flour) : output (pastry) ratio
(3) Output passing rate
(4) Total sales revenue
(5) Total cost of production
(6) Total selling expenses
(7) Total sales tax (i.e. VAT)
(8) Total annual profit before income tax
Or monthly profit before income tax
294 tons 
1.3 : 1.0 
98 .5%
RMB1.0336M 
RMBO.8997M 
RMB23,000 
RMB52,900 
RMB58,000 
RMB 4,833
Incentive Scheme :
(1) Basic Wages
The employee establishment of pastry workshop should be 48 
(including 8 temporary workers). According to the total wages 
and economic efficiency linkage system, the monthly gross wages
for this workshop should be RMB8,890 (or RMB185 per employee) and
could be charged to the cost of production. Then the actual 
basic wages, overtime premium and meal allowance paid are 
compared with the standard gross wages (i.e. RMB8,890) and any 
variance is treated as internal profit or loss to the workshop.
(2) Group Bonus
Let P = actual monthly internal profit before income tax
B = actual monthly group bonus to be paid
If .P < RMB4,833, then B
P = RMB4,833, then B
P > RMB4,833, then B
i.e P = RMB6,000, then B
0 or negative
4,833 x 75% = RMB3,62 5
(P - 4,833) x 15% + 3,625
(6,000-4,833)xl5%+3,625 = RMB3,800
Others :
According to separate regulations, the following factors may 
reduce the group bonus to be awarded :
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(1) production safety;
(2) production facilities maintenance;
(3) financial management and evaluation;
(4) shortfall of target internal profit; and
(5) political education.
Department : Repair & Maintenance Workshop
Energy & Power Workshop
Year : 1993
Guidelines :
The purposes of this internal responsibility contract are to
further enhance the enterprise reform, motivate the creativeness
and increase the incentive of the employees.
Incentive Scheme :
(1) 50% of the total wages (basic + bonus) is determined 
according to the performance of the flour production 
workshops and the workload of the contractee's workshop.
(2) After satisfying the internal required assignments and
duties, the contractees can accept business from outside 
customers in order to increase revenue and profit.
Scope :
(1) To provide various repair and maintenance (including
regular, annual and on-call) services to the flour 
manufacturing and raw material preparation workshops.
(2) To provide and supervise the supply of electricity, gas and
water for the whole enterprise.
(3) Mechanical problems are dealt with by the repair and
maintenance workshop, while the electrical problems are
dealt with by the energy and power workshop.
(4) . To improve the production technology, renovate the
production facilities, and produce and repair spare parts.
(5) To undertake other jobs as assigned by the headquarters
(contractor).
Wages (Basic + Bonus) :
(1) 50% of the total wages (basic + bonus) is determined
according to the performance of the flour production 
workshops and the working hours of the contractee's 
workshop.
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(2) Monthly budgeted working hours :
Repair & Maintenance Workshop = 3,000 hours 
Energy & Power Workshop = 2,000 hours
(3) If the total actual working hours derived from the flour
production workshops are less than the budgeted hours, then
the budgeted hours are used to determined the wages and
bonus.
(4) If the total actual working hours derived from the flour
production workshops are greater than the budgeted hours, 
then the actual hours will be used to determined the wages 
and bonus.
(5) Let S = Monthly average income of flour making employees
Actual income of all flour production workshops
No. of employees of all flour production workshops
(6) Linkage Wages (repair and energy workshops)
= S x Budgeted no. of employees x 6 0%
(7) Working Hours Wages (both workshops)
= RMB0.5 x Actual working hours
(8) External Work Wages (both workshops)
= (Incomes - material costs) x 40%
(9) Total wages = (6+7+8)
Others :
(1) All the repair and maintenance works other than the flour
and raw materials workshops are arranged by the Production
Department. If an individual project requires more than
- 10,000 working hours, a separate contract should be
designed.
(2) Accepting external assignments should be approved by the 
Production Department and the incomes should be received by 
the Accounting Department.
(3) Due .to the time lag between performance measurement and
payroll, the above wages are prepaid in the current month 
and then adjusted in the following month after detail 
calculations.
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(4) According to the <<Entprprise Internal Wages Distribution 
Management Regulations>> [Q/(LZ)NFG 9.12], the workshops 
have the autonomy to distribute the awarded total wages to 
their individual employees.
(5) The Production Department should undertake corresponding 
policies in order to implement the terms and conditions of 
this contract.
(6) This contract commences from September 1993.
Department : General Affairs/Transportation Vehicle Fleet
Year : 1993
Guidelines :
Because of inflation and changes in the vehicle fleet, the
original internal responsibility contract for 1993 has been
revised as follow.
Terms & Conditions :
(1) Due to reduction of number of vehicles, the total targeted 
milage is reduced from 316,600 km to 300,000 km.
(2) Due to inflation, the operating, tyres, insurance and other 
expenses are being increased. Therefore, the total budgeted 
cost is revised to RMB560,000.
(3) The delivery charge (internal and external) is increased 
from RMB0.56 to RMB0.66 per ton-km.
(4) The targeted profit before income tax i.e. RMB60,000 remains
unchanged. If actual profit exceeds the target, the fleet 
can retain 25% of the surplus instead of 15% as previously 
agreed. For example, if actual profit is RMB80,000, then 
RMB75,000 (i.e. RMB20,000 x 75% + RMB60,000) should be
handed over to contractor (or headquarters) and the fleet 
can retain RMB5,000 (i.e. RMB20,000 x 25%) as bonus. If
. actual profit is less than the target, 25% of the shortfall 
will be deducted from the wages.
(5) The above amendments are retrospective to January 1993.
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It takes a few months for the general manager, workshop managers, 
general affairs manager and sales manager to negotiate with the 
terms and conditions for their IRCs signed in parallel with the 
planning process started in October until final approval endorsed 
by the annual general meeting in next February. In this 
negotiation process, the top management do insert influence and 
suggestion in order to ensure that the ultimate profit before 
income tax target agreed with the Guangzhou Food & Oil Bureau can 
be achieved.
The workshop managers and even their shift and group leaders are 
very eager on this issue upon which they are measured against and 
rewarded thereupon. The IRCs are reviewed quarterly and revised 
if necessary in order to enhance the production management such 
as cost control, quantity, quality etc.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
workshop managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also involved the accounting and finance department 
intensively as a vetting mechanism in order to set the targets as 
objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Since each flour production workshop of Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour 
Mill (GNFF) is independent in manufacturing its own products 
without any transfer to other factories, the transfer pricing is 
not applicable. The transfer of some flour products to the 
pastry workshop for manufacturing bread, the services provided by 
the supporting workshops (i.e. raw material treatment, repair and 
maintenance, energy and power), and the transportation services 
provided by the vehicle fleet do involve transfer prices which 
are-all determined according to the standard or market prices as 
fixed by the Enterprise Management Office and Accounting 
Department on a quarterly basis.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Guangzhou Nan 
Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) has four levels of management hierarchy :
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(1) Board of Directors (many overlaps with top management)
(2) Top Management (general manager, deputy-general managers
three chiefs)
(3) Middle Management (workshop managers and department heads)
(4) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-general managers and the three chiefs can decide on 
their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (sections). 
They are also responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of emploment with any 
staff is a difficult task which will be explained in the rewards 
and incentives section at the end.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the workshops and departments are by 
using annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 
above, the most important measurement criteria are internal 
profit and production volume set in the IRCs, although some other 
qualitative targets (non-financial) are employed. However, these 
are subsidiary ones which have lower weightings in calculating 
the group bonus.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of GNFF.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) sets similar objectives for 
its production workshops : workshop managers must meet their
agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement in 
performance year after year except under adverse market 
conditions. The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual 
budget review. In view of the fierce competition within this 
industry and the bottom line (profit before income tax) imposed 
by the top management, the production workshops sometimes feel 
passive in setting their objectives or targets in the budgets or 
IRCs because their activities are depending on the sales demand.
2 0 0
A high pressure to achieve J:he budgeted production and internal 
profit is put on the workshop managers at the monthly review. 
They fully understand that their group bonus are tied in with the 
budget or IRC and it also depends on the overall performance of 
the enterprise as a whole. In terms of expenses, control is 
tighter and a system of standard cost is going to be implemented. 
Although the other departments do not have the IRCs, they are 
constrained by the allocated capital and revenue expense budgets 
by the top management. In addition to the formal monthly review 
process, many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and 
informal communications are made between the top and middle 
management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) regards it as essential to 
catch variances from budget or IRC before they have gone too far. 
To this end the top management monitor results on a monthly and 
even weekly basis. All the workshops and departments submit 
monthly results on standard forms to their respective divisional 
heads and also to the chief accountant for vetting and comparison 
with budgets and IRCs. The production workshops are also 
required to submit production figures to the top management on a 
weekly and daily basis.
The monthly report format is unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the budgeted line items 
from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted 
from this report. The weekly and monthly actuals are compared 
with the budgets and IRCs. The qualitative targets are usually 
subjectively measured by the divisional heads and enterprise 
management office, and written in the monthly reports as well. 
These monthly reports are compiled, some of them through the 
computer, by the accounting department and enterprise management 
office. Any significant variances (without specifying tolerance 
limits) are highlighted in order to bring the attention to the 
top management. Then all the monthly reports are submitted to 
the general manager for review. For any serious adverse 
variances shown on any report, the general manager will contact 
with the .respective deputy managers, chiefs, workshop managers or 
department heads to dig out the underlying reasons or ask them to 
perform investigation immediately. It is expected that 
corrective actions can be taken to remedy the situation as soon 
as possible.
2 0 1
During the Monthly Performance Evaluation Meeting of the top 
management with the middle management, the workshop managers put 
forward the monthly results for open discussion. The workshop 
managers and the department heads may be asked to explain briefly 
the significant variances. Consistent failure (say over 12 
months) in meeting the targets which are controllable by a 
workshop manager, probably he may be replaced by somebody else. 
On the other hand, the favourable results are openly praised by 
the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the accounting department for calculating the group bonus 
of each workshop or department for last month and verified by the 
personnel department. Then the accounting department will process 
the bonus payments at the end of the month (i.e. payment of 
monthly bonus is lagged by one month).
The importance of computerization is not well recognised by the 
top management even though a few stand-alone personal computers 
have been used for production control, statistics, filing and 
payroll. There is no plan for implementing a comprehensive 
integrated management or accounting information system. Perhaps 
the lack of capital for investment in computer hardware and 
software and the urgent needs to focus on the marketing 
strategies put computerization at the bottom of the priority 
list.
Now, GNFF views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the department or workshop. The monitoring process 
is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
Since 1988, GNFF has classified its salaries and wages scale into 
8 c l a s s e s  (with p o i n t s  in ea c h  class) a c c o r d i n g  to 
responsibilities, skills and efforts. The monthly salaries or 
wages, including the bonuses, are floating within the points 
according to individual performance. The gross salaries and 
wages are linked up with the targeted profit set in the Economic 
Responsibility Contract (ERC) in the following manner :
2 0 2
(1) The target profit in 1988 was RMB12.45 million, then the 
allowable gross salaries and wages would be RMB2.87 million 
(23% of profit).
(2) For 1% increase in profit, gross salaries and wages could be 
increased by 0.9%.
(3) If product passing rate was below standard (usually 100%),
50% of any excess gross salaries and wages (i.e. the amount 
over RMB2.87 million ) should be deducted.
(4) For every 1% of input/output (wheat/flour) ratio below
standard (i.e. 84%), 1% of any excess gross salaries and
wages (i.e. the amount over RMB2.87 million) should be
deducted.
(5) For every 10% of electricity consumption over standard (i.e.
65Kwh per ton of flour), 1% of any excess gross salaries and
wages (i.e. the amount over RMB2.87 million) should be
deducted.
(6) For every 1% of productivity (i.e. ton of flour per
employee) below the last year actual, 1% of any excess gross 
salaries and wages (i.e. the amount over RMB2.87 million) 
should be deducted.
The "Basic Salaries and Wages" are determined according to :
(1) seniority (i.e. years of service)
(2) allowance (i.e. meal, housing, attendance, travelling etc.)
(3) job skill (i.e. the weighting of job skill and efficiency)
(4) efficiency (this component has increased from 30% to 40%)
Some jobs, such as the packing workers in the flour production
workshops and the dock carriers, have employed the "piece rate"
wages system. Furthermore, canteen staff's wages are based on
its own operating income.
The above wages reforms have the following advantages :
(1) remuneration is linked up with economic efficiency (i.e. 
productivity);
(2) remuneration is according to effort and individual 
motivation is stimulated;
(3) remuneration is according to individual performance and "big 
rice pot" concept has been broken;
(4) staff are more concerned on production, management and 
efficiency in order to increase their remuneration; and
(5) short term behaviour can be avoided.
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Furthermore, since 1994, GNFF has unified the basic wages and 
bonus together which is determined by two elements i.e. post 
wages (include allowance) and ability wages. Each post has five 
to six grades according to technical skill assessed annually. 
The ability wages include the actual performance which may be 
assessed according to the IRC on a monthly basis. The poor 
performance of an individual in a group may be transferred out 
for education and training or other assignments or even leave the 
enterprise.
Since 1992, GNFF has obtained the autonomy to recruit employees 
from the labour market without getting the Guangzhou Manpower 
Bureau involved (in accordance with the Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations).
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the GNFF is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration. If' GNFF actually paid wages and bonus above the 
ceilings, the excess will not be income tax deductable.
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System) , if there is an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the Guangzhou Food & Oil Bureau will award a 
lump sum of "special bonus" to the factory manager at the end of 
the year. But under no circumstances, the remuneration package of 
the factory manager can be greater than three times the total 
earnings of a department head (middle management). If the annual 
profit before tax can achieve better than' the planned levels, a 
"year-end bonus" will be awarded to all the employees and 
distributed in a way very similar to the monthly bonus.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees.
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However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
may cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
Since 1993, GNFF has fully implemented the employment contract 
system and also the "In-Post Contracts" with most of the 
employees for periods from one to ten years. This in-post
contract signifies that an employee is qualified for that 
specific post and he or she is eligible to receive basic wages, 
allowance and bonus.
Without such a contract, that employee is out of job but he or 
she is still an employee of GNFF and is allowed to receive a 
basic monthly subsidy of about RMB200. This measure may not 
impose a serious threat to the lazy employees, but it can 
motivate the marginal employees to work better. The number of 
employees have been reduced by 20% since 1992. One way was to
transfer some administration staff down to the production
workshops to fill some vacancies.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1.)
In summary, GNFF believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Finance Control"
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
f
The above planning and control influences are'summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Review Process* High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on thfe "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\/
[Post-1992]
(Financial 
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Nan Fang Flour Mill (GNFF) before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been shifting gradually from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) 
to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet 
reached a strong-form (low corporate) of financial control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. It seems 
to be in the "middle of the road" between this two styles.
Revised : 9 March 1996
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In 1990, GNFF has engaged Guangzhou Scientific Research 
Laboratory to suggest means to improve the operation and 
management systems. Finally in October 1991, a book was 
published laying down the long term (1991-2000) policies to 
upgrade GNFF into a "first class enterprise" in China. The 
following is a description of the "Wholistic Management System" 
which is the core of the whole book.
(1) Enterprise Management System
This includes operation mechanism, leadership style, organisation 
structure, personnel affairs and remuneration system. They are 
tools for strategic formulation and means to enhance the economic 
efficiency. GNFF1s management style is using the "economic 
responsibility system" which is an important control mechanism to 
integrate the duties, rights, evaluation and incentive together 
in order to improve the economic performance. Detials refers to 
Organisation Structure (Section 2) above.
(2) Basic Management Jobs
GNFF's Basic Management Jobs are to ensure the proper operation 
of each management position, to achieve the enterprise objectives 
and to implement the strategies and decisions laid down by the 
top management. In fact, GNFF's Basic Management Jobs are the 
corner stones of the Wholistic Management Concepts. They are the 
tools for internal operation reforms, production management and 
modernisation of management techniques. There are seven elements 
of Basic Management Jobs.
2.1 Internal Rules and Regulations
The purposes of designing various internal rules and regulations 
in GNFF are :
(a) to facilitate the responsibility system of integrating the 
duties, rights and incentive together;
(b) to ensure the r e a l i s a t i o n  of the Factory Manager 
Responsibility System; and
(c) to enhance the quality of Wholistic Management Concepts.
These internal rules and regulations cover :
(a) Factory Manager Responsibility System;
(b) Basic and Professional Management System;
(c) Enterprise Management Office (Top Management) Meeting;
(d) Job/Post Responsibility (Description) System;
(e) Quality Management System;
(f) Quality Inspection System; and
(g) Customer Service System.
The above internal rules and regulations enhance :
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(a) enterprise management standard;
(b) economic efficiency;
(c) operation efficiency and quality;
(d) organisation structure and design; and
(e) participation, motivation and creativity of employees.
2.2 Standardisation System
The initiation behind the formation of a Standardisation 
Committee led by the Factory Manager since early 1990s was to 
apply for the Enterprise Graidng Promotion (from third class to 
second class) as assessed by the government for the state-owned 
enterprises. GNFF's standardisation system covers the workflows 
from raw materials input (i.e. wheat) to selling the products to 
customers. This system is divided into the following three 
levels :
(a) management, technical and job standards;
(b) functional standards to realise the standrds in (a) above,
for example, management standards include target management, 
production management, technology management, facility 
management, energy management; and
(c) yardsticks to measure the standards in (b) above, for 
example, energy management is measured by electricity 
consumed by workshop, shift, group or product.
In the standardisation process, GNFF emphasizes on the "coverage" 
and "consistancy" characteristics. In 1992, there were 93 
management standards, 25 technical standards and 12 job 
standards.
2.3 Quantititive Management
GNFF applies the quantitative management in production, operation 
and research aspects in order to improve product quality, 
material and energy consumptions and economic efficiency. A 
"Quality Management Committee" has been formed and chaired by the 
Factory Manager. Each production workshop and department has a 
part-time quantitative controller responsible for implementing 
the policies and procedures and reporting the actual performance. 
GNFF has operated a "Quantitative Management Implementation 
Regulations", having 26 measurement items, to standardise the 
original records, technical files and measuring instruments. 
This.system focuses on the following six management aspects :
(a) energy consumption;
(b) business operation;
(c) production technology;
(d) quality control;
(e) production inspection; and
(f) safety and environment protection.
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The f o l l o w i n g  a r e  some e x a m p l e s  o f  t h i s  s y s t e m  :
(a) apply the ABC theory in classifying 1,000 measuring 
instruments into 3 categories for recording and control;
(b) fully inspect the measuring instruments before repair, scrap 
and replacement; and
(c) invest nearly RMB1 million in purchasing new and advanced 
measuring and inspecting instruments to improve the new 
product testing and trial run, production control, product 
packaging, quality control and energy control.
GNFF was qualified as "Advanced Quantitative Management 
Enterprise" by the government in 1991.
2.4 Target Management
GNFF's Target Management System is similar to a set of production 
budgets which are mainly derived from sales forecast based on 
market demand and government guidance. There is a "Production 
Target Management Regulations" to govern the procedures in 
setting the production targets for workshops, shifts and groups 
taking into account production facilities and technologies of 
individual units. It also determines the product mix, 
input/output rate and production quantities. Other target 
management includes headcount, materials and energy.
2.5 Information Management
GNFF has set up an "Information Network System" which is managed 
by an office with full-time staff handling information 
collection, recording, analysis and feedback. In addition, each 
production workshop and some departments have part-time staff 
responsible for similar information handling procedures. This 
information covers nearly all operation aspects. It can also 
collect and report the information on production quantities, 
input/output rates, energy consumptions, inventory movements, and 
sales figures on a daily basis.
2.6 Recording and Filing System
GNFF has implemented the "Consolidated File Management System" 
and "Recording Coding System" which are managed by the Filing 
Section according to the requirements of Second Class Enterprise 
laid down by the government. The system is divided into the 
following files :
(a) product (f) operation management
(b) plant & equipment (g) communist party work
(c) building & facility (h) personnel
(d) research & development (i) accounting
(e) administration (j) audio/video information
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Some of the above filing 'systems i.e. personnel have been 
computerised.
2.7 Shifts and Groups
Shifts and groups are the basic production units within a 
production workshop. Production management should be started 
from the shifts and groups, and the selection and training of 
leaders are very important.
GNFF has 72 shifts and groups with one leader and a few 
supervisors in each of them. Each leader should possess the 
following five qualities :
(a) assertive and responsible;
(b) ambitious and good management skills;
(c) thorough understanding of production management;
(d) good interpersonal skills; and
(e) at least secondary school academic qualification and rich
working experience.
The leader is elected by members of the shift or group and 
approved by the Production Manager (Chief Engineer). The few 
supervisors are responsibles for facility, safety, sanity, 
evaluation, discipline and party work.
(3) Product Quality Assurance System
GNFF always emphasizes product quality in the first place before 
any other management systems. Product quality should be enhanced 
continuously which is the prerequisite for economic efficiency, 
survival and development. The top three quality flour products, 
accounting for 75% of the total output values, have always been 
qualified as quality products by the government. Furthermore, 
they have won quality prizes in many national exhibitions.
The GNFF's Total Quality Control (TQC) System consists of the 
following four components.
3.1 Education and Training
The slogan of "Quality is No.l" is the core of TQC education and 
training in GNFF. The guiding principles are quality for 
business development, quality for brand name promotion, quality 
for economic efficiency. GNFF has been promoting the following 
"four combined efforts and three channels" in TQC.
(a) combine the "Quality is No.l" concept into the quality 
management education and training;
(b) combine the general (all staff) and professional (senior 
staff) education and training in terms of quality control;
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(c) combine the quality control and technical education and 
training; and f
(d) combine the theory and practice education and training in 
terms of quality control.
The 3 channels are :
(a) make use of the annual staff and worker meeting (i.e. AGM), 
workshop, shift and group meetings to promote TQC;
(b) make use of various kinds of notice boards, newsletters, 
walls and banners to promote TQC; and
(c) organise internal and external full-time and part-time TQC 
training courses for all levels of staff and workers.
From 1987 to 1992, 28 TQC training courses have been conducted
and 96% of employees have undertaken these courses with 100% 
passing rate.
3.2 Network System
GNFF has used the following "one network and three systems" to 
implement the TQC system.
The one network concept means a combination of self- inspection, 
peer-inpsection and specific-inspection. There are 24 full-time 
and 12 part-time quality inspectors responsible for quality 
control in production workshops, shifts and groups, and also some 
other departments. The production shifts and groups have 
part-time quality inspectors, whereas the production workshops 
and Quality Control Department have full-time professional 
quality control staff. Therefore, the shifts and groups are 
responsible for the self-inspection, the workshops are taking the 
peer-inspection, and the QC Department is carrying out 
specific-inspection on both the products and the production 
facilities. Furthermore, GNFF invites . the Guangzhou Health and 
Sanity Department and Guangzhou Industrial Product Quality 
Assurance Bureau to inspect their products on a quarterly basis.
The three systems are organisation assurance system, production 
process quality assurance system and work quality assurance 
system which are centered around the product quality assurance.
(a) Organisation Assurance System
The Total GNFF's Total Quality Management (TQM) Committee is 
chaired by the Factory Manager and the head of Total Quality 
Control (TQC) Department. The TQM Committee is responsible for 
formulating plans and strategies relating to quality management, 
product quality, quality responsibility, quality information and 
quality circles.
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The TQC Group in each production workshop is responsible for 
operating the quality control activities according to the plans 
and standards laid down by the TQM Committee and TQC Department. 
In 1992, GNFF had 20 registered Quality Circles (QC) of which two 
of them (No. 2 and N o . 3 Flour Workshop) have been awarded the 
"Guangdong Province Outstanding Quality Circles".
(b) Production Process Quality Assurance System
There are 6 systems of this Quality Assurance System, namely,
(i) Quality Information Feedback Network;
(ii) New Product Trial Run Guarantee System;
(iii) Production Process Quality Guarantee System;
(iv) Production Support Quality Guarantee System;
(v) Consumption Process Quality Guarantee System; and
(vi) Quality Inspection Guarantee System.
The above sub-systems impose stringent procedural requirements on 
p roduct/market demand, new product development, product 
manufacturing, product inspection and product sales.
(c) Work Quality Assurance System
This system is a combination of work procedures, work standards 
and work assessments to implement the job responsibility system
in order to fulfil the operational plans and objectives. The
quality performance of all workshops and departments, which is 
linked up with the incentive scheme, is evaluated in the Monthly 
Quality Assessment Meeting chaired by the General Manager.
3.3 Rules and Regulations
GNFF has set up a complete set of rules and regulations in order 
to ensure the operation of the "one network and three systems" as 
described in 3.2 above. Typical rules and regulations are :
(a) Internal Quality Control Standards
With reference to the assessment criteria for quality products as 
required by the Ministry of Commerce, GNFF has established the 
"Flour Internal Quality Control Standards" which are even higher 
than the national standards. The major objective is to avoid the 
happening of the following "three rejects" :
(i) sub-standard materials must be rejected;
(ii) sub-standard work-in-progress must not be transferred to 
the next process; and
(iii) sub-standard final products must not be sold.
These stringent standards eventually enhance the product quality 
and increase the market shares.
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(b) Monthly Quality Assessment System
In the monthly Quality Assessment Meeting chaired by the General 
Manager, the quality performance of all workshops and departments 
is evaluated by a marking system which results are linked up with 
the incentive scheme. Ways and means to improve every aspect of 
quality are also recommended and discussed during this meeting.
(c) Quality Veto Right
GNFF has established the "Workshop Quality Management Bonus 
Assessment Regulation" to link up the production quality 
performance with the incentive scheme. The basic formula is :
Quarterly Quality Performance Bonus = (A+B+C+D+E+F) x Q x Bonus
where, A = input/output rate
B = production quantity 
C = electricity consumption 
D = QM organisation and record 
E = QM performance standard 
F = discretionary marks 
Q = quality index 
Bonus = actual bonus before quality factors
In addition, Q = 100% - J
where, J = veto index of quality
= (colour + elasticity + water + others) x 1/3 
colour = flour colur quality veto index 
elasticity = flour elasticity quality veto index 
water = flour water quality veto index 
others = flour powder and fineliness quality veto index
(d) Feedback System
The internal quality feedback system composes of the full-time 
quality control staff in the TQC Department and part-time quality 
control staff in every workshop, shift and group. Original 
records, cards and reports relating to quality management are 
properly kept and can provide timely and accurate information. A 
daily QC report on product quality and problems is submitted to 
the top management for taking corrective actions immediately.
The external quality control system is based on the customers' 
feedback .by the following means :
(i) annual or bi-annual customer seminar;
(ii) monthly or quarterly customer survey questionnaire; and
(iii) regular feedback from the distributors in various cities.
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(e) Q u a l i t y  C o n s u l t a n c y
f
GNFF has employed Guangdong Quality Service Company, Technical 
Department of Guangdong Food & Oil Bureau and Guangzhou 
Quantitative Measurement Bureau to provide consultancy on 
designing and improving the TQM system.
3.4 Technical Measures
To enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Inspection 
Centre, GNFF has utilized RMB370,000 from the production 
development fund (a reserve fund after tax) to import advanced 
testing equipment from the USA, Germany, Sweden and Japan. 
Furthermore, the workshops have used the micro-electronic 
equipment to inspect the flour output. GNFF has also used the 
personal computer to automate production statistics, purchasing 
and sales reports, and wages system.
(4) Economic Efficiency Assurance System
GNFF has always recognised economic efficiency as the most 
important operating indicators. The average annual growth of 
"industrial output value" and "profit before tax" have been 3.19% 
and 28.32% as from 1980 to 1990. Since 1988, GNFF's "return on 
capital employed", "profit per employee" and "productivity per 
employee" have exceeded the required standards of the second 
class enterprises in China. The contributors to continuous 
economic improvement are :
4.1 New Product Development and Product Mix Enhancement
Developing new products, providing required products, selling 
quality products at reasonable prices and expanding the sales 
channels are important means to enhance the economic efficiency 
of GNFF. Based on the external and internal generated market 
information, GNFF has been improving its technology innovation, 
higher quality product development and more product varieties are 
the successful elements as well.
New product development and product divisification are risky 
processes which are handled by GNFF's New Product Development and 
Technology Innovation Management Committee composed of different 
technical and management personnel.
In parallel with the uprising living standard in China, the 
demand of high class flour has been increased. Since the 1990s, 
GNFF h a s .developed 10 brand new of high class flour which have 
saved a certain percentage of imported flour at an estimated cost 
of US$5 million.
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4.2 Renovation, Introduction, and Innovation of Technology
f
Technology advancement and scientific management are the two 
gears for GNFF to bid the keen competition in this industry. 
They include the following three aspects.
(a) Technology Renovation
Since 1983, GNFF has renovated 11 facilities of Workshop No.l and 
N o .2, such as the conveyance (transportation) lines, the pier for 
shipping in and out, high voltage electricity self-supply, etc. 
In 1982, a ba n k  loan of RMB50 0,0 0 0 plus R M B 1 0 0 , 0  00 
self - investment, GNFF renovated the Workshop No.l production 
facility and icnreased the high class flour output rate from 23% 
to 60%. The increased RMB170,000 monthly profit repaid the bank 
loan in the same year.
(b) Technology Introduction
In 1987, GNFF invested RMB18.38 million in introducing an 
advanced production plant from Switzerland which could processed 
400 tons of wheat per day with automated features and computer 
controlled mechanism. Since the operation of this new production 
plant in December 1987, over RMB30 million profit had been 
created in the first three years. Furthermore, this plant could 
produce 3 0% higher class flour than the old ones and productivity 
has been increased by 65%. In addition, a total of RMB300,000 
taken out from the reserve has been invested in purchasing 25 
advanced ultra-red inspection machines from the USA, Germany, 
Sweden and Japan to improve the flour quality.
(c) Technology Innovation
GNFF has experimented many technology innovations to enhance 
production techniques, materials input control, input and output 
ratios, wastages of work-in-progress and output quality.
4.3 Market Information
GNFF makes use of market information to do the following in order 
to ensure all produces can be sold :
(a) adjust the production mix according to market trends,
demands and changes;
(b) develop multi-sales channels and increase stock turnovers
such as to increase retailing shops, distributors and
retailers in many cities (mainly the southern provinces); 
and
(c) adjust the selling prices according to market conditions and 
within government pricing policies.
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4 . 4  F i n a n c i a l  Management
r
GNFF's top management recognised the important functions of the 
accounting and finance which can contribute to the success of
economic efficiency. GNFF has thoroughly complied with and
implemented the <<Accounting Law>> and <<Cost Management 
Regulations>> to strengthen the accounting management and control 
systems such as production cost and quality cost controls in 
order to promote the enterprise accounting standard from one
grade to a higher grade as assessed by the government. In fact,
GNFF has been awarded Grade 1 of Fundamental Accounting Work by 
the Guangdong Finance Bureau. The major accounting and finance 
strategies of GNFF include :
(a) comply and implement the <<Accounting Law>> and <<Guangdong
Province Food and Oil Fundamental A c c o u n t i n g  Work 
Regulations>>. In parallel with the terms and references of 
"Factory M a n a g e r  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  System", GNFF has 
established a set of targets, responsibility and evaluation 
system to control the whole operation from ordering raw 
materials to selling final products;
(b) update and reconcile the accounting records on a daily basis 
and prepare financial statements on a monthly basis;
(c) upkeep the accounting filing and information management 
system by a separate function within the accounting and 
finance department; and
(d) modernise the accounting and financial management techniques 
such as computerization in order to provide accurate and 
timely information for planning, control, evaluation and 
decision-making.
4.5 Rationalisation and Reform
System rationalisation and technology reform (including work 
study) are resources consuming activities but they can solve many 
production and oepration problems in long term. The mechanism is 
to consolidate the experience in a certain piece of work, discuss 
any specific problem happened in the work, devise means to solve 
the problem, implement the solution and review the experience, 
and start the cycle again.
GNFF has established a committee led by the General Manager to 
investigate any system rationalisation and technology reform 
which are linked up with the incentive scheme according to 
economic efficiency derived. Since the promulgation of the 
strategy in 1989, there have been 75 technology reforms in which 
9 have awarded special bonuses. They have saved RMB2.6 million 
of costs and one single item has improved profit by RMB1.7 
million.
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(5) R e s o u r c e s  S a v i n g  S y s t e m '
GNFF consumes over 1,000 tons of wheat and 40,000-50,000 kwh of 
electricity per day. Of course, any savings from these 
consumptions will affect the economic efficiency. Through 
technology innovation, facility renovation, work study, and
organisation and method, GNFF has continuously reduced the ratio 
of input resources (i.e. materials and energy) to output products 
(i.e. flour). GNFF has been classified as Grade 2 in terms of 
resource consumptions by the government. The resources saving 
system is operated in the following manner.
5.1 Organisation
GNFF has set up a Resource Savings Committee to design and review 
programmes for saving different kinds of resources such as raw
materials, indirect materials, electricity, water, etc. These
cost reduction programmes are implemented by the three levels of 
managemnet including administrative departments, production 
workshops and shifts. The Production Manager (Chief Engineer) is 
responsible for resource consumptions relating to the production 
workshops and the General Affairs Manager is responsible for 
other non-production resource consumptions. The 6 engineers in 
the Production Planning Department supervise the situation of 
resource consumptions in the workshops, shifts and groups which 
have designated staff overseeing the planned programmes. The TQC 
Department also includes resource consumption as one of the
important control targets. All the staff involved in the 
resource consumption programmes assess the progress regularly and 
report any anormalities to the senior management for review, 
discussion and action.
5.2 Management Tools
The following three mechanisms are the management tools to 
realise the resource savings programmes.
(a) Control Mechanism
Since the end of 1987, GNFF has inspected all facilities, plants, 
machines and equipment to assess their resource consumptions and 
then set standards for improvements year by year. At the 
meantime, "Energy Management System", "Electricity Management 
System", "Electrical Appliance Management System" and "Water 
Management System" have been established to monitor, control and 
improve the consumption standards. Furthermore, regular Resource 
Consumption Analysis meetings, monthly for production workshops 
and quarterly for production planning department, are held in 
order to compile reports for top management review and solve any 
existing problems.
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(b) I n c e n t i v e  Mechanism
f
The resource consumption standards are incorporated into the 
Internal Responsibility Contracts, signed between the top 
management and workshops, as measurement targets which 
achievements are linked up with the incentive scheme such as 
bonuses. In general, the wages and incentive system is based on 
the following 8 economic and technical targets or standards :
(i) production quantity;
(ii) output quality;
(iii) output passing rate;
(iv) input/output ratio;
(v) electricity per ton of output;
(vi) overheads per ton of output;
(vii) production safety; and
(viii) other electricity consumptions.
The above targets are evaluated on a monthly basis before 
determination of wages and bonuses. Since the implementation of 
this mechanism, the input/output ratio has been increased by 
1.85%, electricity per ton of output reduced by 1.76% and
production volume increased by 3.9%.
(c) Implementation Mechanism
Implementation procedures must be established in order to realise 
the effects of the resource savings programmes, especially in the 
production workshops. The production control department compiles 
detail records of over 670 mechanical and 840 electrical 
equipment on a monthly basis to provide consumption information. 
Furthermore, the production control department is responsible for 
the following types of procedures :
(i) raw materials control down to individual worker;
(ii) facilities and equipment daily maintenance, planned repair 
and regular inspection;
(iii) facilities and equipment daily and weekly cleaning;
(iv) facilities and equipment utilisation rates;
(v) safety measures;
(vi) facilities and equipment purchase, renovation, renewal and 
scrap to save resources i.e. electricity;
(vii) recruiting and training of repair and maintenance staff; &
(viii)quantitative measurement equipment for consumption control.
5.3 Technology Development
Resource savings must be accompanied with technology development 
and innovation which are described in three aspects.
(a) Proper control of input material mix and flow can increase 
input/output ratio by 1%.
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(b) Replace old machines and equipment to save electricity by 6%
and water consumption b^ 4,500 ton per month.
(c) Renovate the existing facilities and import advanced
machines and equipment.
5.4 Two Increases and Two Reductions
GNFF has started the "Two Increases and Two Reductions" campaign 
since 1987. The two increases are production and income. The 
two reductions are resource consumption and expenses (overheads). 
The major factors contributing to the two increases are selling 
the quality products to the right market at the right price and 
time. The components of the two reductions include input 
resource acquisition, requisition, inventory and working capital 
controls. As a result, the comparable cost of production was 
reduced by RMB28.18 million in 1990 compared with 1989. A cost 
reduction competition has also been implemented by setting a 
benchmark of RMB10 0 per employee per month.
(6) Safety Production Assurance System
G N F F 1 s Factory Manager has said that "the more in depth 
enterprise reform, the more production development, the higher 
economic efficiency, then the more production safety measures and 
controls are required". In recent years, there were no death or 
serious injury, fire and q uality b r e a k d o w n  happened. 
Furthermore, the working conditions and environment protection 
have exceeded the government requirements and qualified as a 
Safety Production Enterprise.
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t i m a t e  aim is to classify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB)
Staff Interviewed Mr Zheng Jian Zhong/Assistant General Mgr. 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 12)
Mr Shaw Tim/Accounting & Finance Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 13)
Dates of Visits First Visit 
Second Visit
- 10 December 1993
- 13 August 1994
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Section 1 : History & Background
(
The predecessor of Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. 
(GNFB) was the privately owned Da Xin Department Store
established in 1918 and was burnt down during the Second World
War in 1938. Then the building was rebuilt and named Nan Fang 
Building in 1954. Its first four floors (6,000 square metres) 
were used to engage in selling general merchandise, named Xi Ti 
Department Stores, and in 1973, changed into Guangzhou Nan Fang 
Building Department Store. Since 1954, GNFB has been the largest 
department store in South China. In 1979, as one of experimental 
enterprises in Guangzhou to be empowered higher operating 
autonomy, GNFB truly entered into a new development phase. 
Paying tax on profit instead of profit handover, implementing the 
general manager responsibility system and the economic 
responsibility system have been successively carried out.
Turning into the 1990s, under the guidance of the Municipal 
Commercial Management Committee, GNFB has been undertaking new 
trials, from having only one department store to a large 
synthetic group enterprise with 16 strategic business units 
including retailing, tourism, catering, import and export trade
and joint venture businesses. In 1992, the number of employees
was 5,000, the value of fixed assets amounted to RMB90 million, 
and the shopping area was over 22,600 square metres selling 
80,000 kinds of commodities (10% were imported). In 1993, the 
total sales was increased to RMB1,050 million from RMB685 
million achieved in 1992.
The glorious achievements of GNFB have been established together 
with the profound concern of the government leaders, the best 
support of social circles, the preference of consumers and the 
united efforts of all workers and staff. Since 1993, GNFB's 
development plans have been to explore Xi Ti business district by 
using joint-venture capital, to establish a lot of chain shops 
and co-selling centres, to develop cargohouse and super wholesale 
market, to enter into the real estate market and financial 
market, to build up transnational corporation, and to develop 
overseas market. GNFB is transforming into a modernised business 
organisation, which has the first class goods, service, selling 
concept, quality of staff and business diversification.
GNFB has been trying hard to open up overseas market. After 
gaining the 1 import and export right" in April 1984, GNFB has 
successively set up trade ties with some countries and regions, 
including Hong Kong, Japan, Italy, Burma, USA, France and 
Nethelands. GNFB is very active in attending many exhibitions of 
goods, making sister relationship with An Tian Wu (a Japanese 
famous department stores in Fugan) and also inviting the chief 
executive of Aa Tian Wu as the management consultant. GNFB has 
set up a show room and wholesale centre with Italian Santamato 
Corporation in Barry city.
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GNFB develops their enterprise spirits in terms of "Trustworthy, 
Efficient, Thoughtful and Deligent". The enterprise's culture 
with its own characteristics has become a cohesive and 
centrifugal force to maintain a strong team of employees with 
high quality. GNFB employees always keep looking ahead and are
bold in making innovations. Many reforms have been implemented
in ahead of the other counterparts in Guangzhou. In 1991, GNFB 
invested RMB3 0 million in expanding space and renovating the 
department store. After fitting up, the shopping area has been 
increased by 2,500 square metres and 90% of the space has been 
utilized for open shelves to sell. The reforms of internal 
profit distribution system, labour and remuneration system, and 
selling strategies have created remarkable effects since 1992 
with an increase of 21.6% in sales and 50% in average income for 
employees. Approved by the municipal government, as one of the 
experimental enterprises in Guangzhou, GNFB was converted into a 
private shareholding enterprise in 1992.
GNFB is and will be promulgating the following strategic themes :
(1) customer is always No.l;
(2) sincere to customers;
(3) reputation and goodwill must be maintained;
(4) joint-development with national and overseas counterparts;
(5) cooperative and cohesive work force; and
(6) first class and modern business enterprise.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) has been a 
wholly state-owned enterprise since 1954 and it was converted 
into a private shareholding enterprise in 1992 by issuing 25% of 
the authorized shares to the employees. The local government is 
the majority shareholder by holding 75% of the shares. Before 
the legal form conversion, GNFB's total net assets were revalued 
(by an authorized CPA firm) at RMB116M which was equivalent to 
75% of the share-value held by the government. Then, the 
employees subscribed for an additional RMB3 9M of new shares which 
is equivalent to 25% of the total share-value of RMB155M (i.e. 
RMB3 9M+RMB116M).
There is a ceiling, imposed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
the Bank of China (BOC) , that the total shares held by the 
employees of a shareholding enterprise can not exceed 20%, but 
GNFB h a s .obtained a special approval to issue 25% of shares to 
employees. The employees of GNFB had the free options to 
subscribe from one share up to some limits which are set for 
different staff according to their grades and seniorities. The 
shares are not transf errable among the employees or to any 
outsiders.
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All the department stores in? China are under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Commerce which has delegated its supervision role to 
the provincia.1 or municipal Commerce Bureau. Before 1990s, GNFB 
was under the administrative leadership of the Guangzhou First 
Commerce Bureau as the. other department stores in Guangzhou did, 
but since 1989, GNFB has been directly reporting to the Guangzhou 
Commercial Management Committee which is a standing organisation 
under the Guangzhou municipal government.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all planning and control (long term and short 
term) in the SOEs. Therefore, GNFB had to carry out the 
commands, including the quantities and varieties of commodities 
purchased and sold, as directed from the Bureau.
Turning into the beginning of 1990s, the Guangzhou Commercial 
Management Committee has changed its roles to appoint the chief 
executives (chairman, general manager, party secretary) of GNFB, 
and scruitinise the major development projects, mainly long term 
ones (as stated in section 5.4), recommended by the GNFB. In 
addition, the Committee is providing marketing information to the 
retailing enterprises in Guangzhou in order to help them purchase 
and sell the right products to the right customers at the right 
time. Furthermore, the municipal government assists GNFB in 
getting sources of finance such as bank loan to finance long term 
investments.
The GNFB1s top management has experienced that the Committee has 
been taking away its visible hands from and leaving more 
operating autonomy to the retailing industry even before 1992 
when the mechanism transformation legislation was announced.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of GNFB can be divided into three 
levels which are listed below.
(1) , Board of Directors (BOD)
1.1 Chairman (also the General Manager)*
1.2 Deputy Chairman (also the Party Secretary)*
1.3 12 Directors -
Deputy Party Secretary
Dep>uty General Manager of Sales
Deputy General Manager of Purchasing
Deputy General Manager of Administration
Deputy General Manager of Planning & Development
Assistant General Manager (also head of Finance)
Chairman of Labour Union
Secretary of Disciplinary Committee
General Manager of Nan Feng Shopping Mall
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General Manager of Underground Shopping Mall 
General Manager 6f Guang Ke Long Superstore 
Head of the Legal Department
* They are appointed by the government as representatives to 
the board of directors.
(2) Headquarters (Under the General Manager)
2.1 General Manager Office (headed by Assistant General 
Manager)
2.1.1 Internal Audit
2.1.2 Compliance
2.1.3 Legal Advice
2.1.4 Computer Centre
2.2 Finance Department (headed by Assistant General 
Manager)
2.3 Marketing & Sales Department (headed by a Deputy- 
General Manager)
2.4 Purchasing Department (headed by a Deputy-General 
Manager)
2.5 Planning & Development Department (headed by a Deputy- 
General Manager)
2.6 Administration Department (headed by a Deputy-General 
Manager)
2.6.1 Personnel
2.6.2 Information & Record
2.6.3 Business Centre
2.6.4 Power & Supply
2.6.5 Repair & Maintenance
2.6.6 Security & Safety
2.6.7 Environmental Protection
2.6.8 Education & Training
2.6.9 Medical
2.6.10 Canteen@
2.6.11 Nursary@
2.6.12 Resort House@
2.6.13 Transportation®
@ GNFB is considering to convert these business units in 
1995 into self-financed profit centres (or tertiary 
enterprises) which can provide services both internally and 
externally.
3. Department Stores (Under the General Manager Office)#
3.1 Man's Clothing
3.2 Lady's Clothing
3.3 Children World
3.4 Electrical Appliances
3.5 Audio Visual Appliances
3.6 Clocks & Watches 
3 . 7 Gold & Jewelry
3.8 Furniture
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3.9 Cosmetics
3.10 Famous Brand Square
3.11 Gifts Sc Delicated Goods
3.12 Sportsware
3.13 Wines & Drinks
3.14 Chocolate & Candies
3.15 Supermarket
3.16 Coffee Hall
# Each department store is an independent profit centre 
usually having one manager, two deputy managers and some 
supporting staff for purchasing, marketing, accounting, 
personnel and transportation functions. They are reporting 
to and are supported by the respective departments in the 
headquarters. Each store has entered into Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the General Manager.
(4) Subsidiaries (Under the General Manager Office)@
4.1 Nanfeng Shopping Mall
4.2 Underground Shopping Mall
4.3 Nansheng Shopping Mall
4.4 Nantong Shopping Mall
4.5 Taishan Co-selling Shop
4.6 24-Hour Convenient Shop
4.7 Guang Ke Long Superstore
4.8 Nanfang Storage & Transportation Company
4.9 Nanfang Wholesale & Trading Company
4.10 Nanfang Import & Export Company
4.11 Zhuhai Nanxin Industrial Co. Ltd.
4.12 Nanjiang Garment Manufacturing Company
4.13 Nanqiao Food Manufacturing Company
4.14 Ye Ming Zhu Hotel
4.15 Pu Ti Yuan Hotel
4.16 Red House Restaurant
4.17 Nanfang Real Estate Development Company
@ Each subsidiary or joint-venture is an independent venture or 
business unit with its own management staff who are reporting to 
and supported by the respective departments in the headquarters.
GNFB had a total of 4,000 working and 500 retired employees at 
the end of 1994. It is classified as a "Large Size SOE" in
China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB 155M (1993)
Turnover : RMB 685M (1992)
RMB1,050M (1993)
RMB1,3 00M (1994)
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Income before tax : RMB 21M (1992) - 3.1% of sales
RMB f 26M (1993) - 2.5% of sales
RMB 31M (1994) - 2.4% of sales
Income tax rate : 15% (for shareholding enterprises)
The decrease of profit margin in 1993 and 1994 was due to high 
inflation, higher sales and related taxes (i.e. 17% of VAT and
other urban development taxes) and macro-economic policies 
implemented by the government to cool down the overheated economy 
since July 1993.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) signed its 
first 5-year Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) with the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government in 1987. The major target set in 
the ERC was "Income Before Tax" with 6% growth rate. GNFB was 
underwritten to hand over 55% of the targeted "Income Before Tax" 
per year to the Municipal Government irrespective of actual 
performance (profit or loss) achieved. If the actual income 
before tax exceeded the annual target, 16.5% of the excess would 
be paid to the government and GNFB could retain the majority 
retained earnings of 83.5%.
For example,
(RMB'000) 1987 1988 1989
Budget Income Before Tax (6% growth) 10,000 10,600 11,236
Handover to Government (55%) 5, 500 5, 830 6,180
Income After Tax left for GNFB 4, 500 4, 770 5, 056
If the actual "Income Before Tax" in 1987 was lower or greater 
than the annual agreed target, then the senario would become as 
follow :
(RMB'000)
Budget.Income Before Tax (a) 
Handover to Government 
(fixed at 55% of budget)
Tax on Excess Income 
(12,000-10,000)xl6.5%
1987 1987 1987
(Budget) (Actual) (Actua!
10,000 8, 000 12,000
5, 500 5, 500 5, 500
4, 500 2, 500 6, 500
--- --- 330
4, 500 2, 500 6,170
IAT % of IBT (b)/ (a) 45% 31% 51%
The "Income After Tax" left for GNFB was transfered to four 
reserves, namely,
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(1) Production (Business) Development Reserve;
(2) Employee Bonus Reserve;
(3) Employee Welfare Reserve; and
(4) Special (Standard-by) Reserve.
According to the actual income after tax and the level of bonus 
reserve, the employees might get an additional bonus at the end 
of the year. This system would encourage GNFB to enhance its 
profitability in order to retain more income after tax for 
business development, general reserve, empolyee bonus and welfare 
purposes.
After transforming into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, the 
second ERC (1992-1996 inclusive) was terminated at the end of 
1992. As from 1993, GNFB has to pay an income tax of 15%. It 
would be interesting to compare the taxation impact between the 
ERC and Shareholding system by taking the performance of 1993 as 
an example.
(RMB1000) ERC Shareholding
Budget Income Before Tax 20,000 --
Actual Income Before Tax 26,000 26,000
Handover to Government :
ERC (20,000x55% + 6,000x16.5%) 11,990 --
Shareholding (26,000x15%)   3,900
Income After Tax 14,010 22,100
Assume 100% Dividend Declared :
to Government (75%)   16,575
Income After Tax left to :
GNFB's Four Reserves 14,010
GNFB's Employees as Dividend 5,525
In terms of remuneration to the employees, if a year-end bonus of 
RMB5,525,000 (39% of income after tax i.e. RMB14M) under the ERC
system was paid to the employees in 1993, then the two systems 
would be similar. But according to the past experience, it was 
unlikely to distribute such a high percentage of year-end bonus 
to the employees. However, under the ERC system, GNFB had the 
flexibility to transfer the "Income After Tax" among the four 
reserves of which two of them (development and special reserves) 
were important for the growth of the business. But under the 
shareholding system, GNFB would have nothing left for future 
development if the government decided to declare all the profit 
after tax as dividend. Furthermore, GNFB has lost the privilege 
previously allowed under the ERC system to deduct the bank loan 
repayment from the taxable profit in assessing income tax.
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To tackle this potential problem, GNFB has agreed with the 
municipal government to allow them either :
(1) to borrow from the government's portion of the declared and
distributed dividend as a loan at favourable interest rate 
(80% of prime lending rate); or
(2) to declare and distribute less than 100% of the profit after 
tax as dividend (GNFB declared RMB0.13 6 per RMB1 par value 
share in 1993).
In general, GNFB favours the shareholding system under which the 
staff have become both employees and shareholders who will 
receive higher remuneration than the previous ERC system. 
Furthermore, employee's motivation is higher because they have 
become the owners of the enterprise as well.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The organisation structure of Guangzhou Nan Fang Group Co. Ltd. 
(GNFB) is similar to the type of "Strategic Control Companies" as 
mentioned on p.87 of the "Strategic Management Styles" written by 
Goold and Campbell. Just to quote that section as follow :
"The predominant organizational theme in these companies has been 
the creation or reinforcement of independent, profit-responsible 
divisions that can devise their own strategies with little need 
for coordination between divisions, and that can be held 
separately accountable for their results. The businesses within 
these divisions often require coordinated strategies, and this is 
a prime function for the divisional management level."
The department stores and branches in GNFB are independent profit 
centres which are allowed to formulate their own short term 
strategies in the annual planning and budgeting process. The 
interactions between the department stores are minimal because 
they are selling different types of goods and commodities. 
Therefore, they have little need for coordination and they can be 
held separately accountable for their results. The different 
sections within each department store require coordinated 
strategies, such as the relationship between the stationery and 
toy sections whose customers are largely children. The 
coordination work among the sections is one of the prime 
functions for the manager and deputy managers in each department 
store.
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After the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, the 
ownership and management off GNFB are supposed to be separated. 
The top management are vested with full autonomy to plan and 
control all the operations. Since then, the top management have 
been decentralizing more responsibility to each department store 
and branch such as initiating the annual budget and the internal 
responsibility contract.
The profit responsibility lies with the department store and 
branch managers who should decide their own strategies in 
marketing, selling, purchasing, recruiting and training, cost 
controlling, etc., in order to achieve the targets set in the 
IRCs on one hand and creat a solid foundation for future sales or 
profit growth on the other hand.
Most of the members in the Board of Directors (BOD) are employees 
in the GNFB. It has the disadvantage of conflicts or bias due to 
dual roles played by the board members, but the advantage is that 
they understand each facet of the business well. The selection 
and appointment of the board members are decided by the AGM but 
they should be approved by the Guangzhou Commercial Management 
Committee.
In principle, all the top management (general manager, deputy 
general managers, department heads, store and branch managers) 
should be appointed by the BOD. Any major changes of the 
organisation structure in the department store or branch should 
be initiated by the store or branch manager and approved by the 
general manager.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, GNFB has a divisionalised structure in which the 
department store and branch managers report directly to the 
general manager, and they play a linking and control role between 
the department or branch and the general manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, 
Guangzhou Nan Fang Group Co. Ltd. (GNBF) has implemented a more 
formal planning process - for reviewing, discussing and 
sanctioning the annual plan or budget and the internal 
responsibility contracts (IRCs). This process starts in October 
(i.e. fourth quarter) each year and ends in February (i.e. first 
quarter) the next year.
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After intensive internal and external environmental studies by 
the general manager with his deputy managers and the planning 
department, a preliminary sales target for next year is decided. 
From this overall target, guidelines are provided by the general 
manager to the department store and branch managers to formulate 
their own annual plans and budgets. Other functions in the 
headquarters have to compile their manpower and expense budgets 
as well.
The budgets proposed by the department stores and branches are 
used as the bases for setting the targets in the subsequent 
internal responsibility contracts. In fact, the IRC is a subset 
of the annual plan or budget in order to highlight the key 
variables to measure the performance and determine the group 
bonus for each department store and branch.
The accounting and finance department validates all the budgets 
and consolidate them into a master plan or budget for submission 
to the top management for review. Then, the general and deputy 
managers, store and branch managers, and functional managers 
holds a two-day annual planning meeting outside the city (i.e. 
resort house or hotel) . After this long meeting, most of the 
budgets including the financing plan are basically determined and 
subject to some amendments in the later formal and informal 
meetings and discussions. This iterative exercise is finished 
until all the plans, budgets and contracts are mutally agreed in 
February. Then the master budget is tabled in the BOD meeting 
held in February for approval.
Before 1992, the department stores and other functions in the 
headquarters were also required to participate in the budgeting 
process, but it was only for compiling the "Financial Plan" and 
"Commodity Turnover Plan" in standard formats for submission to 
the First Commerce Bureau annually. Due concerns and focus had 
not been given to these two pieces of planning documents by both 
sides provided the ERC's targets could be reached as appeared in 
the financial plan.
After changing into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, and under 
the, legislative changes and market economy promotion, GNFB has 
been given higher automomy in formulating its strategic 
directions. As a result, all the department stores, branches and 
functions are compelled to participate in the planning process 
and extend their planning horizon beyond one year.
The top management has been trying to insert minimal interference 
in departmental planning decisions, and also leave the short and 
medium term tactical or strategic decisions to the department 
stores as well. But if the headquarters think that the budget of 
a certain department store is too conservative, specific 
direction will be given to the store manager to build in stretch 
into the targets.
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(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q5.5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) explicitly 
spells out its strategic themes, thrusts and suggestions in the 
following manner which are black and white descriptions inside 
the Enterprise Promotion Booklet.
(1) Spirits
1.1 Sincerity
1.2 Efficiency
1.3 Aggressiveness
1.4 Thoughtfulness
(2) Management Aims
2.1 Customers are No.l
2.2 Reputation is paramount
2.3 Sincere cooperation
2.4 Joint development
(3) Development Objectives
3.1 Expand the core business (i.e. retailing)
3.2 Diversify the business portfolio
3.3 Multifunctional services for customers
3.4 Different forms of cooperation and joint-venture
3.5 Be a first class enterprise with modern management
(4) Colours of Enterprise Emblem
4.1 Green - full of vitality and hope
4.2 White - sincere, pure, care and considerate
4.3 Golden - thriving, prosperous and bright future
(5) , Enterprise Song - emphasizes the above
The above strategic themes, thrusts and suggestions are explained 
by the Party Secretary, Mr Wu Xi Hui, in the following article 
written in August 1992.
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(Quote) "The construction of enterprise civilization is one of 
the objectives of developingfthe socialist market economy. It is 
also an inevitable outcome of further deepening the reforms in 
business enterprise. The successful experience in the past few 
years has indicated that the reason why GNFB develops so rapidly 
is because of its specific civilization or culture which is full 
of vitality and getting employees of different ages and 
personalities together.
The establishment of business enterprise's civilization or 
culture should be centred around the socialist business value 
which is reflected by the enterprise's spirit and business 
ethics. In so doing, all the employees have to balance personal 
interests and righteousness, competition and unity, and also to 
adopt the valuable parts of the traditional moral standards and 
to develop the special features of the socialist market economy. 
When GNFB builds its enterprise culture, the essential employee's 
personalities, such as perception, thinking and style, are all 
expressed in terms of the four spirits - sincerity, efficiency, 
aggressiveness and thoughtfulness, and applied them into the 
whole operation and management process in order to make them 
become the common beliefs and codes of conduct for all the 
employees.
"Sincerity" is not only to the customers, but also to the other 
organisations and individuals who have business ties with GNFB. 
It is also the norm of internal relationship among the employees 
and their activities within GNFB. This spirit or strategic theme 
fully reflects GNFB's business characteristic and morality.
"Efficiency" is to improve the management effectiveness and 
efficiency through various internal systematic reforms which 
become unceasing common practice and progress, and open 
competition for all employees to strive for.
"Aggressiveness" means never lagging behind by keeping constant 
progress and new development.
"Thoughtfulness" is to encourage innovation and demands every 
employee to think boldly, diligently and tactfully in order to 
develop individual's intellegence and vitalize the business and 
service.
In order to strike these four spirits or strategic themes into 
the hearts of all the employees, they are not only embeded into 
the process of management and administration, but also revealed 
in the enterprise's emblem, flag, song and other activities.
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Business is the tie and bridge between the production functions 
and the consumers. Marxf has said that "the exchange of 
commodities is the relations between persons". He has further 
explained that "the fundamental characteristics of a business 
enterprise determine its corporate culture and also its image to 
the general public". "To create the first class enterprise 
image" is GNFB1s management philosophy. The context to be a 
first class enterprise include the following 6 first classes: (1)
commodity; (2) service; (3) environment; (4) management; (5) 
sales and marketing; and (6) quality of employee." (Unquote)
GNFB1s most important strategic thrusts are to :
(1) improve the service quality;
(2) enhance the commodity quality and consumer taste;
(3) be innovative in marketing and promotion;
(4) develope new selling and distributing channels; and
(5) create special features in operation style such as to allow 
customers to return and replace the defective or unsuitable 
commodities.
To materialise the above strategic themes and thrusts, GNFB 
emphasizes very much on employee's education and training, 
quality commodity's guarantee, comfortable shopping environment 
and excellent service quality, which can contribute to the 
establishment of enteprise's good reputation to the public at 
large.
To put all the above strategic themes, thrusts and suggestions 
into actions, since the early 1990s, GNFB has firstly implemented 
the following 5 categories of leading reforms and innovations 
among the other counterparts in Guangzhou:
(1) Customer Services
1.1 Greet the customers at the entrances.
1.2 Set up the customer reception room.
1.3 Provide "Shopping Lady Guide" services.
1.4 Employees stand up and sell goods.
1.5 Free delivery of bulky goods to the customers.
1.6 Provide per-call repair services for refrigerator, 
washing machine, television set, etc.
1.7 Set up the "Holiday Purchasing Club".
1.8 Set up the "Bargain Price Express Market" in Nanfeng 
Shopping Mall.
(2) Service Quality Assurance
2.1 Implement customer supervision committee.
2.2 Implement customer evaluation activities.
2.3 Implement "Courtesy and Polite Service Regulations" for 
the employees to comply with.
2.4 Organise activities of "Consumer Rationalization 
Proposals".
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2.5 Set up the commodity quality assurance checking system.
2.6 Establish internalfservice compliance checking system 
and total service quality management system.
(3) Public Relations and Promotion
3.1 Organise the exhibition of famous, execellent and new 
goods.
3.2 Organise the "New Year Arts Variety Show" with the 
consumers.
3.3 Organise the "Nanfang Historic Exhibition" to show the 
past, present and future.
(4) Retail Networking
4.1 Establish co-operative department stores with other 
cities.
4.2 Establish underground shopping malls (stores).
4.3 Establish the 24-hour convenient shops.
4.4 Establish the large area and open shelf superstores.
4.5 Create sister relationship with An Tian Wu (Janpanese 
Department Stores) and invite their executive Mr Ji 
Zenghao as the management consultant.
4.6 Obtain the "import and export rights" of small value 
goods in retail business.
4.7 Takeover a foreign-invested business (Ye Ming Zhu 
Hotel).
4.8 Establish a showroom and wholesale centre in Barry of 
Italy.
(5) Management Information & Control
5.1 Employ the standing legal consultants.
5.2 Employ the commodity bar coding for computer management 
and information system.
5.3 Implement the "employee contract system" in retailing 
industry.
As suggested by Goold and Campbell, a distinguishing feature of 
strategic control companies is the decentralization of strategy 
formulation responsibility to divisional or business unit level. 
Thus, broad themes, major thrusts and specific suggestions are 
generally delivered, if at all, in low key.
Before 1992, the top management in GNFB from time to time made 
suggestions on specific strategic issues such as commodity 
varieties, selling prices, promotion tatics and even display 
arrangements. The top management followed the financial targets 
as agreed in the IRCs closely on a monthly and quarterly basis 
and is quick to make suggestions if they do not match the overall 
long and short term plan.
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To facilitate the implementation of the mechanism transformation 
legislation enacted in 1992f, the top management has left more 
freedom to the department stores and subsidiaries to adjust their 
strategies and tactics as long as they would not deviate much 
from the basic themes, thrusts and the annual budget. The 
puchasing function was decentralised to individual department 
stores and branches in 1993.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 and Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
The famous Zhujiang (Pearl) River runs throgh Guangzhou from west 
to east and divides the city into northern and southern parts. 
The majority of the trade and business centres are situated in 
the northern city. The headquarters and main department store of 
Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) is located at 
the Southwest (Si Ti) District of the Northern Guangzhou city and 
is very close to the river. Xi Ti (means west river bound) 
District is at the southern end of the People's Road along which 
more and more busy business centres and high-rise commercial 
buildings are under construction. The north bound of People's 
Road passes through the present central railway station and the 
international airport. The future underground, which is expected 
to start running in 1998, will have a few stations running from 
the north to the south of this heavy traffic and busy road. As a 
result, both the numbers of working population and residents in 
this district has been increased substantially since 1990. GNFB 
foresees that this trend will further boost their retailing 
business and some other lines of business should be considered in 
longer term.
When GNFB was transformed into a shareholding enterprise in 1992, 
the first mission undertaken by the board of directors was to 
formulate a 15-year long term plan (1993-2007 inclusive) which 
was broken down into two periods (i.e. 1993-2000 and 2001-2007).
The GNFB's board of directors was trying to define some long term 
strategies and propose some long term capital projects although 
they realised that the economic environment in China was changing 
rapidly. The following three underlying business philosophies 
have been laid down in this 15-year long term plan.
(1) Retailing (i.e. department stores, branches and superstores) 
should remain the core business.
(2) Retailing-related businesses should be developed in the 
1990s and beyond (horizontal diversification).
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(3) The business or investment portfolio should be expanded in 
the 1990s and beyond (vertical diversification).
The following are some projects to be implemented in the first
phase (1993-2000) ofthe 15-year long range plan :
(a) Xi Ti Business Centre
Not too far away from the old Nanfang Building (headquarters 
and main department store) , GNFB has acquired a piece of 
land upon which the largest business centre in Xi Ti will be 
built. This modernized and elegant business centre or 
commercial complex will have a total floor area of 180,000 
square metres catering for many synthetical functions such 
as retailing and wholesale business, catering services, 
entertainment, communication and transportation services, 
and office buildings. Such a huge project requires billions 
of capital to be sourced from share listing, right issue,
retained earnings and bank loan. This project is started in
May 1995. It will take one and half years to demolish the 
old buildings and resettle the existing residents, two years 
to complete the premises, and half a year to decorate the 
interior. Therefore, the whole complex will be ready to use 
in mid-1999.
(b) Nanfang Building Redevelopment
A blue-print has been drawn up for redeveloping the present 
old (over 40 years) Nanfang Building into a over 40-storey 
double-tower commercial building which will cater not only 
for the headquarters, department stores and shopping mall, 
but also office floors for renting out. But under the 
present tight credit control policy imposed by the 
government and banks, it is unlikely to acquire billion's of 
capital for this investment in the next couple of years.
(c) Expansion of Branches
Additional branches will be established not only in 
Guangdong province, but also in other provinces or cities 
(i.e. Beijing, Tianjian, Nanzhou). Joint-venture with other 
enterprises in Guangdong province will be a major form of 
expansion in the core business. A cooperative department 
store, having a shopping area of 2,500 square metre, between 
GNFB and a electrical household appliance manufacturing 
enterprise in Zhongshan city (southwest of Guanzhou) started 
business in early 1995. This new department store is 
managed and underwritten (e.g. via IRC) by the electrical 
appliance department store of GNFB. The availability of 
capital and experienced staff to set up these new ventures 
are the major limiting factors.
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(d) Superstores
f
GNFB is the first retailing enterprise in China to open up a 
"superstore" (or cargohouse super-wholesale market) which is 
similar to the first one called "Grantmart" set up in Hong 
Kong three years ago with a large open-self area decorated 
as simple as a warehouse or cargohouse. Commodities, mainly 
food and daily necessities, are sold in large quantities 
with very attractive bulk discounts. The relative low 
running costs (such as depreciation) and large turnover can 
maintain quite handsome profits. Therefore, there are now 
more than five Grantmart superstores in Hong Kong. The 
superstore called Guang Ke Long, which is a joint-venture of 
three partners including Hong Kong, managed by GNFB has 
proved to be successful although it is located in the 
eastern suburb, yet customers are willing to travel a bit 
further away from the city centre. GNFB is planning to set 
up one or two more superstores in locations closer to the 
heart of the city.
(e) Joint Venture Chain Shops
Other than the 24-hour convenient shops, GNFB is looking for 
foreign partners, most likely from Hong Kong, to open a few 
specialized retailing chain shops such as selling clothing, 
fast food, bakery, ice-cream, gift and stationery etc.
(f) Commercial Joint Ventures
GNFB is also searching for local and foreign partners (i.e. 
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Singapore etc.) to set up a few 
joint ventures for commercial businesses such as import and 
export, wholesale, real estate and manufacturing activities. 
Furthermore, in early 1995, GNFB has established a 
joint-venture with a Hong Kong finance company to provide 
hire-purchase service- for the customers (including customer 
credit investigation and underwritting).
(g) Real Estate Development
GNFB has established a real estate development subsidiary to 
start off this completely new line of business which mainly 
involves building and buying commercial buildings for 
renting out and selling. At the end of 1994, the 13-storey 
Huanan Building in the Xidan District (a busy commercial 
district) of Beijing, was completed and the 4 office floors 
were ready for renting out.
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This new building is a joint-veture of GNFB with other three 
enterprises in Guangzhou but none of them have sufficient 
capital to run the retail business such as department store 
in the lower 6 floors and restaurant in the next 3 floors. 
GNFB has been discussing with the government for injecting 
or lending new capital.
(h) Financial Investments
Other than buying and selling securities as investments in 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, GNFB has been investing into 
some subsidiaries in order to diversify the business 
portfolio, such as hotels and restaurants, right away.
(i) Overseas Markets
Besides the import and export business undertakings, GNFB is 
p l a n n i n g  to e s t a b l i s h  j o i n t -ve n t u r e s  with foreign 
counterparts in Southeast Asian countries (i.e. Malaysia, 
Indonesia) to explore the retailing and wholesales 
opportunities. In fact, a joint-venture to establish a 
department store in Peru of South America, where there are a 
lot of Chinese and Japanese, has been discussed since August 
1994 .
(j) Public Listing
All the above long term plans or projects require 
substantial fresh capital of which public listing in the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange is one of fesible means. GNFB is 
one of the 10 shortlisted state-owned enterprises in 
Guangzhou to be listed in 1995 or 1996 depending on the 
macro-economic control policy of the government which has 
been cooled down in 1994.
(k) Education and Training
G N F B 1s top management realise that in order to facilitate 
the long term development of the enterprise in 1990s and 
beyond, education and training for all levels of employees 
should be emphasized. Regular in-house training courses are 
conducted on every Tuesday for various disciplines of 
employees. A collaborated programme between Guangzhou Jinan 
University and GNFB has successfully recruited a batch of 
high school leavers and completed the business study degree 
before they joined GNFB as management trainees in various 
functions, department stores and branches.
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The above long term plans are initiated and executed by the board 
of directors or the top management of GNFB. The store and 
subsidiary managers' participation in some of these plans is 
restricted to the extent of consultation. Therefore, the 
formulation of long term plans in GNFB is a top-down approach 
with little involvement from the department stores and subsidiary 
managers.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The promulgation of "Market Economy" since 1992 has entrusted 
more freedom to GNFB for planning ahead on one hand but 
simultaneously has induced fiercer competition. Now many foreign 
invested department stores (i.e. Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
have been allowed to open up branches in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. In addition to the keen competition from 
the local department stores, GNFB is facing threats from these 
foreign counterparts as well. But this open-door policy is 
carefully monitored by the government in order to protect the 
state-owned department stores such as GNFB whose management 
skills are not as sophisticated as the foreign department stores. 
In this respect, the central government has imposed certain 
restrictions on the foreign invested department stores such as :
(a) any proposed new branch must be approved by the Beijing 
central government;
(b) they are not allowed to perform wholesale business; and
(c) they are not entitled to special tax concession.
All in all, retailing is the most vulnerable service industry (or 
so-called "tertiary enterprise") in China because of having a 
market size of over 1.2 billion consumers. There are too many 
unstable and unforeseeable political,. economical, social and 
demographical factors affecting the planning vision of GNFB 
especially the difficulty in long term planning.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
f
Before 1992, GNFB was required to submit the following two annual 
plans to the Guangzhou First Commerce Bureau :
(a) Financial Plan - to highlight the incomes, expenses, 
profits, taxes, loan repayments and balance sheet items.
(b) Commodity Turnover Plan - to highlight the quantities and 
varieties of commodities to be purchased, sold and carried. 
(The purchase function is controlled by GNFB since 1990s.)
These two plans were used by the Bureau to exercise its macro 
economic control on GNFB through directives or negotiation. 
After the implementation of the mechanism transformation 
legislations in 1992, these two plans were not required by the 
Bureau. As from Ocotber 1992, GNFB has used the following 
annual planning or budgeting process.
In October, the general manager asks the accounting and finance 
department to provide the year-to-date financial results. He 
also requests the planning department to supply information 
concerning the changes in local, national and international 
economic environment. Then he calls up a board meeting (top 
management of the headquarters) to review and discuss the 
following aspects which have direct or indirect impacts on the 
next year's plan or budget.
(1) Capability Evaluation
(a) Financial performance
(b) Financial stability
(c) Borrowing capacity
(d) Space & facility availability
(e) Manpower availability
Environmental Scanning*
(a) Worldwide economy changes
(b) China economy changes
(c) Guangdong province economy changes
(d) Guangzhou city economy changes
(e) Competitor analysis (other Chinese department stores 
and foreign-invested department stores)
(f) Consummer analysis (purchasing power, fashion, taste, 
service expectation, etc.)
* Most of the environmental information is collected and 
analysed by the Planning Department through news cuttings, 
market or customer surveys and consulting experts.
(3) Shareholder Expectations
(a) Guangzhou Commercial Management Committee expectations
(b) Board of Directors expectations
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The general conclusion of this board meeting is to set a 
preliminary total sales tar'get expected to be achieved in the 
next year. Of course, a certain extent of stretch is built into 
this target in order to enforce the department stores and branch 
managers to plan their own budgets agressively. Then the general 
manager notifies this overall target to all the store and branch 
managers.
The next step is for the department store and branch managers to 
formulate their budgets by discussion with their own deputy 
managers and supporting staff. At the beginning of December, the 
store managers have to send their first budget drafts to the 
accounting and finance department for screening and consolidation 
before submitting to the top management in the headquarters for 
consideration. The rest of the annual planning procedures are 
described in the review process of section 5.2 above.
Since October 1992, the department store and branch managers have 
been involved intensively in this budgeting process which they 
believe to be important in setting and negotiating the subsequent 
internal responsibility contracts with the general manager. 
Furthermore, the approved budgets and IRCs will affect their 
strategies and tactics for short and medium term developments.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions especially the 
retailing businesses all over China, the budget review period has 
been shortened from quarterly to monthly (sometimes ad hoc 
meetings are held on a weekly basis) . The top management in 
headquarters and all the department store and branch managers 
hold a formal review meeting at the beginning of each month to 
review and discuss the financial performance of last month. 
Remedial actions are suggested to correct any significant 
controllable deviations from the quarterly budgets. The targets 
determined in the budgets and IRCs are seldom adjusted unless 
facing substantial uncontrollable environmental factors.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, the shareholding system, the mechanism legislation 
and the market economy have driven GNFB spending more effort to 
plan ahead. The top management have involved the department 
store managers or even their subordinates (lower management) in 
the annual planning and budgeting process which on the one hand 
is a critical step in materializing the long term strategic plan, 
and on the other hand, it is an important motivational factor for 
the store managers to manage their own businesses and to be 
rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) established its 
IRC system in 1987 in order to motivate the departments to attain 
at least the financial targets set in the ERC signed with the 
government. This IRC system applies to all the department stores 
and branches.
Since 1992, the major targets set in the IRC are internal profit 
before tax and turnover which are directly linked up with the 
wages and bonus for every department store and subsequently the 
individual employees. The following is the brief description of 
the policy, implemented in 1992, governing the linkage between 
the financial targets and remmuneration under the IRC.
(1) Introduction
In order to further the enterprise reforms, enhance the 
motivation of the employees, increase the economic efficiency and 
employee's remuneration, the headquarters have set the following 
policy or guidelines for determining the group and individual 
wages and bonus for each department store.
(2) Performance Targets Setting Principles
2.1 The internal profit targets for different department stores
are set according to the seggregation of the total 
enterprise's turnover (i.e. RMB600 million for 1992), cost 
of sales and overheads (i.e. rent, electricity, water etc.).
2.2 The staff establishment of each department store is based on 
the number of employees at the end of 1991. The accounting 
staff of each department store are included in the headcount 
and the respective group wages and bonus as well, but they
are directly reporting to and under the management of the
Accounting and Finance Department in the headquarters.
2.3 The "floating wages" of each department store is based on
internal profit per floor area (square metre) , internal
profit per employee, and commodity sales trend.
2.4 The "basic wages" of each department store is based on the 
number of employees at the end of 1991 and their grades and
points on the wages scale in 1992.
2.5 The "floating wages" plus the "basic wages" forms the basis
of linkage between internal profit and remnuneration.
2.6 Wages per ten thousand of Internal Profit =
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Total Floating Wages + Total Basic Wages
------------------------- J------------------x RMB10,0 00
Targeted Total Internal Profit
2.7 The "allowance" per employee as fixed by the government is 
not linked up with the internal profit and is treated as an 
expense in the profit and loss.
2.8 Except the medical allowance and different single-item 
bonuses, which are based on the number of employees in each 
department store and borne by the headquarters, the basic 
wages, bonus, floating wages, post allowance, meal 
allowance, town gas allowance, hairdressing allowance, 
housing allowance, electricity and water allowance, 
telephone allowance, overtime premium, business trip 
expense, sales expenses, etc. are all treated as wages and 
allowances and charged to profit and loss of respective 
department stores.
2.9 The entertainment expenses, overtime payments during the 
government public holidays (7 days in each y e a r ) , 
transportation expenses, and additional taxes levied this 
year are all treated as overheads and charged to profit and 
loss of respective department stores.
2.10 The direct and apportioned overheads such as insurance, 
employee's welfare fund, pension fund contribution, 
depreciation, decoration expenses, advertising and promotion 
expenses, etc. are charged to profit and loss of respective 
department stores to determine the internal net profit and 
corresponding total wages and bonus.
2.11 The group wages and bonus of each department store is based 
on the budgeted number of employees and not affected by the 
actual headcount in each month. The policy of headcount 
reduction is determined by the personnel department.
(3) Evaluation of Department Store's Management, Service & Fault
3.1 According to the agreed sales or turnover target, the 
General Manager evaluates, awards and penalizes the 
management staff (i.e. store manager, store deputy-managers) 
twice every year. The related policy is laid down 
separately.
3.2 Each department store must strictly comply with the 
enterprise service regulations, otherwise, the headquarters 
will give penalty accordingly.
3.3 Any fault and misconduct committed by a department store 
will be handled and penalized according to respective rules 
and regulations.
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(4) I n t e r n a l  Wages & Bonus  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  D ep artm en t  S t o r e
4.1 Sales leaders and other non-sales staff remuneration 
indexes* :
* Administrative staff wages & bonus = remuneration index x 
average wages & bonus of sales staff
The above remuneration indexes are subject to review in 1995 
because it was experienced in 1994 that the administrative 
staff's incomes were lower than many sales personnel.
4.2 The wages and bonus (floating and basic) of sales staff are 
directly linked up the the actual sales or turnover. The 
detail methods and procedures are determined by individual 
department stores according to real situations.
4.3 The wages and bonus of non-sales or administrative staff is
based on the average wages and bonus of all the sales staff 
in the department times respective indexes. The sales 
supervisors and their deputies can calculate their 
remuneration according to the average wages and bonus 
obtained by their respective sales sections or groups.
4.4 The group wages and bonus determined and awarded to each 
department store must distribute to the employees for 
remuneration purpose only. A certain percentage of the 
group wages and bonus awarded in a month can be retained for 
future slack months in order to evenout the fluctuation of 
employee's take-home pay.
Store Manager 
Party Secretary 
Deputy-Store Manager 
Deputy-Party Secretary 
Labour Union Chairman 
Assistant Store Manager 
Section Party Secretary 
Deputy-Union Chairman 
Accounting Supervisor 
Operation Supervisor 
Deputy-Section Party Secretary 
Sales Supervisor 
Deputy-Accounting Supervisor 
Deput-Operating Supervisor 
Deputy-Sales Supervisor 
Accounting/General Clerk 
Driver/Porter
1.70
1.70
1.55
1.55 
1. 55
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.25
1.25
1.25 
1.20 
1.20 
1.15
245
4.5 The management of department store can evaluate the service 
quality, attendance and discipline of individual employee 
according to respective rules and regulations laid down by 
the enterprise.
(5) The budgeted headcount, wages and bonus per ten thousand of
internal profit, bases of floating wages and basic wages are 
jointly determined by the general manager office, accounting 
and finance department, personnel department and individual 
department stores.
(6) Individual department stores should report their internal 
remuneration distribution methods and monthly distribution 
status to the general manager office.
(7) During the implementation of this policy, each department
store must strictly comply with the respective rules and 
regulations of the enterprise, obey headquarters important 
orders, support the enterprise civilisation and culture 
development, and ensure quality service in every aspect. 
The department stores must ensure true and fair accounting 
records which reflect real financial performance. The 
department stores must also comply with the physical 
inventory control system (at least once every week).
(8) According to individual specific situation, each department 
store should design its own "employee shift system" and 
report the details to the personnel department. The 
department stores should ensure the best personnel 
combination in each shift to enhance the labour efficiency. 
The department stores should also keep the standardised 
opening hours and undertake the employee training programmes 
on very Tuesday.
(9) If due to uncontrollable external factors, such as changes 
of government policies and market conditions, which 
adversely affect employee's remuneration, the general 
manager has the right to ajust the wages and bonus to be 
payable. If these external factors affect the validity of
, this policy, the general manager has the power to amend the 
contents or cease this policy.
(10) This policy takes effect as from March 1992 and will be 
reviewed at the end of the year.
As mentioned in the planning review process of section 5.2 above, 
since 1992, the top management have delegated more autonomy to 
the store and branch managers to formulate their annual plans and 
IRCs.
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O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from "Medium C o r p o r a te "
t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the department stores and branches in Guangzhou Nan Fang 
Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) are all independent with very minimal 
interactions and interdependencies, therefore, internal transfer 
pricing does not exist.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Guangzhou Nan 
Fang Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) has four distinct levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Board of Directors (BOD)
(2) Top Management (general and deputy-general managers)
(3) Middle Management (store and branch managers, deputy
managers and other functional managers)
(4) Lower Management (section leaders under the store managers)
Although there are overlaps between the BOD and the top
management who are p laying dual roles in both levels, 
nevertherless, the segregation of duties are clearly defined. 
The general manager (also chairman of BOD) is acting as an
arbitrator to harmonize any role conflicts which happen among the 
members in the BOD.
The store and branch managers can decide on their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units (sections). In addition, 
since 1992, the store managers have been vested with higher 
strategic autonomy to manoeuvre their organisational and
personnel changes but important changes should be discussed with
headquarters before implementation.
The store and branch managers are also responsible for certain 
personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, 
evaluation, remuneration (distribution of bonus) and even 
termination of employment. Unlike Beijing and Shanghai, the 
labour market in Guangzhou is rather free which means employees 
can choose their new jobs and resign from the old ones at their 
own will. On the other hand, the employers have the autonomy to 
lay off their staff by giving advanced notice according to the 
terms of the employment contracts.
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GNFB has fully implemented the "employment contract system" since 
1993 and the "big rice pot"f or "three iron bowls" concept has 
been abolished. If a redundant or badly-performing employee 
cannot be transferred to another departement store, he or she
will be asked to leave the enterprise.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the department stores are by using 
annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the 
most important measurement criteria are sales and profits set in 
the IRCs, although some other qualitative targets (non-financial) 
are employed, however, they are subsidiary and account for only a
small portion of the group wages and bonus calculation.
As long as the department stores can meet the financial targets 
with growth from year to year, the headquarters will devolve the 
responsibility for strategy development to the stores without 
much interference.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Moderate Strategic 
Control" to "Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Objectives in Guangzhou Nan Fang Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) emerge 
from the detailed discussion of the annual plans or budgets with 
the department stores and branches. The financial objectives 
stem from the plans, rather than vice versa. This is not to 
suggest that the objective-setting process is wholly bottom-up 
although the top management initiates an overall financial target 
for all the store and branch managers. It is still the primary 
function of the store and branch managers to formulate their 
detailed budgets and IRCs. But the top management in the 
headquarters can and do push and probe for alternative objectives 
as they see fit. With the long years of experience and 
information (financial and marketing) gathered by the general 
manager, he can give suggestions to individual department stores 
to amend the financial objectives both in short or long term.
Furthermore, the general manager has a holistic view to achieve 
the overall financial objectives year after year according to the 
long term plan. Finally, the result is usually a compromise that 
both headquarters and department can live with.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from “M o d era te  S t r a t e g i c
C o n t r o l "  and " T i g h t  S t r a t e g i c  C o n t r o l "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Guangzhou Nan Fang Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) has monthly and 
quarterly reporting systems to track actual results versus plans 
or budgets. All the department stores send monthly results on 
prescribed formats to the accounting and finance department for 
calculating the profits and comparing with budgets before 
submission to the general manager for review.
The contents of the monthly report are simpler than the 
manufacturing industries. The key financial results such as 
sales and e x p e n d i t u r e s  are the major concerns of the 
headquarters. The non-financial measurement yardsticks are 
assessed jointly by the general manager office and the managers 
of each department store or branch. The comments and ratings of 
the service evaluation are written on the same monthly reports. 
These monthly reports are compiled, through the computer, by the 
accounting department and general manager office. Any significant 
variances (without specifying tolerance limits) are highlighted 
in order to bring to the attention to the top management.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general or deputy-general managers contacts the respective store 
or branch managers to dig out the underlining reasons or ask them 
to perform investigation immediately. It is expected that 
remedial actions can be taken to handle the short term problems 
as soon as possible (such as a sudden sales promotion by a 
counterpart). Whereas, strategic steps may be considered and 
implemented to solve some medium term problems (such as the 
internal decoration and display arrangement).
During the monthly meeting between the top management in 
headquarters and the store and branch managers, the general 
manager puts forward the monthly results for open discussion. 
The store and branch managers may be asked to explain briefly the 
significant variances and any other potential problems. 
Infrequent failures in meeting the budget by the store and branch 
managers can be tolerated as long as they are taking remedial 
tactics or strategies to put things back on the right track and 
attain the budget at the end of the year. Of course, if any 
serious uncontrollable environmental factors happened to hit any 
department store or branch adversely, the manager should not be 
blamed.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the accounting department for calculating the bonus for 
last month.
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(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.) f
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
According to the Guangzhou Government's policy, the annual gross
wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the shareholding 
enterprises can not exceed either one of the following limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, GNFB is allowed to increase the wages 
and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
Under the previous ERC system, GNFB could transfer a certain 
percentage of its annual profit after tax (or handover to 
government) to an "Employee Bonus Reserve" which could be
distributed as a year-end bonus to the employees according to the
overall financial performance and level of this reserve. This 
kind of flexibility or buffer was lost when GNFB was tranformed 
into a shareholding enterprise in 1992. In addition, now GNFB is 
still subject to the above two limits or ceilings and any excess 
of the limits will be added back to the taxable income. If 
declared dividend for the employees is not high enough, then, the 
total annual wages increase can not cover the high inflation in 
Guangzhou (1993 - 30% and 1994 - 25%). As an interim measure, 
GNFB has been allowed by the municipal government to exceed the 
above two limits or ceilings but the excess portion (wages paid) 
should not be tax deductable.
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB9,000 
in 1993 and RMB12,000 in 1994. Under the current high inflation 
rate and the keen competition in the labour market of this 
industry, it is expected to increase the average annual gross 
wages to RMB14,500 in 1995.
The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regard to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10-20, 
therefore, it is not substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "floating wages" or "bonus" is the 
major source of income which is determined according to the IRC.
250
There are two portions for hhe "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Guangzhou Government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the GNFB which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of "allowances" is trying to 
balance the relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable 
standard of living for the employees.
The calculation of "floating wages" or "bonus", as described in 
section 5.6 above, is based on the accomplishment of the IRC. An 
IRC signed between the general manager and a store manager 
decides what level of group bonus will be given to the 
department. Of course, it is up to the store manager to award 
that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates according 
to individual performance, such as the sales achieved by a 
salesgirl in a certain month. The bonus is distributed in cash 
to all employees on a monthly basis but a certain percentage (10% 
- 20%) can be retained in a reserve in order to make up the low 
bonus obtained during the months of slack season. The payment of 
year-end bonus, if there is any, is also according to the annual 
performance of each department store. It is possible that a 
department store will receive very low or even zero bonus if it 
performs much below the targets but it seldom happened in the 
last few years.
In addition to the remuneration paid to the servicing employees, 
as from 1994, GNFB has to pay 25.5% of the monthly gross wages 
and salaries to the government for pension contribution. 
Furthermore, the other benefits in kind, such as medical and 
education allowances, account for about 16% of the monthly gross 
wages and salaries. This kind of life-long responsibility, 
including all the retired employees, is common to all the 
state-owned enterprises and sometimes it is adding a significant 
financial burden to the profit and loss account.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Rice Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is 
to initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to 
impose threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's 
employees.
GNFB has implemented this contract employment system since 1993 
and now all the employees have signed employment contracts from
one to three years subject to review and renewal. At the end of
1994, 250 redundant employees have either been transferred to the 
self-financed tertiary enterprises (i.e. hotels and restaurant) 
or terminated their contracts. In general, the motivation of the 
employees has been improved.
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(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23f on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1. )
In summary, the enforcement of financial objectives has both a 
stick and a carrot aspect. Evidence of the stick can be found in 
the reduction of monthly or year-end bonus and even manangement 
turnover in senior positions. The carrot is represented by 
substantial increase in bonus and perhaps career advancement. 
Due to the difficulty of defining long term strategic control 
objectives because of the volatility of this industry to the 
market conditions, the control process tends to stress control 
against budgeted financial results. As mentioned by Goold and 
Campbell, due to the lack of precise "strategic" targets, the 
control contract focuses on short term profit and cash flow 
figures.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Finance Control"
and "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
(
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. 
(GNFB) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Medium Corporate Low Corporate
Review Process* Medium Corporate Low Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Moderate
Strategic Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate
Strategic
Tight
Strategic
Monitoring Results* Moderate
Financial Strategic
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Strategic
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
Ivic:U. J- U.Ill L U ip U IaL c*  “ " “
Low Corporate
[Post-1992]< 
(Strategic 
Control)
[ P r e - 1 9 9 2 ]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Nan Fang Building Group Co. Ltd. (GNFB) before and 
after 1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility 
Accounting Style" has been shifted from "Financial Control" 
(Pre-1992) to "Strategic Control" (Post-1992) gradually although 
it has not yet reached a very strong-form (very low corporate) of 
strategic control style as suggested by Goold and Campbell.
As a matter of fact, both the degrees of planning and control 
influences are on two separate continua. The planning influence 
should run from high corporate, then medium corporate and down to 
low corporate. Similarly, there should be measurement in between 
tight strategic control and tight financial control.
Revised : 10 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t imate aim is to cla s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF)
Staff Interviewed : Mr He Gao Hua (Chief Accountant)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 13 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 31 August 1993
Second Visit - 30 August 1994
Third Visit - 12 September 1995
255
S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) is a state-owned 
enterprise established in 1960. It is the earliest specialized 
factory in manufacturing power semiconductor devices and 
electronic convertor and equipment in China. It is also a key 
enterprise under the administration of the Ministry of 
Electronics Industry as well as in the Power Convertor Industry 
in China. Over the past 35 years, BCRF has supplied a huge 
amount of varied semiconductors and convertor equipment with wide 
applications to national and overseas customers. Having had 
accumulated experience in producing and researching in power 
convertor and equipment since the 1960s, over 20 other 
enterprises in the power convertor industry have come to learn in 
BCRF. Under the training and support from BCRF, these 
enterprises have obtained great development.
In terms of number of employees (1,200 in 1990) and total assets 
(RMB26 millions in 1990) , BCRF has been the leader among the 
largest six enterprises of this industry in China. Compared with 
the other competitors in Shanghai, Xian and Qingdao, BCRF has the 
most varieties and types of convertor products. BCRF is
currently producing the following two major categories of
convertor products of which over 95% are sold domestically in 
China.
(1) Power Seminconductor Devices*
1.1 ZP Rectifier Diodes (general purpose)
1.2 KP Triode Thyristors (general purpose)
1.3 KK Fast Switching Thyristors
1.4 KS Bi-directional Thyristors
1.5 ZX Rotator Diodes
1.6 CR Series Thyristor
1.7 PB Series Thyristor Module Block
1.8 GTO High Power Capsule Gate Turnoff Thyristor
1.9 GTR Powerline NPN Transistor
1.10 GTR Module Block & Fast Recovery High Power Diodes
* The quality of these products have attained the international 
standards in the late 1980s. The annual total output of these 
products reached 300,000 pieces in 1990 and was the largest 
supplier in China.
(2) Convertor Equipment#
2.1 KGPS Series Thyristor Medium Frequency Power system
2.2 GK Series Silicon Rectifier Equipment (for union and 
division switch)
2.3 KT Series Thyristor AC Power Controller
2.4 GD(KGD) Series Thyristor (for electorplating)
2.5 GH(KGH) & GE(KGE) Series Thyristor (for galvano- 
chemistry and smelting)
2.6 KYH Series High Speed Commutation Oxidation Rectifier
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2.7 KS Series Power Thyristor Convertor (for adjustable 
speed DC motor drives)
2.8 KJP(SCR) Sc. THP (GTR) Series Power Convertors (for 
adjustable speed AC motor drives)
# The annual total output of these equipment were over 2,000 sets 
in 1990.
BCRF does not have the import and export right conferred by the 
government because less than 5% of the above products were 
exported to the Southeast Asian countries and nearly all the raw 
materials and components are produced in China. It is the 
government's policy to be self-satisfied the demands in this 
industry without any imported products from overseas. Therefore, 
BCRF's major marketing strategy is to penetrate and explore the 
domestic markets.
Since the late 1980s, BCRF has been importing international 
advanced technology from the UK, USA and Japan in manufacturing 
its various types of products. While making effort in research 
and development, BCRF has pursued modern management in order to 
produce high quality, multi-applicable, reasonable price and 
prompt delivered power semiconductor devices and convertor 
equipment for every end-user.
In 1994, nearly all the manufacturing enterprises in this
industry were loss-making mainly because of :
(a) lack of sources of capital to replace the old plant and 
machinery due to the macro-economic control policies 
implemented since July 1993;
(b) the existing products could not suit the changing demands in
the national market;
(c) the cost of production is high mainly due to inflation of 
raw materials and wages, and also small batch of production 
but incurring high fixed costs (i.e. set up, scheduling);
(d) the selling prices cannot be increased in line with
inflation in order to maintain the market share;
(e) the end users prefer to import the same products from
overseas suppliers at similar prices but higher quality; and
(f) the incompetent leadership ability of the top management.
In 1988, BCRF obtained a bank loan of RMB29 million to procure a 
set of machines from the UK for producing a series of new 
products. However, most of these products are still keeping in 
the inventory and as a result, 60% of the bank loan is still 
outstanding now. Of course, the loan interest affects the profit 
and loss account adversely. Adding up with the other working 
capital bank loan, BCRF paid RMB2.8 million of bank interest in 
1994 .
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BCRF is affected by the above 6 factors at present especially 
many large infra-structure projects, like the underground 
railways to be built up in over 10 big cities, are intending to 
purchase the electronic converter equipment from overseas 
suppliers. In competing with the overseas competitors, BCRF's 
cost of production may be even higher, and as a result the 
selling prices are not competable. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to explore the overseas markets.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Beijing Chunshu Retifier Factory (BCRF) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since its establishment in 1960 and it 
does not have a concrete plan to convert into a shareholding 
enterprise in the next few years because of the following 
reasons:
(1) stringent rules and regulations governed by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and the Bank of China (BOC);
(2) geographically closer to the central government with tighter 
control on enterprise privatisation than the other coastal 
cities such as Tianjin, Shanghai, Xiamen and Guangzhou;
(3) insufficient strength in terms of financial performance, 
market potential, product development and accounting 
control; and
(4) social responsibility to staff such as laying off employees 
after privatisation.
Since 1991, the government has selectively approved 3,600 of 
large and medium size SOEs, which have good financial performance 
track records, to transform into shareholding enterprises. BCRF 
expects shareholding conversion should be the future prospect in 
view of promulgating market economy and raising capital.
Since BCRF is a wholly state-owned enterprise, it is under the 
administration of the Beijing Municipal Government and the 
Beijing Instrument Bureau. Under the central economic planning 
system before the 1980s, BCRF's planning and control systems were 
dictated by these authorities and it was just acting as a vehicle 
(or a cost centre) to carry out the activities as scheduled by 
them.
In 1983, the Beijing Instrument Bureau was transformed into a 
quasi-government body called Beijing International Instrument 
Corporation (BIIC) as an initial step to delgate the governing 
role to this self-regulated institution composed of all the power 
and electronic instrument manufacturing industries in Beijing.
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Since then, more autonomy r in terms of planning, operation, 
control and pricing decisions has been authorised by the Beijing 
Government to the BIIC. Turning into this decade, BIIC's major 
roles played for its subordinate enterprises are to :
(1) appoint the factory manager (or general manager) and the 
communist party secretary;
(2) maintain macroeconomics control on the 5-year's plans 
suggested by its enterprises;
(3) provide guidance on product development, technology 
improvement and market information; and
(4) act as a bridge or facilitator between the government# and 
its enterprises in policy matters such as bank borrowing, 
capital investment, import and export autonomy, taxation, 
legal form transformation i.e. shareholding, etc.
# Some of the issues have to be discussed and approved by the
Beijing Commission of Economic Reform as well.
In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, the BIIC has delegated the planning and management 
responsibilities to BCRF although quarterly and annual reports 
have to be submitted to the BIIC for review. However, it is a 
learning process for the top management to exercise this power 
and get away with from the old central planning system. They 
concern very much the outcomes and effects on the employees and 
try to avoid rocking the boat too much or taking too much risk.
(Please refer to Q2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of BCRF can be divided into 8
divisions under the direct control of the Factory Manager who has 
an Enterprise Management Office. The departments of the 8 
divisions are listed as follow :
1. Production Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
1.1 Production Workshop No.l - Power Semiconductor Devices
1.2 Production Workshop No.2 - Convertor Devices
- 1.3 Production Workshop No.3 - Convertor Equipment Assembly*
1.4 Production Workshop No.4 - Fabrication & Processing*
1.5 Production Workshop No.5 - Materials Handling*
2. Technical Support Division (headed by the Chief 
Engineer)
2.1 Production Planning Department
2.2 Production Technology Department
2.3 Environment & Safety Department
2.4 No.l Product Design Department
2.5 No.2 Product Design Department
2.6 Power & Energy Department
2.7 Computer & Information Department
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3. Quality Control Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
3.1 Quality Management Department
3.2 Product Inspection Department
3.3 Repair & Maintenance Department
4. Marketing & Sales Division (headed by the Chief Economist)
4.1 Marketing Department 
4 . 2 Sales Department
5. Purchasing & Supply Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory 
Manager)
5.1 Purchasing Department
5.2 Inventory & Supply Department
6. Finance Division (headed by the Chief Accountant)
6.1 Accounting Department
6.2 Internal Audit Department
7. Manpower & Wages Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager
7.1 Personnel Department
7.2 Education & Training Department
7.2.1 Technical Training School
8. Administration Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
8.1 Security Department
8.2 Estate & Development Department
8.3 General Affairs Department
8.3.1 Medical
8.3.2 Canteen
8.3.3 Nursary
9. Communist Party Office (the Factory Manager is also the Party 
Secretary)
9.1 Discipline & Supervision
9.2 Political Education
10. Labour Union Office
* These 3 production workshops are operating in the new factory 
located in the suburb of Beijing.
BCRF had a total of 970 working employees (compared with 1,200 in
1990) and 600 retired employees at the end of 1994. It is
classified as a "medium size SOE" in China.
260
f
S e c t i o n  3 : F i n a n c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s
Total assets 
Turnover
RMB 90M (1994)
RMB 41M (1992)
RMB 33M (1993)
RMB 21M (1994)
RMB 22M@ (1995 forecast)
Income before tax : RMB5.2M (1992) - 12.7% of sales
RMB OM (1993) - breakeven
(RMB4.6M) (1994) - loss making*
(RNB4.5M) (1995 forecast)
Income tax rate : 15%# (before 1996)
3 3% (from 19 96)
@ The rental income of RMB8 million (see 5.4g below) is not 
included but treated as an extraordinary income. Eventually, 
there will be a profit of about RMB3.5M (i.e. RMB8M-RMB4.5M) in 
1995 .
* The decrease in income before tax to breakeven and even 
incurrance of loss in 1994 were due to high inflation, 
depreciation and loan interest, unsellable products, inefficient 
management, insufficient new products and the change of fully 
absorption costing method to manufacturing costing method under 
the new enterprise accounting regulations implemented since July
1993. The outstanding bank loan in 1995 was almost RMB30
# BCRF enjoys a lower income tax rate compared with the 33% 
levied on the other state-owned enterprises because it is treated 
as a hightech manufacturing enterprise which can retain more 
earnings for research and development, and also replace the old 
plant and equipment. Furthermore, since 1992, BCRF has been 
allowed to depreciate the fixed assets over the standard 3% and 
provided 1% of sales for research and development. The net VAT 
(output tax - input tax) was about 9% in 1994 compared with 8% in 
the past. Without disclosing the exact amount, the chief 
accountant has admitted the fact that bad and doubtful debts are 
quite serious in BCRF. He has complained that VAT has to be paid 
on one hand while cash cannot be received from debtors on the 
other hand. But this situation was changed in 1995 by paying the 
net VAT upon receiving cash from the debtors.
million.
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S e c t i o n  4 : E conom ic  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t  S y s te m  (ERCS)
Since 1986, the Chinese government has actively promoted the ERCS 
to the state-owned enterprises with an aim to enhance their 
economic efficiency (over one-third of them were running in 
losses) through the participation in the profit sharing. The 
first stage of the ERCS development was from 1986 to 1990. In 
the first three years of this stage, ERCS created positive 
effects such as the government revenue and the labour 
remuneration were both increased. However, in the following two 
years, due to the macroeconomics contol policies adopted by the 
government to curb down the overheated economy, the market demand 
for products and services declined and as a result, a lot of 
contracts could not be fulfilled. Therefore, during the second 
stage (1991-1995) of the ERCS development, many enterprises were 
not willing to enter into contracts with the government in 1991. 
Then the government had to give more favourable terms and 
conditions to the enterprises in order to induce them entering 
into the contracts.
Under the above situation, the Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory 
(BCRF).entered into an ERC with the Beijing Municipal Government 
represented by BIIC in 1992. It is a standing contract without 
duration (time limit) specified but subject to review by both 
parties every year. The terms and conditions of this contract 
were summarised below :
(1) income tax rate was 15%
(2) income after tax was split 40:60 between the government and
the enterprise (the split was 60:40 and 50:50 before 1992)
(3) income after tax was subject to two local taxes, i.e. 
energy and transportation development tax - 10% 
government budget adjustment tax - 15%
(4) total wages and bonus linked up with economic efficiency
(5) deducted bank loan repayment of RMB1 million from the income 
before tax
(6) accerlarated depreciation by 3%*
(7) provided 1% on sales for new product development*
* These two terms were stopped in 1994 after the implementation 
of the new accounting standards. Actual depreciation and 
development expenses are now written off to the profit and loss.
The top management (factory manager and the deputies) of BCRF 
together with BIIC have had some negotiation and discussion with
the government in setting the terms and conditions of the ERC.
BCRF believed that the ERC could enhance their motivation and 
then the economic efficiency. Besides, more profit could be 
retained for product and market development.
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In 1989, BCRF obtained a RMB10 million bank loan to build a new 
factory in the suburb of Beijing. The new premises catered for 3 
production workshops which started operation in 1991. One of the 
favourable terms provided in the ERC was to deduct the bank loan 
repayment from the taxable income before income tax assessment.
For example at the end of 1992,
Income before tax 
Bank loan repayment
Taxable income 
Income tax (15%)
Income after tax
Income handed over to government (40:
Income retained by BCRF 
Bank loan repayment added back
Actual income retained by BCRF 
(60% of income before tax)
RMB 5, 200,, 000
1/ 000,, 000
4/ 200,, 000
630,, 000
3, 570,, 000
1, 428,, 000
2, 142,.000
1, 000,, 000
3, 142,, 000
Therefore, both the contractor (Government) and contractee (BCRF) 
are satisfied with the present arrangements in the ERC.
In addition to the above terms and conditions, the production 
value, inventory level and turnover targets were also agreed 
between BIIC and BCRF for 1995.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
In consideration of the relatively small operation of Beijing 
Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF), the guiding theme of the 
organisation structure is simplicity and accountability. It went 
to some length in 1992 to create stand-alone business units e.g. 
the 5 production workshops as independent semi-profit centres 
that are controlled by individual workshop managers with clear 
lines of authority and responsibility. Based on the Internal 
Responsibility Contracts, they are accounted for the production 
quantities and costs, as well as the fixed and working capital.
Three production workshops are manufacturing different parts and 
components for the other two assembly workshops, therefore, 
internal•transfer pricing is involved among the five production 
workshops which will be described in another section below. 
Other than these five production workshops, all the other 
departments are classified as cost centres.
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Since 1992, BCRF has bepn decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each workshop and department such as initiating 
the annual budget and the internal responsibility contract. The 
profit responsibility primarily lies with the workshop manager 
but the top management keep a surveillance cost control on each 
production workshop through monthly or weekly report.
The selection and appointment of the factory manager, party 
secretary and some deputy factory managers are still decided by 
the Beijing International Instrument Corporation (BIIC) and a 
"Factory Manager Responsibility System" is in force. This system 
takes the Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a basis to 
evaluate the performance of the factory manager. If an 
outstanding or above target performance has been achieved, the 
factory manager will be awarded a lump sum bonus at the year end. 
At the end of 1992, the BCRF's factory manager was awarded an 
incentive bonus of RMB7,000.
Since 1992, the factory manager has full autonomy to appoint most 
of the deputy-factory managers (the three chiefs are equivalent 
to deputy-factory managers) and the departmental managers under 
the 8 divisions. Any major changes of the organisation structure 
in each division should be initiated by the deputy-factory 
managers and approved by the factory manager. However, more 
autonomy of internal management and operation has been delegated 
to the heads of divisions (deputy-factory managers) since 1992. 
And in turn, the deputy-factory managers have involved their 
department heads more in planning, control and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, BCRF has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual divisional heads report directly to the factory 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
divisions and the factory manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since October 1992, Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) has 
implemented a regular formal planning process to review, discuss 
and sanction the annual plan or budget and the internal 
responsibility contracts (IRCs). First of all, the factory 
manager reviews the long term plan and ERC, and evaluates the 
internal and external environmental factors, and then discusses 
with his deputy managers and three chiefs in order to determine 
the annual sales and profit targets for next year.
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Based on these preliminary targets, some guidelines are provided 
to the workshop managers and other department heads for them to 
initiate their own plans or budgets for the next year. As far as 
the five production workshops are concerned, their budget 
proposals contained the key criteria (i.e. production quantity 
and working capital employed) to be used as the measurement 
yardsticks of their subsequent internal responsibility contracts. 
The other non-production divisions and departments have to 
compile their annual work plans and expense budgets as well.
During November, the Enterprise Management Office under the 
direction of the factory manager receives all the budgets and 
plans for validation and consolidation into a master plan or 
budget for submission to the top management for review. Then, 
formal and informal meetings and discussions are held between the 
factory manager, deputy-factory managers, three chiefs and 
department heads either collectively or individually. This 
iterative exercise carries on until all the plans, budgets and 
contracts are mutually agreed and approved in the AGM (all the 
employees can attain) held during next February. Then the 
enterprise management office publishes a set of the final master 
plan and sends to the top management and all the department 
heads.
Before 1992, the annual budget review process was not as 
dedicated and formal as described above, and the BIIC and in turn 
the top management gave directions to the workshops and 
departments on what should be done over the next 12 months within 
the context of a few key indicators e.g. sales, production volume 
and mix, quality improvement, material consumption, etc.
Since 1992, under the legislative changes and market economy 
promotion, BIIC has delegated higher automomy to BCRF in 
formulating its strategic directions. But in view of the present 
economic downturn in this industry, the BIIC now retains some 
controls in planning and operation including the manpower and 
wages increase.
Nevertheless, all the workshops and departments are encouraged to 
participate in the planning process and extend their planning 
horizon beyond one year in order to match the milestones set in 
the 5-year long term plan. Therefore, the factory manager has 
less interference in departmental planning decisions, but without 
reducing the tight financial control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 3  S t r a t e g i c  Themes,  T h r u s t s  and S u g g e s t i o n s
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
operational mechanism (1993), economic effectiveness (1992), 
quality control (1991),. economic responsibility contract (1990), 
etc. As far as strategic themes are concerned, the Beijing 
Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) has explicitly written the 
following in the introductory section of the policy manual for 
Internal Economic Responsibility System adopted since 1990.
(1) to implement the management by exception principles;
(2) to enhance product and market development;
(3) to maintain flexible operation to cater for changes;
(4) to ensure proper marketable product mix;
(5) to ensure production target with good quality;
(6) to guarantee safety production;
(7) to measure monthly internal profit of production workshops;
(8) to speed up the working capital cycle and cash collection;
(9) to emphasize the cost reduction activities; and
(10) to provide more education and training for employees.
The above strategic themes are directed from the top management 
for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when they are 
performing their duties for the enterprise.
BCRF has been promulgating "Quality" as the most important 
strategic thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for 
the domestic market share on one hand and to explore the overseas 
markets (i.e. Southeast Asian countries) on the other hand. In 
1993, the Quality Control Division was separated from the 
Technical Support Division and became an independent unit. 
Furthermore, it is clearly stipulated in the IRC that "quality" 
has the veto power in determining bonus. As far as hardware is 
concerned, BCRF has imported some modern manufacturing plant and 
equipment from the UK, USA and Japan at a cost of over RMB3 0 
million since the 1990s.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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Before 1992, the top management in BCRF from time to time made 
suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning and 
review process such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, 
marketing strategy and production quantity and mix. The top 
management followed the financial indicators and performance 
closely on monthly and quarterly basis and were quick to make 
suggestions if they did not match the overall long and short term 
plan.
To facilitate the implementation of the legislation in 1992, the 
top management have given some freedom to the workshop managers 
and department heads to compile their own plans or budgets and to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they would not 
deviate much from the ultimate sales and profit targets. 
Nevertheless, the top management still provide guidelines and 
suggestions to the workshops and departments in the planning 
process.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the establishment of Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory 
(BCRF) in 1960, it has followed the national 5-year's planning 
cycle and carried out the missions as assigned in every 5-year's 
plan directed by the municipal government under the central 
economic planning system. The commencement of the economic 
reforms in 1979 started to allowed BCRF to participate in the 
5-year's planning with the BIIC and the municipal government but 
specific directives and suggestions were always coming from the 
top by using the term "macroeconomics control and adjustment" as 
an excuse.
The changing role of BIIC since 1990 has encouraged BCRF, for the 
first time, to formulate their own long term strategic plan 
(1991-1995). The major contents of this long term plan included 
capital projects, product and market development which needed to 
be d i c s u s s e d  w i t h  the B I I C  who have been e x e r c i s i n g  
macro-economic controls and provide directives and targets i.e. 
technology expertise and quality standards. BCRF has also been 
allowed to carry out fesibility studies to ascertain the 
possibility of success in the capital projects to be undertaken.
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Since then, the top management reviewed the long term plan at the 
end of each year. After lengthy discussion, another new 5 year 
plan will be emerged. In fact, a rolling 5-year plan is in 
operation. In the current 5-year plan (1993-1997 inclusive), the 
following strategic directions have been laid down.
(a) Production Facility
Since the early 1990s, a new plant has been established in a 
suburb area of Beijing to house the three production 
workshops manufacturing the parts and components for the 
assembly lines in the old premises. To go in line with the 
huge and long term environmental protection plan, most of 
the manufacturing industries have been and will be moving 
out from the city centre, which is getting bigger and 
bigger, to the suburb districts. Therefore, since 1993, 
BCRF is planning to relocate the existing old factory to a 
new site within the 9th National Economic Planning period 
(1996 -2000) but it is very much d e p e n d i n g  on the 
availability of capital funds such as fresh injection from 
the government. One possibility is to sell the land use 
right to the foreign investors in exchange for source of 
finance.
(b) Competitive Edge
The major two domestic competitors are located in Qingdao 
(Northeast Coast) and Shanghai (Central Coast) who are two 
of the 14 economic development cities established since 
early 1980s. They are benefited from the following 
favourable policies approved by the central government :
(i) lower income tax;
(ii) less municipal taxes;
(iii) more import and export autonomy;
(iv) lower import and export taxes;
(v) more sources of finance for capital investment; and
(vi) generous land and building use rights.
■ Therefore, in order to sustain the market share and a 
competitive edge against these counterparts, BCRF has to 
enhance its product quality by various means as described in 
the strategic themes and thrusts section above.
(c) Research and Development
Related to the competitive edge strategy mentioned above, 
BCRF has taken the following steps to enhance its R&D 
function :
(i) to renew and upgrade the production equipment and 
facilities;
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(ii) to improve the product design by using value analysis;
(iii)to investigate and improve the production technology;
(iv) to strengthen the manpower and technical skills in the 
research and development department; and
(v) to provide more training in research and development.
However, less and less new products have been launched since
1994.
(d) New Product Development
BCRF has emphasized very much on the new product development 
which is one of the major missions of the two product design 
departments and their performance is partly measured against 
this objective.
(e) Overseas Markets
BEEF and BIIC are working hard to negotiate with the 
government in obtaining the export right (also the foreign 
exchange usage right) so that they can explore the overseas 
markets such as Southeast Asian, South America and Eastern 
European countries.
(f) Cost Reduction
In order to enhance the competitive edge and to increase the 
profitability, BCRF has taken the following measures to 
reduce the total cost of operation :
(i) to cut production costs by value engineering;
(ii) to set up a standard (target) costing system;
(iii)to reduce the total number of employees;
(iv) to reduce overheads e.g. heat, light, etc.; and
(v) to tighten functional budgets i.e. accounting, 
personnel, sales, purchasing, etc.
A portion of the costs reduced or savings will be 
distributed to the employees as a kind of bonus.
(g) Land Use Right
In 1995, the land use right of a piece of land (8,000 square 
metre) inside the factory site was leased to an enterprise 
in Guangdong province for constructing a 5-storey commercial 
building with a small motel inside. The annual leasing 
income of about RMB8 million made a significant contribution 
to the profit and loss account. Another piece of land of 
10,000 square metre is ready to lease out in order to bring 
in an additonal RMB10M extraordinary income.
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The current 5-year plan w^s compiled after long discussions 
between the BIIC and the BCRF's top management. It was eventually 
agreed and reflected in the ERC signed with the municipal 
government. Although the department heads (middle management) 
have been involved in this planning process, they were playing a 
consultation role only. Furthermore, the workshop managers and 
department heads are mainly concerned with how the milestones set 
in the long term plan will affect their next year budgets or 
internal responsibility contracts which will have tight financial 
surveillance coming from the factory manager at least on a 
monthly basis. Therefore, the long term planning and review 
process are using a top-down approach in the belief that the 
factory manager (over 20 years in the plant) has better
experience and knowledge of the external environment and even the 
internal operations of the workshops and departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the BIIC has devolved its central planning role to 
individual enterprises under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the 
top management of BCRF is taking the initiative to formulate its 
own long term plan but participation from the middle management 
is limited to consultation only. However, many detrimental
factors, as described in the History and Background section, are
now making the implementation of the above long term plans very 
difficult if not impossible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
Since the 1990s, the general short term planning policy adopted 
by Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) is "production 
determined by sales" which means sales is the initial driving 
force of all the activities. Reference should also be made to 
the 5-year long term plan especially to estimate what the sales 
potential will be for the newly developed product(s) in the next 
year. As from September 1992, BCRF has employed the following 
annual budgeting process.
The factory manager and the marketing and sales division are very 
active in performing some marketing activities such as going to 
the trade fairs and visiting the exisiting and potential 
customers with his sales and marketing staff. In September, he 
evaluates the present and future internal financial, production 
and human resources with the deputy managers and the three 
chiefs. He also scans the external opportunties and threats with 
the sales and marketing staff. Tentatively, the factory manager 
determines a set of sales mix figures (i.e. sales budget). These 
sales forecasts will be provided to the respective departments, 
more importantly to the production workshops, for them to 
initiate their own budgets.
The first budget submission is in early November and the 
enterprise management office consolidates all the pieces into a 
master budget (financial and operation plan) for factory 
manager's review before the first budget meeting is held with all 
the workshop managers and department heads. The major purpose of 
this first meeting is to discuss with the five workshop managers 
to ascertain whether their production capacities can be matched 
with the initial sales budget. If they exceed the sales budget, 
it becomes the primary responsibility of the sales and marketing 
staff and even the factory manager to hunt for other sales 
avenues in order to fully utilize the production capacity. If 
there is excess demand, then priorities will be given to the 
customers for delivery and agreements must be made with the 
customers beforehand. Since the competition in this industry is 
very keen, BCRF has been under full capacity (about 80%) in the 
last two years.
Again, the second budget submission in December is consolidated 
by the enterprise management office for further review by the 
factory manager who will then discuss informally or formally with 
the workshop managers and department heads. Another submission 
is usually made in January next year. Finally, the agreed master 
budget is tabled to the annual general meeting for approval by 
all the employees in February right after the Chinese New Year.
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Since September 1992, the workshop managers have been involved 
intensively in this budgeting process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts with the factory manager. The other 
department heads have also participated carefully in devising 
their expense and operation budgets which they would be measured 
against as performance yardsticks.
A copy of the master budget has been obtained and the contents 
are briefly described in Appendix A at the end of this data 
analysis. From this extract of the master budget, it is noted 
that before 1992, BIIC had been involved in BCRF's budgeting 
process and provided expectations (or targets) to some of the 
line items. The workshops or departments will be measured on 
their individual agreed budgets which are divided into quarterly 
or monthly (for workshops) targets.
Since B C R F 's whole budgeting process is still performed on 
manual basis, therefore, it is not suprising to see that the 
agreed budgets are fixed once every year although some changes 
(i.e. sales and production) can be made during the monthly 
review. In view of the rapidly changing market conditions, the 
budget review period has been shortened from quarterly to 
monthly. The factory manager and his deputy managers and three 
chiefs hold a formal meeting at the beginning of each month to 
review the financial performance against the master budget and 
individual departmental budgets.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given BCRF more freedom to plan ahead. The government 
representative, BIIC, has almost completely devolved the short 
term planning autonomy to BCRF, except to agree on the overall 
sales and profit targets. The top management have involved the 
middle management or even their subordinates (lower management) 
in the annual planning and budgeting process which on one hand is 
a critical step in materializing the long term strategic plan or 
the- ERC, and on the other hand, it is an important motivational 
factor for the workshop managers and department heads to manage 
their own businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) established its IRC 
system in 1991, just one year before signing the first ERC with 
the municipal government, in order to motivate the efficiency, 
profitability and cost reduction in the production workshops. 
Before the implementation of the IRC system across the board, a 
general policy was set up in 1990. The contents are briefly 
described in Appendix B at the end of this data analysis.
It took a few months for the factory manager and the workshop
managers to negotiate with the terms and conditions for the IRCs
signed. This long process indicated that the setting of IRC was 
not a top-down approach and the workshop managers were very eager 
on this issue upon which they would be measured against and
rewarded thereupon. The 1993 IRCs were subject to at least
quarterly review but no adjustments had been made since agreed.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the factory manager has delegated more freedom to the 
workshop managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also involved the finance division intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the central influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the workshops, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Beijing Chunshu Rectifier 
Factory (BCRF) that need headquarters' intervention.
Since 1993, the transfer prices have been determined by standard 
cost of production which is based on the historical cost of 
production multiplied by a factor of 1.16. Motivation to a 
workshop manager to transfer products to another workshop is low 
because there is no profit margin and most of the times, the 
actual cost of production is higher than the standard because of 
unexpected up-rising inflation rates. The workshop managers has 
little autonomy in fixing the transfer prices and all the 
intermediate products have to be transferred internally.
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The standard transfer prices are reviewed annually in line with 
the budgeting process and adjusted according to the inflation 
rates.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High
Corporate" to "High Corporate" since 1992.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Beijing 
Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) has three distinct levels of 
management hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (factory, deputy-factory managers, chief
accountant, chief engineer and chief 
economist)
(2) Middle Management (workshop managers and department heads)
(3) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-factory managers and the three chiefs can decide on 
their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (sections). 
They are also responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of employment with any 
staff is a difficult task which will be explained in the rewards 
and incentives section below.
Since 1988, BCRF has employed an "Internal Economic Evaluation 
System" which laid down the following principles and policies to 
define the relationships between responsibility centres, their 
duties and rights, and how to measure performance.
(1) Introduction
The "Internal Economic Evaluation System" (IEES) is an 
Accounting Information System (AIS) for planning and control 
the capital employed, production consumptions, effectiveness 
and efficiency. The ultimate objective is to maximize the 
profitability by using the minimum resources.
(2) Principles and Methods
2.1 Top Management Support
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The top management should recognise the importance of this 
system by providing directives, demanding efforts, devising 
means and procedures, and reviewing progress. The Factory 
Manager must be personally responsible for this system by 
defining the contents, timetables and procedures.
2.2 Common Recognition
First and foremost, the top management should make the 
middle management (i.e. workshop managers) to recognise the 
importance of implementing the IEES which is a very 
important component of the enterprise management. It 
closely integrates the rights and benefits of the 
government, enterprise and individuals in order to enhance 
the motivation and initiation of every party. Furthermore, 
the spirit and priciples of IEES should also embedded into 
the minds of all the employees who can work together to 
achieve the objective of this system.
(3) System Specifications
3.1 Responsibility Centres (5 types)
3.1.1 Profit Centre - measured by internal profit i.e. 
production workshops;
3.1.2 Capital Centre - measured by the working capital 
employed i.e. purchasing & supply, production support 
and sales;
3.1.3 Expense Centre - measured by operating expenses i.e. 
personnel, accounting and general affairs;
3.1.4 Subsidised Centre - measured by the subsidy of 
expense over income i.e. canteen, medical centre and 
nursary; and
3.1.5 Special Centre - measured by the cost and benefit of 
individual investment or project i.e. R&D, product 
development, estate and facility.
3.2 Contents of Evaluation
3.2.1 Economic Targets - seggregate the economic targets 
provided by the government down to workshop, product 
line, group, shift and individual levels.
3.2.2 Capital Employed - set working capital targets for 
workshops and other non-production departments.
3.2.3 Internal Profit - calculate the difference between 
internal sales revenue and actual expenditure.
3.2.4 Transfer Prices - use the internal standard prices to 
settle the transfers and transactions among the 
responsibility centres.
3.2.5 Material Reward - award to the responsibility centres 
according to degree of effectiveness and efficiency 
achieved.
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3 . 3  P r i n c i p l e s
3.3.1 Economic Responsibility -
(a) each centre is responsible - for its own economic 
efficiency according to the above contents of 
evaluation; and
(b) incentives are awarded according to the degree 
of achievement of the economic targets.
3.3.2 Authority and Responsibility - appropriate authority 
should be given to the centres to carry out their 
responsibilities and achieve the best economic 
effectiveness.
3.3.3 Material Benefit - rewards and penalties should be 
commensurated with the economic results attained.
Principle 3.3.1 is the core, 3.3.2 is the prerequisite, and
3.3.3 is the energizer of the IEES.
(4) Rules & Regulations
4.1 Performance Evaluation
The Factory Manager is responsible to evaluate the 
performance of the workshops, while the workshop managers 
are responsible to measure the performance of their 
respective production lines and groups. The accounting 
staff in the workshops are reporting to the Finance Division 
in the headquarters as far as providing information for 
performance evaluation is concerned.
4.2 Enterprise Performance Evaluation
The Factory Manager is responsible to design and organise 
all the units in evaluating the economic performance 
systematically. All the planned targets should be assessed 
in order to improve the operation and management of the 
whole enterprise. The duties include :
- 4.2.1 to establish a sound performance evaluation system
and to be implemented by different levels of 
management based on the principles shown above;
4.2.2 to determine the economic targets to be assessed in
each workshop and department;
4.2.3 to ensure every economic target and its effectiveness 
is assessed by the workshop or department properly;
4.2.4 to determine the internal profit of each workshop;
4.2.5 to assess the cost of manufacturing of each type of
product; and
4.2.6 to perform economic activity analysis i.e. variance
analysis.
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4 . 3  Workshop P e r f o r m a n c e  E v a l u a t i o n
Workshop performance evaluation is the core of assessment 
which objective is to enhance the productivity in terms of 
achieving or exceeding the planned economic targets by 
employing the least manpower, materials and capital. The 
duties include :
4.3.1 to improve the production management standards and 
emphasize the economic efficiency;
4.3.2 to determine the measurement yardsticks for the 
production lines, groups and shifts and assess the 
performance subsequently;
4.3.3 to calculate the manufacturing cost and internal 
profit correctly;
4.3.4 to ensure the achievement of each economic and 
technical targets; and
4.3.5 to ascertain the quantity and value of work-in- 
progress at the end of every month.
(5) Authority and Responsibility
5.1 Under the leadership of the workshop manager, each workshop 
should conduct the performance evaluation properly according 
to the above principles, rules and regulations.
5.2 After assessing the economic targets, the workshop managers
should investigate the causes of every significant variance.
5.3 Each workshop manager should encourage his production units
to enhance the product quality, improve the productivity per 
employee, save materials, power and energy, reduce the 
working capital employed and cost of production.
5.4 The economic targets should be linked up with the incentive
system in each workshop in order to initiate the motivation 
of the employees.
5.5 Within the enterprise long and short term plans, the 
headquarters has the authority to adjust the production and 
economic targets in the workshops.
5.6 The workshops cannot purchase the raw materials and 
components from outside suppliers, and cannot sell the 
finished goods and spare parts to external customers.
5.7 Each workshop has the right to employ and dispose the fixed 
assets owned.
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(6) E co n o m ic  T a r g e t s  (
The major economic targets used to measure the performance of the 
workshops include :
6.1 production value
6.2 production quantity
6.3 product quality
6.4 internal profit
6.5 working capital employed
6.6 standard labour hour
Most of these targets were assigned by the headquarters to the 
workshops under this IEES. The subsequent implementation of the 
IRC system in 1991 was similar to the IEES but the workshop 
personnel have been involved in negotiating the targets set.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of BCRF.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BRCF) sets similar objectives 
for its production workshops : workshop managers must meet their 
agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement in 
performance year after year except under adverse market 
conditions. The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual 
budget review. In view of the fierce competition within this 
industry, the production workshops sometimes feel passive in 
setting their objectives or targets in the budgets or IRCs 
because their activities are depending on the sales demand. Even 
at the economic downturn in 1994, the workshops were asked to 
follow the production budgets although they realised that some 
products were piling up in stock.
A high pressure to achieve the budgeted production and internal 
profit is put on the workshop managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group bonus are 
tied in with the budget or IRC and it also depends on the overall 
performance of the enterprise as a whole. In terms of expenses, 
control is tighter and a system of standard cost has been 
implemented. Although the non-production departments do not have 
the IRCs, they have agreed specific objectives or targets with 
the factory manager, for example, amounts of working capital 
employed, levels of expenses and management by objectives.
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Across the board, all the non-manufacturing expenses were cut by 
10% in 1994. The promotion, salary and bonus of these functional 
staff are correlated with these quantitative and non-financial 
targets.
In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) regards it as essential 
to catch variances from budget or IRC before they have gone too 
far. To this end the top management monitor results on a monthly 
and quarterly basis. All the workshops and departments submit 
monthly results on standard forms to their respective divisional 
heads and also to the chief accountant for vetting and comparison 
with budgets and IRCs. The production workshops are also 
required to submit production figures to the top management on a 
weekly basis.
The monthly report format is unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the budgeted line items 
from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted 
from this report. The monthly and quarterly actuals are compared 
with the fixed budgets. The qualitative targets are usually 
subjectively measured by the divisional heads and written in the 
monthly reports as well. These monthly reports are compiled by 
the accounting department and assessed by the enterprise 
management office. Any significant variances (without specifying 
tolerance limits) will be highlighted in order to bring the 
attention to the top management. Then all the monthly reports 
are submitted to the factory manager for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
factory manager will contact with the respective deputy managers, 
workshop managers or department heads to dig out the underlying 
reasons or ask them to perform investigation immediately. It is 
expected • that corrective actions can be taken to remedy the 
situation as soon as possible.
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B C R F 's senior management ,hold monthly meetings to discuss 
production planning, scheduling and management, marketing and 
sales, economic performance and party's affairs. During the 
economic performance meeting, the factory manager puts forward 
the monthly results for open discussion. The workshop managers 
and the department heads may be asked to explain briefly the 
significant variances. Consistent failure (say over 12 months) 
in meeting the targets which are controllable by a workshop 
manager, probably he will be replaced by somebody else. It has 
happened once in the last two years that a workshop manager has 
been replaced. On the other hand, the favourable results will be 
openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results are passed 
back to the manpower and wages division for calculating the group 
bonus of each workshop or department for last month. Then the 
accounting department processes the bonus payments at the end of 
the month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by one month).
The importance of computerization is not well recognised by the 
top management even though a few stand-alone personal computers 
have been used for production planning and payroll. The 
accounting functions are still performed manually. There is no 
plan for implementing a comprehensive integrated management or 
accounting information system. Perhaps the lack of capital for 
investment in computer hardware and software and the urgent needs 
to focus on the marketing strategies put computerization at the 
bottom of the priority list.
Now, BCRF views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the department or workshop. The monitoring process 
is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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6 . 4  Rewards  and I n c e n t i v e s  f
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, BCRF is allowed to increase the wages 
and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
The take-home pay of each employee in BCRF is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 35% - 45%
(2) Bonus 40% - 25%
(3) Allowances 25% - 30%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB5,600 
in 1993. This wages level is at least 30% lower than the Southern 
cities like Xiamen and Guangzhou because the inflation rate is 
lower in Beijing (20% compared with 35% in Guangzhou in 1993) . 
Nevertheless, under the current high inflation rate in China 
(overall average 23% and 22% in 1993 and 1994 respectively), BCRF 
increased the average annual gross wages to RMB6,200 in 1994 and 
was expected to reach RMB7,000 in 1995. Because of the loss 
making situation, BCRF's average wages level was lower than many 
other industries in Beijing.
According to the general national standard adopted by most of the 
state-owned enterprises, BCRF's production workers are classified 
into 8 classes and within each class there are two to three 
sub-classes. Promotion from one class (or sub-class) to the next 
higher class (or sub-class) mainly depends on seniority, 
knowledge of work, technical skill and training. Usually, there 
is an annual assessment or test of every worker to determine his 
or her promotion. The pay scale of monthly basic wages to 
workers ranges from RMB150 to RMB350. Therefore, the wages 
difference between two successive classes is only about RMB25 and 
it may take over 20 years rising from the lowest class to the 
highest class. The annual wages increment can never catch up 
with t h e •inflation.
There is another basic salary pay-scale divided into 16 classes 
(2 to 3 sub-classes in each class) for the technical and 
management staff and its range is from RMB150 (Class 1) to RMB350 
(Class 16) per month. For example,
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Management Staff
c
Technical Staff
Post Classes Post Classes
Factory Manager 15 - 16
Deputy Factory Mgr. 13 - 14
Chief Accountant 13 - 14
Chief Engineer 13 - 14
Department Head 10 - 12 Senior Engineer 10 - 12
Deputy Dept. Head 8 - 10 Engineer 8 - 1 0
Supervisor 6 - 8 Senior Technician 6 - 8
Section Leader 5 - 6 Technician 5 - 6
Senior Clerk 3 - 4 Junior Technician 3 - 4
Junior Clerk 1 - 2 Trainee 1 - 2
There are two portions for the "allowance". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
Government at least once in each year mainly for the purpose of 
combating inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity.
The second part is decided by BCRF which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, hair-dressing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowance" is about 
RMB150 to RMB180 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the workshops, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the factory manager and a 
workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will be given 
to the department. Of course, it is up to the workshop manager 
to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates 
according to invidual performance. The bonus is distributed in 
cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a certain percentage 
(10% - 20%) will be retained in a reserve in order to make up the 
low bonus obtained during the months with poor performance.
How is the bonus determined for the management and administrative 
staff in the other departments? It can be described in the 
following steps :
(1) Calculation of management score
(a) Performance according to targets set
(b) Discipline according to rules and regulations
(c) Management methods and styles
(d) Security and safety
(2) Calculation of average bonus
Management score % (1) x Monthly average production bonus
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(3) C a l c u l a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  bonus
Average monthly bonus (2) x Individual index*
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
Factory Manager = 2.0
Deputy-Factory Manager = 1.8 
Department Head = 1.6
Deputy Department Head = 1.5 
Supervisor = 1 . 4
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System) , if there is an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the BIIC will award a lump sum of "special 
bonus" to the factory manager at the end of the year. But under 
no circumstances, the remuneration package of the factory manager 
can be greater than three times the total earnings of a 
department head (middle management). On the other hand, if the 
overall performance of the enterprise is not satisfactory or far 
below the ERC's targets, the factory manager may be replaced by 
the government. Since 1990, BCRF has replaced three factory 
managers already!
If the annual profit before tax can achieve better than the 
planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to all the 
employees and distributed in a way very similar to the monthly 
bonus.
In addition to the wages and salaries to the present employees, 
BCRF has to pay pensions and other allowances (i.e. medical) to 
600 retired employees. As from 1994, a kind of "social welfare 
policy" mandated by the government has to be implemented in all 
the state-owned enterprises. Under this policy, BCRF has to 
contribute 25.5% of the monthly total payroll to the government 
central pension fund. The government will ultimately responsible 
for the future pension payments to the BCRF's employees. The 
government is now considering to ask for an additional 16% - 18% 
from the state-owned enterprises to cover the medical, 
unemployment and disable allowances for the employees.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Rice Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is 
to initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to 
impose threat of termination (in a negative way) on the S O E 's 
employees. At the end of June 1995, the total number of 
employees in all the state-owned enterprises was 143 millions,
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accounting for 86% of the industrial and commercial workforce in 
China. Therefore, it takes a long time to change the working 
attitudes of this huge amount of employed population.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
may cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
Instead of fully implementing this contract employment system, 
BCRF has signed "In-Post Contracts" with most of the employees 
for periods from one to five years. This contract signifies that 
an employee is qualified for that specific post and he or she is 
eligible to receive basic wages (according to class in 
pay-scale), allowance and bonus. Without such a contract, that 
employee is out of job but he or she is still an employee of BCRF 
and is allowed to received a basic monthly subsidy of about 
RMB200. This measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy 
employees, but it can motivate the marginal employees to work 
better. Since the implementation of this system, the number of 
employees has been reduced from 1,200 to 970 at present.
Another means to absorb the redundant employees is to transfer 
them to a few "tertiary enterprises" (service enterprises) , such 
as transportation, motor vehicle repairing, canteen and nursary, 
which are self-financed independent profit centres.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, BCRF believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Finance Control"
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
f
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Very High to 
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High to 
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High to Medium 
Corporate
Low Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
Very High 
Corporate
High Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Financial Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Financial Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and 
Campbell.
control influences 
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used by Goold &
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financi
Program
[Pre-1
al
ming)
992]
IV10Q1UIU L-OjTpOITd. L-0 —
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\
[Post-1992]
(Financi
Control
/
al
)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Chunshu Rectifier Factory (BCRF) before and after 1992, 
it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
has been shifting gradually from "Financial Programming" 
(Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not 
yet reached a strong-form (low corporate) of financial control 
style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. It 
seems to be in the "middle of the road" between this two styles.
Revised : 10 February 1996
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Appendix A f
BEIJING CHUNSHU RECTIFIER FACTORY (BCRF) 
MAJOR CONTENTS OF ANNUAL MASTER BUDGET
(1) Financial Targets Summary
1.1 Production value
1.1.1 Industrial output value
1.1.2 Growth % compared with last year
1.2 Sales incomes (gross before sales tax)
1.2.1 Products sales income
(a) Attainable target
(b) Optimistic target
1.2.2 Growth % compared with last year
1.3 Profits
1.3.1 Net profit before tax
(a) Attainable target
(b) Optimistic target
1.3.2 Growth % compared with last year
1.4 Bank loan repayment
(2) Major Economic Targets
2.1 Production value
2.2 Production quantities (by product categories)
2.3 Financial plan
2.3.1 Net profit before tax
2.3.2 Profit and sales taxes
2.3.3 Working capital turnover rate
2.3.4 Cost reduction rate
2.3.5 Profit and sales taxes % net capital employed
2.4 Sales plan (by product categories)
2.5 Production value per employee
2.6 Product quality assurance rate
2.7 Energy consumption per RMB10,000 of production value
2.8 Material consumption rate
Against each of the above budget items, the following information 
is shown as far as possible :
(a) Measuring unit
(b) Last year's actual
(c) This year's budget
(d) This year budget +/- % of last year's actual
(e) Quarterly breakdowns
(f) Remarks
(3) Financing Plan (Master Budget) Introduction
3.1 Economic targets summary
3.2 Major targets (based on 3.1) agreed with :
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3.2.1 Purchasing & Supply Department
3.2.2 Marketing & Sales Department
3.2.3 Production Planning & Support Division
3.2.4 Production Workshops
3.2.5 Non-manufacturing overheads and expenses
3.3 Profit & loss account (compared with last year actuals)
3.3.1 Sales income (gross) -
3.3.2 Sales tax -
3.3.3 Cost of manufacturing* -
3.3.4 Selling & administration expenses -
3.3.5 Educational surcharge =
3.3.6 Profit from sales +
3.3.7 Other sales income +
3.3.8 Extraordinary income -
3.3.9 Extraordinary expense =
3.3.10 Profit before income tax -
3.3.11 Specific loan repayment -
3.3.12 Income tax -
3.3.13 Energy & transportation development tax -
3.3.14 Other county taxes =
3.3.15 Retained earnings =
3.3.15 Production development reserve +
3.3.16 Employee welfare reserve +
3.3.17 employee bonus reserve.
* includes : raw materials, electricity, gas, water, wages,
depreciation, repair & maintenance, opening & 
closing WIP
3.4 Production workshop cost & internal profit plans 
(broken down by the 5 production workshops)
3.4.1 Internal sales income
3.4.2 Variable cost % sales income
3.4.3 Variable cost (3.4.1 x 3 . 4 . 2)
3.4.4 Fixed cost (wages & expenses)
3.4.5 Total cost (3.4.3 + 3.4.4)
3.4.6 Internal profit (3.4.1 - 3.4.5)
3.4.7 Internal profit margin (3.4.6 % 3.4.1)
[last year budgets and actuals are shown for comparison]
(4) Other Financing Plans (Budgets)
4.1 Production workshop expenses budget
(broken down by the 5 production workshops)
4.1.1 Wages 4.1.2 Welfare fund
4.1.3 Depreciation 4.1.4 Administration
4.1.5 Repair & maintenance 4.1.6 Spare parts
4.1.7 Water & electricity 4.1.8 Gas
4.1:9 Plant hiring charges 4.1.10 Insurance
4.1.11 Consumable materials 4.1.11 Meal allowance
4.1.12 Labour union contribution 4.1.13 Special bonus
4.1.14 Product testing 4.1.15 Travelling
4.1.16 Entertainment 4.1.17 Other allowances
[last year budgets and actuals are shown for comparison]
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4 . 2 General administration
4.2.1 Salaries
4.2.3 Labour union contribution
4.2.5 Repair & maintenance
4.2.7 Water & electricity
4.2.9 Hiring charges
4.2.11 Overseas travelling
4.2.13 Consumable materials
4.2.15 Transportation & tax
4.2.17 Fire & security
4.2.19 Research & development
4.2.21 New product testing
4.2.23 Education & training
4.2.25 Management fees to BIIC
4.2.27 Advertising & promotion 
[last year budgets and actuals are
& management e x p e n s e s  b u d g e t
4.2.2 Welfare fund
4.2.4 Depreciation
4.2.6 Gas
4.2.8 Product testing
4.2.10 Local travelling
4.2.12 Entertainment 
4 . 2 .14 Insurance
4.2.16 Product indemnity
4.2.18 Bank interest
4.2.2 0 Drainage
4.2.22 Estate duties
4.2.24 Medical
4.2.26 Meal
4.2.28 Other allowances 
shown for comparison]
4.3 Working capital budget
4.3.1 Raw materials ’ 4.3.2 Spare parts
4.3.3 Sub-contracted materials 4.3.4 Repair materials
4.3.5 Work-in-progress (breakdown by types of products)
4.3.6 Finished goods (breakdown by types of products)
4.3.7 Accounts receivables & collection period (days)
4.3.8 Working capital turnover period (days)
4.3.9 Working capital employed % production value
Against each of the above budget items, the following information 
is shown as far as possible :
(a) Responsible department
(b) Last year actual (yearly average & year-end balance)
(c) Last year budget
(d) This year budget
(e) Turnover period (days)
(f) Remarks
4.4 Employee welfare expenses budget
4.4.1 Employee medical 4.4.2 Kindergarten subsidies
4.4.3 Employee's dependents medical
4.4.4 Urgency subsidies 4.4.5 Hair-dressing subsidies
4.4.6 Medical centre for kindergarten
4.4.7 Family planning 4.4.8 Canteen
4.4.9 Employee's quarters 4.4.10 Recreation
[last year actuals and budgets are shown for comparison]
4.5 Production unit cost budgets by workshops and products
4.6 Sales budgets by products, quantities and values
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(5) P u r c h a s i n g  &. S u p p l y  P l a n s  (B u d g e t s )
5.1 Raw materials closing balance budget
5.1.1 Major categories of materials
5.1.2 Standard closing balance $
5.1.3 Standard closing balance %
5.1.4 Last year actual closing balance
5.1.5 This year budget closing balance
5.1.6 This year budget over standard (5.1.5 - 5.1.2)
5.1.7 This year budget over last year actual (5.1.5-5.1.4)
5.1.8 Remarks
5.2 Raw materials consumption & turnover budget
5.2.1 Major categories of materials
5.2.2 Last year actual consumption
5.2.3 This year budget consumption
5.2.4 This year budget consumption over last year
5.2.5 Last year actual turnover period (days)
5.2.6 This year budget turnover period (days)
5.2.7 This year budget turnover period over last year
5.3 Consumed materials collected for reuse plan
5.4 Imported materials purchasing plan
(6) Other Plans (Budgets)
6.1 New products development plan
6.1.1 Product description
6.1.2 Technical features
6.1.3 Schedule of progress
6.1.4 Responsible department(s) & person(s)
6.1.5 Remarks
6.2 New technologies development plan
6.2.1 Item description
6.2.2 Major features
6.2.3 Schedule of progress
6.2.4 Responsible department(s) & person(s)
6.2.5 Remarks
6.3 Technologies renovation plan
6.3.1 Item description
6.3.2 Renovation contents
6.3.3 Expected economic benefits
6.3.4 Completion date
6.3.5 Investment required
6.3.6 Materials and parts required
6.3.7 Responsible department(s) & person(s)
6.4 Existing products renovation plan
6.4.1 Item description
6.4.2 Major contents
6.4.3 Schedule of progress
6.4.4 Responsible department(s) & person(s)
6.4.5 Remarks
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6.5 Standardisation programme plan
6.5.1 Item description
6.5.2 Job contents
6.5.3 Responsible department(s) & person(s)
6.5.4 Schedule of progress
6.5.5 Remarks
6.6 Quality product recognition plan*
6.6.1 Product description
6.6.2 Product specification
6.6.3 Quality grading/rating*
6.6.4 Completion date
6.6.5 Contents of procedures
6.6.6 Responsible department(s) & person(s)
* plan to achieve product quality rating such as Grade 1 
awarded by the municipal government
6.7 Quality circles plan
6.7.1 Workshop or department
6.7.2 QC group title
6.7.3 Objective
6.7.4 Group leader
6.8 Product quality standard (national) plan
6.9 Product quality standard (international) plan
6.10 Product reliability testing plan
6.11 Product inspection & measuring plan
6.12 TQM training programme plan
6.13 Import & export action plan
6.14 Intelligence information plan
6.15 Job/Work plan of :
6.15.1 Production Technology Department
6.15.2 Power & Energy Supply Department
6.15.3 Environmental & Safety Department
5.15.4 Design Department
6.16 Facility & Equipment Renovation Plan
6.16.1 Description
6.16.2 Specification
6.16.3 Quantity
6.16.4 Unit price
6.16.5 Total purchase cost
6.16.6 Supplier
6.16.7 Department required
6.16.8 Remarks
6.17 Capital Expenditure Budget (for current year)
6.17.1 Description
6.17.2 Specification
6.17.3 Source of supply
6.17.4 Quantity
6.17.5 Unit price
6.17.6 Total purchase cost
6.17.7 Remarks
6.18 Repair & Maintenance Plan
6.19 Education & Training Plan
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(7)
7 . 1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7 . 5
E n t e r p r i s e  Management P l a n
Factory Manager Responsibility System
7.1.1 Determine the organisation structure and employee 
establishment in order to maximise production output 
and turnover
7.1.2 Coordinate and facilitate the relationships among the 
party, management and employees and to ensure the 
supervision responsibility of the party
7.1.3 Formulate the long term plans for operation and 
development strategies, product development, techno­
logy enhancement and management improvement
7.1.4 Upgrade the class of the enterprise according to the 
standards set by the government
7.1.5 Set down the targets during the term of the contract 
between the factory manager and the government
7.1.6 Agree the economic responsibility contract with the 
government
Resources Consumption
7.2.1 Establish a power and energy consumption saving 
system
7.2.2 Establish a materials consumption saving system by 
applying modern techniques and methods
7.2.3 Establish materials consumption standards
Internal Economic Responsibility System
7.3.1 Establish an internal economic responsibility system 
according to the enterprise's long term strategies, 
product quality standards, resources consumption plan 
and economic efficiency
7.3.2 Enter into internal responsibility contracts with 
different levels of management and determine the 
performance standards for periodic evaluation
7.3.3 Distribute the resources and wages properly among the 
employees, management and government
Financial Resources Management
7.4.1 Establish different types of expenditure and working 
captial employment standards
7.4.2 Establish the efficiency management guarantee system 
according to the economic efficiency targets
Technology & Facility Management
7.5.1 Improve the facility ready-to-use rate, machine and 
equipment utilization rate, and technological level
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7.6 Fundamental Management {
7.6.1 Enhance the job standardisation according to the << 
Industrial Enterprises Standardisation Evaluation 
Methods>> issued by the government
7.6.2 Enhance the quantitative analysis according to the 
cdndustrial Enterprises Quantitative Analysis 
Upgrading Standards>> issued by the government
7.6.3 Revise and improve the average working labour hours
7.6.4 Improve the information and filing systems
7.6.5 Strengthen the composition of production groups and 
shifts, democratic management, safety production and 
inspection systems
7.6.6 Implement the education and training requirements in 
order to commensurate with the enterprise upgrading 
standards
7.6.7 Strengthen the production technology management
7.6.8 Improve the quality management of outside purchases 
and sub-contractor works
7.6.9 Enhance the work-in-progress management
[time schedule, responsible department and person(s) have 
been assigned for each of the above item]
(8) Modern Enterprise Management Plan
8.1 Computer Management
8.1.1 Information Department - establish the index system 
for technological intelligent information
8.1.2 Personal Department - establish relevant personnel 
management policies
8.1.3 Finance Department - provide management accounting 
information on sales and production performance
8.2 Total Quality Management
8.2.1 Establish total quality assurance system
8.2.2 Development quality circle activities
8.3 Value Engineering (Production Technology Department)
8.3.1 Evaluate the economic efficiency of GDS1000A/2-12 
and GDS6000A/3-18 (products) which have completed 
the value engineering and started the production
8.3.2 Start the value engineering process for product 
GDS2000a/l2-36 and reduce the cost of production 
based on the experience gained from 8.3.1 above
8.3.3 Try to undertake value engineering studies on a few 
other products
8.4 Marketing & Sales Forecast (Marketing & Sales Department)
8.5 Target Management (Finance Department)
8.5.1 Target (Standard) costing
8.5.2 Target profit
8.6 Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis (Finance Department)
8.6.1 Use break-even analysis
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8.7 ABC Management (Purchasing & Supply Division)
8.7.1 Employ the ABC concept in inventory management
8.7.2 Reduce the working capital invested in inventory
8.7.3 Reduce and clear the slow-moving and obsolete stock
[time schedule, responsible department and person(s) have
been assigned for each of the above item]
(9) Finance Division Specific Requirements
9.1 Redefine the organisation structure, manpower planning, job 
standardisation and computerisation within the division
9.2 Provide relevant, concise and in time accounting information 
to the top management for decision making and economic 
efficiency improvement
30 June 1995
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Appendix B
BEIJING CHUNSHU RECTIFIER FACTORY (BCRF)
MAJOR CONTENTS OF INTERNAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACT SYSTEM
(1) Introduction
Refer to the Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions in section
5.3 above. The primary financial objective is to achieve income
before tax of RMB7.5 million in 1991.
(2) Incentive Scheme (General Rules)
2.1 The apprentices, who have been in service for one year or 
above, are entitled to 50% of incentive bonus of the 
substantiated employees.
2.2 Group incentive bonus will be deducted by the headquarters 
if any one of the following events happens :
2.2.1 employees who undertake off-the-job education and 
training courses but exclude the less than 6 months 
programmes assigned by the management;
2.2.2 employees who have taken over 6 months accumulated 
sick leave;
2.2.3 employees who have taken over 4 months maternity 
leave (one child only);
2.2.4 employees who join in or leave from or retire from 
the position during the month;
2.2.5 employees who are responsible for any fatal or 
serious injury, facility damage and quality defect;
2.2.6 employees who are under administrative or political 
(party) discipline;
2.2.7 employees who are absent from work without valid 
reasons;
2.2.8 employees who violate the security, fire or traffic 
safety rules and regulations; and
2.2.9 employees who are arrested or detained by the police 
or summoned by the court.
2.3 Individual incentive bonus will be deducted by the workshop 
or department if any one of the following events happens :
2.3.1 employees who have been late or early leave for three
times or accumulated over 30 minutes;
2.3.2 employees who fight, drinking alcohol, playing cards, 
shopping, playing chess, reading novel, trespassing 
into other departments, etc. during the office hours;
2.3.3 employees who do not get off their bicycles when
coming in and going out the main gate, and place
their bicycles in unauthorised places;
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2.3.4 non-establishment employees who take sick, condolence 
causal and marriage leaves (1 day deducts 5%, 2 days 
10%, 3 days 2 5%, 4 days 4 0%, 5 days 60%, 6 days 80%,
7 days 100%); and
2.3.5 employees who violate other rules and regulations.
(3) Bonus Calculation (General Rules)
3.1 According to the Beijing Manpower Bureau Document No.426 
implemented in 1987, RMB20 of each employee's wages or 
salary will be bundled with the monthly bonus as calculated 
and subject to the followings :
3.1.1 the following employees do not entitle to the monthly 
bonus and the RMB2 0 wages -
(a) apprentices who work less than one year;
(b) employees who join in or leave from or retire 
from the position during the month;
(c) employees who take sick, maternity, condolence, 
marriage and sick leaves for over 7 days in the 
month; and
(d) employees who stay in hospital under medical 
cover;
3.1.2 the following employees do not entitle to the monthly 
bonus but receive the RMB10 wages -
(a) apprentices who work over one year; and
(b) employees who are under probation and training.
3.2 One-third of the production workshop's monthly bonus will be
on floating basis. The bonus of the non-production 
departments is 95% of the monthly average bonus of the 5 
production workshops.
3.3 The monthly bonus of the non-production division or
department is calculated as follow :
Monthly average nonus of the 5 production workshops x index*
* Production Facility & Support Division 1.10
Marketing & Sales Division 1.10
Purchasing & Supply Division 1.10
Other Divisions/Departments 1.00
Receptionists/security guards/gardeners/cleaners 0.85
3.4 The monthly bonus of the production workshop's management 
staff is equal to the average bonus of the workers in each 
workshop.
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3.5 All the departmental internal responsibility contracts are 
supplement to this general policy and they should be 
approved and filed by the Enterprise Management Office who 
evaluates the individual performance on a monthly basis 
according to the terms and conditions of the contracts.
3 .6 Any transfer or secondment of employees must be approved by 
appropriate management and recorded by the Personnel and 
Wages Department. The receiving department is responsible 
for the transferred or seconded employee's bonus. Other 
general rules are :
3.6.1 transfer/secondment between non-production 
departments, the bonus is deducted from the outgoing 
department;
3.6.2 transfer/secondment between production workshops, 
no bonus is deducted from the outgoing workshop;
3.6.3 transfer/secondment from workshop to non-production 
department, no bonus is deducted from the outgoing 
workshop; and
3.6.4 transfer/secondment from non-production department to 
workshop, the bonus is deducted from the outgoing 
department.
3.7 The actual equivalent working hours must reach 100 hours 
before any bonus is calculated.
3.8 All employee's education and training hours, including 
examination hours, must be according to the timetables as 
approved by the Education and Training Department. Any 
excess of the scheduled hours without valid authority (i.e. 
school's certification) are treated as causal leave without 
bonus entitlement.
(4) Bonus Calculation (Procedures)
4.1 Before the 5th of each month, the head of every workshop and 
department should access the actual results against the 
targets set, fill in the performance report and submit to 
the Enterprise Management Office.
4.2 The Enterprise Management Office should validate all the 
performance reports and submit to the Factory Manager for 
review before the 7th of each month. The approved peformance 
results or reports should be passed to the Personnel and 
Wages Department for bonus calculation.
4.3 Any delay or unable to submit the performance report should
deduct 20% of the monthly bonus per day. Any falsification 
of the report should deduct 50% of the monthly bonus.
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4.4 The validated performance reports by the Personnel and Wages 
Department should be submitted to the Factory Manager for 
final approval before the 9 th of each month. Then the 
Accounting Department is responsible for the bonus 
distribution on or before the 10th of each month. Any delay 
in the procedures should deduct 50% monthly bonus of the 
person(s) who is/are responsible.
4.5 Bonus calculation formula (see section 5 below).
4 .6 Every workshop and department should consider its working 
environment and evaluation requirement to design its 
internal economic responsibility contract.
4.7 Any deficiency, problems and ideas concerning the internal 
economic responsibility contract identified during the 
implementation period should direct to the Enterprise 
Management Office and subject to Factory Manager's approval 
for amendment if necessary.
(5) Bonus Calculation Formula
5.1 Workshops (Powder Semiconductor Devices, Converter Devices, 
Converter Equipment Assembly)
Average Bonus Per Worker (Al) = (Monthly Output Quantity x 
Bonus Per Unit Output x Product Mix Completion Rate)/Acutal 
Headcount
Actual Monthly Bonus Per Worker (Bl) = (Al) x Quality 
Performance Index x (1 - Mark Deducted)
5.2 Workshop (Fabrication & Processing)
Average Monthly Bonus Per Worker (A2) = (Total Al of 3 
Workshops x Product Mix Completion Rate)/3
Actual Monthly Bonus Per Worker (B2) = A2 x Quality 
Performance Index x (1 - Mark Deducted)
5.3 Divisions (Production Facility & Support, Marketing & Sales, 
Purchasing & Supply)
Average Monthly Bonus Per Employee (A3) = A2 x 0.95 
Actual Monthly Bonus Per Employee (B3) = A3 x (1 - Mark 
Deducted)
5.4 Other Divisions
Actual Monthly Bonus Per Employee (B4) = B3 x 0.91
5.5 Other Specical Posts
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Actual Monthly Bonus Per Employee (B5) = B4 x 0.85
(6) Common Targets (applied to all workshops and departments)
6.1 Work Plan
6.1.1 Contents - based on the annual plan to formulate the 
monthly, quarterly and yearly work plans which should 
aim at problem solving and quality improvement by 
setting targets and implementing procedures. The work 
plan of last month should be assessed on or before 
the 4th of this month and determine the work plan of 
the current month.
6.1.2 Assessment - any delay in work plan submission deduct
0.05 mark.
6.1.3 Assessor - Production Facility & Support Department
6.2 Internal Responsibility Contract
6.2.1 Contents - performance reports should be submitted to 
the Enterprise Management Office on or before the 5th 
each month.
6.2.2 Assessment - any delay by one day deducts 20% of the 
monthly bonus and any falsification deducts 50% of 
the monthly bonus of the person(s) in charge.
6.2.3 Assessor - Enterprise Management Office
6.3 Environment & Sanity
6.3.1 Contents - the area within the responsibility of each 
workshop and department must be kept tidy and clean.
6.3.2 Assessment - see separate rules & regulations
6.3.3 Assessor - General Affairs Department
6.4 Security & Safety
6.4.1 Contents - strictly comply with "Security Management 
System" and "Fire Safety Management System".
- 6.4.2 Assessment - according to the rules and regulations 
of the two systems.
6.4.3 Assessor - Security Department
6.5 Political & Technical Training
6.5.1 Contents - according to the enterprise's education 
and training plans to participate the respective 
programmes. Attendance should be at least 90% and 
learning materials should be noted.
6.5.2 Assessment - every 5% attendance rate below standard 
deducts 0.005 mark.
6.5.3 Assessor - Education and Training Department
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f6.6 Family Planning
6.6.1 Contents - comply with "one-child policy" and 
"marriage age policy" (male min. age 26 and female 
min. age 24).
6.6.2 Assessment - each "illegal pregnancy" deducts 0.02 
mark per employee, and each "illegal child birth" 
deducts 0.1 mark per employee.
6.6.3 Assessor - General Affairs Department
6.7 Workshop Expenses & Management Expenses (Variable Costs)
6.7.1 Contents - reduce 10% of the budgeted expenses 
compared with last year (i.e. 1990).
6.7.2 Assessment - evaluate at the end of the year.
6.7.3 Assessor - Accounting & Finance Department
6.8 Government Policies, Laws and Enterprise Rules & Disciplines
6.8.1 Contents - comply with the government policies and 
laws, observe the society ethics, and follow the 
enterprise's rules and regulations.
6.8.2 Assessment - each disciplinary action deducts 0.005 
mark per employee, and each arrest by the police 
deducts 0.01 mark per employee.
6.8.3 Assessor - Labour & Wages Department
6.9 Internal Reporting
6.9.1 Contents - according to enterprise systems & economic 
responsibility system to submit reports to respective 
departments or parties.
6.9.2 Assessment - except special or ad hoc reports, any 
one day delay in internal reporting deducts 0.005 
mark.
6.9.3 Assessor - respective departments
6.10 Water & Electricity Savings
6.10.1 Contents - no wastage of water and electricity is 
allowed, and using electric heater for cooking, 
boiling water and warming are not allowed.
6.10.2 Assessment - deducts 50% bonus of the employee who 
offends this regulation.
6.10.3 Assessor - Facility & Security Department
(7) Internal Profit Plans of Production Workshops
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The following was the format?of internal profit planned for each 
production workshop for 1993 :
7.1 Inter-departmental sales $
7.2 Variable production cost %
7.3 Variable production cost $ (7.1 x 7.2)
7.4 Fixed production cost $ (7.4.1 + 7.4.2)
7.4.1 production expenses $
7.4.2 production wages $
7.5 Total production cost $ (7.3 + 7.4)
7.6 Internal profit $ (7.1 - 7.5)
7.7 Internal profit % (7.6 % 7.1)
For each of the above items, the following figures were given or 
budgeted :
(a) Actual of 1991
(b) Budget of 1992
(c) Actual of 1992
(d) Budget of 1993
3 0 June 19 95
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ultimate aim is to c l a ssify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic
Financial
Strategic
Financial
Programming(1) 
Programming(2) 
Control (3)
Control (4)
Name of SOE 
Staff Interviewed
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT)
Mr Wu De Cheng (Chief Accountant)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 16 years)
Dates of Visits First Visit - 1 September 1993 
Second Visit - 1 September 1994
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B ack grou n d
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) is specialised in 
manufacturing multi-purpose tool milling machines. It is a key 
enterprise under the Ministry of Machine Building Industry and 
also a production base for exporting. BIMT had 1,200 employees 
including 200 technicians at the end of 1992. The enterprise 
occupied a total land area of 93,000 square metres, whereas the 
building or floor area was 40,000 square metres in the same year. 
Total fixed assets at historical cost was RMB16 million in 1992. 
The production output of various machine tools was about 700 sets 
of which 60% were exported to 30 countries, including the USA, 
France, Italy, South American and Southeast Asian regions. BIMT 
obtained the "import and export right" and created a foreign 
income of US$3M in 1992. The underground railways in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou have been using BIMT's products. The high 
product quality has earned good reputation from both local and 
overseas customers.
BIMT is manufacturing the following three categories of milling 
machines :
(1) Multi-purpose tool milling machines
Models - X8130, X8130A, X8125, X8132 and X8140 which can be 
fitted with digital display device; and 
XK8130A, XK8140 and RU800 can be equipped with CNC 
system.
(2) Radial milling machines 
Models - X6320 and XJ9325B.
(3) Equipment for air-conditioning
Models - BD8100 and BD8200 employing Johnson Control's (USA) 
technology with proportional type air valve;
KG, KGD, KGF, KGT, KK, KKD, KKT, KKF of ESM 
acutator for various instrument panels;
KXW, KXW-A, KXF, KXF-A instrument casing for power- 
supply unit, temperature preservation and protec­
tive device.
In recent years, BIMT has undertaken significant technical 
renovation by importing some advanced production equipment and 
established a 2,000 square metres constant-temperature workshop 
in order to enhance the manufacturing process and product 
quality. BIMT has entered into a cooperative joint-venture with 
Italian Rambaudi Corporation in manufacturing a new RU800 CNC 
multi-purpose tool milling machine. Through this collaboration, 
some technicians have been trained up, and the ability for 
developing new products and manufacturing technology have been 
improved.
In 1994, nearly all the manufacturing enterprises in this 
industry were loss-making mainly because of :
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(a) lack of sources of capital to replace the old plant and 
machinery due to the macro-economic control policies 
implemented since July 1993;
(b) the existing products could not suit the changing demands in
the national market;
(c) the cost of production is high mainly due to inflation of 
raw materials and wages, and also small batch of production 
but incurring high fixed costs (i.e. set up, scheduling);
(d) the selling prices cannot be increased in line with
inflation in order to maintain the market share;
(e) the end users prefer to import the same products from 
overseas suppliers at similar prices but higher quality; and
(f) the incompetent leadership ability of the top management.
In 1993, BIMT obtained a bank loan of RMB20 million to set up a
R&D Centre in order to diversify into new products. Adding up
with the other working capital bank loan, BIMT incurred an 
outstanding balance of RMB40 million and paid RMB4.5 million of 
bank interest in 1994. Of course, the loan interest affects the 
profit and loss account adversely. Since the self-financing 
concept has been implemented in 1992, the government is now 
reluctant to inject fresh capital into the state-owned 
enterprises who can only rely on bank borrowing. Another major 
reason leading to high bank borrowing was due to the bad debts 
problem. BIMT estimated a total of RMB20 million doubtful debts 
in 1994 . Contrary, BIMT was unable to settle RMB8 million of 
accounts payable at the same time.
BIMT is affected by the above 6 factors at present especially 
many large infra-structure projects, like the underground 
railways to be built up in over 10 big cities, are intending to 
purchase the tool milling machines from overseas suppliers. In 
competing with the overseas competitors, BIMT's cost of 
production may be even higher, and as a result the selling prices 
are not competable. Therefore, BIMT is losing out to the 
overseas competitors and was unlikely to maintain an export sales 
of US$3.6 million in 1994.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since its establishment in 1956 and it 
does not have a concrete plan to convert into a shareholding 
enterprise in the next few years because of the following 
reasons:
(1) stringent rules and regulations governed by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and the Bank of China (BOC);
(2) geographically closer to the central government with tighter 
control on enterprise privatisation than the other coastal 
cities such as Tianjin, Shanghai, Xiamen and Guangzhou;
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(3) insufficient strength <in terms of financial performance, 
market potential, product development and accounting 
control; and
(4) social responsibility to staff such as laying off employees 
after privatisation.
At the end of 1995, the government has selectively approved 3,600 
of large- and medium-size SOEs, which had good financial 
performance track records, to transform into shareholding 
enterprises. BIMT expects shareholding conversion should be the 
future prospect in view of promulgating market economy and 
raising capital.
Since BIMT is a wholly state-owned enterprise, it is under the 
administration of the Beijing Municipal Government and the 
Beijing Machine Building Bureau. Under the central economic 
planning system before the 1980s, BIMT's planning and control 
systems were dictated by these authorities and it was just acting 
as a vehicle (or a cost centre) to carry out the activities as 
scheduled by them.
In 1983, the Beijing Machine Building Bureau was transformed into 
a quasi-government body called Beijing International Instrument 
Corporation (BIIC) as an initial step to delegate the governing 
role to this self-regulated institution composed of all the power 
and electronic instrument manufacturing industries in Beijing.
Since then, more autonomy in terms of planning, operation, 
control and pricing decisions has been authorised by the Beijing 
Government to the BIIC and turning into this decade, BIIC's major 
roles played for its subordinate enterprises are to :
(1) appoint the factory manager (or general manager) and the 
communist party secretary;
(2) maintain macroeconomics controls on the 5-year's plans 
suggested by its enterprises;
(3) provide guidance on product development, technology 
improvement and market information; and
(4) act as a bridge or facilitator between the government# and 
- its enterprises in policy matters such as capital
investment, import and export autonomy, taxation, legal form 
transformation i.e. shareholding, etc.
# Some of the issues have to be discussed and approved by the 
Beijing Commission of Economic Reform as well.
In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, the BIIC has delegated the planning and management 
responsibilities to BIMT although quarterly and annual reports 
have to be submitted to the BIIC for review.
305
However, it is a learning fprocess for the top management to 
exercise this power and get away with from the old centrol 
planning system. They concern very much the outcomes and effects 
on the employees and try to avoid rocking the boat too much or 
taking too much risk.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation structure of BIMT can be divided into 5 
divisions under the direct control of the- Factory Manager who has 
an Enterprise Management Office. The departments of the 5 
divisions are listed as follow :
1. Production Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
1.1 Production Workshop No.l#
1.2 Production Workshop No.2#
1.3 Production Workshop No.3#
1.4 Production Workshop No.4#
1.5 Purchasing & Supply Company*
2. Production Technology Division (headed by the Chief Engineer)
2.1 Chief Engineer Office
2.2 Facility & Support Department
2.3 Quality Control Department
2.4 Inspection Department
2.4 Research & Development Department
3. Marketing & Sales Company* (headed by the Chief Economist)
4. Finance Division (headed by the Chief Accountant)
4.1 Accounting Department
4.2 Internal Audit Department
5. Administration Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager)
5.1 Security Department
5.2 Estate & Development Department
5.3 General Affairs Department
5.4.1 Medical
5.4.2 Canteen
5.4.3 Nursary
6. Manpower & Wages Division (headed by a Deputy-Factory Manager
6.1 Personnel Department
6.2 Wages Department
6.3 Education & Training Department
6.3.1 Technical Training School
7. Communist Party Office
7.1 Discipline & Promotion
7.2 Political Education
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8 .  Labour U nion  O f f i c e
# All the 4 production workshops have signed Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the Factory Manager and are 
measured mainly on internal profit.
* The Purchasing and .Supply Company is an independent and 
self-financed service entity (tertiary enterprise) which can buy 
from and sell to the external vendors and customers respectively. 
Similarly, the Marketing and Sales Company is an independent 
investment centre which represents BIMT selling the final 
products to local and overseas customers.
BIMT had a total of 1,250 (including 100 employees in the two 
service companies) working employees and 300 retired employees at 
the end of 1994. It is classified as a "medium-si-ze SOE" in 
China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB13 0M (1993)
Turnover : RMB 42M (1992)
RMB 48M (1993)
RMB 50M# (1994)
Income before tax : RMB3.2M (1992) - 7.6% of sales
RMB2.5M (1993) - 5.2% of sales*
RMB2.5M (1994) - 5 . 0% of sales
Income tax rate : 33%@
# BMIT failed to achieve the target of RMB55M of sales in 1994.
* The decrease in net profit margin was mainly due to high 
inflation and bank interest, and incompetable selling prices as 
well.
@ The net VAT (output VAT - input VAT) is about 7% which has to 
be paid upon sales but some accounts receivable may be doubtful. 
As a result, strain has been placed on the cash flow.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Since 1986, the Chinese government has actively promoted the ERCS 
to the state-owned enterprises with an aim to enhance their 
economic efficiency (over one-third of them were running in 
losses) through the participation in the profit sharing. The 
first stage of the ERCS development was from 1986 to 1990. In
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the first three years of this stage, ERCS created positive 
effects such as the government revenue and the labour 
remuneration were both increased.
However, in the following two years, due to the macroeconomics 
contol policies adopted by the government to curb down the 
overheated economy, the market demand for products and services 
declined and as a result, a lot of contracts could not be 
fulfilled. Therefore, during the second stage (1991-1995) of the 
ERCS development, many enterprises were not willing to enter into 
contracts with the government in 1991. Then the government had 
to give more favourable terms and conditions to the enterprises 
in order to induce them entering into the contracts.
Under the above situation, the Beijing Instrument Machine Tool 
Works (BIMT) entered into the first 5-year ERC (1991-1995) in 
1991 with the following 7 government departments in Beijing:
(1) Finance Bureau;
(2) Tax Bureau;
(3) Manpower & Wages Bureau;
(4) Economic & Trade Commission;
(5) State Assets Administration Bureau;
(6) Bank of China; and
(7) Beijing International Instrument Corporation.
The terms and conditions of this contract were summarised below :
(1) profit before tax RMB3M in the first year;
(2) profit before tax growth rate 8% per year;
(3) foreign exchange income of US$3.6M each year; and
(4) for every 1% increase in profit before tax, the gross wages 
can be increased by 0.7%.
The top management (factory manager and the deputies) of BIMT 
together with BIIC have had some negotiation and discussion with 
the government departments in setting the terms and conditions of 
the ERC. BIMT believed that the ERC could enhance their 
motivation and then the economic efficiency. Besides, more 
profit could be retained for product and market development. 
Therefore, both the contractor (Government) and contractee (BIMT) 
are satisfied with the present arrangements in the ERC.
In vi e w  of the present p r o m u l g a t i o n s  of shareholding 
transformation (privatisation), company law and modern enterprise 
system, BIMT expects that the the ERC will be ceased after the 
current one is expired at the end of 1995, instead BIMT will be 
subject to the new taxation system enforced since January 1994 
and other laws and regulations governing the state-owned 
enterprises.
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fS e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m
5 . 1  O r g a n i s a t i o n  S t r u c t u r e
In consideration of the relatively small operation of Beijing 
Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT), the guiding theme of the 
organisation structure is simplicity and accountability. It went 
to some length in 1992 to create stand-alone business units e.g. 
the 4 production workshops as independent semi-profit centres 
that are controlled by individual workshop managers with clear 
lines of authority and responsibility. Based on the Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC), they are accounted for the 
production quantities and costs, as well as the fixed and working 
capital. Other than these four production workshops, all the 
other departments are classified as cost centres.
Since 1992, BIMT has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each workshop and department such as initiating 
the annual budget and the internal responsibility contract. The 
profit responsibility primarily lies with the workshop manager 
but the top management keep a surveillance cost control on each 
production workshop through monthly or weekly report.
The selection and appointment of the factory manager and party 
secretary are decided by the Beijing International Instrument 
Corporation (BIIC) and a "Factory Manager Responsibility System" 
is in force. This system takes the Economic Responsibility 
Contract (ERC) as a basis to evaluate the performance of the 
factory manager. If an outstanding or above target performance 
has been achieved, the factory manager will be awarded a lump sum 
bonus at the year end.
Since 1992, the factory manager has full autonomy to appoint the 
deputy-factory managers (the three chiefs are equivalent to 
deputy-factory managers) and the departmental managers under the 
5 divisions. Any major changes of the organisation structure in 
each division should be initiated by the deputy-factory managers 
and approved by the factory manager. However, more autonomy of 
internal management and operation has been delegated to the heads 
of divisions (deputy-factory managers) since 1992. And in turn, 
the deputy-factory managers have involved their department heads 
more in planning, control and decision making. (Please refer to 
Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, BIMT has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual divisional heads report directly to the factory 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
divisions and the factory manager.
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O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from  "V ery  H i g h - H i g h
C o r p o r a t e "  t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
5.2 Review Process
Since October 1992, Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) 
has implemented a regular formal planning process to review, 
discuss and sanction the annual plan or budget and the internal 
responsibility contracts (IRCs). First of all, the factory 
manager reviews the long term plan and ERC, and evaluates the 
internal and external environmental factors, and then discusses 
with his deputy managers and three chiefs in order to determine 
the annual sales and profit targets for next year. Based on 
these preliminary targets, some guidelines are provided to the 
workshop managers and other department heads for them to initiate 
their own plans or budgets for the next year. As far as the four 
production workshops are concerned, their budget proposals 
contained the key criteria (i.e. internal profit, production 
quantity and working capital employed) to be used as the 
m e a s u r e m e n t  y a r d s t i c k s  of t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  i n t e r n a l  
responsibility contracts. The other non-production divisions and 
departments have to compile their annual work plans and expense 
budgets as well.
During November, the Enterprise Management Office and Chief 
Accountant under the direction of the factory manager receives 
all the budgets and plans for validation and consolidation into a 
master plan or budget for submission to the top management for 
review. Then, formal and informal meetings and discussions are 
held between the factory manager, deputy-factory managers, three 
chiefs and department heads either collectively or individually. 
This iterative exercise carries on until all the plans, budgets 
and contracts are mutually agreed and approved in the AGM (all 
the employees can attain) held during next February. Then the 
enterprise management office publishes a set of the final master 
plan and sends to the top management and all the department 
heads.
Before 1992, the annual budget review process was not as 
dedicated and formal as described above, and the BIIC and in turn 
the top management gave directions to the workshops and 
departments on what should be done over the next 12 months within 
the context of a few key indicators e.g. sales, production volume 
and mix, quality improvement, material consumption, etc. Since 
1992, under the legislative changes and market economy promotion, 
BIIC has .delegated higher automomy to BIMT in formulating its 
strategic directions.
Nevertheless, all the workshops and departments are encouraged to 
participate in the planning process and extend their planning 
horizon beyond one year in order to match the milestones set in
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the 5-year long term plan. Therefore, the factory manager has 
less interference in departmental planning decisions, but without 
reducing the tight financial control.
(Please refer to Q 5 .5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
operational mechanism (1993), economic effectiveness (1992), 
quality control (1991), economic responsibility contract (1990), 
etc. As far as strategic themes are concerned, the Beijing 
Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) has explicitly written the 
following in the introductory section of the policy manual for 
Internal Economic Responsibility System adopted since 1990.
(1) to implement the management by exception principles;
(2) to enhance product and market development;
(3) to maintain flexible operation to cater for changes;
(4) to ensure proper marketable product mix;
(5) to ensure production target with good quality;
(6) to guarantee safety production;
(7) to measure monthly internal profit of production workshops;
(8) to speed up the working capital cycle and cash collection;
(9) to emphasize the cost reduction activities; and
(10) to provide more education and training for employees.
The above strategic themes are directed from the top management 
for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when they are 
performing their duties for the enterprise.
BIMT has been promulgating "Quality" as the most important 
strategic thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for 
the domestic market share on one hand and to explore the overseas 
markets (i.e. Southeast Asian countries) on the other hand. 
Furthermore, it is clearly stipulated in the IRC that "quality" 
has the veto power in determining bonus. As far as hardware is 
concerned, BIMT has imported some modern manufacturing plant and 
equipment from the USA and Japan at a cost of over RMB3 0 million 
since 1992.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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Before 1992, the top management in BIMT from time to time made 
suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning and 
review process such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, 
marketing strategy and production quantity and mix. The top 
management followed the financial indicators and performance 
closely on monthly and quarterly basis and were quick to make 
suggestions if they did not match the overall long and short term 
plan.
To facilitate the implementation of the legislation in 1992, the 
top management have given some freedom to the workshop managers 
and department heads to compile their own plans or budgets and to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they would not 
deviate much from the ultimate sales and profit targets. 
Nevertheless, the top management still provide guidelines and 
suggestions to the workshops and departments in the planning 
process.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the establishment of Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works 
(BIMT) in 1956, it has followed the national 5-year's planning 
cycle and carried out the missions as assigned in every 5-year's 
plan directed by the municipal government under the central 
economic planning system. The commencement of the economic 
reforms in 1979 started to allowed BIMT to participate in the 
5-year's planning with the BIIC and the municipal government but 
specific directives and suggestions were always coming from the 
top by using the term "macroeconomics control and adjustment" as 
an excuse.
The changing role of BIIC since 1990 has encouraged BIMT, for the 
first time, to formulate their own long term strategic plan 
(1991-1995). The major contents of this long term plan included 
capital projects, product and market development which needed to 
be d i c s u s s e d  w i t h  the B I I C  who have been e x e r c i s i n g  
macro-economic controls and provide directives and targets i.e. 
technology expertise and quality standards. BIMT has also been 
allowed to carry out fesibility studies to ascertain the 
possibility of success in the capital projects to be undertaken.
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Since then, the top management reviewed the long term plan at the 
end of each year. After lengthy discussion, another new 5 year 
plan will be emerged. In fact, a rolling 5-year plan is in 
operation. In the current 5-year plan (1993-1997 inclusive), the 
following strategic directions have been laid down.
(a) Competitive Edge
In order to sustain the market share and a competitive edge 
against these counterparts, BIMT has to enhance its product 
quality by various means as described in the strategic 
themes and thrusts section above.
(b) Research and Development
Related to the competitive edge strategy mentioned above, 
BIMT has invested over RMB20M since 1993 to establish a new 
R&D Centre to investigate into new products. Furthermore, 
BMIT has taken the following steps to enhance its R&D 
function :
(i) to renew and upgrade the production equipment and 
facilities;
(ii) to improve the product design by using value analysis;
(iii)to investigate and improve the production technology;
(iv) to strengthen the manpower and technical skills in the 
research and development department; and
(v) to provide more training in research and development.
(c) New Product Development
BIMT has been discussing with an Italian counterpart to 
jointly develop a new tool milling machine CD840A equiped 
with advanced technology and sold at a higher selling price.
(d) Overseas Markets
BIMT obtained the export right (also the foreign exchange 
usage right) in 1993, so that they can explore the overseas 
. markets such as Southeast Asian, South America and Eastern 
European countries. But BIMT failed the export targets in 
both 1993 and 1994 because of competitors' quality and 
insufficient sales outlets although they have been actively 
participated in the exhibitions held in the UK, Germany and 
South America.
(e) Cost Reduction
In order to enhance the competitive edge and to increase the 
profitability, BIMT has taken the following measures to 
reduce the total cost of operation :
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(i) to cut production costs by value engineering;
(ii) to set up a standard (target) costing system;
(iii)to reduce the total number of employees;
(iv) to reduce overheads e.g. heat, light, etc.; and
(v) to tighten functional budgets i.e. accounting, 
personnel, sales, purchasing, etc.
A portion of the costs reduced or savings will be
distributed to the employees as a kind of bonus.
The current 5-year plan was compiled after long discussions 
between the BIIC and the BIMT's top management. It was eventually 
agreed and reflected in the ERC signed with the municipal 
government. Although the department heads (middle management) 
have been involved in this planning process, they were playing a 
consultation role only. Furthermore, the workshop managers and 
department heads are mainly concerned with how the milestones set 
in the long term plan will affect their next year budgets or 
internal responsibility contracts which will have tight financial 
surveillance coming from the factory manager at least on a 
monthly basis. Therefore, the long term planning and review 
process are using a top-down approach in the belief that the 
factory manager (over 20 years in the plant) has better
experience and knowledge of the external environment and even the 
internal operations of the workshops and departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the BIIC has devolved its central planning role to 
individual enterprises under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the 
top management of BIMT is taking the initiative to formulate its 
own long term plan but participation from the middle management 
is limited to consultation only. However, many detrimental
factors, as described in the History and Background section, are
now making the implementation of the above long term plans very 
difficult if not impossible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to '.'Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
Since the 1990s, the general short term planning policy adopted 
by Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) is "production 
determined by sales" which means sales is the initial driving 
force of all the activities. Reference should also be made to 
the 5-year long term plan especially to estimate what the sales 
potential will be for the newly developed product (s) in the next 
year. As from September 1992, BIMT has employed the following 
annual budgeting process.
The factory manager and the marketing and sales division are very 
active in performing some marketing activities such as 
participating in local and overseas exhibitions and visits to 
exisiting and potential customers with his sales and marketing 
staff. In September, he evaluates the present and future 
internal financial, production and human resources with the 
deputy managers and the three chiefs. He also scans the external 
opportunties and threats with the sales and marketing staff. 
Eventually, the factory manager tentatively determines a set of 
sales mix figures (i.e. sales budget). These sales forecasts will 
be provided to the respective departments, more importantly to 
the production workshops, for them to initiate their own budgets.
The first budget submission is in early November and the 
enterprise management office and chief accountant consolidate all 
the pieces into a master budget (financial and operation plan) 
for factory manager's review before the first budget meeting is 
held with all the workshop managers and department heads. The 
major purpose of this first meeting is to discuss with the four 
workshop managers to ascertain whether their production 
capacities can be matched with the initial sales budget. If they 
exceed the sales budget, it becomes the primary responsibility of 
the sales and marketing staff and even the factory manager to 
hunt for other sales avenues in order to fully utilize the 
production capacity. If there is excess demand, then priorities 
will be given to the customers for delivery and agreements must 
be made with the customers beforehand. Since the competition in 
this industry is very keen, BIMT has been under full capacity 
(about 80%) in the last two years.
Again, the second budget submission in December is consolidated 
by the enterprise management office for further review by the 
factory manager who will then discuss informally or formally with 
the workshop managers and department heads. Another submission 
is usually made in January next year. Finally, the agreed master 
budget is tabled to the annual general meeting for approval by 
all the employees in February right after the Chinese New Year.
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Since September 1992, the workshop managers have been involved 
intensively in this budgeting process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts with the factory manager. The other 
department heads have also participated carefully in devising 
their expense and operation budgets which they would be measured 
against as performance yardsticks.
Since BIMT's whole budgeting process is still performed on 
manual basis, therefore, it is not suprising to see that the 
agreed budgets are fixed once every year although some changes 
(i.e. sales and production) can be made during the quarterly 
review. In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the 
budget review period has been shortened from half-yearly to 
quarterly. The factory manager and his deputy managers and three 
chiefs hold a formal meeting at the beginning of each month to 
review the financial performance against the master budget and 
individual departmental budgets.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given BIMT more freedom to plan ahead. The government 
representative, BIIC, has almost completely devolved the short 
term planning autonomy to BIMT, except to agree on the overall 
sales and profit targets. The top management have involved the 
middle management or even their subordinates (lower management) 
in the annual planning and budgeting process which on one hand is 
a critical step in materializing the long term strategic plan or 
the ERC, and on the other hand, it is an important motivational 
factor for the workshop managers and department heads to manage 
their own businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) established its IRC 
system in 1992, just one year after signing the first ERC with 
the municipal government, in order to motivate the efficiency, 
profitability and cost reduction in the production workshops. 
The followings were the contents of the IRC signed between the 
Factory Manager and No.l Workshop Manager in January 1994.
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Department : ProductionfWorkshop N o .1
Duration : January - December 1994
Introduction :
In order to accomplish the financial targets of RMB80M turnover, 
RMB10M profit before VAT and income tax, and RMB8,000 wages per 
employee, the following terms and conditions have been agreed 
between the Headquarters and the Production Workshop No.l.
(1) Authorities
1.1 Production Workshop No.l is a self-managed and self-financed 
independent profit centre. The workshop manager is the 
representative (contractee) of this IRC.
1.2 Within the manpower budget, the workshop has the authorities
to design its organisation structure, to appoint management 
personnel, to assign jobs to workers, to distribute the 
wages and bonus, and to manage the working capital 
appropriated by the headquarters.
1.3 The workshop has the rights to employ the building, facility 
and equipment assigned by the headquarters in order to 
operate its activities. The workshop should actively 
participate in developing marketable products. The workshop 
should also try to obtain sub-contracting work from the 
outside customers in order to utilize any spare capacity.
(2) Responsibilities
2.1 The workshop should strictly comply with the Industrial 
Enterprise Accounting System and Industrial Financial 
Regulations to determine costs of production correctly. All 
incomes and expenses should be recorded and processed by the 
Accounting and Finance Department. Any violation of these
rules may be penalised by deducting 5-10 times of the amount
involved from the total wages payable to the workshop.
2.2 The workshop guarantees RMB4.5 million of internal profit
and RMB40 million of internal sales to the Marketing and 
Sales Company (servicing company). The internal sales 
include RMB10 million revenue from non-standard products 
manufactured. The workshop's total remuneration is linked 
with the internal profit achieved. If the above targets can 
be attained, RMB2,293,669 of wages, bonus and allowances 
will be awarded to the workshop. The floating base is RMB2 
million (see 3.1 below).
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2.3 The workshop should comply with the production plans to 
purchase the component's from the other workshops at the 
negotiated transfer prices which are equal to [standard cost 
x (1 + mark-up%)].
2.4 The workshop absorbs RMB3,263,000 of management expenses 
allocated from the headquarters.
2.5 The workshop employs RMB5.5 million of production working 
capital and pays a notional interest, as cost of production, 
calculated by [monthly average capital employed x 9.15%].
2.6 The workshop ensures the supplies of standard products and
components (or spares) to the Marketing and Sales Company. 
The selling prices of standard products are according to the 
negotiated (or agreed) prices. The selling prices of 
components (or spares) are equal to the market price. The 
workshop should be allocated 5.6% of the selling expenses 
incurred by the Company. Selling expenses include notional 
interest charged on working capital employed by the Company.
2.7 Standard (Planned) prices are used for materials and parts
supplied by the Purchasing and Supply Company. As from 1 
July 1994, actual purchase prices will be used instead of 
standard prices. The workshop should be allocated 6.7% of 
the purchasing expenses incurred by the Company. Purchasing 
expenses include notional interest charged on working 
capital employed by the Company.
2.8 The workshop should guarantee the product quality and all 
the quality targets laid down must be complied with.
2.9 Repair and maintenance on the production facilities and 
equipment should be performed according to the annual plan. 
Actual repair and maintenance expenses should be charged to 
the cost of manufacturing according to the new accounting 
standards implemented since July 1993.
2.10 Certain percentages on the amount of total wages should be 
provided for :
labour union expenses : 2%
education & training expenses : 1.5%
retirement/pension fund : 20%
retirement medical expenses : 3%
2.11 Enhance the operation management in order to :
(a) . control levels of working capital and expenses;
(b) improve the inventory control such as the physical 
count, bin card and stock ledger are reconciled;
(c) shorten the production cycle, even out the output rate,
and try small batch and flexible manufacturing system;
(d) improve the daily operation control; and
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(e) creat a good working environment.
2.12 The annual repair and maintainence plan must be implemented 
in order to achieve over 85% of ready-to-use rate of the 
production facilities and equipment.
2.13 Enforce the safety education and resolve any potential 
safety problems in advance in order to guarantee no accident 
and damage to the employees and production facilities and 
equipment.
(3) Incentive
3 .1 According to 2.2 above, if any 1% increase in internal 
profit over the annual target of RMB4.5, 0.7% of the
floating base (i.e. RMB2M) will be awarded as bonus. Vice 
versa, 0.7% of the floating base will be deducted from the 
total remuneration for any 1% decrease in internal profit 
target. For examples :
Actual Internal Profit Incentive Bonus/Penalty
RMB4.545M (101%) 
RMB4.725M (105%) 
RMB4.410M ( 98%) 
RMB4.140M ( 92%)
RMB2M x 0.7% 
RMB2M x 0.7% x 5 
RMB2M x 0.7% x 2 
RMB2M x 0.7% x 8
RMB 14,000 
RMB 70,000 
(RMB 28,000: 
(RMB112,000;
3.2 If internal profit is apparently below the monthly target,
the prepaid wages for the month will normally be less than 
70% of the total amount. (The actual internal profit can 
only be determined during the next month.)
3.3 According to the time schedule, the workshop should submit
the pre-determined financial reports to the Accounting and 
Finance Department.
3.4 Any significant damages caused due to managment mal-practice 
or negligence, the workshop leaders will be demoted or 
disciplined.
3.5 If all the financial and non-f inancial targets can be 
achieved, the workshop manager's remuneration will be 1 - 3 
times of the average wages per employee in the workshop. 
However, if some of the targets cannot be achieved, the 
workshop manager's remuneration will be reduced to 80% of 
the average wages per employee in the workshop.
3.6 Any dispute between the workshop and the marketing and sales 
company or purchasing and supply company will be arbitrated 
by the Enterprise Management Office.
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3.7 This contract will be effective for 1994 after discussion 
and approval by the anriual general meeting (represented by 
various levels of management and workers).
It took a few months for the factory manager and the workshop
managers to negotiate with the terms and conditions for the IRCs
signed. This long process indicated that the setting of IRC was 
not a top-down approach and the workshop managers were very eager 
on this issue upon which they would be measured against and
rewarded thereupon.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the factory manager has delegated more freedom to the 
workshop managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also involved the finance division intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the central influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the workshops, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Beijing Insturment Machine 
Tool Works (BIMT) that need headquarters' intervention.
As shown in the organisation chart in Section 2 above, the 
Purchasing and Supply Company is an independent and self-financed 
service entity (teritary enterprise) which can buy from and sell 
to the external vendors and customers respectively. The 
transactions between the Company and BIMT are treated as 
arms-length and charged according to the adjusted market prices. 
Similarly, the Marketing and Sales Company is an independent 
investment centre which represents BIMT selling the final 
products to local and overseas customers. The Company purchased 
the final products from BIMT at adjusted market prices as well.
As described in the IRC sample of Production Workshop No.l in 
Section 5.6 (sub-section 2.3), the workshop should comply with 
the prouction plans to purchase the components from the other 
workshops at the negotiated transfer prices which are equal to 
[standard cost x (1 + mark-up%)].
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Furthermore, the workshop ensures the supplies of standard 
products and components (or spares) to the Marketing and Sales 
Company (sub-section 2.5). The selling prices of standard 
products are according to the negotiated (or agreed) prices. The 
selling prices of components (or spares) are equal to the market 
prices. The standard transfer prices are reviewed annually in 
line with the budgeting process and adjusted according to the 
inflation rates.
Observation of Planning Influence : Shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Beijing 
Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) has three distinct levels of 
management hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (factory manager, deputy-factory managers,
chief accountant, chief engineer and 
chief economist)
(2) Middle Management (workshop managers and department heads)
(3) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-factory managers and the three chiefs can decide on 
their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (sections). 
They are also responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of employment with any 
staff is a difficult task which will be explained in the rewards 
and incentives section.
(Please refer to Q 6 .1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of BIMT.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) sets similar 
objectives for its production workshops : workshop managers must 
meet their agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement 
in performance year after year except under adverse market 
conditions.
The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual budget review. 
In view of the fierce competition within this industry, the 
production workshops sometimes feel passive in setting their 
objectives or targets in the budgets or IRCs because their 
activities are depending on the sales demand. Even at the 
economic downturn in 1994, the workshops were asked to follow the 
production budgets although they realised that some products were 
piling up in stock.
A high pressure to achieve the budgeted production and internal 
profit is put on the workshop managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group bonuses 
are tied in with the budget or IRC and it also depends on the 
overall performance of the enterprise as a whole. In terms of 
expenses, control is tighter and a system of standard cost has 
been implemented. Although the non-production departments do not 
have the IRCs, they have agreed specific objectives or targets 
with the factory manager, for example, amounts of working capital 
employed, levels of expenses and management by objectives.
In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) regards it as 
essential to catch variances from budget or IRC before they have 
gone too far. To this end the top management monitor results on 
a monthly and quarterly basis. All the workshops and departments 
submit monthly results on standard forms to their respective 
divisional heads and also to the chief accountant for vetting and 
comparison with budgets and IRCs. The production workshops are 
also required to submit production figures to the top management 
on a weekly basis.
322
The monthly report format is unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the budgeted line items 
from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted 
from this report. The monthly and quarterly actuals are compared 
with the fixed budgets. The qualitative targets are usually 
subjectively measured by the divisional heads and written in the 
monthly reports as well. These monthly reports are compiled by 
the accounting department and assessed by the enterprise 
management office.
Any significant variances (without specifying tolerance limits) 
will be highlighted in order to bring the attention to the top 
management. Then all the monthly reports are submitted to the 
factory manager for review. For any serious adverse variances 
shown on any report, the factory manager will contact with the 
respective deputy managers, workshop managers or department heads 
to dig out the underlying reasons or ask them to perform 
investigation immediately. It is expected that corrective 
actions can be taken to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
BIMT's senior management hold monthly meetings, to discuss 
production planning, scheduling and management, marketing and 
sales, economic performance and party's affairs. During the 
economic performance meeting, the factory manager will put 
forward the monthly results for open discussion. The workshop 
managers and the department heads may be asked to explain briefly 
the significant variances. Consistent failure (say over 12 
months) in meeting the targets which are controllable by a 
workshop manager, probably he will be replaced by somebody else. 
On the other hand, the favourable results will be openly praised 
by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the manpower and wages department for calculating 
the group bonus of each workshop or department for last month. 
Then the accounting department will process the bonus payments at 
the end of the month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by 
one month).
The. importance of computerization is not well recognised by the 
top management even though a few stand-alone personal computers 
have been used for production planning and payroll. The 
accounting functions are still performed manually. There is no 
plan for implementing a comprehensive integrated management or 
accounting information system. Perhaps the lack of capital for 
investment in computer hardware and software and the urgent needs 
to focus . on the marketing strategies put computerization at the 
bottom of the priority list.
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Now, BIMT views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the department or workshop. The monitoring process 
is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the BIMT is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
The take-home pay of each employee in BIMT is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 35% - 45%
(2) Bonus 40% - 25%
(3) Allowances 25% - 30%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB6,580 
in 1993. This wages level is at least 30% lower than the Southern 
cities like Xiamen and Guangzhou because the inflation rate is 
lower in Beijing (20% compared with 35% in Guangzhou in 1993). 
Nevertheless, under the current high inflation rate in China 
(overall average 23% and 21% in 1993 and 1994 respectively), BIMT 
increased the average annual gross wages to RMB7,500 in 1994 and 
is expected to reach RMB8,500 in 1995.
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There are two portions for the "allowance". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower' and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
Government at least once in each year mainly for the purpose of 
combating inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity.
The second part is decided by the BIMT which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, hair-washing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowance" is about 
RMB115 to RMB140 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the workshops, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the factory manager and a 
workshop manager decides what level of group bonus will be given 
to the department. Of course, it is up to the workshop manager 
to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her subordinates 
according to invidual performance.
The bonus is distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly 
basis but a certain percentage (10% - 20%) will be retained in a 
reserve in order to make up the low bonus obtained during the 
months with poor performance.
How is the bonus determined for the management and administrative 
staff in the other departments? It can be described in the 
following steps :
(1) Calculation of management score
(a) Performance according to targets set
(b) Discipline according to rules and regulations
(c) Management methods and styles
(d) Security and safety
(2) Calculation of average bonus
Management score % (1) x Monthly average production bonus
(3) Calculation of individual bonus
Average monthly bonus (2) x Individual index*
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
Factory Manager = 2 . 0
Deputy-Factory Manager = 1.8 
Department Head = 1.6
Deputy Department Head = 1.5 
Supervisor = 1.4
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Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System) , if there fis an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the BIIC will award a lump sum of "special 
bonus" to the factory manager at the end of the year. But under 
no circumstances, the remuneration package of the factory manager 
can be greater than three times the total earnings of a 
department head (middle management). On the other hand, if the 
overall performance of the enterprise is not satisfactory or far 
below the ERC' s targets, the factory manager may be replaced by 
the BIIC. If the annual profit before tax can achieve better 
than the planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to 
all the employees and distributed in a way very similar to the 
monthly bonus.
In addition to the wages and salaries to the present employees, 
BIMT has to pay pensions and other allowances (i.e. medical) to 
300 retired employees. As from 1994, a kind of "social welfare 
policy" mandated by the government has to be implemented in all 
the state-owned enterprises. Under this policy, BIMT has to 
contribute 25.5% of the monthly total payroll to the government 
for employees' pension.
The government will ultimately responsible for the future pension 
payments to the BIMT's employees.. The government is now 
considering to ask for an additional 16% - 18% from the
state-owned enterprises to cover the medical, unemployment and 
disable allowances for the employees.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Rice Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is 
to initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to 
impose threat of termination (in a negative way) on the S O E ' s 
employees. At the end of June 1995, the total number of
employees in all the state-owned enterprises was 143 millions,
accounting for 86% of the industrial and commercial workforce in
China. Therefore, it takes a long time to change the working 
attitudes of this huge amount of employed population.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
may cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
326
Instead of fully implementing this contract employment system, 
BIMT has signed "In-Post Cohtracts" with most of the employees 
for periods from one to five years. This contract signifies that 
an employee is qualified for that specific post and he or she is 
eligible to receive basic wages (according to class in 
pay-scale), allowance and bonus. Without such a contract, that 
employee is out of job but he or she is still an employee of BIMT 
and is allowed to received a basic monthly subsidy of about 
RMB150. This measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy 
employees, but it can motivate the marginal employees to work 
better.
Another means to absorb the redundant employees is to transfer 
them to a few "tertiary enterprises" (service enterprises) , such 
as transportation, repair and maintenance, canteen and nursary, 
which are self-financed independent profit centres. (Please refer 
to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, BIMT believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing. Instrument Machine Tool Works 
(BIMT) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Very High to 
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High to 
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High to Medium 
Corporate
Low Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight Financial Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and 
Campbell.
control influences used by Goold &
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
1 lw d .L Li III w d 1 £•/ w i  d U d•
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\/
[Post-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Instrument Machine Tool Works (BIMT) before and after 
1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting 
Style" has been shifting gradually from "Financial Programming" 
(Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not 
yet reached a strong-form (low corporate) of financial control 
style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. It 
seems to be in the "middle of the road" between this two styles.
Revised : 10 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE). The u l t imate aim is to c l assify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE Shanghai No.l Department Store Company 
Limited (SDS1)
Staff Interviewed Miss Lee Shu Hua/Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 7 years)
Dates of Visits First Visit - 11 September 1993
Second Visit - 5 September 1994
Third Visit - 10 February 1995
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
Before the formation of People's Republic of China (PRC) in 
October 194 9, Shanghai N o .1 Department Store Co. Ltd. (SDS1) had 
been existed and previously known as Daxin Department Store. 
SDS1 is the first and largest state-owned department store in 
Shanghai established in the same month right after the birth of 
the PRC.
Since the early 1930s, SDS1 has been using the present old 
building as the main store with an expansion from 5 floors in 
1960s to 7 floors in 1980s, and then 9 floors in 1994 with a 
total shopping area over 20,000 square metres and another 5,000 
square metres for administration offices. This famous old 
building is located in the central of Nanging Road (at the one 
end of Nanging East Road) which is recognised as the heart of 
West Shanghai business centre. Probably, there will be another 
significant potential capital gain if this building is revaluated 
again.
Turnover has been expended from a few millions of yuan (Reminbi) 
in the early 1950s to RMB1,700 million (yuan) in 1993 and 
expected to achieve RMB2,100 million (yuan) in 1994. Number of 
items of commodities on sales has been increased to over 30,000 
in 1994. About 5% of the commodities, manily household 
electrical appliances, are imported from overseas countries.
In view of the fierce competition from local and foreign-invested 
department stores in Shanghai, SDS1 has been focusing on 
improving the service quality, modifying the commodity mix, 
expanding the wholesale market and diversifying into other 
businesses, in order to capture a bigger share in this vigorous 
retailing market. In the first 6 months of 1994, SDS1 attained a 
turnover (from retailing) of RMB1,022 million which was increased 
by 22% compared with the same period in 1993. In parallel, 
profit from retailing was increased by 5.4% to RMB57 million. 
According to the local government statistics, SDS1 was ranked the 
top in terms of turnover and profit in the Shanghai retailing 
business. Furthermore, in 1994, SDS1 was qualified by the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade as an "Outstanding Enterprise" and 
presented the "Golden Bridge Award".
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Shanghai. N o . 1 Department Store (SDS1) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since 1949 and it was transformed into a 
shareholding enterprise in mid-1992 in order to raise RMB470 
million of capital to finance the three major projects as 
described in the "Long Term Plans" [Section 5.4] below.
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The shares were held by the government (60%), other enterprises 
(21%) and individuals (19%). The individual shares, issued to 
the employees and general public at a price of RMB8.90 per share, 
were listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange in July 1992. A 
"Right Issue" was made in July 1993 to raise an additional
capital of RMB200 million which has also been fully utilized to 
finance the major projects. Therefore, SDS1 had to obtain a bank 
loan of RMB12 million to further inject funds for these few
capital projects. The total bank loan was further increased to 
RMB200 million at the end of 1994.
Since SDS1's major shareholder is the government, therefore, it 
is under the administration of the Shanghai Municipal Government 
and also the Shanghai Commerce Bureau which is a branch of the 
Ministry of Commerce in Beijing. Before the economic reforms 
started in 1979, the central planning system dictated all the 
planning and control systems of the state-owned enterprises. 
Therefore, SDS1 acted just as a vehicle (or cost centre) to carry 
out the retailing activities according to the commands directed 
from the bureau. Since the economic reform started in 1979, 
instead of dictatorship from the bureau, SDS1 has been involved 
in the 5 -year long range plan even though SDS1 for most of the
time had to take the directives from and give in their
negotiations to the authority.
After converting into a shareholding enterprise, the SDS11s top 
management (i.e. board of directors) have experienced much higher 
pressure to develop and monitor both long and short term plans 
because now they are accountable to various shareholders, 
including the general public, other than the government who is 
the major shareholder. But on the other hand, their degree of 
freedom is higher than the wholly state-owned enterprises in 
terms of higher autonomy and motivation to manage their business 
activities. Now the Shanghai Municipal Government and Commerce 
Bureau only oversee the major development and projects, mainly 
long term ones, recommended by SDS1. Furthermore, the bureau has 
fully delegated the pricing autonomy to SDS1 to compete in the 
fast developing and keen retailing market in Shanghai.
In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Tranformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, both the government and bureau have delegated the 
planning and control responsibilities to the top management of 
SDS1 to run their own business. In addition, a shareholding 
enterprise like SDS1 has vested the right to raise both long and 
short term capital as well.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
The organisation sturucture of SDS1 is listed as follow :
332
Board of Directors (11 members)
1.1 Chairman f
1.2 1 Vice-Chairman
1.3 General Manager
1.4 1 Deputy General Manager
1.5 1 Government Representative
1.6 1 Labour Union Representative
1.7 1 Party Representative
1.8 4 Enterprise Representatives (major shareholders)
Executive Management
2.1 General Manager
Deputy General Manager 
Deputy General Manager 
Deputy General Manager 
Deputy General Manager 
Deputy General Manager 
Chief Accountant
Operation
Purchasing & Stores 
Marketing & Sales 
Planning 
General Affairs
3. 7 Department Stores & 1 Wholesale Market*
3 .1 Women's Clothing
3.2 Men's Clothing
3.3 Electrical Household Appliances
3.4 Watches & Jewellery
3.5 Household Furniture
3 . 6 Daily Necessities
3 . 7 Supermarket
3.8 Wholesale Market
(Each department has its own manager, deputy managers, 
accounting, personnel, general affairs staff and section 
supervisors in charge of several counters selling various 
commodities.)
4. Other Branches (2,000 - 6,000 square metres)*
4.1 Manager
4.2 2 Deputy Managers
4.3 Purchasing Officer
4.4 Accounting Officer
4.5 Personnel Officer
.4.6 General Affairs Officer
4.7 Section Supervisors
5. Joint-Ventures, Subsidiaries & Tertiary Enterprises*
(See section 5.4 of Long-Term Plan)
* All the department stores, branches', joint-ventures, 
subsidiaries and tertiary enterprises are treated as profit 
centres and have signed Internal Responsibility Contracts 
(IRC) with the General Manager. In turn, each Department 
Store has the autonomy to sign second level IRCs with its 
various sections.
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SDS1 had a total of 4,500 employees at end of 1994 and about
2,000 retired employees whose pensions and benefits had to be 
borne by SDS1. Since 1992, all the employees have signed 
"employment contracts" with duration from one to five years.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
3.1 Key Figures
Total assets : RMB 1,101M (1993)
Turnover : RMB 1,780M (1993)
RMB 2,14 0M (1994)
Income before tax : RMB 105M (1993) - 5.89% of sales
RMB 110M (1994) - 5.14% of sales*
Income tax rate : 15% (since 1992)
* The reduction of profit margin in 1994 was mainly due to the 
inflation of purchased goods, wages and overheads.
3.2 Financial Statements
The "Balance Sheet" as at 30 June 1994 was as follow :
Million Yuan 
30.06.94 30.06.93
Intangible & deferred assets 12 16
Net fixed assets 73 77
Construction in progress 344 281
Long-term investments 306 267
Current assets 369 460
Total assets 1,104 1,101
Paid-up capital 198* 153#
Capital reserve 569 581
General reserve 44 17
Unappropriated profit 46 90
Long-term liabilities 13** 1
Current liabilities 234 259
Total equity and liabilities 1,104 1,101
* The paid-up capital was 198,238,992 shares of RMB1 each.
** The increase of RMB12 million was due to a bank loan to 
finance the capital construction projects.
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# A bonus issue (3 for 10) and cash dividend (RMBO. 2/share) were 
made on 23 May 1994 which were financed by the unappropriated 
profit (RMB63 million) and general reserve (RMB13 million). 
After the right issue in 1993 and bonus issue in 1994, the shares 
were held as follow :
No. of shares 
Government 88.51 million 44.65%
Enterprises 61.89 million 31.22%
Individuals 47.84 million 24.13%
198.24 million 100.00!
The 6-month profit and loss account as at 30 June 1994 is as 
follow (excluding subsidiary enterprises) :
Jan.-Jun. 94 Jan.-Jun. 93
Yuan'000 Yuan' 000
Income from major business 1,021,565 837,682
Profit from major business 56,603 53,705
Profit from other business 3, 557 274
Profit from investments 4, 255 13,192
Non-operating income 1,13 9# 345
Non-operating expenses (11,570)® (7,516)
Net profit before tax 53,984 60,000
Income tax 8,133 9, 000
Net profit after tax 45,851 51,000
Net profit after tax % per share 
Net profit after tax % equity
23 .13! 
5 . 35!
# The increase of non-operating income was due to the export tax 
refund of RMB839,000.
@ The increase of non-operating expenses was due to the increase 
payments to the retired employees.
3.3 Performance Indexes (1994)
Operating Income 
Holding only 
Subsidiaries included 
Profit before tax 
Profit after tax
6 months 
Actual 
Yuan'000
102,156 
120,308 
53,984 
45,851
12 months 
Budget 
Yuan'000
2.137.000
2.137.000 
100,000
85,000
% of 
Budget
47.80! 
56.30! 
53 . 98: 
53.94!
The audited financial statements for 1994 would be available in 
April 1995.
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S e c t i o n  4 : Economic  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t  S y s te m  (ERCS)
The Shanghai No.l Department Store had entered Economic 
Responsibility Contract (ERC) with the Shanghai Municipal 
Government and Commerce Bureau since 1987. The major financial 
targets set in the ERC were turnover, profit, income and other 
taxes. The ERC was ceased in 1992 when SDS1 was converted into a 
shareholding enterprise and SDS1 has been subject to income and 
other taxes.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The organisation structure of Shanghai No.l Department Stores 
(SDS1) is similar to a matrix management with functional staff 
i.e. accounting, personnel, purchasing, general affairs etc. in 
each department store or branch reporting to both the store or 
branch managers and the head office. It went to some length 
during the shareholding transformation in 1992 to create 
semi-stand-alone business units of all the 7 department stores, 
other branches and "tertiary enterprises" (i.e. motel, 
restaurant, import/export business and other joint-ventures) by 
giving higher autonomy in terms of personnel, purchasing, sales, 
promotion, operation, evaluation and remuneration.
Since 1992, SDS1 has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each department store and other business units 
such as i n i t i a t i n g  the a nnual p l a n  and the i n t e r n a l  
responsibility contract. The profit responsibility primarily lies 
with the store and branch managers but the top management keep a 
close eye on the financial performance of each profit centre 
through monthly or weekly report.
Since privatisation in 1992, the Chairman of the board has been 
appointed by the State Assets Administration Bureau. The annual 
general meeting and board of directors have full autonomy to 
appoint the general manager and his deputy managers. Then, the 
general manager can appoint other senior managers in the 
headquarters and the managers of the department stores and 
business units. In turn, the store and unit managers have the 
autonomy to appoint their own staff but should report to the 
headquarters. Any major changes of the organisation structure in 
each store and business unit should be initiated by the manager 
and approved by the general manager.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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In summary, SDS1 has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual store and unit managers report directly to the general 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
profit centre and the general manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the transformation into shareholding enterprise, Shanghai 
No.l Department Store (SDS1) has implemented a formal planning 
process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual plan 
or budget and the internal responsibility contracts (IRCs). First 
of all, the board of directors refer to the long term plan and 
evaluate the internal and external environmental factors before 
thorough discussions with the top management in the headquarters. 
The ultimate conclusion is to determine the annual sales and 
profit targets for next year. Based on these preliminary 
targets, some guidelines are provided to the department store 
managers and other business unit managers for them to initiate 
their own plans or budgets for the next year. Much emphasis is 
placed on the internal profits for the department stores which 
annual plans contained the key criteria to be used as the 
m e a s u r e m e n t  y a r d s t i c k s  of t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  i n t e r n a l  
responsibility contracts.
In October, all the department stores and business units submit 
their annual plans to the Planning Deputy General Manager for 
consolidation before review and discussion by the top management 
and board of directors. The first annual planning meeting is 
held in November by the board of directors mainly to discuss the 
gaps between the submitted plans and the targets perceived by the 
board. The top management is trying to provide assistance to the 
department stores and business units to close the gaps as far as 
possible. Then, further formal and informal meetings and 
discussions are held between the top management and department 
and unit heads either collectively or individually. This 
iterative exercise carries on until all the annual plans and 
contracts are mutually agreed and approved in the board meeting 
held during February. The approved annual plans are broken down 
into quarterly and monthly plans to cater for seasonal and 
holiday factors. The annual plans are formally reviewed once 
during the middle of the year.
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Before privatisation in 1992, the department stores had not 
participated too much in the annual planning process. Instead, 
they were given the performance targets by the top management. 
Since 1992, under the ownership and legislative changes, and the 
market economy promotion, the municipal government has delegated 
higher automomy to SDS1 in formulating its strategic directions. 
As a result, all the department stores and business units, who 
know their operations better, are encouraged to participate in 
the planning process and extend their planning horizon beyond one 
year in order to match the milestones set in the 5-year long term 
plan which is accountable to the shareholders.
Therefore, the top management in the headquarters has less 
interference in departmental planning decisions, but without 
reducing the financial control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q5.5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
operational mechanism (1993) , economic effectiveness (1992), 
quality control (1991), economic responsibility contract (1990), 
etc. As far as strategic themes are concerned, the Shanghai No.l 
Department Store (SDS1) has explicitly promulgated the following:
(1) to provide different varieties, choices, models, fashions 
and prices of commodities for various segments of customers;
(2) to guaranteed the quality, return and delivery of the 
. commodities sold;
(3) to adopt different flexible selling methods and styles;
(4) to improve service quality to promote company reputation and 
goodwill; and
(5) to use modern management techniques i.e. computerization to
enhance economic efficiency.
The above strategic themes are directed from the top management 
for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when they are 
performing their duties for the enterprise.
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SDS1 has been promulgating "commodity and price variety" as the 
most important strategic thrust in order to provide a wide 
spectrum of goods for different segments of customers to choose 
from. In parallel with the sharp increases of income, which is a 
major cause of high inflation in China (average 22.7% in 1994), 
the purchasing power of the general public has been raised 
significantly in the 1990s. Therefore, SDS1 offers different 
classes or price levels of many categories of commodities for 
various segments of customers to choose from according to their 
purchasing abilities.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in SDS1 still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and control process 
such as department layout and decoration, promotion strategies, 
selling price, commodity mix, purchasing and manpower. Despite 
this fact, the top management has given more freedom to the 
department and unit heads to compile their own plans or budgets 
and to adjust their plans and operations as long as they do not 
deviate much from the ultimate sales and profit targets.
The top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on monthly and quarterly basis and are quick 
to make suggestions if they do not match the overall long and 
short term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Having had fresh capital from listing in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the subsequent two right issues in 1993 and 1994, 
Shanghai No.l Department Store (SDS1) has actively undertaken the 
following long term projects which are believed to be able to 
contribute handsome returns to the shareholders and other 
stakeholders. These projects will be extended to the 9th 
National Long Term Plan (1996-2000).
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(1) Major Branches in Shanghai
Since 1993, SDS1 has established 4 branches in 3 busy 
districts of Western Shanghai and 1 in Eastern Shanghai. 
This strategy can expand the market share, increase turnover 
and profit, and absorb excessive employees from the main 
store. A few more branches will be opened in the next 5 
years.
(2) Branches outside Shanghai
SDS1 is planning to establish a few branches in the nearby 
counties or cities in order to capture the increasing 
economic growth and income per capita in these places.
(3) Joint Venture with Japan
Since late 1992, SDS1 has entered into a joint-venture with 
Yohan Department Store (holding 45% of the shares), one of 
the top five in Japan, to build up a commercial complex in 
Pudong (Eastern Shanghai on the other side of Huangpu River) 
having 2 towers of 9 floors and 22 floors respectively and 
occupying a total floor area of 140,000 square metres. The 
lower tower will have the largest department store in 
Shanghai and Asia, restaurants, amusement grounds, 
supermarket etc. The higher tower will be office floors to 
be rented out. This giant commercial complex named Shanghai 
New Centuary Plaza will be opened at the end of 1995.
(4) Expansion
Since January 1995, SDS1 started to eract a 20-storey 
building adjacent to the present old building on the Nanjing 
East Road side. Six floors of over 25,000 square metres 
will be used as new department stores (connected with the 
existing stores). The other 16 floors will be rented out as 
offices.
(5) Diversification
At the beginning of 1993, SDS1 has acquired the adjacent 
6-storey building with a total floor area of 6,700 square 
metres and transformed it into a multi-service block having 
a fast-food restaurant (managed by Cafe de Coral of Hong 
Kong), a traditional restaurant, a bar and a small motel.
(6) Manufacturing
Since the early 1990s, SDS1 has entered into small 
joint-ventures with some factories located in the suburban 
areas in manufacturing clothing, leather and consumable 
products for sales in the department stores.
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(7) Import/Export f
Since 1994, SDS1 has obtained the "Import/Export Right" from 
the central government. Then, SDS1 has immediately signed 
an economic responsibility contract with the local 
government to manage an import and export enterprise called 
Fujitec. In the first 6 months of 1994, Fujitec achieved a 
turnover of RMB91 million and a profit before tax of RMB2.3 
million. The import and export trade will be enhanced not 
only for profit but also for gaining foreign exchange.
(8) Investment
Since the late 1994, SDS1 has invested US$1 million to 
acquire 70% of the shares in Shanghai Konmose Computer 
Limited as a first step to involve in the high technology 
business. This subsidiary is generating profit since 
January 1995.
(9) Wholesale
In early 1994, SDS1 has invested RMB5 million in Shanghai 
Textile Product Company and transformed this enterprise into 
a new one called Shanghai No.l Commercial Products Company 
which is mainly handling the wholesale and retailing of 
textile and consumable commodities. In the same year, SDS1 
utilised over half of the space on the 7th floor of the old 
building to convert it into a wholesale market displaying 
various commodities for the retailers to choose from.
(10) Overseas Business
SDS1 is planning to establish a few department stores and 
wholesale business centres in a couple of Southeast Asian 
countries as the first step to penetrate into the overseas 
markets.
(11) Tertiary (Service) Enterprises
Since 1992, SDS1 has been financing and assisting the 
retired employees to establish small retailing shops and 
other related businesses which are all independant 
self-financing profit centres. On one hand, this strategies 
can increase the income of the retirees who receive about 
RMB3 00 pension per month and alleviate the financial burden 
of SDS1 on the other hand.
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(12) Long Term F i n a n c e
f
In order to finance the above long term projects, SDS1 has 
increased the current bank loan to RMB200 million. On 17 
February 1995, SDS1's joint-venture with Japanese Yohan 
Department SDS1 entered into a US$48 million (RMB400 
million) cyndicate loan contract with 13 local and overseas 
banks in Hong Kong. The large sum of cash will be used to 
finance the Shanghai New Centuary Plaza described in (3) 
above. Apart from increasing the bank loan, SDS1 is 
planning to process another right issue or to issue B shares 
(for foreign investors but B shares index has dropped from 
the base 100 to 55 since 1991).
Since the establishment SDS1 in 1949, it has followed the 
national 5-year's planning cycle and carried out the missions as 
assigned in every 5-year's plan directed by the municipal 
government under the central economic planning system.
The commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 started to allow 
SDS1 to participate in the 5-year's planning with the Shanghai 
Municipal Government and the Shanghai Commerce Bureau but 
specific directives and suggestions were always coming from the 
top by using the term "macroeconomic control and adjustment" as 
an excuse.
The Enterprise Mechanism Tansformation promulgated by the 
government and the Privatisation of SDS1 in 1992 have 
legitimately delegated the long term strategic planning autonomy 
to SDS1 who is not only responsible to the government (majority 
shareholder) but also to the other shareholders in the public. 
SDS1 must demostrate to the stakeholders of its future 
development to sustain growth in terms of asset value and 
profitability.
However, many external factors and uncertainties, such as 
government macro-economic control policies and inflation, have 
affected the validity and reliability of the above long term 
plans which have been subject to review and changes every year. 
The long term plans are initiated and discussed by the top 
management and the board of directors without much participation 
from the department store and business unit managers except 
playing a consultation role only. Furthermore, the store and unit 
managers concern with how the milestones set in the long term 
plan will affect their next year budgets or internal 
responsibility contracts which will have financial surveillance 
coming from the top management at least on a monthly basis.
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Therefore, the long term planning and review process are using a 
top-down approach in the belief that the board of directors and 
top management have better experience and knowledge of the 
external environment and even the internal operations of the 
departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Shanghai Commercial Bureau has almost completely 
devolved its central planning role to individual enterprises 
under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the board of directors of 
SDS1 is taking the leading role to formulate its own long term 
plans but participation from the middle management is limited to 
consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
f
Before 1992, Shanghai No.l Department Store (SDS1) was required 
to submit the following two annual plans to the Shanghai 
Commercial Bureau :
(a) Financial Plan - to highlight the incomes, expenses, 
profits, taxes, loan repayments and balance sheet items.
(b) Commodity Turnover Plan - to highlight the quantities and 
varieties of commodities to be purchased, sold and carried. 
(The purchase function is controlled by SDS1 since 1990s.)
These two plans were used by the Bureau to exercise its macro 
economic control on SDS1 through directives or negotiations. 
After the implementation of the mechanism transformation 
legislations in 1992, these two plans were not required by the 
Bureau. As from October 1992, SDS1 has used the following 
annual planning or budgeting process.
In October, the general manager asks the accounting and finance 
department to provide the year-to-date financial results. He 
also requests the planning department to supply information 
concerning the changes in local, national and international 
economic environments. Then he calls up a board of director's 
meeting to review and discuss the following aspects which have
direct or indirect impacts on the next year's plan or budget.
(1) Capability Evaluation
(a) Financial performance
(b) Financial stability
(c) Borrowing capacity
(d) Space & facility availability
(e) Manpower availability
(2) Environmental Scanning*
(a) Worldwide economy changes
(b) China economy changes
(c) Shanghai economy changes
(d) Competitor analysis (other Chinese department stores 
and foreign-invested department stores)
(e) Consummer analysis (purchasing power, fashion, taste,
service expectation, etc.)
* Most of the environmental information is collected and 
analysed by the Planning Department through news cuttings, 
market or customer surveys and consulting experts.
(3) Shareholder Expectations
(a) Commerce Bureau expectations
(b) Board of Directors expectations
(c) Other shareholders expectations
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(4) L o n g - t e r m  P l a n s  (a s  shown i n  5 . 4  ab o v e )
The general conclusion of this board meeting is to set 
preliminary targets for sales and profit expected to be achieved
in the next year. Of course, a certain extent of stretch is
built into these targets in order to enforce the department store 
and business unit managers to plan their own budgets agressively. 
Then the general manager breaks down these targets on divisional 
basis and notify them to individual store, branch and unit 
managers.
The next step is for the department store and business unit 
managers to formulate their budgets by discussion with their own 
deputy managers and supporting staff. In November, the store and 
unit managers have to send their first budget drafts to the 
accounting and finance department for screening and consolidation 
before submitting to the top management in the headquarters for 
consideration. At this point of time, informal discussions may 
be held between the top management and the store and unit 
managers trying to bridge the gap of different expectations.
Then formal and informal meetings are held until compromises and 
agreements have been reached between the headquarters and the 
department stores and business units. After the Chinese New Year 
in early February, the master budget is tabled in the board 
meeting for approval, and after that, implementation begins.
Fruthermore, the annual buget is disclosed during the AGM held in
April and also in the Annual Report. The budgets and IRCs are 
broken down into quarterly targets for periodic control and 
measurement.
Since October 1992, the department store and business unit 
managers have been involved intensively in this budgeting process 
which they believe to be important in setting and negotiating the 
subsequent internal responsibility contracts with the top 
management. Furthermore, the approved budgets and IRCs affect 
their strategies and tactics for short and medium term 
developments.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions especially the 
retailing businesses all over China, the budget review period has 
been shortened from quarterly to monthly (sometimes ad hoc 
meetings are held on a weekly basis) . The top management in 
headquarters and all the department store managers hold a formal 
review meeting at the beginning of each month to review and 
discuss the financial performance of last month. Remedial 
actions are suggested to correct any significant controllable 
deviations from the quarterly budgets. The targets determined in 
the budgets and IRCs are seldom adjusted unless facing 
substantial uncontrollable environmental factors. Basically, a 
fixed budget concept is employed.
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(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.) ?
In summary, the shareholding system, the mechanism legislation 
and the market economy have driven SDS1 spending more effort to 
plan ahead. The top management have involved the department 
store and business unit managers or even their subordinates 
(lower management) in the annual planning and budgeting process 
which on one hand is a critical step in materializing the long 
term strategic plans, and on the other hand, it is an important 
motivational factor for the store managers to manage their own 
businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Very Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Shanghai No.l Department Store (SDS1) established its IRC system 
in 1985 in order to motivate the departments to attain at least 
the financial targets set in the ERC signed with the government. 
This IRC system applies to the 7 department stores and other 
business units. In turn, each department store will sign similar 
IRCs with its sections selling different kinds of commodities. 
The duration of the IRCs is usually last for one year but a few 
of them may be two-year contracts for more stable profit centres.
Since 1993, the major targets set in the IRCs with the 7 
department stores include the followings :
Economic Targets - (1) Turnover
(2) Internal Profit
Other Targets (3) Stock Turnover Rate
(4) Stock-out Frequency
(5) Daily Cash Flow
(6) Business Development
(7) Store Management#
(8) General@
* Measurement criteria include new commodities and 
varieties, department renovation and decoration, usage of 
floor space, etc.
# Measurement criteria include daily operation, staff 
discipline, commodity display, etc.
@ Measurement criteria include service attitude, after sales 
service, security and safety, fictitious or competable 
commodities, cleanliness, customer's comments, etc.
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Since 1992, the IRCs have been developed by the department stores 
during the budgeting process (October - February). After 
iterative discussions and negotiations with the top management in 
the headquarters, the IRCs are agreed and signed by the store 
managers and the general manager.
The IRCs are reviewed quarterly in parallel with the budget 
review but both the general manager and the store managers are 
trying to avoid adjusting the targets unless there are 
significant uncontrollable environmental changes affecting their 
validity.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
store managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, and 
also involved the finance department intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objectively as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the 7 department stores, branches and other business 
units in Shanghai N o . 1 Department Store (SDS1) are all 
independent with very minimal interactions and interdependencies, 
therefore, internal transfer pricing does not exist.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Shanghai No.l 
Department Store (SDS1) has four distinct levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Board of Directors (BOD)
(2) Top Management (general and deputy-general managers)
(3) Middle Management (department store managers, deputy
managers and other functional managers)
(4) Lower Management (section leaders under the store managers)
Although there are overlaps between the BOD and the top 
management who are playing dual roles in both levels, 
nevertherless, the segregation of duties are clearly defined. 
The chairman is acting as an arbitrator to harmonize any role 
conflicts which happen among the members in the BOD.
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The department store and branch managers can decide on their own 
divisional structures, staffing and their roles and functions, 
and interactions between their sub-units (sections). In 
addition, since 1992, the store managers have been vested with 
higher strategic autonomy to manoeuvre their organisational and 
personnel changes but important changes should be discussed with 
headquarters before implementation.
The department store managers are also responsible for certain 
personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, 
evaluation, remuneration (distribution of bonus) and even 
termination of employment. With tremendous increase of foreign- 
invested and joint-venture enterprises, the present labour market 
in Shanghai is rather free which means employees can choose their 
new jobs and resign from the old ones at their own will. On the 
other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay off their 
staff by giving advanced notice according to the Labour Law 
(implemented in January 1995) and the terms of the employment 
contracts. SDS1 has fully implemented the "employment contract 
system" since 1992 and the "big rice pot" or "three iron bowls" 
concept has been abolished. If a redundant or badly-performing 
employee can not be transferred to another departement store, he 
or she will be asked to leave the enterprise.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the department stores are by using 
annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the 
most important measurement criteria are sales and profits set in 
the IRCs, although some other qualitative targets (non-financial) 
are employed.
As long as the department stores can meet the financial targets 
with growth from year to year, the headquarters can devolve the 
responsibility for strategy, development to the stores without 
much interference.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Tight Strategic Control" since 1992.
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s
Objectives in Shanghai No.l Department Store (SDS1) emerge from 
the detailed discussion of the annual plans or budgets with the 
department stores and business units. The financial objectives 
stem from the plans, rather than vice versa. This is not to 
suggest that the objective-setting process is wholly bottom-up 
although the top management initiates an overall financial target 
for all the store managers. It is still the primary function of 
the store managers to formulate their detailed budgets and IRCs. 
But top management in the headquarters can and do push and probe 
for alternative objectives as they see fit since they are under 
the pressure from shareholders. With the long years of
experience and information (financial and marketing) gathered by 
the different board members, suggestions are provided to 
individual department stores to amend the financial objectives 
both in the short or long term. Furthermore, the board of 
directors has a holistic view to achieve the overall financial 
objectives year after year according to the long term plan. 
Finally, the result is usually a compromise that both 
headquarters and department can live with.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Shanghai No.l Department Stores (SDS1) has monthly and quarterly 
reporting systems to track actual results versus plans or 
budgets. Each department store has its own accounting staff 
responsible for sending monthly results on prescribed formats to 
the accounting and finance department in the headquarters for 
calculating the internal profits and comparing with budgets 
before submission to the general manager for review.
The contents of the monthly report are simpler than the 
manufacturing industries. The key financial results such as 
sales and e x p e n d i t u r e s  are the m a jor concerns of the 
headquarters. The non-financial measurement yardsticks (see IRC 
in section 5.6) are assessed by the operation department through 
daily inspections. The comments and ratings of the service 
evaluation are written on the same monthly reports. These 
monthly reports are compiled, through the computer, by the 
accounting staff.
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Any significant variances (without specifying tolerance limits) 
are highlighted in order to bring to the attention to the top 
management. Apart from the accounting function, the computing 
centre of SDS1 is working on the purchasing, inventory and sales 
systems.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general or deputy-general managers contacts the respective store 
managers to dig out the underlining reasons or ask them to 
perform investigation immediately. It is expected that remedial 
actions can be taken to handle the short term problems as soon as 
possible (such as a sudden sales promotion by a counterpart). 
Whereas, strategic steps may be considered and implemented to 
solve some medium term problems (such as the internal decoration 
and display arrangement).
During the monthly meeting between the top management in 
headquarters and the store managers, the general manager puts 
forward the monthly results for open discussion. The store 
managers may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances and any other potential problems. Infrequent failures 
in meeting the budget by the store managers can be tolerated as 
long as they are taking remedial tactics or strategies to put 
things back on the right track and attain the budget at the end 
of the year. Of course, if any serious uncontrollable 
environmental factors happened to hit any department store 
adversely, the manager should not be blamed.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the accounting department for calculating the 
bonus for last month.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
The financial results achieved by SDS1 in 1994 were very 
encouraging even under keen competition from the domestic and 
foreign-invested counterparts in Shanghai since the 1990s. The 
sales and profit per employee of SDS1 in 1994 was ranked the top 
in the retailing business of China.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Moderate Financial 
Control" to "Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
According to the central government's policy, the annual gross 
wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the state-owned 
enterprises, including shareholding companies, cannot exceed 
either one of the following limits :
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(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the SDS1 is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
Under the previous ERC system, SDS1 could transfer a certain 
percentage of its annual profit after tax (or handover to 
government) to an "Employee Bonus Reserve" which could be 
distributed as a year-end bonus to the employees according to the 
overall financial performance and level of this reserve. This 
kind of flexibility or buffer was lost when SDS1 was tranformed 
into a shareholding enterprise in July 1992. In addition, SDS1 
is now subject to the above two limits or ceilings. If declared 
dividend for the employees is not high enough, then, the total 
annual wages increase cannot cover the high inflation in Shanghai 
(30% in 1994) . As an interim measure, SDS1 has agreed with the 
municipal government to allow them to exceed the above two limits 
or ceilings but the excess portion (wages paid) would not be tax 
deductable.
The take-home pay structure of SDS1 is composed of basic wages, 
seniority wages, post (skill) wages, bonus and allowances. The 
average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB12,000 in 
1994. Under the current high inflation rate and the keen 
competition in the labour market of this industry, it is expected 
to increase the average annual gross wages to RMB14,000 in 1995.
The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade and 
seniority without paying regard to qualification and technical 
skill. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is RMB10-20, 
therefore, it is not substantial enough to catch up with the 
inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is the major source of income 
which is determined according to the IRC. The "seniority wages" 
is depending on the years of service while the "post wages" is 
based on a specific skill required in the job.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Shanghai Government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating the 
inflation. The second part is decided by the SDS1 which may 
include housing, meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of "allowances" is trying to 
balance the relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable 
standard of living for the employees.
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The calculation of "bonus", as described in section 5.6 above, is 
based on the accomplishment of the IRC. An IRC signed between 
the general manager and a store manager decides what level of 
group bonus will be given to the department. Of course, it is up 
to the store manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to 
various sales sections and in turn, the section heads can 
distribute the group bonuses to counters or individuals according 
to performance, such as the sales achieved by a salesgirl in a 
certain month. The bonus is distributed in cash to all employees 
on a monthly basis but a certain percentage (20% - 30%) can be 
retained in a reserve in order to make up the low bonus obtained 
during the months of slack season. The payment of year-end
bonus, if there is any, is also according to the annual 
performance of each department stores. It is possible that a 
department store will receive very low or even zero bonus if it 
performs much below the targets but it seldom happened in the 
last few years.
The bonus paid to the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is calculated as follow :
Monthly average wages per employee x Grading factor* x 
Perfromance factor#
* i.e. Position Grading factor
General Manager 1.6
Deputy General Manager 1.5
Chief Accountant 1.5
Supervisor 1.3
Senior Clerk 1.1
# Performance factor is assessed by the head of each service 
department usually less than 100%.
In addition to the remuneration paid to the servicing employees, 
SDS1 has to pay pension and other allowances to 2,000 retired 
employees. This kind of life-long responsibility is common to 
all the state-owned enterprises and it is adding a significant 
financial burden to the profit and loss account. To alleviate 
this ailing situation, a Central Government Welfare Fund System 
has been promulgated since 1993 and will be fully implemented in 
1996 .
Since 1993, SDS1 has been contributing 25.5% of the monthly gross 
wages and salaries paid to the employees to the Central 
Government Social Welfare Fund for the purpose of pension. The 
shortfall between the enterprise contribution and actual payments 
to employees will be covered by the government. Similar 
contributions are under discussion for the other social welfare 
benefits such as medical, unemployment and disable allowances.
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All these policies are aiming at to share the social securities 
between the government and the enterprises for the long term 
benefit of the working population.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Rice Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is 
to initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to
impose threat of termination (in a negative way) on the S O E ' s 
employees. SDS1 has implemented this contract employment system 
since 1992 and now all the employees have signed employment 
contracts from one to five years subject to review and renewal. 
In general, the motivation of the employees has been improved.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the enforcement of financial objectives has both a 
stick and a carrot aspect. Evidence of the stick can be found in 
the reduction of monthly or year-end bonus and even manangement 
turnover in senior positions. The carrot is represented by
substantial increase in bonus and perhaps career advancement. 
The public listing of SDS1 has brought into pressure from the 
shareholders to the board of directors to define long term 
strategic control objectives in order to maintain a satisfactory 
growth in profitability in light of the volatility of this 
industry to the market conditions. The control process tends to 
stress control against budgeted financial results in short term 
on one hand and profit viability of the long term investments or 
projects on the other hand.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Finance Control"
to "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai No.l Department Stores (SDS1) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Medium Corporate Low Corporate
Review Process* Medium Corporate Low Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Medium
Corporate
Medium to Low 
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High to Medium 
Corporate
Medium to Low 
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium
Corporate
Very Low 
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Moderate
Financial
Tight
Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Moderate
Financial Strategic
Monitoring Results* Moderate
Financial Strategic
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Strategic
* Parameters of planning and 
Campbell.
control influences used by Goold &
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on tlie "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
ivieU -LU Ul V-.CJJL £JCJJ. d  L c — ------------
Low Corporate
[Post-1992]< 
(Strategic 
Control)
[ P r e - 1 9 9 2 ]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai No.l Department Store before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
shifted from "Financial Control" (Pre-1992) to "Strategic 
Control" (Post-1992) gradually although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of strategic control style 
as suggested by Goold and Campbell.
As a matter of fact, both the degrees of planning and control 
influences are on two separate continua. The planning influence 
should run from high corporate, then medium corporate and down to 
low.corporate. Similarly, there should be measurement in between 
tight strategic control and tight financial control.
Revised : 12 March 1996
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Post-graduate Programme 
Supervisor 
Student Name 
Research Title
Report Title 
Report Date
PhD in Accounting
Professor Clive Emmanuel
Joseph Yau Shiu Wing (Hong Kong)
"The Responsibility Accounting In China 
- Towards An Exploratory Framework" 
Data Analysis 12 
18 January 1995
Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ultimate aim is to cl a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic
Financial
Strategic
Financial
Programming(1) 
Programming(2) 
Control (3)
Control (4)
Name of SOE 
Staff Interviewed
Dates of Visits
Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW)
Miss Zhu Mei Di/Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 26 years) 
Miss Zhu Zhi Mei/Deputy Manager of Finance 
Department/Shanghai Heavy Mining Machinery 
Corporation (SHMMC)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 25 years)
First Visit - 6 September 1994 
Second Visit - 12 January 1995
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) is a state-owned 
enterprise established in 1958. Over the years, SCCW have 
supplied a great variety of single units and complete material 
handling systems to metalurgical, mining, coal, construction 
material, light and textile, chemical and machine-building 
industries as well as thermal, hydraulic and nuclear power 
stations, harbors, railway stations and airports. The annual 
turnout (output) can be up to 30,000 tonnes. It is one of 
China's leading plants in designing and manufacturing of cranes, 
belt conveyors and special material handling equipment.
SCCW is located on the northern outskirt of Shanghai with a total 
land space of 188,000 square metres and only 10 kilometres away 
from Shanghai River (Huangpu River) from where its products can 
be shipped to other cities and abroad. Its private (internal) 
railway spur (system) is connected with the Shanghai railway 
system for easy access of land transportation. SCCW has nine 
production workshops . for crane and conveyor manufacturing, 
customer-desinged products, speed reducers, frabrication, 
heat-treatment, forging, packing, and two auxiliary workshops. 
In order to assure product qaulity and promote modern management, 
SCCW has set up a quality control office to exercise unified 
control over the entire process from raw material acceptance to 
after-sales service. Computer has been used for design, 
manufacturing, inventory, accounting and management controls.
SCCW has 2,300 employees including 300 experienced and 
well-trined engineers and technicians, who are competent in 
design and manufacturing different types and purposes of cranes, 
belt conveyors and special material handling systems and complete 
equipment. Besides, SCCW has established Shanghai Material 
Handling Machinery Research Institute under the authority of 
Shanghai Municipal Science Commission. In this institute, there 
are three research sections, a technical information section and 
a standard section. It is engaged in scientific research and 
development of new products and components with well equiped test 
facilities such as speed reducer meshing stand, idler test stand, 
electrical laboratory and machine shop. For the purpose o£ 
strengthening education of the employees and enhancing qualified 
personnel, SCCW has run part-time technical school for many 
years.
The major competitors of SCCW of similar scale of operation come 
from Yingchuan, Dalin, Fuzhou and Guangzhou cities. SCCW is very 
active in searching new businesses in national and overseas 
markets and maintain close relationships with customers, 
industries and research institutions. SCCW exported a relatively 
small portion (less than 10%) products to some Southeast Asian 
countries and achieved a revenue of US$3 million in 1994.
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The recent establishment of five affiliate plants in Shanghai 
suburbs, Jiansu and Guizhou p r o v i n c e s  embodies SCCW's 
pace-keeping with the overall economic system reform in China. 
In recent years, SCCW has paid special attention to the 
s w i t c h o v e r  of its main products to special function, 
multi-function and technical intensification. SCCW's operation 
philosophy is to provide advanced products to its customers with 
least cost and maximum use value through modern design and 
upgraded products.
For the sake of further improving the performance and quality of 
the products, SCCW has signed c o l l a b o r a t e d  agreements 
successively with foreign counterparts in Japan, Germany and the 
USA for manufacturing roller table conveyor system used in 
petro-chemical plant, port bulk material handling systems, steel 
works cranes and airport passenger boarding bridges. The foreign 
partners are satisfied with SCCW's performance. A few new 
projects of this nature are under negotiation. SCCW's products 
have been sold to over 2 0 countries and regions.
Material handling equipment play a very important role in various 
industries and are in great demand in the construction of the 
four modernizations in China. Therefore, SCCW is developing the 
second and third generation of its main products which are listed 
below :
1. Cranes
1.1 Double Girder E.O.T. Cranes 
Capacity : 5-50 tonnes 
Span : 10.5m - 31.5m
1.2 Single Girder E.O.T. Cranes 
Capacity : 1-5 tonnes
Span : 7.5m - 17m
1.3 Gantry Cranes 
Capacity : 10-50 tonnes
Span : 24m - 40m
1.4 Special Hoisting Equipment
Cranes for Bao Shan Iron & Steel Complex
(The second largest iron and steel complex in China)
2. Crane Components
2.1 Main Conducting Systems
2.2 Cable Festoon Systems
2.3 Cable Carriage Systems
2.4 Travelling Mechanisms
2.5 Control Cabin Versions
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3. Belt Conveyors
3.1 Fixed Type Model DX Steel Cord Belt Conveyors 
Belt Width : 800mm - 2,000mm
Belt Speed : 2 - 5m/sec 
Length : optional
3.2 Fixed Type Model TD75 Belt Conveyors 
Belt Width : 500mm - 1,400mm
Belt Speed : 0.8 - 4m/sec 
Length : optional
3.3 Truck Feeder (freed the workers from intensive labour) 
Belt Width : 400mm - 1,500mm
Belt Speed : 0.4 - 2.5m/sec
4. Conveyor Components
4.1 Discharge Trolley
4.2 Rubber Lagged Belt Pulley
4.3 Drive Unit
4.4 Electronic Belt Scale
4.5 Scale Calibration Device
4.5 Hydrolic Brake
5. Vibration Conveyors
5.1 Vertical Vibration Conveyor
5.2 Double-mass Inertia-type Vibration Conveyor
5.3 Dewatering Vibration Conveyor
5.4 Horizontal Vibration Conveyor
6. Elevators
6.1 Enclosed Endless Bucket Elevators 
Lifting Speed : 0.4 - 1.4m/sec 
Lifting Height : 2.7m - 30m
Capacity : 20 - 40 cubic metre/hour
7. Material Handling System (Customer Specifications)
8. Airport Equipment
8.1 Passenger Boarding Bridges
8.2 Luggage Conveyors
9. . Speed Reducers
10. Parts for Customer's Production Facilities
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S e c t i o n  2 : L e g a l  Form & O r g a n i s a t i o n  S t r u c t u r e
Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since 1958 and it does not have a concrete 
plan to convert into a shareholding enterprise in the next few 
years because of the stringent rules and regulations governed by 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of China (BOC). These 
bodies have so far approved over 3,600 large- and medium-size 
SOEs, which have good financial performance track records, to 
transform into shareholding enterprises since 1990.
SCCW is under the administration of the Shanghai Heavy Mining 
M a c h i n e r y  C o r p o r a t i o n  (SHMMC) which is an independent 
organisation under the umbrella of the Shanghai Mechanical and 
Electrical Equipment Bureau (a branch of the corresponding 
ministry in Beijing). SHMMC has 17 fully state-owned enterprises 
manufacturing heavy machinery and equipment for mining, steel, 
energy, transportation, construction and other industries. The 
major role played by this corporation is to maintain an 
economical balance of the production and sales among its member 
enterprises. It also arranges capital to finance the approved 
projects or investments for the enterprises. Another important 
function of the corporation is to provide market information for 
its industry to produce the right products and sell to the right 
markets at the right time.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all the planning and control systems of the 
state-owned enterprises. Therefore, SCCW acted just as a vehicle 
(or cost centre) to carry out the activities according to the 
commands directed from the bureau. Since the economic reform 
started in 1979, instead of dictatorship from the bureau, SCCW 
has been involved in the 5-year long range plan even though SCCW 
for most of the time had to take the directives from and give in 
their negotiations to the authority.
Since the promulgation of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations" by the People's Congress in July 
1992, the Shanghai Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Bureau has 
not yet fully delegated the management autonomy to SHMMC and its 
17 enterprises as compared with the more liberal attitude of the 
Shanghai Textile Bureau. The short term planning and operation 
like purchasing, production and sales autonomy have been 
delegated to SCCW. But the Bureau and SHMMC still oversee the 
long term development and projects recommended by SCCW and also 
appoint the top management of SCCW. The investment autonomy such 
as raising capital for project investment has to be arranged by 
the Bureau and SHMMC.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 2 . 6 & Q 2 . 7  on  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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Under the Factory Manager, who has an Enterprise Management 
Office, the organisation structure of SMCW is listed as follow :
1. Deputy-Factory Manager (Production)
1.1 Crane Manufacturing Workshop*
1.2 Conveyor Manufacturing Workshop*
1.3 Customer Designed Proudcts Manufacturing Workshop*
1.4 Speed Reducers Manufacturing Workshop*
1.5 Metal Framework Workshop#
1.6 Heat Treatment Workshop#
1.7 Packing Workshop#
1.8 Mechinery Repair Centre
1.9 Tool Supplies Centre
1.10 Purchasing Department
1.11 Safty & Environment Department
1.12 Production Planning Department
2. Chief Engineer (with 2 Assistant Chief Engineers)
2.1 Quality Control Department
2.2 Quality Inspection Department
2.3 Technical Department
2.4 Research & Development Department
2.5 Information & Filing Department
2.6 Energy Supplies Department
2.7 Tool Department
2.8 Railway Department
3. Deputy-Factory Manager (Sales)
[Acting by Factory Manager]
3.1 Equipment Sales Department
3.2 Components Sales Department
4. Deputy-Factory Manager (Administration)
4.1 Personnel Department
4.2 Education Department
4.3 Estate Department
4.4 Security Department
4.5 General Affairs Department
4.6 Hospital
5. Chief Accountant (Accounting & Finance)
5.1 Accounting Department
5.2 Auditing & Legal Department
6. Deputy-Factory Manager (Tertiary/Service Enterprises)
7. Communist Party Office
8. Labour Union Office
# Production supporting workshops.
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* All the production workshops and departments are treated as 
cost or expense centres.
@ Most of the workshops and departments have signed Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the Factory Manager 
either on an annual basis or on a single project or job 
basis. For the details, please refer to section 5.6 below.
SCCW had a total of 2,470 working employees and 860 retired 
employees at the end of 1994. It is classified as a 
"medium-sized SOE" in China. About 215 of the working employees 
are involved in 20 "tertiary enterprises" (service enterprises) 
including motel, restaurant, transportation (i.e. taxi), 
decoration, repair & maintenance, spares sales, retailing etc. 
On the other hand, 80 redundant employees have stopped their jobs 
or posts and received only basic wages and welfare. All the 
employees have signed "employment contracts" since 1993 with 
duration from one year to no limit leaving an optional right to 
the employees.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets 
Turnover
Income before tax
Income tax rate
RMB 190M (1994)
RMB' 190M (1993)
RMB 230M (1994)
RMB 260M@ (1995 forecast)
1M (1993) - 1.1%* of sales 
3M# (1994) - 1.4% of sales 
1.3% of sales
RMB
RMB
RMB 3.5M (1995) -
55% (before 1994) 
33% (from 1994)
@ This is the figure compromised with the SHMMC but in fact the 
internal target agreed with the sales department is RMB280M in 
order to initiate salemen's motivation.
* The low profit margin was mainly because of open and keen 
competition under the market economy instead of the guaranteed 
production and sales budgets as assigned by the government before 
1992, and also the purchased prices of raw materials like iron 
and steel (60% of turnover) which prices are fluctuating 
tremendously since 1993 due to significant import from other 
countries. In addition, selling prices in quotations have to be 
reduced in order to bid the contracts. Furthermore, inflation 
and heavy payroll and benefit in kinds (including retired 
employees) increased the total expenditures or fixed overheads 
(RMB4 0M in 1993) . Improvement in 1994 was mainly due to product 
quality enhancement and other marketing strategies as described 
in the long term and short term planning sections below.
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# Income before tax has deducted the value added tax already 
which amounted to RMB13.2M in 1994 or 5.7% of the turnover. The 
VAT related to new products approved by the municipal government 
can be refunded. In addition, conversion cost added to input 
materials imported from joint venture partners i.e. Japan can be 
exempted from VAT.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
The Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) entered into the first 
5-year (1988-1992) Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) with 
the Shanghai Mechanical & Electrical Equipment Bureau and the 
Shanghai Finance Bureau (representing the Shanghai municipal 
government) in 1988. This first ERC was based on the "Three
Guarantees and One Linkage" concept which means the contractee
(SCCW) had to guarantee :
(1) income tax handed over to the government;
(2) technology improvement;
(3) foreign exchange created from export; and
the total remuneration payable to the employees was linked up 
with the overall economic (or financial) performance.
As from 1992, no formal ERC has been existed but targets on 
production output value, sales, income tax and accounts
receivable have been agreed between SCCW and the Corporation 
(SHMMC). The production output is valued at 1990 price index 
except new or modified products i.e. 12% growth of sales in 1995. 
The SHMMC has also agreed similar targets with the Shanghai
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Bureau and Shanghai Municipal 
Economic Planning Committee subject to negotiation and review per 
quarter and allowed to revise if necessary. These targets are 
put in terms of growth percentages. The fulfilment of these 
targets by SHMMC will be awarded a lump sum bonus from the 
government assessed twice every year. In turn SHMMC will 
distribute this bonus to its 17 enterprise managers according to 
their achievement of predetermined targets. Usually 40% of the 
bonus will be distributed during the mid-year and 60% will be 
given at the year end. This incentive system is similar to the 
"Factory Manager Responsibility System" adopted by the 
state-owned enterprises in parallel with the ERC system 
promulgated since 1987.
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m
5 . 1  O r g a n i s a t i o n  S t r u c t u r e
The organisation structure of Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works 
(SCCW) has not been changed much since the 1980s. Once for a 
while, the production workshops had been classified as profit 
centres, but the difficulty of determining internal profits due 
to input and output price fluctuation and changes in product mix, 
they have been converted back into cost centres. Now, all the 
units are treated as either cost centres or expense centres.
The four production workshops are manufacturing different product 
lines and the other five production support workshops are 
providing components and services to the production departments 
according to the production schedules without charging any costs 
or profit margins. SCCW is using a job costing system by 
collecting all the direct production, supporting and other 
relevant costs to each individual job or product. Therefore, 
internal transfer pricing is not involved.
Since 1992, SCCW has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each workshop and department such as initiating 
the annual plan and the internal responsibility contract. The 
production and cost control responsibility primarily lies with 
the workshop manager but the top management keep a surveillance 
quantity and quality control on each production workshop through 
monthly or weekly report.
The selection and appointment of the top management (i.e. factory 
and deputy-factory managers) are still decided by the Shanghai 
Heavy Mining Machinery Corporation (SHMMC) and a "Factory Manager 
Responsibility System" is in force. This system takes the 
Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a basis to evaluate the 
performance of the factory manager. If an outstanding or above 
target performance has been achieved, the factory manager will be 
awarded a predetermined lump sum bonus at the year end (see 
section 4.5 above).
Since 1992, the factory manager has the autonomy to appoint the 
senior staff such as the workshop managers and department heads. 
Any major changes of the organisation structure in each unit 
should be initiated by the deputy-factory managers, chief 
engineer or chief accountant and approved by the factory manager. 
However, more autonomy of internal management and operation has 
been delegated to the deputy-factory managers and the chiefs 
since 1992. And in turn, the deputy-factory managers and chiefs 
have involved their workshop managers and department heads more 
in planning, control and decision making.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 5 . 1 . 1 - Q 5 . 1 . 4  on t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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In summary, SCCW has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual deputy-factory managers and chiefs report directly to 
the factory manager, and they play a linking and control role 
between the workshops or departments and the factory manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since 1992, Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) has 
implemented a more formal planning process for reviewing, 
discussing and sanctioning the annual plan or budget and the 
internal responsibility contracts (IRCs). In September, the 
factory manager discusses with the SHMMC concerning the next year 
targets such as production output value, sales, profit and 
working capital. Then, he will evaluate the internal and
external environmental factors with his deputy managers and 
chiefs in order to determine whether the above targets are 
realistic or not. If there is any gap, then the factory manager 
will negotiate with SHMMC until compromise can be reached. 
Based on these preliminary targets, some guidelines are provided 
to the workshop managers and other department heads for them to 
initiate their own plans or budgets for the next year. Much 
emphasis is placed on the production quantity for the four 
production workshops which annual plans contained the key 
criteria to be used as the measurement yardsticks of their 
subsequent internal responsibility contracts.
At the end of October, all the workshops and departments submit 
their initial plans to the Enterprise Management Office for 
consolidation before review and discussion by the factory 
managers with the deputy managers and the two chiefs. The first 
annual planning meeting is held in November mainly to discuss the 
gaps between the submitted plans with the targets agreed between 
the top management and SHMMC. The top management try to help the 
production workshops solving their technical, financial and other 
problems in order to close the gaps as far as possible. Then, 
further formal and informal meetings and discussions are held 
between the factory manager, deputy-factory managers, workshop 
m a n a g e r s  and d e p a r t m e n t  hea d s  e i t h e r  c o l l e c t i v e l y  or 
individually. This iterative exercise carries on until all the 
annual plans and contracts are mutually agreed and approved in 
January.
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The approved annual plans are broken down into quarterly and 
monthly plans to cater for demand, holiday and other factors. All 
the individual annual plans will be consolidated into a booklet 
and distribtuted to all senior staff. A copy of the 1994 Annual 
Plan has been obtained and briefly described in section 5.5 
below. The factory manager has to report the consolidated annual 
plan to the AGM (all the employees can attain) held in February. 
The annual plans are formally reviewed in every April and 
September and adjustments on significant deviations are allowed 
to make after detail discussion and approval from top management.
Before 1992, the workshop managers and department heads did not 
participate so intensively in this annual planning review process 
and the government and the corporation gave directions to the 
workshops and departments on what should be done over the next 12 
months within the context of a few key indicators e.g. sales, 
production volume and mix, quality improvement, material 
consumption, etc. Since 1992, under the legislative changes and 
market economy promotion, the government has delegated higher 
automomy to SHMMC and SCCW in formulating its strategic 
directions. As a result, all the workshops and departments are 
encouraged to participate in the planning process and extend 
their planning horizon beyond one year in order to match the 
milestones set in the 5-year long-term plan.
Therefore, the factory manager has less interference in 
departmental planning decisions, but without reducing the tight 
financial control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
macro-eocnomic control (1994), operational mechanism (1993), 
economic effectiveness (1992), quality control (1991), economic 
responsibility contract (1990), etc.
The strategic themes and thrusts of Shanghai Crane & Conveyor 
Works (SCCW) are listed in the 1994 Annual Plan as follows :
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(1) Increase planning participation and flexibility.
(2) Enhance product design (use value engineering).
(3) Adjust product mix.
(4) Improve production technology.
(5) Simplify production process.
(6) Maintain production output growth.
(7) Improve purchasing and supply process and quality.
(8) Enhance product quality.
(9) Strengthen internal management quality.
(10) Reduce redundent employees.
(11) Reform manpower and wages system.
(12) Continue and increase export and joint ventures.
The above strategic themes are directed from the top management 
at the beginning pages of the annual plan for all the employees 
to observe and keep in mind when they are performing their duties 
for the enterprise.
SCCW has been promulgating "Quality"- as the most important 
strategic thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for 
the domestic market share o n 'one hand and to explore the overseas 
markets on the other hand. However, under the tight quality 
control procedures, some minor technical or manual defects have 
occured and a few complaints have received from big customers 
like Baoshan Iron & Steel Works which is the second largest 
enterprise of this kind in China and a major customer to SCCW. 
SCCW has envisaged a vision to attain IS09000 certification 
before 2000 but no concreate plans have been formulated yet.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in SCCW still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and review process 
such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, marketing strategy 
and production quantity and mix. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given some freedom to the department heads to 
compile their own plans or budgets and to adjust their plans and 
operations as long as they do not deviate much from the ultimate 
sales and profit targets.
The top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on monthly and quarterly basis and are quick 
to make suggestions if they do not match the overall long and 
short term plan.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 5 . 3 . 1 - 4  on  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  fro m  "Very  H i g h - H i g h
C o r p o r a t e "  t o  "Medium C o r p o r a t e "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the establishment of Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) 
in 1958, it has followed the national 5-year's planning cycle and 
carried out the missions as assigned in every 5-year's plan 
directed by the municipal government under the central economic 
planning system.
The commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 started to 
allowed SCCW to participate in the 5-year's planning with the 
Shanghai Heavy Mining Mechinery Corporation (SHMMC) and the 
Shanghai Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Bureau but specific 
directives and suggestions were always coming from the top by 
using the term "macroeconomics control and adjustment" as an 
excuse.
The changing role of bureau and the corporation since 1990 has 
encouraged SCCW, for the first time, to formulate their own 
long-term strategic plan (1991-1995). However, many internal 
factors and uncertainties have affected the validity and 
reliability of this long-term plan which has been subject to 
review and changes every year. During the last year of the 
5-year long-term plan, the factory manager initiates the next 
5-year plan before discussions with the deputy managers and 
chiefs started. After lengthy discussion, the next 5-year plan 
will be emerged and submitted to SHMMC for further discussion and 
negotiation. The 5-year plan will be reviewed every year and 
adjustments will be made through the annual planning exercise.
The followings are the major long-term plans or projects laid 
down for the nineth 5-year plan (1996-2000) although a few of 
them have been started during 1991-1995.
(a) Joint Ventrues
In addition to the present joint ventures with the USA, 
Japan, and Germany to enhance the production and product 
quality, SCCW has entered into a new contract with 
Mitsubishi Heavy Machinery of Japan to manufacture and 
export a series of new crane products to Thailand. The 
trial run and pilot test of the first model finished 
sucessfully at the end of 1994. Further production will be 
commenced in early 1995. This project will be a major one 
in the nineth 5-year plan (1996-2000)
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(b) Product Development
Significant changes in the infrastructure have been occured 
in recent years under the transition from planned economy to 
market ecconomy. SCCW has envisaged that standard conveyors 
and light cranes demands have been declined. On the other 
hand, high technology, high quality, heavy non-standard and 
customer-order cranes sales are on increase coming from iron 
and steel, transportation, energy and mining industries. In 
order to cope with this market trend, SCCW has been 
exploring into this new product mix by using its own R&D and 
cooperation with foreign counterparts. For example, a new 
type of crane product used in the nuclear plan is under 
construction and testing before delivery in June 1995. In 
addition, plans are drawing up for manufacturing waste 
processing machines for iron and steel industry.
(c) Production Diversification
In addition to supply traditional and new products to the 
existing heavy industries, SCCW is developing other new 
product lines to suit the needs of other businesses like the 
passenger boarding bridges and luggage conveyors for the 
airports, speed reducers for different machinery and 
material handling systems for high technology plant. 
Furthermore, SCCW is discussing a joint-venture with a 
German Corporation to manufacture sub-way compartments which 
are in high demand not only in Shanghai (the first 
underground line was completed at the end of 1994) but also 
in many other big cities having plans for building their 
underground systems.
(d) Competitive Edge
SCCW has been facing keen competition from many other 
smaller manufacturers of similar kinds of products (like 
5t-20t of cranes) in the nearby provinces such as Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Jiangxi etc. To maintain at least the market 
share and competitive edge against these counterparts, SCCW 
has to manufacture higher quality, tailor-made and heavier 
products as described in the short-term plans below.
(e) Market Development
To penetrate into the domestic market and capture higher 
market share, the sales personnel has been seggregated into 
geographic teams with different marketing strategies and 
tatics such as regular visits to the existing customers. 
The IRC signed with the Sales Department links up the
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remuneration directly with the sales volume and the accounts 
receivable (or cash cbllected) in order to motivate the 
sales and marketing effort.
(f) Overseas Markets
SCCW is working closely with the SHMMC to negotiate with the 
government in obtaining the import and export right (also 
the foreign exchange usage right) so that they can explore 
the overseas markets such as Southeast Asian, South America 
and Eastern European Countries.
(g) Sources of Capital
Due to capital intensive nature and long production cycle (6 
to 18 months) , SCCW had an outstanding bank loan of over 
RMB90M (for both fixed assets and current assets financing 
purposes) at the end of 1994 and paid almost RMB10M of bank 
interest in the same year. In order to finance the above 
long term projects, at least an additional RMB50M is 
required in the next few y e a r s . One way to capture 
additional capital is getting loans from foreign banks 
through the joint-venture arrangement such as foreign loan 
from a German bank by entering a joint-venture to 
manufacture underground compartments. Another source of 
captial is to transform SCCW into a shareholding enterprise 
and issue shares to its employees, other enterprises and 
individuals. But the latter avenue involves a lot of 
political and economic problems related to the government, 
bureau and corporation (SHMMC).
(h) Computerization
S C C W .purchased a mini-computer and established a computer 
centre in 1994. Except using for product design and 
material requisition plan, the computer system has not been 
expanded for other purposes or for local area networking 
system due to the technical incompetence of the computing 
and management staff. At present, idnividual stand-alone 
personal computers are employed by, purhasing, production, 
sales, personnel and accounting departments for their own 
purposes. For example, accounting department is using a 
personnel computer for wages and invetory control systems. 
SCCW is planning to provide intensive training for both 
c o m p u t i n g  and m a n a g e m e n t  staff to e x p e d i a t e  the 
computerization process and aiming at the LANS.
The current 5-year plan (1991-1995) was compiled after long
discussion between the Bureau, Corporation and the SCCW's top
management. Although the deputy factory managers, chiefs and
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some department heads (middle management) have been involved in 
this planning process., they were playing a consultation role 
only.
As far as the next 5-year plan (1996-2000) is concerned, the 
production workshops and department heads are mainly concerned 
with how the milestones set in the long term plan will affect 
their next year budgets or internal responsibility contracts 
which will have tight financial surveillance coming from the 
factory manager at least on a monthly basis. Therefore, the long 
term planning and review process are using a top-down approach in 
the belief that the factory manager has better experience and 
knowledge of the external environment and even the internal 
operations of the workshops and departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Bureau has devolved its central planning role to 
the SHMMC and in turn individual enterprises under the latter's 
umbrella since 1992. Now, the top management of SCCW is taking 
the initiative to formulate its own long term plan but 
participation from the middle management is limited to 
consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
f
The following is a brief description of SCCW's 1994 Annual Plan 
(Budget) :
Part 1 : Introduction to Annual Plan
(1) Background
The spirit or mission in formulating the 1994 Annual Plan or 
Budget was in accordance with the Third Plennary Session of the 
14th Communist Party Committee held in October 1993 during which 
the major theme promulgated was that continuous, high speed and 
healthy economic development should be maintained in 1994.
(2) Targets
Tight management and administration control must be imposed in 
order to achieve the following financial targets :
2.1 Industrial Output Value (at 1990 cost value)
Minimum : RMB12 0M
Ideal : RMB150M
2.2 Turnover
Minimum : RMB23 0M
Ideal : RMB250M
2.3 Profit Before Tax 
Minimum : RMB3.6M
Ideal : RMB4.1M
2.4 Export Foreign Exchange : Over US$2.05M
2.5 Annual Income Per Employee : RMB10,000
(3) Development
3.1 Significant losses were incurred in 1991 and 1992 but a
profit before income tax of RMB2M was made in 1993 due to
improvements in product mix, marketing strategy and internal 
management.
3.2 Since 1993, the few joint ventures undertaken with Japan,
Germany and USA have brought in new capital, technology,
management and product.
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3.3 In light of the Socialist Market Economy, SCCW has envisaged 
that standard conveyofs and light cranes sales have been 
declined. On the other hand, high technology, high quality, 
heavy non-standard and customer-order cranes sales are on 
increase coming from the infrastructure industries like 
transportation, energy and mines.
(4) Strategic Themes & Thrusts
4.1 Increase planning participation and flexibility.
4.2 Enhance product design (value engineering).
4.3 Adjust product mix.
4.4 Improve production technology.
4.5 Simplify production process.
4.6 Maintain production output growth.
4.7 Improve purchasing and supply process and quality.
4.8 Enhance product quality.
4.3 Strengthen internal management quality.
4.10 Reduce redundent employees.
4.11 Reform manpower and wages system.
4.12 Continue and increase export and joint ventures.
(5) Sales Strategies
5.1 Establish market information and sales/services network.
5.2 Enhance internal responsibility contracts with sales
functions including debt collection control.
5.3 Expand domestic and overseas markets.
5.4 Reinforce existing customers and explore new customers.
5.5 Increase blanket or standing orders.and standardize products
to fully untilize resources especially different grades of
labour.
5.6 Improve product delivery services and before/after sales 
services.
(6) Product Strategies
6.1 Adjust product mix with major foucs on :
6.1.1 iron & steel cranes
6.1.2 containers cranes
6.1.3 powerstation cranes
6.1.4 remote-controlled & speed-adjusted cranes
6.2 Achieve the following new product orders :
6.2.1 QL plastic conveyors for Pudong (Eastern Shanghai) 
Power Station
6.2.2 Crane for Shanghai No.3 Iron & Steel Work
6.2.3 Crane for Shanghai Construction Steel Work
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6.3 Accomplish the following new product development :
6.3.1 multi-frequencyfand speed-adjusted cranes
6.3.2 5-tonne steel-plate fork-lift
6.3.3 45-tonne electric steel-rod fork-lift
6.3.4 600,000 KW nuclear station material handling sytem
(7) Technology Rennovation
7.1 Joint venture with German counterpart to rennovate the 
facilities and equipment in the Cranes Manufacturing 
Workshop
7.2 Replace and rennovate some facilities and equipment in other 
production workshops especially the cranes, conveyors and 
material handling systems required by steel, power and 
transportation industries
(8) Quality Assurance
8.1 Quality assurance training to all departments and levels of 
employees
8.2 Implement IS09000 international standards
8.3 Stringent control on :
8.3.1 product quality
8.3.2 production standards and procedures
8.3.3 quality inspection
8.3.4 wastage and scrap reduction
8.3.5 input materials, components, spares and sub-contract 
work quality inspection
(9) Cost Control
9.1 Cost of manufacturing (use standard costing system)
9.2 Overhead expenses (use budgeting system)
9.3 Cost of quality control
(10) Manpower and Wages Reform
10.1 Access manpower requirement in each department/activity
10.2 Reduce redundant production workers
10.3 Eliminate redundant activities and employees
10.4 Achieve a fairer and better reward and incentive system 
including to incorporate the skill element in wages 
determination
Part 2 : Structure (Contents) of Annual Plan
1. Sales Budget (by product category, by quantity and by value)
1.1 Sales +
1.2 Closing Inventory -
1.3 Opening Inventory =
1.4 Production* (to 2.2)
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2. Production Budget (by product category, by quantity and by 
output value) f
2.1 Actuals of Last Year
2.2 Production of Current Year*
2.3 Production by Quarter
3. Material Supplies Budget (by category, by quantity and by 
cost value)
3.1 Production Requirement +
3.2 Closing Stock -
3.3 Opening Stock =
3.4 Purchase Requirement
4. Component, Consumable & Power Supplies Budget (by category, 
by qunatity and by cost value)
4.1 Production Requirement +
4.2 Closing Stock -
4.3 Opening Stock =
4.4 Purchase Requirement
5. Pre-Production Preparation Work Schedule
5.1 Job/Contract Number
5.2 Product Description
5.3 Preparation Works
5.3.1 Design Blueprint
5.3.2 Production Technical Information
5.3.3 Facilities & Equipment Specification
5.3.4 Bills of Raw Materials
5.3.5 Bills of Components
5.3.6 Bills of Consumables
6. Cash Flow Budget
6.1 Opening Bank Balance +
6.2 Operating Incomes -
6.1.1 Product Sales Income
6.1.2 Other Operation Incomes
6.3 Operation Expenses =
6.3.1 Material Purchases
6.3.2 Energy & Power
6.3.3 Wages & Bonuses
6.3.4 Taxes Paid
6.3.5 Interests Paid
6.3.6 Selling Expenses
6.3.7 Sub-Contracting Fees
6.3.8 Capital Expenditures
6.3.9 Other Expenses
6.4 . Closing Bank Balance
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7. Profit & Loss Budget
7.1 Product Sales Income -
7.2 Cost of Sales =
7.2.1 Opening Inventory +
7.2.2 Cost of Production (1) -
7.2.3 Closing Inventory
7.3 Product Sales Gross Profit +
7.4 Other Operating Incomes -
7.5 Management Expenses (2) -
7.6 Financial Expenses (3) =
7.7 Operating Income +
7.8 Investment Income +
7.9 Non-Operating Net Income =
7.10 Profit Before Tax -
7.11 Income Tax Payable =
7.12 Profit After Tax -
7.13 Transfer to Capital Reserve -
7.14 Transfer to General Reserve
8. Costs Budget (by cost items)
Actuals for Last Year
Budget for Current Year
Budget Analysis by :
8.3.1 Direct Production Cost
8.3.2 Production Overheads (1
8.3.3 Management Expenses (2)
8.3.4 Financial Expenses (3)
Cost Items :
8.4.1 Raw Materials +
8.4.2 Energy & Power +
8.4.3 Wages +
8.4.4 Depreciation +
8.4.5 Repair & Maintenance +
8.4.6 Interest Payments +
8.4.7 Other Expenses =
8.4.8 Cost of Manufacturing +
8.4.9 Opening WIP -
8.4.10 Closing WIP =
8.4.11 Cost of Production (1)
9. Production Wages Budget (analysed by quarters)
9.1 Industrial Production Output Value/
9.2 Average Number of Employees =
9.3 Production Output Value Per Employee
9.4 Planning Number of Production Workers
9.5 Worker's Attendance %
9.6 Available Working Hours %
9.7 Productive Working Hours %
9.8 Total wages Amount
10. Product Quality Budget (standards set for each production 
department)
376
11. Energy & Power Consumption Budget
11.1 Electricity
11.2 Water
11.3 Coal Gas
11.4 Gasoline
12. Technical Rennovation Budget
12 .1 Project Number
12 .2 Project Title
12 .3 Project Description
12 .4 Expenditure Requirement
12.5 Responsible Department/Staff
12 . 6 Period (Beginning/Ending Dates
12.7 Progress Schedule
13. Facility & Equipment Replacement Budget
13.1 Replacement (New)
13.1.1 Title
13.1.2 Description
13.1.3 Expected Delivery/Completion Date
13.1.4 Estimated Cost
13.2 Existing (Old)
13.2.1 Serial Number
13.2.2 Title
13.2.3 Description
13.2.4 Years of Usage
13.2.5 Original Book Value
13.2.6 Department in Use
14. Production Facility Repair & Maintenance Budget
15. New Product Pilot Test Budget
16. Cost Savings Budget (analysed by responsible departments)
16.1 Iron & Steel Materials
16.2 Woodern Materials
16.3 Energy & Power
16.4 Expenses
17. Real Estate (Building) Budget
18. Safety & Environment Protection Budget
18.1 Current Problem Analysis
18.2 Recommended Solutions
18.3 Estimated Expenditures
18.4 Repsonsible Department
18.5 Cooperation Department(s)
18.6 Completion Date
18.7 Items Included :
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18 . 7 .1 Safety Education
18.7.2 Souldering Smoke/Gas Discharge
18.7.3 Ventilation System Rennovation
18.7.4 Dust Clearance System Rennovation
18.7.5 Waste Water Control System
18.7.6 Environmental Control Office
18.7.7 Promotion Programmes
18 . 7 . 8 Vehicle Sc Lift Inspection
18.7.9 Industrial Hygiene Inspection
19. Production Safety Budget (analysed by department)
19.1 Production Accident Rate
20. Education & Training Budget
The general short term planning policy adopted by Shanghai Crane 
Sc Conveyor Works (SCCW) is "production determined by sales" and 
"sales determined by targeted profit before income tax" which 
means profit before income tax growth as agreed with the Shanghai 
Heavy Mining Mechinery Corporation (SHMMC) is the initial driving 
force of all the activities. Reference should also be made to 
the 5-year plan especially to estimate what the sales order 
potential will be for the new product and market situation in the 
next year. As from October 1992, SCCW has employed the annual 
planning or budgeting process as described in section 5.2 (Review 
Process) above.
Since October 1992, the workshop managers have been involved 
intensively in this planning process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the internal responsibility 
contracts with the factory manager. The other department heads 
have also participated carefully in devising their expense 
budgets which they would be measured against as performance 
yardsticks.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the annual plan 
review period has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The 
factory manager and his deputy managers and chiefs will hold a 
formal meeting at the beginning of each month to review the 
financial performance against the annaul plans. Amendments or 
revisions are made once or twice a year according to the 
significance of the factors affecting the annual plan.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
378
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given SCCW more freedom to plan ahead. The government 
representatives, the bureau and corporation, have almost 
completely devolved the short-term planning autonomy to SCCW, 
except to agree on the minimum targets as agreed at the beginning 
of every year. The top management have involved the middle
management or even their subordinates (lower management) in the 
annual planning process which on one hand is a critical step in 
materializing the long-term strategic plan, and on the other 
hand, it is an important motivational factor for the workshop 
managers and department heads to manage their own businesses and 
to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Shanghai Cranes & Conveyors Works (SCCW) established its IRC 
system in 1989 in order to motivate the efficiency, profitability 
and cost reduction in the production workshops.
The IRC of the "Metal Framework Workshop" is described below :
Department : Metal Framework Workshop
Duration : 1 January to 31 December 1994
Guidelines :
The targets set in this IRC are based on the relevant 
expectations determined in the current Annual Plan (Budget). 
References have been made from last year performance and current 
year distribution policies to determine the reward and incentive 
which are linked up with various targets in this IRC.
(A) Terms & Conditions :
(Al) Equivalent Labour Hours of Output (ELH)
Annual Target : 319,500 ELH 
Monthly Target : 35,50 0 ELH
The product mix, specifications and quantities are determined by 
the Production Planning Department on a monthly basis. The 
conversion of ELH based on actual monthly output is also 
calculated by the same department.
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(A2) P r o d u c t  Q u a l i t y
A 2 .1 The 5-50 tonnes Electrical Motors should try to exceed the 
national standard while the B500-1400TD Belt Conveyors must 
conform with local government standards.
A 2 .2 LD Electical Units should attained first-class standard.
A 2 .3 Welding first-class standard > 93%
Sample inspection passing rate > 95%
(A3) Safety Standard
Accident rate < 3%
No fatal or serious accidents would be allowed.
(A4) Operation Management
A 4 .1 Attempt to achieve the Quality Management Prize awarded by 
the local governemnt.
A 4 .2 Improve the routine operation and worker discipline in order 
to attain first-class enterprise standard requirements.
(A5) Production Facility
Production facilities and equipment fit for use rate > 95%
No serious breakdown would be allowed.
(A6) Material Usage
Iron & steel usage rate > 83%
(A7) Basic Wages (whole department)
Annual Target = RMB XXXXX 
Monthly Target = RMB XXXX
(A8) Overtime Payment (whole department)
Annual Target = RMB XXXX (1% of Annual Gross Wages Paid) 
Monthly Target = RMB XXX
(A9) Bonuses (whole department)
Annual Target = RMB XXXX 
Monthly Target = RMB XXX
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(B) Rights of Contractee (Workshop) :
(
(Bl) Within the priciples laid down by the headquarters, the 
workshop has the autonomy to assess the performance of its 
employees and determine their wages and bonues to be awarded 
individually. Monthly report should be submitted to 
headquarters for filing.
(B2) In order to guarrantee the production targets and maintain 
the predetermined product mix, the workshop has the autonomy 
to change the labour mix within the labour laws. But report 
should be made to the personnel department before action.
(B3) According to the actual needs, the workshop has the autonomy 
to change the organisation structure but reports should be 
submitted to the headquarters and personnel department for 
record and filing.
(B4) Within the personnel policies, the workshop has the autonomy 
to evaluate, promote and award its employees, and also to 
confirm and promote the newly recruited employees.
(B5) According to the headquarters' policies, the workshop has 
the autonomy to discipline its employees who have acted 
against the rules and regulations.
(C) Performance Evaluation :
(Cl) The Enterprise Management Office is responsible for 
evaluating the actual performance against the IRC on a 
monthly basis and calculate the bonuses according to the 
following terms and conditions. The gross annual bonuses 
payable can be ajusted during the year end.
(C2) Efficiency Wages Evaluation
C 2 .1 If monthly Equalvalent Labour Hours (ELH) of actual output >
28,000 hours, award efficiency wages of RMB8,971.
C 2 .2 If monthly ELH of actual output < 28,000 hours, then for 
every 1 hour below target, RMB2 of efficiency wages will be 
duducted and placed temporary into a pool. When the yearly 
accumulated ELH can meet the target, then the deducted 
efficiency wages will be distributed out from the pool.
(C3) Overtime Wages Evaluation
Overtime wages is evaluated every month. Overtime wages 
will be awarded if monthly ELH of actual output > 28,000 
hours.
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(C4) B o n u s e s  E v a l u a t i o n
f
C 4 .1 Bonus is evaluated on a 
following table :
Monthly ELH of 
actual output (hours)
ELH < 24,000
24.000 < ELH < 28,000
28.000 < ELH < 35,500
monthly basis according to the
Bonus to be awarded
No bonus*
RMB0.31 per ELH
RMB0.93 per ELH in excess of
28,000 hours
ELH = 3  5,500 a lump sum of RMB16,000
ELH > 35,500 RMB1.92 per ELH in excess of
3 5,500 hours
* Depending on the performance of individual sections or 
employees may receive up to 25% of the minimum bonus. 
Justifications must be made by the workshop manager and approved 
by the general manager.
C 4 .2 The determination of final monthly bonus to be awarded, 
considerations have to be given to the overall economic 
performance of the whole enterprise. If the whole 
enterprise's economic performance is well above budget, a 
lump sum monthly special bonus will be awarded according to 
the performance achieved by the workshop per the above 
table.
C 4 .3 If annual ELH of actual output > 252,000 hours, an year-end 
bonus of RMB70,000 will be awarded disregard the overall 
economic performance of the whole enterprise. If less than
252,000 hours, then certain amount of year-end bonus will be 
deducted. If the average level of year-end bonus of the 
whole enterprise is above the level of this workshop, then 
the difference will be awarded accordingly.
C 4 .4 The bonuses to be awarded to the workshop manager and deputy 
manager will be 40% and 20% higher than the average monthly 
bonus per employee of the wrokshop respectively.
(D) Other Targets Evaluation
(Dl) Quality Targets
If the output products fail to attain the quality assurance 
policies applicable to this department, 10%-30% of the bonus 
and 5%-15% of the efficiency wages may be duducted.
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(D2) S a f e t y  P r o d u c t i o n
If the daily operations violate the safety rules and 
regulations applicable to this workshop, 5%-20% of the bonus 
and 5%-10% of the efficiency wages may be deducted.
(E) Risk Guarantee Money
(El) The workshop has to pay RMB20,000 as risk guarantee money.
(E2) If the annual ELH falls below 80% of the minimum target 
(i.e. 252,000 hours x 80% = 201,600 hours), then the risk
guarantee money will be confiscated.
(E3) If the annual ELH falls between 80% and 100% of the minimum 
target (i.e. 201,600 < ELH < 252,000 hours), then 50% of the 
risk guarantee money will be confiscated.
(E4) If the following targets are fail, certain amount of risk 
guarantee money will be confiscated :
E 4 .1 Quality Targets : 10%-20%
E 4 .2 Safety Targets : 10%
E 4 .3 Management Targets : 5% per target
(E5) If all the targets can be achieved, the risk guarantee money 
will be refunded. If actual performance exceed the targets, 
50%-150% of the risk guarantee money will be awarded as 
special bonus.
The IRC of the "marketing and sales department" is described 
below :
Department : Equipment Sales
Duration : 1 January to 31 December 1994
Guidelines :
To enhance and motivate the responsibility and agressiveness of 
the equipment sales staff, to ensure the economic efficiency 
target of the whole enterprise and to link up the remuneration 
according to contribution, the equipment sales manager agrees 
with the general manager on the following terms and conditions of 
this internal responsibility contract.
(A) Terms & Conditions :
(Al) According to the prevailing selling prices, ensure the sales 
order targets predetermined with the headquarters are 
accomplished in quantity and in time as follow.
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A 1 .1 The current year sales order target should be achieved 
before the end of August.
A 1 .2 60% of the next year sales order target should be achieved 
in the current year.
A 1 .3 The best prices should be achieved when accepting orders. 
The selling prices should not be lower than the minimum 
selling prices as determined by the headquarters according 
to the market conditions at the time of order acceptance.
(A2) Cash Collection
A 2 .1 Within one month after accepting an order, at least 40% of 
the selling price should be received as prepayment or 
downpayment.
A 2 .2 After delivery of the a sales contract, the balance of 
accounts receivable must be settled within the specified 
period of time.
(B) Performance Evaluation
(Bl) The Equipment Sales Manager is fully responsible for the 
terms and conditions of this contract. The Enterprise 
Management Office is responsible for evaluation the sales 
performance according to the terms and conditions of this 
contract. The daily operation and management of the 
equipment sales department should be assessed as well.
(B2) The equipment sales contracts at allowable selling prices 
are counted as the basis for evaluation and bonus 
determination. The cash collected on equipment sales 
contracts is the criterion for bonus calculation.
B 2 .1 1.6% of the sales contract price is calculated as the bonus 
to be payable. The monthly bonus to be awarded is according 
to the proportion of cash collected (including the 
prepayment or downpayment).
B 2 .2 If sales contract price exceeds the listed or standard 
selling price, 2.5% of the excess (after deducting any 
commission and rebate paid or payable) is calculated as the 
bonus to be payable according to the cash collected on a 
monthly basis.
B 2 .3 If the equipment sales department can increase the selling 
prices subsequent to confirming the sales contracts, 2.5% of 
the increased selling price can be calculated as the bonus 
similar to B2.2 above.
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(B3) If the 40% prepayment or downpayment and the accounts 
receivable cannot be settled in time, bonus will be deducted 
in the following manner.
B 3 .1 If the prepayment or downpayment is less than 40% of sales 
contract price, then the bonus payable will be 1.2% of the 
contract price.
B 3 .2 After delivery of the sales contract, the accounts 
receivable must be settled within 3 months. If any 
outstanding accounts receivable exceeds the collection 
period by one month, then 0.1% on the sales contract price 
will be duducted from the bonus (i.e. 1.5% at the end of 4th 
month and 1.3% at the end of 6th month etc.) . If any 
outstanding accounts receivable exceeds 6 months, then 0.2% 
on the sales contract price will be deducted from the bonus 
per every month over the limit (i.e. 1.1% at the end of 7th 
month). For any outstanding accounts receivable exceeds one 
year, no bonus will be awarded but instead bonus will be 
deducted according to the outstanding amount.
(B4) Evaluation of Order Acceptance
B 4 .1 Orders for the current year target must be achieved before 
the end of August. For one month delay, 10% of the year-end 
bonus will be deducted; two months delay, 25% will be 
deducted; three months delay, 50% will be deducted; four 
months delay, 80% will be deducted; and no year-end bonus 
will be awarded if target cannot be accomplished at the end 
of the year.
B 4 .2 At the end of the year, 60% of the next year order target 
must be achieved. For any 5% shortfall, 10% of the current 
year-end bonus will be deducted.
(B5) Management Performance Evaluation
B 5 .1 The equipment sales department must ensure the total quality 
control of every sales contract from order acceptance, 
delivery, to debt collection. For any loss control or 
quality problem, bonuses will be deducted according to the 
"Enterprise Quality Evaluation Regulations"..
B 5 .2 The management performance of the equipment sales department 
is assessed by the enterprise management office. For any 
significant mistakes, the impact will be quantified and 
bonuses will be deducted accordingly.
(B6) Contractee (Equipment Sales Manager) Evaluation
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B 6 .1 The contractee's performance will be evaluated by the 
contractor (general mahager). If the targets stipulated in 
this contract can be achieved or exceeded, the contractee 
will be awarded a special bonus which is within 2 to 4 times 
of the average annual bonus per employee in the equipment 
sales department. Advanced payments will be made on a 
monthly basis and finalized at the year end.
B 6 .2 If the contractee commits any significant mistake or 
misconduct behaviour during the contract period, assessment 
and action will be made by the contractor. If the targets 
stipulated in this contract cannot be achieved, bonus 
awarded to the contractee will be deducted and in addition, 
the total bonus awarded to the contractee should not exceed 
150% of the average annual bonus per employee in the
department.
(B7) Other Terms and Conditions
B7.1 Sales order targets described in this contract refers to the
sales contracts directly entered into by the equipment sales
department, whereas the sales contracts accepted and signed 
by the tertiary enterprises are not counted.
B7.2 Once this contract is signed, the contractee can
sub-contract the targets to his own subordinate sections or 
individuals but records should be filed with the enterprise 
management office.
B 7 .3 Any changes needed to be made after signing this contract, 
mutual agreements from both parties must be sought.
B7.4 This contract is effective from the date of signatures. Six 
copies will be made for contractor, contractee, enterprise 
management office, accounting and finance department etc.
It takes a few months for the factory manager and workshop 
manager to negotiate with the terms and conditions for their IRCs 
signed in parallel with the planning process started in October 
until. final approval by the annual general metting in next 
February. This long process indicates that the setting of IRC is 
not a top-down approach and the workshop managers are very eager 
on this issue upon which they will be measured against and 
rewarded thereupon. The IRCs are subject to at least quarterly 
review but adjustments can only be made if some factors 
affecting the achievement of targets significantly.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 5 . 6 . 1 - 1 6  on  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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In summary, the factory manager has delegated more freedom to the 
workshop managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also involved the accounting and finance personnel 
intensively as a vetting mechanism in order to set the targets as 
objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the 4 production workshops in Shanghai Crane & Conveyor 
Works (SCCW) are manufacturing their own products without any 
interactions with the other workshops, therefore, internal 
transfer pricing does not exist. Although the other 5 supporting 
workshops or departments are supplying materials and services to 
the 4 production workshops according to the requirement of each 
job, however, they are all treated as cost centres and no 
internal profits or transfer prices have to be determined.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Shanghai Crane 
& Conveyor Works (SCCW) has three distinct levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (factory manager, deputy-factory managers,
chief accountant and chief engineer)
(2) Middle Management (workshop managers and department heads)
(3) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-factory managers and the two chiefs can decide on 
their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (production 
lines or sections) . They are also responsible for certain 
personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, 
evaluation and remuneration (distribution of b onus). But 
termination of emploment with any staff is a difficult task which 
will be explained in the rewards and incentives section.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the workshops and departments are by 
using annual plans and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, 
the most important measurement criteria are production efficiency 
(i.e. Equivalent Labour Hour of actual output) and cost control 
set in the IRCs, although some other qualitative targets, such as 
quality and safety, are employed. However, these are subsidiary 
ones which have lower weightings in calculating the group wages 
and bonus.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of SCCW.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s
Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) sets similar objectives 
for its production workshops : workshop managers must meet their 
agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement in 
performance year after year as emphasized by the corporation and 
bureau in terms of growth rates. The critical occasion, 
therefore, is the annual planning review. In view of the market 
economy and macro-economic control policies promulgated by the 
government, and the keen competition within this industry, the 
production workshops sometimes feel passive in setting their 
objectives or targets in the annual plans or IRCs because their 
activities are depending on the sales demands and the derived 
production mixes and volumes.
A high pressure to achieve the planned production quantity and 
efficiency is put on the workshop managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group wages and 
bonus are tied in with the annual plans or IRCs and it also 
depends on the overall performance of the enterprise as a whole. 
Apart from the production workshops, the other departments, such 
as purchasing and sales, may have ad hoc or project based IRCs in 
which they have agreed specific objectives or targets with the 
factory manager. The promotion, salary and bonus of these 
functional staff are correlated with these quantitative and 
non-financial targets.
In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) regards it as essential to 
catch variances from annual plan or IRC before they have gone too 
far. To this end the top management monitor results on a monthly 
and quarterly basis. All the workshops and departments submit 
monthly results on standard forms to their respective divisional 
heads and also to the chief accountant for vetting and comparison 
with budgets and IRCs. The production workshops are also 
required to submit production progress reports to the top 
management on a weekly basis.
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The monthly report format p.s unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the annual plan from which 
all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted from this 
report. The monthly and quarterly actuals are compared with the 
targets. The qualitative targets are usually subjectively 
measured by the divisional heads and enterprise management office 
and written in the monthly reports as well. These monthly reports 
are compiled, through the computer, by the enterprise management 
office. Any significant variances (without specifying tolerance 
limits) will be highlighted in order to bring the attention to 
the top management. Then all the monthly reports are submitted 
to the factory manager for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
factory manager will contact with the respective deputy managers, 
chiefs, workshop managers or department heads to dig out the 
underlying reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the top management with the middle 
management, the factory manager will put forward the monthly 
results for open discussion. The workshop managers and the 
department heads may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances. Consistent failure (say over 12 months) in meeting 
the targets which are controllable by a workshop manager, 
probably he will be replaced by somebody else. On the other 
hand, the favourable results will be openly praised by the top 
management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the personnel department for calculating the group 
wages and bonus of each workshop or department for last month. 
Then the accounting department will process the bonus payments at 
the end of the month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by 
one month).
The importance of computerization has been recognised by the top 
management and some stand-alone personal computers have been 
purchased and used for production planning and control, 
purchasing and inventory control, sales analysis, and financial 
planning and analysis. In 1994, SCCW set up a computer centre 
and installed a mini-computer trying to integrate all the 
sub-systems. However, the computing staff may not understand the 
operations and requirements of other workshops and department, 
and on the other hand, many employees may not understand the 
functions and constraints of the computer. Therefore, SCCW is 
planning to undertake intensive training for both computing and 
management staff in order to enhance their cooperation and to 
implement a comprehensive MIS via the establishment of LANS.
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Now, SCCW views the annual plan or IRC as a contract between the 
top management and the workshop or department. The monitoring 
process is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the
reasons for variances from plan.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
The external financial auditing of SCCW is performed by either 
the Government Audit Department, Shanghai (Municipal) Finance 
Bureau or Shanghai (District) Finance Department once every year. 
One of these government authorities will audit SCCW in every 
year. Apart from the financial audit, the respective
Civilization, Facility, Safety and Quality Control authorities 
will inspect SCCW almost once every year.
Observation of Control Influence : shfit from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
Since 1992, Shanghai Cranes & Conveyors Works has implemented the
following "Bonus Evaluation and Distribution Policy" :
(A) Principles
(Al) The bonus evaluation and distribution should follow the 
"reward according to work" principle. Bonus means award for 
extra workdone over the standard or budget on individual 
basis instead of the "equal share for everybody" or "big 
rice pot" traditional ideology.
(A2) The financial source of bonus comes from enterprise's 
economic efficiency which are corelated with one another. 
The bonus distribution should be based on the evaluation of 
internal responsibility contract's accomplishment taking 
into account of quality and safety which may have the veto 
power on bonus award.
(A3) According to the real situation, the bonus evaluation and 
distribution should put more weighting onto the frontline 
workers who are directly contributing their physical effort 
to the economic well-being of the enterprise.
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(A4) The level of bonus award is according to the financial 
viability of the enterprise. Therefore, all employees 
should raise the production (administration) output, enhance 
the enterprise economic efficiency in order to increase 
their bonus awards.
(A5) The bonus distribution is on a two-level system. The 
headquarters or top management evaluate the performance of 
individual departments and award a lump sum bonus to each 
department. In turn, each department evaluates its own 
e m p o l y e e s  and award bonus a c c o r d i n g  to individual 
performance. The departments can mondify this bonus 
evaluation and distribution policy to suit their actual 
needs after obtaining approval from top management.
(B) Methods
(Bl) Classification of Departments
According to different responsibilities and nature of 
duties, all the workshops and departments are classified 
into four categories i.e. A, B, C and D.
(B2) Asscertainment of Bonus Index
The major determining factors of bonus are effeciency and 
effectiveness index.
B 2 .1 Efficiency Bonus Index Table (Ml)
Category Index 
A
B
C
1.0 (Direct labour) 
0.8 (Indirect labour)
0.75
0.7
Departments 
Production Workshops
Heat Treatment, Packing
Tool, Power, Inspection, Sales 
Electrical Equipment, Planning 
Purchasing, Technical, R&D
D 0.65 Others
(a) The amount of bonus awarded to Category A direct labour 
depends on "utilization rate of available labour hours" as 
follow :
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Utilization rate of 
available labour hours
f Efficiency Bonus formula 
(per worker per month)
U = 80% RMB25
U < 80 RMB25 - (80% - U) x 50*
80% < U < 100 RMB25 + (U - 80%) x 100#
U > 100% RMB45 + (U - 100%) X 150@
* If U = 60%, then efficiency bonus = RMB25 - (80% - 60%) x 50
= RMB15 x 1.0 (index)
= RMB15
# If U = 90%, then efficiency bonus = RMB25 + (90% - 80%) x 100
= RMB35 x 1.0 (index)
= RMB35
@ If U = 110%, then efficiency bonus = RMB45 + (110% - 100%)xl50
= RMB6 0 x 1.0 (index)
= RMB6 0
(b) Efficiency bonus for Category A indirect labour will be 80%
of the direct labour according to the index of 0.8 per above 
Table Ml.
(c) Efficiency bonus for Category B employees will be 75% of the
Category A direct labour's average according to the index of
0.75 per above Table Ml.
(d) Efficiency bonus for Category C employees will be 70% of the
Category A direct labour's average according to the index of
0.7 per above Table M l .
(e) Efficiency bonus for Category D employees will be 65% of the
Category A direct labour's average according to the index of
0.65 per above Table Ml.
(f) Calculation of the utilization rate of available labour hour 
(U) is as follow :
Equivalent labour hours of actual output*
U  = -----------------------------------------------------------------------
8 hours x monthly working days x no. of direct workers
* Equivalent labour hours of actual output is calculated by 
the production planning & control department according to 
the Municipal Standard Statement 001 (1992)
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B2 .2  E f f e c t i v e n e s s  Bonus I n d e x  T a b le  (M2)
Effectiveness bonus is based on actual expense and expense 
per equivalent labour hour versus the budgeted targets 
respectively.
Cat. Standard Act Exp/ Act Exp/ Departments
Expense Act ELH Std ELH
(1) (2) (3)
A
B
D
(1)
5/Month@
5/Quarter
5/Year
10-20
5-10*
5-10#
10-15#
5-10
10-15#
Production Workshops
Heat Treatment, Packing, Power 
Tool, Estate Development
Chief Engineer, Technical, 
Filing, Inspection, Sales, 
General Affairs, Safety & 
Environment, Quality Control, 
Promotion, Education, Hospital, 
Accounting, Security,
Enterprise Management Office
Other departments without any 
expense budget
If actual total expenses at or below standard, the following 
bonuses will be awarded.
(2) If actual expenses/actual labour hours at or below standard, 
the following bonuses will be awarded.
(3) If actual expenses/standard ELH based on actual output at or 
below standard, the following bonuses will be awarded. The 
standard of this ratio is based on last year actual 
performance. The lower of this ratio, the better the 
performance. Upper and lower limits have been set.
@ All figures in RMB
* -Departmental average
# Enterprise average as a whole
B 2 .1.1 Effectiveness Bonus based on Expense Control
The amount of effectiveness bonus awarded to Category A employees
depends on the attainment of expense targets as follow :
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A c t u a l  Vs S t a n d a r d Bonus Formula (Refer to Column 1 of 
Table M2 above)
At standard 
Above standard
Below standard
RMB5 (per worker per month)
1% above standard, deduct 5% bonus up to 
2 0% above standard*
+20% above standard, deduct same propor­
tion from the other bonuses up to RMB5#
1% below standard, add 5% bonus@
* If actual expense exceeds standard by 10%, then effectiveness 
bonus = RMB5 - (10 x 5% x RMB5) = RMB2.50
# If actual expense exceeds standard by 40%, then deduct from the 
other bonuses of RMB5 - (40 x 5% x RMB5) = RMB5
@ If actual expense below standard by 20%, then effectiveness 
bonus = RMB5 + (20 x 5% x RMB5) = RMB10
B 2 .1.2 Effectiveness based on Actual Expense/Actual Labour Hour
The amount of effectiveness bonus awarded to Category A employees 
depends on the actual ratio of actual expense per actual labour 
hour against the standard (the lower the better) as follow :
Actual Vs Standard Bonus Formula (Refer to Column 2 of 
Table M2 above)
At or Below Lower Limit RMB2 0 (per worker per month)
At Upper Limit
Between Lower & 
Upper Limit
Over Upper Limit 
by 1% - 50%
Over Upper Limit 
by 51% or above
RMB10 (per worker per month) 
Pro Rata*
+1% reduce 2% of RMB10 bonus up to +50% 
then zero bonus
+1% reduce RMB1 from other bonuses 
awarded up to a ceiling of RMB10
* Actual Ratio - Lower Limit 
Upper Limit - Lower Limit
x (RMB20 - RMB10) + RMB10
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B2 . 1 .  3 E f f e c t i v e n e s s  b a s e d  on  A c t u a l  E x p e n s e / S t a n d a r d  ELH
The amount of effectiveness bonus awarded to Category A employees 
depends on the actual ratio of actual expense per standard 
equivalent labour hour of actual output against the standard (the 
lower the better) as follow :
Actual Vs Standard
At or Below Lower Limit
At Upper Limit
Between Lower &
Upper Limit
Over Upper Limit 
by 1% - 50%
Over Upper Limit 
by 51% or above
Bonus Formula (Refer to Column 3 of 
Table M2 above)
RMB10 (per worker per month)
RMB5 (per worker per month)
Pro Rata*
+1% reduce 2% of RMB5 bonus up to +50% 
then zero bonus
+1% reduce RMB0.5 from other bonuses 
awarded up to a ceiling of RMB5
x (RMB10 - RMB5) + RMB5
* Actual Ratio - Lower Limit 
Upper Limit - Lower Limit 
B2.1.4 Effectiveness Bonus for Category B Departments
(a) The calculation of effectiveness bonus based on expense 
control is similar to Category A departments. It can be 
assessed either monthly or quarterly.
(b) The calculation of effectivenss bonus based on actual 
expense per ELH, but not standard expense per ELH, which is 
similar to Category A departments except to use either the 
departmental or whole enterprise average as index or basis. 
Only the ratio of actual expense/actual labour hour is used 
to determine bonus.
B2 .1. 5 Effectiveness Bonus for Category C & D Departments
(a) The calculation of effectiveness bonus for Category C 
departments based on expense control is to compare the 
actuals with the budgets at the end of the year. If on or 
below budgets an annual bonus of RMB6 0 (or RMB5 per month) 
will be awarded. If above the bugets, no bonus will be 
awarded.
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(b) Under normal circumstances, Category D departments have no 
expense budgets and their annual expenses are usually below 
RMB10,000. Therefore, no such effectiveness bonus is 
awarded.
(c) The determination of effectiveness bonus for Category C & D
departments based on output control is linked up with the 
actual average bonuses awarded to Category A & B departments 
which calculations are similar to the latter departments but 
assessed on an annual basis.
(B3) Determination of Lump Sum Bonus to Individual Departments
B 3 .1 Category A Departments
(FI) BA = K1 + K2 + K3, where
BA = Departmental Gross Bonus for Category A Departments 
K1 = Gross Bonus for Frontline Budgeted (Allowed) Workers
K2 = Gross Bonus for Non-Budgeted Employees
K3 = Other Bonuses or Deductions
(F2) K1 = I x Q x S x  HI(MlxCA + M2), where
I = IRC Score determined by Enterprise Management Office
Q = Quality Score determined by QC Department 
S = Safety Score determined by Safety Control Department 
HI = Budgeted (Allowed) number of workers determined by 
Personnel Department 
Ml = Average Efficiency Bonus per employee as calculated
above by the Production Planning & Control Department 
CA = Product Mix Index as determinated by the Production & 
Planning Department 
M2 = Average Effectiveness Bonus per employee as calculated 
above by the Accounting Department
(F3) K2 = I x Q x S x  H2(0.8MlxCA + M2), where
H2 = Number of employees agreed by the Production Department 
and the Personnel Department
(F4) K3 are other bonuses or deductions as determined by :
(a) The Enterprise Management Office can award a special 
bonus to a production workshop or department according to 
its outstanding economic performance but the amount should 
not be greater than 5% of the calculated gross amount of 
bonus awarded to that workshop or department already.
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(b) The Production VJorkshops are encouraged to accept 
internal orders from the Headquarters in manufacturing 
components and spare parts. The actual outputs are
coverted into Equivalent Labour Hours (ELH) by the 
Production Planning & Control Department and then passed to 
the Enterprise Management Office for determining bonuses. 
If the assignment or order can be completed on or before the 
specified date, RMB0.5/ELH will be awarded to the workshop. 
If the order can be completed within one month after the 
specified date, RMB0.25/ELH will be awarded. If the order 
cannot be completed one month after the specified date, then 
no special bonus will be awarded but the ELH will be added 
into the normal production to calculate the efficiency 
bonus.
B 3 .2 Category B Departments
(F5) BB = I x Q x S x  H2(0.75MlxCB + M2) + K3, where
BB = Departmental Gross Bonus for Category B Departments
CB = Assignments or Jobs Completion Index determined by the 
Enterprise Management Office
B 3 .3 Category C Departments
(F6) BC = I x Q x S x  H 2 (0.7MlxCC + M2) + K3, where
BC = Departmental Gross Bonus for Category C Departments 
CC = Assignments or Jobs Completion Index determined by the 
Enterprise Management Office
B3.4 Category D Departments
(F7) BD = I x Q x S x  H2(0.65MlxCD + M2) + K3, where
BD = Departmental Gross Bonus for Category D Departments
CD = Assignments or Jobs completion rate determined by the 
Enterprise Management Office
Since 1992, SCCW had the autonomy to recruit employees from the 
labour market without getting the Shanghai Manpower and Wages 
Bureau involved which is in compliance with the Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations. Furthermore, since 1993, all the 
employees have signed employment contracts, which include the 
"employee contract" and the "in-post contract". The employee 
contract signed between the factory manager and an employee 
signifies that he or she has been employed by the enterprise. 
Whereas, the in-post contract means a formal assignment of a 
certain post to the employee who is expected to be capable for 
the job. For the employees without in-post contracts, they may 
be transferred to the Tertiary (Third) Enterprises which are 
fully-owned by SCCW and are self-financed.
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The effectiveness of implementing the employment contracts is 
reflected in the conversion of financial losses incureed in 1991 
and 1992 to positive profit before tax in 1993 and 1994. This 
significant improvement in economic efficiency is partly due to 
the fact that bonues are linked up with efficiency and 
productivity.
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the SCCW is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration. The take-home pays of workers and staff in SCCW 
are mainly composed of three elements as broken down below :
Workers Staff
(1) Wages/Salary 50% - 35% 70% - 55%
(2) Bonus 40% - 50% 20% - 30%
(3) Allowances 10% - 15% 10% - 15%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB7,500 
in 1993 and RMB10,000 in 1994. Under the current high inflation 
rate (overall average 21.7% in China in 1994), SCCW is expected 
to increase the average annual gross wages to RMB12,500 in 1995.
The wages includes the basic wages and the floating wages where 
the former is almost fixed (i.e. average RMB200 per month) across 
the board and increased according to inflation as determined by 
the Manpower and Wages Bureau. The floating wages is classified 
into 22 grades depending on the type of work, seniority, 
efficiency and skill. Grade 22 employees will receive RMB300 
floating wages per month while Grade 1 employees will receive 
RMB15 0 per month. Therefore, the difference between one grade 
and the next upper or lower grade is very small i.e. between RMB5 
to RMB10 per month.
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There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai 
Government at least once in each year mainly for the purpose of 
combating inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity.
The second part is decided by the SCCW which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, hair-washing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowances" is about 
RMB115 to RMB140 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the workshops, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the factory manager and a 
workshop manager will decide what level of group bonus will be 
given to the department. Of course, it is up to the workshop 
manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her 
subordinates according to invidual performance. The bonus is 
distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a 
certain percentage (10% - 20%) will be retained in a reserve in 
order to make up the low bonus obtained during the months with 
poor performance.
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System", if there is an 
overall outstanding or above target performance, the Corporation 
(SHMMC) will award a lump sum of "special bonus" to the factory 
manager at the end of the year. But under no circumstances, the 
remuneration package of the factory manager can be greater than 
three times the total earnings of a department head (middle 
management). If the annual profit before tax can achieve better 
than the planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to 
all the employees and distributed in a way very similar to the 
monthly bonus.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
will cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives. Another way to reduce redundant employees is to 
enforce early retirement at the age of 45.
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Instead of fully implementing this contract employment system, 
SCCW has signed "in-post cdntracts" with most of the employees 
for periods from one to five years. This contract signifies that 
an employee is qualified for that specific post and he or she is 
eligible to receive wages (according to grade in the pay-scale), 
allowances and bonus. Without such a contract, that employee is 
out of job but he or she is still an employee of SCCW and is 
allowed to received a basic monthly subsidy of about RMB200. 
This measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy 
employees, but it can motivate the marginal employees to work 
better.
In relation to the social welfare, since 1993, SCCW has to 
contribute 25.5% of the monthly gross payroll to the government 
for sharing the responsibilities of unemployment, retirement and 
medical allowances. In addition, SCCW has to provide about 14% 
of the monthly gross payroll for various employee's benefits such 
as building residential quarters. Furthermore, SCCW has to bear 
the pension and medical allowance for its 860 retired employees 
(before 1994) which is a rather financial burden to the overhead 
expenditures.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SCCW believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Finance Control"
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure*
High Corporate
High to Medium 
Corporate
Review Process* High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High to 
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High to Medium 
Corporate
Medium to Low 
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High Corporate Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Rewards •& Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Finan
Progr
[Pre-
cial
amming)
1992]
lvicCJ.JL Lllll JJLJ.L d  L. fci “ “ ”
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\
[Post-199
(Finan
Contr
/
2]
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Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Crane & Conveyor Works (SCCW) before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been shifting gradually from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) 
to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet 
reached a strong-form (low corporate) of financial control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. It seems 
to be in the "middle of the road" between this two styles.
Revised : 17 March 1996
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Supervisor 
Student Name 
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Report Title 
Report Date
PhD in Accounting
Professor Clive Emmanuel
Joseph Yau Shiu Wing (Hong Kong)
"The Responsibility Accounting In China 
- Towards An Exploratory Framework" 
Data Analysis 13 
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l timate aim is to c l a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic
Financial
Strategic
Financial
Programming(1) 
Programming(2) 
Control (3)
Control (4)
Name of SOE Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General 
Factory (SMEF)
Staff Interviewed Mr Weng Wei Shan/Finance Division Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 26 years) 
Miss Tao Wen Quen/Assistant Finance Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 22 years)
Dates of Visits First Visit - 28 May 1993
Second Visit - 8 September 1994
Third Visit - 6 February 1995
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) was 
previously known as Ya Xi Ya Steel Plant which was established in 
1929 manufacturing iron and steel sheets and wires. Since the 
early 19950s, Ya Xi Ya Steel Plant had started to manufacture 
various alloy foundry casts for the trains of the Ministry of 
Railways with high quality without the requirement of inspections 
by the end-users. In 1956, the Ministry of Metallurgy changed 
this enterprise's name into Shanghai Mechinery Repairs General 
Factory mainly producing spare parts and components and providing 
maintenance and repair services for the mechinery and equipment 
used by the iron and steel munufacturing plants. Under the 
restructuring of the product lines, in September 1987 the 
Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau combined the Shanghai Machinery 
Repairs General Factory and Shanghai N o . 2 Machinery Repairs 
Factory into the present Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General 
Factory (SMEF) which is a specialized machinery plant for 
manufacturing whole sets of metallurgical equipment, both 
mechanical and electrical, for the iron and steel industry.
At present, SMEF has a total of 5,000 employees including 450 
engineering technical staff, 790 management staff and 2,300 
technicians. SMEF has a total fixed asset of over RMB200M at 
book value and an annual production capacity of over 70,000 
tonnes. The highest profit record of RMB25.63M was made in 1988. 
The accumulated profits and taxes paid to the government as from 
1950 to 1992 was RMB420M. The turnover achieved in 1992 was 
RMB250M but the profit before tax was slipped down to zero mainly 
due to the inflation of raw materials, heavy employee wages and 
benefits, keen competition since early 1990s and relatively old 
and inefficient production facilities and equipment.
SMEF was qualified by the government as a "Second Grade" 
enterprise in 1988. Over 60% of SMEF's products achieved high 
quality standard and received a Quality Management award from the 
Ministry of Metallurgy in 1989. Furthermore, SMEF was also 
qualified as first class "Information Management" and second 
class "Energy Saving" awards in 1990.
SMEF has two production sites. One is located at the Yangpu 
(Eastern Urban) District occupied a land area of over 130,000 
square metres and another one is situated at the Putao (Western 
Urban) District with a land area of over 120,000 square metres.
The various products of SMEF can be classified into the following 
categories :
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(1) Mechanical Equipment (Smelting, Pressing & Crushing)
1.1 Small Type Arc-Furnace
1.2 Continuous Casting Machine For Billet and Slab
1.3 Sintering Machine, Gas Generating Furnace, Spare Parts 
for Blast Furnace
1.4 D70013 Air-Blower Roter
1.5 Various Hot and Cold Rolling Mills, Crimping Machines
1.6 Various Draw Benches & Straightening Machines
1.7 Pressing Machine for Ore Powder Compacting
1.8 Various Crushing Machines & their Spare Parts
(2) Electrical Equipment (Large Size Transformers, Electronic 
Products and Others)
2.1 Various Arc-Furnace Transformers with Capacity below 
40,OOOkVA
2.2 Various Power Transformers with Capacity below 
120,OOOkVA
2.3 Various Rectiformers
2.4 Various Special Transformers
2.5 Various High-Powered S.C.R. Components (below 1,000A,
3,000V)
2.6 KJW Series Electronic Switch Cabinets
2.7 Lifting Electromagnetic Sucking Disc and its Control 
Cabinet
2.8 Reforming Large, Medium Size of AC and DC Motors
(3) Commercial Casts & Forgings (Steel Casts, Iron Casts & 
Forging Steel)
3.1 Various Alloy & Refined Carbon Steel Casts from 10kg to 
10,000 kg
3.2 Various Wear-Resisting Steel Casts for Crushing
3.3 Various Alloy Steel Rools, Spheroidal-Graphite Cast 
Streel Rolls, Adamite etc.
3.4 Various Deformed Cast Iron Works below 20t each piece
3.5 Various Heat-Resisting & Wear-Resisting Cast Iron Works
3.6 Various Deformed Alloy Forging Works below 0.6 tonnes
In addition, SMEF has set up an inspection centre serving the 
customers with techniques such as inspecting pressure vessel; 
testing data of pressure and power energy for rolling mills; 
protecting the degree of oil contamination for transformers; 
testing resonating wave above 50 circle per second for 
electrified wire netting etc. All in all, the factory can be 
able to serve the users from designing, smelting, casting, 
forging, fabricating, assembling, measuring and offering whole 
sets of metallurgical equipment.
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Affected by the building offYangpu Bridge, the longest bridge in 
China, which one end (entrance) is adjacent to SMEF's Eastern 
Plant and the environmental protection scheme implemented by the 
municipal government, since 1994, the iron and steel casting and 
forging production lines of SMEF have been relocating phase by 
phase to a new factory situated in Wangdu of Jiading at the 
southwest suburb of Shanghai. This new production site in Wangdu 
has a land area of over 170,000 square metres and has invested 
over RMB90 million but an additional investment of RMB60M is 
required. The other equipment and appliance production lines 
will be relocated to the Western Plant in Putao District before 
2000  .
Since the South China visit by the Chinese top leader, Mr Deng 
Xiao Ping, the pace of economic development has been speeded up. 
SMEF has made use of this opportunity in time to reform the 
internal operation and management systems on one hand, and react 
to the quick changes in the domestic and overseas markets in 
order to become a re a l l y  s e l f - m a n a g e d , self-financed, 
self-regulated and self-developed modern enterprise on the other 
hand. These reforms included the following :
(1) Organisation Restructuring (see Section 2 below)
(2) Strategic Themes & Thrusts (see Section 5.3 below)
(3) Employee Evaluation & Contract (see Section 6.4 below)
(4) Reward & Incentive Scheme (see Section 6.4 below)
In 1994, the total iron and steel output in China was over 85 
million tonnes in which 20 million tonnes were stockpiled because 
the product mix did not match with the changes of demand due to 
macro economic control measures implemented by the government 
since July 1993. As a result, over 20 million tonnes of iron and 
steel products were imported from the USA, Japan and Korea at 
lower prices than the national prices. At the end of 1994, the 
average price of iron and steel products was dropped from 
RMB4,000 per tonne to RMB3,000 per tonne.
If the iron and steel industry has to change the product mix 
according to the market demands, then heavy capital investments 
will have to be made to rennovate the production facility and 
equipment. However, this industry has been suffering from the 
tight capital control by the government via the banking system as 
one of the 12 macro economic control measures imposed since July 
1993 because a lot of capital was invested into the expensive 
real estate (office and residential buildings) and the overheated 
stock exchange. To resolve this vicious cycle problem, it is 
hoped that the government will release appropriate capital funds 
at more favourable terms for the iron and steel industry in early 
1995 .
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S e c t i o n  2 : L e g a l  Form & O r g a n i s a t i o n  S t r u c t u r e
Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) has been 
a wholly state-owned enterprise since 1958 and it does not have a 
concrete plan to convert into a shareholding enterprise in the 
next few years because of the stringent rules and regulations 
governed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of China 
(BOC) . These bodies have so far approved over 3,600 large- and 
medium-sized SOEs, which have good financial performance track 
records, to transform into shareholding enterprises since 1990.
SMEF is under the administration of the Shanghai Metallurgy 
Bureau (a branch of the Ministry of Metallurgy in Beijing) under 
which all the iron and steel and related industries in Shanghai 
are placed under its umbrella. The major role played by the 
Bureau is to maintain an economical balance of the product mix 
and sales among its member enterprises. It also appoints the top 
management, such as the party leaders and factory managers, of 
the enterprises under its supervision. It also assists the 
arrangement of capital to finance the approved projects or 
investments for the enterprises. Another important economic 
function of the Bureau or the government is to purchase the iron 
and steel raw materials at lower prices (80%-90%) and then sell 
to various enterprises as a means of maintaining reasonable input 
costs under high inflation.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all the planning and control systems of the 
state-owned enterprises. Therefore, SMEF acted just as a vehicle 
(or cost centre) to carry out the activities according to the 
commands directed from the bureau. Since the economic reform 
started in 1979, instead of dictatorship from the bureau, SMEF 
has been involved in the 5-year long range plan even though SMEF 
for most of the time had to take the directives from and give in 
their negotiations to the authority.
Since the promulgation of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations" by the People's Congress in July 
1992, the Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau has almost delegated all the 
management autonomy to its enterprises. The short-term planning 
and operation like purchasing, production and sales autonomy have 
been fully delegated to SMEF. But the Bureau still oversees the 
long term development and projects recommended by SMEF and also 
appoint the top management of SMEF. The investment autonomy such 
as raising capital for project investment has to be discussed 
with the Bureau even though the interference is minimal at 
present. The Bureau is planning to reorganise into a Corporation 
to provide research, development, design and consultation 
services to its enterprises only.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 2 . 6  & Q 2 . 7  on  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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During the organisation restructuing in 1992, SMEF consolidated 
26 administrative departments into 1 Enterprise Management Office 
and 7 Administrative Divisions representing a 60% reduction in 
management units. The management staff was reduced by 33% from 
434 down to 291 in the headquarters. This organisational reform 
has redefined the authority and responsibility of every 
individual unit and staff. On one hand, it has released more 
time for the top management to investigate and solve the critical 
operational problems and develop long term strategic plans. On 
the other hand, it has increased the responsiveness, initiation, 
motivation and creativeness of the middle and lower management 
staff to improve their effectiveness and efficiency.
Under the General Factory Manager, the enterprise management 
office and 7 administrative divisions are the middle level of 
management which functions are servicing, coordination, planning 
and control. The new organisation structure is listed below :
1. 7 Divisions (each has a Division Manager)
1.1 Production Division (supervising the 12 Production
Factories as shown in 2 below)
1.2 Sales & Marketing Division
1.3 Technical & Quality Management Division
1.4 Accounting & Finance Division
1.5 Manpower & Personnel Division
1.6 General Affairs Division
1.7 Enterprise Development Division
2. 12 Production Factories* (each has a Factory Manager)
2 .1 Steel Casting & Forging Factory (Note 1)
2.2 Iron Casting & Forging Factory (Note 1)
2.3 No.l Rolling Steel Factory (Note 1)
2.4 Metallurgical Framework Factory (Note 2)
2 . 5 No.l Metallurgical Equipment Factory (Note 3)
2.6 No.2 Metallurgical Equipment Factory (Note 3)
2.7 No.3 Metallurgical Equipment Factory (Note 3)
2 . 8 Special Transformer Factory (Note 4)
2 . 9 Electrical Appliance Factory (Note 4)
2 .10 Mechanical Appliance Factory (Note 4)
2, 11 Wooden Mould Factory (Note 5)
2 .12 Electricity, Water & Gas Supplies Factory (Note 6)
3. 12 Tertiary Enterprises* (each has a Unit Manager under the
direct supervision of the General Factory Manager)
3.1 Metallurgical Products Sales Company
3.2 Import & Export Sales Company
3.3 Material Supplies Company
3.4 Transportation Service Company 
3 . 5 Food Sc Beverage Company
3.6 Asia Trading Company
3.7 Taiwan Steel & Metallurgy Limited Company
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3.8 Asian Metallurgical Technical Equipment Company
3.9 Research & Development Centre
3.10 Metallurgical Equipment Inspection Centre
3.11 Measurement & Precision Inspection Centre
3.12 Education & Training Centre
* All the production factories and tertiary enterprises are
treated as profit centres measured mainly by internal 
profits. Most of them have signed Internal Responsibility 
Contracts (IRC) with the General Factory Manager either on 
an annual basis or on a single project or job basis. For 
the details, please refer to section 5.6 below.
Notes : (the transfer price issues are discussed in section 5.7)
(1) The majority products of these 3 production factories are 
transferred to the framework factories, equipment factories, 
transformer factory and appliance factories as input 
materials.
(2) Most of the output of metallurgical framework factory will 
be transferred to the equipment factories, transformer 
factory and appliance factories as input components.
(3) The 3 metallurgical equipment factories are manufacturing 
stand-alone products which are tailor-made to customer's 
specifications.
(4) The transformer factory and appliance factories are 
manufacturing various types and models of products in batch 
and selling to the end-users directly or via the tertiary 
enterprises.
(5) The wooden mould factory are producing moulds to all other 
production factories according to specifications.
(6) The supplies factory is providing electricity, water and gas 
to all the other production factories, tertiary enterprises 
and headquarters.
SMEF had a total of 5,000 working employees, in which 3,000 are 
production workers, and 2,000 retired employees at the end of 
1994. It is classified as a "large-sized SOE" in China. About 
500 of the working employees are involved in 12 "tertiary 
enterprises" (service enterprise) as listed above. On the other 
hand, another 50 0 redundant employees have stopped their jobs or 
posts and received only basic wages and welfare. All the 
employees have signed "employment contracts" since 1993 with 
duration from one year to no limit leaving an optional right to 
the employees.
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S e c t i o n  3 : F i n a n c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s
Total assets 
Turnover 
(net of VAT)
Income before tax
Income tax rate
Bank loan
Doubtful debts
Accounts payable
@ The total as 
revaluation was performed by the government in 1993.
@@ The 24% drop of turnover in 1994 was due to the relocation of 
a few production lines to the new plant in Wangdu and the market 
demand.
* The low profit margin or loss making was mainly because of open 
and keen competition under the market economy instead of the 
guaranteed production and sales budgets as assigned by the 
government before 1992, and also the purchased prices of raw 
materials like iron and steel (over 52% of turnover) which prices 
were fluctuating tremendously since 1993 due to significant 
import from other countries. In addition, selling prices had to 
be reduced in order to bid the contracts. Furthermore, the 
following few expenditures could indicate the heavy burden of 
fixed overheads in 1994 :
Payroll (wages, salaries, bonus & allowances) RMB50M
National contribution (pension, medical &
unemployment allowances) 12M
Other benefits in kind 8M
Electricity 30M
Depreciation 15M
Bank & loan interests 15M
Other management expeneses 15M
Total overheads (52.75% of turnover) 145M
Input materials cost (52.35% of turnover) 144M
Total cost of sales 289M
Actual sales/turnover 275M
A c t u a l  l o s s  14M
: RMB 200M (1994)®
: RMB 250M (1992)
RMB 360M (1993)
RMB 275M (1994)@@
RMB 400M (1995 forecast)
: RMB OM (1992)
RMB 5.2M (1993) - 1.4% of sales*
RMB-13.72M(1994) - loss making*
RMB OM (1995 forecast)
: 55% (before 1994)#
3 3% (from 1994)
: RMB 140M (1994)
RMB 200M (1995 forecast)
: RMB 8.5M (1994 ending)
[without bad debt provision]
: RMB 7.5M . (19 94 ending)
sets value was increased by 21.4% after
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In view of the significant loss making in 1994, the local 
government returned (or subsidised) RMB9.9M of VAT and refunded 
RMB3.9M of electricity expenses to SMEF. As a result, SMEF 
actually had a cash profit of RMB80,000 (i.e. RMB9.9M + RMB3.9M - 
RMB13.72M) and paid a profit tax of RMB26,400 (33% of RMB80,000). 
It is expected that without such tax and expense concessions, the 
profit and loss account will be breakeven in 1995.
# Due to the poor financial performance since 1991, both net 
value added tax (about 6% of turnover) and income tax were 
exempted in 1991, 1992 and 1993 but value added tax was resumed
in 1994.
The financial performance of all the enterprises under the 
Shanghai Metallurgical Bureau in 1994 was in downturn achieving a 
total valued added tax of RMB140M and profit before tax of 
RMB100M. Over 60% of the enterprises incurred losses including 
SMEF whose sales/production ratio was 90% in 1994 which means 10% 
of the finished products were still in stock. Apart from the 
inflation factor, new accounting and taxation systems were other 
two attributable reasons.
In summary, the critical factors affecting adversely the 
financial performance of SMEF in the past few years are :
(1) lack of capital to rennovate the production facilities and
invest into new projects to modify the product mix according 
to the market demands and improve the product quality in 
order to compete nationally and internationally;
(2) insufficient market information for product mix and sales
forecasts;
(3) increase in expenses due to high inflation but unable to 
increase the product selling prices in parallel due to 
competition and pricing guidance from the bureau;
(4) macro-economic control measures controlled by the government 
and inadequate assistance to the inefficient enterprises;
(5) quality of internal management and control in the 
enterprises due to insufficient education and training; and
(6) heavy social responsibilities and financial burden to the
enterprises but could not lay-off the redundant employees 
due to insufficient employment benefits (i.e. unemployment, 
medical, retirement etc.) offered by the government.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
The Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) 
entered into the first Economic Responsibility Contract with the 
Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau and the Shanghai Finance Bureau 
(representing the Shanghai municipal government) in 1988.
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This first ERC had takenf the following considerations into 
account :
(1) Format
The form of ERC taken was "Target Profit Underwritten". The
major reason for adopting this basis was because SMEF was a
low-profit making state-owned enterprise and required over RMB90 
million of capital for the next five years (1988-1992) investment 
in production facilities and equipment including RMB56 million 
for relocating a few production factories from the East Plant to 
the New Plant in Wangdu Suburb of Jiading (southwest of Municipal 
Shanghai). It was expected high borrowings and repayments would
be incurred in this period.
(2) Duration
The duration of the first ERC would be 5 years as from 1988 to 
1992.
(3) Target Base
The first year (i.e. 1988) profit target base was determined at
RMB7.72 million after considering the profits achieved by the 
Eastern and Western Plants in 1987 as follows :
Eastern Plant 1987 actual profit = RMB10.20 million
Western Plant 1987 actual profit = RMB 2.01 million
Enterprise 1987 actual profit = RMB12.21 million
Less :
Prior-year adjustment due to production
cost undermined RMB 0.82 million
Bank-loan repayment deductable from
profit before handover RMB 3.67 million
Profit target base in 1988 RMB 7.72 million
Because of profit downturn since 1991, SMEF was exempted in 
handing over any profit or tax to the municipal government in 
1991, 1992 and 1993. The second (1993-1997) ERC's profit target
is zero for the first 3 years and then subject to review for the 
latter 2 years. Although no profit or income tax would be 
levied, however, the net value-added tax (6% of turnover) had to 
be paid since 1994. SMEF is still negotiating with the 
government to refund and exempt their VAT until 1996.
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m  ,
5.1 Organisation Structure
The organisation structure of Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment 
General Factory (SMEF) was significantly restructured in 1993 in 
response to the "Operation Mechanism Transformation" promulgated 
by the government in order to streamline the operation efficiency 
and reduce the redundant employees. All the production factories 
and tertiary enterprises are treated as profit centres and 
measured mainly by internal profits generated. Whereas the 7 
divisions in the headquarters are expense centres and their 
expenses are treated as management expenses and write off to the 
profit and loss of current period according to the "Accounting 
Standards for Enterprises" implemented by SMEF in early 1993.
Since 1992, SMEF has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each division, production factory and tertiary 
enterprise such as initiating the annual plan and the internal 
responsibility contract. The production and cost control 
responsibility primarily lies with the factory and unit manager 
but the top management keep a surveillance quantity and quality 
control on each production factory through monthly or weekly 
report.
The selection and appointment of the top management (i.e. general 
factory manager and party leader) are still decided by the 
Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau and a "Factory Manager Responsibility 
System" is in force. This system takes the Economic 
Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a basis to evaluate the 
performance of the factory general manager. If an outstanding or 
above target performance has been achieved, the factory general 
manager will be awarded a predetermined lump sum bonus at the 
year end (see section 4.5 above).
Since 1992, the factory general manager has the autonomy to 
appoint the senior staff such as the division managers, 
production factory managers and tertiary enterprise managers. 
Any major changes of the organisation structure in each division, 
factory and enterprise should be initiated by the manager and 
approved by the factory general manager. However, more autonomy 
of internal management and operation has been delegated to the 
division, factory and enterprise managers. And in turn, the unit 
managers involved their workshop managers and department heads 
more in planning, control and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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In summary, SMEF has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual division, factory and enterprise managers directly to 
the factory general manager, and they play a linking and control 
role between the workshops or departments and the factory general 
manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since 1992, Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory 
(SMEF) has implemented a more formal planning process for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual plan or budget 
and the internal responsibility contracts (IRCs). In October, the 
factory general manager evaluates the internal and external 
environmental factors with his division, factory and enterprise 
managers in order to determine some major targets such as sales, 
production and profit targets. Then these targets will be used 
as guidelines for the individual division, factory and enterprise 
managers to formulate their own annual plans and IRCs. At the 
end of October, they have to submit their annual plans to the 
Enterprise Management Office for preliminary review and 
consolidation before putting forward to the general manager for 
perusal. The Accounting & Finance Division will also compile an 
annual financing plan based on the individual annual plans in 
order to match with the overall profit target.
In November, the general manager calls upon all the unit managers 
to discuss with their budget submissions and if there is any gap, 
then the general manager will negotiate with the unit managers or 
ask them to revise their plans until compromise can be reached in 
the subsequent meetings. Much emphasis is placed on the internal 
profit targets which cater for both revenue generating and cost 
saving without any trade-off with product quality or failure of 
customer's specification. These are the key criteria to be used 
as the measurement yardsticks of their subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts. This iterative exercise carries on 
until all the annual plans and contracts are mutually agreed and 
approved in January.
The approved annual plans are broken down into quarterly and 
monthly plans to cater for production cycle, delivery dates, 
demand, holiday and other factors. All the individual annual 
plans will be consolidated into a booklet and distribtuted to all 
senior staff. The factory general manager has to report the 
consolidated annual plan to the AGM (all the employees can 
attain) held in February. The annual plans are formally reviewed 
in every April and September and adjustments on significant 
deviations are allowed to make after detail discussion and 
approval from top management.
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Before 1992, the division, ffactory and enterprise managers did 
not participate so intensively in this annual planning review 
process and the government and the bureau gave directions to the 
general manager on what should be done over the next 12 months 
within the context of a few key indicators e.g. sales, production 
volume and mix, quality improvement, material consumption, etc. 
Since 1992, under the legislative changes and market economy 
promotion, the government and bureau have almost delegated full 
automomy to SMEF in formulating its strategic directions. As a 
result, all the division, factory and enterprise managers are 
encouraged to participate in the planning process and extend 
their planning horizon beyond one year in order to match the 
milestones set in the 5-year long-term plan.
Therefore, the factory general manager has less interference in 
departmental planning decisions, but without reducing the tight 
financial control.
(Please refer to Q 5 .5.2, Q5.5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
The p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g  features of the Shanghai 
Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) are as follow :
(1) unique, small batch, non-standard, tailor-made products 
according to customer's specification without much general 
brand-names;
(2) each production factory is close-ended plant manufacturing 
its own products and selling to its own external markets or 
ther internal production factories; and
(3) the traditional end-users of the products are metallurgical
industry, mechanical equipment industry and electrical 
equipment industry.
Under the old centralised economic planning system by the 
government and in view of the above production and marketing 
features, SMEF could hardly well develop and expand its operation 
and management in order to follow suit the current economic 
reforms and market economy changes. To break through the long 
existing constraints, SMEF promulgated the following strategic 
themes and thrusts since 1993.
(1) Improve the production efficiency and capacity in order to
maintain a higher output growth.
(2) Enhance the economic efficiency and development potential.
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(3) Increase employee's remuneration and their unity.
(4) Delegate more autonomy to middle and lower management.
(5) Convert the production cost centres into profit centres and 
deal with the markets directly.
(6) Reorganise and convert some adminstrative cost centres into
independent profit centres (i.e. tertiary enterprises) to 
provide servies to other production and administration units 
on a self-financing basis.
(7) Establish "Internal Banking" system to determine the 
internal transfer prices and to handle the transactions 
between the production factories, administrative divisions 
and tertiary enterprises.
(8) Establish arms-length "Internal Marketing" system by 
entering into internal contracts when production cooperation 
and service are required among the production factories, 
administrative divisions and tertiary enterprises.
(9) Penetrate existing markets and develop new markets.
(10) Enhance product and production quality.
(11) Reduce resources (i.e. materials, energy, power, etc.) 
consumption.
(12) Improve customer before- and after-sales services.
(13) Shorten production cycles.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in SMEF still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and review process 
such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, marketing strategy 
and production quantity and mix. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given more freedom to the unit mangers to compile 
their own plans or budgets and to adjust their plans and 
operations as long as they do not deviate much from the ultimate 
sales and profit targets. The top management follow the 
financial indicators and performance closely on monthly and 
quarterly basis and are quick to make suggestions if they do not 
match the overall long and short term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 4  Long-Term  P l a n s  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
Since the early 1950's, Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General 
Factory (SMEF) had followed the national 5-year's planning cycle 
and carried out the missions as assigned in every 5-year's plan 
directed by the municipal government under the central economic 
planning system. The commencement of the economic reforms in 
1979 started to allowed SMEF to participate in the 5-year's 
planning with the Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau and the Shanghai 
Municipal Government but specific directives and suggestions were 
always coming from the top by using the term "macroeconomics 
control and adjustment" as an excuse.
The changing role of municipal government and bureau since 1990's 
has encouraged SMEF, for the first time, to formulate their own 
long term strategic plan (1991-1995) . However, many internal 
factors and uncertainties have affected the validity and 
reliability of this long term plan which has been subject to 
review and changes every year. During the last year (1995) of 
the 5-year long term plan, the factory general manager initiates 
the next 5-year plan before discussions with the unit managers 
started. After lengthy discussion, the next 5-year plan will be 
emerged and submitted to the bureau for review or any comments. 
The 5-year plan will be reviewed every year and adjustments will 
be made through the annual planning exercise.
The followings are the major long term plans or projects laid 
down for the nineth 5-year plan (1996-2000) although a few of 
them have been started during 1991-1995.
(a) Facility Relocation
Affected by the building of Yangpu Bridge, the longest bridge in 
China, which one end (entrance) is adjacent to SMEF's Eastern 
Plant and the environmental protection scheme implemented by the 
municipal government, since 1994, the iron and steel casting and 
forging production lines of SMEF's East Plant have been 
relocating phase by phase to a new factory situated in Wangdu of 
Jiading at the southwest suburb of Shanghai. This new production 
site in Wangdu has a land area of over 170,000 square metres and 
requires a total capital expenditures of RMB150 millions financed 
by the government (RMB100M) and the bank loan (RMB50M). The other 
equipment and appliance production lines will be relocated to the 
Eastern Plant in Putao District before 2000. Part of the site of 
old eastern plant will construct a high commercial buidling to 
house the headquarters (including the 7 divisions and the 12 
tertiary, enterprises) and rent out some floors to generate 
recurring incomes. The rest of the vacated space will be sold 
(right of land-use only) to obtain RMB300M extraordinary incomes 
to repay the bank loan of RMB200M and leave RMB100M for 
constructing the headquarters building.
418
(b) Joint Ventrues r
In order to explore the overseas market, one of SMEF's production 
factories established a joint-venture with a Taiwanese 
Corporation in casting and forging iron and steel products. In 
1992, this joint-venture attained an output of 900 tonnes at a 
cost value of R M B 4 .5 million and had an export income of 
US$700,000. In the same year, SMEF entered into another 
joint-venture with a Japanese Corporation in producing iron and 
steel products for the construction industry. In 1993, this 
Sino-Janpanese corporation achieved an output of 3,000 tonnes at 
a cost value of RMB20 million and generated an export sales of 
US$1.4 million.
Other than the above two joint-ventures, SMEF has entered into 
other cooperative agreements with foreign counterparts to 
diversify the product mix, enhance the product quality to 
international standards and increase the export business to the 
USA, Japan, Australia, Italy, Middle-East, Hong Kong, Taiwan etc.
(c) Product Development
Significant changes in the infrastructure have been occured in 
recent years under the transition from planned economy to market 
ecconomy. In turn, similar cha.ges have been tNEertake. in the 
metallurgical industries. SMEF has envisaged that traditional 
and standard products for existing metallurgical industries have 
been declined. On the other hand, high technology, high quality, 
heavy non-standard and customer-order sales are on increase 
coming from iron and steel, mechanical equipment and electrical 
equipment industries. In order to cope with this market trend, 
SMEF has been exploring into this new product mix by using its 
own R&D and cooperation with foreign counterparts. Furthermore, 
SMEF is promulgating its "all-through services" of equipment 
sales by offering research, design, manufacturing, assembly, 
packing, delivery, installation, testing, repair and maintenance 
before and after sales services.
(d) Competitive Edge
SMEF has been facing keen competition from many other 
manufacturers of similar kinds of products in other big cities 
like Shanyang, Beijing, Xian, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Wanzhou whose 
facilities and equipment are relatively new. To maintain at least 
the market share and competitive edge against these counterparts, 
SMEF has to invest millions of Reminbi in production facility 
rennovation in order to manufacture higher quality, tailor-made 
and cost-effective products.
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(e) Market Development f
To penetrate into the domestic market and capture higher market 
share, the sales personnel has been seggregated into geographic 
teams with different marketing strategies and tatics such as 
holding regular meetings with and paying visits to the existing 
and new customers. Discounts and other benefits in kind may be 
given to the customers in order to gain the orders. In addition 
to the advertising campaign, SMEF has participated in local and 
foreign (USA and Thailand) trade fair. The IRC signed with the 
Sales Department links up the remuneration directly with the 
sales volume and the accounts receivable (or cash collected) in 
order to motivate the sales and marketing effort.
(f) Overseas Markets
Less than 5% of SMEF's products are directly exported and less 
than US$5 millions foreign exchange has been achieved which are 
unable to be qualified as a free import and export enterprise. 
SMEF is working closely with the bureau to negotiate with the 
government in obtaining the import and export right (also the 
foreign exchange usage right) so that they can explore the 
overseas markets such as Southeast Asian, South American and 
Eastern European Countries.
(g) Sources of Capital
Due to capital intensive nature and long production cycle (6 to 
18 months) , SMEF had an outstanding bank loan of over RMB140M 
(for both fixed assets and current assets financing purposes) at 
the end of 1994 and paid over RMB15M of bank interest in the same 
year. In order to finance the above long term projects, at least 
an additional RMB100M is required in the next few years. One way 
to capture additional capital is getting loans from foreign banks 
through the joint-venture arrangement or cooperation. Another 
source of captial is to transform SMEF into a shareholding 
enterprise and issue shares to its employees, other enterprises 
and individuals. But the latter avenue involves a lot of 
political and economic problems related to the government, 
ministry and bureau. Another source of capital is to transfer 
the land-use right of the vacated land in the Eastern Plant after 
relocation (completed before 2000) to other enterprises and 
generate extraordinary incomes.
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(h) C o m p u t e r i z a t i o n r
At present, stand-alone personal computers are employed by 
individual divisions, production factories and tertiary 
enterprises without any connections. For example, the accounting 
and finance division has been using a personal computer for 
wages, financial reporting and cost analysis only without any 
integration. There is a wrong conception that some SMEF's 
management believe computerization will lead to more redundant 
staff. But the top management have realised the importance of 
untilising computers. Therefore, SMEF is planning to purchase a 
mini-computer and establish a computer centre in 1995. At the 
same time, training and education will be provided to different 
levels of managment staff so that the ultimate aim of setting up 
a LANs system can be materialised in 2000.
The current 5-year plan (1991-1995) was compiled after long 
discussion between the Bureau and the SMEF's top management. 
Although the division, factory and enterprises managers have been 
involved in this planning process, they were playing a 
consultation role only.
As far as the next 5-year plan (1996-2000) is concerned, the 
bureau has almost fully delegated the planning autonomy to SMEF 
for them to initiate the blueprint on their own. However, the 
division, factory and enterprise managers are mainly concerned 
with how the milestones set in the long term plan will affect 
their next year budgets or internal responsibility contracts 
which will have tight financial surveillance coming from the 
factory manager at least on a monthly basis. Therefore, the long 
term planning and review process are using a top-down approach in 
the belief that the factory general manager has better experience 
and knowledge of the external environment and even the internal 
operations of the factories and enterprises.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Bureau has devolved its central planning role to 
SMEF since 1992. Now, the top management of SMEF is taking the 
initiative to formulate its own long term plan but participation 
from the middle management is limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
421
5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
The general short term planning policy adopted by Shanghai 
Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) is "production 
determined by sales" and "sales determined by targeted profit 
before income tax" which means profit before income tax growth 
(either positive or zero) as agreed with the Shanghai Metallurgy 
Bureau is the initial driving force of all the activities. 
Reference should also be made to the 5-year plan especially to 
estimate what the sales order potential will be for the new 
product and market situation in the next year. As from October 
1992, SMEF has employed the annual planning or budgeting process 
as described in section 5.2 (Review Process) above.
Since October 1992, the production factory managers have been 
involved intensively in this planning process, in particular 
determining the production and sales quantity, mix, cost and 
internal profit, which they believe to be important in setting 
and negotiating the internal responsibility contracts with the 
factory general manager. The other division managers and 
tertiary enterprise managers have also participated carefully in 
devising their income and expense budgets which they would be 
measured against as performance yardsticks.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the annual 
planning review period has been shortened from quarterly to 
monthly although the formal performance measurement and group 
bonus calculation are done within one week after the end of each 
quarter. The factory general manager and all the unit managers 
hold a formal meeting at the beginning of each month to review 
the financial performance against the annaul plans. Amendments 
or revisions are made once or twice a year according to the 
significance of the factors affecting the annual plan.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given SMEF more freedom to plan ahead. The government 
representatives and the bureau have almost completely devolved 
the short term planning autonomy to SMEF, except to agree on the 
minimum profit targets as agreed at the beginning of every year. 
The top management have involved the middle management or even 
their subordinates (lower management) in the annual planning 
process which on one hand is a critical step in materializing the 
long term strategic plan, and on the other hand, it is an 
important motivational factor for the factory managers and other 
unit managers to manage their own businesses and to be rewarded 
accordingly.
O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  f r o m  " H ig h -M ed iu m
C o r p o r a t e "  t o  "Low C o r p o r a t e "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
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5 . 6  I n t e r n a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t s  (IRC)
Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) 
established its IRC system in 1989 in order to motivate the 
efficiency, profitability and cost reduction in the production 
workshops.
The IRC of one of the production factories is described below :
Department : N o .1 Metallurgical Equipment Factory
Duration : 1 January to 31 December 1994
Guidelines :
In accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the 14th 
People's Congress held in October 1992 in relation to the further 
reforms in state-owned enterprises, SMEF has to enhance the 
initiation and motivation of all its employees, improve the 
internal management and increase the productivity and economic 
efficiency. In order to realise these objectives, the following 
new version/format of internal responsibility contract is signed 
between the general manager and the factory manager.
(A) Responsibility Targets :
(Al) Financial Target (Per Month)
A 1 .1 Internal Profit = Sales - Cost of Sales - Management 
Expenses - National Contribution - Interest on Fixed 
Capital - Interest on Current Capital - Administration 
Charges - Welfare Fund Deficit +/- Internal Bank 
Interest +/- Other Incomes/Expenses
Management Expenses = allowed for the production factory own
management expenses 
= RMB600 x beginning year headcount
National Contribution = 25.5% of gross wages handover to the
the government for pension
Interst on Fixed Capital =
fixed assets (book value) acquired before 1993 x 2.5% + 
fixed assets (book value) acquired after 1993 x 1.0%
Interest on Current Capital = average current assets 
(monthly opening + monthly closing)/2 x 1%
Administration Charges = headquarters allocation
= RMB50 x beginning year headcount
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Welfare Fund Deficit = actual welfare expenses (i .e .medical, 
nursary, housing etc.) - standard welfare provision 
(i.e. 14% of gross wages)
Internal Bank Interest = interest credited to or charged on 
monthly ending balance in the internal bank account
(A2) Production Targets
A 2 .1 Production Quantity 
A 2 .2 Production Value at Cost
A 2 .3 Equivalent Labour Hours of Finished Products 
A 2 .4 Degree of Completion of Contract 
A 2 .5 Product Quality 
A 2 .6 Others
(A3) Management Targets
A3.1 Quality Management
A3.2 Safety Management
A3.3 Technical Management
A3.4 Material Consumption Management
A3.5 Operational Management
(B) Duties & Rights :
(Bl) According to the terms and conditions of this contract and 
the relevant rules and policies of the enterprise, the 
contractor (i.e. general factory manager) has the right to 
supervise, inspect and evaluate the performance of the 
contractee (i.e. production factory).
(B2) According to the terms and conditions of this contract, the 
contractor has the duties to maintain the rights of the 
contractee and assist the contractee to resolve the 
operational problems encountered.
(B3) The contractee must accomplish the financial targets as 
agreed in this contract.
(B4) The contractee should well untilize the autonomy as 
authorised by this contract and the headquarters to enhance 
the internal management, improve the operation and explore 
the existing and potential markets.
(B5) The contractee must observe the government's laws and 
regulations, enterprise's management systems and standards 
in order to self-regulate seriously.
(C) Incentive Scheme :
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(Cl) Upon completion of all targets, gross amount of - 
Basic wages f = RMBXXXX
In-post wages = RMBXXXX
Bonuses = RMBXXXX
Total wages & bonuses = RMBXXXX
(C2) In general, any RMB1 internal profit exceeds the target, an 
additional RMB1 wages or bonus can be awarded (i.e. 1 : 1
ratio), and any RMB1 falls below the target loss, instead of 
profit target, an additional RMBO.5 wages or bonus can be 
awarded (i.e. 1 : 0.5 ratio).
(C3) If actual performance exceeds targets, the contractee will 
be awarded an extra.bonus.
(C4) If any one of the targets is failed, 2% - 5% of the total 
wages & bonuses will be deducted.
(C5) If the financial target (i.e. internal profit) is failed, 
the shortfall should be made up from the total wages & 
bonuses. In addition, administrative penalty may be taken.
(D) Evaluation :
(Dl) Financial and production targets are formally evaluated
quarterly and finalised at the year end.
(D2) Except complying with the "in-post wages policy" announced
by the personnel department on 2 December 1992, the 
contractee has the autonmy to manage its own manpower and 
distribution policies, but any increase or decrease of
headcounts above or below the allowed establishment will not 
affect the total wages and bonuses as targeted in this 
contract.
(D3) The contractee should reserve a portion of the awarded wages 
and bonuses in order to make up the months of poor
performance.
(E) Others :
(El) Both parties should not changed the terms and conditions of 
this contract without proper discussion and agreement.
(E2) This contract becomes effective after sign, seal and
delivery.
(E3) Both parties should hold a copy of this contract
respectively.
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The IRC of one of the Sales & Marketing Division is described 
below :
Department
Duration
Guidelines
Sales & Marketing Division 
1 January to 31 December 1994
In accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the 14th 
People's Congress held in October 1992 in relation to the further 
reforms in state-owned enterprises, SMEF has to enhance the 
initiation and motivation of all its employees, further develop 
the national and overseas markets, improve the internal 
management and increase the productivity and economic efficiency. 
In order to realise these objectives and clearly define the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and benefits, the following internal 
responsibility contract is signed between the general manager and 
the sales and marketing manager.
(A) Responsibility Targets :
(Al) Financial Targets
Description
Over/Below 
Allowed Target Allowed 
Target ($00 0) Expenses Expenses
A l .1 Type 1 Equipment Sales
Order received 20,000
Internal profit 400
Cash collected 20,000
1 .2! 
5 .0! 
1 . 0!
1.5%* 
8 . 0%
1 . 2%
* (1) If order received valued 22,000,000, then allowed 
expenses = 20,000,000 x 1.2% + 2,000,000 x 1.5%
= 270,000
(2) If order received valued 18,000,000, then allowed 
expenses = 20,000,000 x 1.2% - 2,000,000 x 1.5%
=  210,000
A l .2 Type 2 Equipment Sales
Order received 20,000
Internal profit 1,000
Cash collected 20,000
A l .3 Type 3 Equipment Sales
Order received 20,000
Internal profit 2,000
Cash collected 20,000
1 .31 
3 .0: 
1 .0;
0 . 8!
2 . 0!
0 . 8 !
1 .5! 
5 . 01 
1 . 2:
1.2!
5.0:
1.0!
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D e s c r i p t i o n T a r g e t  ($000)
Allowed
Expenses
Over/Below 
Target Allowed 
Expenses
A l .4 Type 4 Equipment Sales
Order received 20,000
Internal profit 1,500
Cash collected 20,000
0.81 
2 .0! 
0 .8!
1 .2: 
4 . 0: 
1 . 0!
A l .5 Type 1 Iron & Steel Sales
Order received 8,500 tonne RMB25/t
Selling price RMB8,500/t RMBlO/t
RMB35/t# 
RMB15/t@ 
per 1% of price
# (1) If order received is 9,000 tonne, then allowed 
expenses = 8,500 x 25 + 500 x 35 = 230,000
(2) If order received is 8,000 tonne, then allowed 
expenses = 8,500 x 25 - 500 x 35 = 195,000
A l .6 Type 2 Iron & Steel Sales
Order received 55,000 tonne RMBl/t
A l .7 Cash received for Iron & Steel Sales
Type 1 & Type 2 RMB220M 0.1:
A l .8 Other Sales
Internal profit 1,000
A l .9 Overall Performance
Sales delivered 350,000
Internal profit 8,000
Cash received 350,000
15!
0 .151 
3 . 0 0 ' 
0 . 1 5 '
0 .12 -
2 0 '
1 .0! 
1 .0! 
2 . 0:
(A2) Guaranteed Targets
A 2 .1 Contract completion 100%
A 2 .2 Quality control determined separately
A 2 .3 Serious accident 0
(A3) Management Targets (according to separate regulations)
A3.1 Quality Management 
A3.2 Safety Management 
A3.3 Technical Management 
A3.4 Operational Management
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(B) D u t i e s  & R i g h t s  :
f
(Bl) According to the terms and conditions of this contract and 
the relevant rules and policies of the enterprise, the 
contractor (i.e. general factory manager) has the right to 
supervise, inspect and evaluate the performance of the 
contractee (i.e. sales & marketing division).
(B2) According to the terms and conditions of this contract, the 
contractor has the duties to maintain the rights of the 
contractee and assist the contractee to resolve the 
operational problems encountered.
(B3) The contractee must accomplish the financial targets as 
agreed in this contract.
(B4) The contractee should well untilize the autonomy as 
authorised by this contract and the headquarters to enhance 
the internal management, improve the operation and explore 
the existing and potential markets.
(B5) The contractee must observe the government's laws and 
regulations, enterprise's management systems and standards 
in order to self-regulate seriously.
(C) Incentive Scheme :
(Cl) Upon completion of all targets, 16% of the allowed expenses
will be treated as the total allowed salaries for the year
while the other 84% are classified as selling and travelling 
expenses which should be claimed on actual basis according 
to enterprise regulations.
(C2) Interest based on bank lending rate will be calculated and 
charged for accounts receivable overdue for one month.
(C3) All the targets in this contract will be assessed on a
quarterly basis and finalised at the year end.
(C4) The terms and conditions of this contract are assessed on 
the management staff of the sales & marketing division.
(C3) The contractee should reserve a portion of the awarded wages 
and bonuses in order to make up the months of poor
performance.
(D) Others :
(Dl) Both parties should not change the terms and conditions of 
this contract without proper discussion and agreement.
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(D2) This contract becomes effective after sign, seal and 
delivery.
(D3) Both parties should hold a copy of this contract 
respectively.
[SMEF is planning to replace the "internal profit" (financial 
target) by the "return on investment" in 1996 which means the 
profit centres will be converted into investment centre.]
It takes a few months for the general manager and division and 
factory managers to negotiate with the terms and conditions for 
their IRCs signed in parallel with the planning process started 
in October until final approval by the annual general meeting in 
next February. This long process indicates that the setting of 
IRC is not a top-down approach and the division and factory 
managers are very eager on this issue upon which they will be 
measured against and rewarded thereupon. The IRCs are subject to 
at least quarterly review but adjustments can only be made if 
some factors affecting the achievement of targets significantly.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
factory and tertiary enterprise managers in initiating and 
negotiating their own IRCs, and also involved the accounting and 
finance personnel intensively as a vetting mechanism in order to 
set the targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the contral influence in 
the. form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the factories, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Shanghai Metallurgical 
Equipment General Factory (SMEF) that need headquarters' 
intervention.
The interactions among the factories, divisions and tertiary 
enterprises are shown in the table below and their transfer 
pricing issues are described as follow.
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Transfer 1 : (Note 1)
(1) Steel Casting & Forgingf Factory
(2) Iron Casting & Forging Factory
(3) N o .1 Rolling Steel Factory
iron & steel products 
supply to (4), (5) , (6)
(7) , (8) , (9) & (10)
Transfer 2 : (Note 2)
(4) Metallurgical Framework Factory ) supply to (5) - (10) below
Transfer 3 : (Note 3)
(5) No.l Metallurgical Equipment Factory
(6) No.2 Metallurgical Equipment Factory
(7) No.3 Metallurgical Equipment Factory
external sales 
directly or via 
tertiary enterprises
Transfer 4 : (Note 4)
(8) Special Transformer Factory
(9) Electrical Appliance Factory
(10) Mechanical Appliance Factory
same as (5), (6), (7) selling
in batch directly or via the 
tertiary enterprises
Transfer 5 : (Note 5)
(11) Wooden Mould Factory } supply moulds for (1) - (10) above
Transfer 6 : (Note 6)
(12) Electricity, Water, Gas Supplies 
Factory
supply to 
factories
all the above 
and (13) & (14
Transfer 7 : (Note 7)
(13) 12 Tertiary Enterprises (see section 2)
(14) 7 Administrative Division (see section 2)
Notes :
(1) The processed iron and steel products of these 3 factories 
can either be transferred to the other factories for further 
processing or sell to the outside customers as intermediate 
products although there is an obligation and priority as 
suggested by the production planning division to satisfy the 
internal consumptions first.
The "market price" is used as the major reference for the 
supplying and receiving factories to determine the 
appropriate transfer prices which are usually predetermined 
in the "internal contracts" agreed on an annual basis or ad 
hoc basis. Of course, a certain percentage of discount in 
terms of administration and selling cost savings would be 
allowed for in order to motivate the users to buy 
internally. The unsettled arguements in transfer price, 
quantity and timing will be arbitrated by the headquarters 
i.e. production planning division or the general manager.
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(2) The raw materials for manufacturing the frameworks come from 
the internal produced iron and steel, and also the external 
suppliers. The finished frameworks will be mainly- 
transferred to the equipment and appliance manufacturing 
factories as components. Some frameworks are tailor-made 
for the external customers as well. The determination of 
transfer prices and quantities are the same as described in 
note (1) above.
(3) The 3 metallurgical equipment factories are manufacturing 
tailor-made whole sets of equipment according to customer's 
specifications. They can either sell directly or through 
the sales department (i.e. contract value over RMB10 
million) or trading tertiary enterprises as listed in 
section 2 above.
(4) The transformers and appliances are produced in batches and 
sell directly to end-users or via the trading tertiary 
enterprises as described in note (3) above.
(5) The majority of moulds produced are supplied to the other 
production factories according to their designs and 
specifications. Occassionally, sub-contract works are 
obtained from outside customers. The transfer prices may 
either be determined by using standard cost plus profit 
margin or referring to market price if there are competable 
or similar products available.
(6) Electricity, water and gas are supplied to all the 
p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r i e s ,  t e r t i a r y  e n t e r p r i s e s  a n d  
administrative divisions as arms-length transactions. 
Standard cost plus profit margin is employed to predetermine 
the transfer prices by the headquarters at the beginning of 
the year and changes may be made if inflation during the 
year is significant.
(7) The 12 tertiary enterprises are treated as profit centres as 
the 12 production factories and measured by "internal 
profit" as specified in the IRCs. The products supplied or 
services rendered involve the transfer prices which are 
predetermined in the "internal contracts" as agreed or 
compromised at the outset. Sometimes, arbitration from the 
headquarters is required.
(8) Although the 12 administrative divisions (headquarters) are 
treated as expense centres, however, they are considering to 
convert themselves into semi-profit centres and charge their 
services provided to the other internal units through the 
"internal contract" mechanism.
The above internal product and service transfers system has been
implemented since 1993 bearing the following objectives in mind :
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(1) to allow more autonomy to all the factories, enterprises and 
divisions (business units) to negotiate and compromise among 
themselves and minimize the interference from the top 
mangement or headquarters as far as possible;
(2) to convert most of the business units into profit centres to 
motivate their income generating and cost control conscience 
so that economic efficiency can be enhanced for the 
enterprise as a whole; and
(3) to induce the business units to provide quality products or
services to both the internal and external end-users.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
f
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Shanghai 
Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) has three distinct 
levels of management hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (general manager, divisional managers,
chief accountant and chief engineer)
(2) Middle Management (factory managers and department heads)
(3) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The divisional and factory managers can decide on their own 
organisational structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (production 
lines or sections) . They are also responsible for certain 
personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, 
evaluation and remuneration (distribution of bonus). But 
termination of emploment with any staff is a difficult task which 
will be explained in the rewards and incentives section.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the factories and divisions are by 
using annual plans and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, 
the most important measurement criteria are internal profit and 
production efficiency and cost control set in the IRCs, although 
some other qualitative targets, such as quality and safety, are 
employed. However, these are subsidiary ones which have lower 
weightings in calculating the group wages and bonus.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of SMEF.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) sets 
similar objectives for its production factories : factory
managers must meet their agreed IRC targets for the year and 
expect improvement in performance year after year as emphasized 
by the corporation and bureau in terms of growth rates. The 
critical occasion, therefore, is the annual planning review.
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In view of the market economy and macro-economic control policies 
promulgated by the government, and the keen competition within 
this industry, the production factories sometimes feel passive in 
setting their objectives or targets in the annual plans or IRCs 
because their activities are depending on the sales demands and 
the derived production mixes and volumes.
A high pressure to achieve the planned production quantity and 
efficiency is put on the factory managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group wages and 
bonus are tied in with the annual plans or IRCs and it also 
depends on the overall performance of the enterprise as a whole. 
Apart from the production factories, the other divisions or 
tertiary enterprises may have ad hoc or project based IRCs in 
which they have agreed specific objectives or targets with the 
factory general manager. The promotion, salary and bonus of 
these functional staff are correlated with these quantitative and 
non-financial targets.
In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) regards 
that it is essential to catch variances from annual plan or IRC 
before they have gone too far. To this end the top management 
monitor each factory or department results on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. The quarterly reporting is the formal 
assessment of performance and determination of quarterly group 
bonus. The following is the second quarterly report of the Steel 
Casting & Forging Production Factory in 1994 (April to June) :
(A) Format (column numbers and descriptions, one line for each
target) :
(1) Target description* [max. 15 targets see (B) below]
(2) Measurement unit
(3) Annual target
(4) Month 1 target
(5) Month 2 target
(6) Month 3 target
(7) Quarterly target (4+5+6)
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(8) Year-to-date target
(9) Month 1 actual ?
(10) Month 2 actual
(11) Month 3 actual
(12) Quarterly actual (9+10+11)
(13) Year-to-date actual
(14) Completion % (12/7*100%)
(15) Completed (tick if yes)
(16) Not-Completed (tick if no)
(17) Marks added (if completed) and deducted (if not-completed)
(18) Base marks
(19) Actual score# (17+18)
(20) Remarks
(B) Target Descriptions* (Re Al) Measurement Unit (Re A2
(Bl) Electro-furnace steel tonne
(B2) Casting steel tonne
(B3) Rolling steel tonne
(B4) Output value cost value in RMB
(B5) General products completion rate percentage
(B6) Special products completion rate percentage
(B7) Extra . products completion rate percentage
(B8) Inventory % output value percentage
(B9) Cost reduction rate percentage
(B10) Furnace material cost cost per tonne output
(Bll) Electricity consumption 
(total allowed)
KWH per tonne output
(B12) Electricity consumption 
(per actual output)
KWH per tonne output
(B13) Metal consumption Kg per tonne output
(B14) Other material consumption Kg per tonne output
(B15) Input/output ratio percentage
(C) Bonus Calculation :
(Cl) Total marks scored# (sum of A19 column) = 142.91
(C2) Bonus per 100 marks per employee per month = RMB40
(C3) Budgeted headcount for the quarter = 894
(C4) Quality management score for the quarter = 0.936
(C5) General management score for the quarter = 0.978
(C6) Total group bonus for the quarter = Cl/l00*3*C2*C3*C4*C5 
= 142.91/100*3*40*894*0.936*0.978 = RMB140/345
(C7) Security expenses contribution = RMB1 per employee
(C8) Environment expenses contribution = RMB1 per employee
(C9) Civilisation & discipline penalties & other deduction
(CIO) Net group bonus for the quarter = C6-C7-C8-C9
= RMB14 0,345 - RMB1*894 - RMB1*894 - RMB500 = RMB138,057
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The monthly report format is unique for each factory such as the 
above one for a production* factory. The contents are mainly 
corresponding with the annual plan from which all the targets 
stipulated in the IRC can be extracted from this report. The 
monthly and quarterly actuals are compared with the targets. The 
qualitative targets are usually subjectively measured by the 
factory managers and enterprise management office and written in 
the monthly reports as well. Any significant variances (without 
specifying tolerance limits) will be highlighted in order to 
bring the attention to the top management. Then all the monthly 
reports are submitted to the factory general manager for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
factory general manager will contact with the respective 
divisional managers and factory managers to dig out the 
underlying reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the top management with the middle 
management, the factory general manager will put forward the 
monthly results for open discussion. The divisional and factory 
managers may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances. Consistent failure (say over 12 months) in meeting 
the targets which are controllable by a factory manager, probably 
he will be replaced by somebody else. On the other hand, the 
favourable results will be openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the personnel division for calculating the group 
wages and bonus of each factory or division for last month. Then 
the accounting division will process the bonus payments at the 
end of the month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by one 
month).
The importance of computerization has been recognised by the top 
management and some stand-alone personal computers have been 
purchased and used for inventory control, sales analysis, 
payroll, financial reporting and analysis. However, production 
planning and control have not been computerized because it is 
believed by doing so some redundant staff will be laid off. In 
1995, SMEF will invest RMB1 million to set up a computer centre 
and instal a mini - computer trying to integrate all the 
sub-systems. However, the computing staff may not understand the 
operations and requirements of other workshops and department, 
and vice versa, the other personnel may not understand the 
functions and constraints of the computer. Therefore, SMEF is 
planning to undertake intensive training for both computing and 
management staff in order to enhance their cooperation and to 
implement a comprehensive MIS via the establishment of LANS.
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Now, SMEF views the annual plan or IRC as a contract between the 
top management and the factory or division. The monitoring 
process is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from plan.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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6 . 4  Rewards  and  I n c e n t i v e s
[
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE1s employees.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
will cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives. Another way to reduce redundant employees is to 
enforce early retirement at the age of 45.
Since September 1993, SMEF has implemented this "Employment 
Contract System" and signed contracts with every individual 
employee. In addition, SMEF has signed "In-Post Contracts" with 
most of the employees on an annual basis. This contract 
signifies that an employee is qualified for that specific post 
and he or she is eligible to receive wages (according to grade in 
the pay-scale), allowances and bonus. Without such a contract, 
that employee is out of job but he or she is still an employee of 
SMEF and is allowed to received a basic monthly subsidy of about 
RMB300 or transfer to the tertiary enterprises their employees. 
At the end of 1994, SMEF had 500 employees who did not have the 
in-post contracts. Before entering into the in-post contract, 
each employee should be assessed through written examination, 
practical test or skill training. The new system has imposed 
pressure onto the employees who are motivated to work hard on the 
job and enhance their technical and academic skills through 
internal and external education and training. All in all, both
the quality of the enterprise itself and the employees themselves
would be improved.
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the SMEF is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration. The average annual gross wages per employee was
around RMB7,500 in 1993 and RMB10,000 in 1994.
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Under the current high inflation rate (overall average 21.7% in 
China in 1994), SMEF is expected to increase the average annual 
gross wages to RMB12,500 in 1995. The total wages include basic 
wages, in-post wages, skill wages, bonus and allowances composed 
in the following ratios :
Basic wages 40% - 201
In-post wages 30% - 401
Bonus 20% - 25!
Allowances 10% - 15!
Since the beginning of 1993, SMEF has implemented the "more work 
more pay" policy in the Electrical Furnace Section of the Steel 
Casting & Forging Factory. The group bonus was directly related 
to the output quantity according to predetermined standards. 
This trial run was proved very sucessful in terms of workers' 
motivation, cooperation and ambition. Soon, many other production 
factories and departments followed and extended the same 
evaluation and remuneration policy. For those jobs or posts 
which wages or bonus cannot be measured by output or piece-rate, 
SMEF is planning to use a "point - system" in 1995. The 
performance of each employee is evaluated and a total point or 
score is awarded, then this total is multiplied by the unit wages 
per point as predetermined to derive the wages and bonus to be 
payable (the allowances are calculated seperately).
The wages includes the basic wages and the in-post wages where 
the former is almost fixed according to the grade, such as,
General manager 
Divisional manager 
Chief accountant 
Unit chief 
Supervisor 
Worker/Clerk
RMB24 0 per month 
RMB220 per month 
RMB20 0 per month 
RMB180 per month 
RMB150 per month 
RMB13 0 per month
where the differences are small. The in-post wages depend on the 
technical skills required.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Labour Bureau of the Shanghai Government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating 
inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity. The 
second part is decided by the SMEF which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, hair-washing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowances" is about 
RMB115 to RMB140 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
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The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the workshops, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the factory general manager 
and a production manager will decide what level of group bonus 
will be given to the department. Of course, it is up to the 
factory manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or 
her subordinates according to invidual performance. The bonus is 
distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a 
certain percentage (10% - 20%) will be retained in a reserve in 
order to make up the low bonus obtained during the months with 
poor performance.
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System", if there is an 
overall outstanding or above target performance, the Bureau will 
award a lump sum of "special bonus" to the factory general 
manager at the end of the year. But under no circumstances, the 
remuneration package of the geneeral manager can be greater than
three times the total earnings of a department head (middle
management). If the annual profit before tax can achieve better 
than the planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to 
all the employees and distributed in a way very similar to the 
monthly bonus.
In relation to the social welfare, since 1993, SMEF has to
contribute 25.5% of the monthly gross payroll to the government 
for sharing the responsibilities of unemployment, retirement and 
medical allowances. In addition, SMEF has to provide about 14% 
of the monthly gross payroll for various employee's benefits such 
as building residential quarters. Furthermore, SMEF has to bear 
the pension and medical allowance for its 2,000 retired employees 
which is a rather heavy financial burden to the overhead
expenditures.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SMEF believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary f
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General 
Factory (SMEF) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Review Process* High
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and 
Campbell.
control influences 
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used by Goold &
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\/
[Post-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment General Factory (SMEF) before 
and after 1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility 
Accounting Style" has been shifting gradually from "Financial 
Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) 
although it has not yet reached a strong-form (low corporate) of 
financial control style as described by Goold's and Campbell's 
Strategic Style. It seems to be in the "middle of the road" 
between this two styles.
Revised :• 19 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 22 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
December 1993 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ultimate aim is to classify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE 
Staff Interviewed
Dates of Visits
Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2)
Miss Zhou Wei Min 
(No. of years in this enterprise
First Visit - 10 September 1993
Second Visit - 12 September 1994
Third Visit - 8 February 1995
15 years)
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
Shanghai N o . 2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) was established in 1914 just 
three years after the Last Emperor, Pu Yi, stepped down from his 
throne. The two major categories of product are yarn and cloth 
of which the former products are the input materials for the 
latter products. The quality or grade of yarn is measured in 
terms of numbers of count which means the higher the count, the 
more refined the product. In 1994, the average count of all the 
yarn products manufactured in China was about 30, whereas SCM2's 
average count achieved 42 in 1993 already. For example, the 
monthly yarn production of N o .3 Spinning Factory in 1994 was 300 
tonnes in which over 70% of the produce is over 60 count. The 
highest count of yarn product achieved by SCM2 is 120.
Shanghai N o . 2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) is an ambitious and creative 
shareholding enterprise making significant progress since the 
economic reforms started in 1978. Under the economic reforms, 
open-door policies and operation mechanism transformation, SCM2 
insists the strategic theme of "textile is the mainstream 
business and diversification is the breakthrough venture". 
SCM21s long-term visions are to maintain textile manufacturing as 
the core business, enhance the product quality and increase 
export as the driving force, develop tertiary enterprises as the 
diversification strategy, and establish advanced management 
techniques as a modern enterprise.
Operating under the competitive market economy, SCM2 agressively 
adjust its product mix and organisation structure. To actualise 
the technology advancement as the first production strategy, 
since 1990s SCM2 has invested RMB50 millions in importing 75 
modern and advanced spinning and weaving machines in order to 
upgrade the product variety and quality. As a result, SCM2 was 
qualified as the "high count kingdom" (means high grade products) 
by the mayor of Shanghai in January 1994. SCM2 is developing 75 
new high grade products and trying to explore the overseas 
markets.
Subsidiary to the main business of textile, SCM2 has reserved
20,000 square metres of land space for establishing various 
"tertiary enterprises" including commercial office block, 
securities trading company, storage and transportation service, 
beverage wholesales market, food and oil future market, motel, 
restaurants and amusement centre which are expected to bring in 
RMB10 million before the end of 2000.
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The competitive edge of SCM2 is offering high count and high 
density (quality measurement of cloth) yarn and cloth to sustain 
the market share. Furthermore, SCM2 had been the first cotton 
mill in China to use the advanced combing machine (for aligning 
the cotton fabric) imported from the USA during the 1950s, to 
manufacture a protective yarn during the 1970s, to produce a coal 
gas polished yarn of 80-100 count for weaving into T-shirts 
exporting to the USA during the 1980s, and to invent a purely 
cotton made rain-coat selling domestically during the 1990s. 
These new and high technology products had won many prizes 
awarded by the municipal and central government authorities.
Before the oil-shortage crisis in 1993, SCM2 had produced 
cotton-synthetic (a by-product of crude oil) cloth and supplied 
to a large clothing factory for manufacturing the "Smart" shirt 
which is a famous brand name in Hong Kong as well. In addition, 
SCM2 started to produce and supply low-price yarn (6-10 count) 
for other weaving factories to manufacture denim (jeans) in 1993. 
This low-price yarn used cheaper cotton (raw material) costing
RMB10,000 per tonne compared with those high count (80-120) using 
cotton costing RMB40,000 per tonne. However, this low-count yarn 
could generate good profit because the production cycle of this 
low-count was shorter and output volume was greater. In the same 
year, SCM2 produced high-count (80-100) cotton cloth and supplied 
to a large clothing factory for manufacturing a delux gentleman 
shirt with the brand name called "Seashell".
SCM2 supplies 92% of its yarn and cloth to other textile and 
clothing industries for further processing and exporting the 
final products overseas. Only 3% of SCM2's products (mixture of 
cotton and linen cloth) exported directly (i.e. Australia) and 
the other 5% are sold domestically. The production and sales 
ratio of SCM2 have been maintained at 1:0.95. Unlike the last 
few decades, the demands of textile products, in particular the 
old cotton mills such as SCM2, in China have been declining since 
the early 1990s due to the following reasons:
(1) The production plants and equipment are rather out-dated
such as before 1994, SCM2 were still using very old machines 
manufactured in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Productivity, 
efficiency and quality of these retiring machines are low 
compared with the other developed countries like the USA, 
Japan and Europe or even the many newly developed 
small-sized cotton mills located in small towns and cities 
all around China which have the ability to imported advanced 
equipment and machines from overseas.
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(2) Lacking of capital, either coming from retained earnings or 
bank loans, makes the large- and medium-sized and 
long-established cotton mills (there are 30 cotton mills in 
Shanghai) unable to rennovate their out-dated plants and 
equipment. Therefore, they can mainly manufacture lower 
quality or class of products and only a small portion of 
them belong to the higher counts for futher processing into 
high quality products such as the shirts and T-shirts with 
famous brand names as mentioned above.
(3) The surging of too many small-sized township cotton mills 
increases the total supply in excess of the total demand. 
Under this unfavourable situation, the old cotton mills 
including SCM2 can hardly compete with them in terms of 
price and quality.
(4) In the 1980s, SCM2 has entered into joint-ventures in terms
of associated enterprise mode with two old cotton mills in 
Shandong and Jingsu provinces (major raw cotton producing 
places in China). SCM2 has invested capital, equipment and 
technology into these two enterprises in order to revive 
their deteriorating performance. This kind of assistant 
programme as imposed by the government has diverted the 
resources of SCM2 from own development purposes.
In spite of the above difficulties, SCM2 obtained RMB29.65 
millions of 5-year bank loan in 1990, half of which was used to 
import 48 mordern weaving machines from Japan, 2 coal-gas 
polished spinning machines from Germany, and the other half was 
used to rennovate the production building and facilities. In the 
bank loan application proposal, it had estimated these new 
production facilities and machines could increase profit by
RMB500,000 per month or RMB6 millions per year to repay the 
5-year bank loan. However, due to some internal and external 
factors, this profit target has not been achieved and the 
outstanding balance of this bank loan was RMB25 millions at the 
end of 1994.
The following are some factors hindering the market development 
of SCM21s own products and then the derived product (i.e. cloth):
(1) the quality of the final products manufactured by the 
clothing industrial customers cannot attain international 
standards and compete with overseas competitors although the 
cloth produced by SCM2 is among the top three in Shanghai;
(2) many small- and medium-sized cotton mills in other
developing cities and economic zones are enjoying some
favourable policies, such as low import and export taxes, 
given by the municipal government so that they are very cost 
competitive;
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(3) therefore, SCM2 product selling prices may not be competable 
with the younger and smaller brothers and sisters in this 
industry; and
(4) furthermore, the local governments of these districts do not 
allow buying in the textile products from the other 
provinces or cities (local trade protectionism) , and as a 
result over 90% of SCM21s products are selling locally in 
Shanghai.
Depsite of the above unfavourable conditions, the goodwill of 
SCM2 has been well established mainly due to its quality 
products, high technology and good management. It is ranked 
within the top three cotton mills in Shanghai.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Shanghai No. 2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) has been a wholly state-owned 
enterprise since 1950 and under the administration of the 
Shanghai Textile Bureau (a branch of the Ministry of Textile in 
Beijing). All the cotton mills and related industries such as 
textile machines manufacturing are under the umbrella of the 
Shanghai Textile Bureau. Since the textile industrial 
restructuring in early 1990s, many cotton mills have been grouped 
under three large corporations in Shanghai. One of these three 
large textile corporations is Xin Da Corporation which has the 
following subsidiaries :
(1) Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill
(2) Shanghai No.6 Weaving Factory
(3) Shanghai Industrial Cloth Factory
(4) Xin Da Real Estate Development Company
(5) 10 Trading/Import and Export Companies
(6) Representative Offices in the USA, Australia and Macau
In 1991, Xin Da Corporation was registered in Pudong (Eastern 
Shanghai) which is a special economic development zone enjoying 
many favourable policies granted by the municipal government, 
such as income tax of 15% for shareholding enterprises compared 
with the 33% of the counterparts registered in old Western 
Shanghai city. In May 1992, Xin Da Corporation was transformed 
into a shareholding entity by issuing shares to the governement 
(63%), other enterprises (27%) and other individuals (10%) 
including employees working for Xin Da Corporation (i.e. SCM2's 
employees) . The shares owned by the individuals, at an issue 
price of RMB3 per share, were listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange at the same time. Therefore, SCM2 is a 100% shareholding 
subsidiary of Xin Da Corporation.
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The major role played by Xin Da Corporation is to supervise the 
financial performance and appoint the top management such as 
general manager and party leader (rectified by the Shanghai 
Textile Bureau) of each subsidiary. Another important function of 
the corporation is to raising capitals for the approved projects 
or investments initiated by the subsidiaries. Despite the latter 
fact, SCM2 has the autonomy to obtain bank loan independently.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all the planning and control systems of the 
state-owned enterprises. Therefore, SMC2 acted just as a vehicle 
(or cost centre) to carry out the activities according to the 
commands directed from the Shanghai Textile Bureau. Since the 
economic reform started in 1979, instead of dictatorship from the 
bureau, SCM2 has been involved in the 5-year long range plan even 
though SCM2 for most of the time had to take the directives from 
and give in their negotiations to the authority.
Since the promulgation of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations" by the People's Congress in July 
1992, the Shanghai Textile Bureau has fully delegated the 
management autonomy to Xin Da Corporation which in term has given 
almost full authority to SCM2 to manage its own business such as 
the short-term planning and operation like purchasing, production 
and sales.
The fixed assets of SCM2 were revaluated in 1989 and 1992. The 
first time was done by the State Assets Administration Bureau in 
order to ascertain the current values of government1s investment 
in SCM2, whereas the second time was initiated by SCM2 when it 
was transformed into a shareholding enterprise.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Since SCM2 is a shareholding enterprise, it has a Board of 
Directors constituted by the following 11 members :
Chairman - Chairman of Xin Da Corporation
Vice-Chariman - General Manager of SCM2
Directors - 3 representatives from other enterprises
holding shares of Xin Da
1 representative from Shanghai Textile Bureau
1 representative from Communist Party Office
1 representative from Labour Union
Chief Accountant of Xin Da Corporation
Deputy-General Manager (Production) of SCM2 
Deputy-General Manager (Operation) of SCM2
448
According to the Company Law implemented in January 1994, SCM2 
has established a Supervision Committee overseeing the planning 
and control policies made by the Board of Directors, and also to 
ensure they are in compliance with laws and regulations. The 
Supervision Committee includes the following 7 members :
Chairman - Party Leader of SCM2
Members - 3 representatives from other enterprises
holding shares of Xin Da
1 representative from Shanghai Textile Bureau 
1 representative from Labour Union 
Chief Accountant of Xin Da Corporation
Obviously there are some overlapping of personnel between the 
Board of Directors and Supervision Committee and they are playing 
dual roles in policy making and control. As a result, it seems 
that the supervision committee is just like a formality and 
always agrees with the plans and policies determined by the board 
of directors. There have not been any significant arguments and 
discrepancies between the two reports submitted by the committee 
and the board to the annual general meeting of shareholders held 
in May each year. Many legislators, officials, academics and 
managers have suggested to leave the supervisory role of 
shareholding enterprises to the auditors of the Government Audit 
Bureau and the CPA firms as well as the other authorities such as 
the Finance Bureau and Tax Bureau.
Under the Factory General Manager, who has an Enterprise 
Management Office, the organisation structure of SCM2 is listed 
as follow :
1. Production Department (headed by a Deputy-General Manager)
1.1 No.l Spinning Factory*
1.2 No.2 Spinning Factory*
1.3 No.3 Spinning Factory*
1.4 Weaving Factory*
1.5 Production Support Factory (supplying electricity, gas, 
wager, consumables, spares, tools etc.)**
1.6 Technical Support Section (headed by Chief Engineer)
1.7 Production Planning Section (headed by Chief Engineer)
1.8 Production Facilities Section
1.9 Quality Control Section
2. Operation Department (headed by a Deputy-General Manager)
2.2 Purchasing Section
2.3 Sales Section
3. Organisation & Personnel Department®
3.1 Personnel Section
3.2 Manpower & Wages Section
3.3 Organisation & Discipline Section
3.4 Education & Training Section
4 4 9
4. Safety & Security Department®
4.1 Safety Section
4.2 Security Section
@ headed by the same Depduty-General Manager
5. Accounting & Finance Department (headed by Chief Accountant)
5.1 Accounting & Finance Section @@
5.2 Internal Audit Section
6. Promotion Department (headed by the Party Leader)
6.1 Promotion Section
6.2 Party Office
7. Labour Union Office
8. Third Enterprises# (headed by a Deputy-General Manager)
(see section 5.4 below)
* All the production factories have a factory manager, a 
deputy factory manager, section supervisors and group 
leaders. Each factory is responsible for its own repair and 
maintenance work.
** All the production factories and tertiary enterprises are 
treated as profit centres. But the production support 
factory is a cost centre and allocates its operating costs 
to the other production factories or departments according 
to actual usages.
*** All the p r o d u c t i o n  factories have signed Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the General Manager on 
an annual basis. For the details, please refer to section
5.6 below.
@@ In addition to the 21 staff in the accounting and finance 
department in the headquarters, there is one accounting 
staff in each production factory and tertiary enterprises 
reporting to both the unit manager and chief accountant.
# The third enterprises are independent profit centres having 
their own management teams and bank accounts, and they have 
signed IRCs with the General Manager on an annual basis.
SCM2 had a total of 4,860 working employees (10% are 
administrative staff) and 5,200 retired employees (annual pension 
RMB14 millions) at the end of 1994. It is classified as a 
"medium-sized SOE" in China. About 350 of the working employees 
are involved in the "tertiary enterprises" (established since 
mid-1993) as described in section 5.6 below.
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On the other hand, 350 redundant employees have stopped their 
jobs or posts and received fabout RMB300 basic wages per month. 
All the employees have signed "employment contracts" since 1993 
with duration from one year to no limit leaving an optional right 
to the employees.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets 
Turnover
Income before tax**
Income tax rate
RMB 4 0M (1994)
RMB 180M (1992)
RMB 2 0 0M (1993)
RMB 18 0M@ (1994)
RMB 2 0 0M@ (1995 forecast)
RMB 7 . 0M (1992) - 3 . 9 % of sales
RMB 4 . 0M (1993) - 2.0%* of sales
RMB 5 . 1M# (1994) - 2.8% of sales
RMB 4.0M##(1995) - 2.0% of sales
55% (before 1992)
15% (from 1992)###
@ Including sales of tertiary enterprises.
* The low profit margin was mainly because of a fire occured in 
May 1993 and N o .1 Spinning Factory was burnt down lossing RMB4 
millions of assets after claiming insurance. In addition, selling 
prices or quotations have to be reduced in order to bid the 
orders. Furthermore, inflation and heavy payroll and benefits in 
kind (including retired employees) increased the total 
expenditures or fixed overheads. The purchase prices of raw 
materials(i .e . cotton) have been increased from RMB11,000 per 
tonne in 1993 to RMB18,000 per tonne in 1994 (or 64% increase) 
due to reduction of domestic production. The farmers do not have 
the incentive to grow cotton because of low selling prices set by 
the government and high inflation of input materials like 
fertilisers. The domestic produced cotton is centrally purchased 
and distributed by the Ministry of Textile (and also the 
corporations under its umbrella), Ministry of Commerce and 
Ministry of Agriculture at predetermined pricds. In view of 
domestic short supply, 45% of the cotton demand was imported from 
foreign countries in 1994. SCM2 is importing overseas cotton via 
the import and export right of its holding Xin Da Corporation.
** Income before tax has deducted the value added tax already 
which is 17% on sales but only 13% on cotton purchased can be 
deducted according to the new taxation system implemented in 
January .1994. As a result, the VAT paid in 1994 was RMB10 
millions (6% of turnover) which is RMB500,000 higher than the 
previous known sales tax in 1993.
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# The tertiary enterprises generated RMB2 millions of profit 
before tax in 1994 which achieved only 40% of the budget. The 
target for 1995 will be RMB2.5 millions of profit before tax.
## To support a few capital projects started in 1990, SCM2 
obtained a RMB29 millions 5-year bank loan and interest payment 
of RMB3 millions has been capitalized into the work-in-progress. 
Since all the projects were completed in 1994, both the interest 
of outstanding loan (RMB25 millions) and the depreciation of a 
total RMB4 .5 millions has to be charged to profit and loss as 
from 1995. Therefore, the potential profit level of RMB8.5 
millions (including RMB2.5 millions coming from the tertiary 
enterprises) will be reduced to RMB4 millions in 1995.
### All the profit before tax belongs to the Xin Da Corporation 
which is registrated in Pudong (Eastern Shanghai) and subject to 
15% of income tax rate in this economic development zone.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
The Shanghai N o . 2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) entered into the first 
five-year Economic Responsibility Contract with the Shanghai 
Textile Bureau and the Shanghai Finance Bureau (representing the 
Shanghai municipal government) in 1988. The major financial 
target set in this ERC was based on the target income tax which 
was 55% of net profit. The target income tax (base) in the first 
year (1988) was agreed at RMB5 millions with a 2% annual growth 
in the subsequent years. SCM2 exceeded the target income tax 
every year until 1992. In addition, the annual total gross wages 
was linked up with this financial target as well. The ERC was 
ceased in 1993 after SCM2 had been tranformed into a shareholding 
enterprise and subject to a preferential income tax rate of 15%.
In general, the labour efficiency and productivity have been 
increase after shareholding conversion compared with the ERC 
system because without good profit there would be no handsome 
dividends distributed and the share maket price would be affected 
as well. However, under the ERC system, once the target profit 
has been achieved, the predetermined wages, bonuses and 
benefits-in-kind will be awarded plus other favourable terms like 
bank loan repayment could be tax deductable. Therefore, all the 
personnel in SCM2 have been facing higher pressure and challange 
to enhance the overall economic efficiency year after year.
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m  f
5 . 1  O r g a n i s a t i o n  S t r u c t u r e
The holding company of Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) , Xin Da 
Corporation has delegated full autonomy to SCM2 in managing its 
own organisation structure except appointing the general manager 
and the party leader. The organisation structure of SCM2 was 
consolidated from over 20 departments into 6 major departments in 
1992 when coverting into a shareholding enterprise. Since then 
the number of employees has been reduced from over 5,500 to 4,860 
at the end of 1994.
The board of directors is mainly a policy making body while the 
operational funtions have been delegated to the top management 
who in turn has been decentralizing more planning responsibility 
to each production factory and department such as participation 
in formulating the annual plan and the internal responsibility 
contract. The production and cost control responsibility 
primarily lies with the production manager but the top management 
keep a surveillance quantity and quality control on each 
production factory through monthly or weekly report.
The selection and appointment of the top management (i.e. general 
manager and party leader) is still decided by the Xin Da 
Corporation and endorsed by the Shanghai Textile Bureau, and a 
"Factory Manager Responsibility System" is in force. This system 
adopts the previous Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a 
basis to evaluate the performance of the general manager. If an 
outstanding or above target performance has been achieved, the 
general manager will be awarded a predetermined lump sum bonus at 
the year end.
Since 1992, the general manager has the autonomy to appoint the 
senior staff such as the production managers and department 
heads. Any major changes of the organisation structure in each 
unit should be initiated by the deputy-general managers and 
approved by the general manager. • However, more autonomy of 
internal management and operation has been delegated to the 
deputy-general and factory managers since 1992. And in turn, the 
deputy-general and factory managers have involved their workshop 
supervisors and section heads more in planning, control and 
decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix.1.)
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In summary, SCM2 has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual deputy-general and department managers are reporting 
directly to the general manager, and they play a linking and 
control role between the factories or departments and the general 
manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the conversion into a shareholding enterprise in May 1992, 
Shanghai No. 2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) has implemented a more formal 
planning process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plan or budget and the internal responsibility contracts 
(IRCs). In October, the general manager calls for a board meeting 
to discuss with the directors concerning the next year targets 
such as production output value, sales, profit, capital 
requirements and other important events. The board will also 
evaluate the internal and external environmental factors in order 
to determine whether the above targets are realistic or not. If 
there is any gap, then the general manager will negotiate with 
Xin Da Corporation until compromise can be reached. Based on 
these preliminary, targets, the general manager will assign them 
to the production managers and other department heads for them to 
formulate their own plans or budgets for the next year. Much 
emphasis is placed on the production value, internal profit and 
cost control which are the key criteria to be used as the 
m e a s u r e m e n t  y a r d s t i c k s  of t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  i n t e r n a l  
responsibility contracts.
At the end of November, all the factories and departments submit 
their initial plans to the Enterprise Management Office for 
consolidation before review and discussion by the general manager 
with the board of directors. If the overall predetermined 
targets cannot be met, the board will try to enforce and insist 
the factories and departments to revise their annual plans 
accordingly. Although back and forth iterative discussions are 
allowed in December, it does not leave much rooms for negotiation 
for the factory and department managers unless they can provide 
very strong evidence such as the deficiency in the production 
facilities. Eventually, the annual plans must be approved by the 
board of directors in January next year for implementation and 
reporting in the annual general meeting held in May.
The approved annual plans are broken down into quarterly and 
monthly plans to cater for demand, holiday and other factors. 
The annual plans are formally reviewed in July and adjustments on 
significant deviations are allowed to make after detail 
discussion and approval from the board of directors.
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fBefore 1992, the production managers and department heads did not 
participate this annual planning review process at all and the 
general manager, under the direction of the bureau, gave 
directions to the factories and departments on what should be 
done over the next 12 months within the context of a few key 
indicators e.g. sales, production volume and mix, quality 
improvement, material consumption, expense levels etc. Since 
1992, under the legislative changes and market economy promotion, 
the Shanghai Textile Bureau has delegated higher automomy to Xin 
Da Corporation and SCM2 in formulating its strategic directions. 
As a result, all the factories and departments are involved in 
the planning process but the key variables are still determined 
and controlled by the top management.
(Please refer to Q 5 .5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate" 
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
macro-eocnomic control (1994), operational mechanism (1993), 
economic effectiveness (1992), quality control (1991), economic 
responsibility contract (1990), etc.
As mentioned in the Introductory section at the very beginning, 
the Shanghai N o . 2 Cotton Mill has laid down the following 
strategic themes and thrusts since 1992 :
(1) Textile is the mainstream business.
(2) Production facilities should be rennovated to further 
enhance product quality.
(3) Expand the domestic market share and explore the overseas 
markets.
(4) Diversification is the breakthrough venture such as 
developing tertiary enterprises.
(5) Streamline the organisation structure and reduce the number
of employees.
(6) Sustain steady profit growth and maintain a resonable return 
to shareholders.
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(7) Employ advanced management techniques to achieve a modern 
enterprise system. {
The above strategic themes and thrusts are directed from the top 
management for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when 
they are performing their duties for the enterprise. SCM2 has 
been promulgating "Quality" as the most important strategic 
thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for the domestic 
market share on one hand and to explore the overseas markets on 
the other hand.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in SCM2 still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and review process 
such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, marketing strategy 
and production quantity and mix. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given some limited freedom to the factory managers 
and department heads to compile their own plans or budgets and to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they do not deviate 
much from the ultimate sales and profit targets.
The top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on monthly and quarterly basis and are quick 
to make suggestions if they do not match the overall long- and 
short-term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1. )
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the transformation of Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) into 
a state-owned enterprise in 1950, it has followed the national 
5-year's planning cycle and carried out the missions as assigned 
in every 5-year's plan directed by the municipal government under 
the central economic planning system. The commencement of the 
economic reforms in 1979 started to allowed SCM2 to participate 
in the 5-year's planning with the Shanghai Textile Bureau but 
specific directives and suggestions were always coming from the 
top by using the term "macroeconomics control and adjustment" as 
an excuse.
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fThe changing role of the Bureau and the formation of Xin Da 
Corporation since 1991 has encouraged SCM2, for the first time, 
to participate in the first long-term strategic plan (1991-1995) . 
However, many internal factors and uncertainties have affected 
the validity and reliability of this long-term plan which has 
been subject to review and changes every year. This year is the 
last year of the 5-year long-term plan, the board of directors is 
discussing with Xin Da Corporation and trying to formulate the 
next 5-year plan (1996-2000) although formal long-term planning 
is not required by the corporation nor the bureau.
The followings are the major long-term plans or projects 
envisaged by the Xin Da Corporation and SCM2 to be implemented in 
the next 5-year plan (1996-2 000) although some of them have been 
started during 1991-1995.
(A) Product Development
Significant changes in the textile industry have been 
occured in recent years under the transition from planned 
economy to market economy. Now SCM2 has to promote and sell 
its products in a highly competitive market. The goodwill 
of SCM2 has been well established mainly due to its quality 
products, high technology and good management. Taking this 
advantage, SCM2 has to bias its product mix to the higher 
end by manufacturing upper grades of yarn and cloth (higher 
counts and density) and selling to the clothing industry for 
producing final products of high quality. By aiming at the 
higher quality and price market segment, SCM2 will be able 
to sustain steady profit growth and maintain reasonable 
returns to the shareholders.
(B) Competitive Edge
SCM2 has been facing keen competition from many small- and 
medium-sized cotton mills in other developing cities and 
economic zones which are enjoying some favourable policies, 
such as low import and export taxes, given by the municipal 
governments so that they are very cost competitive and 
fliexible. To maintain at least the market share and 
competitive edge against these counterparts, SCM2 has to 
manufacture higher quality products but this strategy needs 
capital for reinvestment and rennovation in plant and 
machinery. It is unlikely to be successful to raise fresh 
capital through right issue or new issue in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange because it has been a bear market since the 
middle of 1994. Furthermore, the banks are reluctant to 
grant substantial loans to SCM2 in view of its mild profit 
level and the macro-economical control policies laid down by
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the central government since July 1993. Xin Da Corporation 
and SCM2 are negotiate hardly with the banks for capital 
loans.
(C) Joint Ventures'
The cost of production in the textile industry is getting 
higher and higher since 1990s mainly due to shortage in 
cotton grown in China and inflation on wages and other 
overheads. SCM2 is looking for joint-venture opportunities 
in other developing countries such as Russia, Vietnam, 
Philippines etc. However, sources of capital is the major 
hurdle to be overcome before entering into any foreign 
j oint-ventures.
(D) Market Development
To penetrate into the domestic market and capture higher 
market share, the sales personnel has been seggregated into 
geographic teams with different marketing strategies and 
tatics such as regular visits to the existing customers. 
The IRC signed with, the Sales Department links up the 
remuneration directly with the sales volume and the accounts 
receivable (or cash collected) in order to motivate the 
sales and marketing effort.
(E) Overseas Markets
SCM2 is making use of the trading subsidiaries and the 
import and export right of Xin Da Corporation to explore the 
overseas markets such as Southeast Asian, South America and 
Eastern European Countries.
(F) Tertiary Enterprises
Diversification is one of the strategic themes promulgated 
and implemented since July 1993 and one year after SCM2 1 s 
transformation into a shareholding enterprise. The following 
tertiary enterprises have been or will be established within 
the present premises and absorbed over 350 redundant 
employees from the textile business. They are all 
self-financed profit centres which are expected to generate 
surplus for SCM2.
(FI) Ao Men Business City
This is a 5,000 square metres business complex started 
operation in May 1994. The facilities include 62 motel 
rooms, 8 conference rooms, audio visual room, beauty 
and hair saloon, tennis court, air-conditioning, 
long-distance telephone, and fax, typing, printing, 
copying services provided in the business centre.
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(F2) Tai Xiang Yan Hotel
This is a 4,000 square metres hotel started business in 
September 1994. The facilities include 60 standard 
rooms, air-conditioning, long-distance telephone, 
restaurant, conference rooms and business centre.
(F3) Xin Da Restaurant
This restaurant occupies 1,000 square metres and 
employs over 70 staff. Other than serving meals to 
both SCM2's employees and outsiders, this restaurant 
also provides dancing hall, karaoke lounge, coffee 
house and meeting room to customers.
(F4) Shanghai Beverage Wholesale Market
This 7,000 square metres beverage wholesale market has 
invited over 400 manufacturers to display and sell 
their beverage products in large quantities to the 
retailers. Rental charges and commissions have to be 
paid to SCM2 on a monthly basis. Other facilities 
inside this market include 43 meeting rooms, a 1,500 
square metre storeroom, a 3 00 square metre canteen and 
50 sets of long-distance telephones. This wholesale 
market is a joint venture with the Shanghai Commercial 
Bureau and is the largest one of its kind in Shanghai.
(F5) Jianli Beverage Factory
A small beverage factory of 4 00 square metres has been 
established to process the packaging and delivery for 
the beverage manufacturers, and also supply to the 
beverage wholesale market.
(F6) Daily Necessity Wholesale Market
A total floor space of 1,000 square metres has been 
leased to a Taiwan trading company to establish a daily 
necessity wholesale market.
(F7) Grain & Oil Forward Market
A 1,000 square metres grain and oil forward market has 
been established and invited many manufacturers and 
wholesellers to display their products and transact 
with the retailers. This forward market will bring in 
rental charges and commissions.
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f(F8) X in y e  F u t u r e s  S a l e s  Company
This is a joint-venture with the Shanghai Flour Factory 
having a floor area of 400 square metres, 20 sets of 
personal computers, 14 meeting rooms and 1 large 
trading hall for transacting futures sales of various 
types of goods.
(F9) Security Trading Company
A total floor space of 300 square metres has been
leased to the Nanjing Transportation Bank to establish 
a security trading company. The annual rental charges 
is RMB700,000.
(F10) Banking Office
A total floor space of 400 square metres has been
leased to the Agricultural Bank to establish a branch.
The bank pays a cheaper rental charge because a reduced
loan interest rate is given to SCM2.
The budget (1994), actual (1994) and forecast (1995) profits 
of the above 10 tertiary enterprises are shown as follow :
Profit Level in RMB'000 
Budget Actual Forecast 
Enterprise (Notes) 1994 1994 1995
(1) Ao Men Business Centre (1) 500 200 300
(2) Tai Xiang Hotel (1) 500 100 200
(3) Xin Da Resturant (1) 800 200 200
(4) , Beverage Wholesale Market (2) 1, 000 400 500
(5) Jinli Beverage Factory (3) 200 100 100
(6) Daily Necessity Wholesale 
Market (4) 500 100 300
(7) Grain & Oil Forward Market (2) 400 200 200
(8) Xinye Futures Sales Company (2) 300 200 200
(9) Security Trading Company (5) 400 100 100
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(10) B a n k i n g  O f f i c e
f
Total annual profit
400 400 400
5,000 2,000 2,500
The 1994 total profit generated from the 10 tertiary
enterprises had been over-estimated due to the following 
reasons :
(1) The using or occupying rates were unsatisfactory 
because they were new facilities without adequate 
p r o m o t i o n  and the f i xed o v e r h e a d s  (including 
depreciation) were subject to high inflation.
(2) About 40%-60% of the counters were leased out and the 
running expenses were subject to high inflation.
(3) The operating capacity was 70% and the running expenses 
were subject to high inflation.
(4) The Taiwan trading company cancelled the leasing 
contract and only paid a compensation of RMB100,000.
(5) In order to obtain a future loan from the Nanjing
Transportation Bank, the rental charges was reduced by 
RMB200,000. The running expenses increased by
RMB100,000.
SCM2 is planning to form a "Motorcycle and Bicycle Wholesale 
Market" in 1996.
(G) Merger and Takeover
In May 1993, as suggested by the Shanghai Textile Bureau, 
SCM2 took over the 600 employees (including 300 retired) and 
the plant and equipment valued at RMB10 millions of the 
Shanghai No.36 Weaving Factory while the premises were left 
to the Shanghai Liberal Army Publication House. This merger 
did not bring into immediate benefits to SCM2 but did 
increase the payroll and pension. Depending on the 
municipal planning and policy, it is possible to have other 
such merger or takeover in the 9th 5-year plan (1996-2000) 
which is one of the solutions to solve the headache problems 
of thousands of ailing state-owned enterprises. This policy 
means to let the profitable enterprises to take up the
burden of the loss-making enterprises.
The current 5-year plan (1991-1995) was compiled after long 
discussion between the Bureau, Corporation and the SCM21s top 
management without much participation by the middle management 
who were playing a consultation role only. As far as the next
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5-year plan (1996-2000) is concerned, the Xin Da Corportion and 
SCM2 are trying to maintain and further develop the above 
long-term strategies.
The factory managers and department heads are mainly concerned 
with how the milestones set in the long-term plan will affect 
their next year budgets or internal responsibility contracts 
which will have tight financial surveillance coming from the 
general manager at least on a monthly basis. Therefore, the 
long-term planning and review process are using a top-down 
approach in the belief that the general manager and the holding 
corporation has better experience and knowledge of the external 
environment and even the internal operations of the factories 
and departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Shanghai Textile Bureau has devolved its central 
planning role to the Xin Da Corporation and in turn individual 
enterprises under the latter1s umbrella since 1992. Now, the top 
management of SMC2 is taking the initiative to formulate its own 
long-term plan but participation from the middle management is 
limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
The general short-term planning policy adopted by Shanghai No. 2 
Cotton Mill (SCM2) is "production determined by sales" and "sales 
determined by targeted profit before income tax" which means 
profit before income tax growth as agreed with the Xin Da 
Corporation is the initial driving force of all the activities. 
During the board meeting held in October, the directors will 
review and discuss the following four most important issues :
(1) present and future production and operation situations;
(2) current and future financial positions including capital, 
assets and liabilities mamagement;
(3) next year profit target agreed with Xin Da Corporation; and
(4) domestic and overseas market changes.
At the end of the day, the board lays down some guidelines and 
targets to the factory managers and department head to compile 
their individual annual plans or budgets. First of all, based on 
the production quantity and mix targets, the production factories 
draft their production plans and submit to the deputy-general 
manager (production) for consolidation and then send copies to 
the accounting and finance department for compiling financing 
plans (i.e. profit and loss, balance sheet, cash flow). At the 
mean time, the technical support and quality control sections 
also determine its production quality plans in order to ensure 
the production technology and facilities are capable to achieve 
the production plans.
In parallel, the wages and manpower section will ascertain the 
labour hours and total payroll required which are directly linked 
up with the sales, profit or production value growth rates. On 
the other hand, the tertiary enterprise managers figure out their 
income and expense budgets as well. Finally, all the pieces are 
consolidated and reviewed by the enterprise management office 
before submission to the next board meeting for consideration. 
The other steps in the annual planning or budgeting process are 
as described in section 5.2 (Review Process) above.
Since October 1992, the factory managers, department heads and 
tertiary enterprise managers have been involved in this planning 
process which they believe to be important in setting and 
negotiating the internal responsibility contracts with the 
general manager subsequently.
(The above annual planning or budgeting process is summarised in 
a flowchart as shown in Appendix 2.)
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In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the annual plan 
review period has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The 
general manager, deputy managers, factory managers, department 
heads and tertiary enterprise managers hold a formal meeting at 
the beginning of each month to review the financial performance 
against the annaul plans. Appropriate corrective actions may be 
taken to rectify any problems identified or deviations from the 
plan. Amendments or revisions are seldom made unless some 
significant uncontrollable factors are affecting the annual plan.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given SCM2 more freedom to plan ahead. The bureau and 
corporation have almost completely devolved the short-term 
planning autonomy to the board of SCM2, except to agree on the 
minimum targets as agreed at the beginning of every year. 
Nevertheless, the bureau and corporation can still influence the 
planning process by their representatives sitting in the board of 
directors. The top management have involved the middle management 
in the annual planning process which on one hand is a critical 
step in materializing the long-term strategic plan, and on the 
other hand, it is an important motivational factor for the 
factory managers, department heads and tertiary enterprise 
managers to manage their own businesses and to be rewarded 
accordingly.,
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) established its IRC system in 
1993 in order to motivate the efficiency, profitability and cost 
reduction in the production workshops.
The IRC of the "Production Factory" (standard format) is 
described below :
Department : Production Factory
Duration : 1 January to 31 December 1994
(A) Aims and Objectives :
1994 is a year of further economic reform and leading the 
enterprise into market economy. In order to achieve these aims, 
SCM2 has laid down the following four strategic themes :
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(1) to realise the management system's transformation;
(2) to emphasize both textile business and tertiary enterprises;
(3) to focus on economic efficiency; and
(4) to aim at increasing profit.
This IRC is formulated in accordance with the guidelines of these 
strategic themes.
(B) Targets :
(Bl) Total Output Quantity = XXXXX tonnes (or metres'000)
(B2) Share of Enterprise Management Expenses = RMBXXXX 
(based on 1993 actual central allocation)
Non-Operational Expenses = RMBXXXX (based on 1993 actual)
(B3) Internal Profit = Market Selling Price - Total Costs
= RMBXXXX
Internal Profit shared by Headquarters : Factory = Y% : Z% 
Excess Profit shared by Headquarters : Factory = M% : N% 
Actual Profit < Target Profit : Deduct 5% of Total Wages
(B4) Product Quality must achieve the predetermined enterprise 
standards and be all acceptable by the customers.
(B5) No serious safety accidents would be allowed.
(B6) Operation management should be enhanced gradually.
The performance of all the above targets (Bl) - (B6) are linked
up with the incentive scheme or the total remuneration which are 
defined separately. Two of which are :
(B7) If the above financial targets cannot be achieved, the 
surplus profits of previous years or future years can be 
used to calculate the total wages and bonus.
(B8) For every RMB1 in excess of the target profit, the total 
wages and bonus can be increased by RMB0.6.
(C) Rights of Factory Manager (Contractee)
(Cl) Employment, assignment, transfer and termination of factory 
employees.
(C2) Distribution of remuneration among the factory employees.
(C3) Managing the factory internal affairs.
(C4) Participating in the enterprise's operation.
(D) R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  Gen'eral Manager ( C o n t r a c t o r )
(Dl) To balance the resource allocations in the planning process 
of the whole enterprise.
(D2) To ensure the adequate supply of raw materials.
(D3) To coordinate with the service department to provide 
appropriate and adequate support.
(D4) To conduct performance evaluation in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of this contract and other enterprice's 
rules and regulations.
It takes a few months for the general manager, factory managers 
and tertiary enterprise managers to negotiate with the terms and 
conditions for their IRCs signed in parallel with the planning 
process started in October until final approval by the board 
meeting in next January. This long process indicates that the 
setting of IRC is not a top-down approach and the factory and 
tertiary enterprise managers are very eager on this issue upon 
which they will be measured against and rewarded thereupon. The 
IRCs are subject to at least quarterly review but adjustments 
can only be made if some factors affecting the achievement of 
targets significantly.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
factory managers, department heads and tertiary enterprise 
managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, and also 
involved the accounting and finance personnel intensively as a 
vetting mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as 
possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the control influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the factories, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Shanghai No. 2 Cotton Mill 
(SCM2) that need headquarter's intervention.
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As shown in the organisation structure (section 2 above), 60% and 
10% of the outputs (yarn) in No. 2 and No. 3 Spinning Factory are 
transferred to the Weaving Factory for manufacturing cloth. The 
"market price" is used as the major reference for the supplying 
and receiving factories to set the appropriate transfer prices 
which are usually predetermined monthly depending on the 
fluctuation of the yarn prices in the open market. The transfer 
quantities are also predetermined in the production plans which 
are broken down into monthly targets and reviewed or adjusted on 
a weekly basis.
Therefore, there is no much rooms for negotiation between the 
spinning and weaving departments in both transfer prices and 
quantities because the spinning factories do not have much 
autonomy to sell the intermediate products externally and it 
seems to be indifferent to sell internally or externally as long 
as the transfer prices are equal to the market prices. Even 
under the situation when the cost of production is higher than 
the market selling price, the production factories are compelled 
to improve production efficiency and reduct costs in order to 
maintain the internal profit targets as set down in the IRCs. 
All the yarn products in No.l Spinning Factory are sold via the 
sales department externally and it does not involve in the 
transfer pricing issue.
The Production Support Factory is providing electricity, gas, 
water, consumables, spares, tools etc. to the other production 
factories, service departments and tertiary enterprises. This 
supporting factory is treated as a cost centre and allocates its 
operating costs to the users according to actual usages. 
Therefore, it does not involve in the transfer prices but only 
some arguments in the transfer costs and quantities.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
Special Notes
In 1994, over 80% of the cotton mills in China were loss-making.
Some economic reforms since 1980s affecting the textile industry
are elaborated below.
(1) Many textile enterprises, especially the old ones, may not 
get used to the transformation of central planning system to 
the market economy environment partly because they have not 
possessed relevant and sufficient market information, and 
partly due to some internal factors (i.e. management 
reliance and reluctance to change) and external factors 
(i.e. inflation and bank credit control).
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(2) Too much emphasis has been put into "tertiary enterprises" 
as a means to settle down the redundant employees and to 
contribute small amounts of profits. Instead of creating 
wealth to the society, some of them such as trading 
companies and retailing shops may consume resources of the 
main business. The fast expansion of tertiary enterprises 
in SCM2 has not brought into very significant profit yet up 
to the end of 1994.
(3) Contrary to point (2) above, the government has not put 
enough investments into the "first enterprise" (i.e. 
farming, mining, fishing, etc.) and the "second enterprise" 
(i.e. manufacturing, electricity, transportation, housing, 
tele-communication, etc.). For examples, the reduction of 
cotton produces and lacking of capital or credit support are 
adversely affecting the developing of SCM2. Without good 
foundations in or insufficient supplies from the first and 
second enterprises, the general living standards of the 
people cannot be raised. As a result, the people's
purchasing power cannot affort to spend in the tertiary or 
third enterprises such as reastaurant, entertainment, 
retailing, taxi, security market, insurance, etc.
(4) Due to the factors described in (2) and (3) above, SCM2 
could only attain 7 millions tonnes of total output in 1994 
which was just 70% of the full capacity. Looking at the 
financial position, the current asset ratio at the end of 
1994 was dropped down to 0.82 : 1. The accounts payable was 
RMB40 millions, whereas the accounts receivable was RMB30 
millions in which a significant portion has been in
outstanding for more than a year. Furthermore, short-term 
or current bank loan reached RMB48 millions at the end of 
1994 and had to pay RMB5 millions interest per annum.
(5) As mentioned in the introductory section 1 above, SCM2 has 
been facing very keen competition from those small- and 
medium-sized cotton mills established in the towns and 
villages. They can obtain more and cheaper cotton because
their locations are closer to cotton farms. In addition,
their wages and other expenses are lower than their 
counterparts in the big cities like Shanghai. Furthermore, 
they can easily accumulate and obtain capital funds to 
rennovate their production facilities which can enhance 
their flexibility and adaptability to the fast changing 
market enconomy.
The following are some ways suggested by SCM2 to revive the
prosperity of the textile industry in China.
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(1) The government and bank should provide lenient sources of 
capital to rennovate the production facilities and 
technologies in order to enhance the product quality and 
competition in the market.
(2) The increase of total textile output should be controlled,
whereas, the export of high quality products should be 
increased to create better profit and foreign exchange.
(3) The economic responsibility contract and taxation system 
(i.e. value-added and income taxes) should allow some 
favourable terms for the textile industry to retain more 
earnings for working capital.
(4) The government should increase the investments and policy
support into the cotton farming in order to expand the 
output and reduce the price.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Shanghai No.2 
Cotton Mill (SCM2) has four distinct levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Board of Directors (including members of supervisory
committee)
(1) Top Management (general manager, deputy-general managers)
(2) Middle Management (factory managers, department heads, chief
accountant, chief engineer, tertiary 
enterprise managers)
(3) Lower Management (foremen, supervisors, section heads)
As mentioned before in section 2 and section 5.1 above, the board 
of directors has delegated the daily operation and management to 
the top management of SCM2 except if there is any sudden and 
important issues to be interferred or decided by the board. 
Since five out of the eleven board members are management staff 
or employees of SCM2 itself, the line between ownership and 
management is not very clear-cut and it seems that the board 
still has some sort of control over the operation side of the 
whole enterprise.
The deputy-general managers, factory managers and tertiary 
enterprise managers can decide on their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units (production lines or 
sections). They are also responsible for certain personnel 
functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation 
and remuneration (distribution of bonus). But termination of 
employment with any staff is a difficult task which will be 
explained in the rewards and incentives section.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the factories and departments are by 
using annual plans and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, 
the most important measurement criteria are internal profit, 
production efficiency and cost control set in the IRCs, although 
some other qualitative targets, such as quality and safety, are 
employed. However, these are subsidiary ones which have lower 
weightings in calculating the group wages and bonus. Obviously, 
financial objectives are the major factors in the control 
mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of SCM2.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 6 . 1 . 1 - 3  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from  " F i n a n c i a l  C o n t r o l "
t o  " M oderate  F i n a n c i a l  C o n t r b l "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Shanghai N o .2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) sets similar objectives for its 
production factories and tertiary enterprises : production and 
tertiary enterprise managers must meet their agreed IRC targets 
for the year and expect improvement in performance year after 
year as emphasized by the board of directors and the corporation 
in terms of growth rates. The critical occasion, therefore, is 
the annual planning review. As mentioned before, in view of the 
market economy and macro-economic control policies promulgated by 
the government, and the keen competition within this industry, 
the production factories and tertiary enterprises sometimes feel 
passive in setting their objectives or targets in the annual 
plans or IRCs because their activities are depending on some 
internal and external factors which are sometimes out of their 
control.
A high pressure to achieve the planned production quantity and 
efficiency is put on the production managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group wages and 
bonus are tied in with the annual plans or IRCs and it also 
depends on the overall performance of the enterprise as a whole. 
Apart from the production factories, the other department, such 
as purchasing and sales, and the tertiary enterprises may have 
annual or project based IRCs in which they have agreed specific 
objectives or targets with the general manager. The promotion, 
salary and bonus of these functional staff and independent profit 
centre staff are correlated with these quantitative and 
non-financial targets as well.
In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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f6 . 3  M o n i t o r i n g  R e s u l t s  ( R e p o r t i n g  & P e r f o r m a n c e  M easurem ent)
Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) regards it as essential to catch 
variances from annual plan or IRC before they have gone too far. 
To this end the top management monitor results on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. All the factories, departments and tertiary 
enterprises submit monthly results on standard forms to their 
respective deputy-general managers and department heads, and also 
to the chief accountant for vetting and comparison with budgets 
and IRCs. The production factories are also required to submit 
production progress reports to the top management on a weekly 
basis.
The major performance measurement criterion is "internal profit" 
as shown in the IRC section. Without much autonomy on setting 
the selling or transfer prices, the production factories can only 
control the costs by employing the "responsibility costing" 
system implemented in 1992 . This cost control system mainly sets 
quantitative standards such as material consumptions. In 
addition, the "full costing" system was employed in the same year 
by allocating all the non-manufacturing overheads, including 
administration, selling, distribution and management expenses, to 
all the production or profit centres. The basis used to 
apportion these overheads is "total wages paid" which tends to be 
reduced (i.e. by reducing headcount) by the profit centre in the 
last few years in order to undertake less allocated overheads. 
Of course the full costing concept does not measure the 
performance of the centre managers and affect their rewards.
The repair and maintainance which amounted to over R M B 3 .5 
millions in 1993 but it was reduced by almost 90% in 1994 under 
the full costing system as a means to measure the performance of 
the whole profit centre. Obviously, there will be a serious 
long-term hidden problem because the plant and machinery are not 
well maintained.
The monthly report format is unique for each factory or 
department. The contents are mainly corresponding with the 
annual plan from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can 
be extracted from this report. The monthly and quarterly actuals 
are compared with the targets. The qualitative targets are 
usually subjectively measured by the deputy-general managers and 
enterprise management office and written in the monthly reports 
as well. These monthly reports are compiled, by the enterprise 
management office. Any significant variances (without specifying 
tolerance limits) will be highlighted in order to bring the 
attention to the top management. Then all the monthly reports 
are submitted to the general manager for review.
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fFor any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general manager will contact with the respective deputy managers, 
chiefs, factory managers, department heads or tertiary enterprise 
managers to dig out the underlying reasons or ask them to perform 
investigation immediately. It is expected that corrective 
actions can be taken to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the top management with the middle 
management, the general manager will put forward the monthly 
results for open discussion. The chief accountant will also 
report the financial performance of individual units. The 
factory managers, department heads and tertiary enterprise 
managers may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances.
Consistent failure (say over 12 months) in meeting the targets 
which are controllable by a factory manager, probably he will be 
replaced by somebody else. On the other hand, the favourable 
results will be openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the manpower and wages department for calculating 
the group wages and bonus of each factory, department and 
tertiary enterprise for last month. Then the accounting 
department will process the bonus payments at the end of the 
month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by one month).
The importance of computerization has been recognised by the top 
management and some stand-alone personal computers have been 
purchased and used for production planning and control, 
purchasing and inventory control, sales analysis, and financial 
planning and analysis. In spite of this piece-meal computer 
utilisation, SCM2 does not have a concrete plan to purchase more 
personal computers or instal a mini-computer for networking. The 
major stumbling block is lacking of fund for this kind of 
investment which is at low priority compared with many other 
perceived important projects like rennovation of production 
facility, plant and equipment.
Now, SCM2 views the annual plan or IRC as a contract between the 
top management and the factory, department and tertiary 
enterprise. The monitoring process is used to maintain the 
pressure for performance. Top management's close surveillance of 
results enables them to ensure that no unit goes too far astray 
before remedial action is taken. It also gives top management an 
understanding of the reasons for variances from plan.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 6 . 3 . 1 - 3  & Q 6 . 4 . 1 - 1 4  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e
e x t r a c t s  i n  A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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6.4 Rewards and Incentives
Since 1992, The Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) had the autonomy 
to recruit employees from the labour market without getting the 
Shanghai Manpower Bureau involved which is in compliance with the 
Mechanism Transformation Regulations. Furthermore, since 1993, 
all the employees have signed employment contracts, which include 
the "employee contract" and the "in-post contract".
The employee contract signed between the general manager and an 
employee signifies that he or she has been employed by the 
enterprise. Whereas, the in-post contract means a formal 
assignment of a certain post to the employee who is expected to 
be capable for the job. For the employees without in-post 
contracts, they may be transferred to the Tertiary (Third) 
Enterprises which are fully-owned by SCM2 and are self-financed.
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the SCM2 is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration. Under the new taxation system implemented in 
January 1994, the enterprise's payroll can exceed the two limits 
but the excess will not be income tax deductable. The take-home 
pays of workers and staff in SCM2 are mainly composed of three 
elements as broken down below :
Workers Staff
(1) Wages/Salary 55% - 65% 70% - 60%
(2)' Bonus 30% - 25% 20% - 25%
(3) Allowances 15% - 10% 10% - 15%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB5,500 
in 1993 and RMB7,000 in 1994 (total wages RMB38 millions in 1994) 
which were about 30% less than the metallurgical industry and 40% 
less than the retailing industry. Under the current high 
inflation rate (overall average 21.7% in China in 1994), SCM2 is 
expected to increase the average annual gross wages to RMB9,000 
in 1995.
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The wages includes the basic wages and the floating wages where 
the former is almost fixed (i.e. average RMB200 per month) across 
the board and increased according to inflation as determined by 
the Manpower Bureau. The floating wages is classified into 
different grades depending on the type of work, seniority, 
efficiency and skill. The average floating wages is about RMB150 
per month.
There are two portions for the "allowances" . The first part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Shanghai Government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating 
inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity. The 
second part is decided by the SCM2 which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, hair-washing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowances" is about 
RMB100 to RMB120 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the factories, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the general manager and a 
factory manager will decide what level of group bonus will be 
given to the department. Of course, it is up to the factory 
manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her 
subordinates according to individual performance. The bonus is 
distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a 
certain percentage (10% - 20%) will be retained in a reserve in 
order to make up the low bonus obtained during the months with 
poor performance.
The calculation of "bonus" for the non-manufacturing employees is 
based on an "index" (scale) and then multiplied by the average 
monthly bonus achieved by the workers. The index scale is as 
follow :
General Manager 1. 6
Deputy-General Manager 1. 5
Chief Accountant/Chief Engineer 1.4 
Section Head 1.3
Supervisor 1.2
Clerks 1.1
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System", if there is an 
overall outstanding or above target performance, the Xin Da 
Corporation will award a lump sum of "special bonus" to the 
general manager at the end of the year. But under no 
circumstances, the remuneration package of the general manager 
can be greater than three times the total earnings of a 
department head (middle management).
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If the annual profit before tax can achieve better than the 
planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to all the 
employees and distributed in a way very similar to the monthly 
bonus. The year-end bonus ranged from RMB500 to RMB800 for 1994.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
will cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives. Another way to reduce redundant employees is to 
enforce early retirement at the age of 45.
Instead of fully implementing this contract employment system, 
SCM2 has signed "in-post contracts" with most of the employees on 
an annual basis. This contract signifies that an employee is 
qualified for that specific post and he or she is eligible to 
receive wages (according to grade in the pay-scale), allowances 
and bonus. Without such a contract, that employee is out of job 
but he or she is still an employee of SCM2 and is allowed to 
received a basic monthly subsidy of less than RMB300. This 
measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy employees, 
but it can motivate the marginal employees to work better. In 
fact, 2 5 % - 3 0 %  of SCM2 emp l o y e e s ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  the
non-manufacturing staff, are still redundant but reluctant to lay 
off due to some social constraints. On the other hand, a few
hundreds of workers are employed from the other provinces who are
hardworking and paid less wages than the local workers.
In relation to the social welfare, since 1993, SCM2 has to 
contribute 25.5% (or RMB800,000 per month) of the monthly gross 
payroll to the government for sharing the responsibility of
pension. Fortunately SCM2 is able to claim more than its 25.5% 
contribution from the government because its retired employees 
exceeded its working employees at the end of 1994. In addition, 
SCM2 has to provide about 14%-16% (standard rate and tax 
deductable) of the monthly gross payroll for various employee's 
benefits such as medical, unemployment and building or buying 
residential quarters. But the actual monthly employee's benefits 
cost was RMB100,000 over the standard in 1994 and was not income 
tax deductable).
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Therefore, many old-aged state-owned enterprises, including SCM2 
are proposing to handover fthe standard provision i.e. 16% of 
monthly gross payroll to the municipal government who will 
reimburse the actual cost of benefits incurred by the 
enterprises.
The 3rd Plennary Session of the 8th People's Congress held from 
3-15 March 1995 will discuss and most likely approve this social 
welfare policy. SCM2 spent RMB3 millions in purchasing
apartments for employee's quarters. Furthermore, SCM2 has to 
bear the medical allowance for its 5,200 retired employees which 
is a rather heavy financial burden to the overhead expenditures.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SCM2 believes in the' "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : sift from "Finance Control" to 
"Moderate Financial Control" since 1992
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai No.2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Review Process* High
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarised planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
11 e  Li x ill w x v  x a  b ^
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\/
[Post-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai N o . 2 Cotton Mill (SCM2) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
shifting from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to the boarder 
of "Financial Control" (Post-1992) which indicates the change is 
not very significant.
28 February 1995
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Introduction : A total number of 22 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
December 1993 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ultimate aim is to c l a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW)
Staff Interviewed : Mr Ni Zhong Fong (Deputy-Chief Accountant)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 4 years) 
Mr Zhang Ke Qin (Financial Accountant)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 27 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 11 September 1993
Second Visit - 7 September 1994
Third Visit - 12 January 1995
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Section 1 : History & Background
(
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) is a wholly state-owned 
enterprise specializing in producing medium and small sized iron 
and steel products. Founded in 1939, SXSW, after over 55 years 
of development, has become one of the key enterprises under the 
Ministry of Metallurgy and a large profit making enterprise in 
Shanghai. SXSW obtained the import and export right or autonomy 
from the government at the end of 1994.
Employing 5,600 workers and staff and covering an area of 204,000 
square metres, SXSW produces 600,000 tons of steel, 400,000 tons 
of billet and 12,000 tons of rolled steel annually. SXSW 
maintains eight workshops including billet mill, five shaped 
steel rolling mills, one rolled steel casting workshop and one 
processing workshop. SXSW was awarded the title of First-Class 
Enterprise of the State and National Labor Day (1st of May) 
Certificate of Merit in 1990.
SXSW manufactures 10 general categories of products with 1,500 
different specifications for building construction/ aerospace, 
ship building, light industry, textile, farm machinery, 
automobile and other industries. Over 150 specifications are the 
only steel products manufactured by SXSW in China. SXSW has been 
invested heavily in research and development in order to launch 
about 10 new products every year. Some of the products are 
exported to over twenty countries and regions in the world. From 
1973 to 1993, total amount of 440,000 tons of rolled steel had 
been exported and US$154 millions had been earned. However, the 
export quantity has been declined since 1993 because the average 
selling prices are higher than the steel products manufactured by 
other Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia etc.
Over 85% of the output have achieved international standards. 
All major products are awarded top quality titles conferred by 
Shanghai Municipal Government and Ministry of Metallurgy. The 
window's frame steel products have won the State Quality 
Recognition Certificate. Thread (Deformed) bar, round bar, 
window's frame steel, U-bar and angle bar have been honoured with 
the title of "Shanghai Top Quality Export Commodity".
With strong technical expertise and advanced manufacturing 
technology, SXSW has kept on upgrading its production facilities. 
At present, SXSW is installing an annual 300,000-ton model steel 
and round bar production line, importing a newest continuous 
rolling mill from Pomini Company of Italy and an electronic 
automatic control system from ABB Company of Sweden, which are 
expected to start production in 1995. SXSW is committed to 
satisfying its customers with products of more variety and higher 
quality.
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The major 10 categories of SXSW products are :
{
(1) Rolled Steel (i.e. seamless steel pipe, thin plate)
(2) Window's Frame Steel (for buildings)
(3) Deformed (Thread) Bar (for building construction)
(4) Steel for automobiles and farm tools
(5) Steel for spinning and weaving machines
(6) Steel for standard parts
(7) Steel for sewing machine
(8) Steel for electrical appliance
(9) Steel for aviation and ship building
(10) Other section and figured bar steel
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) has been transormed into 
a wholly state-owned enterprise since the early 1950s and there 
is no plan to transform into a shareholding enterprise in the 
next five years because it is a government policy to keep a 
macroeconomic control over the steel industry in China.
Since SXSW is a wholly SOE, it is under the administration of the 
Shanghai Municipal Government and the Shanghai Metallurgical 
Bureau. Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central 
planning system dictated all the planning and control (long-term 
and short-term) in the SOEs. Therefore, SXSW was just acted as a 
vehicle (or cost centre) to carry out the activities according to 
the commands directed from the Municipal Government and the 
Metallurgical Bureau. Since the economic reforms started in 
1979, instead of dictatorship from the authorities, the top 
management of the SXSW have been involved in the 5-year long 
range plan even though SXSW for most of the time had to take the 
directives from and give in their negotiations to these two 
authorities.
The situation has been changing rapidly since 1992. Now the 
municipal government only appoints the general manager and party 
leader of SXSW and oversees the major development and projects, 
mainly long-term ones, recommended by the SXSW. On the other 
hand, the Metallurgical Bureau is resolving into a "Trade 
Association" (something like a semi-governmental body) and its 
objective is trying to maintain a balance of the overall iron and 
steel production quantities and varieties produced by the plants 
located in Shanghai. In addition, it is providing market 
information for the steel industry in Shanghai in order to help 
those enterprises to sell their products to the right market at 
the right time.
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Gradually, these authorities have been taking away their visible 
hands from and leaving more operating autonomy to the local steel 
industry since 1992 after the pronouncement of the legislative 
changes.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Under the General Manager, who has an Enterprise Management 
Office, the organisation structure of SXSW can be divided into 
the following four Divisions :
(1) Production Division (headed by one Deputy-General Manager)
1.1 Production Planning Department (headed by Deputy-Chief 
Economist*)
1.2 Production Technical Department (headed by Deputy-Chief 
Engineer*)
1.3 Quality Control Department
1.4 No.l Refine Rolling Factory#
1.5 No.2 Refine Rolling Factory
1.6 N o .3 Rolling Factory
1.7 No.l Steel Factory
1.8 No.2 Steel Factory
1.9 No.3 Steel Factory
1.10 No.4 Steel Factory
(2) Operation Division (headed by one Deputy-General Manager)
2.1 Operation Planning Department
2.2 Purchasing Department
2.3 Sales Department
2.4 Accounting & Finance Department (headed by Deputy-Chief 
Accountant*)
2.5 Internal Audit Department
(3) Support Division (headed by one Deputy-General Manager)
3.1 Repair & Maintenance Department
3.2 Energy Supply Department (electricity, gas & water)
(4) Administration Division (headed by one Deputy-General 
Manager)
4.1 Personnel Department
4.2 Manpower & Wages Department
4.3 General Affairs Department
4.3.1 Education & Training
4.3.2 Safety & Security
4.3.3 Estate & Quarters 
. 4.3.4 Canteen
4.3.5 Medical
* The deputy chiefs are one rank lower than the deputy general 
managers.
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# Each production factory has a few production sections, support 
sections, 1 repair and maintenance section and 1 administration 
section (including personnel, wages, accounting and statistics).
@ All the production factories and service departments are 
treated as cost centres.
SXSW had a total of 5,600 employees (4,000 workers) and 1,800 
retired employees at the end of 1993. It is classified as a 
"Medium SOE" in China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets RMB 540M (historical cost)
Turnover RMB 946M (1992)
RMB1,335M (1993)
RMB1,236M (1994)*
RMB1,300M (1995 forecast)
Income before tax RMB 15M (1992) - 1.6% of
RMB 19M (1993) - 1.4% of
RMB 13M (1994) - 1.1% of
RMB 10M (1995 forecast)
Income tax rate 33%
sales
sales
sales#
* The 7.4% decrease in turnover (including 17% of VAT) was mainly 
due to the government macro-economic control policies (i.e. 
contraction of certain industries and availability of capital) 
and keen competition under the market economy.
# The decrease in net profit margin was mainly due to reduced 
selling prices (affected by cheaper imported products) and high 
inflation (affected the cost of production). Another reason to 
cut selling prices was to reduce inventroy and obtain cash to 
repay the long-outstanding creditors. Contrary, SXSW had a total 
of doubtful debts (accounts receivable) of RMB200M at the end of 
1994 .
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) signed its first 5-year 
Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) with the Shanghai 
Municipal Government in 1989. The major target set in the ERC 
was income before tax of RMB2.4 million in the first year and 
then an annual compound growth rate of 5%.
The ERC was ceased at the end of 1993. Since 1994, SXSW has been 
subject to income tax of 33%.
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S e c t i o n  5 : P l a n n i n g  S y s t e m
e
5.1 Organisation Structure
The guiding theme of the structure of Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel 
Works (SXSW) is simplicity and accountability. It goes to some 
length to create stand-alone business units e.g. the 7 factories 
as independent responsibility centres that are run by individual 
factory managers with clear lines of responsibility. SXSW goes 
further in decentralizing responsibility such as initiating the 
annual budget or internal responsibility contract and setting up 
of sections within individual factory. The production, manpower 
and cost control responsibilities lie with the factory managers. 
Section, group and sub-group leaders are seen as extensions of 
each individual factory.
The selections and appointments of the factory managers and a few 
key positions (e.g. senior engineers) are controlled by the 
headquarters' top management. Furthermore, any major changes of 
the organisation structure must seek approval from the 
headquarters. More autonomy of internal management and operation 
has been delegated to the factory managers since 1992.
(Please refer to Q5.1.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, SXSW has decentralized structures in which the 
individual factories report directly to the headquarters, and the 
factory managers play a linking and surveillance role between the 
factories and the headquarters.
Observation of Planning Influence s shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since 1992, Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) has 
implemented a more formal and rigorous planning process for 
reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the annual plan and 
internal responsibility contract (IRC) of each factory. This 
process starts in October each year and ends in February the next 
year.
After intensive internal and external environmental studies by 
the general manager with his deputy managers and three chiefs, a 
set of preliminary sales and production targets will be 
determined. Other than these quantitative targets, many other 
qualitative targets (described in section 6.3 "monitoring 
results" below) using as guidelines are also laid down by the top 
managment.
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The general manager will provide these quantitative and 
qualitative guidelines to all the factory and department managers 
for them to initiate their own annual plans or budgets in which 
some key criteria will be be used as the measurement yardsticks 
in the subsequent agreed internal responsibility contracts.
The Enterprise Management Office with the assistance of the 
Accounting and Finance Department in the headquarters will 
validate and consolitate all the individual annual plans or 
budgets into a master plan or budget for submission to the top 
management for review. Then, formal and informal meetings and 
discussions will be held between the headquarters and the 
factories and departments either collectively or individually. 
This iterative exercise will be finished until all the plans, 
budgets and contracts are mutally agreed in late January and 
s u b i m i t t e d  to the annual general m e e t i n g  (attended by 
representatives from all levels of employees) for approval after 
the Chinese New Year in February.
Before 1992, the sole purpose of this annual budget review 
process was to agree what should be done over the next 12 months 
within the context of a few key indicators e.g. production volume 
and sales as agreed between the Shanghai Municipal Government and 
SXSW. Since 1992, under the legislative changes and market 
economy promotion, SXSW has been given higher automomy in 
formulating and reviewing its strategic directions. As a result, 
the production factories are encouraged to extend their planning 
horizon beyond one year but the contents are still mainly 
production and financial oriented. Therefore, the headquarters 
has less involvement in the factory level planning decisions, but 
without reducing their tight financial control.
(Please refer to Q 5 .5.2 , Q5.5,6 & 5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3, Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) promulgates the 
following three strategic themes as the spirit of the enterprise:
(1) Unity - of all the employees.
(2) Truthfulness - to customers, employees and other outsiders.
(3) Innovation - of product and management quality.
SXSW also spells out clearly the following strategic thrust in
its enterprise brochures and on many walls :
486
(1) Adjust the product mix according to market needs.
(2) Enhance the product quality.
(3) Develop new products.
(4) Develop existing and new markets.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Technological improvement (long- and short-term), efficiency 
enhancement and capacity expansion (described in next section) 
are the strategic thrusts that SXSW always emphasizes in the 
planning process. There have been significant manufacturing 
technology and production efficiency advancement since the late 
1980s by importing new plants and machines for the European 
Countries and the USA. These production facility renovations 
have always been receiving top priorities in the capital 
appropriation budget which is formed an integral part of the 
annual budget.
The above strategic theme and thrusts are initiated by the 
headquarters which has a positive role to play in creating the 
strategic plans with the individual factories. However, since 
1992, the factory managers have been encouraged to make strategic 
or tactical suggestions to realise these themes and thrusts in 
both short- and medium-term i.e. suggest capital investment 
projects.
Before 1992, the top management in SXSW from time to time made 
suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning review 
process such as production quantity and mix amendments, and 
material and energy consumptions. The headquarters followed 
financial indicators and performance closely on a monthly or 
quarterly basis and were quick to make suggestions if they did 
not match with the overall long- and short-term plan. To 
facilitate the implementation of the legislation in 1992, the 
headquarters has left more freedom to the factory manager to 
adjust their planning and operation as long as it would not 
deviate much from the long-term plan and the annual budget in 
aggregate.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 4  Long-Term  P l a n s  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) has been following the 
"Central 5-Year Planning Policy" of the government since the 
1950s. The early 5-year long-term plans focused mainly on the 
production volume as directed by the government without paying 
due regards to the efficiency, profitability and market demand. 
After starting the economic reforms in 1979, these factors have 
been taken into account. In the current 5-year plan (1991-1995 
inclusive), the following strategic directions have been laid 
down. Some of them will be carried forward into the 9th 5-year 
long-term plans (1996-2000).
(a) Plant Relocation
As part of the environmental protection planning, most of 
the iron and steel enterprises located in the city have to 
be moved to the suburb districts of Shanghai. Since 1994, 
SXSW has been relocating part of its production lines to the 
northeastern suburb which requires substantial sources of 
capital coming from government investment and bank loan.
(b) Product Differentiation and Diversification
The improvement of product features and varieties to match 
the changes of market demand (i.e. construction industry) 
under the present open-market economy is one of the major 
strategies. Since 1990s, SXSW's R&D can develop about 10 
new products to replace the declining products. In 
parallel, improving the product quality is another 
successful factor to maintain and expand the market share.
(c) Production Technology and Facility Enhancement
SXSW has phased out all the production plant and machinery 
purchased during the 1940s and 1950s. On the other hand, 
advanced and improved production plants and facilities have 
been imported from the European Countries (i.e. Italy in 
1995) and the U S A  since the late 1980s. Further 
enhancements will be made in No.2 and No.4 Steel Factory in 
order to maintain an annual total output of 600,000 tons. 
On the other hand, this long-term strategy can improve the 
p ro d u c t i o n  efficiency, product quality and material 
consumption.
(d) Merger and Takeover
Since 1993, SXSW has invested over RMB400M (including RMB100 
long-term bank loan in 1995) to takeover a few small iron 
and steel factories located in the northeast suburb of 
Shanghai in order to phase out the old production lines in
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the original plant which is the government policy for the 
reason of new town planning and environmental protection. 
This strategy will continue in the 9th 5-year long-term plan 
(1996-2000) so as to maintain the total production capacity 
at a level of 700,000 tons.
(e) Production Capacity
The production capacity of SXSW was dropped from 600,000 
tons in 1993 to 510,000 tons in 1994 due to market condition 
and inflation although the government via the bureau has 
implemented an economic policy to purchase the outputs from 
the steel industry at lower prices and sell them the 
required industries. SXSW is planning to revive the annual 
production capacity to 600,000 tons in the next 5 years 
mainly through the long-term strategies described in (a),
(b), (c) and (d) above. In addition, cost reduction such as
laying off redundant employees is another important factor.
(f) Sources of Capital
In 1994, the total iron and steel output in China was over 
93 million tons in which 20 million tons were stockpiled 
because the product mix did not match with the changes of 
demand due to macro economic control measures implemented by 
the government since . July 1993. As a result, over 20 
million tons of iron and steel products were imported from 
the USA, Japan and Korea at lower prices than the national 
prices. In order to compete with the foreign counterparts 
and clear the stock, the average price of iron and steel 
products was dropped from RMB4,000 per ton to RMB3,000 per 
ton at the end of 1994. Ultimately, some iron and steel 
enterprises incurred losses in the same year.
If the iron and steel industry has to change the product mix 
according to the market demands, then heavy capital 
investments will have to be made to renovate the production 
facility and equipment. However, this industry has been 
suffering from the tight capital control by the government 
via the banking system as one of the 12 macro economic 
control measures imposed since July 1993 because a lot of 
capital was invested into the expensive real estate (office 
and residential buildings) and the overheated stock 
exchange. To resolve this vicious circle problem, it is 
hoped that the government will release appropriate capital 
funds at more favourable terms for the iron and steel 
industry in early 1995. SXSW is actively searching 
different sources of capital to finance the projects stated 
in (a) - (d) above and to support the working capital
(inclduing RMB200M short-term bank loan in 1995) as well. 
The government returned RMB2 00M of VAT and income tax to 
SXSW in 1993 and 1994 as a means of capital investment.
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(g) M arket  P e n e t r a t i o n
Since early 1990s, SXSW has established some sales agencies 
in different big cities in order to promote various 
products. Furthermore, the sales personnel are dividied 
into different geographical locations to provide support to 
the sales agents.and visit them on a regular basis.
(h) Computerisation
At present, stand-alone personal computers are employed by 
individual department and production factories without any 
connections. For example, the accounting and finance 
department has been using a personal computer for wages, 
financial reporting and cost analysis only without any 
integration. There is a wrong conception that some SXSW's 
employee believe computerisation will lead to more redundant 
staff, but the top management have realised the importance 
of utilising computers. Provided sufficient fund is 
available, SXSW will purchase a mini-computer and establish 
a computer centre in the next few years. At the same time, 
training and education will be provided to different levels 
of management staff so that the ultimate aim of setting up a 
LANS system can be materialised in 2000.
(i) Manpower and Training
The abolishment of "Three Iron Bowls" (iron employment, iron 
position and iron wages) or "Life-Long Employment" can not 
be effectively implemented in SXSW because cutting off, 
let's say, 20% of the labour force will create many social 
problems in the light of the current insufficient employment 
social welfare and benefits existed in China. (Please refer 
to Q5.2.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in Appendix 1.)
One way to tackle this headache problem ("Big Rice Pot") is 
to transfer the excess workers (about 200 at the end of 
1994) to the newly established "Service Enterprises" (Third 
Enterprises) within the SXSW organisation structure. These 
service enterprises include restaurants, groceries, trading 
and repair service so that they can be self-financed on
their own. SXSW is planning with care to expand the third
or tertiary enterprises, which can actually creat wealth and
be self-financed, in order to absorb more redundant
employees. Another means to reduce excess employees is to 
encourage early retirement (age of 45-50). Of course, 
training and education are indispensible planning elements 
for SXSW in order to crystalize its strategic themes and 
thrusts in long-term.
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( j )  C o s t  R e d u c t i o n
(
Since the promulgation of "market economy" in 1993, 
basically the selling prices of over 95% commodities and 
services in China are determined by supply and demand
factors. In order to be profitable, competitive or survive,
cost reduction is a must. All the above long-term plans can 
directly or indirectly achieve this aim.
Before the 1990s, the 5-year long-term plans were compromises 
between the local government and the SXSW without any involvement 
from the middle management from the factories. The current 
5-year plan (1991-1995) has been formulated through substantial 
analysis, evaluation and discussion among the top management in 
the headquarters and the senior staff of the production
factories. However, SXSW anticipates that it is very difficult 
to formulate the 9th 5-year plan (1996-2000) because of a lot of 
fast-changing external factors such as macro-eocnomic control, 
market economy, enterprise reform, credit control, triangle
(doubtful) debts, etc.
As a result, the long-term plan is reviewed at least annually and 
suggestions may be directed by the headquarters because of 
government's macro-policy changes or market condition changes. 
However, the factory managers seldom initiate changes in their 
respectively plans. They are mainly concern how the milestones 
set in the long-term plan will affect their next year plans or 
internal responsibility contracts which will have tight financial 
surveillance coming from the headquarters at least on a monthly 
basis.
Therefore, the long-term planning and review process is using a 
top-down approach in the belief that the top management in the 
headquarters have the better experience and knowledge of the 
external environment and even the internal operations of the 
factories.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, from no involvement in long-term planning to some 
participation by the factory and department managers (middle 
management) , it is a big step of advancement signifying that 
their participations are an important part of the responsibility 
accounting system through which they will be assessed and 
rewarded.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)r
The general short-term planning policy adopted by Shanghai Xinhu 
Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) is "production determined by sales" and 
"sales determined by targeted profit before income tax" which 
means profit before tax growth (either positive or zero) as 
agreed with the Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau is the initial driving 
force of all the activities. Reference should also be made to 
the 5 -year plan especially to estimate what the sales order 
potential will be for the new product and market situation in the 
next year. However, the promulgation of market economy is still 
in its infant stage, therefore, it is difficult to predict the 
sales mix and quantities which are subject to many external 
variables. As from October 1992, SXSW has employed the annual 
planning or budgeting process as described in section 5.2 (Review 
Process) above.
Since October 1992, the production factory managers have been 
involved intensively in this planning process, in particular 
determining the production quantity, sales mix, material and 
energy consumptions, which they believe to be important in 
setting and negotiating the internal responsibility contracts 
with the general manager. The other division and department 
managers have also participated carefully in devising their 
income and expense budgets which they would be measured against 
as performance yardsticks.
(The above annual planning or budgeting process is summarised in 
a flowchart as shown in Appendix 2.)
In view of the rapid changing market conditions such as demand, 
supply and inflation of raw materials in the last two years, the 
annual planning review period has been shortened from quarterly 
to monthly although the formal performance measurement and group 
bonus calculation are done within one week after the end of each 
quarter. The general manager and all the factory and department 
managers will hold a formal meeting at the beginning of each 
month to review the financial performance against the annual 
plans. Amendments or revisions are made on a quarterly basis 
according to the significance of the factors affecting the annual 
plan.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism transformation legislation and the 
market economy have given SXSW more freedom to plan ahead. The 
municipal government and bureau have almost compeltely devolved 
the short-term planning autonomy to SXSW, except to agree on the 
profit targets as agreed in the ERC.
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The top management have involved the middle management or even 
their subordinates (lower management) in the annual planning and 
budgeting process which on one hand is a critical step in 
materializing the long-term strategic plan, and on the other 
hand, it is an important motivational factor for the factory 
managers to manage their own businesses and to be rewarded 
accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Me'dium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) established its IRC 
system in 1988. The following was an IRC of a production factory 
in 1993.
Factory : No.l Refine Rolling
Duration : 1 January to 31 December 1993 
Guidelines :
The purposes of entering into this IRC are :
(1) to accomplish the whole enterprise's production targets;
(2) to motivate the effectiveness and efficiency of workers;
(3) to motivate the initiation of supporting staff;
(4) to enhance the management and administration efficiency;
(5) to define the economic responsibilities of various parties;
(6) to link up the employee's reward with the enterprise's 
profitability and government benefits.
Targets :
(1) Quality is a "Veto Factor". If the factory cannot achieve 
the required quality standards, bonuses will not be awarded.
(2). Production targets : 194,500 - 213,000 tons.
(3) Production bonus is awarded on a quarterly basis and 
determined as follow :
Actual output in tons (A)
A < .194,500 
194,500 < A < 203,750 
203,750 < A < 213,000 
A > 213,000
Bonus per employee per month
No bonus 
RMB10 
RMB20 
RMB3 0
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(4) If the following targets cannot be attained, production 
bonus as determined* in (3) above will be deducted 
accordingly :
4.1 Product Quality : 35%
(details refer to 1989 Quality Assurance Regulations)
4.2 Input/Output Ratio : 20%
4.3 Cost of Production : '20%
(according to the standard costing system monitored by 
the accounting and finance department)
4.4 Safety Production : 10%
(minor injury rate > 1.5/1,000 employees, deduct 10% - 
50% bonus;
serious injury = 1, deduct 50% bonus; 
fatal accident = 1, deduct 100% bonus)
4.5 Energy Consumption : 10%
(Gas - 6%; Electricity - 3%; Water - 1%)
4.6 New Product Success : 5% (trial production)
(5) If the actual output exceeds the upper target (i.e. 213,000
tons) and simultaneously the input/output ratio can be 
achieved, then the following "Extra-Output Bonus" per 
employee per month will be awarded accordingly :
Factory For every ton exceeded Upper Target at :
Standard Input/ Ideal Input/
Output Rate Output Rate
N o .1 Refine Rolling RMB3 RMB 5
No.2 Refine Rolling RMB6 RMB10
No.3 Rolling RMB3 RMB 5
No.2 Steel RMB6 RMB10
No.4 Steel RMB6 RMB10
Evaluation :
(1) One-twelves of the annual production bonus will be awarded 
on a monthly basis. The production performance is assessed 
on a quarterly basis and any over-awarded bonus will be 
deducted in the subsequent months after evaluation. Final 
assessment will be done at the year end.
(2) Extra-output bonus is evaluated and determined on a monthly
cummulative basis. The shortfall of last month will be
loaded into this month's or subsequent month's actual 
production.
(3) The monthly and quarterly evaluations are performed by the
Operation Planning Department and reports should be 
submitted to the Enterprise Management Office for validation 
and Manpower & Wages Department for bonus calculation on or
before 5th and 7th in the next month respectively.
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(4) This contract is checked and evidanced by the Internal Audit 
Department.
(5) 2 copies of this contract are kept by the factory 
(contractee) and 18 copies are retained by the headquarters 
(contractor).
Since 1992, the IRCs have been initiated by the factories during 
the budgeting process (October - February). After back and forth 
discussions and negotiations with the headquarters, the IRCs are 
agreed and signed by the general manager and the factory 
managers. In the same year, the factory managers started to sign 
second level of IRCs with their own production sections or 
production lines without any involvement from headquarters. The 
top management believe that this second-tier IRC system can 
further motivate the lower level of management and hold their 
accountability to the factory managers.
The IRCs are reviewed quarterly in parallel with the budget 
review but both the headquarters and the factories are trying to 
avoid adjusting the targets unless there are significant changes 
affecting their validity. Because frequent adjustment to the 
targets will cause confusion to all levels of management.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the headquarters have delegated more freedom to the 
factory managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also the full autonomy to breakdown the responsibility or 
targets into the second-level of IRCs to be shared by their 
subordinates.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of Interdependencies means the central influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions needed to be managed. Cross-supply and 
transfer pricing between the factories, and exploitation of a 
shared resource are examples that happened in Shanghai Xinhu Iron 
& Steel Works (SXSW) that need headquarters' intervention.
As illustrated in the organisation structure in section 2 above, 
the six of the seven manufacturing factories are in a continuous 
process and have some interdependencies in the following manner :
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(1) No.3 Rolling Factory [casted & rolled iron goto (2) - (6)]
(2) No.l Refine Rolling Factory [output for sales]
(3) No.2 Refine Rolling Factory [output for sales]
(4) No.2 Steel Factory [output for sales]
(5) No.3 Steel Factory [output for sales]
(6) No.4 Steel Factory [output for sales]
(7) No.l Steel Factory* [output for sales]
* No.l Steel Factory is a stand-alone manufacturing plant 
transforming semi-finished inputs into customer's products.
Since all the production factories are treated as cost centres 
and the sales of intermediate products (both quantities and
prices) are controlled by the headquarters' sales department, 
therefore, all the internal transfer prices are based on standard 
costs without any profit mark-up. In this respect, material 
consumption and cost controls are crucial in order to avoid 
unfairness in internal transfers.
(Please refer to Q5.9.1-12 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "High Corporate" since 1992.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Shanghai Xinhu 
Iron & Stell Steel Works (SXSW) has decentralised its production 
function into 16 semi-autonomous factories or responsibility 
centres according to the nature of production in each factory. 
The factory managers can decide on their own organisation 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units (sections and groups).
T h e ,IRC has agreed the target number of employees in each factory 
which is an important figure to calculate the gross wages to be 
paid out per annum. However, within the limit of the gross
wages, a factory manager has the autonomy to increase (unlikely)
or decrease its manpower. If some redundant staff resign or
transfer to other factories and "third enterprises", then less
employees will share the fixed amount of gross wages (or a 
portion of the excess will be transferred to a designated welfare 
fund for that factory).
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The factory managers are also responsible for certain personnel 
functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation 
and remuneration (distribution of bonus). But termination of 
employment with any staff is a difficult task as explained in 
section 5.4 (i) above.
The major control mechanisms employed by the headquarters to 
control the performance of the factories are by using annual 
budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the most 
important measurement criteria are production quantify and ’cost 
control as set in the IRCs, although some other economic and 
qualitative targets (non-financial) are employed, however, they 
are subsidiary ones which do not have very significant effects on 
the group bonus calculation. But the infringement of veto 
factors (i.e. safety and quality) will have substantial 
reductions in the group bonus.
(Please refer to Q 6 .1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are dominated in the control 
mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of SXSW.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) sets similar objectives 
for its factories : factory managers must meet their agreed
budget figures or IRC targets for the year and improvement 
performance year on year except under adverse market conditions. 
The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual budget review. 
SXSW is trying to set for the next year a stretching standard of 
performance that factory managers are committed to achieve.
Two kinds of pressure are put on factory managers at the annual 
or quarterly review : to submit a budget they can achieve; and at 
the, same time, to aim for results that are, if possible, better 
than the previous year's. They fully understand that their group 
bonus are tied in with the budget or IRC and it also depends on 
the overall performance of the enterprise as a whole. Therefore, 
the headquarters does not tell the factories what their targets 
(e.g. production quantities and costs) should be, but tries to 
"energize" the ambitions of the factory management teams to do 
better year by year.
In addition to the formal annual or quarterly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings and informal communications are made between 
the headquarters and factories, and also among the factories 
themselves.
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(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2* on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) employs both 
quantitative and qualitative yardsticks as stated in the annual 
plan and IRC to measure the performance of production factories 
and other servicing departments. As mentioned in the "review 
process" (section 5.2) above, the top management at the beginning 
of the annual planning process (i.e. October) will lay down the 
following performance guidelines (e.g. 1990) :
(1) ERC Targets
1.1 Production Quantity & Value
1.1.1 Production Quantity - 606,000 tons
1.1.2 Production Value - RMB380 million
1.2 Economic Efficiency
1.2.1 Tax and Profit
1.2.2 Production Value Per Employee
1.2.3 Working Capital Turnover
1.2.4 Production Completion Rate
RMB85 million 
RMB83,000 
4 0 days 
100%
1.3 Consumption & Cost Control
1.3.1 Input : Output Ratio - 1.000 : 0.984
1.3.2 Cost Reduction Per Employee - RMB1,000
1.4 Safety
1.4.1 Safety Production (per month)
1.4.2 Equipment Minor Problem Rate
1.4.3 Employee Safety Training
0% death
0% serious injury 
0.1% injury 
0.3% minor injury 
10%
100%
1.5 Capital Projects
1.5.1 Electric Furnance Renovation - before 1 July
1.5.2 No.l & 2 Open-Air Pre-Heat Furnance - before 15 June
1.5.3 Rolling Steel Refining Facility - before 31 December
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(2) Quality Targets
2.1 Product Quality
2.1.1 Window Frame's Steel - upgrade from silver to gold
medal award
2.1.2 Top Quality Products - 50%
2.2 International Standard
2.2.1 International Standard Products - 15%
2.2.2 Marginal Standard Products - 80%
2.3 Product Passing Rate
2.3.1 Internal Inspection Rate - 99.5%
2.3.2 External Inspection Rate - 90%
(3) Research & Development Targets
3.1 Research Project
3.1.1 Complete 3 Research Projects
3.2 New Product
3.2.1 Develop 6 New Products
3.3. Technology Project
3.3.1 Complete 2 New Technology Projects
3.4 Technical Problem
3.4.1 Solve 10 Production Technical Problems
3.5 QC Activity
3.5.1 QC Training - 6.5 per 1,000 employees
3.5.2 QC Proposal - 2 proposals accepted by Bureau
3.5.3 QC Group - 2 groups recognised by Bureau
3.6 Technical, Management & Others Proposals - leading to a 
total savings of RMB7 million
3.7 Quality Management
3.7.1 Enhance process quality control and maintain steady 
output quality
3.7.2 Achieve international standard on new product line 
inspected by the government
3.7.3 Implement QC responsibility system to individual 
production and service departments
3.7.4 QC responsibility should be assigned down to
individuals
3.7.5 Identify the key elements in QC management system and 
fully documented according to GB/T10300 standard
3.7.6 Implement QC costing system
3.7.7 Improve the quality of inspection system
3.7.8 Implement process QC system and documentation
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(4) Management T a r g e t s
f
4.1 Energy & Environment
4.1.1 Save 1,000 tons coal consumption
4.1.2 Average coal consumption per ton of steel < 73.8 kg
4.1.3 Oil tank renovation of No.2 Steel Factory
4.1.4 Wastage disposal passing rate > 76.6%
4.1.5 Implement 15 environmental protection projects
4.1.6 Complete 11 green projects
4.2 Facility Management
4.2.1 Implement the <<State-owned Industrial Enterprise 
Facility Management Regulations>> enacted by the 
government
4.2.2 Amend and implement the facility management system 
designed by the enterprise
4.2.3 Facility availability rate > 98%
4.2.4 Casting & rolling machine working rate > 90%
4.2.5 Serious facility breakdown = 0%
4.2.6 Complete all major repair and maintenance projects
4.3 Operation Management
4.3.1 Balancing and smoothing production schedules
4.3.2 Maintain "Shanghai Civilized Enterprise".award
4.3.3 Maintain "Shanghai Hyginic Enterprise" award
4.3.4 Achieve "Clean Enterprise" title
4.3.5 Strictly observe the enterprise rules & regulations
4.3.6 Material & consumable supplies in right quantities 
and at right time
4.3.7 Complete, accurate and concise original records
4.3.8 Maintain reasonable and better standard posts and 
number of employees
4.4 Section & Shift Management
4.4.1 Standardize section and shift management system
4.4.2 Define duties and rights of section and shift in the 
production factories
4.5 Modern Management
4.5.1 Implement management by objective system
4.5.2 Develop computer control in on-line data collection, 
management information network system, quality and 
safety software
4.5.3 Establish modern management performance awards
4.6 Financial Control
4.6.1 Enhance financial control and achieve Grade 2 
Financial Control Award
4.7 Employee Welfare
4.7.1 Allocate 60-80 quarters to employees
4.7.2 Renovate the assembly hall
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4.7.3 Improve the canteen service and food quality
4.7.4 Enhance medical (facilities
4.7.5 100% adhere to one child policy
4.7.6 Improve kindergarten and baby care facilities
(5) Political Targets
5.1 Enterprise Politics
5.1.1 Enhance the political mind of employees
5.1.2 Improve the political environment
5.2 Democratic Management
5.2.1 Major policies must be decided by the Employee 
Representative Meeting
5.2.2 Enhance employee consultation system
5.2.3 Implement the resolution passed in the Employee 
Representative Meeting
5.3 Ethical Conduct
5.3.1 Implement the codes of conduct
5.3.2 Design the ethical conduct evaluation system
5.3.3 Encourage management to praticipate in physical work
5.3.4 Supporting departments are providing services to 
production factories
5.3.5 Comply with economic laws and regulations
5.3.6 Protect enterprise legal rights
5.4 Management Standardisation
5.4.1 Design and implement systems for standardisation for 
the whole enterprise
5.4.2 Determine working procedural standards
5.4.3 Suppliment, amend and enhance management work
standards
5.4.5 Document all the standardised system and evluate by 
external experts
(6) Lont-Term Targets
6.1 Education & Training
6.1.1 Political training > 20% of employees
6.1.2 Intermediate technician training > 8% of employees
6.1.3 Senior technician training > 1% of employees
6.1.4 Management staff training > 15% of employees
6.2 Medium- & Long-Term Planning
6.2.1 Amend 1990-92 Enterprise Management Plan
6.2.2 Amend 1990-95 Enterprise Development Plan
Each of the above target is clearly assigned to respective 
departments with two levels of responsibility - (A) is primary
responsibility and (B) is secondary responsibility.
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Shanghai Xinhu Iron & Steel Works (SXSW) regards it as essential 
to catch variances from budget or IRC before they have gone too 
far. To this end the headquarters monitor results on a monthly 
and quarterly basis. All the 7 factories submit monthly results 
directly to the headquarters on standard forms. They are also 
required to submit key production figures to the headquarters on 
a weekly basis.
The monthly condensed report format is unique for each factory. 
The contents are corresponding with the budgeted line items from 
which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted from 
this report. The monthly, quarterly and yearly accumulative 
actuals are compared with the budgets and the yearly accumulative 
actuals are also compared with the last year accumulative 
actuals.
These monthly reports are compiled, by the management and 
accounting staff in each individual factory who have staff 
relationship with the headquarters' accounting and finance 
department. Any variances plus or minus 5% will be highlighted 
in order to bring the attention to the factory managers and the 
top management in the headquarters.
Each monthly report must be reviewed and signed by the factory 
manager before submitting to the Enterprise Management Office in 
the headquarters for vetting and consolidating. The accounting 
personnel in the headquarters will rearrange and consolidate some 
of the financial and non-financial figures to generate a master 
report with similar comparisons with budgets, IRC and actuals of 
last year. Then the master and individual monthly reports are 
submitted to the top management for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general manager or deputy-general managers will contact the 
respective factory manager or his subordinates to dig out the 
underlining reasons or ask him to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the top management and factory 
managers, the general manager will put forward the monthly 
factory reports for open disscussion. The factory managers may 
be asked to explain briefly the significant variances. The 
unsatisfactory results will sometimes make the factory managers 
embarassed if they were due to the results of management fault. 
Consistent failure (say over 10 months) the targets which are 
controllable by a factory manager, probably he will be replaced 
by somebody else. It is very common in an SOE to see a factory 
manager step down from his office and go back to the shop floor 
and become a technician or worker again.
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On the other hand, the favourable results will be openly praised 
by the top management and < sometimes a special bonus will be 
announced in the same occasion.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the headquarters' manpower and wages department 
for calculating the group bonus of each factory for last month. 
The group bonus result sheets will be sent to the accounting and 
finance department for verification before submitting to the 
general manager for final approval. Then the accounting
department will process the bonus payments at the end of the
month (i.e. this month pays bonus for last month).
SXSW views a budget or IRC as a contract between the headquarters 
and the factory. The monitoring process is used to maintain the 
pressure for performance. Headquarters' close surveillance of 
results enables them to ensure that no factory goes too far 
astray before remedial action is taken. It also gives top
management an understanding of the reasons for variances from
budget. Where the business is stable, this knowledge enables the 
headquarters to judge next year's budget without the elaborate 
planning processes. But when the business environment is 
unpredictable such as the steel industry experience in 1993, the 
headquarters may not be able to see the edge of the cliff or 
catch the factory manager before he hits the bottom. As a 
result, SXSW appears to avoid unstable products and markets, 
especially those with fierce competition.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
The take-home pay of each employee in SXSW is mainly composed of 
three elements as broken down below :
(1) Basic Wages 40% - 30%
(2) Bonus 4 0% - 45%
(3) Allowances 20% - 25%
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB8,000 
in 1993 and RMB10,500 in 1994. Under the fierce competition from 
the other steel works within the same Baoshan District (the
second largest steel works in China - Baoshan Steel Works - is 
also located in this area) , SXSW is expected to increase this 
average figure to RMB12,000 in 1995. In addition, the high 
inflation rate (21.7% overall in China in 1994) adds a lot of 
pressure to increase the remuneration for the workforce of SXSW.
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Since 1994, SXSW has been using a "pointing system" to determine 
the basic wages. The points are calculated based on grade, 
seniority, qualification, technical skill and supervisory duty 
etc. The total point or score of individual employee will be 
multiplied by a "wages per point" factor which is adjusted
according to the financial performance of the enterprise as a 
whole on a monthly basis. In the past, the increments from year 
to year are not substantial and the parity between a factory 
manager and a front-line worker is not great. Now this pointing 
system can differentiate the basic rewards between different 
types of works and employees. The "basic salary" paying to all
the management and administrative staff in SXSW is very similar
to the "basic wages" paid to the workers.
There are two portions for the "allowance". The frist part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Shanghai
municipal government at least once in each year mainly for the 
purpose of combatting inflation in food, transportation, gas and 
electricity. The second part is decided by the SXSW which may 
include housing, meals, travel, child, attendance, overtime, 
inflation, stoppage, hair-dressing, festival gifts etc., which 
are trying to balance the relatively low basic wages or salaries 
and maintain a reasonable standard of living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonous", as described in the above sections, 
is based on the accomplishment of the IRC. The IRC signed 
between the top management and the factory manager will decide 
what level of group bonus will be given to the factory. Whereas, 
the IRCs agreed between a factory manager and his sections or 
production lines will be used as a basis to distribute that total 
amount of group bonus to the respective sections.
And of course, it is up to the section heads to award that lump 
sum of group bonus to his or her individual subordinates working 
in the section. The bonus is distributed in cash to all 
employees on a monthly basis but a certain percentage (10% - 20%) 
will be retained in a reserve in order to make up the low bonus 
obtained during the months with poor performance.
The bonus determined for the management and administrative staff 
is based on the "monthly average bonus per worker in all the 
factories" multiply by an "individual index" according to 
different grades of staff, i.e.
General Manager 
Deputy General Manager 
Production Manager 
Deputy Chiefs 
Head of Department 
Supervisor 
Senior Clerk 
Junior Clerk
2 . 0 
1.8 
1.6 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.2 
1.1
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Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System) , if there is an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the Bureau will award a lump sum of "special 
bonus" to the general manager at the end of the year. But under 
no circumstance, the remuneration package of the general manager 
can be greater than three times the total earnings of a factory 
manager. This system is still in practice although the ERC was 
ceased at the end of 1993. If the annual profit before tax can 
achieve much better than the planned level, an "additional bonus" 
may also be awarded to all the employees and distributed in a way 
very similar to the monthly bonus.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regualtions" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees. 
However, as mentioned earlier in section 5.4(i), that the 
redundant employees will create many social problems in light of 
the current insufficient empolyment social welfare and benefits 
existed in China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract 
system may not create a threat to the employees nor motivate 
their own initiatives.
Despite the fact that many employees voiced their adverse opinion 
against this new system in the Employee Representative Meeting 
(or AGM) held in February 1993 (which is supposed to the highest 
decision-making authority in a SOE with representatives from all 
levels of employees), SXSW decided to implement this contract 
employment system across the board in 1993. The contract 
durations will be various from one to three years subject to 
review and renewal. In addition to these employment contracts, 
SXSW has signed "in-post contracts" with most of the employees 
for periods from one to three years. This contract signifies 
that an employee is qualified for that specific post and he or 
she is eligible to receive wages, allowances and bonuses. 
Without such a contract, that employee is allowed to receive a 
basic monthly susidy of about RMB150. This measure may not 
impose a serious threat to the laszy employees, but it can 
motivate the marginal employees to work better.
In relation to the social welfare, since 1993, SXSW has been 
contributing 25.5% of the monthly gross payroll to the government 
for sharing the responsibilities of unemployment and retirement 
allowances. In addition, SXSW has to provide about 16% of the 
monthly gross payroll for various benefits such as medical and 
education. Furthermore, SXSW has to bear the pension and medical 
allowance for its retired employees (before 1994) which is a 
rather financial burden to the overhead expenditures.
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As a result of too many? redundant employees coupled with 
out-dated production facilities in most of the iron and steel 
enterprises in China, the productivity per employee is far lower 
than the steel industry in other Asian countries. Furthermore, 
the cost of manufacturing and selling prices are higher than the 
foreign counterparts, leading to substantial import of iron and 
steel products in 1993 and 1994 as mentioned in section 5.4(f) 
above. (Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts 
in Appendix 1.)
In summary, SXSW believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary f
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Shanghai Xinhu Iron Steel Work (SXSW) 
belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Very High/
High Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
Very High to 
High Corporate
High
Corporate
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
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* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell. *
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
Meaium xrpoira. u g -------
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\/
[Post-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Shanghai Xinhu Iron Steel Works (SXSW) before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been changed from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to 
"Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style.
Revised : 22 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t imate aim is to c l a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Huang Yan Qing/Finance Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 9 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 29 October 1993
Second Visit - 1 April 1994
Third Visit - 12 August 1994
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
The origin of Lonkey was Guangzhou Chemical Oil Refinary Factory 
which was established in 1959. The company's name has been 
changed three times in the past 3 5 years. At present, Lonkey is 
one of the largest cleaning consumables manufacturers in China. 
Lonkey was ranked in the top 500 Chinese Industrial enterprises 
in the years of 1990, 1991 and 1992. The current plant site is
located at the Eastern suburb of Guangzhou city occupying a 
total area of 100,000 square metres. The production capacity is 
able to manufacture over 50 product types of 100,000 tons of 
washing powder (clothing), 10,000 tons of soap and 20,000 tons of 
liquid detergent. In addition, it can produce two categories of 
industrial cleaning materials. The total output quantity was 
103,331 tons in 1992 and 120,000 tons in 1993.
1993 was a critical turning point of Lonkey since the Guangzhou 
municipal government has approved Lonkey as one of the first four 
state-owned enterprises in Guangzhou to issue shares to the 
public and list the shares in the Shanzhen Stock Exchange. This 
breakthrough has brought Lonkey more capital for future 
development and higher autonomy in operation and management.
The major performance indicators in 1992 had significant growth 
compared with the previous years. The "industrial output value" 
attained RMB354 million which represented an increase of 24.4% 
from 1991. The "turnover" was increased by 20.9% against 1991 
and achieved RMB397 million. Whereas, the "income before tax" 
was RMB46.15 million with a growth rate of 23.5%. After the 
transformation into a listed public company in 1993, the growth 
rates of output value, turnover and income before tax during the 
first six months were 24.4%, 34% and 43% respectively compared
with the same period in 1992.
Lonkey presently has 6 production lines, 12 servicing departments 
and 5 employee's collective companies. The total number of 
employees is 1,300 of which one-third of them are degree or 
diploma graduates and over 3 00 employees are holding professional 
titles. Lonkey has initially established a computer network
system integrating production and planning, sales, quality
control, material control, personnel and finance.
Other than the domestic sales (95%) to various provinces and 
cities, Lonkey has been approved the "import and export right" to
sell its products to North America, Western Europe, Africa,
Middle East, Hong Kong, Macau and other Southeast Asian 
countries. The newly reorgainised Marketing and Sales Department 
is drawing a blue-print to further promote its existing and new 
products to the diversified local and overseas market.
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Lonkey is manufacturing the following 3 major categories of 
products :
(1) Washing Powder
1.1 Ordinary Type
1.2 Condense Type
1.3 BIO Special Type
(2) Detergent Liquid
2.1 Kitchen Use
2.2 Bathroom Use
2.3 Toilet Use
2.4 Glass Use
2.5 Metal Use
2.6 Fabric Softener
2.7 Fabric Pre-wash
(3) Bathing Consumables
3.1 Soap
3.2 Foan Bath
3.3 Shampoo
3.4 Hair Conditioner
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since 1959 and it was converted into a 
shareholding enterprise and listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
on 8 November 1993 by issuing 15% of the authorized shares to the 
employees and 25% to the general public. The local government is 
the majority shareholder by holding 60% of the shares. A total 
of RMB140 million of share capital was raised to finance a series 
of long term projects.
Since Lonkey is a state-owned enterprise, it is under the 
administration of the Guangzhou Light Industrial Bureau. In 
responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism
Tranformation Regulations1 enacted by the People's Congress in
July 1992, the bureau has delegated the planning and control 
responsibilities to the top management of Lonkey to run their own 
business. Furthermore, the investment autonomy has been delegated 
and raising capital for project investment can be arranged by 
Lonkey on its own. The roles played by the Bureau are appointing 
the chief executives (i.e. chairman, general manager and party 
secretary), reviewing major capital investment projects and 
supplying information on government policies.
Lonkey's Board of Directors composed of the following members :
Chairman (also the General Manager)*
Vice-Chairman (also the Party Secretary)
Directors - 3 Deputy-General Managers
Chief Engineer
A Labour Union Representative
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* The terms of the chairman is usually 5 years. The board of 
directors usually hold a meeting every month.
Under the Factory General Manager, who has a General Manager 
Office, the organisation structure of Lonkey is as follow :
(1) Production Department (headed by a Deputy-General Manager)
1.1 No.l Washing Powder Factory*
1.2 No.2 Washing Powder Factory*
1.3 Soap Factory* @
1.4 No.l Liquid Detergent Factory* @
1.5 No.2 Liquid Detergent Factory*
1.6 Energy & Power Factory*
(2) Production Planning Department } (in-charged by the Chief
(3) Technical Support Department j Engineer)
(4) Engineering Department** J
(5) Research Department j
(6) Quality & Inspection Department }
(7) Marketing Department } (headed by a Deputy-General
(8) Sales Department j Manager)
(9) Import & Export Department }
(10) Purchasing Department J (headed by a Deputy-General
(11) Finance Department j Manager)
(12) Personnel Department j
(13) Security Department }
(14) Party & Labour Union Office
(15) Employee's Collective Companies#
15.1 Repair & Maintenance Service Company
15.2 Transportation Service Company
15.3 Industrial Trading Service Company
15.4 Packaging & Container Service Company
15.5 Human Resource Service Company
(16) Branch Office in Hong Kong##
* The five production factories and the supporting factory are 
all treated as profit centres having a factory manager, a deputy 
manager, a few supervisors, technicians and clerical staff. 
There are three 8-hour production shifts in each workshop. Each 
shift has a leader, deputy leader, group leaders and workers who 
are all concerning the production target setting very much. They 
all have entered into Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRCs) 
with the Factory General Manager on an annual basis.
** Mainly provides spare parts, repair and maintenance services.
@ The Soap Factory and No.l Liquid Detergent Factory were 
transferred into a joint-venture with the P&G Corporation of the 
USA in 1994. Therefore, they have become a separate legal entity 
and their IRCs were ceased in the same year. Their products are 
sold back to Lonkey for selling to the end-users.
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# The five collective companies are separated legal entities 
formed and managed by some; Lonkey's employees. In order to 
support the formation of these servi c i n g  or "tertiary 
enterprises", Lonkey has charged them the rent of premises and 
other facilities including energy and power provided. They are 
providing various supporting services to the production factories 
and other departments of Lonkey. They are free to sell their 
services to outside customers. However, they are not formally 
included in the organisation structure of Lonkey.
## The branch office in Hong Kong is responsible for importing 
raw materials (subject to 7% custom duties) for production in 
Guangzhou and exporting some final products to overseas 
countries.
Lonkey had a total of 1,450 full-time (including 1,000 workers) 
and 500 retired employees at the end of 1993. It is classified 
as a "medium size state-owned enterprise" in China. All the 
employees have signed "employment contracts" with duration from 
one to ten years since 1993.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB 279M (1993)®
Turnover : RMB 397M (1992)
RMB 53 0M (1993)
RMB 610M (1994)@@
Income before tax : RMB 3 0M (1992) - 7.6% of sales
RMB 43M (1993) - 8.1% of sales
RMB 44M (1994) - 7.2% of sales*
Income tax rate : 55% (before November 1993)
15% (from Novmber 1993)#
@ The total assets (fixed + current) have been revaluated once
when changing into shareholding in November 1993.
@@ The slow down of sales growth was due to keen competition of 
this industry in Guangzhou and Shenzhen with foreign invested 
joint-ventures such as from Hong Kong. In addition, the effects 
of macro-economic control policies implented by the government in 
July 1993 was surfaced out in 1994 and 1995.
* In light of high inflation in Guangzhou (30% in 1993 and 20% in
1994), Lonkey's profit margin was declined significantly in 1994. 
However, Lonkey is subject to some limitations from the 
government in raising the selling prices because its products are 
daily necessities for the general public.
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# Since Lonkey is a shareholding enterprise located in one of the 
14 economic development cities, it can enjoy a reduced income tax 
rate of 15% instead of 55% (before 1994) or 33% (from 1994) 
applied to the other state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, the 
VAT is 17% instead of the previous sales tax of 14% and as a 
result, the turnover tax has been increased by 0.5% as from 1993.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) signed the first 
5-year (1986-1990) ERC with the Guangzhou Finance Bureau in 1986. 
Based on the profits of the previous three years and substiantial 
negotiation, the first year target profit was set at RMB14.55 
million with an annual growth rate of 5%. The income tax for the 
target profit level was 55% and any excess profit over the target 
would be split 25/75 between the government and Lonkey. For 
example, at the end of 1986, the actual profit before income tax 
was RMB18.18 million, hence,
RMB'000
Actual profit before income tax 18,180
Target profit before income tax 14,550
Surplus profit before income tax 
25% split to the government
3, 630 
900
75% retained by the enterprise 2, 730
55% income tax on target profit (14,550 x 55%) 
25% surplus profit before income tax
8, 000 
900
Total profit and tax paid to the government 8, 900
Target profit retained by enterprise (14,550 x 45%) 
75% surplus profit retained by enterprise
6,550 
2, 730
Total profit retained by enterprise 9,280
Therefore, total resultant income tax rate = 8,900/18,180 = 49%.
Lonkey exceeded the profit targets in all the 5 years during the 
first ERC. In 1991, Lonkey signed the second ERC (1991-1995) 
with similar terms and conditions. This second ERC was 
terminated in November 1993 when Lonkey was transformed into a 
shareholding enterprise and no profit target has been assigned 
since then.
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The adoption of ERCS seperated the management autonomy out from 
the government and defined the duties, rights and benefits 
between the government and the enterprise. It has made Lonkey to 
be a self-operating, self-financing, self-developing and 
self-regulating enterprise and to initiate the motivation of the 
management and workers. After changing into a shareholding 
enterprise, more autonmy has been delegated by the government to 
Lonkey and almost all the policy and decision making are rest 
with the board of directors.
Compared the present Shareholding system with the previous ERC 
system, which one is better from the standpoint of the enterprise 
and the employee? The following scenario can explain the general 
opinion within the top management of Lonkey :
ERC System Share System
Assume (RMB1000) :
Actual profit before income tax -
Target 30,000 30, 000
Surplus 10,000 10, 000
40,000 40, 000
Income tax - ERC (Target 55%) (16,500)
(Surplus 25%) ( 2,500)
Share (15%) 6, 000
Profit after income tax 21,000 34, 000
Bonus from retained earnings (24 .3%) 5, 100
Dividend pay-out (100%) -
Employees (15%) 5, 100
Individuals (25%) 8, 500
Retained earnings 15,900
Government dividends retained as loan 20, 400
Loan interest (10.98% x 80% = 8. 784%) 1, 790
Total liability to government 22, 190
Observations :
(1) Assume the employees receive the same monetary benefit of
RMB5, 10 0,0 00 (i.e. ERC system in a form of bonus and
Shareholding system in a form of dividend pay-out).
(2) Government receives less tax in the Shareholding system.
(3) Under the ERC system, Lonkey has RMB15,900,000 retained 
earnings for future development.
(4) Under the Shareholding system, Lonkey has a total liablility 
of RMB22,190,000 in which the preferential loan interst 
(i.e. RMB1,790,000) has to be paid in cash annually, whereas 
the retained dividend portion will be payable any time upon 
demand by the government.
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(5) It seems that under the Shareholding system, Lonkey has more 
capital (in the form of loan) or cash to use, but bear in 
mind that it is a liability to the government and may be 
repay upon demand. However, under the ERC system, Lonkey 
has the full autonmy to use the retained earnings left 
behind.
(6) Furthermore, under the ERC system, Lonkey could charge the
bank loan repayment in the profit and loss account before 
income tax. But this income tax preferential treatment is
not allowable for the shareholding enterprises.
(7) For the long term growth, development and security, Lonkey's
top management prefer to the ERC system rather than the 
present Shareholding system. On the other hand, the 
employees are now shareholders and their motivation has been 
enhanced in terms of productivity and efficiency.
(8) Under the present Shareholding system, Lonkey can transfer
more profit after income tax to the "statutory capital 
reserve" and "general capital reserve", so that less 
dividend will be paid out and less government loan and 
interest will be incurred.
(9) The actual dividends paid.to the employees in 1994 for the 
year ended 1993 were RMBO.2 cash per 10 shares and 7 for 10 
bonus issue which could be sold in the stock market.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The guiding theme of the organisation structure of Guangzhou 
L o n k e y  I n d u s t r i a l  Co. Ltd. (GLIL) is s i m p l i c i t y  and 
accountability. It went to some length in 1992 to create 
stand-alone business units e.g.the 6 production factories as 
semi-independent profit centres that are controlled by individual 
f a c t o r y  m a n a g e r s  w i t h  c l e a r  l i n e s  of a u t h o r i t y  and 
responsibility.
Each production factory is manufacturing different product lines 
without any interaction and therefore they do not involved in any 
transfer pricing issues. The production support factory is 
providing energy and power to the production factories by 
charging at standard cost plus or market price.
The 5 employee's collective companies are providing various 
services to the production factories and other departments by 
charging at standard selling prices having profit margins in 
order to reflect the arm's length transactions.
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Since 1992, Lonkey has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each factory and department such as formulating 
their annual plans or budgets and negotiating the internal 
responsibility contracts. The production and cost control 
responsibilities primarily lie with the factory manager but the 
top management keep a surveillance quantity and quality control 
on each production factory through monthly or weekly report.
The selection and appointment of the chairman (also the general 
manager) and party leader (also the deputy-chairman) is still 
decided by the Guangzhou Light Industrial Bureau and a the 
previous "Factory Manager Responsibility System" under the ERCS 
has been waived. This system takes the Economic Responsibility 
Contract (ERC) as a basis to evaluate the performance of the 
factory general manager. If an outstanding or above target 
performance has been achieved, the factory manager will be 
awarded a predetermined lump sum bonus at the year end. Now 
under the shareholding system, the ultimate management 
responsibilities lie with the board of directors.
Since 1992, the factory general manager has full autonomy to 
appoint the deputy-general managers, chief engineer and the other 
departmental managers. Any major changes of the organisation 
structure in each division should be initiated by the 
deputy-general managers and approved by the general manager. 
However, more autonomy of internal management and operation has 
been delegated to the deputy-general managers and the chief 
engineer since 1992. And in turn, the deputy-general managers 
and chief engineer have involved their department heads more in 
planning, control and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, Lonkey has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual deputy managers report directly to the general 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
departments and the general manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 2  R e v ie w  P r o c e s s
Before changing into a shareholding enterprise in 1993, Guangzhou 
Longkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) has implemented a formal 
planning process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning the 
annual plan or budget and the internal responsibility contracts 
(IRCs). Before the annual planning process starts in October, the 
board of directors will discuss with the Guangzhou Light 
Industrial Bureau to ascertain the "profit before income tax" 
target which is the driving factor for the board and other senior 
staff to evaluate the internal and external environmental factors 
in order to determine the annual sales for next year. Based on 
these preliminary targets, some guidelines are provided to the 
factory managers and department managers to initiate their own 
annual plans or budgets. Much emphasis is placed on the 
production targets for the 6 production factories and the 
supporting factory which annual plans contained the key criteria 
to be used as the measurement yardsticks of their subsequent 
internal responsibility contracts.
Before the end of the calender year, all the factories and 
departments submit their annual plans to the Accounting and 
Finance Department for compiling the "financial plan" or "master 
budget" before submitting to the General Manager Office for 
review and discussion by the general manager with the deputy 
managers, chief engineer and department managers. At the 
beginning of the new year, a "Production & Operation Planning 
Meeting" will be held for two to three days in a venue outside 
the company so that all the top and middle management (at least 
one representative from each factory or department) can 
concentrate in discussing the annual plans and identifying any 
problems and gaps between the submitted plans with the targets 
perceived by the top management. The top management try to help 
the production factories solving their technical, financial and 
other problems in order to close the gaps as far as possible. 
Most likely all the annual plans including the financing plan 
would be compromised and agreed.
Then, further formal and informal meetings and discussions may be 
held between the general manager, deputy-general managers, chief 
engineer and factory managers either collectively or individually 
to fine tune the details of the annual plans. Eventually, all 
the annual plans and contracts are approved by the board of 
directors in early February. The approved annual production plans 
are broken down into quarterly and monthly plans to cater for 
demand and holiday factors. The financial plan and cash budget 
are also divided into quarterly pieces for control and evaluation 
purposes.
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Before 1992, the annual planning review process was not as 
systematic as described above and the government and in turn the 
top management gave directions to the factories and departments 
on what should be done over the next 12 months within the context 
of a few key indicators e.g. sales, production volume and mix, 
quality improvement, material and energy consumption, etc. Since 
1992, under the legislative changes and market economy promotion, 
the government has delegated higher automomy to Lonkey in 
formulating its strategic directions.
As a result, all the factories and departments are encouraged to 
participate in the planning process and extend their planning 
horizon beyond one year in order to match the milestones set in 
the 5-year long term plan. Therefore, the board of directors and 
general manager have inserted less interference in departmental 
planning decisions, but without reducing the tight financial 
control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
For all the times, Lonkey emphasizes that "quality" is the 
strategic theme or life of its products. Lonkey keeps on 
renovating its production equipment such as to acquire washing 
powder and soap production lines from Italy which are capable to 
generate world-class products. In order to enhance the 
competitiveness of its products, the production processes have 
adopted a "quality rejection" system so that to guarantee that 
all passed outputs attain national or international standards. 
Lonkey also periodically sends out quality assurance staff to 
sample inspect its products selling in the market and listen to 
the opinion of the consumers as means of quality control. 
Therefore, the passing out quality rate of all Lonkey's products 
is 100% and over 80% of its products have received various levels 
of quality awards. The washing powder has acquired the largest 
market share in Guangzhou.
Product development is a major strategic thrust focused by 
Lonkey. Its research and development department is the most 
powerful cleaning consumables laboratory in the Guangdong 
province.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 5 . 2 . 4 - 7  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in Lonkey still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and review process 
such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, marketing strategy 
and production quantity and mix in order to ensure the "profit 
before income tax" can be achieved. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given some freedom to the workshop managers and 
department heads to compile their own plans or budgets and to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they do not deviate 
much from the ultimate sales and profit targets.
The top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on a weekly and monthly basis and are quick 
to make suggestions if they do not match the overall long and 
short term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the establishment of Guangzhou Lonkey in 1959, it has 
followed the national 5-year's planning cycle and carried out the 
missions as assigned in every 5-year's plan directed by the 
municipal government under the central economic planning system.
The commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 started to allow 
Lonkey to participate in the 5-year's planning with the Guangzhou 
Light Industry Bureau but specific directives and suggestions 
were always coming from the top by using the term "macroeconomics 
control and adjustment" as an excuse.
The changing role of the bureau since 1990 has encouraged Lonkey, 
for the first time, to formulate their own long term strategic 
plan (1991-1995) . However, many internal factors and 
uncertainties have affected the validity and reliability of this 
long term plan which has been subject to review and changes every 
year.The long term plan was initiated and formulated by the board 
of directors and top management without much participation from 
the middle or lower management although they have been consulted 
during some occasions such as during the annual planning review.
Since then, the board of directors and top management 
subsequently reviewed the long term plan at the end of each year. 
Amendments have to be made in view of significant changes in the 
external environmental factors. Since the early 1990s, the 
following strategic directions have been laid down and will be 
carried forward in the 1996-2000 long-range plan.
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(a) J o i n t - V e n t u r e
Since 1993, Lonkey has entered into a joint-venture with the 
Porter & Gamble (P&G) of the USA to manufacture cosmetics and 
other cleaning products by taking over the Soap Factory and No.l 
Liquid Detergent Factory. P&G invested into cash capital of 
US$3 0 million while Lonkey invested into premises and production 
facilities at a market value of US$12 million. The production 
started in 1994 and the products are sold in China and exported 
overseas as well.
Since mid-1994, Lonkey has been exploring another joint-venture 
with a Japanese counterpart to manufacture a special detergent 
for kitchenware and a chemical by-product by taking over the No.2 
Liquid Detergent Factory. It is expected that new production mix 
would be started in 1995.
(b) Product Development
Other than the product differentiation strategy, Lonkey invested 
over RMB140 million (including bank loan) in 1994 to import a 
modern production line from Italy for manufacturing brand new 
detergent for cleaning kitchenware. This new production will 
enter into a joint-venture with a Japanese company as mentioned 
in (a) above.
(c) Production Capacity
The establishment of joint-ventures and internal expansion as 
shown in (a) and (b) above will increase the total production 
capacity from 130,000 in 1994 to over 160,000 tons per annum 
before 2000.
(d) Market Development
To penetrate into the domestic market, especially the southern 
provinces, and capture higher market share, Lonkey has 
established many sales agencies in the major cities in China and 
also in Hong Kong and Macau. In addition, the sales personnel has 
been seggregated into geographic teams with different marketing 
strategies and tatics including paying regular visits to the 
agents.
The IRC signed with the Sales Department links up the 
remuneration directly with the sales volume and the accounts 
receivable (or cash collected) in order to motivate the sales and 
marketing effort. To explore the overseas markets, such as South 
America, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Southeast Asia, 
is the most important task of the marketing and sales function in 
the next 5 to 10 years as perceived by the board of directors.
521
(e) M a r k e t in g  and P r o m o t io n
e
In parallel with the market development, marketing and promotion 
strategies are crucial to success in particular for the 
consumable products. Lonkey spent over RMB10 million in 
adver t i s i n g  alone during 1994 i n c l u d i n g  an attractive 
advertisement produced in Europe and broadcasted in the TV 
channels of Beijing, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Hong Kong and Macau.
(f) Diversification
After transforming into a shareholding and listed enterprise, 
Lonkey's board of directors have been agressively in planning for 
d i v e r s i f y i n g  the business portfolio. Other than the 
joint-venture development as mentioned in (a) above, Lonkey is 
planning other ventures which are related to or different from 
the present core business such as to purchase a premises for 
runnng a shopping mall. Furthermore, the five employee's 
cooperative companies (or tertiary enterprises) which are selling 
their services to the outsiders and expanding their own 
businesses by joint-venture and cooperation with other 
enterprises.
(g) Computerisation
Personal computers have been used intensively for production 
planning and control, sales recording, inventory control, 
financial accounting, annual planning, performance reporting and 
personnel recording purposes. The board of directors have 
recognised the importance of and efficiency in using computers. 
Lonkey is planning to instal a mini-computer and to implement a 
networking system before 2000. Of course staff education and 
training are the prerequisites.
(h) Sources of Capital
To finance the all the above long term project requires 
substaintial amount of capital. Apart from joint-venture capital 
and bank loan, Lonkey is planning to raise fresh equity capital 
through right issue in 1995 or 1996.
(i) Modern Enterprise System
In October 1993, one of the major themes thoroughly discussed and 
promulgated by the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party was the "Modern Enterprise 
System" which has the following five characteristics :
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(1) An enterprise (management and employees) should be a 
separate legal entity having ownership, usage and disposal 
rights of all the assets and also possesses the civil rights 
and responsibilities to insiders (i.e. shareholders) and 
outsiders.
(2) Having had all the legal rights of all the assets, the 
enterprise should be self-operated (full autonomy), 
self-financed (no government subsidy), subject to respective 
tax liabilities, and responsible to the owners (i.e. 
shareholders) in maintaining and increasing the net assets 
value of the enterprise.
(3) According the the amounts of investment, the enterprise's 
owners (i.e. shareholders) are entitled to the rights of 
profit distribution, important decision making and top 
management appointment.
(4) According to the market demand and supply, the enterprise 
should have the full autonomy to organise the production and 
operation in order to increase the employee's productivity 
and enhance economic efficiency. The government should not 
insert any interference.
(5) The enterprise should establish scientific leadership and 
management systems in order to balance the relationships 
among the owners, management and employees, initiate their 
motivation and define their duties and rights.
Establishing and implementing the modern enterprise system is the 
long term planning framework of Lonkey who has taken the first 
very important step - public listing. Conceptually, shareholding 
enterprises are more capable to achieve the above five 
characteristics in the present economic development stage in 
China.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Bureau has devolved its central planning role to 
individual enterprises under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the 
Lonkey's board of directors is very active to initiate and 
formulate its own long term plan but participation from the 
middle management is limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
{
The general short term planning policy adopted Guangzhou Lonkey 
Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) is "production determined by sales" 
and "sales determined by targeted profit before income tax" which 
means that profit before income tax, as agreed in the ERC (before 
1993) or in the BOD/AGM (from 1993) is the initial driving force 
of all the activities. After transforming into shareholding 
enterprise, reference has also be made to the 5-year plan 
especially to estimate what the sales potential will be from the 
joint-venture, new product and market situation in the next year. 
As from October 1992, Lonkey has employed the annual planning or 
budgeting process as described in Section 5.2 above.
Since October 1992, the production and department managers have 
been involved in this budgeting process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts with the general manager.
Other than the board of directors, all the annual plans and IRCs 
will be thoroughly discussed and compromised in the "Production 
and Sales Committee" meetings composed of top management and 
functional managers held every month during the planning cycle. 
Therefore, at least the middle management are actively involved 
in the annual planning exercise.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the budget 
review period has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The 
general manager, deputy managers and department managers hold a 
General Manager Office meeting at the beginning of each month to 
review the financial performance against the master budget and 
individual departmental budgets. Amendments are made when there 
are significant factors affecting the overall production, sales 
and profit targets.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given Lonkey more freedom to plan ahead. The government or 
bureau has completely devolved the short term planning autonomy 
to Lonkey. The top management have involved the middle management 
in the annual planning and budgeting process which on one hand is 
a critical step in materializing the long term strategic plan or 
the ERC, and on the other hand, it is an important motivational 
factor for the factory and department managers to manage their 
own businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
c
Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) started the Internal 
Responsibility Contract (IRC) System in 1986 in parallel with the 
first ERC. The most important financial target set in the IRC 
for the production factories is "internal profit" which is 
directly linked up with the total wages and bonus.
The following was an IRC which was applied for the two washing 
powder factories in 1993 :
Department : No.l (No.2) Washing Powder Factory
Year : 1993
Guidelines :
In order to further reduce the cost of production, to strengthen 
the internal management, to realise the development potential and 
to improve the economic efficiency, No.l Washing Powder Factory 
enters into this IRC with the General Manager to undertake the 
targeted internal profit which is linked with the total wages 
(including bonus) of the whole factory.
Economic Targets :
1993 1992 1991
Target Actual Actual
(1) Total Wages & Bonus
(2) Total Internal Profit*
(3) Wages & Bonus/Internal Profit %
(4) Internal Profit Growth %
* Internal Profit = Standard Turnover - Actual Cost of Production 
Standard Turnover = Actual Production Mix x Standard Selling
Prices
Actual cost of production include transfer prices for internal 
materials and services supplied.
Contractor's & Contractee's Responsibilities :
(1) If the contractee cannot achieve the internal profit target, 
for every RMB100 drop in profit, RMBXX of gross wages and 
bonus will be deducted.
(2) If the raw materials consumed are below predetermined 
standards, the material costs charged to the contractee's 
department should be 90% of the internal standard prices.
(3) The transfer price of the steam used should be standard cost 
plus 10% internal profit markup.
(4) The transfer price of the oil supplied by the Power & Energy 
Factory should be 97% of the listed price.
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(5) Due to changes of product formula, production facility
renovation (within 3 months after completion), and changes 
of personnel, the affected standard costs should be amended 
promptly in determining the internal profit.
(6) If the export washing powder exceeds the quantitative
target, the excess portion will raise the standard selling 
prices by Y% in determining the internal profit.
(7) For every ton of washing powder (clothing) output exceeding
the targeted quantity, RMB4 additional wages and bonus will 
be awarded to the contractee's department. (It is the usual 
practice to employ temporary workers to increase the 
production.)
(8) If the output of washing powder (others) exceeds the
targeted quantity, for every RMB100 of the excess internal 
profit, RMB2.8 additional wages and bonus will be awarded to 
the contractee's department.
(9) If the sales department cannot sell the contractee's output 
and cause production stoppage of one month, the headquarters 
(or contractor) will pay RMBXXX as wages to each employee of 
the contractee's department for that month.
If the contractee's internal profit greatly decreases and 
causes substantial reduction in wages to the employees, the 
contractor will ensure that a minimum annual wages of 88% of 
the previous year's average annual wages per employee to be 
paid to each employee of the contractee's department.
(10) The contractee should strictly comply with the safety 
production, birth control, security and discipline, and 
quality control policies. If any of the following events 
occurs :
10.1 fire, bribery, criminal offence, product quality 
failure causing financial loss of over RMB5,000;
10.2 environmental pollution and protection failure causing 
financial loss of over RMB5,000; and
10.3 death or serious injury of one time; then
the total wages and bonus (ceiling) of the factory manager 
and party secretary cannot exceed three times of the average 
annual wages and bonus (average) of the employees in the 
contractee's department.
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If any of the above events happens twice, then the "ceiling" 
(for factory manager and party secretary) cannot exceed two 
times of the "average" (for employees). If it happens three 
times or more, then the "ceiling" will be equal or less than 
the "average".
For other incidences, the award and penalty will be decided 
by the contractor according to relevant enterprise's rules 
and regulations.
It takes a few months for the general manager, factory managers 
and sales manager to negotiate with the terms and conditions for 
their IRCs signed in parallel with the planning process started 
in October until final approval by the board of directors in next 
February. In this negotiation process, the top management do 
insert influence and suggestion in order to ensure that the 
ultimate profit before income tax target can be made. The 
factory managers and even their shift and group leaders are very 
eager on this issue upon which they will be measured against and 
rewarded thereupon. The IRCs are reviewed monthly and revised if 
necessary in order to enhance the production management such as 
cost control, product mix, product quality etc.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
factory and department managers in initiating and negotiating 
their own IRCs, and also involved the accounting and finance 
department intensively as a vetting mechanism in order to set the 
targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Nedium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Since the five production factory of Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial 
Co. Ltd. is independent in manufacturing its own products without 
any transfer to other factories, the transfer pricing is not 
applicable. The energy and power supplied by the supporting 
factory to the production factories or other departments are 
using "standard cost plus mark up" or "market price" as the 
transfer prices. Similarly, the transfer prices of the services 
provided by the five employee's cooperative companies are mainly 
market prices because they have the ability to render their 
services to the outside customers after they have satisfied the 
needs of internal users.
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These transfer prices are mainly set by the headquarters, with 
the involvement of the accounting and finance department, and 
usually reviewed once every year during the annual planning 
process. The supplying and receiving departments would be 
consulted but without much room for negotiation in setting the 
IRCs.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Guangzhou 
Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd (GLIL) has four levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Board of Directors (many overlaps with top management)
(2) Top Management (general manager, deputy-general managers,
chief engineer)
(3) Middle Management (factory managers, department heads,
subsidiary managers)
(4) Lower Management (deputy managers, supervisors, leaders)
The deputy-general managers and the chief engineer can decide on 
their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (sections). 
They are also responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of emploment with any 
staff is a difficult task which will be explained in the rewards 
and incentives section.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the factories and departments are by 
using annual budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 
above, the most important measurement criteria are internal 
profit and production volume set in the IRCs, although some other 
qualitative targets (non-financial) are employed. However, these 
are subsidiary ones which have lower weightings in calculating 
the group wages and bonus.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Obviously, financial objectives are the major factors in the 
control mechanisms used in the decentralized operation of Lonkey.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Strategic" since 1992.
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s
Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) sets similar 
objectives for its production factories : factory managers must
meet their agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement 
in performance year after year except under adverse market 
conditions. The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual 
budget review. In view of the fierce competition within this 
industry and the bottom line (profit before income tax) imposed 
by the top management, the production factories sometimes feel 
passive in setting their objectives or targets in the budgets or 
IRCs because their activities are depending on the sales demand.
A high pressure to achieve the budgeted production and internal 
profit is put on the factory managers at the monthly review. They 
fully understand that their group wages and bonus are tied in 
with the budget or IRC and it also depends on the overall 
performance of the enterprise as a whole. In terms of expenses, 
control is tighter and a system of standard cost is going to be 
implemented. Although the other non-production departments do 
not have the IRCs, they are constrained by the allocated capital 
and revenue expenses budgets by the top management.
In addition to the formal monthly review process, many ad hoc 
m e e t i n g s  (sometimes on a w e e k l y  basis) and i n f ormal  
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) regards it as 
essential to catch variances from budget or IRC before they have 
gone too far. To this end the top management monitor results on 
a monthly and even weekly basis. All the factories, departments 
and subsidiaries submit monthly results on standard forms to 
their respective deputy-general manager, chief engineer and also 
to the finance manager for vetting and comparison with budgets 
and IRCs. The production factories are also required to submit 
production figures to the top management on a weekly or daily 
basis.
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The monthly report format i-s unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the budgeted line items 
from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted 
from this report. The weekly and monthly actuals are compared 
with the budgets and IRCs. The qualitative targets are usually 
subjectively measured by the deputy-general manager and chief 
engineer and written in the monthly reports as well. These 
monthly reports are compiled, some of them through the computer, 
by the accounting department. Any significant variances (without 
specifying tolerance limits) will be highlighted in order to 
bring the attention to the top management. Then all the monthly 
reports are submitted to the general manager for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general manager will contact with the respective deputy managers, 
chief engineer, factory managers or department heads to dig out 
the underlying reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the Monthly Performance Evaluation Meeting of the top 
management with the middle management, the factory and department 
managers will put forward the monthly results for open 
discussion. The factory and subsidiary managers may be asked to 
explain briefly the significant variances. Consistent failure 
(say over 12 months) in meeting the targets which are 
controllable by a factory or department manager, probably he will 
be replaced by somebody else. On the other hand, the favourable 
results will be openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the personnel department for calculating the group 
bonus of each factory and department for last month and verified 
by the accounting department. Then the accounting department will 
process the bonus payments at the end of the month (i.e. payment 
of monthly bonus is lagged by one month).
Now, Lonkey views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the factories and subsidiaries. The monitoring 
process is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management's close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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6 . 4  Rewards and I n c e n t i v e s  ?
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the Lonkey is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration. In 1994, Lonkey actually paid wages and bonus 
above the ceilings, the excess portion would not be income tax 
deductable.
The take-home pay of each employee in Lonkey is mainly composed 
of basic wages, bonus and allowances. After transforming into a 
shareholding enterprise, Lonkey has merged the basic wages and 
bonus together which is evaluated mainly according to the 
accomplishment of the IRCs for the production factories and 
supporting factory (see Section 5.6 above). The basic salaries 
of other non-production or servicing departments are based on 
grades and points on the scale, whereas the bonuses are linked up 
with the average bonus awarded to the workers such as using this 
figure and then multiplying by a rank index (i.e. general manager 
- 1.8, deputy manager - 1.6, factory manager - 1.5, supervisor -
1.3 etc.) and an adjustment factor of 0.9. Therefore, the 
parities of income between the front-line workers and management 
staff would not be great. A "management by objective" system is 
going to be implemented to evaluate the performance of the 
non-production staff.
It is up to the factory managers to award that lump sum of group 
wages and bonus to his or her individual subordinates according 
to post, seniority, skill and performance (see the evaluation 
grid as shown at the end of this section). The wages and bonus 
are distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis. In 
high pay months, 10% of the wages and bonus will be retained in a 
reserve in order to make up the low income obtained during the 
months with unsatisfactory performance. The average annual gross 
wages per employee was around RMB9,500 in 1993 and RMB12,000 in 
1994. Under the high inflation in Guangzhou (i.e. 30% in 1993 
and 20% in 1994) , Lonkey is expected to increase this average 
figure to RMB14,500 in 1995.
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There are two portions for the "allowance". The first part is 
determined by the Guangzhou Manpower and Wages Bureau at least 
once in each year mainly for the purpose of combatting inflation 
in food, transportation, gas and electricity. The second part is 
decided by Lonkey which may include housing, meals, travel, 
child, attendance, overtime, production stoppage, hair-dressing, 
festival gifts etc., which are trying to balance the relatively 
low basic wages or salaries and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
Since 1992, Lonkey has obtained the autonomy to recruit employees 
from the labour market without getting the Guangzhou Manpower 
Bureau involved (in accordance with the Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations). Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" 
(as a part of the ERC System), if there is an overall outstanding 
or above target performance, the Guangzhou Light Industry Bureau 
will award a lump sum of "special bonus" to the factory manager 
at the end of the year. But under no circumstances, the 
remuneration package of the factory manager can be greater than 
three times the total earnings of a department head (middle 
management). If the annual profit before tax can achieve better 
than the planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to 
all the employees and distributed in a way very similar to the 
monthly bonus.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees. 
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
will cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
Since 1993, Lonkey has fully implemented the employment contract 
system and also the "In-Post Contracts" with most of the 
employees for periods from one to ten years. This in-post 
contract signifies that an employee is qualified for that 
specific post and he or she is eligible to receive basic wages, 
allowance and bonus. Without such a contract, that employee is 
out of job but he or she is still an employee of Lonkey and is 
allowed to received a basic monthly subsidy of about RMB200. 
This measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy 
employees, but it can motivate the marginal employees to work 
better.
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In relation to the social welfare, since 1993, Lonkey has been 
contributing 25.5% of the monthly gross payroll to the government 
for sharing the pension scheme. Upon retirement of a worker, the 
government will fully responsible for the pension but not the 
medical allowance which is still a heavy burden borne by the 
state-owned enterprise. Other than the pension contribution, 
Lonkey has to provide over 16% of the monthly gross payroll for 
various benefits such as medical and education. To alleviate the 
heavy financial onus to the state-owned enterprises, the 
government is planning to request a 16%-18% employee's welfare 
contribution so that the government can underwrite most of the 
medical, unemployment, education, etc. allowances for the 
enterprises.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, Lonkey believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : sifht from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
Individual Employee's Performance Evaluation Grid
Y
High
5 D E
4
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2
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X
Low 0 High 100
X = Job Performance (usually score 0 - 100)
Y = Post & Grade (usually 5 grades in each post)
A = Low Remuneration Zone
B, C, D = Medium Remuneration Zone
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E = High Remuneration Zone 
Section 7 : Summary ?
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. 
(GLIL) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Review Process* Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Financial Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
Low Corporate
[I
(Strategic
Control)
\/
3ost-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Guangzhou Lonkey Industrial Co. Ltd. (GLIL) before and after 
1992, it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting 
Style" has been shifting gradually from "Financial Programming" 
(Pre-1992) to "Financial Control" (Post-1992) although it has not 
yet reached a strong-form (low corporate) of financial control 
style as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. It 
seems to be in the "middle of the road" between this two styles.
Revised : 23 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ult i m a t e  aim is to c l a ssify the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company 
(XLIG)
Staff Interviewed Miss Lin Chu Zhi/Deputy General Manager & 
Finance Manager
(No. of years in this enterprise : 8 years) 
Mr Ye Ren Chu/Administration Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 10 years)
Dates of Visits First Visit - 17 September 1993 
Second Visit - 14 September 1994
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B ack grou n d
The Xi a m e n  Beverage Fact o r y  was the largest beverage 
manufacturing enterprise in Xiamen established in 1985. On 8 
June 1993, Xiamen Beverage Factory merged with an old and small 
enterprise called Xiamen Preserved Fruits Factory to form the 
present Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company (XLIG) which is 
a state-owned enterprise. XLIG's core business is manufacturing 
and distributing various kinds and brands of beverage including 
softdrinks, milkdrinks, fruitdrinks and tea. XLIG also produces 
preserved fruits selling domestically as well as export to 
overseas countries to gain foreign exchanges.
XLIG is a holding enterprise (having 85 administrative staff in 
the headquarters) under which it has the following subsidiaries 
and joint-ventures :
(1) Xiamen Beverage Factory
1.1 Establishment date :
1.2 Ownership (Joint-venture):
1.3 No. of employees (1994) :
1.4 Products (Softdrinks) :
1.5 Output quantity :
1.6 Sales markets :
1.7 Turnover
1.8 Income before tax
1 April 1985
XLIG (45%) , Hong Kong Swire 
Bottle - Coca-Cola (55%)
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Coca-Cola, Sprite, Fanda (in can, 
bottle & condensed container) *
4 0,00 0 tons per annum 
domestic (Fujian, Guangdong, Jia- 
jiang, Suzhou, Northeast and some 
Western provinces)
RMB145 million (1993)
RMB200 million (1994)
RMB 11 million (1993)
RMB 18 million (1994)
* XLIG has entered into a franchaise contract with the Coca- 
Cola Corporation in the USA to manufacture and distribute 
the three brands of softdrink in China.
(2) Xiamen Preserved Fruits
2.1 Establishment date 
2.2. Ownership
2.3 No. of employees (1994)
2.4 Products
2.5 Output quantity
2.6 Sales markets
2.7 Turnover
2.8 Income before tax
Factory
31 December 1955 
wholly state-owned 
26
over 80 types of preserved fruits
4,000 tons per annum 
mainly domestic with some export 
RMB 8 million (1993)
RMB 7 million (1994)
RMB 15,000 (1993)
RMB 10,000 (1994)
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(3) Xiamen Huarong Food Factory
3 .1 Establishment date 1989
3.2 Ownership (joint-venture) XLIG (65%), Hong Kong (35%)
3.3 No. of employees (1994) 33
3.4 Products paperbag milk & fruit drinks
3.5 Output quantity 12,00 0 tons per annum
3.6 Sales markets domestic (to every province in 
China)
3.7 Turnover RMB45 million (1993) 
RMB60 million (1994)
3 . 8 Income before tax RMB 4 million (1993) 
RMB 5 million (1994)
(4) Xiamen Huayi Food Factory
4.1 Establishment date :
4.2 Ownership (Joint-venture):
4.3 No. of employees (1994) :
4.4 Products :
4.5 Output quantity :
4.6 Sales markets :
4.7 Turnover (1993)
4.8 Income before tax
1987
XLIG (31%), Beijing (17%),
Xiamen’ (17%), Japan (35%)
20
Chinese tea leaves
export (to Japan, Taiwan, Macau, 
Hong Kong & other Southeast Asian 
countries)
RMB 10 million (1993)
RMB 20 million (1994)
RMB 2 million (1993)
RMB 4 million (1994)
(5) Xiamen Huacheng Packing
5.1 Establishment date
5.2 Ownership
5.3 No. of employees (1994)
5.4 Products
5.5 Output quantity 
5 . 6 Sales markets
5.7 Turnover (1993)
Factory 
: 1993
: Collective owned with another 
enterprise in Xiamen 
: 25
: paper & cartoon boxes & packs for 
XLIG's products and external 
customers 
: 3 million square metres 
: other factories within the group 
and external customers in Xiamen
(6) Xiamen Luofang Trading Company
6.1 Establishment date
6.2 Ownership
6.3 No. of employees (1994
6.4 Services
6.5 Output quantity
6.6 Sales markets
6.7 Turnover (1993)
5 January 1993
Cooperative (owned by employees) 
61
shopping mall, import & export 
trade
provide services to subsidiaries 
of XLIG and external customers
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The headquarters and all the subsidiaries are located in the same 
location having a land area fof 48,500 square metres and building 
floor space of 59,300 square metres.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Xiamen Luquan Industries General Comapny (XLIG) has been a wholly 
state-owned enterprise since 1985 when the Xiamen Beverage 
Factory and Xiamen Preserved Fruits Factory were merged together. 
Since XLIG is a state-owned enterprise, it is under the 
administration of the Xiamen Economic and Trade Commission.
Being one of the five special economic development zones, 
Xiamen's state-owned enterprises have enjoyed not only 14 
favourable economic policies since early 1990s, but also the 
higher degree of freedom or autonomy to manage their own 
businesses including the planning and control systems employed by 
the enterprises.
In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Tranformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, the Xiamen Economic and Trade Commission has delegated 
the planning and control responsibilities to the top management 
of XLIG to run their own business. Furthermore, the investment 
autonomy has been delegated and raising capital for project 
investment can be arranged by the Commission and XLIG together. 
However, the commission is still in control of appointing the 
general manager and party secretary. Furthermore, major long 
term investment projects, such as the equity joint-venture 
agreement with the Hong Kong Swire Group (see section 5.4 below), 
have to been approved by the commission.
Since the early 1990s, XLIG's party secretary has inserted less 
and less influence on the planning and control systems. 
Basically, the roles played by the party secretary are as 
follows:
(1) to assist the general manager in the operation and 
management but not to interfere his leadership;
(2) to be consulted by the general manager in making long term 
investment decisions; and
(3) to help the general manager in implementing the determined 
plans and policies.
Under the General Manager, who has an Enterprise Management 
Office (mainly respo n s i b l e  for long term p l a n n i n g  and 
development), the organisation structure of XLIG's headquarters 
is as follow :
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(1) Finance Department (headed by a Deputy General Manager)
1.1 Accounting f 
1. 2 Internal Audit
1.3 Computing Centre
(2) Research & Technology (headed by a Deputy General Manager)
2.1 Product Research & Development
2.2 Production Technology & Facility
(3) Facility & Estate Department (headed by a Deputy General 
■ Manager)
2.1 Power & Gas
2.2 Building & Facility
2.3 General Supply
(4) Administration Department (headed by a Deputy General 
Manager)
3.1 Personnel
3.2 Safety & Security
3.3 Education & Training
3.4 Medical & Housing
3.5 Canteen
(5) Party Office (headed by the Party Secretary)
Under the headquarters of XLIG, the Xiamen Beverage Factory has 
the following decentralized structure :
(1) Factory Manager (in charge of sales as well)
(2) Deputy-Factory Manager (in charge of production, purchasing
and supply)
(3) Purchasing Department
(4) Production Department
(5) Quality Control & Inspection Department
(6) Sales Department
(7) Repair & Maintenance Department
(8) Accounting Department
(9) Personnel & General Affairs Department
The other three beverage, tea and packing material manufacturing 
factories have the similar organisation structure as above. All 
the factories and the trading company are treated as independent 
profit centres with high degree of operating, planning and 
control autonomy.
XLIG had a total of 540 working (including 50 administrative 
staff in the headquarters) , 40 not in post (non-working) and 130 
retired employees at the end of 1994. It is classified as a 
"small-size enterprise" in China. All the employees have signed 
"employment contracts" with duration from one to ten years since 
1993 .
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(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.) ?
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB 56M (1993)
Turnover : RMB 110M (1992)
RMB 208M (1993)
RMB 287M (1994)®
Income before tax : RMB 11M (1992) - 10 . 0% of sales
RMB 17M (1993) - 8.2% of sales*
RMB 27M (1994) - 9.4% of sales**
Income tax rate : 15%#
@ Market demand for the softdrinks exceeds the supply which 
requires the expansion of the production capacity in the 1990s.
* In light of high inflation (25% in 1993 and 20% in 1994) and 
wages increases in Xiamen, XLIG expects the profit margin will 
continue to be less than 10%. In order to maintain the profit 
growth, XLIG has to increase the production and sales volumes 
substantially in the next few years. Fortunately, XLIG does not 
have cashflow problem because most of the sales are "cash on 
delivery" especially during the peak (summer) seasons when 
demands for softdrinks are higher than supplies.
** The profit margin in 1994 was improved compared with 1993 
mainly because of great increase in turnover and selling prices 
for the products sold within Fujian province could be maintained 
at higher levels than the same products sold to the other 
provinces. Furthermore, production and management efficiency 
have been enhanced.
# Since Xiamen is one of the five Special Economic Development 
Zones, most of the state-owned enterprises are subject of 15% 
income tax instead of 33% applied to the enterprises in other 
cities.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
When Xiamen Beverage Factory (XBF), the major subsidiary of XLIG, 
was established in 1985, it signed the first 5-year ERC with the 
Xiamen Economic and Trade Commission. The first year profit 
target was set at RMB2 million which is subject to 55% of income 
tax. In. order to repay the initial bank loan, XBF was exempted 
from income tax in the first two years. In 1988, the terms were 
changed to 15% income tax rate and handing over 27% of income 
before tax to the government. For example,
541
RMB'000
Actual income before tax in 1988 8,000
27% handing over to government (2,160)
15% income tax (1,200)
Income after tax retained by XBF 4,640
Therefore, XBF was better off compared with the 55% income tax 
levied before 1988. Although, no formal ERC has been continued 
since 1990, XBF was still subject to the above terms until 1995 
when XBF became a equity joint-venture enterprise with Hong Kong 
Swire Group (see section 5.4(1) below). Suppose XBF's actual 
income before tax in 1995 is RMB26 million, then,
Swire Group XBF Total
(RMB1000) 55% 45% 100%
Actual income before tax in 1995 14,300 11,700 26,000
15% income tax (2,145) (1,755) (3,900)
2 7% handing over to government --- (3,159) (3,159)
Income after tax 12,155 6, 786 18,941
Compared with the pre-1995 type of ownership in which 100% of the 
income after tax was retained by XBF, the new equity 
joint-venture should at least double the turnover and profit in 
the next few years in order to be equal footing with the old 
joint-venture. This is very likely to be the case since the Hong 
Kong Swire Group will bring in not only capital for production 
capacity expansion, but also production and management technology 
as well. XLIG is aiming at the long term growth in terms of 
turnover, efficiency and profitability at the end of the day.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The guiding theme of the organisation structure of Xiamen Luquan 
I n d u s t r i e s  General C o m p a n y  (XLIG) is s i m p l i c i t y  and 
accountability. Since its formation in 1993, XLIG has retained 
the separate legal entities of all the factories and trading 
company under its umbrella and treated them as independent profit 
centres with clear lines of authority and responsibility with the 
headquarters.
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Since 1993, XLIG has been decentralizing the planning 
responsibility to each factory such as formulating their annual 
plans or budgets and negotiating the internal responsibility 
contracts. The production and cost control responsibilities 
primarily lie with the factory manager but the top management 
keep a surveillance quantity and quality control on each factory 
through monthly report.
The selection and appointment of the general manager and the 
party secretary are still decided by the Xiamen Economics and 
Trade Commission. The "Factory Manager Responsibility System" is 
in force. This system takes the Economic Responsibility Contract 
(ERC) as a basis to evaluate the performance of the factory 
manager. If an outstanding or above target performance has been 
achieved, the factory manager will be awarded a predetermined 
lump sum bonus at the year end.
The general manager has full a u t o n o m y  to appoint the 
deputy-general managers, factory managers and the other 
departmental managers. Any major changes of the organisation 
structure in each factory should be initiated by the factory 
manager and approved by the general manager. However, more 
autonomy of internal management and operation has been delegated 
to the factory managers since 1993 . And in turn, the factory 
managers have involved their deputies and management staff in 
planning, control and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, XLIG has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual factory managers report directly to the general 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
factories and the general manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the formation of Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company 
(XLIG) in 1993, a formal planning process for reviewing, 
discussing and sanctioning the annual plan or budget and the 
internal responsibility contracts (IRCs) has been implemented. 
Before the annual planning process starts in October, the general 
manager will discuss with all the deputy-general managers to 
ascertain the "profit before income tax" target which is the 
driving factor for the senior management group to evaluate the 
internal and external environmental factors in order to determine 
the annual sales for next year.’
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Based on these preliminary targets, some guidelines (sales and 
profits) are provided to the factory managers to initiate their 
own production plans or budgets. Much emphasis is placed on the 
sales and profit targets for the five production factories which 
annual plans contained the key criteria to be used as the 
m e a s u r e m e n t  y a r d s t i c k s  of t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  i n t e r n a l  
responsibility contracts. In September 1994, XLIG employed an 
external marketing company to perform a market research to
predict the demand patterns in the next few years.
At the end of November, all the factories submit their annual 
plans (mainly production, cost of sales, turnover and profit) to 
the Finance Department for compiling the "financial plan" or 
"master budget" before submitting to the Enterprise Management 
Office for review and discussion by the general manager with the 
deputy managers. The headquarters then holds a meeting in 
December mainly to discuss the gaps between the submitted plans 
with the targets perceived by the top management. The top
management tries to help the production factories solving their 
technical, financial and other problems in order to close the 
gaps as far as possible. Then, further formal and informal 
meetings and discussions are held between the general manager, 
deputy-general managers and factory managers either collectively 
or individually. This iterative exercise carries on until all the 
annual plans and contracts are mutually agreed by the general
manager and approved in the AGM (all the employees can attain)
held during January. The apporved annual plans will be broken 
down in quarterly budgets for control and review purposes.
The factory managers and in turn their subordinates (lower 
management) have been intensively involved in the annual planning 
process, and the general manager has inserted less interference 
in departmental planning decisions, but without reducing the 
tight financial control.
(Please refer to Q 5 .5.2, Q5.5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company (XLIG) has been 
promulgating "Quality" as the most important strategic theme in 
order to compete with the counterparts for the domestic market 
share on one hand and to explore the overseas markets on the 
other hand. As far as hardware is concerned, XLIG has imported 
some modern manufacturing plant and equipment from the European 
countries and Japan to replace the old ones since the late 1980s.
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Each factory has a quality control department responsible for 
designing policies, setting production and product standards, 
testing new products and providing training. The inspection 
section is responsible for controlling the input materials and 
output products quality, and enforcing the compliance of quality 
procedures in production.
In XLIG's company's information booklet, the following strategic 
thrusts are clearly written down :
(1) Company's goodwill and reputation must be maintained at all 
times.
(2) Every employee should be trustworthy and faithful to the 
company.
(3) Every employee should maintain good discipline in the 
company.
(4) Product innovation and development should be the life-blood
for compnay's growth.
(5) Economic efficiency should be enhanced year after year.
(6) Operation efficiency should be promoted at all times.
The above strategic themes and thrusts are mainly laid down by 
the top management but the factory managers have certain degree 
of freedom to promulgate some strategic ideas if they are not out 
of line with those prescribed by the headquarters. The top 
management follow the financial indicators and performance 
closely on monthly basis and are quick to make suggestions if 
they do not match the overall long and short term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 and Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High
Corporate" to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the early 1980s, the Beijing government adopted Deng Xiao 
Ping's idea, the Chief Architect of Chinese Economic Reforms, to 
set up five "Special Economic Development Zones" in the southern 
coastal cities of :
(1) Xiamen in Fujian Province (close to Taiwan);
(2) Zhantao in Guangdong Province (between Xiamen & Shenzhen);
(3) Shenzhen in Guangdong Province (close to Hong Kong);
(4) Zhuhai in Guangdong Province (close to Macau); and
(5) Haikau in Hainan Province/Island (close to Southeast Asian
countries).
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These five special economic development zones have been 
authorized by the central government to enjoy many favourable 
economic policies such as low tax rates or rebates, foreign 
exchange freedom, preferential bank loans, import and export 
autonomy, and generous land use rights etc., in order to attract 
billions of foreign investments and technology knowhow as well. 
Being one of the five special economic development zones, 
Xiamen's state-owned enterprises have enjoyed not only the above 
favourable economic policies, but also the higher degree of 
freedom or autonomy to manage their own businesses including the 
planning and control systems employed by the enterprises.
Xiamen Beverage Factory (XBF), the major member of XLIG was borne 
in April 1985 when the Xiamen's economic development has taken 
off and entered into the growing stage. By that time, the Xiamen 
Light Industry Committee started to allow the state-owned 
enterprises under its umbrella to actively participate in the 7th 
5-year (1986-1990) long term planning process with two major aims 
of introducing more foreign investments (i.e. from Taiwan and 
Hong Kong) and improving the economic benefits in terms of trade 
volume and foreign exchange. The subsequent 8th 5-year 
(1991-1995) long term plan has further encouraged XBF to initiate 
its own blueprint for development. The current 5-year plan is 
going to an end. XLIG is now planning for the next 5-year plan 
(1996-2000) as breifly described below in which some projects 
have been implemented in the past few years.
(1) Xiamen Beverage Factory
Since the formation of XBF on 1 April 1985, a 10-year cooperative 
joint-venture agreement has been signed with the Coca-Cola 
Corporation in the USA to manufacture and distribute a series of 
Coca-Cola's softdrinks including Coke (50%), Sprite (48%) and 
Fanda (2%). US Coca-Cola invested technology and management into 
this joint-venture. Equiped with the advanced production lines
from the USA, Xiamen Beverage Factory (XBF) can produce over 
40,000 tons of those softdrinks and packed in the forms of 
bottles, cans and PET condensed containers (after dilution 
becomes normal drinks). This beverage factory is the largest one 
in Xiamen as well as in the Fujian province and can generate over 
RMB150 millions per annum. In the past few years, this beverage 
factory has been awarded the following titles :
(a) ranked 22nd among the top 50 best economic efficient 
enterprises in Fujian province in 1991;
(b) ranked 19th in terms of output volume of all the beverage 
manufacturing enterprises in China in 1992;
(c) ranked 72th in terms of overall performance of all the 
industrial manufacturing enterprises in Fujian province in 
1992; and
(d) ranked 59th in terms of tax and profit of all the 
industrial enterprises in Fujian province.
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(e) ranked 4th among the top 10 best economic efficient 
enterprises in Xiamen in 1993.
The softdrink market in China is getting keener and keener since 
more and more foreign beverage companies have stepped into this 
largest market in the world. Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola are the 
two most famous and largest US corporations which have 
established franchaised operations in many big cities in China 
manufacturing and distributing their softdrink products. XBF is 
the sole franchaised agent for Coca-Cola in Fujian province but 
they are facing head to head competition from the Pepsi-Cola 
manufacturing plant in Fuzhou, the capital city of Fujian 
province and about 600 Km northwest from Xiamen.
To maintain the market share in Fujian, XBF spends over 
RMB300,000 to run two sales offices in Fuzhou and Zhangzhou of 
Fujian province. Apart from Pepsi-Cola, XBF is also competing 
with hundreds of other brands of softdrink products in China. 
XBF is aggressively expanding its domestic markets in Fujian 
province and try to keep about 30% of sales to other provinces. 
Another means is to sub-contract the production to a softdrink 
factory in Guangzhou and distribute the products within Guangdong 
province.
The joint-venture with US Coca-cola was expired and ceased at the 
end of 1994. On 1 January 1995, the Hong Kong Swire Group, which 
is the sole agent of Coca-Cola in Hong Kong, invested 55% of 
share capital into XBF to transformed the latter into an equity 
joint-venture. Although competition is fierce, yet the demand of 
softdrinks is higher than the maximum production capacity of XBF 
especially during the peak (summer) season when most of the sales 
are on cash on delivery. Therefore, XBF is planning to utilize 
the fresh capital injected from Swire Group to import three new 
proudction lines from Germany to increase the output by four 
times (170,000 tons) in the next 3 to 4 years. XLIG and Swire 
Group are discussing with the Xiamen government to acquire a 
location for building the new production premises*. As an interim 
measure, XBF spent over RMB3 millions (all came from retained 
earnings) in December 1994 to renovate the present two production 
lines in order to increase the production capacity by 20%.
The liquidity and cashflow situations are quite satisfactory, 
except RMB20 million of bank loan for working capital, XPF does 
not have any long term bank loan nor any significant doubtful 
debts.
* Eventually, a piece of land with an area of 70,000 square 
metres located in the Fangwu Industrial District was acquired in 
late 1995 and started the building construction in March 1996. 
It is expected the three new production lines imported from 
Germany will increase total annual production to 170,000 tons 
with an annual turnover of RMB500 million.
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(2) Xiamen Preserved FruitsfFactory
The Xiamen Preserved Fruits Factory (XPF) was formed on 31 
December 1955 when 8 small private factories in this industry 
were merged together. In the past 40 years, renovation and
improvement of the premises, production facilities and technology 
have developed over 80 types of preserved fruits with an annual 
production capacity of 4,000 tons selling domestically and 
overseas. The grape and peach products have been awarded.the 
silver and bronze medals respectively in the China First Food 
Expo. Hygenic production is the major thrust of this factory 
which has been well approved by the Fujian Provincial Consumer 
Association and was awarded as an Advanced Enterprise in 1989.
In view of the keen competition in this industry and the overall 
decline in demand of preserved fruits domestically and overseas, 
XLIG is reducing gradually the output variety and volume of XPF 
and transfer the resources into the Xiamen Beverage Factory.
(3) Xiamen Huarong Food Factory
Xiamen Huarong Food Factory is a joint-venture between Xiamen 
Beverage Factory, Hong Kong Xianing Enterprise Ltd. and Hong Kong 
Huashan Trading Ltd. The major products are paperpack fruit and 
milk drinks. Since the installation of a Swedish production line 
in 1989, the production quantity and efficiency have been grown 
at a rate between 30% - 50%. In 1995, this factory has equiped 3 
Swedish made TBA-9 production lines and has reached an annual 
production capacity of 12,000 tons. The major thrusts of this 
factory are developing at least a few products every year and 
penetrating into new domestic markets. It has become one of the 
largest beverage manufacturing enterprises of this kind in the 
Fuj ian province.
XLIG is discussing with a Taiwanese counterpart to form a US$2.5 
million worth joint-venture to produce new beverage products in 
Guangzhou.
(4) Xiamen Huayi Food Factory
Xiamen Huayi Food Factory is a joint-venture established in 1987 
between Xiamen Beverage Factory, Xiamen Tea Import & Export 
Branch Company, Beijing Tea Import & Export Holding Company and 
two Japanese tea manufacturing companies. Having installed 
advanced production plant imported from Japan, this factory can 
refine a .kind of tea leave called Ulong which is 100% exported to 
Japan and other Souteast Asian countries. This joint-venture is 
the only entity having had the import and export right in XLIG.
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(5) Xiamen Huacheng Packing Factory
{
Xiamen Huacheng Packing Factory was established in 1993 by Xiamen 
Luofang Trading Company (55% owned by employees of XLIG) and 
Xiamen Packing General Factory (45% owned). This factory has a 
production capacity of 3 million square metres of different 
packing materials which can satisfy not only the requirements of 
other factoris within XLIG, but also can accept orders from 
external customers.
(6) Xiamen Luofang Trading Company
Xiamen Luofang Trading Company registered on 5 January 1993 in 
the Xiamen Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau and 
owned by the employees of XLIG. It is a sel f - m a n a g e d , 
self-financed and separated legal entity located in the premises 
of XLIG. The business units of this company or tertiary 
enterprises include investment department, trading department, 
industrial development department, three small department stores 
and a few retailing shops. This company makes use of the 
favourable economic policies granted by the Xiamen government and 
the strong support of XLIG to diversify the business portfolio 
into different industries. The commodities traded by this 
company include the beverage and food produced by XLIG, oil and 
foodstuff, daily necessities, metallurgical products, electrical 
components, chemical products and food manufacturing technology 
transfer. XLIG is still applying for the import and export right 
for this company in order to expand the business portfolio.
(7) New Joint-Venture
Since the late 1994, XLIG has been discussing with a large and 
famous French wine manufacturer to enter into a new joint-venture 
in producing grape wine in Xiamen. Market research is undertaken 
in order to perform the SWOT analysis at a later stage. If 
predictions and forecasts are positive, it is expected that 
operation will be started in 1996.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the Xiamen Commercial and Trade Commission has 
devolved its central planning role to individual enterprises 
under its umbrella since 1992. Now, the top management of XLIG 
is taking the initiative to formulate its own long term plan and 
the middle management (i.e. factory managers) is involved as 
well.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
c
The general short term planning policy adopted by Xiamen Luquan 
Industries General Company (XLIG) is "production determined by 
sales" and "sales determined by targeted profit before income 
tax" which means that profit before income tax, as agreed at the 
very beginning of the annual planning process, is the initial 
driving force of all the activities. Although the demand of 
Coca-Cola softdrinks is greater than supply in the South China 
market, yet cautious has to be made to guard against other 
similar franchaises granted by Coca-Cola and other competition 
from substitute products. Reference is also made to the 5-year 
plan especially to estimate what the sales potential will be from 
the new product and market situation in the next year. As from 
October 1993, XLIG has employed the annual planning or budgeting 
process as described in Section 5.2 above.
Since October 1993, the factory managers have been involved in 
this budgeting process which they believe to be important in 
setting and negotiating the subsequent internal responsibility 
contracts with the general manager.
Apart from the annual plans of the individual factories, the 
financial or master budget does not involve too much from the 
other departments in the headquarters, but largely based on the 
guidelines from the top management and the experience of the 
finance manager. Eventually, the other departments in the 
headquarters are constrainted by their allocated expense budgets. 
Therefore, it is quite a top-down process in terms of expense 
budget and also the capital budget for the factories as well.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the budget 
review period has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The 
general manager, deputy-general managers and factory managers 
hold a formal meeting at the beginning of each month to review 
the financial performance of each factory against the breakdown 
monthly budget. Amendments are made when there are significant 
factors affecting the overall production, sales and profit 
targets.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given XLIG more freedom to plan ahead. The Xiamen 
Commercial and Trade Commission has completely devolved the short 
term planning autonomy to XLIG.
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The top management have involved the factory managers and also 
their subordinates, in the annual planning and budgeting process 
which on one hand is a critical step in materializing the long 
term strategic plan, and on the other hand, it is an important 
motivational factor for the factory managers to manage their own 
businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company (XLIG) started the 
Internal Responsibility Contract (IRC) System in 1994, the year 
after the establishment of the holding company. The following is 
a breif description of the IRC for the Xiamen Beverage Factory in 
1994 :
Department : Xiamen Beverage Factory
Year : 1994
Guidelines :
This IRC is designed to enhance the economic efficiency of the 
beverage factory by assignment of respective responsibilities and 
delegation of appropriate authorities to the management. The 
incentive scheme is linked up with the achievement of the targets 
set in this IRC.
Production Targets :
(1) Quality & Management
1.1 Production Quality (40% of incentive bonus)
(according to Coca-Cola US standards)
Standard Score
Sugar concentration 20
Carbonation 20
Liquid purity 20
Metal cover 14
Liquid surface height 12
Capacity (per unit) 12
Distilated water 10
Bottle washing water 10
Waste water processing 10
External packaging 8
Consumption date & bar code 6
Carbonated water 5
Total Standard Score 147
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If Actual Score/147 > 94%, then 100% bonus will be awarded.
1.2 Production Management (60% of incentive bonus)
Standard Score
Production Safety 
Product quality 
Operation control
20
20
15
15
15
15
Production scheduling 
Production facilities 
Production technology
Total Standard Score 100
If Actual Score/100 > 90%, then 100% bonus will be awarded.
(2) Material Consumption
If the raw materials consumed exceed standards, 10% - 15% of 
the total inventive bonus will be deducted.
Sales Targets :
The bonus for the sales personnel will depend on the volume of 
sales and the cash collected in the accounts receivable.
It takes two to three months for the general manager and the 
factory managers to negotiate with the terms and conditions for 
their IRCs signed in parallel with the planning process started 
in October until final approval by the annual general meeting in 
next February. In this negotiation process, the top management do 
insert influence and suggestion in order to ensure that the 
ultimate profit before income tax target agreed with the budget.
The factory managers and their subordinates are very eager on 
this issue upon which they will be measured against and rewarded 
thereupon. The IRCs are reviewed quarterly and revised if 
necessary in order to enhance the motivation and incentive.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
general managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, 
and also involved the finance department intensively as a vetting 
mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
f
Except the Xiamen Huacheng Packing Factory (XHPF), all the other 
production factories of Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company 
(XLIG) are independent in manufacturing thier own products 
without any transfer to other factories. The packing materials 
supplied by XHPF internally are charged at the market prices less 
a small percentage for the savings of selling and administration 
expenses. The ultimate transfer prices are determined by the 
negotiation between the seller and buyer without interference 
from the XLIG.
Section 6 : Control System
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Xiamen Luquan 
Industries General Company (XLIG) has three levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (general manager, deputy-general managers)
(2) Middle Management (factory managers and department heads)
(4) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-general managers and the factory managers can decide 
on their own divisional structures, staffing and their roles and 
functions, and interactions between their sub-units (sections). 
They are also responsible for certain personnel functions such as 
recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation and remuneration 
(distribution of bonus). But termination of emploment with any 
staff is a difficult task which will be explained in the rewards 
and incentives section below.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the factories are by using annual 
budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the most 
important measurement criteria are material consumption, 
production quality and management which are all non-financial, 
whereas the major financial measurement is sales volume. 
Provided the turnover can be increased and materials consumption 
(the largest cost item) can be controlled constantly, then profit 
will be increased. Therefore, the headquarters applies strategic 
contol on the factories more than the financial control with a 
belief that the achievement of the latter depends on the former's 
success.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from  " F i n a n c i a l  C o n t r o l"
t o  "M oderate  S t r a t e g i c  C o n t r o l "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
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6 . 2  A g r e e i n g  O b j e c t i v e s
Xiamen Luquan Industries General Company (XLIG) sets similar 
objectives for its production factories : factory managers must
meet their agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement 
in performance year after year except under adverse market 
conditions. The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual 
budget review. In view of the fierce competition within this 
industry and the bottom line (profit before income tax) imposed 
by the top management, the production factories sometimes feel 
passive in setting their objectives or targets in the budgets or 
IRCs but they are given the autonomy to decide the marketing, 
selling and promotion strategies to achieve the targets.
A high pressure to achieve the budgeted production and internal 
profit is put on the factory managers at the monthly review. They 
fully understand that their group bonus are tied in with the 
budget or IRC and it also depends on the overall performance of 
the enterprise as a whole. Although the other departments in the 
headquarters do not have the IRCs, they are constrained by the 
allocated capital and revenue expenses budgets by the top 
management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Xiamen Luquan Industries General Comapny (XLIG) regards it as 
essential to catch variances from budget or IRC before they have 
gone too far. To this end the top management monitor results on
a monthly basis. All the factories submit monthly results on
standard forms to the Finance Department for vetting and 
comparison with budgets and IRCs. In order to measure the total 
economic performance of each factory, the management expenses in 
the headquarters are apportioned to the factories according to 
sales or turnover.
The monthly report format is unique for each department. The 
contents are mainly corresponding with the budgeted line items 
from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can be extracted 
from this report. The monthly actuals are compared with the 
budgets and IRCs. The qualitative targets are usually 
subjectively measured by the factory manager and enterprise
management office and written in the monthly reports as well.
These monthly reports are compiled, through the computer, by the 
Finance Department and Enterprise Management Office.
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Any significant variances (without specifying tolerance limits) 
will be highlighted in order to bring the attention to the top 
management. Then all the monthly reports are submitted to the 
general manager for review. For any serious adverse variances 
shown on any report, the general manager will contact with the 
respective deputy managers and factory managers to dig out the 
underlying reasons or ask them to perform investigation 
immediately. It is expected that corrective actions can be taken 
to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the Monthly Performance Evaluation Meeting of the top 
management with the middle management, the factory managers will 
put forward the monthly results for open discussion. The factory 
managers may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances. Tolerance is allowed for the factory managers to fail 
the budgets or targets for some months in a year provided they 
have the strategies and tactics to meet the budget at the end of 
the year. After the monthly meeting, all the approved results 
will be passed back to the finance department for calculating the 
group bonus of each factory for last month.
The importance of computerization is well recognised by the top 
management and a mini-computer was installed in July 1994. A few 
stand-alone personal computers have been used for production 
control, financial and management reporting, personnel, sales and 
wages. A comprehensive programme is on the way to implement a 
network system and provide education and training to the 
employees.
Now, XLIG views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the factory. The monitoring process is used to 
maintain the pressure for performance. Top management's close 
surveillance of results enables them to ensure that no department 
goes too far astray before remedial action is taken. It also 
gives top management an understanding of the reasons for 
variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
555
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the state-owned enterprises are 
allowed to increase the wages and bonus payable to its employees. 
This rule is trying to motivate all the employees to enhance the 
productivity, efficiency and profitability in order to increase 
their remuneration. In 1994, the Xiamen government allowed XLIG 
to break away from these two ceilings and free to determine the 
wages and bonus to be paid out, however, if XLIG actually pays 
wages and bonus above the ceilings, the excess will not be income 
tax deductable.
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System" (as a part of 
the ERC System) , if there is an overall outstanding or above 
target performance, the Xiamen Commercial and Trade Commission 
will award a lump sum of "special bonus" to the factory manager 
at the end of the year. But under no circumstances, the 
remuneration package of the factory manager can be greater than 
three times the total earnings of a department head (middle 
management). If the annual profit before tax can achieve better 
than the planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to 
all the employees and distributed in a way very similar to the 
monthly bonus.
The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB9,000 
in 1993 and RMB11,500 in 1994. Under the current high inflation 
rate (over 22% in 1993 and 1994) and the keen competition in the 
labour market of this industry, it is expected to increase the 
average annual gross wages to RMB14,000 in 1995.
The "basic wages" is reviewed annually depending on grade, 
seniority, qualification and skill. There are totally eight 
grades in the wages scale and there are some points in each grade 
for annual increase of wages but the parity between two 
consecutive points is only RMB10-20, therefore, it is not
substantial enough to catch up with the inflation. Obviously,
the bonus is the major source of income which is determined 
according to the IRC.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Xiamen government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combation of 
inflation. The amount was about RMB90 in 1994. The second part 
is decided by XLIG which may include housing, meals, travel, 
education, attendance, overtime, festival gifts, shift (two
shifts of 11 hours each) etc. The payment of "allowances" is 
trying to balance the relatively low basic wages and maintain a
reasonable standard of living for the employees.
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The calculation of "bonus", as described in section 5.6 above, is 
based on the degree of accomplishment of the IRC. An IRC signed 
between the general manager and a factory manager will decide 
what level of group bonus will be given to the factory as a 
whole. It is up to the factory manager to award that lump sum of 
group bonus to the production sections and then to every workers 
according to individual performance- The bonus awarded to the 
administrative or non-production staff is calculated as follow :
worker's monthly average bonus x 80% x grade index* x performance 
score#
* Different positions have different grade indexes such as 
general manager = 1.8, deputy-general manager = 1.6, factory 
manager = 1.5, deputy-factory manager = 1.4, foreman = 1.3, etc.
# Performance score is evaluated by the superior of each employee 
and the maximum is 100%.
The 80% is a buffer in order to maintain the staff's bonus (about 
55% of the total wages) relatively close to the worker's average. 
The bonus is distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly 
basis but a certain percentage (10%-20%) will be retained in a 
reserve in order to make up the low bonus obtained during the 
months of slack season.
In addition to the remuneration paid to the servicing employees, 
as from 1994, XLIG has to pay 25.5% of the monthly gross wages 
and salaries to the governemnt for pension contribution. 
Furthermore, the other benefits in kind, such as medical and 
education allowances, account for about 16% of the monthly gross 
wages and salaries. XLIG also transfers 8% of the income after 
tax to an "employee's welfare reserve" for some capital 
expenditures such as building dormintory for the employees. 
These life-long responsibilities, including all the retired 
employees, is common to all the state-owned enterprises and 
sometimes it is adding a significant financial burden to the 
profit and loss account.
One, of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's employees. 
However, . to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
will cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
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Since 1993, XLIG has only implemented the employment contract 
system with the non-manufacturing employees for periods from one 
to ten years. After a certain trial period, XLIG is expected to 
extend this system to the production workers in the near future 
as well. When XLIG was established by merger in 1993, over 40 
redundent employees have sent home although they are still 
receiving the basic wages and allowances (about RMB300 per 
month). The minimum wages per month for the working employees 
was RMB300 and RMB150 for the out-of-job employees as fixed by 
the Xiamen government in 1994.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, XLIG believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Finance Control"
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992
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S e c t i o n  7 s Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Xiamen Luquan Industries General Factory 
(XLIG) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Review Process* High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High/High 
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Financial Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on th?e "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate
Medium Corporate-
Low Corporate
^Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
[Post-1992]<-
(Strategic
Control)
^Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the Xiamen 
Luquan Industries General Company (XLIG) before and after 1992, 
it can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
has been shifting gradually from "Financial Control" (Pre-1992) 
to "Strategic Control" (Post-1992) . Although it has not yet 
reached a strong-form (low corporate) of Strategic control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style, it is 
moving towards the "Strategic Control" style.
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t i m a t e  aim is to c l a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic
Financial
Strategic
Financial
Programming(1) 
Programming(2) 
Control (3)
Control (4)
Name of SOE 
Staff Interviewed
Dates of Visits
Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill (BCM3)
Mr Hsu Ching Soon/Chief Accountant 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 3 8 years)
First Visit - 4 September 1993
Second Visit - 31 August 1994
Third Visit - 13 September 1995
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B ack grou nd
Beijing N o . 3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) is a large, cotton cloth 
export-oriented enterprise established in 1956 and started 
production since May 1957. It possesses 120,980 ring spindles, 
over 3,200 looms, 11,240 twisting spindles, and 1,600 open-end 
heads. The main products are cotton and T/R yarn, cotton and T/R 
cloth of full widths, cotton ramie yarn as well as Vinylon and 
Jinlun products. The annual production capacity is 23,000 tons 
of cotton yarn and 90 million metres of cotton cloths. BCM3 is 
also a major foreign currency earning enterprise, with annual 
export volume of 50 million metres of grey cotton cloth which can 
earn over US$40 million.
Products of BCM3 are exported mainly to European Common Market, 
accounting for 25% of total Chinese cotton cloth export to 
Europe. The products are also popularly received by overseas 
clients in the USA, Canada, Africa and Southeast Asian countries 
and regions. BCM3 enjoys a good reputation in the international 
market.
BCM3 upholds the principle of "customer first and quality first". 
Bearing in mind that quality is the life of the mill, BCM3 has 
been devoting to promote the quality of its products. Over 20 
types of yarn and cloth have won national, municipal and 
ministerial prizes. Its Tex29 grey cotton cloth series which is 
mainly for export once won national gold prize, and Peng Chentex
19.5 and 29 grey cotton plain cloth series are highly acclaimed 
by the overseas clients.
BCM3 attaches great importance to its equipment renovation. 
During the current 8th 5-year plan (1991 - 1995) , BCM3 has
imported and will continue to import a great deal of advanced 
technology and critical machine parts from Germany, Switzerland 
and Japan. To become more competitive, BCM3 is stepping up the 
efforts for technical renovation. When the overall technical 
renovation plan is fulfilled at the end of 1995, SCM3 will be 
equiped with the advanced fore-spinning equipment of the 1990s, 
and other machinery of the 1980s to 1990s. The quality of 
finished cotton yarn will reach upper middle international level. 
The international standard will be adopted for grey cloth 
production, and indirect weft will be used, consequently, the 
quality will reach level "A".
BCM3 pursues modern management methods. Its management technique 
is improving steadily. Among its counterparts in Beijing, it is 
the only, one which has been awarded the state's first grade 
enterprise. As one of the major textile enterprises in China, 
BCM3 has provided a large number of execellent products to the 
clients at home and aborad.
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Unlike the last few decades, the demands of textile products, in 
particular the old cotton mills such as BCM3, in China have been 
declining since the early 1990s due to the following reasons:
(1) The production plants and equipment are rather out-dated 
such as before 1994, BCM3 were still using very old machines 
manufactured in the 1940s and 1950s. Productivity, 
efficiency and quality of these retiring machines were low 
compared with the other developed countries like the USA, 
Japan and Europe or even the many newly developed 
small-sized cotton mills located in small towns and cities 
all around China which have the ability to import advanced 
equipment and machines from overseas.
(2) Lacking of capital, either coming from retained earnings or
bank loans, makes the large- and medium-sized and 
long-established cotton mills unable to renovate their 
out-dated plants and equipment. Therefore, they can mainly 
manufacture lower quality or class of products and only a 
small portion of them belong to the higher counts for 
further processing into high quality products such as the
shirts and T-shirts with famous brand names.
(3) The surging of too many small-sized township cotton mills 
increases the total national supply in excess of the total 
national demand of cotton yarn by one-third in 1995. Under 
this unfavourable situation, the old cotton mills including 
BCM3 can hardly compete with them in terms of price and 
quality.
(4) As the cost of production of the textile mills all along the 
coastal provinces in China is getting higher mainly due to 
inflation on raw materials, labour wages, electricity, 
depreciation and bad debts, the central government decided 
in 1995 to transfer a quarter of all the textile production 
capacity from the east-coast to the inland provinces such as 
Qinghai and Xinjiang where abundant of cotton is produced at 
cheaper costs. As a result, over a million of textile 
workers will be redundant in the next few years.
The following are some factors hindering the market development 
of BCM3's own products and then the derived product (i.e. cloth):
(1) the quality of the final products manufactured by the
clothing industrial customers cannot attain international 
standards and compete with overseas competitors although the 
cloth produced by BCM3 is among the top three in Beijing;
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(2) many small- and medium-sized cotton mills in other 
developing cities a n d f economic zones are enjoying some 
favourable policies, such as low import and export taxes, 
given by the municipal government so that they are very cost 
competitive; and
(3) therefore, BCM3 product selling prices may not be competable 
with the younger and smaller brothers and sisters in this 
industry.
Depsite of the above unfavourable conditions, the goodwill of 
BCM3 has been well established mainly due to its quality 
products, high technology and good management. It is ranked 
within the top three cotton mills in Beijing.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Beijing No. 3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) has been a wholly state-owned 
enterprise since 1956 and previously under the administration of 
the Ministry of Textile in Beijing which was transformed into the 
National Textile Industry Council in 1994. All the cotton mills 
and related industries such as textile machines manufacturing are 
treated as subsidiaries under the Council which is one of the 8 
institutions under the State Council and has less political 
influences on its member enterprises.
The major role played by the Council, which is similar to a trade 
association, is to control the supply of cotton (raw materials), 
total number of employees and appointment of the top management 
such as general manager and party secretary of each member 
enterprise under its umbrella. Another important function of the 
Council is raising capitals for the approved projects or 
investments initiated by the member enterprises. Despite the 
latter fact, BCM3 has the autonomy to obtain bank loan 
independently.
Before the economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning 
system dictated all the planning and control systems of the 
state-owned enterprises. Therefore, BMC3 acted just as a vehicle 
(or cost centre) to carry out the activities according to the 
commands directed from the Ministry of Textile. Since the 
economic reform started in 1979, instead of dictatorship from the 
bureau, BCM3 has been involved in the 5-year long range plan even 
though BCM3 for most of the time had to take the directives from 
and give in their negotiations to the authority.
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Since the promulgation of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations"' by the People's Congress in July 
1992, the National Textile Industry Council has fully delegated 
the management autonomy to SCM3 to manage its own business such 
as the short term planning and operation like purchasing, 
production and sales.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Under the Factory General Manager, who has an Enterprise 
Management Office, the organisation structure of BCM3 is listed 
as follow :
1. Production Division (headed by a Deputy-General Manager)
1.1 No.l Spinning Factory*
1.2 No.2 Spinning Factory*
1.3 No.3 Spinning Factory*
1.4 No.4 Spinning Factory*
1.5 No.5 Spinning Factory (Macau Joint-Venture)
1.6 No.l Weaving Factory*
1.7 No.2 Weaving Factory*
1.8 Production Support Factory (supplying electricity, gas, 
consumables, spares, tools etc.)**
1.9 Technical Support Department (headed by Chief Engineer)
1.10 Production Facilities Department (headed by CE)
1.11 Quality Control Department (headed by CE)
2. Operation Division (headed by a Deputy-General Manager)
2.1 Purchasing Department
2.2 Supplies Department
2.3 Sales Department
2.4 Accounting & Finance Department (headed by Chief 
Accountant)
3. Administration Division (headed by a Deputy-General Manager)
3.1 Personnel Department
3.2 Manpower & Wages Department
3.3 Safety & Security Department
3.4 Education & Training Department
3.5 Tertiary Enterprises#
3.5.1 No.l Knitting Factory (Shenzhen Join-Venture)
3.5.2 No.2 Knitting Factory (Shenzhen Join-Venture)
3.5.3 No.71 Cotton Weaving Factory (Shenzhen JV)
3.5.4 Beijing Colour Weaving Factory (Hainan JV)
3.5.5 Cotton Printing Factory
3.5.6 Import & Export Company
3.5.7 Textile Retailing Shop
3.5.8 Repair & Maintenance Centre
3.5.9 Restaurant
3.5.10 Nursary
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I4 .  Communist P a r t y  O f f i c e
5. Labour Union Office
* All the production factories have a factory manager, a 
deputy factory manager, section supervisors and group 
leaders. Each factory is responsible for its own repair and 
maintenance work. All the production factories are treated 
as cost c e n t r e s  a nd have e n t e r e d  into I n t e r n a l  
Responsibility Contracts (IRC) with the General Manager on 
an annual basis.
** The production support factory is a cost centre and 
allocates its operating costs to the other production 
factories or departments according to actual usages.
# The tertiary enterprises are independent investment centres 
having their own management teams and bank accounts, and 
they have signed IRCs with the General Manager on an annual 
basis.
BCM3 had a total of 8,000 working employees (10% are 
administrative staff) and 3,000 retired employees at the end of 
1994. It is classified as a "large-sized SOE" in China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets 
Turnover
Income before tax**
Income tax rate
RMB 240M (1993)
RMB 300M (1992)
RMB 33 0M (1993)
RMB 410M (1994)
RMB 43 0M (1995 forecast)
RMB 1.2M (1992) - 0.4%* of sales
RMB 0M (1993) - 0%@ of sales
RMB 1.5M (1994) - 0.4%# of sales
RMB 0M (1995) - 0% of sales
55% (before 1994)
33% (from 1994)
* The low profit margin was mainly because of selling prices have 
to be reduced in order to bid the orders. Furthermore, inflation 
and heavy payroll and benefits in kind (including retired 
employees) increased the total expenditures or fixed overheads. 
The purchase prices of raw materials (i.e. cotton) have been
increased from RMB11,000 per tonne in 1993 to RMB18,000 per tonne 
in 1994 (or 64% increase) due to reduction of domestic 
production. The farmers do not have the incentive to grow cotton 
because of low selling prices set by the government and high 
inflation of input materials like fertilisers.
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The domestic produced cotton is centrally purchased from the 
farmers and distributed to the mills by the National Textile 
Industry Council, Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of 
Agriculture at predetermined prices. In view of domestic short 
supply, 3 0% of the cotton demand was imported from foreign 
countries in 1995. BCM3 is importing about 30% of its cotton 
requirements from overseas countries.
** Income before tax has deducted the value added tax already 
which is 17% on sales (output VAT) but only 13% on cotton 
purchased (input VAT) can be deducted according to the new 
taxation system implemented in January 1994. As a result, the 
VAT paid in 1994 was higher than the previous known sales tax in 
1993 .
@ Since BCM3 did not have the "import and export right" before 
1994, the export products have to be sold to the trading entities 
under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC) at a fixed exchange rate of US$1 = RMB5.8. Then these 
trading enterprises sell the products overseas at the market 
exchange rate of US$1 = RMB8.7 to make a handsome profit out from 
the exchange gap. This means most of the export profit is taken 
away by the government.
# Another major reason of low or no profit before tax making was 
the annual payment of RMB36 millions of bank interest due to 
capital investment and working capital loans of over RMB300 
million in both 1994 and 1995.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
The Beijing N o . 3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) is one of the earliest 
state-owned enterprises in Beijing entered into the first 
five-year Economic Responsibility Contract with the Beijing 
Textile Bureau and the Beijing Finance Bureau (representing the 
Beijing municipal government) in 1986. The major financial 
targets set in this ERC were income before tax and foreign 
exchanged created from export. The gross wages and salaries was 
linked up with the income before tax achieved. Furthermore, an 
annual growth factor was also set for the income before tax 
target. In addition, production quantity, product quality and 
safety are also other targets to be determined in the ERC as 
well.
BCM3 could easily achieve the foreign exchange target because its 
quality products were yarn and cloth which were input materials 
for the clothing industry having high demands overseas. 
Contrary, the clothing industry was constrainted by many customer
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factors like fasion, season/ culture and taste. The first ERC 
was successfully completed in 1990, and then the second 5-year 
ERC (1991-1995) was signed immediately.
Under the ERC system, once the target profit has been achieved, 
the predetermined wages, bonuses and benefits-in-kind would be 
awarded plus other favourable terms like bank loan repayment 
could be tax deductable. Therefore, all the personnel in BCM3 
have been facing higher pressure and challange to enhance the 
overall economic efficiency year after year.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The National Textile Industry Council has delegated full autonomy 
to BCM3 in managing its own organisation structure except 
appointing the general manager and the party secretary. The 
"Factory Manager Responsibility System" is still adopted in BCM3 
by the Council. This system adopts the previous Economic 
Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a basis to evaluate the 
performance of the general manager. If an outstanding or above 
target performance has been achieved, the general manager will be 
awarded a predetermined lump sum bonus at the year end.
Since 1992, the general manager has the autonomy to appoint the 
senior staff such as the production managers and department 
heads. Any major changes of the organisation structure in each 
unit should be initiated by the deputy-general managers and 
approved by the general manager. However, more autonomy of 
internal management and operation has been delegated to the 
deputy-general and factory managers since 1992. And in turn, the 
deputy-general and factory managers have involved their workshop 
supervisors and section heads more in planning, control and 
decision making.
The top management has been decentralizing more planning 
responsibility to each production factory and department such as 
participation in formulating the annual plan and the internal 
responsibility contract. The production and cost control 
responsibility primarily lies with the production managers but 
the top management keep a surveillance quantity and quality 
control on each production factory through monthly or weekly 
report. (Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, BCM3 has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual deputy-general and department managers are reporting 
directly to the general manager, and they play a linking and 
control role between the factories or departments and the general 
manager.
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(O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from  "High C o r p o r a te"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the promulgation of the "enterprise transformation 
regulations" in July 1992, Beijing N o .3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) has 
implemented a more formal planning process for reviewing, 
discussing and sanctioning the annual plan or budget and the 
internal responsibility contracts (IRCs). In October, the general 
manager calls for a planning meeting to discuss with the 
deputy-general managers concerning the next year targets such as 
production output value, sales, profit, capital requirements and 
other important events. The top management also evaluates the 
internal and external environmental factors in order to determine 
whether the above targets are realistic or not. If there is any 
gap, then the general manager negotiates with the National 
Textile Industry Council until compromise can be reached. Based 
on these preliminary targets, the general manager assigns them to 
the production managers and other department heads for them to 
formulate their own plans or budgets for the next year. Much 
emphasis is placed on the production value and cost control which 
are the key criteria to be used as the measurement yardsticks of 
their subsequent internal responsibility contracts.
At the end of November, all the factories and departments submit 
their initial plans to the Enterprise Management Office for 
consolidation before review and discussion by the top management. 
If the overall predetermined targets cannot be met, the top 
management then try to enforce and insist the factories and 
departments to revise their annual plans accordingly. Although 
back and forth iterative discussions are allowed in December, it 
does not leave much rooms for negotiation for the factory and 
department managers unless they can provide very strong evidence 
such as the deficiency in the production facilities. Eventually, 
the annual plans must be approved by the top management in 
February next year for endoresement by the annual general meeting 
(attended by all enterprise representatives).
The approved annual plans are broken down into quarterly and 
monthly plans to cater for demand, seasonal and other factors. 
The annual plans are formally reviewed in July and adjustments on 
significant deviations are allowed to make after detail 
discussion and approval by the top management.
Before 1992, the production managers and department heads were 
only consulted in this annual planning review process and the 
general manager, under the direction of the Beijing Textile 
Bureau, gave directions to the factories and departments on what
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should be done over the next 12 months within the context of a 
few key indicators e.g. sales, production volume and mix, quality 
improvement, material consumption, expense levels etc.
Since 1992, under the legislative changes and market economy 
promotion, the Bureau (subsequently the Council) has delegated 
higher automomy to BCM3 in formulating its strategic directions. 
As a result, all the factories and departments are involved in 
the planning process but the key variables are still determined 
and controlled by the top management.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
macro-eocnomic control (1994), operational mechanism (1993), 
economic effectiveness (1992), quality control (1991), economic 
responsibility contract (1990), etc.
As mentioned in the introductory section at the very beginning, 
the Beijing No-. 3 Cotton Mill has laid down the following 
strategic themes and thrusts since 1992 :
(1) Customer and quality are always number one.
(2) Production facilities and technology should be renovated to 
further enhance product quality to international standards.
(3) Expand the domestic market share and explore the overseas 
markets.
(4) Employ advanced management techniques to achieve a modern
enterprise system.
The above strategic themes and thrusts are directed from the top 
management for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when 
they are performing their duties for the enterprise. BCM3 has 
been promulgating "Quality" as the most important strategic 
thrust in order to compete with the counterparts for the domestic 
market share on one hand and to explore the overseas markets on 
the other hand.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 5 . 2 . 4 - 7  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p en d ix  1 . )
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After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
top management in BCM3 still from time to time make suggestions 
on specific issues relating to the planning and review process 
such as sales quantity and mix, selling price, marketing strategy 
and production quantity and mix. Despite this fact, the top 
management has given some limited freedom to the factory managers 
and department heads to compile their own plans or budgets and to 
adjust their plans and operations as long as they do not deviate 
much from the ultimate sales and profit targets.
The top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on monthly and quarterly basis and are quick 
to make suggestions if they do not match the overall long and 
short term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Very High-High 
Corporate" to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Since the transformation of Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) into 
a state-owned enterprise in 1956, it has followed the national 
5-year's planning cycle and carried out the missions as assigned 
in every 5-year's plan directed by the municipal government under 
the central economic planning system. The commencement of the 
economic reforms in 1979 started to allowed BCM3 to participate 
in the 5-year's planning with the Beijing Textile Bureau but 
specific directives and suggestions were always coming from the 
top by using the term "macroeconomics control and adjustment" as 
an excuse.
The. changing role of the Bureau and the formation of National 
Textile Industry Council since 1993 has encouraged BCM3, for the 
first time, to participate in the first long term strategic plan 
(1991-1995). However, many internal factors and uncertainties 
have affected the validity and reliability of this long term plan 
which has been subject to review and changes every year. This 
year is the last year of the 5-year long term plan, the top 
management of BCM3 is trying to formulate the next 5-year plan 
(1996-2000).
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The followings are the major long term plans or projects 
envisaged by BCM3 to be implemented in the next 5-year plan 
(1996-2000) although some of them have been started during 
1991-1995.
(A) Production Renovation
BCM3 has been undertaken very long term facilities renovation in 
order to enhance the production technology and efficiency. 
Modern plant and equipment have been imported from Germany, 
Switzerland and Japan since the 1980s to upgrade the product 
quality and variety and satisfy the higher customer demands. 
Over 40% of the plant and machinery have been replaced with a 
total investment of RMB180 millions since the 1980s. BCM3 is 
needing over RMB200 millions of sources of fund to replace the 
other production facilities.
(B) Product Development
Significant changes in the textile industry have been occured in 
recent years under the transition from planned economy to market 
economy. Now BCM3 has to promote and sell its products in a 
highly competitive market. The goodwill of BCM3 has been well 
established mainly due to its quality products, high technology 
and good management. Taking this advantage, BCM3 has to bias its 
product mix to the higher end by manufacturing upper grades of 
yarn and cloth (40-50 higher counts and density) and selling to 
the local and overseas clothing industry for producing final 
products of high quality. By aiming at the higher quality and 
price market segment, BCM3 will be able to at least avoid loss in 
the next 5 years.
(C) Competitive Edge
BCM3 has been facing keen competition from many small- and 
medium-sized cotton mills in other developing cities and economic 
zones which are enjoying some favourable policies, such as low 
import and export taxes, given by the municipal governments so 
that they are very cost competitive and fliexible. To maintain 
at least the market share and competitive edge against these 
counterparts, BCM3 has to manufacture higher quality products but 
this strategy needs capital for reinvestment and renovation in 
plant and machinery. BCM3 are negotiating hardly with the banks 
for capital loans in order to further improve its production 
technology such as plant and machinery replacements.
(D) Joint Ventures
The cost of production in the textile industry is getting higher 
and higher since 1990s mainly due to shortage in cotton grown in 
China and inflation on wages and other overheads. In 1991, under
572
the guidance of the government, BCM3 invested RMB2 million in a 
small textile mill in Shandong in order to obtain additional 
cotton supply produced in that province, but this practice was 
banned by the Council in 1993.
BCM3 is looking for joint-venture opportunities in other 
developing countries such as Russia, Vietnam, Philippines etc. 
However, sources of capital is the major hurdle to be overcome 
before entering into any foreign joint-ventures.
(E) Market Development
To penetrate into the domestic market and capture higher market 
share, the sales personnel has been seggregated into geographic 
teams with different marketing strategies and tactics such as 
regular visits to the existing customers. The IRC signed with 
the Sales Department links up the remuneration directly with the 
sales volume and the accounts receivable (or cash collected) in 
order to motivate the sales and marketing effort.
(F) Overseas Markets
Since the last 20 years, BCM3 has been relying very much on 
product export to creat both profit and foreign exchange. This 
strategy should be further explored by making use of its import 
and export right (since 1994) to expand and develop overseas 
markets in the Southeast Asian, South America and Eastern 
European countries.
(G) Tertiary Enterprises
Diversification is one of the strategic themes promulgated and 
implemented since the early 1990s. Other than the existing 
tertiary enterprises as listed in the Legal Form and Organisation 
Structure section above, BCM3 is planning to diversify into other 
businesses such as property development, clothing, retailing and 
trading.
(H). Reducing Headcount
In order to curb down the increasing payroll, BCM3 has to reduce 
the number of employees in the next 5 years (1991-1995) by means 
of transferring a proportion of employees to the existing and new 
tertiary enterprises, and encourage early retirement age of 55 
for male workers (60 for male staff) and 50 for female workers 
(55 for female staff).
The current 5-year plan (1991-1995) was compiled after long 
discussion and negotiation between the Council and the BCM31s top 
management without much participation by the middle management 
who were playing a consultation role only. The 5-year plan is
573
reviewed at least once every year and adjustments are made via 
the annual plans. As far as the next 5-year plan (1996-2000) is
concerned, BCM3 is trying to maintain and further develop the 
above long term strategies.
The factory managers and department heads are mainly concerned 
with how the milestones set in the long term plan will affect 
their next year budgets or internal responsibility contracts 
which will have tight financial surveillance coming from the 
general manager at least on a monthly basis. Therefore, the long 
term planning and review process are using a top-down approach in 
the belief that the general manager has better experience and 
knowledge of the external environment and even the internal
operations of the factories and departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in
Appendix 1. )
In summary, the National Textile Industrial Council has devolved 
its central planning role to BCM3 since 1992. Now, the top 
management of BMC3 is taking the initiative to formulate its own 
long term plan but participation from the middle management is 
limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5 . 5  S h o r t - T e r m  P l a n s / B u d g e t s  ( R e s o u r c e  A l l o c a t i o n )
The general short term planning policy adopted by Beijing N o .3 
Cotton Mill (BCM3) is "production determined by sales" which 
means sales or turnover figure as agreed with the National 
Textile Industry Council is the initial driving force of all the 
activities. During the planning meeting held in October, the 
top management review and discuss the following four most 
important issues :
(1) present and future production and operation situations;
(2) current and future financial positions including capital, 
assets and liabilities mamagement;
(3) next year profit target agreed with the Council; and
(4) domestic and overseas market changes.
At the end of the day, the top management lays down some 
guidelines and targets to the factory managers and department 
heads to compile their individual annual plans or budgets. First 
of all, based on the production quantity and mix targets, the 
production factories draft their production plans and submit to 
the deputy-general manager (production) for consolidation and 
then send copies to the accounting and finance department for 
compiling financing plans (i.e. profit and loss, balance sheet, 
cash flow) . At the mean time, the technical support and quality 
control sections also determine its production quality plans in 
order to ensure the production technology and facilities are 
capable to achieve the production plans.
In parallel, the wages and manpower section ascertains the labour 
hours and total payroll required which are directly linked up 
with the sales, profit or production value growth rates. On the 
other hand, the tertiary enterprise managers figure out their 
income and expense budgets as well. Finally, all the pieces are 
consolidated and reviewed by the enterprise management office 
before submission to the next planning meeting for consideration. 
The other steps in the annual planning or budgeting process are 
as described in section 5.2 (Review Process) above.
Since October 1992, the factory managers, department heads and 
tertiary enterprise managers have been involved in this planning 
process which they believe to be important in setting and 
negotiating the internal responsibility contracts with the 
general manager subsequently.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions, the annual 
planning review period has been shortened from quarterly to 
monthly. The general manager, deputy managers, factory managers, 
department heads and tertiary enterprise managers hold a formal 
meeting at the beginning of each month to review the financial 
performance against the annaul plans.
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Appropriate corrective actions may be taken to rectify any 
problems identified or deviations from the plan. Amendments or 
revisions are seldom made on the annual plans but adjustments are 
allowed in the monthly forecast and estimation.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
The major guidelines laid down by the top management before the 
budgeting process started include the followings :
(1) Sales income
(2) Profit before income tax + value added tax
(3) Sales per employee
(4) Production quantities
4.1 yarn in tons
4.2 cloth in ten thousand metres
(5) Production value
(6) Product quality
6.1 yarn first class
6.2 cloth first class
6.3 export passing rate
(7) Year-end number of employees
(8) Safety targets
(9) Employee's benefits
9.1 new quarters provided
(10) Capital projects
10.1 research and development
10.2 technology renovation
10.3 buildings and facilities
10.4 machinery and equipment
10.5 major repair and maintenance
The following is an example of the Cash Budget which is a very 
important piece of master budget especially under the present 
lack of financial support from the banks.
(1) Textile products sales income
(2) Tertiary enterprises sales income
(3), Other sales income
3.1 raw materials
3.2 second products
3.3 scrap materials
(4) Sub-contracted work income
(5) Other incomes (i.e. interest)
(6) Bank loan received
(7) Capital fund increased
(8) Production expenses
8.1 raw materials
8.2 spares and consumables
8.3 electricity and power
8.4 wages and benefits
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8.5 sub-contract charges
(9) Administration expenses
9.1 salaries and benefits
9.2 selling and distribution
9.3 financial and insurance
9.4 labour union
9.5 others
(10) Taxes paid
(11) Capital expenditures
11.1 production development
11.2 production renovation
11.3 major repair and maintenance
11.4 machine and equipment
11.5 buildings and facilities
(12) Bank loan repayment
In summary, both the mechanism legislation and the market economy 
have given BCM3 more freedom to plan ahead. The Council has 
almost completely devolved the short term planning autonomy to 
the top management of BCM3, except to agree on the minimum 
targets as agreed at the beginning of every year. Nevertheless, 
the Council can still influence the planning process by 
appointing new general manager and party secretary, and agreeing 
the sales and profit targets. The top management have involved
the middle management in the annual planning process which on one
hand is a critical step in materializing the long term strategic 
plan, and on the other hand, it is an important motivational 
factor for the factory managers, department heads and tertiary 
enterprise managers to manage their own businesses and to be 
rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence s shift from "High-Medium 
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Beijing N o . 3 Cotton Mill (SCM3) established its IRC system in 
1988 in order to motivate the efficiency, profitability and cost 
reduction in the production workshops.
The following is the format of a typical IRC for the production 
factories :
(1) Headcount and Wages
No. of Employees : XXX Budgeted Gross Wages : XXXXXX
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Including -
No. of Workers : XXX
No. of Day-time Staff : XX
No. of Shift Staff : XX
XXX
Budgeted Gross Wages : XXXXXX 
Budgeted Gross Wages : XXXXX
Budgeted Gross Wages : XXXXX
XXXXXX
(2) Rights and Responsibility
2.1 Contractor (General Factory Manager)
2.2 Contractee (Factory Manager)
(3) Performance Targets
3.1 Controllable Targets
3.1.1 Production Quantities
3.1.2 Product Quality
3.1.3 Materials and Resources Consumption
3.1.4 Facility and Equipment Condition
3.1.5 Production Safety
3.2 Management Targets
3.2.1 Production/Operation Management
3.2.2 Human Resource Management
3.2.3 Technology Innovation/Renovation Management
3.2.4 Scientific Research Management
3.2.5 Education and Training
3.2.6 Sanity and Environmental Protection
3.3 Other Targets
3.3.1 Serious Accidents and Fire Events
3.3.2 Serious Quality Incidents
3.3.3 Repair and Maintainence
3.3.4 Family Planning
(4) Contractee's Reward
It takes a few months for the general manager, factory managers 
a n d ,tertiary enterprise managers to negotiate with the terms and 
conditions for their IRCs signed in parallel with the planning 
process started in October until final approval by the top 
management in next February. This long process indicates that 
the setting of IRC is not a top-down approach and the factory and 
tertiary enterprise managers are very eager on this issue upon 
which they will be measured against and rewarded thereupon.
The IRCs are subject to quarterly review but adjustments can be 
made if some factors affecting the achievement of targets 
significantly.
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Another type of IRC is related to individual project signed 
between the general manager and the heads of department such as 
technical support and production facilities. The followings are 
the major contents of this kind of sigle-project IRC :
(1) Project title
(2) Degree of completion
(3) Project quality control and inspection methods
(4) Safty measures and responsible party
(5) Incentive scheme
(6) Economic responsibilities of contractor and contractee
(7) Budget
(8) Other issues mutually agreed by both parties
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
factory managers, department heads and tertiary enterprise 
managers in initiating and negotiating their own IRCs, and also 
involved the accounting and finance personnel intensively as a 
vetting mechanism in order to set the targets as objective as 
possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the control influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the factories, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Beijing No. 3 Cotton Mill 
(BCM3) that need headquarter's intervention.
As shown in the organisation structure (section 2 above), the 5 
spinning factories are integrated into a process type of 
production in which the outputs of No.l Spinning Factory become 
input of No.2 Spinning Factory and so on. Furthermore, a certain 
proportion of the outputs from N o . 5 Spinning Factory are 
transferred to the two weaving factory for manufacturing cloth. 
Since all the production factories are treated as cost centres, 
standard costs are used as the "transfer prices".
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The transfer quantities are also predetermined in the production 
plans which are broken down finto monthly targets and reviewed or 
adjusted on a weekly basis. This practice can ensure all 
factories are operating together towards the same production 
goals or plans without bottlenecks due to arguement in transfer 
prices and quantities.
Therefore, there is no much rooms for negotiation among the 
spinning and weaving factories in both transfer prices and 
quantities because the spinning factories do not have much 
autonomy to sell the intermediate products externally and it is 
decided by the headquarters. Arbitration by the general manager 
is required to settle any unresolved dispute.
The Production Support Factory is providing electricity, gas, 
water, consumables, spares, tools etc. to the other production 
factories, service departments and tertiary enterprises. This 
supporting factory is treated as a cost centre and allocates its 
operating costs to the users according to actual usages at 
standard costs. Therefore, it does not involve in the transfer 
prices but only some arguements in the transfer (or standard) 
costs and quantities.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
Special Notes
In 1994, over 80% of the cotton mills in China were loss-making.
Some economic reforms since 1980s affecting the textile industry
are elaborated below.
(1) Many textile enterprises, especially the old ones, may not
get used to the transformation of central planning system to 
the market economy environment partly because they have not 
possessed relevant and sufficient market information, and 
partly due to some internal factors (i.e. management 
reliance and reluctance to change) and external factors 
(i.e. inflation and bank credit control).
(2) Too much emphasis has been put into "tertiary enterprises" 
as a means to settle down the redundant employees and to 
contribute small amounts of profits. Instead of creating 
wealth to the society, some of them such as trading 
companies and retailing shops may consume resources of the 
main business. The tertiary enterprises in BCM3 have not 
brought into very significant profit to the headquarters.
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(3) Contrary to point (2) above, the government has not put 
enough investments into the "primary enterprises" (i.e. 
farming, mining, fishing, etc.) and the "secondary 
enterprises" (i.e. housing, transportation, manufacturing, 
electricity, tele-communication, etc.). For examples, the 
reduction of cotton produces and lacking of capital or 
credit support are adversely affecting the development of 
BCM3. Without good foundations in or insufficient supplies 
from the primary and secondary enterprises, the general 
living standards of the people cannot be raised. As a 
result, the people's purchasing power cannot affort to spend 
in the tertiary or third enterprises such as reastaurant, 
entertainment, retailing, taxi, security market, insurance, 
etc.
(4) As mentioned in the introductory section 1 above, BCM3 has 
been facing very keen competition from those small- and 
medium-sized cotton mills established in the towns and 
villages. They can obtain more and cheaper cotton because 
their locations are closer to cotton farms. In addition, 
their wages and other expenses are lower than their 
counterparts in the big cities like Beijing. Furthermore, 
they can easily accumulate and obtain capital funds to 
renovate their production facilities which can enhance their 
flexibility and adaptability to the fast changing market 
enconomy.
The following are some ways suggested by BCM3 to revive the
prosperity of the textile industry in China.
(1) The government and bank should provide lenient sources of 
capital to renovate the p r o d u c t i o n  facilities and 
technologies in order to enhance the product quality and 
competition in the market.
(2) The increase of total textile output should be controlled,
whereas, the export of high quality products should be 
increased to create better profit and foreign exchange.
(3) The economic responsibility contract and taxation system 
(i.e. value-added and income taxes) should allow some 
favourable terms for the textile industry to retain more 
earnings for working capital.
(4) The government should increase the investments and policy
support into the cotton farming in order to expand the 
output and reduce the price.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s t e m
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Beijing No. 3 
Cotton Mill (BCM3) has three distinct levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (general manager, deputy-general managers)
(2) Middle Management (factory managers, department heads, chief
accountant, chief engineer, tertiary 
enterprise managers)
(3) Lower Management (foremen, supervisors, section heads)
The deputy-general managers, factory managers and tertiary 
enterprise managers can decide on their own divisional 
structures, staffing and their roles and functions, and 
interactions between their sub-units (production lines or 
sections). They are also responsible for certain personnel 
functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, evaluation 
and remuneration (distribution of bonus). But termination of 
employment with any staff is a difficult task which will be 
explained in the rewards and incentives section.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the factories and departments are by 
using annual plans and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, 
the most important measurement criteria are production efficiency 
and cost control set in the IRCs, although some other qualitative 
targets, such as quality and safety, are employed. However, 
these are subsidiary ones which have lower weightings in 
calculating the group wages and bonus. Obviously, financial 
objectives are the major factors in the control mechanisms used 
in the decentralized operation of BCM3.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Beijing No.3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) sets similar objectives for its 
production factories and tertiary enterprises : production and 
tertiary enterprise managers must meet their agreed IRC targets 
for the year and expect improvement in performance year after 
year as emphasized by the top management and the Council in terms 
of growth rates. The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual 
planning review.
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As mentioned before, in f view of the market economy and 
macro-economic control policies promulgated by the government, 
and the keen competition within this industry, the production 
factories and tertiary enterprises sometimes feel passive in 
setting their objectives or targets in the annual plans or IRCs 
because their activities are depending on some internal and 
external factors which are sometimes out of their control.
A high pressure to achieve the planned production quantity and 
efficiency is put on the production managers at the quarterly or 
monthly review. They fully understand that their group wages and 
bonus are tied in with the annual plans or IRCs and it also 
depends on the overall performance of the enterprise as a whole. 
Apart from the production factories, the other departments, such 
as purchasing and sales, and the tertiary enterprises may have 
annual or project based IRCs in which they have agreed specific 
objectives or targets with the general manager. The promotion, 
salary and bonus of these functional staff and independent profit 
centre staff are correlated with these quantitative and 
non-financial targets as well.
In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Beijing N o .3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) regards it as essential to catch 
variances from annual plan or IRC before they have gone too far. 
To this end the top management monitor results on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. All the factories, departments and tertiary 
enterprises submit monthly results on standard forms to their 
respective deputy-general managers and department heads, and also 
to the chief accountant for vetting and comparison with budgets 
and IRCs. The production factories are also required to submit 
production progress reports to the top management on a weekly 
basis.
The major performance measurement criteria are production 
quantity and product quality as shown in the IRC section. 
Without much autonomy on setting the selling or transfer prices, 
the production factories can only control the costs by employing
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the "responsibility (target) costing" system implemented in 1992. 
This cost control system mai:nly sets quantitative standards such 
as material and electricity consumptions.
The monthly report format is unique for each factory or 
department. The contents are mainly corresponding with the 
annual plan from which all the targets stipulated in the IRC can 
be extracted from this report. The monthly and quarterly actuals 
are compared with the targets. The qualitative targets are 
usually subjectively measured by the deputy-general managers and 
enterprise management office and written in the monthly reports 
as well. These monthly reports are compiled, by the enterprise 
management office. Any significant variances (without specifying 
tolerance limits) will be highlighted in order to bring the 
attention to the top management. Then all the monthly reports 
are submitted to the general manager for review.
For any serious adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general manager will contact with the respective deputy managers, 
chiefs, factory managers, department heads or tertiary enterprise 
managers to dig out the underlying reasons or ask them to perform 
investigation immediately. It is expected that corrective 
actions can be taken to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
During the monthly meeting of the top management with the middle 
management, the general manager will put forward the monthly 
results for open discussion. The chief accountant will also 
report the financial performance of individual units. The 
factory managers, department heads and tertiary enterprise 
managers may be asked to explain briefly the significant 
variances.
Consistent failure (say over 12 months) in meeting the targets 
which are controllable by a factory manager, probably he will be 
replaced by somebody else. On the other hand, the favourable 
results will be openly praised by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the manpower and wages department for calculating 
the group wages and bonus of each factory, department and 
tertiary enterprise for last month. Then the accounting 
department will process the bonus payments at the end of the 
month (i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by one month).
The importance of computerization has been recognised by the top 
management and some stand-alone personal computers have been 
purchased and used for production planning and control, 
purchasing and inventory control, sales analysis, wages, and 
financial planning and analysis. In spite of this piece-meal 
computer utilisation, BCM3 does not have a concrete plan to 
purchase more personal computers or instal a mini-computer for 
networking. The major stumbling block is lacking of fund for
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this kind of investment which is at low priority compared with 
many other perceived important projects like renovation of 
production facility, plant and equipment.
Now, BCM3 views the annual plan or IRC as a contract between the 
top management and the factory, department and tertiary 
enterprise. The monitoring process is used to maintain the 
pressure for performance. Top management's close surveillance of 
results enables them to ensure that no unit goes too far astray 
before remedial action is taken. It also gives top management an 
understanding of the reasons for variances from plan.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial
Control" to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
Since 19 92, The Beijing No. 3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) had the autonomy 
to recruit employees from the labour market without getting the 
Beijing Manpower Bureau involved which is in compliance with the 
Mechanism Transformation Regulations. Furthermore, since 1993, 
the employees have gradually signed employment contracts, which 
include the "employee contract" and the "in-post contract".
The employee contract signed between the general manager and an 
employee signifies that he or she has been employed by the 
enterprise. Whereas, the in-post contract means a formal 
assignment of a certain post to the employee who is expected to 
be capable for the job. For the employees without in-post 
contracts, they may be transferred to the tertiary (service) 
enterprises which are fully-owned by BCM3 and are self-financed.
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the BCM3 is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration. Under the new taxation system implemented in 
January 1994, the enterprise's payroll can exceed the two limits 
but the excess will not be income tax deductable.
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The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB5,300 
in 1993 and RMB6,200 in 1994 which were about 30% less than the 
metallurgical industry and 40% less than the retailing industry. 
Under the current high inflation rate (overall average 21.7% in 
China in 1994) , SCM3 is expected to increase the average annual 
gross wages to RMB7,000 in 1995.
The wages includes the basic wages and the floating wages where 
the former is almost fixed (i.e. average RMB200 per month) across 
the board and increased according to inflation as determined by 
the Manpower Bureau. The floating wages is classified into 
different grades depending on the type of work, seniority, 
efficiency and skill. The average floating wages is about RMB150 
per month.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower Bureau of the Beijing Government at 
least once in each year mainly for the purpose of combating 
inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity. The 
second part is decided by the BCM3 which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, hair-washing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowances" is about 
RMB100 to RMB120 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the factories, as 
described in the above sections, is based on the accomplishment 
of the IRC. An IRC signed between the general manager and a 
factory manager will decide what level of group bonus will be 
given to the department. Of course, it is up to the factory 
manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or her 
subordinates according to individual performance. The bonus is 
distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a 
certain percentage (10% - 20%) will be retained in a reserve in 
order to make up the low bonus obtained during the months with 
poor performance.
The calculation of "bonus" for the non-manufacturing employees is 
based on an "index" (scale) and then multiplied by the average 
monthly bonus achieved by the workers. The index scale is as 
follow :
General Manager 1. 6
Deputy-General Manager 1.5
Chief Accountant/Chief Engineer 1.4 
Section Head 1.3
Supervisor 1.2
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C l e r k s 1 . 1
Under the "Factory Manager Responsibility System", if there is an 
overall outstanding or above target performance, the Council will 
award a lump sum of "special bonus" to the general manager at the 
end of the year. But under no circumstances, the remuneration 
package of the general manager can be greater than three times 
the total earnings of a department head (middle management). If 
the annual profit before tax can achieve better than the planned 
levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to all the employees 
and distributed in a way very similar to the monthly bonus.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is to 
initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to impose 
threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE1s employees.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
will cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives. Another way to reduce redundant employees is to 
enforce early retirement at the age of 45 to 50.
Instead of fully implementing this contract employment system, 
BCM3 has signed "in-post contracts" with most of the employees on 
an annual basis. This contract signifies that an employee is 
qualified for that specific post and he or she is eligible to 
receive wages (according to grade in the pay-scale), allowances 
and bonus. Without such a contract, that employee is out of job 
but he or she is still an employee of BCM3 and is allowed to 
received a basic monthly subsidy of less than RMB300. This 
measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy employees, 
but it can motivate the marginal employees to work better. In 
fact, 25%-30% of SCM2 e m p l o y e e s ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  the 
non-manufacturing staff, are still redundant but reluctant to lay 
off due to some social constraints. On the other hand, a few 
hundreds of workers are employed from the other provinces who are 
hardworking and paid less wages than the local workers.
In relation to the social welfare, since 1993, BCM3 has to 
contribute 25.5% of the monthly gross payroll to the government 
for sharing the responsibility of pension. Fortunately BCM3 is 
able to claim a significant portion of its 25.5% contribution 
from the government because it has over 3,000 retired employees 
at the end of 1995.
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In addition, BCM3 has to provide about 14%-16% (standard rate and 
tax deductable) of the monthly gross payroll for various 
employee's benefits such as medical, unemployment and building 
or buying residential quarters. Therefore, many old-aged 
state-owned enterprises, including BCM3 are proposing to handover 
the standard provision i.e. 16% of monthly gross payroll to the 
municipal government who will reimburse the actual cost of 
benefits incurred by the enterprises.
The 3rd Plennary Session of the 8th People's Congress held from 
3-15 March 1995 discussed and approved this social welfare 
policy. BCM3 has to bear the medical allowance for its 3,000 
retired employees which is a rather heavy financial burden to the 
overhead expenditures.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, BCM3 believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing No. 3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
Very High/High 
Corporate
High/Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and 
Campbell.
control influences used by Goold &
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
x i e  ci x Li in w x C/ x ci u w
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\/
[Post-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing N o . 3 Cotton Mill (BCM3) before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
shifting from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to the boarder 
of "Financial Control" (Post-1992) which indicates the change is 
not very significant.
Revised : 24 March 1996
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The ul t i m a t e  aim is to c l a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE 
Staff Interviewed
Dates of Visits
Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH)
Miss Zhang Lin/Finance Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 20 years) 
Mr Sun Yu Qing/Assistant Finance Manager 
(No. of years in this enterprise : 18 years)
First Visit - 4 September 1993
Second Visit - 31 August 1994
Third Visit - 11 September 1995
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S e c t i o n  1 : H i s t o r y  & B a ck g ro u n d
Built in 1954, the Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) covers an area 
of 330,500 square metres and it has a construction area of
320,000 square metres. It is the largest hotel in Beijing in 
terms of land area. BFSH is situated at the west side of Beijing 
with a distance of 33km and 14km from the airport and city centre 
respectively. BFSH is a very traditional, cultural and elegant 
hotel composed of a main building, four hotel buildings and 48 
stand-alone apartments. The gardens and recreation facilities 
occupy most of the space of this big piece of land. Hundred 
kinds of trees and flowers are growing in the gardens and along 
the lanes, so that the guests can enjoy the green peace all 
around the year. It is equipped with complete service and
recreational facilities of international standard.
BFSH has 2,600 standard rooms, suites, deluxe suites and
apartments, 3,000 beds, 9 restaurants and other facilities
including conference building, acadamic hall, business centre, 
theatre, dancing hall, swimming pool, tennis court, fitness 
centre, sauna room, billard room, penthouse garden, coffee 
lounge, bars, department stores, foreign exchange counter, 
medical clinic, hair saloon, post office, bookshop, photoshop, 
flowershop, etc.
Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) has been a wholly state-owned 
enterprise since 1954. BFSH is under the administration of the 
State Foreign Experts Bureau because during the 1950s and 1960s, 
BFSH mainly provided accommodations to the foreign experts who 
were invited by and worked for the China government. Before the 
economic reforms started in 1979, the central planning system 
dictated all the planning and control systems of the state-owned 
enterprises. Therefore, BFSH acted just as a vehicle (or cost 
centre) to provide the accommodation activities according to the 
commands directed from the Bureau. Since the economic reform 
started in 1979, instead of dictatorship from the bureau, BFSH 
has been delegated autonomy in the business decisions and 
operations although the bureau still imposed influences on some 
affairs like personnel, pricing, investment, finance and wages.
In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Tranformation Regulations" enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, both the government and bureau have delegated the 
planning and control responsibilities to the top management of 
BFSH to run their own business.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 2 . 6 & Q 2 . 7  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
592
Under the General Manager,• who has an Enterprise Management 
Office, the organisation sturucture of BFSH is listed as follow :
Profit Centres -
1. Guest Houses Department (5 buildings)
2. Expert Houses Department (48 apartments)
3. Customer Service Department
4. Meal & Beverage Department
5. Commodity Selling Department
6. Transportation Service Department
7. Friendship Palace (see section 5.4)
8. Beidaihu Hotel*
9. Tertiary Enterprises :
Friendship Shopping Malls 
Trading Companies 
Engineering & Decoration Company 
Entertainment Company
Distill Water Company
Cost Centres (Servicing Departments) -
10. Purchasing & Storage Department
11. Repair & Maintenance Department
12. Accounting & Finance Department
13. Personnel Department
14. Security Department
15. Quality Control Department
16. Education & Training Department
17. Organisation & Promotion Department
18. Labour Union Office
19. Communist Party Office
* This is a small hotel in Beidaihu which is about 150km 
Northeast of Beijing. This small hotel has 180 employees.
BFSH had a total of 3,800 employees at the end of 1994 and about 
600 retired employees whose wages and benefits had to be borne by 
BFSH. It is classified as a medium size state-owned enterprise 
in China.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets 
Turnover
Income before tax
Income tax rate
RMB 290M (1993)
RMB 130M (1993)
RMB 200M (1994)
RMB 230M (1995)
RMB 23M (1993) - 17.7% of sales
RMB 20M (1994) - 10.0% of sales*
RMB 20M (1995) - 8.7% of sales*
15% (since 1993)#
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* The significant reduction of profit margin in 1994 and 1995 was 
mainly due to the inflation effect on the cost of sales. Despite 
the drop of profitability, BFSH's cash position is rather 
healthy. It repaid RMB3 0M in 1995 and had a bank credit balance 
of RMB2 0M at the end of the same year.
# The income tax rate may be unified at 33% in 1996 pending for 
the government final decision.
Section 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) has never entered into any formal 
Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) with the government but 
instead major financial targets such as turnover, profit, foreign 
exchange and capital expenditure have been assigned by the State 
Foreign Expert Bureau since the 1950s.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
The organisation structure of Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) is 
a typical functional type by grouping the operations into 9 
profit centres and 10 cost centres as shown in Section 2 above. 
Each department has one manager who is responsible for most of 
the personnel affairs. Since 1992, BFSH has been decentralizing 
more planning responsibility to each department such as 
initiating the annual plan and the internal responsibility 
contract. The income, profit and expense responsibilities 
primarily lie with the departmental managers but the top 
management keep a close eye on the financial performance of each 
profit or cost centre through monthly, weekly and daily report.
Before 1992, the general manager, departmental managers and some 
assistant managers were appointed by the Bureau. But now the 
departmental managers and their assistants are recruited by the 
general manager who is still appointed by the bureau. Any major 
changes of the organisation structure in each department should 
be initiated by the manager and approved by the general manager. 
However, the major appointments and changes are still influenced 
by the bureau.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
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In summary, BFSH has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual departmental managers report directly to the general 
manager, and they play a linking and control role between the 
department and the general manager.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since 1992, the government or bureau has assumed the planning 
autonomy to the Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) to implement a 
formal planning process for reviewing, discussing and sanctioning 
the annual plan or budget and the internal responsibility 
contracts (IRCs). First of all, the general manager refers to 
the long term plan and evaluate the internal and external 
environmental factors before thorough discussions with the 
departmental managers. The ultimate conclusion is to determine 
the annual sales, profit and foreign exchange targets for next 
year which have to be agreed with the bureau. Based on these 
preliminary targets, some guidelines are provided to the 
departmental managers for them to initiate their own plans or 
budgets for the next year. Much emphasis is placed on the
internal profit and cost control for the departments whose annual 
plans contained the key criteria to be used as the measurement 
yardsticks of their subsequent internal responsibility contracts.
In October, all the departmental managers submit their annual 
plans to the Accounting & Finance Department for consolidation 
before review and discussion by the general manager and the 
departmental managers. The first annual planning meeting is held 
in November by the general managers and departmental managers 
mainly to discuss the gaps between the submitted plans and the 
targets perceived by the bureau. The top management is trying to 
provide assistance to the departmental managers to close the gaps 
as far as possible. If not, the general manager has to refer 
back to the bureau and ask for compromise. Then, further formal 
and informal meetings and discussions are held between the 
general manager and departmental managers either collectively or 
individually. This iterative exercise carries on until all the 
annual plans and contracts are mutually agreed and approved in 
the annual staff representative meeting held during February. 
The approved annual plans are broken down into quarterly and 
monthly plans to cater for seasonal and holiday factors. The 
annual plans are formally reviewed once every quarter.
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Before 1992, the departmental managers had not participated too 
much in the annual planning process. Instead, they were given 
the performance targets by the general manager who had to fulfil 
the financial goals as assigned by the bureau. Since 1992, under 
the legislative changes and the market economy promotion, the 
government or bureau has delegated higher automomy to BFSH in 
formulating its strategic directions. As a result, all the 
departmental managers, who know their operations better, are 
encouraged to participate in the planning process and extend 
their planning horizon beyond one year in order to match the 
milestones set in the 5-year long term plan.
Therefore, both the bureau and general manager have less 
interference in departmental planning decisions, but without 
reducing the financial control.
(Please refer to Q 5 .5.2, Q 5 .5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
operational mechanism (1993), economic effectiveness (1992), 
quality control (1991), economic responsibility contract (1990), 
etc. The strategic themes and thrusts promoted by the Beijing 
Friendship Hotel (BFSH) are as simple as follow :
(1) friendly atmosphere;
(2) considerate and quality service; and
(3) beautiful surroundings.
The above strategic themes and thrusts are directed from the top 
management for all the employees to observe and keep in mind when 
they are performing their duties for the customers.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix .1.)
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After the promotion of "Mechanism Transformation" in 1992, the 
bureau and the top management in BFSH still from time to time 
make suggestions on specific issues relating to the planning and 
control process such as personnel, pricing and investment 
decisions. Despite this fact, the top management has given more 
freedom to the departments to compile their own plans or budgets 
and to adjust their plans and operations as long as they do not 
deviate much from the ultimate sales, profit and cost targets.
The top management follow the financial indicators and 
performance closely on weekly, monthly and quarterly basis and 
are quick to make suggestions if they do not match the overall 
long and short term plan.
(Please refer to Q5.3.1-4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "High-Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) has been and will be undertaken 
the following long term projects which would increase the revenue 
and profit in the next five years (i.e. 1996-2000).
(1) Friendship Palace
A euqal-share joint-venture with a Taiwanese company was 
established in 1992 to invest RMB100 million in building the 
Friendship Palace which is located to the west of the central
garden of the Beijing Friendship Hotel which, after this
renovation, has been rated internationally as a four-star hotel. 
The three-storey building of 17,000 square metres combining 
facilities for conventions, recreation, dining and bar service
has become an important part in the total provision of services
by the Friendship Hotel.
On the first floor is situated the large-scale recreational 
centre of first-class facilities include a beauty salon, a sauna, 
a massage, a bowling alley and a karaoke lounge. On the second 
floor, there are several elegantly decorated restaurants serving 
different style of Western-food as well as regional Chinese-food. 
The multi-function hall on the third floor is an ideal place for 
conventions of all kinds, grand banquest, cocktail parties and 
entertainments.
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The Friendship Place was opened in September 1993. It brought in 
over RMB20M of income in 1995 which is equivalent to the total 
revenue of all the other restaurants and entertainment facilities 
provided in the hotel.
(2) Expansion
BFSH is planning to increase the number of Guest Houses from 48 
to 13 0 in the next few years in order to provide more apartments 
for the higher demand from the foreign investors and expatriates 
in Beijing.
(3) Joint Venture
BFSH has been discussing with foreign investors, including Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, to invest RMB200M-300M for constructing a 18-28 
floors of commercial building close to the present hotel site. 
This project will take at least 3 years time.
(4) Import/Export
Since BFSH has been operating two department stores, further plan 
has been made to expand its import/export trade in particular the 
household electrical appliances. This would require an 
additional working capital of RMB15M-RMB2 5M in 1996. The long 
term objective is to obtain the import and export right from the 
government.
(5) Tertiary (Service) Enterprises
BFSH will continue to expand and diversify its tertiary 
enterprises in order to allocate the resources better on one hand 
and to transfer many excess employees to these independant 
self-financing entities on the other hand.
Since the establishment BFSH in 1954, it has followed the 
national 5-year's planning cycle and carried out the missions as 
assigned in every 5-year's plan directed by the municipal 
government under the central economic planning system.
The commencement of the economic reforms in 1979 started to allow 
BFSH to participate in the 5-year's planning with the Beijing 
Municipal Government and the State Foreign Experts Bureau but 
specific directives and suggestions were always coming from the 
top by using the term "macroeconomic control and adjustment" as 
an excuse.
The Enterprise Mechanism Tansformation Regulations promulgated by 
the government in 1992 have legitimately delegated the long term 
strategic planning autonomy to BFSH who should demostrate to the 
bureau of its future development to sustain growth in terms of 
asset value and profitability.
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However, many external factors and uncertainties, such as 
government macro-economic control policies and inflation, have 
affected the validity and reliability of the above long term 
plans which have been subject to review and changes every year. 
The long term plans are initiated and discussed by the top 
management and the bureau without much participation from the 
departmental managers except playing a consultation role only. 
Furthermore, the departmental managers concern with how the 
milestones set in the long term plan will affect their next year 
budgets or internal responsibility contracts which will have 
financial surveillance coming from the top management at least on 
a monthly basis.
Therefore, the long term planning and review process are using a 
top-down approach in the belief that the top management have 
better experience and knowledge of the external environment and 
even the internal operations of the departments.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the State Foreign Expert Bureau has devolved most of 
its central planning role to BFSH since 1992. However, major 
long term projects involving substaintial capital still require 
the approval from the bureau whose endorsement on the bank loan 
is a must. Now, the top management of BFSH is taking the leading 
role to formulate its own long term plans but participation from 
the middle management is limited to consultation only.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
e
After the implementation of the mechanism transformation 
legislations in 1992, BFSH has employed the following more formal 
annual planning or budgeting process.
In October, the general manager asks the accounting and finance 
department to provide the year-to-date financial results. Then 
he calls up an initial planning meeting to review and discuss the 
following aspects which have direct or indirect impacts on the 
next year's plan or budget.
(1) Capability Evaluation
(a) Financial performance
(b) Financial stability
(c) Borrowing capacity
(d) Space & facility availability
(e) Manpower availability
Environmental Scanning
(a) Worldwide economy changes
(b) China economy changes
(c) Beijing economy changes
(d) Competitor analysis
(e) Customer analysis
(3) State Foreign Experts Bureau Expectations
(4) Long-term Plans (as shown in 5.4 above)
The general conclusion of this planning meeting is to set 
preliminary targets for income and profit expected to be achieved 
in the next year. Of course, a certain extent of stretch is 
built into these targets in order to enforce the departmental 
managers to plan their own budgets agressively. Then the general 
manager breaks down these targets on divisional basis and notify 
them to individual departments.
The next step is for the departmental managers to formulate their 
budgets by discussion with their own deputy managers and 
supporting staff. In November, the departmental managers- have to 
send their first budget drafts to the accounting and finance 
department for screening and consolidation before submitting to 
the top management in the headquarters for consideration. At 
this point of time, informal discussions may be held between the 
top management and the departmental managers trying to bridge the 
gap of different expectations.
6 0 0
Then formal and informal meetings are held until compromises and 
agreements have been reached between the headquarters and the 
departmental managers. After the Chinese New Year in February, 
the m a s t e r  b udget is t a b l e d  in the a nnual e m p l o y e e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  m e e t i n g  for approval, and after that, 
implementation begins. The budgets and IRCs are broken down into 
quarterly targets for periodic control and measurement. Since 
1994, BFSH has compiled the expense budget and profit and loss 
budget as the two important pieces of financing plans which 
formats are shown in Appendix A at the end of this case writing.
Since October 1992, the departmental managers have been involved 
intensively in this budgeting process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts with the top management. Furthermore, 
the approved budgets and IRCs affect their strategies and tactics 
for short and medium term developments.
In view of the rapid changing market conditions of the tourism 
business in China, the budget review period has been shortened 
from quarterly to monthly. The top management in headquarters 
and all the departmental managers hold a formal review meeting at 
the beginning of each month to review and discuss the financial 
performance of last month. Remedial actions are suggested to 
correct any significant controllable deviations from the 
quarterly or monthly budgets. The targets determined in the 
budgets and IRCs are seldom adjusted unless facing substantial 
uncontrollable environmental factors. Basically, a fixed budget 
concept is employed.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, the mechanism legislation and the market economy have 
driven BFSH spending more effort to plan ahead. The top 
management have involved the departmental managers or even their 
subordinates (lower management) in the annual planning and 
budgeting process which on one hand is a critical step in 
materializing the long term strategic plans, and on the other 
hand, it is an important motivational factor for the departmental 
managers to manage their own businesses and to be rewarded 
accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
f
Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) established its IRC system in 
1988 in order to motivate the various departments to attain at 
least the financial targets set in the ERC signed with the 
government. This IRC system applies to the 8 profit centres as 
listed in Section 2 above. In turn, individual departments, such 
as guest houses, meal and beverage etc., sign similar or 
second-tier IRCs with their sub-units. The duration of the IRCs 
is usually last for one year and reviews on a quarterly basis.
The followings are the major contents of an IRC signed between 
the Headquarters and the Guest Houses Department for 1992.
Purposes :
1. Enhance the operation management and service quality.
2. Motivate the initiative of employees.
3. Improve the economic and social effectiveness.
4. Ensure the target accomplishment of "wages linked up with 
efficiency".
5. Balance the economic benefits distribution among the 
government, enterprise and employees.
Section 1 : General
The signing up of this IRC does not change the organisational 
relationship and leadership between the contractor (general 
manager) and the contractee (guest house department) . The 
contractee is under the supervision and management of the 
contractor. The contractee is obliged to increase the revenue 
and reduce the expenses in order to achieve every target agreed 
in this contract.
Section 2 : Economic Targets
2.1 Income* and Profit Targets
2.1.1 For Income RMB42M, Profit RMB 5.40M (PM=12.9%)
2.1.2 For Income RMB4 8M, Profit RMB 7.30M (PM=15.2%)
2.1.3 For Income RMB55M, Profit RMB 8.80M (PM=16.0%)
* Income is based on cash received or receivable.
2.2 Expense Targets#
2.2.1 Allocated Expenses RMB12M
2.2.2 Fixed Assets Depreciation, Repair and Maintenance 
RMB7.4M
2.2.3 Water, Electricity, Power RMB6.14M (if no direct 
metre, use building area as apportionment basis)
2.2.4 Insurance RMB0.31M
2.2.5 Land, Building and Vehicle Taxes RMB1.11M
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# The expense targets are adjusted once every year unless 
under significant inflation or deflation during the year.
Section 3 : Total Wages Underwritten
The contractor will allow a total wages of RMB1,146,596 to the 
contractee for the year. The total wages cannot be adjusted due 
to any increase or decrease in number of employees. This amount 
will be reviewed annually. The daily wages for temporary workers 
is RMB2.5.
Section 4 : Service Targets
E n h a n c e  the o p e r a t i o n  m a n a g e m e n t  and s e r v i c e  q u a l i t y  
persistantly. Maintain proper service, sanity, safety and 
facility according to 3-star hotel standards subject to any 
sudden inspection.
Section 5 : Materials Supplied
The contractee should submit a materials requisition plan to the 
contractor one week in advance for materials which are available 
in Beijing, one month in advance for materials which are 
purchased from other places, and six months in advance for 
materials which need to place orders. The requisition plan 
should stipulate the material description, type and model, 
quantity, quality, unit price, and delivery time. According to 
the plan, the contractor is responsible to search for the 
suppliers, provide sample, place orders upon contractee1s 
agreement, and charge contractee the purchase cost.
In order to save the expenses, the contractee should consume 
firstly the materials available in contractor's stock. For any 
urgent required materials which are out of contractor's stock, 
the contractee can purchase directly the materials at a cost not 
exceeding RMB50 each time.
The contractee can collect the planned and purchased materials 
from the contractor's stock collectively, regularly or at any 
time upon proper approval by the authorized personnel.
Section 6 : Income Handover
The contractee should handover all the recorded operating income 
to the contractor's accounting and finance department every day 
and no retention is allowed.
Section 7 : Floating Wages
If the contractee cannot accomplish the first economic target 
(2.1.1), the total wages underwritten will be adjusted downward 
accordingly.
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The total wages underwritten in next year will be increased if 
the contractee can accomplish the second economic target (2.1.2). 
If not, the responsible personnel of the contractee will be 
subject to discipline until laying off.
The total wages underwritten in current year will be increased if 
the contractee can accomplish the third economic target (2.1.3). 
In addition, the contractor should grant appropriate award to the 
responsible personnel of the contractee. If the actual 
performance is in between the second and third economic targets, 
the contractor should grant a lump sum award to the contractee on 
a proportional basis.
Section 8 : Bonus Distribution
The bonus to be awarded to the contractee is calculated at 6.5% 
on the actual monthly profit achieved. In addition, a year end 
bonus of RMB140,000 can be awarded to the contractee according to 
overall annual performance and other special circumstances. A 
bonus at 3% of the sub-contract (external) income earned by the 
laundry is calculated and awarded on a monthly basis as well.
Section 9 : Education and Training
In order to enhance the personal competance, the contractee1s 
employees should actively participate in the education and 
training programmes organised by the contractor. The related 
expenses should be borne by the contractor except the wages and 
bonus of the employees receiving the training. The contractee is 
responsible for the expenses related to the education and 
training programmes offered by itself. The contractor is 
responsible for arranging those outsiders coming to attend the 
education and training programmes and leaving 50% of the training 
income to the contractee.
Section 10 : Contractor's Rights and Duties
10.1 Rights
10.1.1 Determine and assign the economic targets and total 
wages for the contractee.
10.1.2 Assign specific duties to the contractee in writing.
10.1.3 Considering the benefit of the whole enterprise, add 
or delete certain contractee's business operations. 
Expenses of the additional operation are borne by 
the contractor, whereas the derived benefits should 
be reflected by increasing the economic targets to 
the contractee. On the other hand, the reduction in 
benefits to the contractee due to operation deletion 
should be reflected by reducing the economic targets
10.1.4 Employ, transfer or lay off the senior staff and 
their deputies of contractee's major sections.
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1 0 . 2  D u t i e s
10 .2  .1
10.2.2
10.2 . 3 
10 . 2 . 4
Section 11 :
11.1 Rights 
11.1.1 
11.1. 2
11.1.3
11.1.4
11.1. 5 
11.1.6 
11.1.7
11.1. 8
11.1.9
11.1.10
11.2 Duties
11.2 .1
11 . 2.2 
11.2 . 3
11.2.4
Ensure the supplies of water, electricity and gas to 
contractee.
Perform timely inspection and maintenance for the 
contractee1s equipment and facilities in order to 
ensure the contractee's normal operation.
Creat a favourable environment for the contractee's 
operation and do not affect any contractee's 
activities.
Provide the bonus, medical expenses, quarters, meal 
and education allowances, and other benefits to the 
contractee.
Contractee's Rights and Duties
Has the autonomy of operation and management.
Recruit management staff and arrange group and shift 
Recruit employees according to contractor's 
personnel policies.
Subject to the contractor's approval procedures, 
transfer out or lay off employees.
Recruit temporary employees according to seasonal 
needs.
Punish the against-the-rules employees according to 
employee's handbook.
Put redundant employees out of job with contractor's 
approval and under contractor's training programme. 
Decide the posts for the employees but the transfer 
from service post to technical post should obtain 
contractor's approval.
Arrange proper jobs for the old, weak, sick and 
handicap employees.
Decide the wages and bonus distribution system but 
should file the record with the contractor.
Observe the government policies, laws and the 
hotel's rules and regulations.
Work hard to operate actively to maintain the 
goodwill of the hotel.
Take appropriate measures to enhance management in 
order to reduce expenses and improve profit. 
Maintain the equipment and facilities in good 
operating conditions and notify contractor's for 
repair and maintenance promptly.
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Section 12 : Breaching Contract Responsibilities
f
12.1 Both parties should comply with this contract and should not 
change any terms and conditions or breach this contract 
unilaterally.
12.2 If the contractor, after operational audit, discovers any 
malpractice, significant wrong decision making or serious 
misconduct on the part of the contractee and make the 
latter's operation a standstill, the contractor has the 
right to terminate or withdraw the contract.
12.3 If the contractee breaches the contract and affect the 
contractor's benefits adversely, the latter has the right to 
terminate or withdraw the contract.
12.4 If the contractor breaches the contract and interfers the 
rights of the contractee seriously to an extent of unable to 
manage the latter's operation, the contractee has the right 
to terminate or withdraw the contract. Any loss incurred by 
the contractee should be compensated by the contractor.
Section 13 : Contract Period
This contract is effective for two years as from January 1992 to 
December 1993. Three months prior to the expiry of this 
contract, both parties can mutually agree to extend or terminate 
this contract. Both parties should also mutually discuss and 
agree to solve any questions related to this contract.
Section 14 : Managing Department
The Enterprise Management Office is responsible to assess the 
performance, supervise and explan of the terms and conditions of 
this contract.
Section 15 : Dispute
The council meeting of the Labour Union is responsible to deal 
with any disputes arising from this contract.
Section 16
If any conflicts occur between this contract and the government 
policies and regulations, the latter will be prevail. If any 
c o nflicts occur b etween this c o ntract and the hotel's 
regulations, the former will be prevail.
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S e c t i o n  17
In case of any unavoidable or uncontrollable events occur and 
affect the accomplishment of the targets agreed in this contract, 
both parties can mutually resolve the problems.
Section 18
Both parties have the same copy of this contract which is 
effective after sign, seal and delivery.
Since 1992, the IRCs have been developed by the headquarters and 
relevant departments during the budgeting process (October - 
February). After iterative discussions and negotiations with the 
top management in the headquarters, the IRCs are agreed and 
signed by the departmental managers and the general manager.
The IRCs are reviewed quarterly in parallel with the budget 
review but both the general manager and the departmental 
managers are trying to avoid adjusting the targets unless there 
are significant uncontrollable environmental changes affecting 
their validity.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
departmental managers in initiating and negotiating their own 
IRCs, and also involved the accounting and finance department 
intensively as a vetting mechanism in order to set the targets as 
objectively as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Because the 8 departments or profit centres in Beijing Friendship 
Hotel (BFSH) are all independent with very minimal interactions 
and interdependencies, therefore, if there is any internal 
transfer of product/service, actual or standard cost is used to 
settle the transactions.
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S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s te m
c
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Beijing 
Friednship Hotel (BFSH) has three distinct levels of management 
hierarchy :
(1) Top Management (general and deputy-general managers)
(2) Middle Management (departmental managers, deputy managers
and other functional managers)
(3) Lower Management (section leaders under the departmental
managers)
The profit centre managers, who have signed the IRCs, can 
recommend their own divisional structures, staffing and their 
roles and functions, and interactions between their sub-units 
(sections) to the headquarters. In addition, since 1992, the 
profit centre managers have been vested with higher strategic 
autonomy to manoeuvre their organisational and personnel changes 
but important changes should be discussed with headquarters 
before implementation. Whereas, the organisational and personnel 
matters of the other cost centres are still influenced by the 
headquarters.
The profit centre managers are also responsible for certain 
personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, training, 
evaluation, remuneration (distribution of bonus) and even 
suggestion of termination. With tremendous increase of foreign- 
invested and joint-venture enterprises, the present labour market 
in Beijing is rather free which means employees can choose their 
new jobs and resign from the old ones at their own will. On the 
other hand, the employers have the autonomy to lay off their 
staff by giving advanced notice according to the Labour Law 
(implemented in January 1995) and the terms of the employment 
contracts. BFSH has implemented the "employment contract system" 
since 1994 but the "big rice pot" or "three iron bowls" concept 
is still existed. Almost a few hundreds of the employees are 
redundant but it is difficult, under the influence of the 
communist party and labour union, to ask them to leave the 
enterprise.
The major control mechanisms employed by the top management to 
control the performance of the departments are by using annual 
budgets and IRCs. As described in section 5.6 above, the most 
important measurement criteria are sales and profits set in the 
IRCs, although some other qualitative targets (non-financial) are 
employed.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 6 . 1 . 1 - 3  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p en d ix  1 . )
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O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  C o n t r o l  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from " F i n a n c i a l  C o n t r o l "
t o  "M oderate  F i n a n c i a l  C o n t r o l "  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Objectives in Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) emerge from the 
detailed discussion of the long and short term plans between the 
government or bureau and the top management. The financial 
objectives stem from the compromise between the two parties, and 
then impose on the departments, especially the profit centres. 
The departmental managers participate in formulating their annual 
budgets and IRCs, but top management in the headquarters can and 
do push and probe for alternative objectives as they see fit 
since they are under the pressure form the bureau. With the long 
years of experience and information (financial and marketing) 
gathered by the top management, suggestions are provided to 
individual departments to amend the financial objectives both in 
the short or long term. Furthermore, the top management have a 
holistic view to achieve the overall financial objectives year 
after year according to the long term plan.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Tight Financial 
Control" and "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) has monthly and quarterly 
reporting systems to track actual results versus plans or 
budgets. Each profit centre has its own accounting staff 
responsible for sending monthly results on prescribed formats to 
the accounting and finance department in the headquarters for 
calculating the internal profits and comparing with budgets 
before submission to the general manager for review.
The contents of the monthly report are simpler than the 
manufacturing industries. The key financial results such as 
sales and e x p enditures are the major concerns of the 
headquarters. The non-financial measurement yardsticks (see IRC 
in section 5.6) are assessed by the headquarters and department 
through daily inspections. The comments and ratings of the 
service evaluation are written on the same monthly reports. 
These monthly reports are compiled, through the computer, by the 
accounting staff. Any significant variances (without specifying 
tolerance limits) are highlighted in order to bring to the 
attention to the top management.
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For any significant adverse variances shown on any report, the 
general manager contacts the respective departmental managers to 
dig out the underlining reasons or asks them to perform 
investigation immediately. It is expected that remedial actions 
can be taken to handle the short term problems as soon as 
possible.
During the monthly meeting between the top management in 
headquarters and the departmental managers, the general manager 
puts forward the monthly results for open discussion. The 
departmental managers may be asked to explain briefly the 
significant variances and any other potential problems. 
Infrequent failures in meeting the budget by the departmental 
managers can be tolerated as long as they are taking remedial 
tactics or strategies to put things back on the right track and 
attain the budget at the end of the year. Of course, if any 
serious uncontrollable environmental factors happened to hit any 
department adversely, the manager should not be blamed.
Apart from the monthly reporting system, daily performance or 
control reports are required for the profit centres since they 
receive cash around the clock everyday. The followings are two 
examples of these daily control reports.
(1) Guest House (Front Desk/Cashier)
1.1 Shift
1.2 Receipt No.
1.3 Staff No.
1.4 Receipt from Customers :
1.4.1 Ad Hoc
1.4.2 Long-term
1.4.3 Experts
1.4.4 Tourist Group
1.4.5 Conference 
Sub-total
1.6 Payment Analysis
1.6.1 Cash
1.6.2 Credit Card
1.6.3 Credit Account
1.6.4 Account Transfer
1.7 Reporter
1.8 Auditor
1.9 Date of Report
1.5 Receipt from Services :
1.5.1 Meals
1.5.2 Telephone
1.5.3 Business Centre
1.5.4 Laundry
1.5.5 Beverage
1.5.6 Service Charge
1.5.7 Deposits
1.5.8 Others
1.5.9 Taxes 
Sub-total
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(2) R e s t a u r a n t s
? Name of Restaurant (Each)
Breakfast Lunch Dinner Sub-Total
2.1 Cashier
2.2 No. of Dinning People
2.3 No. of Seats
2.4 Occupancy Rate (2.2/2.3)
2.5 Sales per Customer
2.6 Service Items :
2.6.1 Food
2.6.2 Beverage
2.6.3 Wine
2.6.4 Bear
2.6.5 Tobacco
2.6.6 Others
2.6.7 Taxes
2.6.8 Adjustment 
Total Sales
2.7 Weekday/Holiday
2.8 Weather
2.9 Reporter
2.10 Auditor
2.11 Date of Report
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
According to the central government's policy, the annual gross 
wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the state-owned 
enterprises, including shareholding companies, can not exceed 
either one of the following limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) is 
allowed to increase the wages and bonus payable to its employees. 
This rule is trying to motivate all the employees to enhance the 
productivity, efficiency and profitability in order to increase 
their remuneration. Any excess wages and bonus paid above either 
of these two limits will be subject to income tax of 15% in the 
case of BFSH.
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The take-home pay structure of BFSH is composed of basic wages, 
bonus and allowances. Because of the high inflation rate of 
21.7% and 14.8% in 1994 and 1995 respectively, the average annual 
gross wages per employee was increased from RMB6,000 in 1994 to 
RMB7,500 in 1995.
The "basic wages" is reviwed annually depending on post, skill 
and seniority. Every point increase on the basic pay scale is 
RMB10-25, therefore, it is not substantial enough to catch up 
with the inflation. Obviously, the "bonus" is an significant 
component of income which is determined according to the IRC.
There are two portions for the "allowances". The first part is 
determined by the Beijing Manpower Bureau at least once every 
year mainly for the purpose of combating the inflation. The 
second part is decided by the BFSH which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, festival gifts 
etc. The payment of "allowances" is trying to balance the
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus", as described in section 5.6 above, is 
based on the accomplishment of the IRC. An IRC signed between 
the general manager and a departmental manager decides what level 
of group bonus will be given to the department. Of course, it is 
up to the store manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to 
various sections and in turn, the section heads can distribute 
the group bonuses to individuals according to performance as 
agreed beforehand usually in black and white. The bonus is 
distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly basis but a 
certain percentage (10% - 20%) can be retained in a reserve in 
order to make up the low bonus obtained during the months of 
slack season. The payment of year-end bonus, if there is any, is 
also according to the annual performance of each department. It 
is possible that a department will receive very low or even zero 
bonus if it performs much below the targets.
The bonus paid to the management and administrative staff in the 
headquarters is calculated as follow :
Monthly average wages per employee x Grading factor* x 
Perfromance factor#
* i.e. Position Grading factor
General Manager 1.8
Accounting Manager 1.5
Supervisor 1.3
Senior Clerk 1.1
# Performance factor is assessed by the departmental manager 
usually less than 100%.
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In addition to the remuneration paid to the servicing employees, 
BFSH has to pay pension and other allowances to 600 retired 
employees. This kind of life-long responsibility is common to 
all the state-owned enterprises and it is adding a significant 
financial burden to the profit and loss account. To alleviate 
this ailing situation, a Central Government Welfare Fund System 
has been promulgated since 1993 and will be fully implemented in 
1996 .
Since 1993, BFSH has been contributing 25.5% of the monthly gross 
wages and salaries paid to the employees to the Central 
Government Social Welfare Fund for the purpose of pension. The 
shortfall between the enterprise contribution and actual payments 
to employees will be covered by the government. Similar 
contributions are under discussion for the other social welfare 
benefits such as medical, unemployment and disable allowances. 
All these policies are aiming at to share the social securities 
between the government and the enterprises for the long term 
benefit of the working population.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Rice Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is 
to initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to
impose threat of termination (in a negative way) on the S O E 's 
employees. BFSH has implemented this contract employment system 
since 1993 and now all the employees have signed employment 
contracts from one to five years subject to review and renewal. 
In general, the motivation of the employees has been improved.
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the enforcement of financial objectives has both a 
stick and a carrot aspect. Evidence of the stick can be found in 
the reduction of monthly or year-end bonus and even manangement 
turnover in senior positions. The carrot is represented by
substantial increase in bonus and perhaps career advancement.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beijing Friendship Hotel (BFSH) belonged 
to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High
Corporate
Medium
Corproate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
N/A N/A
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Financial
Agreeing Objectives* Tight
Financial
Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Financial Moderate
Financial
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell.
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Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
II
_ _ _  _ \ /_____1 1 w  Li -L LI III w  w  i  w  i CX U  L*
Low Corporate (Strategic
Control)
\ /
[ P o s t - 1 9  9 2 ]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the 
Beijing Friendship Hotel before and after 1992, it can be 
concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has been 
shifted from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) to "Financial 
Control" (Post-1992) gradually although it has not yet reached a 
very strong-form (very low corporate) of financial control style 
as suggested by Goold and Campbell.
As a matter of fact, both the degrees of planning and control 
influences are on two separate continua. The planning influence 
should run from high corporate, then medium corporate and down to 
low corporate. Similarly, there should be measurement in between 
tight strategic control and tight financial control.
Revised : 24 March 1996
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A p p e n d ix  A
B e i j i n g  F r i e n d s h i p  H o t e l  E x p e n s e s  B u d g e t  (1 9 9 4 )
Line Expense 
N o .
01 Wages
02 Welfare
03 Fuel
04 Depreciation
05 Repair & Maintenance
06 Consumable Materials
07 Water & Electricity
08 Postage
09 Uniform
10 Laundry
11 Meals
12 Service Charges
13 Travelling
14 Entertainment
15 Conference
16 Advertising & Promotion
17 Education & Training
18 Labour Insurance
19 Other Insurance
20 Security
21 Transportation
22 Labour Union
23 Management (Bureau) Charges
24 Local Taxes
25 Bad Debts
26 Damaged Stock
27 Others
28 Finance
29 Total Expenses (Sum 1-28) = 
29.1 Operating Expenses 
2 9.2 Management Expenses 
2 9.3 Finance Expenses
Last Year 
Actual $
This Year 
Budget $
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A p p e n d ix  3
B e i j i n g  F r i e n d s h i p  H o t e l  B u d g e t e d  P r o f i t  & L o s s  A c c o u n t
Line Expense Last Year
No.
01 Operating Income
Less :
02 Operating Cost
03 Operating Expenses
04 Operating Taxes
Equal :
05 Gross Profit
Less :
06 Management Expenses
07 Finance Expenses
Equal :
08 Operating Profit
Add :
09 Investment Income
10 Other Income
Less :
11 Other Expense
Equal :
12 Profit Before Tax
24.03.96
This Year 
Budget $
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Introduction : A total number of 20 State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 
have been visited during the period from September 1991 to 
September 1995 in order to collect data concerning the changes of 
planning, control and responsibility accounting systems in these 
SOEs before and after 1992 due to some legislative, economic and 
ownership reforms implemented in China during that year. The 
purpose of this Data Analysis is to describe the changes of the 
parameters in these systems operated in each SOE (one analysis 
for one SOE) . The u l t i m a t e  aim is to c l a s s i f y  the 
"Responsibility Accounting Style" (before and after 1992) of each 
SOE into a simplified two-dimensional (planning & control 
influence) matrix similar to the "Strategic Style Grid" 
propounded by Goold & Campbell in 1987. The four specified 
"Responsibility Accounting Styles" are summarised as follow :
Planning Influence Control Influence RA Style
High Corporate 
High Corporate 
Low Corporate 
Low Corporate
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial 
Tight Strategic 
Tight Financial
Strategic Programming(1) 
Financial Programming(2) 
Strategic Control (3)
Financial Control (4)
Name of SOE : Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. -
Beijing (BPMH)
Staff Interviewed : Miss Zhang Weifen (Finance Manager)
(No. of years in this enterprise : 15 years)
Dates of Visits : First Visit - 2 September 1993
Second Visit - 30 August 1994
Third Visit - 15 September 1995
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Section 1 : History & Background
e
Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) is a core member 
of Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) which specialises in the 
design, development, production and sale of various types of 
sheet-fed offset presses in China. BGC (formerly known as 
Beijing Renmin Machinery Factory) was established in 1952 through 
the merger of 21 small iron factories and machinery factories.
BPMH was established in Beijing, the PRC on 13 July 1993 as a 
joint stock limited company in accordance with the provisions set 
out in the Standard Opinion on Joint Stock Limited Companies 
issued as of 15 May 1992 by the State Commission for 
Restructuring the Economic System of the PRC. BPMH is registered 
as an overseas company in Hong Kong under Part XI of the Hong 
Kong Companies Ordinance. Its ultimate holding company is Beiren 
Group Corporation ("BGC"), a legal entity owned by the PRC 
government.
Pursuant to the approval of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the State Council and other relevant authorities, 
BPMH issued H Shares in Hong Kong in July 1993 and A Shares in 
Shanghai in April 1994. The H Shares were listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange on 6 August 1993 and the A Shares (public 
shares) were listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on 6 May 1994. 
Additional A Shares (employee shares) were listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange on 29 November 1994.
Since the shareholding transformation of BPMH in July 1993, the 
issue and listing of shares are as follows :
(a) Issue and listing of Hong Kong public shares (H Shares)
Date of issue : 4 August 1993
Issue price : RMB2.3 per share, payable at HK$2.08 per share
Number of shares issued : 100,000,000 shares
Date of listing : 6 August 1993
Place of listing : Hong Kong Stock Exchange
Number of shares listed : 100,000,000 shares
(b) Issue and listing of PRC public shares (A Shares)
(i) Public shares 
Date of issue : 9 April 1994 
Issue price : RMB5.3 per share 
Number of shares issued : 35,000,000 shares 
Date of listing : 6 May 1994 
Place of listing : Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Number of shares listed : 35,000,000 shares
619
(ii) Employee shares 
Date of issue : 9 Aprilf1994 
Issue price : RMB5.3 per share 
Number of shares issued : 15,000,000 shares 
Date of listing : 29 November 1994 
Place of listing : Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Number of shares listed : 15,000,000 shares
As at 31 December 1994, the share capital structure of BPMH was
as follow :
Shares not yet listed
State-owned legal person shares (A Shares)* 
Listed shares
PRC public shares (A Shares)
Hong Kong public shares (H Shares)
Million shares 
Nominal value 
RMB1 each
250 (62.5%)
50
100
(12.5%)
(25.0%)
400 (100.0%)
* Represented by the Beiren Group Corporation (BGC).
In 1994, BPMH applied the funds raised from the listing for 
construction and renovation of workshops, purchase of staff 
quarters, purchase and installation of advanced equipment, 
introduction of overseas modern management skill and investments 
in profitable projects. The investments in five workshops have 
made some progress. In 1994, BPMH invested RMB52 million for the 
introduction, installation, construction and improvement of staff 
quarters, equipment and technology. Long term and short term 
loans of RMB68 million were repaid in 1994.
In 1995, BPMH pursued technology improvement, management 
diversification, vertical integ r a t i o n  of o p e r a t i o n  and 
reformation of operational structure to meet the demand of the 
market with a view to having higher economic return.
The major business operation of BPMH are development, design, 
manufacturing and sales of printing machines, pressing machines, 
packing machines and parts and components of such machines. The 
other operations include technology consultancy and technical 
support services related to the above business.
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BPMH is principally engaged in the production and sale of various 
types of sheet-fed offset presses in China. BPMH currently has 
more than 300 regular customers located throughout China, 
including printers of books, magazines, newspapers, notes, 
certificates and packaging materials. BPMH's products are 
principally sold to customers in the PRC. In addition, a small 
proportion of its products (less than 10%) are exported to a 
number of developing countries and regions including Southeast 
Asia and the Middle East.
BPMH's head office and production facilities are located adjacent 
to the Beijing-Tianjin Express Highway in Beijing city. BPMH 
uses computers in the production and testing of key parts, 
components and fittings and has entered into an agreement with 
Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) whereby BPMH will undertake 
research and development of new products using the research 
facilities of BGC.
BGC (including BPMH) is the largest manufacturer of offset 
presses in the PRC and was accredited as a "Category 1" 
enterprise in 1990. "Category 1" enterprise is a national award 
given by the State to enterprises which have attained certain 
standards of management, proudct quality and profitability. BPMH 
is the largest manufacturer of sheet-fed offset presses in China. 
BPMH's products principally consist of sheet-fed offset presses, 
which are widely considered to be one of the most commonly used 
presses in the printing industry. BPMH produces 61 different 
models of offset presses, which include single/double colour, 
multi-colour and multi-function sheet-fed offset presses. BGC 
has obtained the two Gold Quality Awards and two of the three 
Silver Quality Awards that have ever been given to the printing 
machinery industry by the State during the past decade.
In 1994, under the supervision of the directors and with the 
efforts of all the staff, BPMH managed to overcome the 
difficulties of the volatile market conditions due to the 
macro-economic control measures taken by the PRC government and 
to speed up the technology improvement programme. The quality of 
the products has been improved and the company was able to 
achieve its targets and to grow satisfactorily when compared with 
last year.
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Section 2 : Legal Form & Organisation Structure
e
Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) was restricted by its production 
capacity and shortage of staff which led to an insufficient 
supply of its products. To expand its production capacity, BGC 
acquired the Beijing Electrical Punched Part Factory and the 
Beijing Forging Press Factory in 1983 and 1992 respectively. 
These factories were subsequently coverted into a sheet-fed 
machine factory and a single/double colur offset press factory 
respectively. The company s u c c e s s f u l l y  d e v e l o p e d  and 
m a n u f a c t u r e d  C h i n a ' s  first f o l i o  s i x - c o l o u r  g l a z i n g  
multi-function offset press in 1992. Commercial production of 
such offset press commenced in 1994.
On 13 July 1993, BPMH was registered with the administrative 
bureau of industry and commerce of Beijing municipality upon 
approval from the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic 
System of the PRC. The ownership rights in the multi-colour 
offset press factory, the single/double colur offset press 
factory, the foundry, the gear workshop, the sheet-fed machine 
factory and the supply division, which were originally under BGC, 
were transferred to BPMH and became the operating divisions.
Under the Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH), the 
company structure is shown as follow :
(1) Production Factories & Workshops*
1.1 Multi-Colour Offset Press Factory
[manufacture of sheet-fed multi-colour offset press]
1.2 Single/Double Colour Offset Press Factory
[manufacture of sheet-fed single/double colour offset press]
1.3 Sheet-Fed Machine Factory
[component and sheet-fed machine manufacturing]
1.4 Gear Workshop 
[gear manufacturing]
1.5 Foundry
[casting of semi-finished products]
* Each factory or workshop is an independent profit centre, 
having signed IRC with the General Manager, and has its own 
manager, deputy managers, foremen and other supporting staff, 
such as accounting and personnel. Therefore, a kind of matrix 
management exist with various reporting relationships with the 
respective departments in the headquarters.
(2) Headquarters
2.1 Enterprise Management Office (headed by the General Manager
2.2 Internal Audit & Law Office and a Deputy-General Manager)
2.3 Production Planning & Control Department (headed by the
2.4 Technical & Quality Assurance Department Chief Engineer)
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2.5 Investment & Development Department (headed by the Chief
2.6 Sales & Marketing Department Economist)
2.7 Accounting & Finance Department (headed by the Chief
2.8 Computer Department Accountant)
2.9 Purchasing & Supply Department (headed by a Deputy-General
2.10 Personnel & Manpower Department Manager)
The BPMH had the following 11 persons in the Board of Directors
Chairman
Deputy Chairman
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
2 Non-executive 
Directors
(General Manager)
(Deputy General Manager)
(Deputy General Manager)
(Chief Engineer)
(Chief Economist)
(Assistant to General Manager)
(Deputy General Manager of Beiren Group 
Corporation*)
(Deputy General Manager of Beiren Group 
Corporation)
(Senior Assistant to the General Manager of 
Beiren Group Corporation)
(Government Officials)
* Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) is the ultimate holding of BPMH.
The followings are the 3 members in the Supervisory Committee :
Chairman (Chairman of BGC's Labour Union)
Supervisor (Supervisor of BGC's Supervisory Committee)
Supervisor (Representative of BPMH Labour Union)
Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) is an independent legal entity 
owned by the State. The supervisory authority of BPMH and BGC is 
Beijing Industrial Machinery Bureau. BPMH and BGC are independent 
of such authority in respect of management decision relating to 
policy setting, strategy, planning and operations.
As far as BGC is concerned, the major roles played by the Beijing 
Industrial Machinery Bureau before 1993 are to :
(1) appoint the factory manager (or general manager) and the 
communist party secretary;
(2) maintain macroeconomics control on the 5-year's plans 
suggested by its enterprises;
(3) provide guidance on product development, technology 
improvement and market information; and
(4) act as a bridge or facilitator between the government and 
its enterprises in policy matters such as capital 
investment, import and export autonomy, taxation, legal form 
transformation i.e. shareholding, etc.
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In responding to and implementing of the "SOE Operation Mechanism 
Transformation Regulations" ?enacted by the People's Congress in 
July 1992, the Bureau has delegated the planning and management 
responsibilities to BGC although the quarterly and annual reports 
have to be submitted to the Bureau for review. Since BPMH is a 
shareholding enterprise, the Bureau exerts less planning and 
control influences although it can do so by the two 
representatives sitting on the board of directors.
(Please refer to Q 2 .6 & Q 2 .7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
At the end of 1994, BPMH had a workforce of 3,650 people, 
including 2,800 workers, 290 engineering and technical personnel, 
450 administration staff and 110 responsible in servicing and 
other duties. It is classified as a "large-size SOE" in China. 
BPMH has extensive staff training programmes depending on the 
current staff situation and the needs. It provides training to 
its staff in the following areas :
For management, engineering and technical personnel: computer
operation, foreign language skills and various kinds of 
specialised technical training.
For workers: training of elementary, intermediate and advanced 
levels in metal cold-working and hot-working and the study of 
theories on related subjects for technicians.
Section 3 : Financial Indicators
Total assets : RMB1,027M (1994)
Turnover : RMB 265M (1992)
RMB 385M (1993)
RMB 426M (1994)
RMB 362M (1995)
Income before tax : RMB 52M (1992) - 19.6% of sales
RMB H I M (1993) - 28.0% of sales
RMB 122M (1994) - 28.6% of sales
RMB 107M (1995) - 29.6% of sales
Income tax rate : 15%
BPMH generally commences production upon confirmation of orders. 
As a result of the recent rapid growth of printing industry, 
demand for BPMH's printing machines has significantly exceeded 
supply. Therefore, the customers are generally required to pay a 
cash deposit of 10% - 20% of the purchase price at the time of 
order. The balance will be payable immediately prior to delivery 
or upon delivery. Coupled with the shares issued in 1993 and 
1994, BPMH had a total of cash and bank balance of RMB220M 
against a total of long term and short term borrowings balance of 
RMB83M at the end of 1994. Bad debt was quite minimal.
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S e c t i o n  4 : Economic  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  C o n t r a c t  S y s t e m  (ERCS)
Since 1986, the Chinese government has actively promoted the ERCS 
to the state-owned enterprises with an aim to enhance their 
economic efficiency (over one-third of them were running in 
losses) through the participation in the profit sharing. The 
first stage of the ERCS development was from 1986 to 1990. In 
the first three years of this stage, ERCS created positive 
effects such as the government revenue and the labour 
remuneration were both increased.
However, in the following two years, due to the macroeconomics 
contol policies adopted by the government to curb down the 
overheated economy, the market demand for products and services 
declined and as a result, a lot of contracts could not be 
fulfilled. Therefore, during the second stage (1991-1995) of the 
ERCS development, many enterprises were not willing to enter into 
contracts with the government in 1991. Then the government had 
to give more favourable terms and conditions to the enterprises 
in order to induce them entering into the contracts.
Under the above situation, the Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) 
entered into the first 3-year ERC (1988-1990) in 1988 with the 
Beijing municipal government. The major economic target was 
sales tax plus income before tax which initial base was set at 
RMB20 million for the first year 1988. Then the annual growth 
rate was 6%. The profit and tax handovered to the government 
included sales or value-added tax, income tax, municipal taxes 
and a portion of the profit after income tax. Any excess of the 
profit and tax over the targets would be refunded to the 
enterprise.
Upon the expiry of the first ERC, the second one for five years 
(1991 - 1995) was agreed and signed in 1991. The 1991 sales tax 
plus income before tax was set at RMB24 million and then the 
annual growth rate was increased to 8%. Any excess of the income 
tax over the ERC target would be refunded. Other than income 
tax, there were sales tax, value-added tax and other municipal 
taxes. 90% of the profit after tax was transferred to the 
Renovation and Development Fund, whereas, the 10% went to the 
Employee Welfare Fund for capital expenditures such as building 
or buying staff quarters.
The inception of Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) 
in 1993 did not affect the ERC of its ultimate holding, BGC, 
because BPMH is a public limited company which is not required to 
entered into any ERC with the government, but instead income and 
relevant taxes are the sources of revenue paid by BPMH to the 
government.
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BGC is currently negotiating with the government to waive the 
continuance of ERC and adopt the similar tax payments to the 
government as its subsidiary, BPMH.
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
Although Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) is a 
large listed SOE, the guiding theme of the organisation structure 
is simplicity and accountability. It went to some length in 1993 
to establish the 5 production workshops as stand-alone business 
units which are independent semi-profit centres that are 
controlled by individual factory or workshop managers with clear 
lines of authority and responsibility. Based on the Internal 
Responsibility Contracts (IRC), they are accounted for the 
production quantities and costs, as well as the fixed and working 
capital. Other than these four production workshops, all the 
other departments are classified as cost centres.
Since the inception of BPMH in 1993, more planning responsibility 
has been decentralised to each factory and department such as 
initiating the annual budget and the internal responsibility 
contract. The profit and cost responsibility primarily lies with 
the factory manager but the top management keep a surveillance 
cost control on each production workshop through monthly or 
weekly report.
It has been the practice that the selection and appointment of 
the factory manager and party secretary of BGC are decided by the 
Beijing Industrial Machinery Bureau and a "Factory Manager 
Responsibility System" is in force. This system takes the 
Economic Responsibility Contract (ERC) as a basis to evaluate the 
performance of the factory manager. If an outstanding or above 
target performance has been achieved, the factory manager will be 
awarded a lump sum bonus at the year end.
Since BPMH is a shareholding enterprise, the board of directors 
has full autonomy to appoint all the senior management staff in 
the headquarters and the managers of the 5 production factories 
and workshops. As a matter of fact, most of the senior
management staff in the headquarters are members of the board who 
know the business and operation better on one hand but may have 
conflict or independence in decision making. Any major changes 
of the organisation structure in each production factory and 
service department should be initiated by the manager in charge 
and approved by the general manager via the Enterprise Management 
Office.
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However, more autonomy of internal management and operation has 
been delegated to the factory and department managers in BPMH 
compared with its holding enterprise BGC. And in turn, the 
factory and department managers have involved their subordinates 
more in planning, control and decision making.
(Please refer to Q 5 .1.1-Q5.1.4 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, BPMH has a decentralized structure in which the 
individual factory and department managers report directly to the 
general manager who in turn reports to the board of directors, 
and they play a linking and control role between the factories, 
headquarters and the board.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium Corporate" since 1992.
5.2 Review Process
Since the establishment of Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings 
Ltd. (BPMH) in 1993, a regular formal planning process to review, 
discuss and sanction the annual plan or budget and the internal 
responsibility contracts (IRCs) has been implemented. First of 
all, the board of directors reviews the long term plan and 
evaluates the internal and external environmental factors, and 
then discusses with the senior management staff in details in 
order to determine the annual sales and profit targets for next 
year. Based on these preliminary targets, some guidelines are 
provided to the production managers and other department heads 
for them to initiate their own plans or budgets for the next 
year. As far as the five production factories are concerned, 
their budget proposals contained the key criteria (i.e. internal 
profit, production quantity and cost, and working capital 
employed) to be used as the measurement yardsticks of their 
subsequent internal responsibility contracts. The other service 
departments in the headquarters have to compile their annual work 
plans and expense budgets as well.
During November, the Enterprise Management Office and Accounting 
and Finance Department, under the direction of the general 
manager receive all the budgets and plans for validation and 
consolidation into a master plan or budget for submission to the 
Board of Directors for review. Then, formal and informal 
meetings and discussions are held between the board of directors 
and senior management staff either collectively or individually. 
This iterative exercise carries on until all the plans, budgets 
and contracts are mutually agreed and approved by the board in 
February and endorsed by the AGM held in April or May. Then the 
enterprise management office publishes a set of the final master 
plans and sends to the production and department managers.
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tApart from the annual planning exercise, all the factories or 
workshops and departments are encouraged to participate in the 
planning process and extend their planning horizon beyond one 
year in order to match the milestones set in the 5-year long term 
plan. Therefore, the top management have less interference in 
departmental planning decisions, but without reducing the tight 
financial control.
(Please refer to Q5.5.2, Q5.5.6, & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire 
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Obvervation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.3 Strategic Themes, Thrusts and Suggestions
It is an usual practice for the traditional (especially old) 
state-owned enterprises to promulgate various strategic themes 
and thrusts to their employees through different means such as 
meetings, documents, notice boards or banners. Some of these 
themes and thrusts are disseminated by the government such as 
operational mechanism (1993), economic effectiveness (1992), 
quality control (1991), economic responsibility contract (1990), 
etc.
The directors of Beijing Printing Machinery Holdings Limited 
(BPMH) believe that the success of the company is attributable to 
the following strategic thrusts :
(1) the growth of China's printing industry leading to 
increasing demand for advanced printing machines as a result 
of modernized production processes;
(2) its association with Beiren Group Corporation, which has a
history of 43 years in the printing machinery industry in 
the PRC and which is one of the market leaders;
(3) its experienced management team and workers who have 
extensive experience and expertise in the printing machinery 
industry;
(4) its continuous efforts in research and development to 
improve the quality of the existing products and on the 
development of offset presses;
(5) its e x t e n s i v e  product r a n g e  of h i g h - q u a l i t y  and 
competitively priced offset presses, which at present 
consists of 61 different models; and
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(6) the use of computer controlled facilities in the processing 
of key parts and components which enable the company to 
maintain its control over product quality and production 
schedules.
BPMH has been promulgating "Quality" as the most important 
strategic theme in order to compete with the counterparts for the 
domestic market share on one hand and to explore the overseas 
markets on the other hand.
In order to establish the quality assurance system for the full 
size paper offset presses, BPMH has adopted the ISO 9000 quality 
management and quality assurance standard since 1995. It is 
expected that the system will obtain the certification from the 
relevant PRC authorities of the State in 1996. The system 
intensifies the internal quality control of BPMH so that products 
of reliable quality are provided to its customers. It also 
facilities the penetration of the products into international 
markets.
In addition to the "GS" recognition of the six models of quarto 
offset presses, it is expected that the folio offset presses of 
BPMH will pass the examination for the "GS" recognition of 
Germany and the "UL" recognition of the United States in 1996. 
The recognition will facilities the expansion of the markets of 
the Europe and the United States for BPMH's products.
(Please refer to Q5.2.4-7 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Before 1992, the top management in BGC (BPMH's holding entity) 
from time to time made suggestions on specific issues relating to 
the planning and review process such as sales quantity and mix, 
selling price, marketing strategy and production quantity and 
mix. The top management followed the financial indicators and 
performance closely on monthly and quarterly basis and were quick 
to make suggestions if they did not match the overall long and 
short term plan.
To facilitate the implementation of the legislation in 1992, both 
the top management of BGC and BPMH have given more freedom to the 
factory managers and department heads to compile their own plans 
or budgets and to adjust their plans and operations as long as 
they would not deviate much from the ultimate sales and profit 
targets. Nevertheless, the top management still provide 
guidelines and suggestions to the factories and departments in 
the planning process.
( P l e a s e  r e f e r  t o  Q 5 . 3 . 1 - 4  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e x t r a c t s  i n
A p p e n d ix  1 . )
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O b s e r v a t i o n  o f  P l a n n i n g  I n f l u e n c e  : s h i f t  from  "High C o r p o r a te"
t o  "Medium C o r p o r a te"  s i n c e  1 9 9 2 .
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Resource Allocation)
The current trend in the printing industry worldwide is the 
switching from letterpress printing to lithography, which has 
resulted in an increasing demand for offset presses. In 
addition, the trading volume of printing machines worldwide is 
accelerating. BPMH's offset presses compare favourably with 
those of its competitors in pricing. Accordingly, the Directors 
believe that BPMH's products have a competitive edge in the 
expanding international market.
Since the public listing in 1993, BPMH's efforts have be focused 
on :
(1) improving the quality and performance level of its offset 
presses;
(2) expanding the range of offset presses produced; and
(3) increasing its production capacity and improving its 
productivity.
In order to materialize the above objectives, the board of 
directors have been actively formulating the following long term 
plans which are extending to the 9th National Planning Cycle from 
1996 to 2000.
(a) joint-Ventures
A joint venture contract dated 2 April 1994 between Beijing 
Daqing County Taihe Industrial Company and BPMH whereby the 
parties agreed to invest an aggregate amount of RMB5 million to 
establish Beiren Tai He Printing and Casting Factory. BPMH would 
contribute R M B 3 .5 million, representing 70% of the total 
investment. The factory started operation in 1995.
A joint venture contract dated 1 November 1993 was signed between 
BPMH and Xiaotangshan Town People's Government of Changping 
County, Beijing whereby a joint venture named Beijing Pressing 
Machine Factory No.2 was established with a registered capital of 
RMB9 million. BPMH contributed machinery and equipment of RMB4.6 
million to acquire 51% of the equity interest of the joint 
venture. The term of the joint venture is from 1 November 1993 
to 31 December 2003. Profit would be distributed prior to 
taxation.and equally distributed to the parties after each year 
end. Upon the liquidation of the joint venture, the parties 
shall be entitled to take back the assets respectively 
contributed by them. The joint veture started operation in 1995.
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(b) Long Term I n v e s t m e n t s
A wholly-owned subsidiary of BPMH, Sheenlite Company Limited, was 
incorporated by BPMH under Hong Kong Companies Ordinance on 6 
January 1994. A special resolution was passed on 24 May 1994 to 
rename it as Sheenlite Finance Company Limited.
An agreement was entered into between Sheenlite Finance Company 
Limited ("Sheenlite") and Full Pool Limited Corporation ("Full 
Pool") in May 1994 whereby Honmark Investment Co. Ltd 
("Honmark") , a wholly-owned subsidiary of Full Pool, would 
enlarge its issued share capital from 2 shares of HK$1 each to 
2,000,000 shares prior to the execution of the agreement and all 
the 2,000,000 shares would be owned by Full Pool. The principal 
business of Full Pool are import and export trading, shares, 
properties holding and other projects.
It was agreed between Full Pool and Sheenlite that Full Pool 
would sell 1,000,000 sahres in the enlarged share capital of 
Honmark to Sheenlite, representing 50% of the enlarged share 
capital of Honmark. The shares entitled Sheenlite to receive 
dividends and the rights to assets. Based on friendly 
negotiation, Honmark was jointly managed by the directors 
appointed by Full Pool and Sheenlite in Hong Kong administration 
practice.
An agreement dated 29 December 1994 between BPMH, Sheenlite and 
Full Pool whereby the shares of Full Pool owned by Sheenlite were 
transferred to BPMH.
(c) Renovation
After renovation of the Single/Double Offset Factory, BPMH has 
strengthened the production of single/double colour offset 
presses. A total of 270 sets of single/double offset presses 
were produced in 1994, representing an increase of 125% over 
1993 .
(d) Research & Development
After two years' effort, BPMH's quarto offset presses passed the 
"GS" examination of the Germany in 1994 and was granted the right 
to use "GS" trade mark on six models of the products. It 
indicates that the safety technology of "Beiren" offset press 
meets the advanced standard of developed countries. With such a 
recognition, the products can be sold to the European market.
In order to cope with the demand for printing of packaging 
papers, 15 sets of newly developed four-colour offset presses 
were produced in 1994. With the fine quality and high 
adaptability of the printed products, the presses are well 
received by the customers.
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(e) Equipment & Technology Transfer
The 500 tonnes single-spot forging press with the technology 
introduced from Japan has commenced operation. A small number of 
products were produced in 1994 to meet the demand for medium to 
large size press in the automotive and electrical industries. 
The production of each products was also a new development of the 
production of forging machine.
Mechinite cast iron technology was introduced from British 
International Machanite Co. After throughout study of the 
technology, BPMH has obtained the authorisation from the British 
Company to use the internationally recognised quality trade mark 
"M". As the quality of the casted parts has been improved, BPMH 
is able to accept orders for export of large quantity of casted 
parts.
(f) Production Development
The construction of phase 1 of Beiren Tai He Printing and Casting 
Factory, a joint venture with Daxing County Government of 
Beijing, was completed in 1994. The factory will have a 
production capacity of 1,500 to 2,000 tonnes of quality casted 
parts for offset press. It will also have the ability of primary 
processing of certain major components. The factory will help 
improving the quality of small casted parts of offset press.
Part of the renovation of the workshop for high precision small 
parts was completed. Trial production has commenced and the 
production capacity of the workshop was 300,000 man-hours in 
1995. It has anticipated that the quality of high precision 
parts of offset press would be further improved after 1995.
A cold-formed parts machine workshop for the production of safety 
guard of offset press was established. The renovation of the 
workshop of 2,600 square metres was completed. Agreements for 
the introduction of three cold-formed parts machines from Germany 
and Japan had been signed. The machines were delivered in the 
second quarter of 1995 and operation commenced in the last 
quarter of the year.
Plasma coating workshop was constructed in order to improve the 
anti-rust protection of the roller of offset press.
Hebei Beiren Paper Feeder Factory was established in 1995 with 
Shijiazhuang Government of Hebei to produce paper feeder for the 
BPMH's offset presses.
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(g) M a r k e t in g  & P r o m o t io n
In order to provide comprehensive after-sales and maintenance 
services to its customers, and assist its customers in the 
technical aspects of their operations, BPMH has entered into an 
agreement with Beiren Group Corporation (BGC) whereby BGC's 27 
servicing centres for offset presses located throughout the PRC, 
which employ more than 300 service personnel, will provide
after-sales service for BPMH's products. In addition, BGC will
be the sole sales agent for BPMH's products in the PRC and
overseas, and be responsible for the implementation of marketing 
programmes formulated by BPMH. When a customer purchases a new 
offset press, BPMH will, through BGC, provide free installation 
testing, technical advice and training for the customer. In 
addition, after-sales services such as machine repair and 
maintenance, the supply of components and fittings, and one-year 
free maintenance will be provided.
Under the above arrangement, BPMH will also have access to the 
marketing network and sales staff of BGC located in various sales 
centres throughout the PRC. These marketing staff, through
interaction with customers, are aware of the customers' needs. 
They provide service on the development of new technology, and 
gauge the customers' requirements and assessments of the 
capability of BPMH's products at the same time.
BPMH often participates in exhibitions and conferences relating 
to printing machinery, including the annual roadshow in major 
cities in the PRC and the International Exhibition for Printing 
Machinery, such as the one held in Drupa of Germany in 1995. 
BPMH also advertises in various PRC newspapers, periodicals and 
trade magazines relating to printing.
(h) ISO 9000
Since 1979, Beiren Group Corporation (BGC), including BPMH has 
implemented a comprehensive quality control system in its 
production process. BPMH undertakes inspection for quality 
control purposes in every aspect of the production process. All 
materials and parts have to undergo quality control tests after 
each principal stage of the production process and before further 
processing. BPMH has established internal guidelines on quality 
control and regularly trains its staff on quality control 
procedures. To ensure the effective implementation of such 
procedures, BPMH has set up a department with experienced 
personnel to undertake random checks and tests on quality control 
procedures to evaluate their effectiveness.
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BCG, including BPMH, has compiled a quality control handbook 
based on the ISO 9000 Quality Control Management and Quality 
Standard System, and since 1990, quality control procedures have 
been implemented on this basis. BCG and BPMH are planning to 
obtain ISO 9000 certification in 1997 or 1998.
(i) Turnover/Profit Growth
The Board of Directors believe that BPMH has been able to 
maintain consistent profitability as a result of continuous 
improvement to existing models and introduction of new and 
improved models in accordance with market demand. Prices of most 
raw materials and components used by BPMH and its products were 
previously subject to state control, and most adjustments to 
prices had to be approved by the relevant authorities. However, 
since the latter part of 1992, such price control has been 
eliminated and currently, the prices of raw materials and 
components used by BPMH and its products are not subject to any 
form of state control.
During the period, which was also a period of rapid economic 
growth in the PRC, BPMH's production costs have increased 
significantly, as a result of increases in material costs as well 
as labour costs. Nonetheless, throughout the period, BPMH has 
been able to adjust its sales prices in response to increases in 
such costs, and overall profit margins have been maintained. 
With its established market position and competitive pricing 
policy, as against both domestic and imported products, and the 
strong market demand, the BOD expect that BPMH will be able to 
sustain its profit margins in the 1990s.
(Please refer to Q5.4.1-9 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the government has devolved its central planning role 
to BGC and in particular BPMH as a shareholding enterprise. Now, 
the top management of BPMH is taking the initiative to formulate 
its own long term plan with active participation from the middle 
management whose medium and short term operation may be affected 
as well. The board of directors of BPMH are very keen in the 
strategic planning process which represents the committment to 
the shareholders and other stakeholders in terms of profitability 
and growth.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High Corporate"
to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
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5.5 Short-Term Plans/Budgets (Resource Allocation)
f
Since the establishment of Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings 
Ltd. (BPMH) in 1993, the general short term planning policy 
adopted is "production determined by sales" which means sales is 
the initial driving force of all the activities. Reference 
should also be made to the 5-year long term plan especially to 
estimate what the sales potential will be for the newly developed 
products in the next year. As from October 1993, BPMH has 
employed the following annual budgeting process.
The board of directors and top management are very active in 
performing some marketing activities such as participating in 
local and overseas exhibitions and visits to exisiting and 
potential customers with his sales and marketing staff. In 
October, they evaluate the present and future internal financial, 
production and human resources with the deputy managers, factory 
managers and the three chiefs. They also scan the external 
opportunities and threats with the sales and marketing staff. 
Eventually, the board of directors tentatively determine a set of 
sales mix figures (i.e. sales budget). These sales forecasts are 
provided to the respective departments, more importantly to the 
production factories and workshops, for them to initiate their 
own budgets.
The first budget submission is in early November and the 
enterprise management office and chief accountant consolidate all 
the pieces into a master budget (financial and operation plan) 
for board of directors' review before the first budget meeting is 
held with all the factory and department managers. The major 
purpose of this first meeting is to discuss with the factory 
managers to ascertain whether their production capacities can be 
matched with the initial sales budget. If they exceed the sales 
budget, it becomes the primary responsibility of the sales and 
marketing staff and even the factory manager to hunt for other 
sales avenues in order to fully utilize the production capacity. 
If there is excess demand, then priorities will be given to the 
customers for delivery and agreements must be made with the 
customers beforehand. Due to the resultant effects of the 
macro-economic control measures installed by the government in 
July 1993, the demand of BPMH's printing machines have been 
affected since 1995. It is expected that the overall production 
capacity will be about 90% in 1996.
Again, the second budget submission in December is consolidated 
by the enterprise management office for further review by the 
board of directors who will then discuss informally or formally 
with the factory managers and department heads. Another 
submission is usually made in January next year. Finally, the 
agreed master budget is tabled to the board of directors for 
approval in February and then endorsed by the AGM in April or 
M ay.
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Since October 1993, the production managers have been involved 
intensively in this budgeting process which they believe to be 
important in setting and negotiating the subsequent internal 
responsibility contracts with the general manager. The other 
department heads have also participated carefully in devising 
their expense and operation budgets which they would be measured 
against as performance yardsticks.
In view of the rapidly changing market conditions, the budget 
review period has been shortened from quarterly to monthly. The 
general manager and his deputy managers and three chiefs hold a 
formal meeting at the beginning of each month to review the 
financial performance against the master budget and individual 
departmental budgets. Amendments to the budgets can be made 
although flexible budget has not been made.
(Please refer to Q5.5.1-8 & Q5.7.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
In summary, both the privatisation and the market economy have 
given BPMH more freedom to plan ahead. The government authority 
has completely devolved the short term planning autonomy to BPMH, 
except the two government representatives sitting on the board 
can make suggestions in relation to the overall sales and profit 
targets. The top management have involved the middle management 
or even their subordinates (lower management) in the annual 
planning and budgeting process which on one hand is a critical 
step in materializing the long term strategic plan or the ERC, 
and on the other hand, it is an important motivational factor for 
the factory managers and department heads to manage their own 
businesses and to be rewarded accordingly.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "Medium Corporate" 
to "Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.6 Internal Responsibility Contracts (IRC)
Beijing Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) established its 
IRC system at the beginning of 1993 and seven months before 
listing its H shares in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The major 
purposes of adopting the IRC are to motivate the efficiency, 
profitability and cost reduction in the production workshops. 
Before 1993, the production factories were measured on target 
production quantity and cost, while the subsequent IRCs 
emphasized on the internal profit for the 3 production factories 
and cost of production for the gearing and foundry workshops.
The followings were the contents of the IRC signed between the 
General Manager and Foundry Factory Manager (casting of 
semi-finished products) in January 1994.
636
(A) IRC Format : mainly cost control oriented
(B) Duration : January - December 1994
(C) Agreed Targets :
(Cl) Economic Targets
1.1 Production Quantity
1.1.1 Internal supply/transfer 
Fixed external supply 
Temporary external supply
5,500 tonnes 
3,453 tonnes 
1,100 tonnes
Total production quantity : 10,053 tonnes
1.1.2 Labour hours for internal supply = 38,000 hours
Labour hours for external supply = 8,000 hours
Total production labour hours 46,000 hours
1.2 Cost of Production
1.2.1 Production cost per tonne = RMB3,226
1.2.2 Conversion cost = RMB13.2 million
1.2.3 Working capital = RMB1.36 million
1.2.4 Discretionery expenses = RMB1.01 million
1.3 The production targets, according to the Production Planning
and Control Department's standards, should be accomplished
and assessed in the monthly economic responsibility system.
(C2) Quality Targets
2.1 Sample inspection passing rate = 96%
2.2 First class output rate = 50% (over)
2.3 Wastage & scrap rate (cylinder parts) = 8.5%
2.4 Wastage & scrap rate (other parts) = 13%
2.5 Serious quality defect incidence = 0%
(C3) Working Capital Targets
Total annual average working capital is fixed at RMB1.36 
million. An interest rate of 12% is charged on any excess 
within 20% of the fixed amount. An interest rate of 24% is 
charged on any excess over 20% of the fixed amount. The 
interest, if there is any, will be calculated quarterly and 
charged to the cost of production.
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(C4) T e c h n i c a l  T a r g e t s
Due to the controllable factors, any delay in each item of 
the technical renovation or improvement will be fined 
RMB1,000 to RMB5,000.
(C5) Other Targets
5.1 No serious employee injury incidence.
5.2 No serious facility breakdown incidence.
5.3 Different resource consumption rates at least equal to the
levels in 1993.
(D) Targets and Gross Wages Linkage System Policy
(Dl) The gross wages is linked up with the accomplishment of the
above economic targets. The gross wages will be reduced
proportionately according to the degree of achievement in 
the targets.
(D2) Bonus not exceeding 10% of the gross wages will be awarded 
if the actual performance exceeds each item of the economic 
targets (cost targets and quality targets account for 5% 
each).
(D3) Increase or decrease in headcount should refer to the 
personnel policy.
(E) Contractee1s Right
(El) Entrusted Legal Entity Right : within the entrusted legal 
entity right authorised by the General Manager (contractor), 
the Workshop Manager (contractee) has the right to manage 
the production operations and related activities.
(E2) Employee Deployment Right : within the predetermined gross 
wages and headcount, the contractee has the rights to employ 
technical and management staff, and to lay off, transfer, 
warn and punish employees. The contractee also has the 
right to change the posts and adjust the wages of the 
employees as well. The above arrangements should not
violate the personnel policies and be reported to the 
Personnel & Manpower Department.
(E3) Bonus Distribution Right : within the control of gross wages 
level, the contractee has the right to distribute the 
awarded bonus among his own employees.
(E4) Pricing Right : without affecting the production plan, the 
contractee can accept the outside orders and determine the 
prices of these orders, provided the overall profitability 
of the enterprise will not be reduced.
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(E5) Technical Renovation ?Right : the contractee is allowed
RMB100,000 to proceed small technical renovation work and 
purchase minor equipment and accessories.
(E6) The contractee is allowed RMB10,000 for business expenses 
including entertainment.
(E7) Assessment Review Right : the contractee has the right to 
counter assess and appeal the planning, adjustment, 
compromise, service and p o l i c y  made by the other 
departments, which affect the operation of the contractee1s 
factory.
(F) Contractee's Responsibilities
(FI) Comply with the state laws and regulations and pay the 
relevant and respective taxes.
(F2) Accomplish each target agreed in this contract and ensure 
the maintenance and increase of the assets' value.
(F3) Apart from the economic achievement, the political and 
cultural education work should be enforced and improved.
(F4) Achievement (Operation) audit should be performed at the end 
of the year. The respective management staff will be 
accounted for any shortfall of targets which are not due to 
uncontrollable factors.
(G) Contractor's Rights
(Gl) The contractor has the rights to inspect, evaluate, award, 
penalize the accomplishment of the targets agreed in this 
contract.
(G2) The interpretation right of this contract belongs to the 
Enterprise Management Office.
(G3) The contractee's operation should be self-disciplined. If 
any malpractice which is against the rules and regulations 
and causes economic loss to the enterprise, the contractee 
will be punished for 1% of the amount of loss after auditing 
and inspection by the respective authorities.
(G4) At the end of the year, the final assessed performance and 
corresponding wages and bonus awarded will be matched 
against the two ceilings as laid down in the Enterprise Law 
1988 (refer to section 6.4 below).
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(H) C o n t r a c t o r ' s  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
(HI) Ensure the realisation of the wages and bonus awarded and 
recognised the other terms and conditions as stipulated in 
this contract.
(H2) Within the pre-determined amount, ensure the adequacy of the 
working capital provided to the contractee.
(H3) In order to provide an all-round favourable environment for 
the contractee to accomplish all the targets in this 
contract, the corresponding departments should perform their 
planning, facilitating, servicing and supervising work well.
It takes a few months for the general manager and the production 
or workshop managers to negotiate with the terms and conditions 
for the IRCs signed. This long process indicates that the setting 
of IRC is not a top-down approach and the production managers are 
very eager on this issue upon which they will be measured against 
and rewarded thereupon.
(Please refer to Q5.6.1-16 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, the general manager has delegated more freedom to the 
production or workshop managers in initiating and negotiating 
their own IRCs, and also involved the accounting and finance 
personnel intensively as a vetting mechanism in order to set the 
targets as objective as possible.
Observation of Planning Influence : shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
5.7 Management of Interdependencies (Transfer Pricing)
Management of interdependencies means the central influence in 
the form of broad thrusts or specific suggestions exercised 
particularly where overlaps, links or relationships between 
business divisions need to be managed. Cross-supply and transfer 
pricing between the workshops, and exploitation of a shared 
resource are examples that happen in Beiren Printing Machinery 
Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) that need headquarters' intervention.
The production process for the BPMH's printing machines 
principally involves the following steps: the preparation of
moulds for parts and components and other ancillary materials, 
processing and assembly. The initial stage involves the 
preparation of moulds for parts and components and other 
ancillary materials by way of casting, forging and other 
processing for subsequent stages.
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The moulds for parts and' components and other ancilliary 
materials are then processed using processing machinery, pressure 
treatment, heat treatment and electroplating or other processes 
to manufacture parts and components that match specific 
requirements as to structure, length, precision and strength and 
other requirements. Principal parts and components include the 
main printing unit frame, gears and printing cylinders.
The assembly stage involves the assembly of the various processed 
parts and components as well as certain mechanical fittings and 
standard fittings sourced from supplies into finished products, 
which are packed and delivered for sale after alignment and 
testing.
The above production process can be summarized as follow :
(1) Mixing of Materials > (2) F o r g i n g  > (3) C a s t i n g ----- >
 <-- (5) Component & Machinery Processing<  (4) Surface <-----
Processing
 >(6) T e s t i n g  > (7) S p r a y i n g  > (8) Assembly o f ------- >
Components
 <-- (10) Alignment & Testing <---  (9) Final Assembly <---------
 >(11) External Spraying -- >(12) Packaging --- >(13) Shippment
Beiren Group Corporation and BPMH continue to facilitate each 
other in the purchase of raw materials required by BPMH and BGC. 
Pruchases can be made by BGC or BPMH and the materials can be 
sold to the other party at the original purchase price. BPMH 
also sells to BGC processed parts at a price equal to 115% of its 
production cost. Referring to the organisational structure as 
shown in section 2 above, the Gearing and Foundry Workshops are 
providing processed parts to the other three production 
departments at standard cost plus 15% internal profit margin.
Under the terms of an agreement with BPMH, BGC acts as the sole 
sales agent for the BPMH's products in the PRC in addition to 
being responsible for implementing the BPMH's marketing 
programmes, and providing after-sales services to BPMH's 
customers, in the PRC. Accordingly, BPMH can access to BGC's 
distribution and servicing network, including sales and marketing 
and servicing staff in the PRC. Under this agreement, BPMH's 
products can be sold through BGC's distribution network in the 
PRC and the various technical services including installation and 
maintenance provided to BPMH's customers are undertaken by BGC. 
BPMH pays to BGC a monthly sales agency fee at the rate of 3% of 
the total turnover in the PRC in the relevant month. BPMH is 
also be responsible for all expenses relating to marketing and 
the after-sales services provided by BGC.
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Under the terms of an agreement with BPMH, Beijing Yan Long 
Import & Export Company, a Subsidiary of BGC, acts as the sole 
export sales agent for BPMH's products to be sold to overseas 
customers. Beijing Yan Long Import & Export Company is also
responsible for implementing BPMH's marketing programmes for 
overseas markets and for providing after-sales services, 
including installation and maintenance services, to BPMH's 
overseas customers. BPMH pays to Beijing Yan Long Import & 
Export Company a sales agency fee at the rate of 3% of total 
export sales in the relevant financial year. BPMH is responsible 
for all expenses relating to marketing and after-sales services 
provided by BGC.
Under the terms of an agreement with BGC, BPMH can access BGC's 
research facilities when undertaking research and development 
work on new products. Pursuant to the research agreement, BPMH 
pays an annual fee of RMB450,000 to BGC for use of its research 
facilities.
BGC has registered the "Beiren" trademark in the PRC. BPMH has 
entered into a trademark licensing agreement with BGC whereby 
BPMH has the exclusive right to use the "Beiren" trademark for 
its products for sale in the PRC and overseas. Under the 
licensing agreement, BPMH pays a licensing fee, on a quarterly 
basis, of RMB15,000 or at the rate of one percent of the sales 
proceeds of products using the "Beiren" trademark during the 
relevant period, whichever is the higher, to BGC.
Under the terms of an agreement with BPMH, BGC will be 
responsible for the provision of benefits relating to housing for 
BPMH's staff including those currently in employmnet and those 
who have retired. In consideration of such provision, BPMH pays 
to BGC a total fee, payable semi-annually, equal to 6% of BPMH's 
profit after tax.
Under the terms of an agreement with BGC, BPMH has agreed to pay 
BGC a sum equal to BPMH's contribution in respect of the state 
retirement fund organised by the State. BGC will aggregate such 
sum with its own contribution for its staff and submit the 
aggregation sum to the state retirement fund.
Observation of Planning Influence : Shift from "High-Medium
Corporate" to "Medium-Low Corporate" since 1992.
642
S e c t i o n  6 : C o n t r o l  S y s te m
c
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
As far as the organisation structure is concerned, Beiren 
Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) has four distinct levels 
of management hierarchy :
(1) Board of Directors (including chief executives of BPMH)
(2) Top Management (general, deputy-general managers, chief
accountant, chief engineer and chief 
economist)
(3) Middle Management (factory managers and department heads)
(4) Lower Management (foremen and supervisors)
The deputy-general managers, factory managers and the three 
chiefs can decide on their own divisional structures, staffing 
and their roles and functions, and interactions between their 
sub-units (workshops or sections). They are also responsible for 
certain personnel functions such as recruitment, assignment, 
training, evaluation and remuneration (distribution of bonus). 
But termination of employment with any staff is a difficult task 
which will be explained in the rewards and incentives section.
(Please refer to Q6.1.1-3 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Since BPMH is a listing enterprise with higher management 
autonomy delegated by the government authorities and is 
responsible to more stakeholders, including the shareholders as 
the general public, the board of directors and top management are 
compelled to focus on more strategic plans and tactical moves in 
order to maintain a balance of the different requirements. 
Therefore, the decentralistion and control in the context of 
organisation structure are more dynamic and flexible compared 
with the other wholly state-owned enterprise. However, financial 
objectives are still important factors in the control mechanisms 
used in the decentralized operation of BPMH.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.2 Agreeing Objectives
Beiren Printing Mechinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) sets similar 
objectives for its production factories : factory managers must 
meet their agreed IRC targets for the year and expect improvement 
in performance year after year except under adverse market 
conditions and other uncontrollable factors.
643
The critical occasion, therefore, is the annual budget review. 
In view of the keen competition within this industry, the 
production factories sometimes feel passive in setting their 
objectives or targets in the budgets or IRCs because their 
activities are depending on the sales demand. A high pressure to 
achieve the budgeted production and internal profit is put on the 
factory managers at the quarterly or monthly review. They fully 
understand that their gross wages and group bonuses are tied in 
with the budget or IRC and they also depend on the overall 
performance of the enterprise as a whole. In terms of expenses, 
control is tighter and a system of standard cost has been 
implemented. Although the non-production departments do not have 
the IRCs, they have agreed specific objectives or targets with 
the general manager, for example, amounts of working capital 
employed, levels of expenses and management by objectives.
In addition to the formal quarterly or monthly review process, 
many ad hoc meetings (sometimes on a weekly basis) and informal 
communications are made between the top and middle management.
(Please refer to Q6.2.1-2 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
6.3 Monitoring Results (Reporting & Performance Measurement)
Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) regards it as 
essential to catch variances from budget or IRC before they have 
gone too far. To this end the top management monitor results on 
a monthly and quarterly basis. All the factories, workshops and 
departments submit monthly results on standard forms to their 
respective deputy-general managers and also to the chief 
accountant for vetting and comparison with budgets and IRCs. The 
production factories are also required to submit production 
progress reports to the top management on a weekly basis.
Any significant variances (without specifying tolerance limits) 
will be highlighted in order to bring the attention to the top 
management. Then all the monthly reports are submitted to the 
general manager for review. For any serious adverse variances 
shown on any report, the general manager will contact with the 
respective deputy managers, factory managers or department heads 
to dig out the underlying reasons or ask them to perform 
investigation immediately. It is expected that corrective 
actions can be taken to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
The following is the format of the Quarterly Performance Report 
of individual factories or workshops compared with the IRC 
targets :
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Factory/Workshop 1 2 3 ... Total
(1) Sales Income ■
(2) Cost of Sales
(3) Sales Tax
(4) Interest Expenses
(5) Selling Expenses
(6) Interest on Cost of Capital
(7) Other Non-Operating Income (Net)
(8) Net Profit (8=l-2-3-4-5-6+7)
(9) Internal Transfer Sales Income
(10) Internal Transfer Cost of Sales
(11) Total Net Profit (11=8+9-10)
(12) IRC Total Net Profit Target
(13) Profit Variance (11-12)
The following is the format of the Monthly Performance Report of
individual factories or workshops compared with the IRC targets :
Factory/Workshop :
Date of Report* :
(1) Economic Targets
This Month This Month YTD YTD
Actual Target Actual Target
1.1 Sales Income
1.2 Cost of Sales
1.3 Sales Tax
1.4 Pension Fund
1.5 Interest on Cost of Capital
1.6 Net Profit (1.6=1.1-1.2-1.3-1.4-1.5)
(2) Working Capital.Targets
2.1 Total Average Working Capital
2.2 Fixed Average Working Capital
2.3 Fixed Working Capital Turnover
(3) Other Expense Targets
This Month 
Actual
3.1 Tools
3.2 Consumables
3.3 Sub-Contract Work
3.4 Electricity 
3 . 5 Gas
3 . 6 Heat
3.7 Water
3.8 Repair & Maintenance
This monthly report is usually handed into the Enterprise 
Management Office on 4th the next month.
This Month 
Actual
This Month 
Target
(days)
This Month 
Target
YTD YTD 
Actual Target
645
BPMH's senior management ?hold monthly meetings to discuss 
production planning, scheduling and management, marketing and 
sales, economic performance and personnel affairs. During the 
economic performance meeting, the general manager will put 
forward the monthly results for open discussion. The factory 
managers and the department heads may be asked to explain briefly 
the significant variances. Consistent failure (say over 12 
months) in meeting the targets which are controllable by a 
factory manager, probably he will be replaced by somebody else. 
On the other hand, the favourable results will be openly praised 
by the top management.
After the monthly meeting, all the approved results will be 
passed back to the personnel and manpower department for 
calculating the gross wages and group bonus of each factory, 
workshop or department for last month. Then the accounting 
department will process the payments at the end of the month 
(i.e. payment of monthly bonus is lagged by one month).
Now, BPMH views a budget or IRC as a contract between the top 
management and the department or workshop. The monitoring process 
is used to maintain the pressure for performance. Top 
management1s close surveillance of results enables them to ensure 
that no department goes too far astray before remedial action is 
taken. It also gives top management an understanding of the 
reasons for variances from budget.
(Please refer to Q6.3.1-3 & Q6.4.1-14 on the questionnaire
extracts in Appendix 1.)
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Strategic Control" since 1992.
6.4 Rewards and Incentives
It is the general policy imposed by the central government that 
the annual gross wages (including bonus) growth rate of all the 
state-owned enterprises cannot exceed either one of the following 
limits :
(1) "Income Before Tax" annual growth rate; and
(2) "Productivity Per Employee" annual growth rate.
Within these two ceilings, the BPMH is allowed to increase the 
wages and bonus payable to its employees. This rule is trying to 
motivate all the employees to enhance the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability in order to increase their 
remuneration.
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The average annual gross wages per employee was around RMB8,000 
in 1993, and due to high inflation rate of 21%, this average 
figure was increased to RMB9,500 in 1994. It was expected that 
the annual gross wages per employee would be further increased to 
RMB11,00 0 in 1995.
The take-home pay of each employee in BPMH is mainly composed of 
basic wages, bonus and allowances.
The basic wages are divided into 21 grades which entry point or 
promotion depends of post, skills, seniority and experience. 
There are two portions for the "allowance". The first part is 
determined by the Manpower and Wages Bureau of the Beijing 
Government at least once in each year mainly for the purpose of 
combating inflation in food, transportation, gas and electricity.
The second part is decided by the BPMH which may include housing, 
meals, travel, education, attendance, overtime, hair-washing, 
festival gifts etc. The payment of monthly "allowance" is about 
RMB120 to RMB150 whose purpose is trying to balance the 
relatively low basic wages and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living for the employees.
The calculation of "bonus" for the employees in the factories or 
workshops, as described in the above sections, is based on the 
accomplishment of the IRC. An IRC signed between the general 
manager and a factory manager decides what level of group bonus 
will be given to the department. Of course, it is up to the 
factory manager to award that lump sum of group bonus to his or 
her subordinates according to individual performance.
The bonus is distributed in cash to all employees on a monthly 
basis but a certain percentage (10% - 20%) will be retained in a 
reserve in order to make up the low bonus obtained during the 
months with poor performance.
How is the bonus determined for the management and administrative 
staff in the other departments? It can be described in the 
following steps :
(1) Calculation of management score
(a) Performance according to targets set
(b) Discipline according to rules and regulations
(c) Management methods and styles
(d) Security and safety
(2) Calculation of average bonus
Management score % (1) x Monthly average production bonus
(3) Calculation of individual bonus
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A v e r a g e  m o n t h ly  bonus  (2) x  I n d i v i d u a l  i n d e x *
* Different indexes for different grades of staff, i.e. 
Factory Manager = 2.0
Deputy-Factory Manager = 1.8 
Department Head = 1.6
Deputy Department Head = 1.5 
Supervisor = 1.4
If the annual profit before tax can achieve better than the 
planned levels, a "year-end bonus" will be awarded to all the 
employees and distributed in a way very similar to the monthly 
bonus.
Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the "Decision on the 
Reformation of Pension Scheme of Retired Employees of the 
Enterprises" of the State Council, BPMH contributes 19% of the 
total payroll of its employees as basic employee's pension 
expense. The total expenses of this basic employees' pension in 
1994 amounted to RMB8,706 , 000.
The government will ultimately responsible for the future pension 
payments to the BPMH's employees. The government is now 
considering to ask for an additional 16% - 18% on total payroll 
from the state-owned enterprises as contribution to cover the 
medical, unemployment and disable allowances for the employees.
One of the 57 clauses in the "SOE Mechanism Transformation 
Regulations" enacted in 1992 is to assign the power and freedom 
to the top management to implement the "Employment Contract 
System" to replace the long-established "Life-Long Employment" or 
"Iron Rice Bowl" practices. The spirit behind this new system is 
to initiate the self-motivation (in a positive way) of or to 
impose threat of termination (in a negative way) on the SOE's 
employees. At the end of June 1995, the total number of 
employees in all the state-owned enterprises was 143 millions, 
accounting for 86% of the industrial and commercial workforce in 
China. Therefore, it takes a long time to change the working 
attitudes of this huge amount of employed population.
However, to lay off a certain percentage of redundant employees 
may cause many social problems in light of the current 
insufficient employment social welfare and benefits existed in 
China. Therefore, the changing to employment contract system may 
not create a threat to the employees nor motivate their own 
initiatives.
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Instead of fully implementing this contract employment system, 
BPMH has signed "In-Post Contracts" with most of the employees 
for periods from one to five years. This contract signifies that 
an employee is qualified for that specific post and he or she is 
eligible to receive basic wages (according to class in 
pay-scale), allowance and bonus. Without such a contract, that 
employee is out of job but he or she is still an employee of BPMH 
and is allowed to received a basic monthly subsidy of about 
RMB200. This measure may not impose a serious threat to the lazy 
employees, but it can motivate the marginal employees to work 
better.
Another means to absorb the redundant employees is to transfer 
them to a few "tertiary enterprises" (service enterprises), such 
as restaurant, transportation, repair and maintenance, canteen 
and nursary, which are self-financed independent profit centres. 
This is the solution adopted by Beiren Group Company (BGC) since 
the early 1990s including the establishment of a small hotel in 
1994 .
(Please refer to Q6.5.1-23 on the questionnaire extracts in 
Appendix 1.)
In summary, BPMH believes in the "stick" as a motivation tool. 
Its incentive system - the financial carrot (bonus) - may be used 
to replace managers, to apply pressure through the monitoring 
process, and more effectively, to recognize and acclaim good 
performance.
Observation of Control Influence : shift from "Financial Control" 
to "Moderate Financial Control" since 1992.
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S e c t i o n  7 : Summary
The above planning and control influences are summarised in the 
following table in order to assess what are the responsibility 
accounting styles that Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. 
(BPMH) belonged to before and after 1992.
Influences Before 1992 After 1992
Planning Influences :
Organisation Structure* High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Review Process* High/Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Strategic Themes, Thrusts 
and Suggestions*
High
Corporate
Medium
Corporate
Long-term Plans* 
(Resource Allocation)
High
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Short-Term Plan/Budgeting* 
(Resource Allocations)
Medium
Corporate
Low
Corporate
Internal Responsibility 
Contract
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Management of Interdepen­
dencies*
(Transfer Pricing)
High/Medium
Corporate
Medium/Low
Corporate
Control Influences :
Organization Control* Financial Moderate
Strategic
Agreeing Objectives* Financial Moderate
Financial
Monitoring Results* Financial Moderate
Strategic
Rewards & Incentives* Financial Moderate
Financial
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* Parameters of planning and control influences used by Goold & 
Campbell. ■
Based on the above summarized planning and control influences, 
the following mapping on the "Responsibility Accounting Style" 
can be identified.
Planning Influence Control Influence
Tight Strategic Tight Financial
High Corporate (Strategic
Programming)
(Financial
Programming)
[Pre-1992]
ivieaiuiu Luipuiate-----  ~
Low Corporate
[PO£
(Strategic
Control)
\/
3t-1992]
(Financial
Control)
Section 8 : Conclusion
After the above detail analysis of the planning and control 
influences on the responsibility accounting adopted by the Beiren 
Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. (BPMH) before and after 1992, it 
can be concluded that the "Responsibility Accounting Style" has 
been shifting gradually from "Financial Programming" (Pre-1992) 
to "Strategic Control" (Post-1992) although it has not yet 
reached a strong-form (low corporate) of strategic control style 
as described by Goold's and Campbell's Strategic Style. It seems 
to be in the "middle of the road" between this two styles.
Revised : 24 March 1996
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWS THE MANAGEMENT IN SOES
Name of Enterprise : _____________________________
Address : ________________________________________
Tel.
Staff Interviewed : c
(1) Name :
Position :
No. of years - in enterprise :
- in this position :
(2) Name :
Position :
No. of years - in enterprise :
- in this position :
(3) Name :
Position :
No. of years - in enterprise : 
- in this position s 
Date : Remarks :
Section 1 : History and Background
1.1 When was this enterprise formed or established?
1.2 Which manufacturing or service industry does the enterprise 
belong to?
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1.3 What were/are the major product (service) lines manufactured 
(provided) before and after 1992?
1.4 What were/are the major markets (local and overseas) for 
selling (rendering) the products (service) before or after 
1992?
1.5 What will be the future product/market development in the 
next five years?
Section 2 : Legal Form and Organisation Structure
2.1 What was/is/will be the enterprise legal form in the past, 
present and future? (please tick)
Wholly SOE Shareholding SOE Other
Before 1992 
In 1992
After 1992
2.2 If the legal form was/is/will be a shareholding SOE, what 
percentages of share were/are/will be held by the respective 
parties?
Before 1992 In 1992 After 1992
Government % % %
Other SOEs % % %
Management % % %
Employees % % %
Individuals
(Outsiders)
% % %
Others : please specify
% % %
100% 100% 100%
Is it possible 
organisational
to have a copy 
chart(s)?
(copies) of the enterprise
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2.4 What is the position of this enterprise in the whole
organization? (please tick)
(a) ____ the holding enterprise
(b) ____ a subsidiary enterprise
(c) ____ an individual enterprise (neither holding nor
subsidiary
(d) Other (please explain) : _______________________________
2.5 Do you have the following posts in the top management elite? 
(If there are any, please indicate the numbers of people)
_______  Board of Directors (BOD)
Executive Directors in BOD
/___ Chairman/Vice Chairman(s) in BOD
  Chief Executive Officer/Enterprise General Manager
  Deputy CEO(s)/Deputy Enterprise General Manager
Chief Accountant
Chief Economist
_______  Chief Engineering
_______  Other (please specify)
2.6 Who has ultimate responsibility for determination of the 
enterprise’s long-term plans or corporate mission before and 
after 1992?
2.7 In practice, are other management levels involved in the 
setting of enterprise long-term plans or corporate mission? 
If yes, please specify.
2.8 Can you briefly mention each of your subsidiary enterprises 
in terms of : (this question is for holding enterprises)
(a) name and year of establishment;
(b) manufacturing or service industry;
(c) major product or service lines;
(d) major markets (local and foreign);
(e) wholly state-owned or shareholding;
(f) total number of employees; and
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(g) total turnover (sales) in last year?
(h) total income before tax in last year? and
(i) total income after tax in last year?
2.9 Can you briefly mention each of your major divisions or 
departments in terms of :
(a) number of employees (including workers)?
(b) management structure (middle or lower management)?
(c) major functions? and
(d) interactions with other divisions or departements?
2.10 What is the total number of employees in your enterprise 
overall at present?
2.11 What is the total number of employees in your part of the 
enterprise?
(3) Financial Indicators (this part of the enterprise)
3.1 What was the total assets in this enterprise last year?
3.2 What was the total turnover (sales) in last year?
3.3 What was the split of domestic and export turnover (sales)
in last year?
3.4 Do you have inter-transfer or internal sales to the holding
or other subsidiary enterprises? If yes, what was/were the 
proportion(s) to total turnover (sales) in last year? (This 
question applies to group enterprise.)
3.5 What was the net income before tax in last year?
3.6 What was the net income after tax in last year?
3.7 Can estimates or forecasts on any of the the above figures
(3.1 - 3.6) for this year be made now? If yes, please
provide the details.
3.8 Are there any long-term (say within 5 years) plans for the
above key financial indicators (3.1 - 3.6) at this moment?
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cSection 4 : Economic Responsibility Contract System (ERCS)
4.1 Has your enterprise ever signed a "Economic Responsibility 
Contract" (ERC) with the government (central or local)? If 
yes, when?
4.2 What were the basic amounts of "gross turnover (sales)" and
"income after tax" agreed upon when signing such an ERC in 
the first year?
4.3 On what "bases" were the two figures arrived at in the above
question (4.2)?
4.4 How have the "growth factors" on the above two contracted 
financial targets been determined year by year since after 
the first year?
4.5 Do you think the "bases" (4.3) and "growth factors" (4.4) 
described above have been fairly and realistically set? 
Why?
4.6 What other important targets, other than the above mentioned 
two financial targets, have been set in the ERC?
4.7 Did you participate in determining the two financial targets 
(4.2) and other targets (4.6)?
4.8 Did you participate in determining the level at which the 
performance measures (i.e. "bases", "growth factors", etc.) 
are set?
4.9 What have been the actual performances achieved by your 
enterprises compared against the above pre-determined 
financial and non-finanicaal targets since the first year 
signing up the ERC?
4.10 If the actual performances have not been satisfactory in the 
past years, what were the major reasons, other than the 
possibilities raised in 4.5 above, for the real situations?
4.11 Has your enterprise withdrawn from the ERCS already? If 
yes, why?
4.12 Are you anticipating to withdraw from the ERCS in the near 
future? If yes, why?
4.13 What is or will be the alternative system to enhance the 
productivity and efficiency in your enterprise instead of 
using the ERCS?
656
Section 5 : Planning System
5.1 Organisation Structure
5.1.1 How many in each type of the following responsibility 
centres (RCs) have been set up in your enterprises?
______ Investment Centres
______ Profit Centres
______ Cost Centres
______ Expense Centres
______ Others, please specify : _______________________
5.1.2 What are the major criteria (e.g. products, markets,
geographic, clients, etc. ) in setting the
Investment Centres;
Profit Centres;
Cost Centres;
Expense Centres; and 
Other Centres?
5.1.3 Are there any major problems encountered in setting the 
above RCs?
5.1.4 What are major relationships and interdependencies
among the RCs? Are any of them involved in the 
internal transfer of goods or services? Are central 
services provided for all the RCs?
5.1.5 Will there be any changes in setting and defining the
RCs in the next two years?
5.2 Strategic Themes
5.2.1 How is/was the abolishment of the "three iron bowls" 
(i.e. iron employment, iron position and iron wages) 
implemented?
5.2.2 What are the difficulties encountered in abolishing the 
"three iron bowls"? How can these difficulties be 
solved?
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5.2.3 What are the results (i.e. employees' motivation and 
incentives) in abolishing the "three iron bowls so far?
5.2.4 Are there any other strategic themes (e.g. quality 
control) or distinctive competences (e.g. industrial 
safety) explicitly stated by the top management?
5.2.5 Are these strategic themes or distinctive competences 
helpful in planning and actual implementation?
5.2.6 When and under what circumstances will these themes and 
competences be changed? Do you participate in the 
change process?
5.2.7 How are these themes and competences communicated to 
every level of management and employees within the 
enterprise?
5.3 Broad Strategic Thrusts
5.3.1 Are there any strategic thrusts or guidelines (e.g. 
productivity, profitability, assets turnover, product 
or market diversification etc.) laid down by the top 
management?
5.3.2 How do these strategic thrusts or guidelines affect the 
strategic planning and setting targets or budgets in 
different levels of management?
5.3.3 When and under what circumstances will these strategic 
thrusts or guidelines be changed?
5.3.4 How are these strategic thrusts or guidelines 
communicated to every level of management within the 
enterprise?
5.4 Long-Term Plans (Management's Participation, Review and 
Modification)
5.4.1 Do the top management set long-term (within 5 years) 
strategic plans? If yes, how long is the time-frame?
5.4.2 What are major context of the strategic plans? (please 
tick and describe briefly)
_____ Product development :
diversification
658
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
Market development :
diversification
  penetration
Organisation Structure :
  merger and takeover
  shareholding
  joint-venture
divestment
  others, please specify -
_____ Others, please specify :
5.4.3 Is there any formal planning committee or equivalent 
existed? If yes, how is it operating in terms of 
membership composition, strategic plans formulation, 
evaluation and determination?
5.4.4 How far the different levels of management participate 
in formulating the above strategic plans? (please rank 
from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate proposals/plans and
discuss in planning committee
4 = make final decision)
Levels of Management : Top (a) Middle (b) Lower (c)
Product Development :
Diversification
Differentiation
Market Development :
Diversification
Penetration
Organisation Structure :
Merger & takeover
Shareholding
Joint-venture
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Divestment
Others (please specify) 
Others (please specify) :
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General 
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief 
Economist and Chief Engineering (assume the final 
decisions are made either by the government or the 
board of directors if ranking is not 4).
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.4.5 Is formulating strategic plans a way for the top
management to allocate the resources to different 
business units according to (please tick) :
  long term business plan;
  project-by-project approach;
  relative importance of units;
_____ power of unit managers;
_____ other external factors;
  earning or profitability potentials; or
  other (please specify)?
5.4.6 How far can the participation in formulating the
strategic plans enhance the communication between 
different levels of management?
5.4.7 How frequent are the strategic plans reviewed either
formally by the planning committee or infromally by the 
top management?
  yearly
  half-yearly
  quarterly
  monthly
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Other (please specify) :  __________________
5.4.8 What are the major factors for justifying the 
modification of those strategic plans? (please tick) :
  central government plan
  local government plan
  long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
  management's knowledge and experience
  management's personal belief or bias
  other (please specify)?
5.4.9 How are the determined strategic plans be communicated 
to the various levels of management?
  meetings
_____ written report
  notice board
Others (please specify) : _______________
5.5 Short-Term Plan (Management's Participation, Review and 
Modification)
5.5.1 What is the extent of autonomy can the *top management
exercise in each of the following short-term (within 
one year) plans? (please rank from 0-4, i.e.
0 = no autonomy at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = make suggestions and discuss
3 = initiate plans and negotiate
4 = have full autonomy subject to
macro-economical adjustments)
*Top management is defined as the Enterprise General 
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief 
Economist and Chief Engineering.
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R ank in g  0 1 2  3 4 R e a so n
Short-term Plan :
Sales -
Price
Volume
Mix
Production - 
Capacity 
Quantity 
Mix
Material - 
Price 
Quantity 
Mix
Labour -
Rates
Bonus
Number
In-take
Lay-off
Inventory - 
Level 
Valuation 
EOQ
Ordering time
Servicing Depts. - 
Headcount 
In-take 
Lay-off 
Salaries 
Expenses
Income Before Tax
Others (please specify) -
5.5.2 How the above short-term plans are developed? Is there
any formal planning committee or equivalent existed? 
If yes, how it is operating in terms of membership 
composition, short-term plans formulation, evaluation 
and determination?
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5.5.3 How far the middle and lower management participate in
determining the above (5.5.1) short-term plans? (please 
rank from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consultation for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate proposals/plans and
discuss in planning committee
4 = make final decision)
Name of Department : ________________________________
Levels of Management : Middle (a) Lower (b)
Short-term Plan :
Sales -
Price
Volume
Mix
Production - 
Capacity 
Quantity 
Mix
Material - 
Price 
Quantity 
Mix
Labour -
Rates
Bonus
Number
In-take
Lay-off
Inventory - 
Level 
Valuation 
EOQ
Ordering time
Servicing Depts. - 
Headcount 
In-take 
Lay-off 
Salaries 
Expenses
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L e v e l s  o f  Management : M i d d l e  (a) Lower (b)
Income Before Tax 
Transfer Pricing 
Others (please specify) -
(a) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(b) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.5.4 Is formulating short-term plans a way for the top 
management to allocate the resources to different 
business units according to (please tick) :
_____ long term business plan;
_____ project-by-project approach?
_____ relative importance of units;
  power of unit managers?
_____ other external factors?
_____ earning or profitability potentials? or
_____ other (please specify)?
5.5.5 How far can the participation in formulating the
short-term plans enhance the communication between 
different levels of management?
5.5.6 How frequent are the short-plans reviewed either
formally by the planning committee or infromally by the
top and middle management?
5.5.7 What are the major factors for justifying the
modification of these short-term plans? (please tick) :
_____ central government plan
_____ local government plan
  long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
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  m an agem en t1s k n o w l e d g e  and e x p e r i e n c e
_____ management's personal belief or bias
  other (please specify)?
5.5.8 How the determined short-term plans be communicated to
the various levels of management?
5.6 Setting Targets Through Internal Responsibility Contracts
[IRC] (Management's Participation, Review and Modification)
5.6.1 When was the IRC system started to be employed in this 
enterprise?
5.6.2 How are the IRCs correlated to the Economic 
Responsibility Contract signed with the government?
5.6.3 What is the duration of each IRC?
5.6.4 Which responsibility centres in this enterprise have 
signed the IRCs with the top management?
5.6.5 Can you provide me with a few samples of the IRCs 
(before and after 1992) for reference?
5.6.6 What are the major "targets" (both financial and 
non-financial) set in these few IRCs? (take a few 
responsibility centres, i.e. production, purchasing, 
sales etc., as examples)
5.6.7 What are the formal procedures (i.e. planning committee 
or equivalent) in setting these targets?
5.6.8 How far the middle and lower management participate in 
setting the various targets in their IRCs? (please rank 
from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consultation for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate targets and negotiate
in planning committee
4 = make final decision)
Name of Department : _________________________________ __
L e v e l s  o f  Management : M i d d l e  (a) Lower (b)
T a r g e t s  :
(1) _______________________
(2) ____________________
(3) _______________________
( 4 )  ______________________________
(5) _____________________
(a) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(b) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.6.9 Are the above targets related (or responsibility 
delegated) to the levels of management within the 
responsibility centre (or department)? How? (please 
tick and explain)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
★Section *Sub-section Individual
Targets :
(1) _________________
(2) _______________
(3) _________________
( 4 )  ______________________
(5) ________________
* Please define these levels of management.
5.6.10 Is formulating targets in the IRCs a way for the top 
management to allocate the resources to different 
business units according to (please tick) :
_____ long term business plan;
_____ project-by-project approach;
_____ relative importance of units;
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power o f  u n i t  m a n a g e r s ;
5.6.11
5.6.12
5.6.13
5.6.14
5.6.15
5.6.16
  other external factors;
  earning or profitability potentials; or
  other (please specify)?
How far can the participation in formulating the 
targets in the IRCs enhance the communication between 
different levels of management?
How frequently are the targets in the IRCs reviewed 
either formally by the planning committee or informally 
by the top and middle management?
What are the major factors for justifying the 
modification of these targets? (please tick) :
_____ central government plan
_____ local government plan
  long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
_____ management's knowledge and experience
_____ management's personal belief or bias
_____ other (please specify)?
Are these targets modified in a way similar to the 
"flexible budget" concept (i.e. according to actual or 
current performance/condition)?
How the determined or agreed targets be communicated 
to the various levels of management?
What have been the results (i.e. turnover, 
profitability, labour productivity or effieiency, etc.) 
since the employment of the IRC system? How were they 
compared with the performance before using this system?
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5.7 Setting Targets Through Budgets (Management's Participation, 
Review and Modification)
5.7.1 When was the budgeting system started to be employed in 
this enterprise?
5.7.2 Can you outline the budgeting structure or hierarchy 
and indicate which responsibility centres (RCs) are 
involved?
5.7.3 What is the duration of each budget? What is the 
time-schedule of the budgeting cycle?
5.7.4 Can you provide me a few samples of proforma budgets 
for reference?
5.7.5 What are the formal procedures (i.e. budget committee 
or equivalent) in setting these budgets?
5.7.6 How far the middle and lower management participate in 
setting the various budgets in their RCs? (please rank 
from 0 - 4, i.e. 0 = no participation at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate budgets and negotiate
in planning committee
4 = make final decisions)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
L e v e l s  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  :  M i d d l e  ( a )  L o w e r  ( b )
b u d g e t e d  i t e m s  :
(1)  
(2)  
(3) ______________________
(4) ______________________
(5) ______________________
( a )  M i d d l e  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  d i v i s i o n a l  o r  
d e p a r t m e n t a l  m a n a g e r s .
( b )  L o w e r  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  d e p a r t m e n t a l  o r  
s e c t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s o r s  o r  f o r e m e n .
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5.7.7 Are the above budgets related (or responsibility
delegated) to the levels of management within the 
responsibility centre (or department)? How? (please 
tick and explain)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
*Section *Sub-section Individual
budgeted items :
(1)  
(2)  
( 3 )  ____________________
( 4)  ___________________
(5) __________________
* Please define these levels of management.
5.7.8 Is formulating the budgets a way for the top management 
to allocate resources to different business units 
according to (please tick) :
_____ long-term business plan?
_____ project-by-project approach?
_____ relative importance of units?
  power of unit managers?
_____ other external factors?
_____ earning or profitability potentials? or
_____ others (please specify)?
5.7.9 How far the process of budgettng can enhance the 
communication in the various levels of management?
5.7.10 How frequent the budgets in the RCs are reviewed either 
formally by the planning committee or informally by the 
top and middle management?
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5.7.11 What are the m&jor factors for justifying the
modification of these budgets? (please tick) :
  central government plan
  local government plan
  long-term enterprise's benefit
_____ short-term enterprise's benefit
  management's knowledge and experience
  management's personal belief and bias
  others (please specify)?
5.7.12 Are "flexible budgets" used? If yes, how?
5.7.13 How the determined or agreed budgets be communicated
to the various levels of management?
5.7.14 What have been the results since the employment of the
budgeting system? How were they compared with the 
performance before using this system?
5.8 Capital Budgeting (Management's Participation, Review and 
Modification)
5.8.1 When was the capital buegeting system started to be
employed in this enterprise?
5.8.2 How long is the coverage of the capital budgets?
5.8.3 What are the formal procedures (i.e. budget committee
or equivalent) in setting these capital budgets?
5.8.4 Can you provide me a few samples of capital budget
forms for reference?
670
5.8.5 How far the various levels of management participate in
setting the capital budgets in their RCs? (please rank 
from 0 - 4 ,  i.e. 0 = n o  participation at all
1 = consult for ideas only
2 = attend planning committee meeting
and give suggestions only
3 = initiate budgets and negotiate
in planning committee
4 = make final decisions)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle(b) Lower(c)
capital budgeted items :
(1) Land & Building
(2) Plant & Machinery
(3) Motor Vehicles
(4) Fixtures & Fittings
(5) Research & Development
(6) Advertising
(?) Others (please specify) :
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General 
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountant, Chief 
Economists and Chief Engineer. (Assume the final 
decisions are made by either the government or the 
board of directors if ranking is not 4).
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or
sectional supervisors or foremen.
5.8.6 What kinds of techniques (i.e. DCF, Pay-back, ROI, RI
etc.) have been used for evaluating the capital budgets 
at the planning stage?
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5.8.8
5.8.9
5.8.10
5.8.11
e
Is formulating the capital budgets a way for the top 
management to allocate resources according to (please 
tick) :
  long-term business plan;
_____ project-by-project approach?
  relative importance of units?
_____ power of unit managers;
_____ other external factors?
  earning or profitability potentials; or
_____ others (please specify)?
How frequent the capital budgets are reviewed either 
formally by the planning committee or informally by the 
top and middle management?
What are the major factors for justifying the 
modification of these capital budgets? (please tick) :
_____ central government plan
_____ local government plan
_____ long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
  management's knowledge and experience
  management's personal belief and bias
  others (please specify)?
How the capital budgets be communicated to the various 
levels of management?
What have been the results since the employment of the 
capital budgeting system? How were they compared with 
the performance before using this system?
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5.9 Transfer Pricing (Managements Participation, Review and 
Modification)
5.9.1 What kinds of transactions within your enterprise (or 
group of enterprises) involve the setting of transfer 
prices? (Please describe the divisions or departments 
involved, the nature of transfers and the purposes of 
setting transfer prices.)
5.9.2 On what bases are the transfer prices determined? Are 
negotiations allowed by the selling and buying 
divisions?
5.9.3 Are there any outside markets to sell the intermediate 
products instead of transfer internally? Are the 
market prices higher or lower than the internal 
transfer prices?
5.9.4 Are the intermediate products available from external 
suppliers instead of purchasing internally? Are the 
market prices for these external supplies higher or 
lower than the internal transfer prices?
5.9.5 On what bases are the transfer quantities determined? 
Are negotiations allowed by the selling and buying 
divisions?
5.9.6 Do the top management interfere with the setting of 
transfer prices and/or quantities? How?
5.9.7 Does the government determine or the economic 
responsibility contract stipulate the transfer prices 
and/or or quantities? How?
5.9.8 What is the extent of participation by the divisional 
managers in determining each transfer price in general? 
(Please rank from 0 - 4 ,  i.e.
0 = no participation at all
1 = consult of ideas only
2 = suggest and discuss
3 = propose and negotiate
4 = determine on their own)
TP No. Nature of Transfer Rank Remarks
1
2
3
4 etc.
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5.9.9 How frequent the transfer prices are reviewed either
formally in the meetings or informally by the
(1) top management;
(2) middle management;
(3) top & middle management; and
(4) other (please specify)?
5.9.10 What are the major factors for justifying the
modification of these transfer prices? (please tick) ;
  central government plan
_____ local government plan
_____ long-term enterprise's benefit
  short-term enterprise's benefit
  management's knowledge and experience
  management's personal belief and bias
_____ others (please specify)?
5.9.11 Is internal and external information available for
negotiating and determining the transfer prices? Why?
5.9.12 Is internal and external information sufficient for
negotiating and determining the transfer prices? Why?
SECTION 6 S CONTROL SYSTEM
6.1 Decentralisation and Control
6.1.1 In gneral, how far the decentralisation in the
following few managerial aspects is delegated to the 
different levels of management? (please rank from 0 - 4  
and describe briefly, i.e. 0 = no autonomy is given
1 = low autonomy
2 = moderate autonomy
3 = high autonomy
4 = full autonomy
Major Division ; ___________________________________
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(L e v e l s  o f  Management : T o p (a )  M id d le ( b )  L o w er (c )
Managerial Aspects :
Organisational design - 
Structure 
Staffing
Roles & functions 
Interactions
Employees/Workers - 
Recruitment 
Assignment 
Training 
Evaluation 
Remmuneration 
Termination
Operations -
Getting resources 
Using resources 
Disposing resources
Others (please sepcify) :
(a) General Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountant, 
Chief Economists and Chief Engineer. (Assume the final 
decisions are made by either the government or the 
board of directors if ranking is not 4).
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
6.1.2 What type(s) of control mechanism, both financial and
non-financial, is(are) used to ensure the effective 
performance of the following functions under certain 
degree of decentralisation?
(a) Personnel
(b) Production
(c) Purchasing and supplies
(d) Sales and distribution
(e) Finance and administration
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( f )  O th e r s  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y )
6.1.3 What kinds of communication channels or information
systems (both formal or informal) are employed to make 
the above managerial aspects (6.1.1) and the associated 
control mechanisms (6.1.2) known to the various levels 
of management?
6.2 Agreeing Targets
6.2.1 How the following factors affect the types and styles
of control mechanisms employed by the different levels 
of management? i.e. 0 = no influence
1 = little influence
2 = moderate influence
3 = high influence
Major Division : ___________________________________
Control mechanisms employed : __________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle(b) Lower(c)
Factors or Variables :
*Precision and detail of 
targets
*Balance between objective 
and subjective target 
measurement
*Timeframe for achieving 
the targets
*Degree of "stretch" built 
into the targets
*Emphasis on financial vs 
non-financial targets
*Management inluence on 
setting targets
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(a) Top management is, defined as the Enterprise General
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountant, Chief
Economist and Chief Engineer.
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or
sectional supervisors or foremen.
*
6.2.2 What kinds of communication channels or information
systems (both formal or informal) are employed to make 
the above control mechanisms (6.2.1) known to the 
various levels of management?
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6.3 Reporting Requirements
6.3.1 What are the requirements for the *control reports to
be submitted to the top management? Please answer
(with brief descriptions) the following checklist for
the control report(s) which reflect the responsibility 
in each major division or department. Please also 
provide a sample (perhaps a blank one) of each control 
report if possible.
* This question refers to the control reports submitted 
by the middle management (i.e. divisional or 
departmental managers) to the top management.
Division/Department : __________________________________
Control Report No. : __________
(1) What is the title of the report?
(2) What is the purpose of the report?
(3) What is the frequency of the report?
(4) Is this a financial or a non-financial or a
combined control report?
(5) What are the major contains of the report?
(6) Who prepare the report?
(7) Who check the report?
(8) Who sumit the report?
(9) Who receive the report?
(10) Who review the report?
(11) Who evaluate the report?
(12) Will feedback be given by (9)-(11)?
(13) Will discussion held between sender and (9)-(11)?
(14) What follow-up actions will be taken?
(15) Will the report affect performance evaluation and
remuneration or incentive? How?
(16) Can computer aid in compiling this report?
(17) Is this report relate to, link up or integrate 
with other reports?
(18) What changes will be made in this report (1)-(17) 
in the next 12 months? Why?
6.3.2 What are the requirements for the *control reports to
be submitted to the middle management? Please answer 
(with brief descriptions) the following checklist for 
the control report(s) which reflect the responsibility 
in each major division or department. Please also 
provide a sample (perhaps a blank one) of each control 
report if possible.
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*  T h i s  q u e s t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  r e p o r t s  s u b m i t t e d  
b y  t h e  l o w e r  m a n a g e m e n t  ( i . e .  d e p a r t m e n t a l  o r  s e c t i o n a l  
s u p e r v i s o r s  o r  f o r e m e n )  t o  t h e  m i d d l e  m a n a g e m e n t  ( i . e .  
d i v i s i o n a l  o r  d e p a r t m e n t a l  m a n a g e r s ) .
Department/Section : __________________________________
Control Report No. : __________
(1) What is the title of the report?
(2) What is the purpose of the report?
(3) What is the frequency of the report?
(4) Is this a financial or a non-financial or a
combined control report?
(5) What are the major contains of the report?
(6) Who prepare the report?
(7) Who check the report?
(8) Who sumit the report?
(9) Who receive the report?
(10) Who review the report?
(11) Who evaluate the report?
(12) Will feedback be given by (9)-(11)?
(13) Will discussion held between sender and (9)-(11)?
(14) What follow-up actions will be taken?
(15) Will the report affect performance evaluation and
remuneration or incentive? How?
(16) Can computer aid in compiling this report?
(17) Is this report relate to, link up or integrate 
with other reports?
(18) What changes will be made in this report (1)-(17) 
in the next 12 months? Why?
6.3.3 Is there (Will there be) any integrated (i.e. covered 
most of the key functions) "Accounting Information 
System (AIS)1 or "Management Information System (MIS)" 
for overall managerial control purposes? If yes, how 
far it has been (will be) computerized? If no, what 
are the constraints in designing and implementing such 
a system?
6 . 4  P e r f o r m a n c e  M e a s u r e m e n t  C r i t e r i a
6 . 4 . 1  W h a t  a r e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  ( o r  w e i g h t i n g s )  t h e  f o l l o w i n g
" f i n a n c i a l "  c r i t e r i a  o r  i n d i c a t o r s  h a v e  b e e n  u s e d  t o  
m e a s u r e  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  d i v i s i o n s  o r  
d e p a r t m e n t s ?  ( p l e a s e  g i v e  r e a s o n s  a n d  r a n k  f r o m  0 - 4 ,  
i . e .  0  =  d o  n o t  u s e  a t  a l l
1  =  l o w  w e i g h t i n g
2  =  m o d e r a t e  w e i g h t i n g
3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Ranking : 0 1 2  3 4 Reason
Residual income*
Return on investment 
Profit before tax 
Profit after tax 
Profit % sales 
Profit growth %
Profit per employee 
Sales growth %
Sales per employee 
Cash flow 
Added value#
Others : (please specify)
* Residual income = Income after tax - (notional interest 
rate x capital employed)
# Added value = Sales - Outside purchased materials and 
services costs
6.4.2 What are the importance (or weightings) the following
"financial" criteria or indicators have been used to 
measure the performance of different levels of 
management? (please give reasons and rank from 0-4, 
i.e. 0 = do not use at all
1 = low weighting
2 = moderate weighting
3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
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Name o f  D e p a r tm e n t  : ____________________________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle (b) Lower(c)
Residual Income
Return on Investment
Profit before tax
Profit after tax
Profit % sales
Profit growth %
Profit per employee 
Sales growth %
Sales per employee 
Others : (please specify)
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief
Economist and Chief Engineer.
(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
6.4.3 When the actual results of the above "financial”
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.4 How the actual results of the above "financial"
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.5 What happens when the actual results of the above 
"financial" criteria or indicators are received by the 
top or middle management?
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6.4 . 6  How frequent the above "financial" criteria or
indicators be reviewed by the top and middle 
management?
6.4.7 What are the factors affecting the mondification or
changes of the above "financial" criteria or 
indicators?
6.4.8 What are the importance (or weightings) the following
"non-financial" criteria or indicators have been used 
to measure the performance of different divisions or 
departments? (please give reasons and rank from 0-4, 
i.e. 0 = do not use at all
1 = low weighting
2 = moderate weighting
3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Ranking : 0 1 2 3 4 Reason
Production quality 
Production capacity 
Production volume 
Product development 
Product quality 
Product mix 
Material consumptions 
Inventory levels 
Labour efficiency 
Labour cost 
Labour turnover 
Expenses levels 
Safety records 
Birth control 
Others : (please specify)
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6.4.7 What are the importance (or weightings) the following
"non-financial1 criteria or indicators have been used 
to measure the performance of different levels of 
management? (please give reasons and rank from 0-4, 
i.e. 0 = do not use at all
1 = low weighting
2 = moderate weighting
3 = high weighting
4 = the only criterion)
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Levels of Management : Top(a) Middle (b) Lower(c)
Production quality 
Production capacity 
Production volume 
Product development 
Product quality 
Product mix 
Material consumptions 
Inventory levels 
Labour efficiency 
Labour cost 
Labour turnover 
Expenses levels 
Safety records 
Birth control 
Others : (please specify)
(a) Top management is defined as the Enterprise General 
Manager (EGM), Deputy EGMs, Chief Accountants, Chief 
Economist and Chief Engineer.
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(b) Middle management is defined as the divisional or 
departmental managers.
(c) Lower management is defined as the departmental or 
sectional supervisors or foremen.
6.4.8 When the actual results of the above "non-financial” 
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.9 How the actual results of the above "non-financial" 
criteria or indicators be communicated to the various 
levels of management and employees?
6.4.10 How frequent the above "non-financial" criteria or 
indicators be reviewed by the top and middle 
management?
6.4.11 What happens when the actual results of the above 
"non-financial" criteria or indicators are received by 
the top and middle management?
6.4.12 What are the factors affecting the mondification or 
changes of the above "non-financial" criteria or 
indicators?
6.5 Rewards and Incentives
6.5.1 What is (was) the average "basic wages" per worker in 
this (last) year?
6.5.2 What are the factors (i.e. performance, grade,
seniority, inflation, qualification, experience etc.) 
in determining the "basic wages" of the workers?
6.5.3 How frequent the "basic wages" is reviewed?
6.5.4 What are the factors (i.e. performance, grade,
seniority, inflation, qualification, experience etc.) 
in determining the "basic salaries" of the 
non-manufacturing staff?
6.5.5 How frequent the "basic salaries" is reviewed?
6.5.6 What are the types of "allowances" (i.e. housing,
meals, travel, child, attendance, overtime, inflation, 
stoppage etc.) paid to the workers and staff?
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6.5.7
6.5.8
6.5.9
6.5.10
6.5.11
6.5.12
6.5.13
What is (was) the average "total allowances" per worker 
in this (last) year?
How frequent these "allowances" are reviewed?
What are the weightings of the following measurement 
criteria used in the "incentive scheme" for workers in 
various divisions or departments? Are these criteria 
measured on "Group" (G) or "Individual" (I) basis?
Name of Department : ___________________________________
Measurement Criteria Weightings Basis (G)/(I)
( 1 )  P r o d u c t i o n  q u a l i t y
(2) P r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y
( 3 )  P r o d u c t i o n  v o l u m e
(4) P r o d u c t  d e v e l o p m e n t
( 5 )  P r o d u c t  q u a l i t y
( 6 )  P r o d u c t  m i x
(7)  M a t e r i a l  c o n s u m p t i o n s
( 8 )  I n v e n t o r y  l e v e l s
( 9 )  L a b o u r  e f f i c i e n c y
(10) L a b o u r  c o s t
(11) L a b o u r  t u r n o v e r
(12) E x p e n s e s  l e v e l s
(13) S a f e t y  r e c o r d s
(14) B i r t h  c o n t r o l
O t h e r s  : ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y )
(15) _________________
(16)  :________
100%
How the above measurement criteria (6.5.9) is assessed 
i.e. actuals vs actuals, actuals vs budgets or targets 
etc. ?
How frequent the bonus is calculated and distributed to 
workers in the various divisions or departments based 
on the criteria listed in 6.5.9 above?
Are there any ceilings for the bonus?
If the above incentive system is formal, how the 
criteria, weightings and bases (6.5.9), the calculation 
and distribution (6.5.10) of bonus be communicated to 
the workers? How frequent are these rules reviewed and 
under what circumstances will they be modified? Do the 
workers participate in designing and reviewing this 
incentive scheme?
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6.5.14
6.5.15
6.5.16
6.5.17
6.5.18
6.5.19
How and when the workers know the amounts of bonus that 
they can get? In what forms the bonus are paid to the 
workers?
Will there be any penalties if the workers can not 
achieve any of the measurement criteria stated in 6.5.9 
above?
When was this "incentive scheme" for workers adopted? 
How this scheme is improving the productivity, 
efficiency and profitability of the enterprise as a 
whole?
What are the weightings of the following measurement 
criiteria used in the "incentive scheme" for 
non-manufacturing staff in various divisions or 
departments? Are these criteria measured on "Group" 
(G) or "Individual" (I) basis?
Name of Department : __________________________________
Measurement Criteria Weightings Basis (G)/(I)
( 1 ) R e s i d u a l  I n c o m e
( 2 ) R e t u r n  o n  I n v e s t m e n t
( 3 ) P r o f i t  b e f o r e  t a x
( 4 ) P r o f i t  a f t e r  t a x
( 5 ) P r o f i t  % s a l e s
( 6 ) P r o f i t  g r o w t h  %
( 7 ) P r o f i t  p e r  e m p l o y e e
( 8 ) S a l e s  g r o w t h  %
( 9 ) S a l e s  p e r  e m p l o y e e
O t h e r s  : ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y )
( 1 0 )
( 1 1 )
100%
How the above measurement criteria is assessed i.e. 
actuals vs actuals, actuals vs budgets or targets etc.?
How frequent the bonus is calculated and distirbuted to 
non-manufacturing staff in the various divisions or 
departments based on the criteria listed in 6.5.17 
above? Are there any ceilings for the bonus?
6 8 6
6.5.2 0 If the above incentive system is formal, how the
criteria, weightings and bases (6.5.17), the 
calculation and distribution (6.5.19) of bonus be 
communicated to the non-manufacturing staff? How 
frequent are these rules reviewed and under what 
circumstances will they be modified? Do the staff 
participate in designing and reviewing this incentive 
scheme?
6.5.21 How and when the non-manufacturing staff know the
amounts of bonus that they can get? In what forms the 
bonus are paid to the staff?
6.5.22 Will there be any penalties if the non-manufacturing 
staff can not achieve any of the measurement criteria 
stated in 6.5.17 above?
6.5.2 3 When was this "incentive scheme" for non-manufacturing
staff adopted? How this scheme is improving the
productivity, efficiency and profitability of the
enterprise as a whole?
28 April 1993
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